AZNAR V.

GARCIA
Facts:
Edward S. Christensen, though born in New York, migrated to California where he resided and
consequently was considered a California Citizen for a period of nine years to 1913. He came to the Philippines
where he became a domiciliary until the time of his death. However, during the entire period of his residence in this
country, he had always considered himself as a citizen of California.
In his will, executed on March 5, 1951, he instituted an acknowledged natural daughter, Maria Lucy
Christensen as his only heir but left a legacy of some money in favor of Helen Christensen Garcia who, in a decision
rendered by the Supreme Court had been declared as an acknowledged natural daughter of his. Counsel of Helen
claims that under Art. 16 (2) of the civil code, California law should be applied, the matter is returned back to the law
of domicile, that Philippine law is ultimately applicable, that the share of Helen must be increased in view of
successional rights of illegitimate children under Philippine laws. On the other hand, counsel for daughter Maria , in as
much that it is clear under Art, 16 (2) of the Mew Civil Code, the national of the deceased must apply, our courts
must apply internal law of California on the matter. Under California law, there are no compulsory heirs and
consequently a testator should dispose any property possessed by him in absolute dominion.

Issue:
Whether Philippine Law or California Law should apply.

Held:
The Supreme Court deciding to grant more successional rights to Helen Christensen Garcia said in effect
that there be two rules in California on the matter.
1.

The conflict rule which should apply to Californians outside the California, and

2.

The internal Law which should apply to California domiciles in califronia.

The California conflict rule, found on Art. 946 of the California Civil code States that if there is no law to the
contrary in the place where personal property is situated, it is deemed to follow the decree of its owner and is
governed by the law of the domicile.
Christensen being domiciled outside california, the law of his domicile, the Philippines is ought to be
followed.
Wherefore, the decision appealed is reversed and case is remanded to the lower court with instructions that
partition be made as that of the Philippine law provides.

BELLIS V. BELLIS
FACTS:
Amos Bellis, born in Texas, was a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States. He had 5 legitimate children with his
wife, Mary Mallen, whom he had divorced, 3 legitimate children with his 2nd wife, Violet Kennedy and finally, 3 illegitimate
children.
Prior to his death, Amos Bellis executed a will in the Philippines in which his distributable estate should be divided in trust in
the following order and manner:
a. $240,000 to his 1st wife Mary Mallen;
b. P120,000 to his 3 illegitimate children at P40,000 each;
c. The remainder shall go to his surviving children by his 1st and 2nd wives, in equal shares.
Subsequently, Amos Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, USA. His will was admitted to probate in the Philippines.
The Peoples Bank and Trust Company, an executor of the will, paid the entire bequest therein.
Preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted and filed its Executors Final Account, Report of
Administration and Project of Partition where it reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the legacy of Mary Mallen by the
shares of stock amounting to $240,000 delivered to her, and the legacies of the 3 illegitimate children in the amount of
P40,000 each or a total of P120,000. In the project partition, the executor divided the residuary estate into 7 equal portions
for the benefit of the testators 7 legitimate children by his 1st and 2nd marriages.
Among the 3 illegitimate children, Mari Cristina and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective opposition to the project
partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children.
The lower court denied their respective motions for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether Texan Law or Philippine Law must apply.
RULING:
It is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his death. So that even
assuming Texan has a conflict of law rule providing that the same would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine
Law, but would still refer to Texas Law.
Nonetheless, if Texas has conflict rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application of the law of the
place where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here involved are found in the Philippines.
In the absence, however of proofs as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be presumed different from our
appellants, position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of renvoi.
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, USA and that under the Laws of Texas,
there are no forced heirs or legitimates. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of
successional rights has to be determined under Texas Law, the Philippine Law on legitimates cannot be applied to the
testate of Amos Bellis.
Bellis vs. Bellis
FACTS:
Amos G. Bellis was a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States. He had five legitimate children with his first wife (whom he divorced), three
legitimate children with his second wife (who survived him) and, finally, three illegitimate children.
6 years prior Amos Bellis death, he executed two(2) wills, apportioning the remainder of his estate and properties to his seven surviving children. The
appellants filed their oppositions to the project of partition claiming that they have been deprived of their legitimes to which they were entitled according
to the Philippine law. Appellants argued that the deceased wanted his Philippine estate to be governed by the Philippine law, thus the creation of two
separate wills.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Philippine law be applied in the case in the determination of the illegitimate childrens successional rights
RULING:
Court ruled that provision in a foreigners will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with his
national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be ignored in view of those matters that Article 10 now Article 16 of the Civil Code
states said national law should govern.
Where the testator was a citizen of Texas and domiciled in Texas, the intrinsic validity of his will should be governed by his national law. Since Texas
law does not require legitimes, then his will, which deprived his illegitimate children of the legitimes, is valid.
The Supreme Court held that the illegitimate children are not entitled to the legitimes under the texas law, which is the national law of the deceased.

CADALIN VS POEA
FACTS:
This is a consolidation of 3 cases of SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS in the Supreme Court for Certiorari.
On June 6, 1984, Cadalin, Amul and Evangelista, in their own behalf and on behalf of 728 other OCWs instituted a class suit
by filing an Amended Complaint with the POEA for money claims arising from their recruitment by ASIA INTERNATIONAL
BUILDERS CORPORATION (AIBC) and employment by BROWN & ROOT INTERNATIONAL, INC (BRI) which is a foreign
corporation with headquarters in Houston, Texas, and is engaged in construction; while AIBC is a domestic corporation
licensed as a service contractor to recruit, mobilize and deploy Filipino workers for overseas employment on behalf of its
foreign principals.
The amended complaint sought the payment of the unexpired portion of the employment contracts, which was terminated
prematurely, and secondarily, the payment of the interest of the earnings of the Travel and Reserved Fund; interest on all the
unpaid benefits; area wage and salary differential pay; fringe benefits; reimbursement of SSS and premium not remitted to
the SSS; refund of withholding tax not remitted to the BIR; penalties for committing prohibited practices; as well as the
suspension of the license of AIBC and the accreditation of BRII
On October 2, 1984, the POEA Administrator denied the Motion to Strike Out of the Records filed by AIBC but required the
claimants to correct the deficiencies in the complaint pointed out.
AIB and BRII kept on filing Motion for Extension of Time to file their answer. The POEA kept on granting such motions.
On November 14, 1984, claimants filed an opposition to the motions for extension of time and asked that AIBC and BRII
declared in default for failure to file their answers.
On December 27, 1984, the POEA Administrator issued an order directing AIBC and BRII to file their answers within ten
days from receipt of the order.
(at madami pang motions ang na-file, new complainants joined the case, ang daming inavail na remedies ng both parties)
On June 19, 1987, AIBC finally submitted its answer to the complaint. At the same hearing, the parties were given a period
of 15 days from said date within which to submit their respective position papers. On February 24, 1988, AIBC and BRII
submitted position paper. On October 27, 1988, AIBC and BRII filed a Consolidated Reply, POEA Administrator rendered
his decision which awarded the amount of $824, 652.44 in favor of only 324 complainants. Claimants submitted their
Appeal Memorandum For Partial Appeal from the decision of the POEA. AIBC also filed its MR and/or appeal in addition to
the Notice of Appeal filed earlier.
NLRC promulgated its Resolution, modifying the decision of the POEA. The resolution removed some of the benefits
awarded in favor of the claimants. NLRC denied all the MRs. Hence, these petitions filed by the claimants and by AlBC and
BRII.
The case rooted from the Labor Law enacted by Bahrain where most of the complainants were deployed. His Majesty Ise
Bin Selman Al Kaifa, Amir of Bahrain, issued his Amiri Decree No. 23 on June 16, 1176, otherwise known re the Labour Law
for the Private Sector. Some of the provision of Amiri Decree No. 23 that are relevant to the claims of the complainantsappellants are as follows:
Art. 79: x x x A worker shall receive payment for each extra hour equivalent to his wage entitlement increased by a minimum
of twenty-rive per centurn thereof for hours worked during the day; and by a minimum off fifty per centurn thereof for hours
worked during the night which shall be deemed to being from seven oclock in the evening until seven oclock in the
morning .
Art. 80: Friday shall be deemed to be a weekly day of rest on full pay.
If employee worked, 150% of his normal wage shall be paid to him x x x.
Art. 81; x x x When conditions of work require the worker to work on any official holiday, he shall be paid an additional sum
equivalent to 150% of his normal wage.
Art. 84: Every worker who has completed one years continuous service with his employer shall be entitled to Laos on full
pay for a period of not less than 21 days for each year increased to a period not less than 28 days after five continuous
years of service.
A worker shall be entitled to such leave upon a quantum meruit in respect of the proportion of his service in that year.
Art. 107: A contract of employment made for a period of indefinite duration may be terminated by either party thereto after
giving the other party prior notice before such termination, in writing, in respect of monthly paid workers and fifteen days
notice in respect of other workers. The party terminating a contract without the required notice shall pay to the other party
compensation equivalent to the amount of wages payable to the worker for the period of such notice or the unexpired portion
thereof.
Art. Ill: x x x the employer concerned shall pay to such worker, upon termination of employment, a leaving indemnity for the
period of his employment calculated on the basis of fifteen days wages for each year of the first three years of service and

of one months wages for each year of service thereafter. Such worker shall be entitled to payment of leaving indemnity upon
a quantum meruit in proportion to the period of his service completed within a year.
ISSUE:
1. WON the foreign law should govern or the contract of the parties.(WON the complainants who have worked in Bahrain
are entitled to the above-mentioned benefits provided by Amiri Decree No. 23 of Bahrain).
2. WON the Bahrain Law should apply in the case. (Assuming it is applicable WON complainants claim for the benefits
provided therein have prescribed.)
3. Whether or not the instant cases qualify as; a class suit (siningit ko nalang)
(the rest of the issues in the full text of the case refer to Labor Law)
RULING:
1. NLRC set aside Section 1, Rule 129 of the 1989 Revised Rules on Evidence governing the pleading and proof of a
foreign law and admitted in evidence a simple copy of the Bahrains Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 (Labour Law for the Private
Sector).
NLRC applied the Amiri Deere, No. 23 of 1976, which provides for greater benefits than those stipulated in the overseasemployment contracts of the claimants. It was of the belief that where the laws of the host country are more favorable and
beneficial to the workers, then the laws of the host country shall form part of the overseas employment contract. It approved
the observation of the POEA Administrator that in labor proceedings, all doubts in the implementation of the provisions of the
Labor Code and its implementing regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor.
The overseas-employment contracts, which were prepared by AIBC and BRII themselves, provided that the laws of the host
country became applicable to said contracts if they offer terms and conditions more favorable than those stipulated therein.
However there was a part of the employment contract which provides that the compensation of the employee may be
adjusted downward so that the total computation plus the non-waivable benefits shall be equivalent to the compensation
therein agree, another part of the same provision categorically states that total remuneration and benefits do not fall below
that of the host country regulation and custom.
Any ambiguity in the overseas-employment contracts should be interpreted against AIBC and BRII, the parties that drafted it.
Article 1377 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides:
The interpretation of obscure words or stipulations in a contract shall not favor the party who caused the obscurity.
Said rule of interpretation is applicable to contracts of adhesion where there is already a prepared form containing the
stipulations of the employment contract and the employees merely take it or leave it. The presumption is that there was an
imposition by one party against the other and that the employees signed the contracts out of necessity that reduced their
bargaining power.
We read the overseas employment contracts in question as adopting the provisions of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 as
part and parcel thereof. The parties to a contract may select the law by which it is to be governed. In such a case, the foreign
law is adopted as a system to regulate the relations of the parties, including questions of their capacity to enter into the
contract, the formalities to be observed by them, matters of performance, and so forth. Instead of adopting the entire mass
of the foreign law, the parties may just agree that specific provisions of a foreign statute shall be deemed incorporated into
their contract as a set of terms. By such reference to the provisions of the foreign law, the contract does not become a
foreign contract to be governed by the foreign law. The said law does not operate as a statute but as a set of contractual
terms deemed written in the contract.
A basic policy of contract is to protect the expectation of the parties. Such party expectation is protected by giving effect to
the parties own choice of the applicable law. The choice of law must, however, bear some relationship the parties or their
transaction. There is no question that the contracts sought to be enforced by claimants have a direct connection with the
Bahrain law because the services were rendered in that country.
2. NLRC ruled that the prescriptive period for the filing of the claims of the complainants was 3 years, as provided in Article
291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, and not ten years as provided in Article 1144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
nor one year as provided in the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976.
Article 156 of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 provides:
A claim arising out of a contract of employment shall not actionable after the lapse of one year from the date of the expiry of
the Contract.
As a general rule, a foreign procedural law will not be applied in the forum (local court), Procedural matters, such as service
of process, joinder of actions, period and requisites for appeal, and so forth, are governed by the laws of the forum. This is
true even if the action is based upon a foreign substantive law.
A law on prescription of actions is sui generis in Conflict of Laws in the sense that it may be viewed either as procedural or
substantive, depending on the characterization given such a law. In Bournias v. Atlantic Maritime Company (220 F. 2d. 152,

2d Cir. [1955]), where the issue was the applicability of the Panama Labor Code in a case filed in the State of New York for
claims arising from said Code, the claims would have prescribed under the Panamanian Law but not under the Statute of
Limitations of New York. The U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Panamanian Law was procedural as it was not
specifically intended to be substantive, hence, the prescriptive period provided in the law of the forum should apply. The
Court observed: . . . we are dealing with a statute of limitations of a foreign country, and it is not clear on the face of the
statute that its purpose was to limit the enforceability, outside as well as within the foreign country concerned, of the
substantive rights to which the statute pertains. We think that as a yardstick for determining whether that was the purpose,
this test is the most satisfactory one.
The Court further noted: Applying that test here it appears to us that the libellant is entitled to succeed, for the respondents
have failed to satisfy us that the Panamanian period of limitation in question was specifically aimed against the particular
rights which the libellant seeks to enforce. The Panama Labor Code is a statute having broad objectives. The American
court applied the statute of limitations of New York, instead of the Panamanian law, after finding that there was no showing
that the Panamanian law on prescription was intended to be substantive. Being considered merely a procedural law even in
Panama, it has to give way to the law of the forum (local Court) on prescription of actions.
However the characterization of a statute into a procedural or substantive law becomes irrelevant when the country of the
forum (local Court) has a borrowing statute. Said statute has the practical effect of treating the foreign statute of limitation
as one of substance. A borrowing statute directs the state of the forum (local Court) to apply the foreign statute of
limitations to the pending claims based on a foreign law. While there are several kinds of borrowing statutes, one form
provides that an action barred by the laws of the place where it accrued will not be enforced in the forum even though the
local statute was not run against it.
Section 48 of Code of Civil Procedure is of this kind. It provides: If by the laws of the state or country where the cause of
action arose, the action is barred, it is also barred in the Philippine Islands.
Section 48 has not been repealed or amended by the Civil Code of the Philippines. In the light of the 1987 Constitution,
however, Section 48 cannot be enforced ex proprio vigore insofar as it ordains the application in this jurisdiction of Section
156 of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976.
The courts of the forum (local Court) will not enforce any foreign claim obnoxious to the forums public policy. To enforce the
one-year prescriptive period of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 as regards the claims in question would contravene the
public policy on the protection to labor.
In the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the 1987 Constitution emphasized that:The state shall promote social
justice in all phases of national development (Sec. 10).
The state affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare
(Sec. 18).
In Article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights, the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full
employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.
Thus, the applicable law on prescription is the Philippine law.
The next question is whether the prescriptive period governing the filing of the claims is 3 years, as provided by the Labor
Code or 10 years, as provided by the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Article 1144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides:
The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accross:
(1) Upon a written contract; (2) Upon an obligation created by law; (3) Upon a judgment
In this case, the claim for pay differentials is primarily anchored on the written contracts between the litigants, the ten-year
prescriptive period provided by Art. 1144(l) of the New Civil Code should govern.
3. NO. A class suit is proper where the subject matter of the controversy is one of common or general interest to many and
the parties are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the court. When all the claims are for benefits
granted under the Bahrain law many of the claimants worked outside Bahrain. Some of the claimants were deployed in
Indonesia under different terms and condition of employment.
Inasmuch as the First requirement of a class suit is not present (common or general interest based on the Amiri Decree of
the State of Bahrain), it is only logical that only those who worked in Bahrain shall be entitled to rile their claims in a class
suit.
While there are common defendants (AIBC and BRII) and the nature of the claims is the same (for employees benefits),
there is no common question of law or fact. While some claims are based on the Amiri Law of Bahrain, many of the
claimants never worked in that country, but were deployed elsewhere. Thus, each claimant is interested only in his own
demand and not in the claims of the other employees of defendants. A claimant has no concern in protecting the interests of
the other claimants as shown by the fact, that hundreds of them have abandoned their co-claimants and have entered into
separate compromise settlements of their respective claims. The claimants who worked in Bahrain can not be allowed to sue
in a class suit in a judicial proceeding.
WHEREFORE, all the three petitioners are DISMISSED

Bank of America v. American Realty

Facts:
Petitioner granted loans to 3 foreign corporations. As security, the latter mortgaged a
property located in the Philippines owned by herein respondent ARC. ARC is a third party
mortgagor who pledged its own property in favor of the 3 debtor-foreign corporations.
The debtors failed to pay. Thus, petitioner filed collection suits in foreign courts to enforce
the loan. Subsequently, it filed a petition in the Sheriff to extra-judicially foreclose the said
mortgage, which was granted.
On 12 February 1993, private respondent filed before the Pasig RTC, Branch 159, an action
for damages against the petitioner, for the latters act of foreclosing extra-judicially the real
estate mortgages despite the pendency of civil suits before foreign courts for the collection
of the principal loan.
Issue:
WON petitioners act of filing a collection suit against the principal debtors for the recovery
of the loan before foreign courts constituted a waiver of the remedy of foreclosure.
Held: Yes.
1. Loan; Mortgage; remedies:
In the absence of express statutory provisions, a mortgage creditor may institute against the
mortgage debtor either a personal action or debt or a real action to foreclose the mortgage.
In other words, he may pursue either of the two remedies, but not both. By such election, his
cause of action can by no means be impaired, for each of the two remedies is complete in
itself.
In our jurisdiction, the remedies available to the mortgage creditor are deemed alternative
and not cumulative. Notably, an election of one remedy operates as a waiver of the other.

For this purpose, a remedy is deemed chosen upon the filing of the suit for collection or
upon the filing of the complaint in an action for foreclosure of mortgage. As to extrajudicial
foreclosure, such remedy is deemed elected by the mortgage creditor upon filing of the
petition not with any court of justice but with the Office of the Sheriff of the province where
the sale is to be made.
In the case at bar, petitioner only has one cause of action which is non-payment of the debt.
Nevertheless, alternative remedies are available for its enjoyment and exercise. Petitioner
then may opt to exercise only one of two remedies so as not to violate the rule against
splitting a cause of action.
Accordingly, applying the foregoing rules, we hold that petitioner, by the expediency of
filing four civil suits before foreign courts, necessarily abandoned the remedy to foreclose
the real estate mortgages constituted over the properties of third-party mortgagor and
herein private respondent ARC. Moreover, by filing the four civil actions and by eventually
foreclosing extra-judicially the mortgages, petitioner in effect transgressed the rules against
splitting a cause of action well-enshrined in jurisprudence and our statute books.
2. Conflicts of Law
Incidentally, petitioner alleges that under English Law, which according to petitioner is the
governing law with regard to the principal agreements, the mortgagee does not lose its
security interest by simply filing civil actions for sums of money.
We rule in the negative.
In a long line of decisions, this Court adopted the well-imbedded principle in our
jurisdiction that there is no judicial notice of any foreign law. A foreign law must be properly
pleaded and proved as a fact. Thus, if the foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and
proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or
internal
law. This is what we refer to as the doctrine of processual presumption.
In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the English Law on the matter were properly
pleaded and proved in said foreign law would still not find applicability.

Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and established
public policy of the forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order shall not be applied.
Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which
have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered
ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed
upon in a foreign country.
The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is the principle imbedded in our
jurisdiction proscribing the splitting up of a single cause of action.
Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application would work undeniable
injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice is the most important
function of law; hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust negates the
fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws.
Clearly then, English Law is not applicable.

HERALD BLACK DACASIN,

Petitioner
, v.
SHARON DEL MUNDO DACASIN,
Respondent
.
G.R. No. 168785 : February 5, 2010CARPIO,
J.:
Facts:

Herald, American, and Sharon, Filipino, were married in Manila in April 1994.
They have one daughter, Stephanie, born on September 21, 1995.
In June 1999, Sharon sought and obtained a divorce decree from the CircuitCourt, 19th Judicial Circuit, Lake County,
Illinois (Illinois court). In its ruling, the Illinoiscourt dissolved the marriage of petitioner and respondent, awarded to
respondentsole custody of Stephanie and retained jurisdiction over the case for enforcementpurposes.
On January 28, 2002,
both executed in Manila a contract for joint custody over Stephanie.
In 2004,
Herald filed a case against Sharon alleging that Sharon had exercised sole custody over Stephanie contrary to their
agreement.
The trial court held that (1) it is precluded from taking cognizance over the suit considering the Illinois courts retention of
jurisdiction to enforce its divorce decree, including its order awarding sole custody of Stephanie to respondent; (2) the
divorce decree is binding on petitioner following the nationality rule prevailing in this jurisdiction; and (3) the Agreement is
void for contravening Article 2035, paragraph 5 of the Civil Code prohibiting compromise agreements on jurisdiction and
dismissed the case.
Issue:
WON the trial court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of petitioners suit and enforce the Agreement on the joint custody
of the parties child
Held/ Rationale:
The trial courts refusal to entertain petitioners suit was grounded not on its lack of power to do so but on its thinking that
the Illinois courts divorce decree stripped it of jurisdiction. This conclusion is unfounded. What the Illinois court retained was
jurisdictionx x x for the purpose of enforcing all and sundry the various provisions of [its] Judgment for Dissolution.
Petitioners suit seeks the enforcement not of the various provisions of the divorce decree but of the post-divorce
Agreement on joint child custody. Thus, the action lies beyond the zone of the Illinois courts so-called retained jurisdiction.

HSBC v. Sheman

FACTS: It appears that sometime in 1981, Eastern Book Supply Service PTE, Ltd.
(COMPANY), a company incorporated in Singapore applied with and was granted by
HSBC Singapore branch an overdraft facility in the maximum amount of Singapore
dollars 200,000 with interest at 3% over HSBC prime rate, payable monthly, on
amounts due under said overdraft facility.
As a security for the repayment by the COMPANY of sums advanced by HSBC to it
through the aforesaid overdraft facility, in 1982, both private respondents and a
certain Lowe, all of whom were directors of the COMPANY at such time, executed a
Joint and Several Guarantee in favor of HSBC whereby private respondents and
Lowe agreed to pay, jointly and severally, on demand all sums owed by the
COMPANY to petitioner BANK under the aforestated overdraft facility.
The
Joint
and
Several
Guarantee
provides,
inter
alia,
that:
This guarantee and all rights, obligations and liabilities arising hereunder shall be
construed and determined under and may be enforced in accordance with the laws
of the Republic of Singapore. We hereby agree that the Courts of Singapore shall
have jurisdiction over all disputes arising under this guarantee.
The COMPANY failed to pay its obligation. Thus, HSBC demanded payment and
inasmuch as the private respondents still failed to pay, HSBC filed A complaint for
collection of a sum of money against private respondents Sherman and Reloj before
RTC
of
Quezon
City.
Private respondents filed an MTD on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter. The trial court denied the motion. They then filed before the
respondent IAC a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction and/or prayer
for a restraining order. The IAC rendered a decision enjoining the RTC Quezon City
from taking further cognizance of the case and to dismiss the same for filing with
the proper court of Singapore which is the proper forum. MR denied, hence this
petition.
ISSUE: Do Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the suit, vis-a-vis the Guarantee
stipulation regarding jurisdiction?
HELD: YES
One basic principle underlies all rules of jurisdiction in International Law: a State
does not have jurisdiction in the absence of some reasonable basis for exercising it,
whether the proceedings are in rem quasi in rem or in personam. To be reasonable,
the jurisdiction must be based on some minimum contacts that will not offend
traditional
notions
of
fair
play
and
substantial
justice
The defense of private respondents that the complaint should have been filed in
Singapore is based merely on technicality. They did not even claim, much less
prove, that the filing of the action here will cause them any unnecessary trouble,
damage, or expense. On the other hand, there is no showing that petitioner BANK
filed the action here just to harass private respondents.

**
In the case of Neville Y. Lamis Ents., et al. v. Lagamon, etc., where the stipulation
was [i]n case of litigation, jurisdiction shall be vested in the Court of Davao City.
We held:
Anent the claim that Davao City had been stipulated as the venue, suffice it to say
that a stipulation as to venue does not preclude the filing of suits in the residence of
plaintiff or defendant under Section 2 (b), Rule 4, ROC, in the absence of qualifying
or restrictive words in the agreement which would indicate that the place named is
the
only
venue
agreed
upon
by
the
parties.
Applying the foregoing to the case at bar, the parties did not thereby stipulate that
only the courts of Singapore, to the exclusion of all the rest, has jurisdiction. Neither
did the clause in question operate to divest Philippine courts of jurisdiction. In
International Law, jurisdiction is often defined as the light of a State to exercise
authority over persons and things within its boundaries subject to certain
exceptions. Thus, a State does not assume jurisdiction over travelling sovereigns,
ambassadors and diplomatic representatives of other States, and foreign military
units stationed in or marching through State territory with the permission of the
latters authorities. This authority, which finds its source in the concept of
sovereignty, is exclusive within and throughout the domain of the State. A State is
competent to take hold of any judicial matter it sees fit by making its courts and
agencies assume jurisdiction over all kinds of cases brought before them

CARNIVAL CRUISE LINES v. SHUTE

Brief Fact Summary. Plaintiff Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. opposes a suit by a passenger injured on one of their cruise ships,
because the cruise tickets contained an agreement that all matters relating to the cruise would be litigated before a Florida court.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. Forum-selection clauses forcing individuals to agree to submit to jurisdiction in a particular place are
enforceable so long as they pass the test for judicial fairness.
Facts. Defendant Shute purchased passage for a seven day cruise on the Tropicale, a ship owned by Plaintiff, through a
Washington travel agent. The face of each ticket contained terms and conditions of passage, which included an agreement that all
matters disputed or litigated subject to the travel agreement, would be before a Florida court. Defendant boarded the ship in
California, which then sailed to Puerto Vallarta, Mexico before returning to Los Angeles. While the ship was in international waters,
Defendant Eulala Shute was injured from slipping on a deck mat. Defendants filed suit in Federal District Court in Washington.
Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging that the clause in the tickets required Defendants to bring their suit in
Florida.
Issue. Whether the court should enforce a forum-selection clause forcing individuals to submit to jurisdiction in a particular state.

Held. Yes. The Supreme Court of the United States held that the Court of Appeals erred in refusing to enforce the forum-selection
clause.
Forum-selection clauses contained in form passage contracts are subject to judicial scrutiny for fundamental fairness, but where
they are not lacking in fairness, they will be enforced.

Dissent. Justice Stevens dissented, in which he was joined by Justice Marshall. Essentially Justice Stevens feels that adhesion
contracts, particularly forum-selection clauses, are void as contrary to public policy if they were not freely bargained for, create
additional expense for one party, or deny one party a remedy.
Discussion. In reaching its decision, the court noted that there is no evidence that Plaintiff set Florida as the forum as a means of
discouraging cruise passengers from pursuing their claims. Such a suggestion is negated by the fact that Plaintiff has its
headquarters in Florida, and many of its cruises depart from Florida.
Analysis: The Court says that the ticket contract was a routine commercial passage contract. It was not
negotiated, and the parties did not have equal bargaining power.
The Court enumerates several good reasons for a forum selection clause in a cruise ticket contract:
1.
A cruise will have passengers from all over the country, and absent a forum selection clause, the cruise
company could be subject to suit in all sorts of places.
2.

A forum selection clause eliminates uncertainty about the forum and avoids costly pretrial motions.

3.
Forum selection clauses mean lower fares for passengers because the cruise company passes along savings
from limiting the forums where the company must defend itself.

The Court says that the key question is whether the clause is fair. In evaluating the fairness of such clauses, the
Court must consider whether Carnival was, in bad faith, discouraging legitimate claims from its passengers. The
Court says that because Carnival does business primarily in Florida and has a lot of cruises that depart from Florida,
they didnt include the clause in bad faith.
Stevens, in his dissent, refers to two strands of contract law that come into play in this case.

1.
Courts look closer at contracts made between parties with unequal bargaining power, especially take it or
leave it contracts.
2.
At least in the past, forum selection clauses have been found to be counter to public policy. In particular, they
are not enforced if they (1) were not freely bargained for, (2) create additional expense for one party, or (3)
deny one party a remedy.

EDISTAFF BUILDERS v. NLRC

FACTS: In 1993, EDI-Staffbuilders, Inc. (EDI), upon request of Omar Ahmed Ali Bin Bechr Est. (OAB), a
company in Saudi Arabia, sent to OAB resumes from which OAB can choose a computer specialist. Eleazar
Gran was selected. It was agreed that his monthly salary shall be $850.00. But five months into his service in
Saudi Arabia, Gran received a termination letter and right there and then was removed from his post. The
termination letter states that he was incompetent because he does not know the ACAD system which is
required in his line of work; that he failed to enrich his knowledge during his 5 month stay to prove his
competence; that he is disobedient because he failed to submit the required daily reports to OAB. Gran then
signed a quitclaim whereby he declared that he is releasing OAB from any liability in exchange of 2,948.00
Riyal.
When Gran returned, he filed a labor case for illegal dismissal against EDI and OAB. EDI in its defense averred
that the dismissal is valid because when Gran and OAB signed the employment contract, both parties agreed
that Saudi labor laws shall govern all matters relating to the termination of Grans employment; that under
Saudi labor laws, Grans termination due to incompetence and insubordination is valid; that Grans
insubordination and incompetence is outlined in the termination letter Gran received. The labor arbiter
dismissed the labor case but on appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed the
decision of the arbiter. The Court of Appeals likewise affirmed the NLRC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Saudi labor laws should be applied.
HELD: No. The specific Saudi labor laws were not proven in court. EDI did not present proof as to the
existence and the specific provisions of such foreign law. Hence, processual presumption applies and
Philippine labor laws shall be used. Under our laws, an employee like Gran shall only be terminated upon just
cause. The allegations against him, at worst, shall only merit a suspension not a dismissal. His incompetence is
not proven because prior to being sent to Saudi Arabia, he underwent the required trade test to prove his
competence. The presumption therefore is that he is competent and that it is upon OAB and EDI to prove
otherwise. No proof of his incompetence was ever adduced in court. His alleged insubordination is likewise not
proven. It was not proven that the submission of daily track records is part of his job as a computer specialist.
There was also a lack of due process. Under our laws, Gran is entitled to the two notice rule whereby prior to
termination he should receive two notices. In the case at bar, he only received one and he was immediately
terminated on the same day he received the notice.
Lastly, the quitclaim may not also release OAB from liability. Philippine laws is again applied here sans proof of
Saudi laws. Under Philippine Laws, a quitclaim is generally frowned upon and are strictly examined. In this
case, based on the circumstances, Gran at that time has no option but to sign the quitclaim. The quitclaim is
also void because his separation pay was merely 2,948 Riyal which is lower than the $850.00 monthly salary
(3,190 Riyal).

WILDVALLEY v. CA
FACTS: In the Orinoco River in Venezuela, it is a rule that ships passing through it must be piloted by pilots
familiar to the river. Hence, in 1988 Captain Nicandro Colon, master of Philippine Roxas, a ship owned by
Philippine President Lines, Inc. (PPL), obtained the services of Ezzar Vasquez, a duly accredited pilot in
Venezuela to pilot the ship in the Orinoco River. Unfortunately, Philippine Roxas ran aground in the Orinoco
River while being piloted by Vasquez. As a result, the stranded ship blocked other vessels. One such vessel
was owned Wildvalley Shipping Co., Ltd. (WSC). The blockade caused $400k worth of losses to WSC as its
ship was not able to make its delivery. Subsequently, WSC sued PPL in the RTC of Manila. It averred that PPL
is liable for the losses it incurred under the laws of Venezuela, to wit: Reglamento General de la Ley de
Pilotaje and Reglamento Para la Zona de Pilotaje N o 1 del Orinoco. These two laws provide that the master and
owner of the ship is liable for the negligence of the pilot of the ship. Vasquez was proven to be negligent when
he failed to check on certain vibrations that the ship was experiencing while traversing the river.
ISSUE: Whether or not Philippine President Lines, Inc. is liable under the said Venezuelan laws.
HELD: No. The two Venezuelan Laws were not duly proven as fact before the court. Only mere photocopies of
the laws were presented as evidence. For a copy of a foreign public document to be admissible, the following
requisites are mandatory:
(1) It must be attested by the officer having legal custody of the records or by his deputy; and
(2) It must be accompanied by a certificate by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul,
vice consular or consular agent or foreign service officer, and with the seal of his office.
And in case of unwritten foreign laws, the oral testimony of expert witnesses is admissible, as are printed and
published books of reports of decisions of the courts of the country concerned if proved to be commonly
admitted in such courts.
Failure to prove the foreign laws gives rise to processual presumption where the foreign law is deemed to be
the same as Philippine laws. Under Philippine laws, PPL nor Captain Colon cannot be held liable for the
negligence of Vasquez. PPL and Colon had shown due diligence in selecting Vasquez to pilot the vessel.
Vasquez is competent and was a duly accredited pilot in Venezuela in good standing when he was engaged.

MANUFACTURERS HANOVER TRUST CO. v. GUERRERO

G.R. No. 136804 February 19, 2003
FACTS
The petition alleged the following:
- On May 17, 1994, respondent Rafael Ma. Guerrero fled before the Regional
TrialCourt of Mania against Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. and/or Chemical Bank
- Guerrero sought payment of damages allegedly for (1) illegally withheld taxed
charged against interests on his checking account with the Bank, (2) a returned
check worth $18,000.00 due to signature verification problems; and (3)unauthorized
conversion of his account.
-The bank filed its Answer alleging that Guerreros account is governed by NewYork
law which does not permit any Guerreros claims except actual damages.
-Seeking the dismissal of Guerreros claims, the Bank filed a Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment, supported by an affidavit of New York attorney AlyssaWalden.
-The RTC denied the Banks Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
-The Court of Appeals also dismissed the petition for certiorari and
prohibitionassailing the RTC Orders
ISSUE
Whether the Walden affidavit does serve as proof of the New York law
and jurisprudence

HELD
The Walden affidavit stated conclusions from the affiants personal interpretation
and
opinion of the facts of the case vis--vis, the alleged laws and jurisprudence
withoutciting any laws in particular. While the attached copies of some US court
decisions donot comply with Section 24 of Rule 132 on proof of official records or
decisions of foreigncourts. Thus, the Walden affidavit did not prove the current state
of New York law and jurisprudence.
Hence, the petition is denied for lack of merit and Court of Appeals decision is
affirmed

Facts:
Napoleon B. Abordo, the deceased husband of private respondent Restituta C.
Abordo, was the Second Engineer of M.T. "Cherry Earl" when he died from an
apoplectic stroke in the course of his employment with petitioner NORSE
MANAGEMENT COMPANY (PTE). The M.T. "Cherry Earl" is a vessel of Singaporean
Registry. In her complaint for compensation benefits filed before the National
Seamen Board, private respondent alleged that the amount of compensation due
her from petitioners should be based on the law where the vessel is registered.
Petitioners contend that the law of Singapore should not be applied in this case
because the National Seamen Board cannot take judicial notice of the Workmen's
Insurance Law of Singapore instead must be based on Boards Memeorandum
Circular No. 25. Ministry of Labor and Employment ordered the petitioner to pay
jointly and severally the private respondent. Petitioner appealed to the Ministry of
Labor
but
same
decision.
Hence,
this
petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the law of Singapore ought to be applied in this case.
Held:
The SC denied the petition. It has always been the policy of this Board, as
enunciated in a long line of cases, that in cases of valid claims for benefits on

account of injury or death while in the course of employment, the law of the country
in which the vessel is registered shall be considered. In Section 5(B) of the
Employment Agreement between petitioner and respondents husband states that
In the event of illness or injury to Employee arising out of and in the course of his
employment and not due to his own willful misconduct, EMPLOYER will provide
employee with free medical attention. If such illness or injury incapacitates the
EMPLOYEE to the extent the EMPLOYEE's services must be terminated as
determined by a qualified physician designated by the EMPLOYER and provided such
illness or injury was not due in part or whole to his willful act, neglect or misconduct
compensation shall be paid to employee in accordance with and subject to the
limitations of the Workmen's Compensation Act of the Republic of the Philippines or
the Workmen's Insurance Law of registry of the vessel whichever is greater. Finally,
Article IV of the Labor Code provides that "all doubts in the implementation and
interpretation of the provisions of this code, including its implementing rules and
resolved in favor of labor.