Civil Procedure Case Digest Batch 2-1

1.REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, through its trustee, the ASSET PRIVATIZATION TRUST v. G
HOLDINGS, INC.
FACTS:On May 21, 1992, the Committee on Privatization approved the proposal of the Asset Privatization
Trust (APT) for the negotiated sale of 90% of the shares of stock of the government-owned Maricalum
Mining Corporation (MMC). The respondent "G" Holdings, Inc. signified its interest to purchase MMC and
submitted the best bid.
Series of negotiations between the petitioner and the respondent culminated in the execution of a purchase
and sale agreement on October 2, 1992. Under the agreement, the Republic undertook to sell and deliver
90% of the entire issued and outstanding shares of MMC, as well as its company notes, to "G" Holdings in
consideration of the purchase price of P673,161,280. It also provided for a down payment of P98,704,000
with the balance divided into four tranches payable in installment over a period of ten years.
However, a disagreement on the matter of when the installment payments should commence arose which
was unsettled. Hence, "G" Holdings filed a complaint for specific performance and damages with the
Regional Trial Court of Manila to compel it to close the sale in accordance with the purchase and sale
agreement.
RTC ruled in favor of respondent and ordered the petitioner to execute the Document of Transfer and cause
the actual delivery of the subject shares and notes to respondent within 30 days.
Solicitor General filed a notice of appeal with the the Court of Appeals (CA), not with the trial court which
rendered the judgment appealed from contrary to the rules of procedure. It claimed that the decision should
be annulled on the ground of abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial
court. It questioned the handling of the case assailing that the court a quo promulgated its decision prior to
the submission of the Republics formal offer of evidence and without ruling on the admissibility of the
evidence offered by "G" Holdings. The Republic also asserted that the failure of the Solicitor General to file
the notice of appeal with the proper forum amounted to extrinsic fraud which prevented it from appealing the
case.
The CA dismissed the petition finding no ground for the annulment of judgment as there was no extrinsic
fraud. The appellate court also held that the trial court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, as
well as over the person of the parties. Hence, whatever error the trial court committed in the exercise of its
jurisdiction was merely an error of judgment, not an error of jurisdiction. As an error of judgment, it was
correctable by appeal. Unfortunately, appeal could no longer be availed of by the Republic. Also, the CA
declared that there was no grave abuse of discretion as the evidence of both parties was already in the
possession of the court and painstakingly considered before the decision was arrived at.
ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in not holding that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction which resulted to the nullity of the RTCs decision?
DECISION:A petition for annulment of judgment is an extraordinary action. 9 By virtue of its exceptional
character, the action is restricted exclusively to the grounds specified in the rules, 10 namely, (1) extrinsic
fraud and (2) lack of jurisdiction.
Lack of jurisdiction as a ground for annulment of judgment refers to either lack of jurisdiction over the person
of the defending party or over the subject matter of the claim. 14 Where the court has jurisdiction over the
defendant and over the subject matter of the case, its decision will not be voided on the ground of absence
of jurisdiction.
The Republic does not deny that the trial court had jurisdiction over it as well as over the subject matter of
the case. What the Republic questions is the grave abuse of discretion allegedly committed by the court a
quo in rendering the decision.

The Court did not agree with the Republic.

In a petition for annulment of judgment based on lack of jurisdiction, the petitioner must show not merely an
abuse of jurisdictional discretion but an absolute lack of jurisdiction. 15 Thus, the concept of lack of jurisdiction
as a ground to annul a judgment does not embrace abuse of discretion.
Second, by claiming grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, the Republic actually concedes
and presupposes the jurisdiction of the court to take cognizance of the case. Hence, the Republic effectively
admits that the two grounds for which lack of jurisdiction may be validly invoked to seek the annulment of a
judgment want of jurisdiction over the parties and want of jurisdiction over the subject matter do not exist.
It only assails the manner in which the trial court formulated its judgment in the exercise of its jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction is distinct from the exercise thereof. We amply explained the distinction between the two in
Tolentino v. Leviste,16 thus:
Jurisdiction is not the same as the exercise of jurisdiction. As distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction,
jurisdiction is the authority to decide a cause, and not the decision rendered therein. Where there is
jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter, the decision on all other questions arising in the case is
but an exercise of the jurisdiction. And the errors which the court may commit in the exercise of jurisdiction
are merely errors of judgment which are the proper subject of an appeal.
2. ACE PUBLICATIONS, INC. vs. THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS and THE COLLECTOR OF
CUSTOMS
Topic: Duty of a court to determine its jurisdiction
FACTS:The petitioner is a publisher of the Filipino, Especial and Hiwaga Comics and Tagalog Classics,
magazines for combined literary entertainment, news items and opinions, imported several rolls and
packages of newsprints for the exclusive use in the publication of the above mentioned magazines.
Herein petitioner wrote a letter address to the Collector of customs claiming a refund but remain unheeded.
The inaction compelled the petitioner to bring the matter to the attention of respondent Commissioner of
Customs. In this letter petitioner asked for a review of the alleged erroneous and/ or illegal assessments and
collections and to authorize the refund thereof to petitioner. This letter, likewise, did not merit any attention
from the Commissioner.
So, the petitioner presented with the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), a Petition for Review. Respondents, thru
the Office of the Solicitor General, presented a Motion for Extension of Time to File an Answer. On the latter
date, however, the Solicitor General presented a Motion to Dismiss instead based on the lack of jurisdiction
of the CTA to take cognizance of the petition for review.
CTA- the filing of petition for review is premature considering that no judgement has been rendered by the
Commissioner of Customs.
ISSUE:Whether or not the CTA is correct in dismissing motopropio the petition for review due to lack of
jurisdiction.

Civil Procedure Case Digest Batch 2-2

HELD:Yes. Under appellant's second error, it claims that the CTA had no power to dismiss the petition for
review motuproprio, citing Manila Herald Pub. Co., et al. v. Ramos, et al., G. R. No. L-4258, Jan. 18, 1951.
The facts and issues therein, however, are entirely different from the ones at bar.
Moreover, it is provided that whenever it appears that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject-matter, it
shall dismiss the action (Sec. 2, Rule 9, New Rules). Courts are bound to take notice of the limits of
their authority and they may, by their own motion, even though the question is not raised by the
pleadings, or not even suggested by counsel, recognize the want of jurisdiction and act accordingly
by staying pleadings, dismissing the action, or otherwise noticing the defect, at any stage of the
proceedings (15 C.J. 852).
Having reached the above conclusions, the discussion of the last error becomes superfluous. There being
want of jurisdiction, it matters not if the motion to dismiss was filed out of time or it was filed at all.
WHEREFORE, the resolution sought to be reviewed is hereby affirmed, without special pronouncement as
to costs.
4. CATINDIG v VDA. DE MENESES
Before the Court are two consolidated cases filed by petitioners Manuel Catindig and SilvinoRoxas Sr.
assailing the decisions of both RTC and CA.The subject of this controversy is a parcel of land titled in the
name of the late RosendoMeneses, Sr, (hereinafter referred to as the Masusuwi Fishpond). Aurora Irene C.
Vda. deMeneses, the surviving spouse of the registered owner, was issued Letters of Administration over the
estate. She alleged that in September 1975, petitioner Catindig, , deprived her of the possession over the
Masusuwi Fishpond, through fraud, undue influence and intimidation by leasing the same to Roxas.
Catindig maintained that he bought the Masusuwi Fishpond from respondent and her children in January
1978, as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale. The Trial Court found that the Deed of Absolute Sale
executed between respondent and petitioner Catindig was simulated and fictitious, and therefore, did not
convey title to Catindig; that it lacked consideration, because respondent and her children never received the
stipulated purchase price for the Masusuwi Fishpond which was pegged at PhP150,000.00. Petitioners
separately challenged the trial court's Decision before the CA. The CA dismissed both the petitioners'
appeals and affirmed the RTC. The CA also found that since it is settled that a Torrens title is a constructive
notice to the whole world of a property's lawful owner, and that petitioner Roxas could not invoke good faith
by relying on the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of his lessor, petitioner Catindig.
ISSUE(S):
1.
(Petitioner Catindig) -Whether or not the court of appeals seriously and gravely erred in
disregarding the genuineness and due execution of the deed of absolute sale.?
2.
(Petitioner Roxas) - Whether The Honorable Court Of Appeals Has Acted With Grave Abuse Of
Discretion Amounting To Lack Or Excess Of Jurisdiction In Finding That The Petitioner Is Jointly And
Solidarily Liable With His Co-Defendant; And In Not Considering That He Was A Lessee In Good Faith Of
The Subject Property.,(petition for Certiorari under Rule 65)
RULING:The Court finds that there exists no reason to disturb the trial court's finding that the Deed Of Sale
was simulated as it is not onlyunregistered, it is even undated and un-notarized and that respondent
never received consideration, hence, there is no compelling reason to depart from the court a
quo's decision.
As regards Roxas contention, that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion, the Court in dismissing
such claim enunciated that the assailed findings of the CA, that Roxas is jointly and severally liable with
petitioner Catindig and in not considering him as a lessee in good faith of the subject property, amount to
nothing more than errors of judgment, correctible by appeal. It further stated that when a court,
tribunal, or officer has jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter of the dispute, the

decision on all other questions arising in the case is an exercise of that jurisdiction. Thus, all errors
committed in the exercise of said jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment; and under prevailing procedural
rules and jurisprudence, errors of judgment are not proper subjects of a special civil action for certiorari,
specifically, where the issue or question involved affects the wisdom or legal soundness of the decision, and
not the jurisdiction of the court to render said decision, the same is beyond the province of a special civil
action for certiorari .
5. ARRANZA vs. B.F. HOMES, INC. AND THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:Respondent BF Homes, Inc. (BFHI), is a domestic corporation engaged in developing subdivisions
and selling residential lots. One of the subdivisions that respondent developed was the BF Homes
Paranaque Subdivision, which now sprawls across not only a portion of the City of Paranaque but also those
of the adjoining cities of Las Pinas and Muntinlupa.
When the Central Bank ordered the closure of Banco Filipino, which had substantial investments in
respondent BFHI, respondent filed with the SEC a petition for rehabilitation and a declaration that it was in a
state of suspension of payments. SEC placed respondent under a management committee. SEC appointed
Atty. Florencio B. Orendain as a Receiver, and approved a Revised Rehabilitation Plan.
Orendain, turned over to UBFHAI control and administration of security in the subdivision, the Clubhouse
and the open spaces along Concha Cruz Drive. Respondent entered into an agreement with UBFHAI for the
annual collection of community assessment fund and for the purchase of eight new pumps to replace the
over~capacitated pumps in the old wells.
A new Board of Receivers was made. They revoked the authority given by Orendain to use the open spaces
and to collect community assessment funds; deferred the purchase of new pumps; recognized BF Paraaque
Homeowners Association, Inc., (BFPHAI) as the representative of all homeowners in the subdivision, among
others.
Petitioners filed with the HLURB a class suit "for and in behalf of the more than 7,000 homeowners in the
subdivision" against respondent BFHI, BF Citiland Corporation, PWCC and A.C. Aguirre Management
Corporation "to enforce the rights of purchasers of lots" in BF Homes Paranaque.
Petitioners argue that the complaint is an action for specific performance of a real estate developers
obligations under P.D. No. 957, and the relief sought is revocation of the subdivision projects registration
certificate and license to sell. These issues are within the jurisdiction of the HLURB. Even if respondent is
under receivership, its obligations as a real estate developer under P.D. No. 957 are not suspended.
On the other hand, respondent asserts that the SEC, not the HLURB, has jurisdiction over petitioners
complaint based on the contracts entered into by the former receiver. The SEC, being the appointing
authority, should be the one to take cognizance of controversies arising from the performance of the
receivers duties. Since respondents properties are under the SECs custodialegis, they are exempt from any
court process.
Lower courts ruling:
HLURB issued a 20~day TRO to avoid rendering nugatory and ineffectual any judgment that could be issued
in the case; and subsequently, an Order granting petitioners prayer for preliminary injunction was issued
enjoining and restraining respondent from preventing necessary improvements and repairs of infrastructures
within the authority and administration of complainant UBFHAI.
CAs ruling:

Civil Procedure Case Digest Batch 2-3

Court of Appeals rendered a decision annulling and setting aside the writ of preliminary injunction issued by
the HLURB. It ruled that private respondents action may properly be regarded as a "claim" within the
contemplation of PD No. 902~A which should be placed on equal footing with those of petitioners other
creditor or creditors and which should be filed with the Committee of Receivers. In any event, pursuant to
Section 6(c) of P.D. No. 902~A and SECs Order, petitioners action against respondent, which is under
receivership, should be suspended.
ISSUE:Whether it is the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) or the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB) that has jurisdiction over a complaint filed by subdivision homeowners against a
subdivision developer that is under receivership for specific performance regarding basic homeowners
needs.
Assuming that the HLURB has jurisdiction, may the proceedings therein be suspended pending the outcome
of the receivership before the SEC?
RULING:Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a cause the right to act in a case. It is conferred
by law and not by mere administrative policy of any court or tribunal. It is determined by the averments of the
complaint and not by the defense contained in the answer. Hence, the jurisdictional issue involved here shall
be determined upon an examination of the applicable laws and the allegations of petitioners complaint
before the HLURB.
Presidential Decree No. 957 (The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers Protective Decree) was issued to
the popular call for correction of pernicious practices of subdivision owners and/or developers that adversely
affected the interests of subdivision lot buyers. Section 3 of P.D. No. 957 empowered the National Housing
Authority (NHA) with the "exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade and business." P.D. No. 1344
was issued to expand the jurisdiction of the NHA to include the specific performance of contractual and
statutory obligationsfiled by buyers of subdivision lot or condominium unit against the owner, developer,
dealer, broker or salesman.
Thereafter, the regulatory and quasi~judicial functions of the NHA were transferred to the Human
Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC) by virtue of Executive Order No. 648. Section 8 thereof
specifies the functions of the NHA that were transferred to the HSRC including the authority to hear and
decide "cases on unsound real estate business practices; claims involving refund filed against project
owners, developers, dealers, brokers or salesmen and cases of specific performance." Executive Order No.
90 renamed the HSRC as the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB).

development of subdivisions and condominiums. What complicated the jurisdictional issue in this case is the
fact that petitioners primarily prays for the retention of BFHIs obligations under the MOA that the Receiver
had entered into with them but which Board of Receivers had revoked.
Hence, the HLURB should take jurisdiction over petitioners complaint because it pertains to matters within
the HLURBs competence and expertise. The HLURB should view the issue of whether the Board of
Receivers correctly revoked the agreements entered into between the previous receiver and the petitioners
from the perspective of the homeowners interests, which P.D. No. 957 aims to protect.
The proceedings at the HLURB should not be suspended notwithstanding that respondent is still under
receivership. The TRO that this Court has issued should accordingly continue until such time as the HLURB
shall have resolved the controversy.

6. Que v CA 339 scra 505,510

Facts:Nicolas Johannes Klaver entered into a Contract to Sell with Golden Dragon Real Estate Corporation
(GDREC) involving a condo unit. After paying the full purchase price, he executed a Conditional Deed of
Sale over the same unit in favor of Ma. Louisa T. Que.
Klaver filed a Complaint for specific performance and damages against petitioner Que before the
Regional Trial Court for alleged violation of the provisions of their contract, referring primarily to her failure to
pay the full purchase price and her taking possession of the property without his consent.
Later, Klaver amended (first amendment) his Complaint by impleading GDREC and its
officers. As amended, he also sought to recover damages from them and for Que to surrender possession
of the unit to GDREC which, in turn, should execute an Absolute Deed of Sale in his favor.

In the case at bar, petitioners complaint is for specific performance to enforce their rights as purchasers of
subdivision lots as regards rights of way, water, open spaces, road and perimeter wall repairs, and security.
Indisputably then, the HLURB has jurisdiction over the complaint.

Que filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the amendment to the original Complaint
impleading GDREC as additional defendant transformed the case to one cognizable by the Housing
and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), and since the claim against her was merely incidental, it
must be resolved by the HLURB together with the claim against GDREC.

The fact that respondent is under receivership does not divest the HLURB of that jurisdiction. A receiver is a
person appointed by the court, or in this instance, by a quasi~judicial administrative agency, in behalf of all
the parties for the purpose of preserving and conserving the property and preventing its possible destruction
or dissipation, if it were left in the possession of any of the parties.

Thereafter, Klaver filed a Manifestation seeking the dismissal without prejudice of his Complaint
against GDREC, Vasquez and Cruz. Subsequently, he moved to file an Amended Complaint (second
amendment).

Petitioners claim for reimbursement should be viewed in the light of respondents alleged failure to observe
its statutory and contractual obligations to provide petitioners a "decent human settlement" and "ample
opportunities for improving their quality of life." The HLURB, not the SEC, is equipped with the expertise to
deal with that matter.

Klaver lodged a Complaint with the HLURB against GDREC and its officers for unsound real estate
practices consisting mainly in their unwarranted delay in the delivery of unit. GDREC, on the other hand, filed
a Third Party Complaint against Que on account of her alleged previous undertaking to assume
responsibility for any and all claims which could arise on account of the transfer of possession of the unit to
her. Que asserted in her Answer that she had fully paid, if not overpaid, for the unit such that Klaver had lost
all rights over it.

SEC and HLURB are two quasi-judicial agencies exercising functions that are distinct from each other. SEC
has authority over the operation of all kinds of corporations, partnerships or associations with the end view of
protecting the interests of the investing public and creditors. On the other hand, HLURB has jurisdiction over
matters relating to observance of laws governing corporations engaged in the specific business of

Civil Procedure Case Digest Batch 2-4

Going back to the case pending before the trial court, Que filed her Comment to Klaver's
Manifestation contending that upon the previous amendment (first amendment) of the complaint
which included GDREC as co-defendant, the trial court ipso facto lost jurisdiction over the case.

(b) Que was able to get the keys of the unit from GDREC without the knowledge and written
permission of Klaver and started making improvements on the premises;

The trial court dismissed without prejudice the amended Complaint against GDREC, denied Que's
Motion to Dismiss, granted Klaver's Motion to File Amended Complaint, and admitted the Amended
Complaint solely against Que.

Undoubtedly,Klaver's Complaint against Que for specific performance (an action incapable of
pecuniary estimation) and damages was within the jurisdiction of the trial court.

Petitioners argument:
Que alleges that when Klaver amended his Complaint for the first time, his original Complaint was
deemed superseded. She argues that Klaver's cause of action in his first Amended Complaint, being
one for specific performance against GDREC, was beyond the jurisdiction of the trial court but
vested in the HLURB. The trial court could not have validly acquired jurisdiction over her alone to the
exclusion of GDREC because both parties are indispensable for a complete resolution of the
case. She further argues that when Klaver amended his Complaint the second time, his evident purpose
was to confer jurisdiction anew on the trial court over his cause of action against her. She then invites
attention to the circumstance that Klaver's Complaint before the HLURB was dismissed. The HLURB found
that Klaver had in fact been overpaid by Que. This ruling was affirmed by the HLURB and by the Office of
the President. The case is now pending before the Court of Appeals. On these accounts, she submits that
this Court should not allow the case before the trial court to proceed
Respondents argument:
Klaver contends that upon the filing of the original Complaint the trial court acquired jurisdiction over
the subject matter thereof which jurisdiction continued with the filing of the first Amended Complaint that
substantially reproduced the same causes of action against Que, i.e.,specific performance and damages. He
maintains that inasmuch as his cause of action against Que was independent of the cause of action against
GDREC, the inclusion of GDREC in the first Amended Complaint merely resulted in misjoinder of a cause of
action and party which he remedied by dropping GDREC from the case before the trial court and proceeding
only against Que.
Issue:
(1) Whether or not the trial court loses its jurisdiction over the case against Que when Klaver amended
his complaint which included GDREC as co-defendant?
(2) Does the trial court retain jurisdiction over the case against Que when trial court dismissed the
case against GDREC?
Held:
(1) No. It is settled that jurisdiction of courts over the subject matter of the litigation is conferred by law
and determined by the allegations in the complaint. Klaver's original Complaint contained the following
pertinent allegations:
(a) Klaver and Que agreed that possession of unit would be transferred to Que only upon full payment
of the purchase price;

(c) Que unilaterally decided to withhold payment of the full purchase price.

(2) No. In determining whether a different cause of action is introduced by amendments to the
complaint, what must be ascertained is whether the defendants shall be required to answer for a liability or
legal obligation wholly different from that stated in the original complaint. An amendment will not be
considered as stating a new cause of action if the fact alleged in the amended complaint shows substantially
the same wrong with respect to the same matter but is more fully and differently stated, or where averments
which were implied are made express, or the subject of the controversy or the liability sought to be enforced
remains the same.
The first and second amended complaints with regard to Que alleged substantially the same
causes of action as the original Complaint. Consequently, the Court agrees with Klaver that the trial
court's jurisdiction continued even with the first and second amendments of his complaint because
the amended Complaints averred substantially the same causes of action against Que.
7.ANGELA DELA ROSA and CORAZON MEDINAvs. ORFELINA D. ROLDAN, LORNA SAN DIEGO,
FLORDELIZA D. CATACUTAN, NORMA Y. LACUESTA, and ARSENIO DULAY.
FACTS: The spouses Rivera were the owners of two (2) parcels of land located in Tarlac, Tarlac. Sometime
in 1957, the spouses Rivera executed a deed of sale over the properties in favor of the spouses
ArsenioDulay and Asuncion dela Rosa. Gideon dela Rosa, one of Asuncion's brothers, was one of the
instrumental witnesses in the deed. To pay for the property, the spouses Dulay, who were members of the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), secured a P9,500.00 loan and executed a real estate
mortgage over the two lots as security therefor. On September 16, 1957, the Register of Deeds issued TCT
in the names of the spouses Dulay.
The spouses Dulay forthwith took possession of the lots, except a 500-square-meter portion which was then
occupied by Gideon dela Rosa and his wife Angela and the portion where the house of Corazon Medina
stood. The spouses Dulay declared the property for taxation purposes in their names and paid the realty
taxes therefor.
Sometime in 1982, the spouses Dulay made demands on Gideon, Angela and Corazon to vacate the
premises, as their three daughters would be constructing their respective houses thereon. Gideon, Angela
and Corazon refused to do so, prompting the spouses to file a complaint for recovery of possession
(accionpubliciana) against them with the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Tarlac. The trial court rendered
judgment in favor of the spouses Dulay and ordered the spouses Dela Rosa and Corazon Medina to vacate
the property and turn over possession to plaintiffs.
The spouses Dela Rosa and Corazon Medina appealed to the CA. The appellate court rendered judgment
granting the appeal and reversed the trial court's ruling.
In the meantime, Gideon died. His wife Angela and Corazon Medina continued residing in the property
without paying any rentals therefor. Asuncion Dulay passed away, survived by her husband Arsenio and their
children.

Civil Procedure Case Digest Batch 2-5

Arsenio and his children, through counsel, made demands on Corazon and Angela to vacate the property
within 30 days from receipt thereof, with a warning that failure to do so would impel them to file the
necessary legal action. Arsenio and his children filed a complaint for eviction against Angela and Corazon in
the Office of the Barangay Captain and after the parties did not arrive at a settlement, the Pangkat Secretary
issued a certification to file action.
On January 29, 1996, Arsenio and his children, filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against Corazon and
Angela, in the MTC of Tarlac, Tarlac.
Angela filed a complaint against Arsenio and his children in the MTC of Tarlac, Tarlac for recovery of
ownership, reconveyance, cancellation of title, and damages.
The MTC rendered judgment in favor of Corazon and Angela and ordered the dismissal of the complaint on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The court held that the issue between the parties was one of ownership
and not merely possession de facto.
Arsenio and his children appealed to the RTC and it reversed the decision of the MTC and ordered the
eviction of defendants, holding that the issue was the entitlement to the physical possession de facto of the
property, an issue within the exclusive jurisdiction of the MTC. Corazon and Angela moved to reconsider the
decision, which the RTC denied. They filed a petition for review in the CA. The CA affirmed the decision of
the RTC and ruled that, contrary to the claim of Angela, there was no trust created over one-half of the
property in her favor. Since the complaint against Angela and Corazon in the MTC was one for unlawful
detainer, the MTC had exclusive jurisdiction over the case.
ISSUE: Whether the MTC had jurisdiction over the action of respondents (plaintiffs therein)?

the bank foreclosed on his property when he failed to pay his account. Then after, the property was sold to
Julieta C. Salgado, the Chairman of the Board of the respondent, Perpetual Help Development and Realty
Corporation (PHDRC). TCT No. 133298 was, thereafter, issued in favor of PHDRC on January 18, 1985. No
liens or encumbrances whatsoever or any notice that the property had been placed under the agrarian
reform laws were annotated at the dorsal portion thereof.
Subsequently, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) granted Emancipation Patents to the
twenty (20) tenants on the property from April 28, 1988 to July 1, 1988 on the basis of which titles were
issued in their favor during the period of September 16, 1988 to August 24, 1990. Then on August 26, 1997,
the respondent filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against the twenty (20) petitioners, who were all
occupants-farmers on the property, with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Kabankalan City. The
MTC granted the respondents petition.
The petitioners asserted that the MTC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action of
the respondent in Civil Case No. 034-97, it being an agrarian dispute between the petitioners, as patentees,
and the respondent; hence, the court a quos decision was null and void. They contended that the Provincial
Agrarian Reform Adjudicatory Board (PARAD) had exclusive jurisdiction over the action in Civil Case No.
034-97.
The RTC found the petition sufficient in form and substance and directed the respondent to file its
comment on or answer to the petition.
On April 29, 1998, the RTC issued an Order declaring that the case involved only questions of law
and not of facts, and ordered the parties to file their respective memoranda. On May 26, 1998, the RTC
rendered judgment dismissing the petition on the ground that the MTCC had exclusive jurisdiction over the
action of the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 034-97 and over the persons of the defendants therein. The RTC also
held that the petitioners failed to file a motion to dismiss the complaint in the MTCC and even participated in
the proceedings therein; hence, they were estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the MTCC. The
petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision, but on June 26, 1998, the RTC issued an order
denying the same.
ISSUE: Whether the case should have been appealed before the CA rather than the SC?

RULING: We agree with the decision of the CA that the action of respondents against petitioners was one for
unlawful detainer, and that the MTC had jurisdiction over the same. Indeed, petitioners claimed ownership
over one-half of the property in their answer to the complaint and alleged that respondents were merely
trustees thereof for their benefit as trustors; and, during the pre-trial, respondents admitted having filed their
complaint for recovery of possession of real property (accionpubliciana) against petitioners before the CFI of
Tarlac, docketed as Civil Case No. 6261. However, these did not divest the MTC of its inceptial jurisdiction
over the complaint for unlawful detainer of respondents.
It is settled jurisprudence that what determines the nature of an action as well as which court or body
has jurisdiction over itare the allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought,
whether or not plaintiff is entitled to any and all of the reliefs prayed for. The jurisdiction of the court or
tribunal over the nature of the action cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the court or
upon a motion to dismiss, for otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would depend almost entirely on
defendant. Once jurisdiction is vested, the same is retained up to the end of the litigation.
As gleaned from the averments of the complaint, they were the owners of parcels of land covered, hence,
entitled to the possession of the property.
8. ILADO, et.al. v. CHAVEZ
Facts:The property in question was owned by Celso Nene Zayco who lost his property when

Whether the MTCC has jurisdiction over the said case?

Whether the court erred in its decision
RULING:On the first issue, the court held that the remedy of a party aggrieved by the decision of the RTC, in
the exercise of its original jurisdiction, is to appeal by writ of error to the Court of Appeals under Rule 41 of
the Rules of Court, in which questions of facts and/or of law may be raised by the parties. However, under
Section 2(c), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, where only questions of law are raised or are involved, the
appeal shall be to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules.
However, even if only questions or issues are raised by the party in his appeal, it should be made to the
Court of Appeals and not to the Supreme Court, unless there are compelling reasons to allow such appeal.
On the second issue, the court held that on the issue of jurisdiction, Section 33, paragraph 2 of
Batas PambansaBlg. 129, as amended by Section 3 of Rep. Act No. 7691 provides that Municipal Trial
Court, Municipal Circuit Trial Court and Metropolitan Trial Court, have exclusive original jurisdiction over
cases for unlawful detainer. The proceedings in ejectment cases are covered by Rule 70 of the Rules of
Court and the Rules on Summary Procedure. However, such courts have no original jurisdiction to determine
and adjudicate agrarian disputes under Rep. Act No. 6657, as amended, and the Rules of Procedure issued
by the DARAB implementing said laws, which are within the exclusive original and appellate jurisdiction of
the DARAB.
The DAR is vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters
and shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform
programs. The rule is that the DARAB has jurisdiction to try and decide any agrarian dispute or any incident
involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. In Tirona v. Alejo, we held

Civil Procedure Case Digest Batch 2-6

that the MTCC has no jurisdiction over an ejectment case where the issue of possession is inextricably
interwoven with an agrarian dispute.

the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action. After all, the only relief prayed for by
them in their answer was the dismissal of the complaint.

The well-entrenched principle is that the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the
action is determined by the material allegations of the complaint and the law, irrespective of whether or not
the plaintiff is entitled to recover all or some of the claims or reliefs sought therein.
In Movers-Baseco Integrated Port Services, Inc. v. Cyborg Leasing Corporation, we ruled that the
jurisdiction of the court over the nature of the action and the subject matter thereof cannot be made to
depend upon the defenses set up in the court or upon a motion to dismiss for, otherwise, the question of
jurisdiction would depend almost entirely on the defendant. Once jurisdiction is vested, the same is retained
up to the end of the litigation. We also held in Arcelona v. Court of Appeals that in American jurisprudence,
the nullity of a decision arising from lack of jurisdiction may be determined from the record of the case, not
necessarily from the face of the judgment only.

9. Gustilo vs. Gustilo

The MTCC does not lose its jurisdiction over an ejectment case by the simple expedient of a party
raising as a defense therein the alleged existence of a tenancy relationship between the parties. But it is the
duty of the court to receive evidence to determine the allegations of tenancy. If after hearing, tenancy had in
fact been shown to be the real issue, the court should dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.

After their fathers death, Mary Joy and Jose Vicente entered into a Memorandum of Agreement
(MOA), adjudicating between themselves their fathers properties. One of these was Hacienda Imelda which
the MOA assigned to Mary Joy. The haciendas title remained in the name of A.G. Agro. Mary Joy
immediately took possession of the land through her mother and planted sugarcane on it.

In this case, there is no showing that the DAR ever approved the reclassification of the property. It
appears that the reclassification of the landholding was unilaterally made by the Sangguniang Bayan despite
the issuance to the petitioners of Emancipation Patents and transfer certificates of title in their names over
the portions of the landholdings respectively occupied by them.

Jose Vicente, as president of A.G. Agro, leased Hacienda Imelda and its farm implements to
respondent Tita Sy Young for five agricultural crops. Being financially hard up, Mary Joy and her mother
were pained to watch Young take over the land.

The petitioners appended to their petition in the RTC a Certification of the Register of Deeds
indicating that thirteen (13) of the petitioners were issued transfer certificates of title based on the
Emancipation Patents filed with said office, made of record in the Primary Entry Book on September 16, 20,
and 22, 1998; and an LBP certificate stating that eighteen (18) of the petitioners had made advance
payments for the portions of the landholding occupied by them. And yet, the RTC dismissed the petition and
affirmed the ruling of the MTCC that it had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint.
It is evident from the face of the complaint and the pleadings of the parties and the appendages
thereof that the issue of possession of the subject property was inextricably interwoven with the issue of
whether the Emancipation Patents issued by the DAR to the petitioners were valid. Under the DAR Rules of
Procedure, the DARAB has primary and exclusive original jurisdiction over cases involving the issuance and
cancellation of Emancipation Patents. Moreover, the respondent claimed possession over the property
based on TCT No. 133298, which had already been partially cancelled by the Emancipation Patents and
Torrens titles issued to the petitioners.

FACTS: This case is about the proper characterization of a dispute between the president of a corporation
and a stockholder, both heirs to the corporations controlling shares of stock, over the lease of a property that
the president agreed to assign to the stockholder as her inheritance.
Petitioner Mary Joy Anne Gustilo and respondent Jose Vicente Gustilo III are heirs of their natural
father, the late Atty. Armando Gustilo (they have different mothers), the president of A.G. Agro-Industrial
Corporation (A.G. Agro). Petitioner Pea is Mary Joys attorney-in-fact whom she authorized to exercise
general control and supervision of her real properties.

When the lease contract was about to expire, however, Mary Joy had her lawyer advise Young to
surrender the land to her. But the latter refused to yield possession and continued to cultivate the same for
sugarcane. This prompted Mary Joy to file an action against Jose Vicente and Young for recovery of
possession of the hacienda, cancellation of the lease contract, and damages before the RTC of Cadiz City.
Jose Vicente filed a motion to dismiss mainly on the ground that the Cadiz RTC had no jurisdiction to hear
and decide intra-corporate disputes, the proper forum being a specially designated commercial court.
The RTC granted Jose Vicentes motion and dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction,
without prejudice to its re-filing in the proper court. The CA affirmed the RTC decision, prompting Mary Joy to
file the present petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Mary Joys action presents an intra-corporate dispute that belongs to the
jurisdiction of a specially designated commercial court.
HELD:

On the third issue, we reject the contention of the respondent that the decision of the MTCC had
become final and executory because of the petitioners failure to perfect the appeal therefrom; hence,
immutable. Neither do we agree with the respondents contention that by participating in the proceedings
before the MTCC, the petitioners were estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the MTCC.
Since the judgment here on its face is void ab initio, the limited periods for relief from judgment in
Rule 38 are inapplicable. That judgment is vulnerable to attack "in any way and at any time, even when no
appeal has been taken." It is settled that jurisdiction over the judgment cannot be changed by agreement of
the parties or by the act or omission of each of them that will contravene the legislative will. A party should
not be allowed to divest a competent court of its jurisdiction, whether erroneously or even deliberately in
derogation of the law.
In this case, the counsel of the petitioners opted to assail in a direct action the decision of the MTCC,
instead of perfecting their appeal or assailing the decision of the MTCC disallowing their appeal. The
petitioners believed that the decision of the MTCC was null and void for want of jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the action filed therein; hence, they are not proscribed from assailing such decision in a direct
action. The remedy resorted to by their counsel should not prejudice and bar them from assailing the MTCC
decision before the RTC on a petition to annul the same for lack of jurisdiction. Neither are they estopped
from assailing the decision, simply because they filed their answer and motion to dismiss the complaint on

NO. It is a basic rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations in the
complaint. It can be gleaned from Mary Joys allegations in her complaint that her case is principally one
for recovery of possession. A party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession even
against the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his prior possession, if he has in his favor
priority in time, he is entitled to remain on the property until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a better
right
Here, Jose Vicente and Young mainly argued in their Motion to Dismiss that inasmuch as the
subject property is in the name of A.G. Agro, the nature of the claim or controversy is one of intracorporate. The Court has ruled in the past that an action to recover possession is a plenary action in an
ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better and legal right to possess, independently of title. But where
the parties raise the issue of ownership, as in this case, the courts may pass upon such issue to
determine who between the parties has the right to possess the property. This adjudication, however, is not
final and binding as regards the issue of ownership; it is merely for the purpose of resolving the issue of
possession when it is inseparably connected to the issue of ownership. The adjudication on the issue of
ownership, being provisional, is not a bar to an action between the same parties involving title to the
property. Also, any intra-corporate issues that may be involved in determining the real owner of the property
may be threshed out in a separate proceeding in the proper commercial court.

Civil Procedure Case Digest Batch 2-7

10.Province of Aklanvs Jody King Construction and Development Corp
FACTS: The Province of Aklan (petitioner) and Jody King Construction and Development Corp. (respondent)
entered into a contract for the design and -construction of the Caticlan Jetty Port and Terminal (Phase I) in
Malay, Aklan. On October 22, 2001, respondent made a demand for the total amount of P22,419,112.96
covering the following items which petitioner allegedly failed to settle from their contract. Petitioner was
unable to pay so respondent sued petitioner in the RTC of Marikina City to collect the aforesaid amounts.
Thus, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary attachment and subsequently ruled in favour of respondent
and a writ of execution was signed by the court, ordering the garnishment of the property of petitioner to
satisfy the judgement. upon appeal, CA ruled that the petitioner is estopped from invoking the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction as it only raised the issue of COAs primary jurisdiction after its notice of appeal was
denied and a writ of execution was issued against it.
ISSUE: whether or not the doctrine of primary jurisdiction may be invoked as a defense by the petitioner
HELD:YES.COA has primary jurisdiction over private respondents money claims Petitioner is not estopped
from raising the issue of jurisdiction. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction holds that if a case is such that its
determination requires the expertise, specialized training and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies,
relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy is supplied by the courts even if
the matter may well be within their proper jurisdiction.The doctrine of primary jurisdiction is guide the court in
determining whether it should refrain from exercising its jurisdiction until after an administrative agency has
determined some question or some aspect of some question arising in the proceeding before the court. In
the case at bar, respondent seeks to enforce a claim for sums of money allegedly owed by petitioner, a local
government unit and under Commonwealth Act No. 327, as amended by Section 26 of Presidential Decree
No. 1445, it is the COA which has primary jurisdiction over money claims against government agencies and
instrumentalities.
Petitioner argues, however, that respondent could no longer question the RTCs jurisdiction over the matter
after it had filed its answer and participated in the subsequent proceedings. But as the court held,
respondents collection suit being directed against a local government unit, such money claim should have
been first brought to the COA. Hence, the RTC should have suspended the proceedings and refer the filing
of the claim before the COA. Moreover, petitioner is not estopped from raising the issue of jurisdiction even
after the denial of its notice of appeal and before the CA.
There are established exceptions to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, such as: (a) where there is estoppel
on the part of the party invoking the doctrine; (b) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal,
amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (c) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will
irretrievably prejudice the complainant; (d) where the amount involved is relatively small so as to make the
rule impractical and oppressive; (e) where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be
decided by the courts of justice; (f) where judicial intervention is urgent; (g) when its application may cause
great and irreparable damage; (h) where the controverted acts violate due process; (i) when the issue of
non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot; (j) when there is no other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy; (k) when strong public interest is involved; and, (l) in quo warranto
proceedings. However, none of the foregoing circumstances is applicable in the present case. The doctrine
of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself authority to resolve a controversy the
jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence. All the
proceedings of the court in violation of the doctrine and all orders and decisions rendered thereby are null
and void.
Writ of Execution issued in violation of COAs primary jurisdiction is void
11. Tijam v Sibonghanoy 23 scra 29, 35
Facts: The petitioner in this case, Serafin Tijam as well as Felicitas Tagalog filed an action for collection of a
sum of money amounting to P 1,908.00, exclusive of interest, against Sps. Magdaleno Sibonghanoy and
Lucia Baguio. Such action was originally instituted in the Court of FIrst Instance of Cebu on July 19, 1948.
However, prior to the filing of the complaint, the Judiciary Act of 1948 or R.A. 296 took effect depriving the

CFI of original jurisdiction over cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, is not more than P 2,000.00
as stated in Sec. 44(c) and 86 (b) of the said law.
As the case has already been pending for almost 15 years, and throughout the entire proceeding, the
question of jurisdiction was never raised by the appellant until the receipt of the CA's adverse decision.
Considering that the SC has the exclusive appelate jurisdiction over all cases in which jurisdiction of any
inferior court is in issue, the CA certified the case to the SC along with the records of the same.
Issue: Whether the appellant's motion to dismiss the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the CFI will
prosper?
Held: According to the Supreme Court, a party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in
different ways and for different reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by
record, and of estoppel by laches.
Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do
that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission
to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either
has abandoned it or declined to assert it.
The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds of public policy which requires, for the
peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute of limitations, is not a mere
question of time but is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be
enforced or asserted.
It has been held that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to sure affirmative relief against his
opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction. It
was further said that the question whether the court had jurisdiction either of the subject-matter of the action
or of the parties was not important in such cases because the party is barred from such conduct not because
the judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that such a
practice can not be tolerated obviously for reasons of public policy.
Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse
decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court. It is not
right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an
affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape a penalty.
Upon this same principle is what We said in the three cases mentioned in theresolution of the Court of
Appeals of May 20, 1963 (supra) to the effect that we frown upon the "undesirable practice" of a party
submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack
of jurisdiction, when adverse as well as in Pindagan etc. vs. Dans, et al., G.R. L-14591, September 26,
1962; Montelibano, et al., vs. Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc., G.R. L-15092; Young Men Labor Union etc.
vs. The Court of Industrial Relation et al., G.R. L-20307, Feb. 26, 1965, and Mejia vs. Lucas, 100 Phil. p.
277.
The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety became a quasi-party on July 31, 1948, it could
have raised the question of the lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Cebu to take cognizance
of the present action by reason of the sum of money involved which, according to the law then in force, was
within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts. It failed to do so. Instead, at several stages of the
proceedings in the court a quo as well as in the Court of Appeals, it invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to
obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for a final adjudication on the merits. It was only after an
adverse decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise the question of
jurisdiction. Were we to sanction such conduct on its part, We would in effect be declaring as useless all the
proceedings had in the present case since it was commenced on July 19, 1948 and compel the judgment
creditors to go up their Calvary once more. The inequity and unfairness of this is not only patent but
revolting.

Civil Procedure Case Digest Batch 2-8

Coming now to the merits of the appeal: after going over the entire record, We have become persuaded that
We can do nothing better than to quote in toto, with approval, the decision rendered by the Court of Appeals
x xx granting plaintiffs' motion for execution against the surety x xx
UPON ALL THE FOREGOING, the orders appealed from are hereby affirmed, with costs against the
appellant Manila Surety and Fidelity Company, Inc.
12. Ga Jr. v Tubungan 600 scra 739,746
The CA set aside the Order and the Writ of Demolition of the Commission on Settlement of Land Problems
(COSLAP) for having been issued without jurisdiction. Also the MR was denied.
FACTS: Sometime in 1985, petitioner filed a Complaint for Recovery of Property and Ownership of a parcel
of land against respondent (Norberto Ga) before the COSLAP. The complaint was subsequently re-filed in
2000 by petitioners daughters. Thereafter, the COSLAP rendered judgment declaring petitioner and his
heirs as the lawful owners. Respondent moved for reconsideration but the same was denied. In 2002,
respondent together with respondents Tubungan, filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, Preliminary
Injunction, Quieting of Title and Damages with Prayer for TRO [3]before the RTC Guimaras. The trial court
issued an order[6] dismissing the case having no jurisdiction to nullify the COSLAP decision, as the same
would be an interference with a co-equal and coordinate body.[7] Respondents filed a MR but it was denied.
[8]
Consequently, respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA which granted the petition and
SET ASIDE the decision of the COSLAP. Further, the respondent commission is hereby ordered to DISMISS
COSLAP Case for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioners filed for MR but the same was denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WON, the CA erred in granting the petition and ordering to dismiss COSLAP case for lack of
Jurisdiction?
HELD: NO.The Court finds that the CA correctly held that respondents remedy from the decision of the
COSLAP was to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, as they assailed the lack of jurisdiction of said
body over the dispute. However, the petition should have been filed before the CA and not the trial court. In
other words, while respondents availed of the correct remedy, they sought the same from the wrong
court. This mistake would have rendered the assailed COSLAP decision final and executory, were it not for
its patent nullity and invalidity.
In the instant case, COSLAP had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of petitioners complaint. The
disputed lot was not shown to be public land and the nature of the dispute is not among those which fall
under the jurisdiction of the COSLAP. Thus, the COSLAP may resolve land disputes that involve only public
lands or lands of the public domain or those covered with a specific license from the government such as a
pasture lease agreement, a timber concession, or a reservation grant. [19] However, the lot subject of the
instant petition was not shown to fall under any of these categories of land and appears to be a private
unregistered land. Neither is the dispute between petitioners and respondents critical and explosive in nature
nor does it involve a large number of parties that could result to social tension and unrest. It can also hardly
be characterized as involving a critical situation that requires immediate action.
As such, the COSLAP should have dismissed petitioners complaint for lack of jurisdiction or referred the
same to the regular courts, which has jurisdiction over controversies relating to ownership and possession of
private lands. The records show that respondents have consistently assailed the jurisdiction of the COSLAP,
[20]
and yet, the latter ignored the matter and simply proceeded to resolve petitioners complaint. Since the
COSLAP had no jurisdiction over the land dispute between petitioners and respondents, the judgment it
rendered on the case is null and void. As stated earlier, a void judgment can never be final and executory
and may be assailed at any time. It is thus clear that the CAourt of Appeals did not err in taking cognizance
of respondents petition for certiorari as the judgment of the COSLAP could not have attained finality. In other
words, the failure of respondents to properly appeal from the COSLAP decision before the appropriate court
was not fatal to the petition for certiorari that they eventually filed with the CA. The latter remedy remained
available despite the lapse of the period to appeal from the void COSLAP decision. WHEREFORE, the
petition is DENIED.
13. BOSTON EQUITY V CA
FACTS:

-Complaint for sum of money w/ prelim.attachment against Manuel & Lolita Toledo
-Lolita filed an answer & alleged that Manuel (husband) is already dead
-Boston filed a motion to require Lolita to disclose heirs of Manuel, Lolita then submitted names & addresses
of heirs
-Boston filed Motion for substitution praying that Manuel be substituted by children = GRANTED
-Trial proceeded & Boston presented evidence, however evidence for Toledos was cancelled & their counsel
was given 15 days to file demurrer
-Toledos filed motion to dismiss (6 yrs had already paased),grounds=failed to aquire jurisdiction over the
person of Manuel pursuant to Rule 86, failed to implead indispensible party = MOTION DENIED BY TRIAL
COURT (file dout of time)
-Toledos filed MR but denied = their attack on the jurisdiction of trial court is now barred by estoppel by
laches since they failed to raise the issue despite several chances to do so
-Toledos filed Petiton for Certiorari w/ CA, ground=trial court seriously erred and gravely abused its
discretion in denying her motion to dismiss despite discovery, during the trial of the case, of evidence that
would constitute a ground for dismissal of the case
-CA= granted petition bec. at time of filing of complaint by Boston, Manuel is alreadydead hence no
jurisdiction acquired
ISSUE
1. WON Toledos are already already estopped from questioning the trial courts jurisdiction
2. WON jurisdiciton over the person of Manuel was acquired by TC
HELD
1. NO
-question of jurisdiction involved here is that over the person of the defendant Manuel, the same is deemed
waived if not raised in the answer or a motion to dismiss.
-Toledos cannot claim the defense since lack of jurisdiction over the person, being subject to waiver, is a
personal defense which can only be asserted by the party who can thereby waive it by silence
-The aspect of jurisdiction which may be barred from being assailed as a result of estoppel by laches is
jurisdiction over the subject matter
2. NO
-no valid service of summons because Manuel is already dead even before complaint was filed hence no
acquisition of jurisdiction
14. La Naval Drug Corp vs CA
Facts:
-Responndent Wilson Yao appeared to be the present owner of a commercial building a portion of which is
leased to petitioner La Naval under a contract of lease
-Petitioner exercised its option to lease the same building for another 5 years
-the two parties disagreed on the rental rates and to resolve the controversy, submitted the disagreement to
arbitration in accordance with RA876 and paragragh 7 of the said contract
-the two parties appointed their respective arbitrators; that the appointment of third arbitrator was in
conveyance due to the instruction of the petitioner(until its Board of Directors could convene and approve
such appointment)
-respondent then theorized that this act was to delay the proceedings; on the basis of such allegation,
respondent prayed for a summary hearing;
-In its answer, petitoneravered that the delay was due to respondents failure to exercise what was
encumbent to him
-respondent then filed an amended petition Enforcement of Arbitration Agreement with Damages which was
admitted by the Court
-In its answer, La Naval asserted that the case should be dismissed as it was filed prematurely; La Naval
questioned Yaos claim for damages as it averred that the same should be litigated independently and not in
the same summary proceeding case. However, La Naval also posed a counterclaim.

Civil Procedure Case Digest Batch 2-9

-The RTC resolved the matter regarding the arbitrators (it appointed a third arbitrator). The RTC also ruled
that La Naval is estopped from questioning Yaos claim for damages for being out of jurisdiction as
La Naval itself filed a counterclaim for damages.
-this was affirmed by CA

Issue:Whether or not the Court acquires jurisdiction over the claim for damages of respondent Yao?

Velayo-Fong questioned the propriety and validity of the service of summons made upon her as she did not
remember having been served with summons but remembers that a man hurled some papers at her while
she was entering the elevator and she threw back the papers to the man before the elevator closed; that she
has a valid and meritorious defense to refute the material allegations of respondents complaint. She also
argued that the summons should have been served through extraterritorial service since she is a resident of
Hawaii.
On the other hand, respondents contend that petitioner was validly served with summons since
extraterritorial service applies only when the defendant does not reside and is not found in the Philippines;
that the proper remedy is a motion for new trial or a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 and not
Motion to set aside order; and that the issue on summons is a pure question of law which the CA does not
have jurisdiction to resolve.
ISSUE:Whether or not the issue involved in the appeal filed with the CA is purely questions of law and
therefore not within the jurisdiction of the CA to resolve.

Rule: No. The arbitration law explicitly confines the court's authority only to pass upon the issue of whether
there is or there is no agreement in writing providing for arbitration. The litigation on matters of damages
shall be made in a separate action.
The SC reiterated in this case that lack of jurisdiction over subject matter is different from lack of jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant.
In lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, it may be waived expressly or impliedly.
Voluntary appearance means submission to the jurisdiction of the court. To avoid such waiver, he must
seasonably file a motion objecting to the jurisdiction of the court. In cases wherein the defendant raises any
other issue regarding the dismissal of the action, the defendant is then estopped from pursuing the defense
of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.
While in lack of jurisdiction over subject matter, like in the present case, whenever it appears that the
court has no jurisdiction, the action shall be dismissed. This defense may be interposed at any time, during
appeal or even after final judgment.
It is neither for the courts nor the parties to violate or disregard that rule, let alone to
confer that jurisdiction, this matter being legislative in character. Barring highly
meritorious and exceptional circumstances, such as hereinbefore exemplified, neither
estoppel nor waiver shall apply.
15. ERLINDA R. VELAYO-FONG, Petitioner, VS SPOUSES RAYMOND and MARIA HEDY
VELAYO
FACTS:Spouses Raymond and Maria HedyVelayo filed a complaint for collection of sum of money against
Velayo-Fong. In the complaint, Spouses Velayo alleged that Velayo-Fong was a resident of Hawaii. Since
Velayo-Fong was a non-resident and not found in the Philippines, Spouses Velayo-Fong prayed for a writ to
attach Velayo-Fongs properties found in the Philippines.However, before the application for the writ can be
acted upon by the RTC, Spouses Velayo filed an Urgent Motion praying that the summons be served to
Velayo-Fong at her Two Condominium Suites at Pasay City and Makati. Subsequently, the RTC granted the
said motion.Then, the Process Server indicated on his Officers Return that after several failed attempts, he
was able to serve personally the summons to Velayo-Fong, not at her two addresses but at a lobby of a
hotel, right in the presence of a lobby counter personnel but Velayo-Fong refused to sign in receipt thereof.
RTC in its Order declared Velayo-Fong in default for failure to file an answer. Velayo-Fong, filed a Motion to
Set Aside Order claiming that she was prevented from filing an answer because no summons was served
upon her.
The RTC denied the Motion and CA affirmed RTCs order.

HELD:Respondents claim that the issues raised by petitioner before the CA are pure legal questions is not
tenable.
A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a
question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one
of law, the same must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the
litigants or any of them. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given
set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question
posed is one of fact.Thus, the test of whether a question is one of law or of fact is not the appellation given
to such question by the party raising the same; rather, it is whether the appellate court can determine the
issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise it
is a question of fact.
In this case, petitioners petition before the CA reveals that it raised two issues: (a) the propriety of the
service effected on a non-resident; and (b) the validity of the service made upon her. The first is a question
of law. There is indeed a question as to what and how the law should be applied (Section 17, Rule 14 of the
Rules of Court provides a rule on Extraterritorial service.) The second is a question of FACT - the resolution
of said issue entails a review of the factual circumstances that led the RTC to conclude that service was
validly effected upon petitioner. Therefore, petitioner properly brought the case to the CA via the first mode of
appeal under the aegis of Rule 41(Ordinary appeal.)
16. Spouses Gomez vs CA
Jurisprudence holds that if the action in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is
not required. What is required is the jurisdiction over the res although summons must also be served upon
the defendant in order to satisfy the requirements of due process.
Facts of the case:
-

This is a case of action for specific performance and recission filed by petitioner Spouses
Fortunato and Aurora Gomez, against heirs of Jesus Trocino Sr. And their mother CaridadTrocino.
In 1975, the spouses Jesus and CaridadTrocino mortgaged two parcels of land covered by TCT
Nos. 10616 and 31856 to Dr. Clarence Yujuico. The mortgage was subsequently foreclosed and
the properties sold at public auction on July 11, 1988, and before the expiry of the redemption
period, the spouses Trocino sold the property to petitioners on December 12, 1989, who in turn,
redeemed the same from Dr. Yujuico. The spouses Trocino, however, refused to convey
ownership of the properties to petitioners, hence, the complaint.
On January 10, 1992, the trial courts Process Server served summons on respondents, in the
manner described in his "Return of Service," to wit:

Civil Procedure Case Digest Batch 2-10

Respectfully returned to the Branch Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 10, the
herein attached original summons issued in the above-entitled case with the information that on
January 8, 1992 summons and copies of the complaint were served to the defendants Jacob,
Jesus Jr., Adolfo, Mariano, Consolacion, Alice, Racheal thru defendant CaridadTrocino at their
given address at Maria Cristina Extension (besides Sacred Heart School for Girls), Cebu City,
evidence by her signature found at the lower portion of the original summons.
-

Respondents Adolfo and Mariano Trocino filed with the CA, a petition for the annulment of the
judgment rendered by the RTC-Cebu. Private respondents alleged that the trial courts decision is
null and void on the ground that it did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons as they were not
validly served with a copy of the summons and the complaint. According to them, at the time
summons was served on them, Adolfo Trocino was already in Ohio, U.S.A., and has been residing
there for 25 years, while Mariano Trocino was in Talibon, Bohol, and has been residing there since
1986. They also refuted the receipt of the summons by Caridad A. Trocino, and the representation
made by Atty. Bugarin in their behalf. Respondents also contended that they have a meritorious
defense. Petitioners filed their Comment/Answer to the petition. The CA then disposes the
decision of the RTC due to the fact that the summons was not properly given.

Issue: Whether or not the court of appeals erred in declaring the need of personal extra territorial summons,
despite the nature of the cause of action being in rem.
Held: No. The Supreme Court held that petitioners cause of action in Civil Case No. CEB-11103 is anchored
on the claim that the spouses Jesus and CaridadTrocino reneged on their obligation to convey ownership of
the two parcels of land subject of their sale. Thus, petitioners pray in their complaint that the spouses Trocino
be ordered to execute the appropriate deed of sale and that the titles be delivered to them (petitioners); or in
the alternative, that the sale be revoked and rescinded; and spouses Trocino ordered to return to petitioners
their down payment in the amount of P500,000.00 plus interests. The action instituted by petitioners affect
the parties alone, not the whole world. Hence, it is an action in personam, i.e., any judgment therein is
binding only upon the parties properly impleaded.
In actions in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer
jurisdiction on the court provided that the court acquires jurisdiction over the res, although summons must be
served upon the defendant in order to satisfy the due process requirements. Thus, where the defendant is a
non-resident who is not found in the Philippines, and (1) the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff;
(2) the action relates to, or the subject matter of which is property in the Philippines in which the defendant
has or claims a lien or interest; (3) the action seeks the exclusion of the defendant from any interest in the
property located in the Philippines; or (4) the property of the defendant has been attached in the Philippines,
summons may be served extraterritorially by (a) personal service out of the country, with leave of court; (b)
publication, also with leave of court; or (c) any other manner the court may deem sufficient.

Facts: Ricardo Gonzaga filed with the Office of the Ombudsman an administrative complaint with the prayer
for preventive suspension against respondent Baldazo, for alleged falsification of a Deed of Donation dated
September 18, 1995 in favor of Baldazo, as donee. The complaint alleged that Baldazo, taking advantage of
her position as Municipal Civil Registrar of Bustos, Bulacan falsified the said deed by making it appear
therein that TeofistaLazaro-Gonzaga (Teofista, for brevity), Ricardos wife and Baldazos aunt, executed the
subject deed when in truth and in fact Teofista was already incapable of doing so. Ricardo further accused
Baldazo of falsifying the Death Certificate of Teofista by making it appear that the latter died in Bustos,
Bulacan when in truth, she died at the Philippine General Hospital (PGH) in Manila. In her counter-affidavit,
Baldazo vehemently denied all accusations against her. She claimed that after her aunt signed the subject
Deed of Donation, then undated, the same was immediately taken away by Ricardo and the latters sister
and was kept in their possession since August of 1995; that she did not cause it to appear that said deed
was executed only on September 18, 1995; and that she did not use her position as Municipal Civil Registrar
to falsify her aunts Death Certificate, which was duly accomplished by Ricardo and his sister, with the
assistance of her (Baldazos) staff, Ma. Cecilia Ortega-Santos, such that if there was anybody who falsified
the same, it would be no less than Ricardo himself, who, with the aid of some relatives, prepared the Death
Certificate and even used it in claiming for burial assistance from the Philippine Veterans Affairs, as well as
for other benefits from the Government Service Insurance System. Finally, Baldazo alleged that it was not
true that Teofista died at the PGH, and because Ricardo was then too preoccupied grieving for the
impending death of his wife (Teofista), he did not even notice that the latter was brought to Bustos, Bulacan
where she expired. The Ombudsman found respondent Baldazo administratively liable for Dishonesty and
accordingly recommending her DISMISSAL from the service. ResspondentBaldazo elevated the case to the
CA on petition for review, where the latter came out with a decision finding the evidence insufficient to
establish a case of falsification of public documents against Baldazo.
Issue: Whether or not there is sufficient evidence to support a conclusion that there was falsification of
public documents a factual issue?
Held: YES. It is readily noticeable from the lone error assigned by the petitioner that the present recourse
raises factual issues which necessarily require this Court to revisit the evidence presented during the
investigation process. There is nothing more settled in this jurisdiction than the rule that this Court is not a
trier of facts, and that only questions of law may be entertained by the Court in petitions for review on
certiorari under Rule 45. Questions of fact are not reviewable. The question of whether there is sufficient
evidence to support a conclusion that there was falsification of public documents in the instant case is
definitely a factual issue which requires a review of the pieces of evidence presented by the parties. We
have, time and again, held that in administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving, by
substantial evidence, the allegations in the complaint. Here, complainant Ricardo claimed that respondent
Baldazo falsified the Deed of Donation in question on the basis of the presumption that Teofista was too
weak and incapable of executing said deed on the same day that she died. The CA, however, noted that the
deed was a public document having been duly notarized by Notary Public Santiago Lindayan. As correctly
pointed out by the appellate court, citing earlier cases: x xx. Documents acknowledged before notaries public
are public documents and public documents are admissible in evidence without necessity of preliminary
proof as to their authenticity and due execution. They have in their favor the presumption of regularity, and to
contradict the same, there must be evidence that is clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant.
(Emphasis supplied.)
18.ELMER F. GOMEZ vs. MA. LITA A. MONTALBAN

The objective sought in petitioners complaint was to establish a claim against respondents for their alleged
refusal to convey to them the title to the two parcels of land that they inherited from their father, Jesus
Trocino, who was one of the sellers of the properties to petitioners. Hence, to repeat, Civil Case No. CEB11103 is an action in personam because it is an action against persons, namely, herein respondents, on the
basis of their personal liability. As such, personal service of summons upon the defendants is essential in
order for the court to acquire of jurisdiction over their persons.

FACTS: On 30 May 2003, petitioner filed a Complaint with the RTC for a sum of money, damages and
payment of attorneys fees against respondent. The Complaint alleged, among other things, that: on or about
26 August 1998, respondent obtained a loan from petitioner in the sum of P40,000.00 with a voluntary
proposal on her part to pay 15% interest per month; upon receipt of the proceeds of the loan, respondent
issued in favor of petitioner, as security, bank checks. When the check became due, respondent failed to pay
the loan despite several demands; thus, petitioner filed the Complaint praying for the payment of
P238,000.00, representing the principal loan and interest charges, plus 25% of the amount to be awarded as
attorneys fees, as well as the cost of suit.

17. Office of the Ombudsman vsLazaro-Baldazo

RTC rendered a decision in favor of petitioner.

Civil Procedure Case Digest Batch 2-11

Respondent filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment, She claimed that she had good and valid defenses
against petitioner and that the RTC had no jurisdiction as the principal amount being claimed by
petitioner was only P40,000.00, an amount falling within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC).

The respondents reliance on Section 12 and Section 18 of Act No. 1120 to sustain their position that the
Bureau of Public Lands (now Land Management Bureau) instead had exclusive jurisdiction was without
basis. Act 1120 gives limited administration and disposition of friar lands to Land Management Bureau
(LMB). LMB ceases to have jurisdiction once the friar land is disposed of in favor of a private person.

RTC granted respondents Petition for Relief from Judgment and set aside its Decision dated 4 May 2004
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

By disregarding the allegations of the complaint, the RTC acted whimsically and capriciously. Given all the
foregoing, the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The term grave
abuse of discretion connotes whimsical and capricious exercise of judgment as is equivalent to excess, or
lack of jurisdiction.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over this case for sum of money, damages
and attorneys fees where the principal amount of the obligation is P40,000.00 but the amount of the demand
per allegation of the complaint is P238,000.00
HELD: The Supreme Court gleans from the foregoing that petitioners cause of action is the respondents
violation of their loan agreement. In that loan agreement, respondent expressly agreed to pay the principal
amount of the loan, plus 15% monthly interest. Consequently, petitioner is claiming and praying for in his
Complaint the total amount ofP238,000.00, already inclusive of the interest on the loan which had accrued
from 1998. Since the interest on the loan is a primary and inseparable component of the cause of action, not
merely incidental thereto, and already determinable at the time of filing of the Complaint, it must be included
in the determination of which court has the jurisdiction over petitioners case. Using as basis the
P238,000.00 amount being claimed by petitioner from respondent for payment of the principal loan
and interest, this Court finds that it is well within the jurisdictional amount fixed by law for RTCs.
Contrary to respondents contention, jurisdiction can neither be made to depend on the amount ultimately
substantiated in the course of the trial or proceedings nor be affected by proof showing that the claimant is
entitled to recover a sum in excess of the jurisdictional amount fixed by law. Jurisdiction is determined by the
cause of action as alleged in the complaint and not by the amount ultimately substantiated and awarded.
Basic as a hornbook principle is that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and
determined by the allegations in the complaint which comprise a concise statement of the ultimate facts
constituting the plaintiffs cause of action.
The averments in the complaint and the character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted.
19.Heirs of Spouses Reterta vs. Spouses Mores
Facts: Petitioners commenced an action for quieting of title and reconveyance in the RTC of TreceMartires,
Cavite City. They averred that they were the true and real owners of the subject land, having inherited the
same from their late father, who was the grantee of the land. Petitioners discovered an affidavit purportedly
executed by their late father wherein he waived his rights, interests and participation in the land. By virtue of
said affidavit, a certificate of title was issued in favor of respondents. Respondents filed a motion to dismiss
insisting that the RTC had no jurisdiction because the subject land is friar land.

20. Spouses SabitsanavsMuertegui

Facts: Garcia executed an unnotarized Deed of Sale in favor of respondent Juanito over a parcel of land.
Domingo Sr.and brother Domingo Jr. took actual possession of the lot and planted thereon coconut and ipilipil trees.
Then, Garcia sold the lot to the Muertegui family lawyer, petitioner Atty. Sabitsana, through a notarized deed
of absolute sale. Although Domingo Jr. and Sr. paid the real estate taxes, Atty. Sabitsana also paid real
property taxes. In 1996, he introduced concrete improvements on the property, which shortly thereafter were
destroyed by a typhoon.
When Domingo Sr. passed away, his heirs applied for registration and coverage of the lot under the Public
Land Act or Commonwealth Act No. 141. Atty. Sabitsana, in a letter, addressed to the CENRO/PENRO office
in Naval, Biliran, opposed the application, claiming that he was the true owner of the lot. He asked that the
application for registration be held in abeyance until the issue of conflicting ownership has been resolved.
Juanito, through his attorney-in-fact Domingo Jr., filed Civil Case for quieting of title and preliminary
injunction, against herein petitioners Atty. Sabitsana and his wife, Rosario, claiming that they bought the lot
in bad faith and are exercising acts of possession and ownership over the same, which acts thus constitute a
cloud over his title.
Petitioners asserted that the sale to Juanito is null and void absent the marital consent of Garcias wife,
Soledad Corto (Soledad); that they acquired the property in good faith and for value; and that the Complaint
is barred by prescription and laches. They likewise insisted that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naval,
Biliran did not have jurisdiction over the case, which involved title to or interest in a parcel of land the
assessed value of which is merely P1,230.00.
RTC found in favor of the muertegui's and declared the deed of sale of 1981 valid and preferred while that
entered by Garcia and SAbistana are void and of no legal effect. It declared further that sabistana was a
buyer in good faith.
The decision was appealed to the CA. CA affirmed the decision of RTC.

The RTC dismissed petitioners complaint and held that Act No 1120 is the prevailing law over friar lands and
the Director of Lands has the exclusive administration and disposition of Friar Lands. More so, the
determination whether or not fraud had been committed in the procurement of the sales certificate rests to
the exclusive power of the Director of Lands.
Issue: Whether or not the instant petition is within jurisdiction of regular courts
Held: The Court here ruled in the Affirmative, applying BP 129, as amended by RA 7691.
Conformably with the said law, an action for reconveyance or to remove a cloud on ones title involves the
title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, exclusive original jurisdiction over such action
pertained to the RTC, unless the assessed value of the property did not exceed P20,000.00 (in which
instance the MTC having territorial jurisdiction would have exclusive original jurisdiction). Determinative of
which regular court had jurisdiction would be the allegations of the complaint (on the assessed value of the
property) and the principal relief thereby sought.

Issue: WON THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE IN VIEW
OF THE FACT THAT THE ASSESSED VALUE OF THE SUBJECT LAND WAS ONLY P1,230.00 (AND
STATED MARKET VALUE OF ONLY P3,450.00).
HELD:YES. A suit for quieting of title is one whose subject matter is incapable of pecuniary estimation, and
thus falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC. The Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the suit for quieting
of title.
On the question of jurisdiction, it is clear under the Rules that an action for quieting of title may be instituted
in the RTCs, regardless of the assessed value of the real property in dispute. Under Rule 63 of the Rules of
Court, an action to quiet title to real property or remove clouds therefrom may be brought in the appropriate
RTC.

Civil Procedure Case Digest Batch 2-12

It must be remembered that the suit for quieting of title was prompted by petitioners letter-opposition to
respondents application for registration. Thus, in order to prevent a cloud from being cast upon his
application for a title. In this sense, the action is one for declaratory relief, which properly falls within the
jurisdiction of the RTC pursuant to Rule 63 of the Rules.