"Virtual Expressions'':

Alternative Online Spaces and the

Staging of Kenyan Popular Cultures
DINA LIGAGA
University of Witwatersrand
dina.ligaga@wits.ac.za

ABSTRACT
There is a growing body of work on popular culture in Africa that has
focused on the eclectic production of culture on the continent. However,
very little attention has been paid to the rising significance of the Internet
as a site of production for these popular cultures. Existing scholarship on
Internet usage and production on the continent has tended to focus on
issues of lack, whether it is about access, literacy, or usage, which though
important, has muted the much more vibrant set of activities by Africans
online. In this article, I argue that by locating the Internet as an alternative site of production for popular culture, it becomes possible to begin to
explore the myriad meanings of online activities that reference the social
and political lives of their users. It is in such a venture that one can begin to
explore the impact and significance of the Internet in transforming how we
read popular culture in Africa. I explore the meanings of selected Internet
texts circulated in the "Kenyan blogosphere," arguing that the Internet
provides alternative routes of expression of popular culture, bringing to
the fore aspects of social and political lives and ideas that would otherwise
have remained hidden from public discourse.

ne of the ways that popular culture functions is by foregrounding aspects

of culture often ignored in formal spaces, which are, however, very definitive of practices and relationships that take place in different segments of
society (Barber, "Popular Arts"; Newell; Fabian). Such cultures can be quite revealing of undercurrents that mark relationships between members of a society or that
define the codes and ideologies that shape people's lives. Investigating pockets of
popular culture that appear in different spaces allows one to begin to engage with
* RESEARCH IN AFRICAN LITERATURES, Vol.43, No.4(Winter2012).2012 *

2 * RESEARCH IN AERICAN LITERATURES VOLUME 43 NUMBER4

the manner in which a significant part of the general public deals with political
and social issues. It enables one to interrogate popular responses and attitudes
toward particular political and social occurrences in society.
This article reads the Internet as one such alternative space where "unofficial" cultures in Kenya are performed. Unofficial cultures, following Barber, are
read as popular art forms that are representative of muted, under-represented, or
misrepresented media cultures. The idea of the unofficial is understood as fluid
and uncategorized precisely because it defies and/or traverses known boundaries.
I argue that the Internet offers a space for a vast majority of people to articulate
their opinions and desires, perform their identities, present the unsaid, circulate
informal information, and to generally negotiate the meanings of political and
cultural issues in their lives. While acknowledging this celebratory aspect of the
Internet, the examples engaged with below reveal complex ways in which one
can approach these cultures, not merely as being oppositional to power, but also
as revealing deep-seated anxieties among Kenyan online users. Importantly, the
examples point to ways in which the Internet has enabled the destabilization of
easy readings of alternative spaces vis--vis power. The study of the Internet forces
one to engage with the freedom it encourages in the context of a nation rendered
delicate by ethnic and class divisions. Focusing primarily on political discussions and engagements, this article forces one to begin to question the nature of
engagements with politics in Kenya and the manner in which users of these online
forums relate. This article aims to conclude that while the Internet offers vast possibilities for the performance of popular culture, it also reveals underlying sets of
complex relationships that Kenyans have with each other and with those in power.
To fully explore the meanings and processes involved in the production and
circulation of cultures by Kenyans online, this article will embrace the Internet as
an alternative media, in that it is made of "contested spaces constructed and reconstructed anew, according to the needs, experiences, and aspirations of specific
groups (particularly those otherwise underrepresented, ignored, or trivialized
elsewhere in the mediascapes)" (Allen x). As Bailey, Cammaerts, and Carpentier
argue, such forms are "'alternative' not only in relation to mainstream media but
also in their potential to voice ideas which are important and distinctive in their
own right, that are not necessarily counter-hegemonic, but are still of significance
for different communities" (xii). This article takes the stance that alternative media
can be understood beyond its binary relationship with mainstream media or other
formal spaces of representation. As has been argued by Chris Atton and Bailey,
Cammaerts, and Carpentier, alternative media can be read in multiple ways to represent competing sites of public discourses of a wider range of voices than allowed
in mainstream media. Indeed Stuart Allen reflects that, "alternative media are part
and parcel of the daily life of individuals, at once 'banal' and 'political' in their significance" (x). This focus on the everyday becomes key toward unpacking popular
culture online, for it is this "banal" in cultural studies that "comes to refer to the
productivity through which Internet practicesreticulated with everyday practices 'outside' those onlinesignify not the worthless and the worn (the 'trivial')
but what we might call the 'significant everyday'" (Atton, Alternative Internet 8).
To read the popular as unofficial cultures produced and circulated on the
alternative space of the Internet, one has to get a sense of the context in which such
cultures are produced. The article follows literature that reads popular cultures in

DINA LIGAGA 3

Kenya as existing not only in opposition to mainstream media, but also as independent practices to it. Historically, both print and broadcast mainstream media,
were long seen as tools for articulating state power in the public and private lives of
Kenyans. As such, censorship and self-censorship aided in constricting spaces of
expression for ordinary Kenyans, whose opinions often had to be filtered through
strict editorial practices that were shaped around the authoritarian rule of the
reigning president. Consistently, media forms and art that existed in opposition
to state-centric agendas were quickly squashed and pushed aside, in most cases
never to be heard of again. In a space where public discourse was so heavily mediated, popular culture became the only existing alternative means through which
power could be challenged. As George Ogola has argued, although Kenya was
under authoritarian rule for most of its post-independence history, "there was a
thriving oppositional counterculture that found space" within and, in most cases,
outside mainstream media (126).
This counterculture has been well documented in a growing body of work
on Kenyan popular culture. Consistently, several of these scholars have shown
that popular culture in Kenya has grown not just in opposition to power, but as
a record of the everyday that shows how people managed to live in spaces and
conditions that were not always conducive to their lives. It demonstrates how
Kenyans found agency in avenues that were oppressive. Thus Tom Odhiambo's
study of Kenyan popular fiction highlights accounts of ordinary men and women
who strive to exist in the bleak city spaces of post-independence Kenya, just like
Bodil Frederiksen shows the meanings and processes of reception of everyday
forms such as soap operas and magazines in the working-class spaces in Nairobi
slums. These studies signal interesting ways in which Kenyans have innovatively
found alternative avenues to express themselves and engage with their realities
in spite of the contexts of their existence. Indeed, it is such emphasis on the banal
that allows for studies of popular culture's intersections with power. Grace Musila
for instance, demonstrates how the cartoon form in Kenya has constantly challenged the meanings of power through humor ("Democrazy"). She engages with
how it has become a potent discursive site for engaging with the absurdities of
authoritarian rule in Kenya. This constant teasing out of issues that are important
to ordinary Kenyans lends popular cultures their characteristic ability to "shed
their pleasures and becomethrough the uses to which they are put and through
judgments made of themforms of political practice" (Ogola 125). As Ogude and
Nyairo show, "popular cultural and narrative forms are particularly excellent sites
for understanding complex issues of power, especially in authoritarian societies
where many people lack access to forums of political debate" (1).
The idea of the popular in Kenya is therefore historically linked to power in
a context where Kenyans existed on a staple of mediated information and where
ideas of "truth" and newsworthy information were circulated mainly through
print and reiterated in broadcast media. Public information was always controlled
by those in whose interest it was to remain in the good books of the state. The
state, for its part, depended on mainstream media to build its identity and kept
a close watch on its various activities. This arrangement quite obviously meant
that the ordinary Kenyan was heavily policed and that anything that was deemed
subversive or that had the potential to undermine the nation-state would be edited
out of public discourse. In this context, the printed word had legitimacy as truth.

4 * RESEARCH IN AFRICAN LITERATURES VOLUME 43 NUMBER4

dispelling any rumors that would arise following a major incident in the country,
whether high profile assassinations or illicit affairs by politicians (Cohen and
Odhiambo; Musila, "Kenyan and British Social Imaginaries"). Media was used to
represent the ideas of the political elite around a nationhood in which Kenyans
spoke a unitary language, so that English and Swahili were favored in place of
vernacular languages that were seen as divisive and encouraging of ethnic rivalries. On the other hand, the traditional, the utamaduni zetu or "our traditions," were
celebrated as sources of national pride and were dramatized through broadcast
and print media. Yet the contradictions of the Kenyan nation emerged through
very specific cracks. For instance, while African languages were deemed subversive, leading to Daniel Moi banning all vernacular radio stations in the 1980s,
his politics were forged through clashes among various ethnic groups in Kenya,
especially those of the early 1990s (Haugerud).
The entry of the Internet has been crucial in disrupting this highly policed
public space. I argue that the Internet has introduced an assertive form of literacy
that has given agency to categories that previously did not have an outlet. The
1990s brought with it a liberalization of the media that saw a revolution with the
entry of FM stations that encouraged more direct participation from the public
through talk radio, call-in formats, and other means of dialogue between broadcasters and the public. However, in spite of this positive development, there was
still a level of mediation that explicitly and implicitly controlled what could be
freely circulated on air. As such, excesses of information were still disseminated
through unofficial avenues such as rumors, gossip, and in-group dialogues and
conversations.
The Internet destabilized the information infrastructure that had been built
around the nation-state creating space for categories that before had been "floating" in private and individualized sites, uncategorized, unacknowledged, and
therefore easily dismissed. That which had existed as oral communication found
its way online as written text via discussions forums, blogs, chat room dialogues,
and various social networks. It disrupted Kenya's dependence on the printed word
as truth by legitimizing oral cultures that could now exist, unedited, side-by-side
with well-researched written pieces. Where before Kenyans depended on journalists who were trained to gather evidence before making a story public, there were
now several truths as people from different backgrounds and persuasions could
post their opinions online, each categorically sticking to their version of what they
felt was factual. No longer was the state in sole control of the archive: the act of
purging evidence from it by the state was challenged as many found innovative
ways of digging for the truth and recording it on multiple sites online. The anonymity that the Internet allowed presented Kenyans with new forms of freedom
to express themselves with little worry of censorship. Online moderators, unlike
editors of mainstream media, were more lax and rarely intervened in discussions.
The discussions that ensued traversed boundaries and borders, constructing a new
Kenyan diasporic public. Finally, Kenyans had a space to vent, share, clash, argue,
agree, and be creative without the state's constant nagging presence.
It is with this background in mind that it becomes possible to study Internet
cultures by Kenyans online. Because of its global presence, fluid nature, and multiuser characteristics, the Internet has grown into a space that makes it possible to
imagine and create new narratives reflective of the desires and social lives of its

DINA LIGAGA *

users. One such role of the Internet is its ability to accommodate the circulation of
syncretic forms online. An example of this is the extremely popular Makmende
phenomenon that spread through the Internet in 2010 (Mathenge; Mwaniki;
Gaitho), Makmende was an imaginary Kenyan hero, named by the Kenyan musical group Just a Band, and was featured in their video for "Ha-He," In the video
(available on YouTube), Makmende fights bad guys and restores peace in a "tough"
neighborhood. Upon the release of the video in 2010, the character Makmende
quickly went viral, with different Kenyans posting quips about him. Soon he
became a larger than life phenomenon that was being celebrated for his superpowers in clever one-liners. The response to Makmende was so huge that the website
makmende.com (which has unfortunately since been deleted) became dedicated
to it. Examples of the creative quips about Makmende included the ones below:
After eating garlic Makmende doesn't smell like garlic but garlic smells like
Makmende,
Makmende can look at your photo and know you are lying.
Nobody knows what would happen if Chuck Norris and Makmende met, but
one thing is for sure: Makmende would still be standing.
Always look before you leap. Unless Makmende is chasing you. Then you had
better just jump,
Makmende refused a syringe at a blood bank. Instead, he asked for a gun and
a bucket,
Makmende found Bin Laden, Let him go, and found him again for his own
amusement,
Makmende doesn't drink honey. He chews bees,
Makmende doesn't have nightmares. Nightmares have Makmende, (Olang)

Quite truthfully, the idea of Makmende is not original. Like other mmes before
it, such as those about American heroes Jack Bauer from the television program
24 and Chuck Norris, the Makmende phenomenon began with a heroic character
in a video who always successfully defeated the bad/tough guys and seemed
invincible. The possibility of this hero, however, grew and became larger than
life almost overnight. The interesting ways in which the Makmende phenomenon
grew is indicative of the level of creativity by Kenyans online.
Among other things, Makmende revealed that as a popular culture form,
it could borrow from existing popular forms and morph into something that it
was not before. Thus Makmende drew equally from the film genre of Blaxploitation as from the street cultures of Nairobi of the 1980s and 1990s, Blaxploitation
films (such as Shaft) typically were crime dramas set in urban locations that used
spectacle and sensation to exhibit violence, sex, and other forms of visual excesses
(Howell), They were also expressions of black hyper-masculinity or, in the case of
the heroines, stereotypes of highly daring, sexualized women. Drawing from this
genre, Makmende presents a character at once familiar and alien, local and foreign.

6 RESEARCH IN AFRICAN LITERATURES VOLUME 43 NUMBER 4

The word Makmende, itself, is said to have originated from the catchphrase
of the Hollywood character Dirty Harry (played by Clint Eastwood)"Go ahead,
make my day" (Sudden Impact). Makmende is then a sheng (Kenyan urban slang)
derivation of "make my day." Appearing initially in a Kenyan urban setting following an influx of Kung Fu movies in the 1990s, Makmende was a word used to
sarcastically refer to children who wanted to start fights because they thought they
were superheroes. Clearly, Makmende is linked to a very specific urban culture
in Kenya and its revival online becomes an interesting link to it. The video can
further be connected to local representations of heroes in popular pictorial comics
in Kenya such as Big Ben, a Drum magazine comic series that circulated for a few
years in the 1970s in East Africa.
Part of how Makmende is circulated is then pegged on familiar popular
knowledge that points to very specific locations and cultures. For instance, the
entire song "Ha-He" is in sheng and would be lost on the non-Kenyan consumers
of the video. Globally though, Makmende links to several genres through intertextual references. The character is hilariously photoshopped on the front covers
of well-known magazines, such as those of GQ and Time, circulated in Google
Images. Makmende jokes could also be found on social networks such as Twitter,
Facebook, and in blogs and discussion forums. As described by Ethan Zuckerman,
the Makmende phenomenon captured the imagination of Kenyans in 2010, both
online and offline ("Makmende's so Huge").
Yet in spite of the "fun" it generated, the Makmende phenomenon was read
by some as something that was more than what it presented itself to be. For them,
it was representative of Kenyans' desires for a steady political leadership. In a
newspaper article, Onyango-Obbo states:
Makmende represented something beyond a fun, action-filled music video. In
Kenya, the good boys and girls, the ones who have tried to fight corruption,
to reform the politics, to stop land-grabs, and the destruction [and] violence
have nearly all ended up in grief. They were condemned to a life of exile, jail,
or ostracism.. . . Makmende struck a chord, because he was a raritythe first
good guy in Kenya to win against the bad guys.... The Makmendes are figures
born out of a refusal to give in to despair. They are the means by which the weak,
or the small group of progressive[s] who are boxed into a corner by powerful
conservative forces, express hope that they can still triumph, even though they
may be outnumbered.

Onyango-Obbo's observation points to a deeper political story in Kenya of corruption, dictatorship, and lack of transparency. It also shows how Makmende came
to be seen as a representative of change in a war between the people and power.
The Makmende phenomenon, though short-lived, was a powerful way through
which Kenyans suspended their differences in order to express their joys as well
as their frustrations.
The example of Makmende above enables one to begin a discussion of how
Kenyans use the Internet to deal with difficult questions regarding their political
and social lives. In the following section, I will discuss more explicit engagements
with politics by Kenyans online. I begin by arguing that in a context where the
political elite had control of important avenues of communication, the entry of the
Internet provided space for politicians to be critiqued, ridiculed, and dismissed

DINALIGAGA 7
in a way not previously possible. Rather than use the same language as the mainstream media in presenting political events and politicians, most Internet users
adopted a different style of communication. As Barber points out, "more usually
.. . people's disillusion and resentment is expressed in a more subterranean manner, in the form of jokes, catchphrases, and anecdotes that circulate with great
rapidity and undergo many phases of elaboration while they are in vogue" ("Popular Arts in Africa" 5). The manner in which Kenyan Internet users communicate
with each other and how they frame their ideas is therefore vital in uncovering
their attitudes and their responses to power. I draw my examples from the discussion forum of the popular website mashada.com and argue that it is only through
reading the patterns of users' communications that one can begin to uncover "real
experiences, attitudes, and responses to power" (ibid. 3).
Founded in 1999 by David Kobia to serve the increasingly computer literate
members of the Kenyan diaspora, mashada.com is considered one of the population's largest online bulletin boards. The discussion forum section, from where I
draw my examples, is divided into several subsections, including politics, society
and culture, leisure, and personals, among others. For the purposes of my argument, I selected examples from the politics section because it is the most active in
the entire forum. Out of several threads that were posted in May 2012,1 selected
those that were most popular, signaled by the number of "views" and responses
they received. Not surprisingly, the contents of a post were easily determined from
the titles or headings of the threads. So for instance, a thread post with the heading "Miguna's New Book: How Raila Wailed Uncontrollably in Front of Kibaki"
immediately located the discussion within a familiar news item about the public
fallout between the former advisor to the Prime Minister, Joshua Miguna Miguna,
and Kenya's Prime Minister, Raila Odinga. To briefly contextualize, Miguna was
suspended by Raila publicly in the media, leading to an equally public reaction
by Miguna who felt the suspension, done in a way similar to the dictator-style
tactics of former president Moi, was unfair and unwarranted (Namunane). What
is of interest here though is not the content of the public drama that followed, but
the ways in which members of Mashada used the information about the fallout.
Mashada exchanges are rarely politically neutral and mainly revolve around those
who support Kenya's ruling party, the Party of National Unity (PNU) and its president Mwai Kibaki, and those who support the opposition party, the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) and its president Raila Odinga. Therefore, when a scandal
such as the one described above occurs, it creates an opportunity for mockery and
insult to be exchanged between the two groups. In the example above, information about the fallout between Miguna and Raila became an opportunity for PNU
supporters to ridicule their opponents.
While such exchanges between users appear to be useless banter, I argue that
they are in fact extremely revealing of the kinds of attitudes Kenyans have toward
leadership in Kenya and each other. The use of exaggeration and insult in reference
to politicians is a way for Kenyans to deal with the abhorrent excesses of power.
Mikhail Bakhtin's logic of the carnivalesque, in which power is unveiled by those
whose voices are ordinarily never heard, can be applied here to understand how
Mashada users reduce politicians to objects of ridicule, taming their power by
locating it in familiar, everyday spaces (Mbembe). Thus, posts such as "Mudavadi's
Wife Impregnated by Some Mhindi (Indian) in Town . . . Bastard Child," "Nation

8 * RESEARCH IN AFRICAN LITERATURES VOLUME 43 NUMBER4

of Drunkards Hoping to Rule Kenya," "Ida Odinga Had a Bastard Son When
Raila Was in Prison," "Dictator and Bloody Prime Minister Raila Odinga: Please
Arrest This Fool," "Three Reasons Why Kikuyu Ruling Elite Is Hated by Millions
of Kenyans," "This Picture Is the Problem I Have with Uhuru Supporters," "Why
Are Kikuyus Insecure?," "Kenyatta: The Biggest Land Grabber in Kenyan History,"
"For Ethnic and Violence Agenda, Look No Further Than Odingaism," "Musalia
Mudavadi Has a Small Penis," "Historical Injustices in Kenya," and other similar
posts, mirror the varying degrees of disappointment in Kenyan politicians and
define the kinds of publics that are drawn to such posts.
The tone of these headings is indicative of the kinds of exchanges that take
place within the posts, which are often not necessarily constructive engagements
with political goings-on, but rather a sort of "tug-of-war" between users. Because
these Kenyans lack a language for expressing their feelings of rage, they reduce the
arguments and debates to politicians' personal lives, a familiar and accessible site
of engagement. Thus, presidential aspirant and Deputy Prime Minister, Musalia
Mudavadi's private parts as well as his wife's infidelity become important sites
for engaging with power. By reducing Mudavadi to a laughing stock, these users
find it possible to connect with and contribute to political debates as they occur. In
much the same way, references to the Prime Minister Raila Odinga's private life,
whether in regard to his personal conduct, his wife's supposed infidelity, or even
his leadership stylewhich has him reduced to a fool, a dictator, and an ethnic
chauvinistallows users access to a discussion about their attitudes toward his
style of leadership. This license to interrogate power allows users to probe the
structure and quality of leadership and to critically engage with the caliber of it
in Kenya. Thus, references to Kenya's first president's land grabbing antics, Uhuru
Kenyatta's (Kenya's second Deputy Prime Minister and a presidential aspirant)
drinking problems, or even references to the class divide that makes it impossible
for the ordinary Kenyan to comprehend power, all become subjects of heated
debate on the Mashada website. The manner in which power is discussed and
engaged with shows that the Internet is a democratic space that allows freedom
of speech to be practiced without fear of retribution.
Yet even as power is mercilessly ridiculed, it would be erroneous to celebrate
its democratic tendencies without fully engaging with the ways in which it is
contested. While the ideal relationship with power is often one in which opponents are unified in their protests, mashada.com has revealed the interesting ways
in which relationships among users remain fractured and violent, mirroring the
manner in which such relationships are manifested in Kenyan political and social
spaces. These fractured relations are often structured around ethnic, class, and
gender differences, which have caused a constant tussle between the members of
different groups. In this article, I pursue how ethnicity and ethnic identities have
defined and directed the level of political discussions online, complicating the
notion of unified protest against those in power. Central in such online discussions
is ethnicity.
In an article on ethnic humor and Kenyan identities online, I argued that
ethnicity in Kenya is so intertwined with political power that it has worked its way
into how Kenyans relate to each other in everyday spaces (Ligaga). As Mahmood
Mamdani showed, ethnicity was a useful tool for colonialists who used it to foster
differences among Kenyans to aid colonial rule. Leaders in post-independence

DINA LIGAGA
Kenya have continued to use this to exercise power at the expense of ordinary
Kenyans. Members of Kenyan society have consequently developed an ethnicized
grammar with which they construct ideas of the ethnic other, who is seen as inferior and whose identity is captured in the same Stereotypie references used in their
engagements with the country's politics. Particularly during periods of political
upheaval, ethnic stereotypes were bandied about to discredit, insult, and, in many
ways, to mark the "other" as different and inferior. Based on the ethnicized nature
of Kenyan politics, in which most political parties are structured around large
ethnic groups such as the Luo, Luhya, and Kikuyu, the kinds of engagements that
Kenyans have online are often marked by elements of segregation in which various Kenyans begin to identify with parties aligned with their own ethnic groups.
Leaders of each party then become sites of reference to either discredit opponents
or reinforce/support political agendas.
The most applicable example of the manifestations of difference online
are the unfortunate events that followed the election in Kenya in 2007 and 2008;
namely the killing of thousands of Kenyans and the displacement of hundreds of
thousands more. The violence was instigated by botched election results, in which
the incumbent president, Mwai Kibaki, won by a small margin. This caused the
supporters of the opposition leader, Raila Odinga, and those of the president to
clash, leading to the worst case of internal violence in Kenyan history. During this
period, the official media struggled to censor and ban news of the violence, yet
information spilled from various alternative sites, key among them, the Internet
and mobile phones (Goldstein and Rotich; Zuckerman, "Citizen Media"; Musangi).
While the government was able to contain the use of mobile phones, by curbing
the spread of mass text messages, the Internet became a "free zone," an alternative space for circulating information, countering what the mainstream media
was saying and offering spaces for negotiating peace, but most memorably, for
distributing hate speech.
Chris Atton, in his analysis of far-right media on the Internet, argues that
the study of alternative media has tended to only privilege progressive, liberal,
or anarchist media while ignoring right-wing, racist, or ethnic media, which are
dismissed as immoral, unethical, and merely in support of hegemonic tendencies
and therefore not worthy of study ("Alternative Internet"). However, as he argues,
the circulation of hate speech is often a struggle to occupy symbolic power and
normalize hegemonic discourses and it is important to note how power manifests
itself in such a context. If one begins from this line of argument, it is possible to
engage with what was largely seen as hate speech being circulated by Kenyans.
Where before such kinds of exchanges were mostly confined to very small, private
spaces, the Internet now provided a location for Kenyans to display their disaffections with each other, their prejudices against the "other," and to confirm and
justify what they thought of one another.
Since the 2007 elections, online discussions and debates have been distinctively framed around ethnic politics by the supporters of President Kibaki and
those of Raila Odinga. The fact that these two groups were highlighted in a context
of a multi-ethnic nation such as Kenya followed the tribal logic of Kenyan politics
constructed before and during the reigns of the country's first and second presidents. That the political rivalry between Kikuyu and Luo has come to symbolically
represent the tone of politics in Kenya is no longer contestable.

10 RESEARCH IN AERICAN LITERATURES VOLUME 43 NUMBER4

Following the outbreak of violence in Kenya, online debates turned into
insults where users on opposing sides sought to out-insult each other, which led
to the temporary shutdown of websites such as mashada.com. Mashada's founder,
David Kobia, stated that he saw his website being used to perpetuate the negative aspects of what was happening on the ground and was troubled so much by
it that he was left with no other choice but to shut it down. The examples below
provide a snippet of what was taking place on mashada.com during and after the
violence had ended:
Example 1
A Luo free Kenya, ohh what a relief, please hurry up and secede, historically Luo
was part of Uganda, you should have stayed there, Kenya doesn't need lazy jang
monkeys on their backs, (QuestioNear, "Raila Should Be President")

In example 1, the kinds of ethnic divisions discussed earlier become visible. With
references to a "rumor" that the Luos of the Nyanza province of Kenya want to
secede and form a separate nation, the response captured above engages with how
the user feels about this ethnic group. It is a celebration of the fact that "Kenyans"
will no longer have to deal with "Lazy Luos," a stereotype that has been used
severally to describe them in the Kenyan social and political space. This stereotype dates back to the colonial era, where Luos, deemed uncooperative by colonial
administrators, were marked as lazy (E, A, Odhiambo), Immediately after independence, this stereotype was cemented by Kenya's first President, Jomo Kenyatta,
who used it to refer to and dismiss them after major disagreements with his Vice
President, Jaramogi Oginga Odinga, In Kenyan political discourse, the Luos have
continued to exist as radicals who constantly destabilize what otherwise would
be an easy rule for those in power.
The tussle between Luo politicians and the President has then always been
an anxious one, filled with constant struggles for power. Popular discourses on
the Luo and their relationship to power hold that they have struggled to gain the
presidential seat ever since independence and, because they have not yet achieved
this, they are constantly causing trouble for the ruling party. One gets a glimpse
of how this struggle has been interpreted in popular culture in example 1, Where
the political desire for a Luo-free Kenya would rest on the fact that they represent
a radical presence that makes absolute power impossible, in popular parlance
they are merely regarded as lazy, a handy stereotype that then makes it possible
to unconscientiously dismiss them as non-Kenyans,
Example 2
If Raila [had] won the presidency; KIKUYUS were to [be] killed in mass numbers
never again to be heard of; Mass prosecution of GEMA'S; Mass stone throwing
would be included in the constitution; Raila would not only be a president, but
a king of his cult; Mass destruction of property would also be included in the
constitution; Light coloured Kenyans would never visit Nyanza coz they may
have kikuyu blood, Kenyans would acquire Visa while visiting the KING'S
LAND [rift valley and Nyanza] like what Mobutu did, (Ours, "If Raila Won
Presidency")

DINA LIGAGA 11
Example 2 further extends the stereotype of the Luo discussed previously.
However, the kinds of dismissive stereotypes, where the Luo are associated with
monstrous actions, become a little more dangerous. In the example, Raila Odinga,
who has been deemed the de facto leader of (zombified) Luos, is painted as a monster who, should he become president, would specifically target the Kikuyu ethnic
group and basically annihilate them. I argue that this kind of irrational fear is part
of a larger set of constructed discourses meant to serve those in power. Such discourses make it easier for politicians to manipulate their electorates, among who
deep-seated fears of the "other" are constantly being referenced and ignited at will
in the Kenyan political sphere. By drawing from such shorthand understandings
of politics and political relations among Kenyans, online users fall prey to larger
political games that are played and sustained by politicians, who invariably are
the only true beneficiaries of such power struggles.
It is not just the Luos who take a character beating online, however. As is seen
in the example below, another stereotype dragged from the colonial period, this
time about the Kikuyu ethnic group, plays itself out:
Example 3
Bullsh.it! A thief must never rule. Senator put it well, where a community considers thieving as a virtue instead of a vice, then the other communities have
a moral obligation to separate from this community (read thief Kibaki and his
criminal supporters). (Ours, "If Raila Won Presidency")
Once again, as is the case of the Luo, the stereotypes in Example 3 are specifically targeted at Kikuyu leadership. In the above example, Kikuyus are deemed
thieves and, as such, are linked squarely with corruption and immorality with
regard to power. Again, "other" communities are "urged" to separate themselves
from the Kikuyu if they are to save themselves from these "criminals." Like the
stereotype of the lazy Luo, the stereotype of the Kikuyu as thieves was also used
by colonial agents and the white settler communities in Kenya to describe this
group with who they had close encounters. This stereotype made its way into
popular parlance and is used randomly to "understand" how Kikuyus "operate"
in social and political circles. In Example 3, the stereotype is used to discredit the
value of Kikuyu leadership, pointing out that it only leads to increased corruption
in the country. It works to make Kikuyu leaders unattractive and to dismiss their
credibility. As above, the last example below continues to stretch this stereotype:
Example 4
Are you forcing us to respect those who don't respect Kenyans? You and your
people have no moral ground to impose on Kenyans a toad in order to gain
respect by force. Wakati wenyu umefika. You can beat your chest harder but
at the end of the day you'll be seated under those funny Mugumo trees in
jiggerland. (Kenyan_gangster, "Balala a Lesotho to Be Formed for Kikuyus")
Example 4 makes references directly to Kibaki's return to the office of President of Kenya, which was seen by opposition party supporters as extremely unfair
and unacceptable. Mwai Kibaki was sworn in for a second term in a hurriedly prepared ceremony that, unlike his first swearing in, was private. His first swearing
in, in 2002, was a public affair that marked a great milestone in Kenyan history, as

12 * RESEARCH IN AERICAN LITERATURES VOLUME 43 NUMBER4

it saw the end of Daniel Moi's twenty-four-year authoritarian rule. Kenyans were,
for the first time, united as a nation. However, during the course of his rule, Kibaki
began recanting some of the promises he had made when he was inaugurated,
causing members of his party to oppose some of his decisions and consequently
form separate parties. In 2005, a constitutional referendum was held to propose
a new constitution, but it was voted down by a majority of Kenyan voters. Mwai
Kibaki, among several other government officials, campaigned for a "yes" vote but
lost. The referendum caused divisions among those who campaigned for a change
(the "yes" vote was assigned the symbol of the banana) and those who campaigned
against it (the "no" vote symbolized by the orange). The divisions consequently
divided the ruling National Rainbow Coalition party, eventually leading to the
formation of parties such as the Party of National Unity (PNU), with Kibaki as
its leader, and its opposition, the Orange Democratic party (ODM), with Raila
Odinga as its leader, among others. The tone of the post is therefore reflective of the
attitude that a supporter of the opposition has toward Kibaki and his supporters
by pejoratively referring to Kibaki as a toad and rendering his occupation of the
office of President as useless, ugly, and undesired.
Importantly, this post was created in the aftermath of the post-election violence of 2007 and 2008 during the time when Kofi Annan was trying to mediate
peace between Mwai Kibaki and Raila Odinga and their supporters. Disgruntled
by the pace at which the negotiations were moving, Najib Balala, a senior government official and member of the opposition party, hinted at the possibility of isolating Kibaki and his supporters in central Kenya (home of the majority of Kikuyus
who are read as automatic supporters of Kibaki) from the rest of the country,
likening it to Lesotho, a southern African country that is completely surrounded
by South Africa. Balala's statement was borne out of a growing impatience with
Kibaki, who he saw as stubbornly holding onto power that was not his to begin
with. Balala's statement ignited heated debates online, cementing the belief among
Kikuyu hardliners that there was a genocidal plot against them, generally. Others believed that Balala's statement was in bad taste as it served to further incite
violence in which Kikuyus would continue to be victimized and targeted by other
groups. To further emphasize the "otherness" of Kikuyus online, the post refers to
central Kenya as "jiggerland," a pejorative term used to dismiss Kikuyus following
reports of the presence of jiggers in the region.
As the four examples discussed previously show, online discussions, though
often imagined as "alternative" spaces in which radicalism against hegemonic
practices are instituted, can be as much part of these hegemonic tendencies as
other overt practices. The examples show how ideologies mutate in these online
spaces, revealing interesting ways in which Kenyans relate to one another and
how they define themselves and their identities. The examples show that beyond
using such spaces to render power useless, Kenyans use the Internet to engage
with their own prejudices against each other, showing how they in fact embrace
the very hegemonic practices they supposedly seek to condemn. The examples
also expose ways in which one can begin to complicate readings of Kenyans', and
indeed Africans', use of such promising spaces of democratic engagements. While
the Internet has definitely led to and encouraged new voices to emerge, it has also
exposed Kenya's social and political underbelly, revealing unpleasant aspects of
the kinds of relations that Kenyans have toward power and among themselves.

DINA LIGAGA JS 13
Importantly, such revelations make it possible to understand the logic behind
the "cyberwars" that took place among different Kenyans online during and
after the 2007 elections. While a number of websites and blogs were created in an
effort to forge peace among Kenyans, several other spaces were formed specifically to gather followers who supported very particular ethnic or tribalist ideas
(Zuckerman, "Citizen Media").
Yet, in spite of the negative aspects raised in the analysis of the examples
above, Kenyan Internet usage is not always filled with such desolate engagements.
In fact, one of the most remarkable aspects of Kenyan online usage is the vibrant
and creative ways in which they have been able to engage with political and social
goings-on. Great examples exist in the phenomenon of Makmende, a viral sensation that circulated as short quips about an imaginary hero called Makmende. The
creation and circulation of this phenomenon showed how Kenyans were capable
of momentarily setting aside their differences to have fun as Kenyans. Importantly,
Makmende had no ethnic background, had a very ethnic-neutral name borrowed
from sheng (street parlance of Kenyan city spaces), and who existed in a world
that remained unmarked by familiar landscapes of Kenyan towns. The Makmende phenomenon, based on its ability to morph through its many intertextual
references, became an instant hit just months after Kenya's horrendous violence
against each other. In addition to Makmende, the Internet has hosted several creative videos of Kenyan popular culture on YouTube, such as the extremely trendy
Bonoko video that makes fun of Kenyan police dealings with ordinary (and often
unarmed) Kenyans, among many others.
Apart from the extensive possibilities created by the Internet for the circulation of creative forms, it must be noted that several decent forums exist in which
Kenyans are able to dialogue in rational ways about the state of politics in Kenya.
Websites such as jukwaa.com and rcbowen.com, as well as several others, have
allowed Kenyans to engage with several alternative versions of stories that are
circulated in mainstream media. The Internet can also be seen as a space in which
Kenyan social lives are performed. On mashada.com alone, posts such as "Manyake,
Very Skinny" (small buttocks), "Nairobi Prostitutes Serve 3 to 4 Clients a Night,"
and "Exclusive Kenya Bush Sex: Muliro Gardens," etc., are quite revealing in terms
of their popularity and show the kinds of subjects that preoccupy the minds and
time of their users. The kinds of posts made on the social forum section of the
website have the possibility of opening up interesting debates around gender
relations and attitudes online.
Nonetheless, this article has emphasized ways in which the Internet is not a
simple alternative space and that complex sets of relations between Kenyans, as
well as with power, are revealed by engaging with the kinds of exchanges that take
place in some Kenyan online spaces. The article has gone into a lengthy discussion
on what an oppositional culture in Kenya represents and the ways in which the
Internet has aided in making this culture possible. It has also pointed out how the
Internet has allowed for honest engagements among Kenyans who have exchanges
online with their fragmented identities. I deliberately chose a controversial website,
mashada.com, to expose ways in which online popular cultures often reinforce
hegemonic tendencies in Kenya. Rather than offer a neat analysis of how Kenyans
use the online space, I have shown that this space is in itself rife with contradictions, indicative of the same kinds of relationships of which it is reflective. I have

14 RESEARCH IN AFRICAN LITER.ATURES VOLUME 43 NUMBER4

shown that the Internet can be both a space for engaging and ridiculing power,
performing identities, and reinforcing stereotypes.
WORKS CITED
Allen, Stuart. Series Editor's Foreword. Understanding Alternative Media. Eds. Olga
Bailey, Bart Cammaerts, and Nico Carpentier. London: Open University Press,
McGraw-Hill, 2008. ix-x. Print.
Atton, Chris. An Alternative Internet. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2004.
Print.
. Alternative Media. London: Sage Publications, 2002. Print.
BahariaMzenge. "Ida Odinga Had a Bastard Son When Raila Was in Prison." Mashada:
Africa's Online Community. Mashada, 30 Apr. 2012. Web. 26 May 2012.
Bailey, Olga, Bart Cammaerts, and Nico Carpentier, eds. Understanding Alternative
Media. London: Open University Press, McGraw-Hill, 2008. Print.
Bakhtin, Mikhail. Rabelais and His World. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1968. Print.
Barber, Karin. "Popular Arts in Africa." African Studies Review 30.3 (1987): 1-78. Print.
. The Generation of Plays: Yoruba Popular Life in Theatre. Bloomington: Indiana UP,
2000. Print.
Cohen, David, and Elisha Atieno Odhiambo. Risks of Knowledge: Investigations into the
Death of the Hon. Minister John Robert Ouko in Kenya, 1990. Athens: Ohio UP, 2004.
Print.
DigO. "Musalia Mudavadi Has a Small Penis." Mashada: Africa's Online Community.
Mashada, 22 Apr. 2012. Web. 26 May 2012.
Dmitry. "Nairobi Prostitutes Serve 3 to 4 Clients a Night." Mashada: Africa's Online
Community. Mashada, 10 Mar. 2012. Web. 26 May 2012.
Fabian, Johannes. Moments ofPreedom: Anthropology and Popular Culture. Charlottesville:
University Press of Virginia, 1998. Print.
Frederiksen, Bodil. "Popular Culture, Gender Relations, and the Democratization of
Everyday Life in Kenya." Journal of Southern African Studies 26.2 (2000): 209-22.Print.
Gaitho, Macharia. "And Now, a Makmende to Solve Kenya's Problems." Daily Nation.
Nation Media Group, Ltd., 29 Mar. 2010. Web. 12 Aug. 2012.
Goldstein, Joshua, and Juliana Rotich. "Digitally Networked Technology in Kenya's
2007-2008 Post-Election Crisis." Internet and Democracy Case Study Series. Berkman
Center for Internet and Society, 29 Sept. 2008. Web. 10 June 2012.
Haugerud, Anglique. The Culture of Politics in Modern Kenya. Cambridge: Cambridge
UP, 1995. Print.
Howell, Amanda. "Spectacle, Masculinity, and Music in Blaxploitation Cinema."
Screening the Past 18 (2005): n. pag. Web. 28 July 2012.
Kenyan_gangster. "Balala: Lesotho to Be Formed for Kikuyus." Mashada: Africa's Online
Community. Mashada, 20 Feb. 2008. Web. 26 May 2012.
KingRuoth. "Historical Injustices in Kenya." Mashada: Africa's Online Community.
Mashada, 23 May 2012. Web. 26 May 2012.
Ligaga, Dina. "Ethnic Stereotypes and the Ideological Manifestations of Ethnicity in
Kenyan Cyber Communities." Africa Insight 39.1 (2009): 72-85. Print.
M_kenya. "Miguna's New Book: How Raila Wailed Uncontrollably in Front of Kibaki."
Mashada: Africa's Online Community. Mashada, 25 May 2012. Web. 26 May 2012.

DINA LIGAGA

15

Majeshi, "Mudavadi's Wife Was Impregnated by Some MHINDI in Town , , , Bastard

Child," Mashada: Africa's Online Community. Mashada, 21 Apr, 2012, Web, 26 May
2012,
Mamdani, Mahmood, Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late
Colonialism. Kampala: Fountain, 1996, Print,
Mathenge, Oliver, "Makmende Craze Sweeps the Internet," Daily Nation. Nation Media
Group, Ltd,, 24 Mar, 2010, Web, 12 Aug, 2011,
Mbembe, Achille, "The Banality of Power and the Aesthetics of Vulgarity in the Postcolony," Public Culture 4,2 (1992): 1-30, Print,
Mwaniki, Philip, "There's a New Hero in Town, His Name Is Makmende," Daily Nation.
Nation Media Group, Ltd,, 27 Mar. 2010, Web, 12 Aug, 2012,
Musangi, Jennifer, "'Oiily a Few Skirmishes Here and There': Interrogating the 'Truth'
of an Election in the Kenyan Blogosphere," Africa Insight 39,1 (2009): 86-97 Print.
Musila, Grace, "Kenyan and British Social Imaginaries on Julie Ward's death in Kenya,"
Diss, University of the Witwatersrand, 2008, Print,
, "Democrazy: Laughter in Gado's Editorial Cartoons (1992-1999)," Urban Legends, Colonial Myths: Popular Culture and Literature in East Africa. Eds, James Ogude
and Joyce Nyairo, Trenton: Africa World Press, 2007 97-123, Print,
Namunane, Bernard, "Raila Kicks Out Key Aide," Daily Nation. Nation Media Group,
Ltd,, 4 Aug, 2011, Web, 6 Aug, 2012,
Newell, Stephanie, Readings in African Popular Fiction. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 2002,
Print,
Odhiambo, Elisha Atieno, "Hegemonic Enterprises and the Instrumentalities of Survival: Ethnicity and Democracy in Kenya," Ethnicity and Democracy in Africa. Eds.
Bruce Berman, Dickson Eyoh, and Will Kymlicah, Athens: Ohio UP, 2004,167-82,
Print,
Odhiambo, Tom, "Alternative Moral Economies, Crime, and Violence in Kenyan Popular Fiction," Urban Legends, Colonial Myths: Popular Culture and Literature in East
Africa. Eds, James Ogude and Joyce Nyairo, Trenton: Africa World Press, 2007,
243-59, Print,
Ogola, George, "'If You Rattle a Snake, Be Prepared to Be Bitten': Popular Culture.
Politics, and the Kenyan News Media," Popular Media, Democracy, and Development
in Africa. Ed, Herman Wassermaned, New York: Routledge, 2011,123-36, Print,
Ogude, James, "'The Cat that Ended up Eating the Homestead Chicken': Murder,
Memory and Fabulization in D, O, Misiani's Dissident Music," Urban Legends,
Colonial Myths: Popular Culture and Literature in East Africa. Eds, James Ogude and
Joyce Nyairo, Trenton: Africa World Press, 2007 173-200, Print,
Ogude, James, and Joyce Nyairo, eds. Introduction, Urban Legends, Colonial Myths:
Popular Culture and Literature in East Africa. Trenton: Africa World Press, 2007,
1-22, Print,
Olang, Marcus, "Makmende," Diary Blog. Blog,com, 18 Mar, 2010, Web, 12 Aug, 2012,
Onyango-Obbo, Charles, "Why Fabulous Hero Makmende Is about the 'Lost' Kenyan
Story," Daily Nation. Nation Media Group, Ltd,, 25 Aug, 2010, Web, 12 Aug, 2012.
Ours, "If Raila Won Presidency," Mashada: Africa's Online Community. Mashada, 20 Feb.
2008, Web, 26 May 2012,
QuestioNear, "Kenyatta: The Biggest Land Grabber in Kenyan History," Mashada:Africa's Online Community. Mashada, 9 May 2012, Web, 26 May 2012,
, "Raila Should Be President," Mashada: Africa's Online Community. Mashada, 29
May 2012, Web, 31 May 2012,

16

RESEARCH IN AFRICAN LITERATURES VOLUME 43 NUMBER4

. "Three Reasons Why Kikuyu Ruling Elite Is Hated by Millions of Kenyans."

Mashada: Africa's Online Community. Mashada, 14 May 2012. Web. 31 May 2012.
-. "Why Are Kikuyu's Insecure?" Mashada: Africa's Online Community. Mashada,
12 Feb. 2012. Web. 31 May 2012.
Shaft. Dir. Gordon Parks. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Warner Bros., 1971. DVD.
Spairo. "Manyake, Very Skinny (Small Buttocks)." Mashada: Africa's Online Community.
Mashada, 3 May 2005. Web. 26 May 2012.
Sperms4U. "Dictator and Bloody Prime Minister Raila Odinga: Please Arrest This Fool."
Mashada: Africa's Online Community. Mashada, 12 May 2012. Web. 26 May 2012.
Spyglass. "For Ethnic and Violence Agenda, Look No Further Than Odingaism."
Mashada: Africa's Online Community. Mashada, 13 May 2012. Web. 26 May 2012.
Steven36664. "Nation of Drunkards Hoping to Rule Kenya." Mashada: Africa's Online
Community. Mashada, 29 May 2012. Web. 31 May 2012.
Sudden Impact. Dir. Clint Eastwood. Warner Bros., 1983. DVD.
Taskmaster. "Exclusive Kenya Bush Sex: Muliro Gardens." Mashada: Africa's Online
Community. Mashada, 24 Feb. 2011. Web. 26 May 2012.
Thelghetto4nr. "This Picture Is the Problem I Have with Uhuru Supporters." Mashada:
Africa's Online Community. Mashada, 23 May 2012. Web. 31 May 2012.
Zuckerman, Ethan. "Citizen Media and the Kenyan Electoral Crisis." Citizen Journalism:
Global Perspectives. Eds. Stuart Allen and Einar Thorsen. New York: Peter Lang
Publishing, 2009.187-208. Print.
. "Makmende's so Huge, He Can't Fit in Wikipedia." My Heart's in Accra.
Ethanzuckerman.com, 24 Mar. 2010. Web. 28 July 2012.

Copyright of Research in African Literatures is the property of Indiana University Press and its content may not
be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written
permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.