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To cite this article: Eric Arne Lofquist (2011) Doomed to Fail: A Case Study of Change
Implementation Collapse In the Norwegian Civil Aviation Industry, Journal of Change Management,
11:2, 223-243, DOI: 10.1080/14697017.2010.527853
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14697017.2010.527853
ABSTRACT Managerial choices for change implementation methods have a direct impact on
strategic change outcomes. In a three-year longitudinal case study of the Norwegian airport
management and air navigation services provider Avinor a fundamental mismatch between
organizational culture type and change implementation method contributed to the premature
collapse of a deliberate strategic change initiative. The major contribution of this article is to
expand our knowledge about identifying and avoiding potential pitfalls resulting from a
fundamental mismatch between organizational culture in place and change implementation
methods during deliberate organizational change. The findings from this case study will show
how managerial choices and actions, such as: consensus building, communication and use of
participation during deliberate change processes, can positively influence attitudes towards
change. However, it will also show that a sudden reversal from a participatory process to purely
top-down implementation can lead to a breakdown in consensus and trust, leading to internal and
external resistance, and the premature collapse of a change process.
KEY WORDS : Strategic change, organizational culture types, attitude formation, change
implementation
Introduction
The purpose of this article is to shed light on how organizational culture affects
strategic change implementation based on a three-year longitudinal case study
of the Norwegian airport management and air navigation services provider,
Avinor. It is believed that matching organizational change methods with organizational culture types during deliberate organizational change affects change
Correspondence Address: Eric Arne Lofquist, Norwegian School of Management, Leadership and Organizational
Management, Lars Hillesgata 15, Bergen, N-5008 Norway. Email: eric.lofquist@bi.no
1469-7017 Print/1479-1811 Online/11/02022321 # 2011 Taylor & Francis
DOI: 10.1080/14697017.2010.527853
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outcomes (Meyerson and Martin, 1987; Bluedorn and Lundgren, 1992; Waldersee
and Griffiths, 2004). Outcomes are often based on issues such as: the effectiveness
of various change models (Bamford and Daniel, 2005), change type (Leavitt,
1965; Powell and Posner, 1980), content factors (Burke, 1994; Self et al.,
2007), readiness to change (Armenakis and Harris, 2002, 2009; Jones et al.,
2005; By, 2007), failures in implementation process (Beer et al., 1990; Dunphy,
1996; Weick and Quinn, 1999; Quinn, 2004), culture as an integrating mechanism
(Geertz, 1973; Schein, 1983), power and politics (Lines, 2007; Lofquist and Lines,
2009), opportunistic behavior (By et al., 2008) and participative vs. unilateral
implementation (Beer and Nohria, 2000; Chapman, 2002; Johnson-Cramer
et al., 2003; Russ, 2008). Most notably, it is assumed that a mismatch between
organizational culture type and organizational change method will increase organizational resistance to change (Piderit, 2000) and decrease organizational support
for the change initiative. Cultural matching has been argued to produce better
change outcomes (Meyerson and Martin, 1987), although most studies have
focused either on clearly defined culture types or paradigms (Meyerson and
Martin, 1987), or change types, such as, participative or unilateral change (Beer
and Nohria, 2000; Chapman, 2002). Yet, few studies have looked at how mixed
culture types react to mixed change processes.
Most studies look at change as either structural or behavioral. Waldersee and
Griffiths (2004) argue that the relationships between attitude and behavior are
two opposing assumptions and underlie the participative and unilateral
approaches. Dunphy and Stace (1990), by contrast, propose that it is the size of
the change that determines the appropriate change type, where large-scale
changes are less likely to be supported by employees due to complexity and uncertainty, and top-down methods are more appropriate. But according to Waldersee
and Griffiths (2004), the studies carried out by Dunphy and Stace tended to be
more structural in nature, involving management restructuring, downsizing, reengineering and outsourcing, and behavioral-type changes were limited in nature.
Up to this point, very little empirical evidence has been provided to show how
complex organizational cultural settings react to mixed-change types, and how
this interaction moderates change outcomes. Mixed-change types refer to organizational change processes in complex organizations in which both structural and behavioral changes are attempted simultaneously. Waldersee and Griffiths (2004)
defined mixed-change types as those involving the introduction of new management systems, such as total quality management (TQM), as well as socio-technical
changes. One reason for the lack of studies in this area may be that complex organizational changes are more difficult to categorize into either/or types. In complex
cases, where organizations may also be separated geographically, even organizations with relatively strong organizational cultures may develop distinct subcultures and anti-cultures that complicate change-implementation processes
(Schein, 2004), or even disrupt the entire change process altogether.
Research on the moderating effects of culture types on change-implementation
processes have been mostly carried out by focusing on historical results from multiple case studies (D. Miller et al., 1982; D. Miller and Toulouse, 1986; Dunphy
and Stace, 1990), where culture types and change methods are relatively controlled. Most of these studies also focus on changes that are relatively successful.
In addition, most studies focus on either identifying culture types (Meyerson and
Martin, 1987) or change type, such as unilateral or shared (Greiner, 1967). Unilateral changes tend to be top-down in nature using prescription, control and authority-based techniques, are procedural and focus on a reallocation of resources
(Waldersee and Griffiths, 2004). Shared changes, by contrast, also described as
the participative approach (Lawler, 1992; Beer and Nohria, 2000; Chapman,
2002), are argued to be absolutely essential for successful change implementation
especially in organizations where both socio-technical and behavioral changes are
desired (Lawler, 1992; Emery and Emery, 1993; Dunphy and Griffiths, 2002).
This article examines the moderating effects of organizational culture on a
deliberate strategic change process that leads to the collapse of a high-profile strategic change initiative in the Norwegian civil aviation industry. The article will
first focus on the legitimate reasons for change in the Avinor case, and the potential influence of external stakeholders in change decisions. Second, the article will
focus on leadership attempts to build consensus for change during the planning
phase of the change project through communication and direct employee participation. Third, it will show how a sudden leadership decision to change from a participative process, to a purely top-down implementation, destroyed the consensus
for change and led to a general loss of trust, and subsequently to internal and external resistance to the change process. And finally, this article will examine the evolving role of internal and external power and politics that both complicate the
implementation process, and increase the level, intensity and complexity of
resistance.
Theoretical Background
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It is widely accepted that organizations need to change over time to remain competitive and in many cases, simply to survive (Page et al., 2008). Organizations
that do not change in response to changes in environmental demands risk facing
degrading performance over time (Burnes, 2004), or even sudden, and often unexpected, life-threatening crises that can lead to early extinction (By, 2005). Much of
this change happens naturally and comes in the form of evolutionary change that
takes place without conscious thought or effort within the organization, and its
model is algorithmic in nature in that outcomes occur if certain conditions are
met (Aldrich, 1999). However, evolutionary change can also be problematic in
that, due to its insidious nature, it often goes unnoticed and can interact with deliberate change processes in unexpected ways (Reason, 1997). Deliberate change, by
contrast, is a conscious change effort in which decisions are made and
implemented in response to perceived threats or challenges.
Studies addressing how leaders approach the entire organizational change
process often focus on strategy implementation and are limited in their coverage
of the early phases of the change decision-making process (Isabella, 1990). One
reason may be that large-scale changes, most reflective of strategic change, tend to
require extensive attention and take focus from other organizational matters
(Meyer and Stensaker, 2005). This can often lead to accelerated decisionmaking processes and premature final strategy decision choices. Yet organizational change, and strategic change in particular, is characterized by high
levels of complexity and ambiguity with regard to its causes, content and consequences (Isabella, 1990; Self et al., 2007). This would demand more attention
devoted to the formulation phase of change, and not less, which is often the
case. Several authors (Meyerson and Martin, 1987; Bluedorn and Lundgren,
1992; Elsmore, 2001; Lines, 2005; Meyer and Stensaker, 2005) have recently
emphasized the focus upon a broader spectrum of integrating change activities
and have actively considered how organizations need to prepare for change, in
addition to how the change process is carried out. This shift in emphasis from
the implementation phase of change to the formulation phase is largely culturedriven and caused by a general move away from monolithic-type organizations
that are homogenous in their cultural make-up, toward more heterogeneous organizations exemplified by complex and embedded subcultures with differentiated
needs (Schein, 2004).
One key aspect for change reflected in the change literature addresses employee
reaction to change (Gopinath and Becker, 2000; Bovey and Hede, 2001; Huy,
2002; Kickul et al., 2002; Dasborough et al., 2003). This can be summarized by
Lines (2005) who states that a key challenge for managing change is to control
the attitude formation processes in the organization so that positive attitudes
toward change are formed early in the change process, and the formation of negative attitudes toward change is avoided (p. 17).
Others claim that forming positive attitudes early in a change process, when
organizational members are first exposed to information about a pending
change, improves an organizations capability of implementing the change in
such a way that important objectives are met (Isabella, 1990; Armenakis et al.,
1993). But attitudes toward change are not always only based on the information
presented by leaders, and Starbuck et al. (1978) argue that employee resistance to
change is often not a result of negative attitudes toward change but from a wellgrounded understanding of the implications of change that are different from management. And that management can make poor change decisions. In these
respects, attitude and more importantly, attitude formation are tightly linked to
culture, increasing the importance of the formulation phase of change implementation and for matching change methods to culture type.
It can be argued that even the simplest of organizational changes is complex and
dynamic requiring a well thought-out plan for successful change implementation.
But the leadership role does not end with the act of taking a decision and approving a plan. Yet this is exactly how many leaders define their role in the changeimplementation process. Change is often initiated without the deliberate thought
processes essential for mapping decisions relating to successful implementation
of strategy and are well-founded in exemplars of organizational change such as:
deliberate strategic change (Mintzberg and Waters, 1985; Korsgaard et al.,
1995), downsizing (Brockner et al., 1994; T.D. Allen et al., 2001), and process
aspects such as communication or participation (Gopinath and Becker, 2000;
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Lines, 2005; J. Allen et al., 2007). This can also be extended to include research
concerned with specific reactions to change such as emotional reactions (Huy,
2002; Dasborough et al., 2003), consideration of change recipients (Armenakis
and Harris, 2009), structure and function of attitude (Lines, 2005) and procedural
justice (Brockner et al., 1994).
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Method
This article is based on the findings of a three-year longitudinal case study of the
Norwegian airport management and air navigation services provider (Avinor)
during a volatile strategic change initiative that prematurely collapses in spring
2006. Avinor delivers a wide spectrum of aviation-related services including:
airport management, approach, departure and transit radar services and control,
ground services, snow clearance, aircraft de-icing and weather reporting to domestic and international airlines. Avinor also provides airline customer-related
services including airport hotels, parking and food services, baggage handling
and physical security (Avinor Corporate Handbook, 2004).
The goal of the change initiative was to make airport management and air
navigation services in Norway more productive and efficient through the transformation of the government management agency (Luftfartsverket) into a government-owned, private company (Avinor). Specific demands of the government
required that this change take place without disruption of air traffic services to customers and that safety levels would either be maintained or improved during the
change process. This change was part of an international civil aviation initiative
known as corporatization. The International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO) describes corporatization as creating a legal entity outside the government to manage airports and/or air navigation services, either through a specific
statute or under an existing general statute, such as the company law. Normally,
ownership of the corporation remains with the government. However, in a corporatized body, private sector participation is possible. It depends upon the provisions
of the statute under which it is established and the policy of the government
(ICAO, 2002, p. 3).
The goal of the study was to follow the change planning and implementation
process and to observe how leadership decisions and actions during deliberate
organizational change affected change outcomes over time. This article focuses,
in particular, on how a fundamental mismatch between organizational culture
and change implementation type, with particular focus on selected subcultures,
contributed to the internal and external disruptions experienced during the
change process, and the eventual failure of the planned change initiative known
as Take-Off 05.
Design of the Study
leading to a sudden collapse in the change project. For this article, the main focus
will be on the moderating variable (attitudes toward change), as affected by the
dependent variables perception of leadership commitment and organizational
culture.
Because the size and geographic dispersion of Avinor, three internal cases, combined with the supporting leadership structure, were chosen to represent the effects
of the change implementation strategy on three distinct subcultures composed primarily of air traffic controllers and air traffic controller assistants. It can be argued
that this group holds a historical position of power within the organization, and, as
such, needs to be included in decisions that affect organizational goals.
The strategic change process was given the name Take-Off 05, and was advertised by the leadership as a results improvement program. However, in reality
Take-Off 05 was a cost-reduction program with two highly visible main goals:
a reduction in costs through a downsizing of the workforce and a reduction in
the number of air traffic control centers in Norway from four to two.
Data Collection
The primary method for collecting data during the study was qualitative in nature,
although several quantitative data sources were also used. In addition, interviewees and selected leaders from all levels of management were used as key
informants, implying that participants were used as observers and interpreters of
the change planning and implementation processes (Van de Ven and Huber,
1990).
The results presented in this article are based primarily on 57 one-hour, semistructured interviews from three separate internal cases followed during the
study. The internal cases chosen for the study were three air traffic control
centers (ATCCs) that were similar in size, composition and function, but were
experiencing three different phases of a common organizational change process.
These cases also proved to be central to the internal resistance that developed
within the company during the implementation phase of the project, and contributed directly to the eventual collapse of the Take-Off 05 project (Lofquist, 2008).
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Originally, 10 interviews were planned for each site, and consisted of a mix of
middle managers, supervisors, trainers and operative air traffic controllers and air
traffic controller assistants with varying levels of experience (Lofquist, 2008). The
choice of interviewees was made as randomly as possible except that each unit
leader was included as an interview object. Unfortunately, during the final interview session, the company CEO resigned unexpectantly, and three interviews
were postponed due to the uncertainty presented by the subsequent collapse of
the Take-Off 05 project.
The semi-structured interviews were designed based on the four theoretical constructs depicted in Figure 1. Questions were designed using the academic literature
for each individual construct as a basis, and modified to fit the Avinor case based
on an extensive internal orientation of the intended change process, a review of the
change planning documents and a familiarization with the three internal cases
used in the study. Questions focused mainly upon individual attitudes toward
the change process and upon individual perceptions of the leaderships role and
performance in particular. The interview protocol was then reviewed by two air
traffic controllers not involved in the study for quality assurance of the questions,
language and to strengthen internal validity of the question set.
All interviews were digitally recorded and lasted approximately one hour. The
interviews were then transcribed using the native language, Norwegian, and then
open coded using NVivo 7 software. The individual codings were then grouped
into the four constructs depicted in Figure 1 using the tree function in Nvivo 7
before being analyzed using within and across case comparisons from the three
internal cases. The most representative quotations were used to support the findings of the study.
Findings and Discussion
The Avinor case is interesting from a strategic change perspective for many
reasons. First, Avinor is a complex organization within the high-risk, civil aviation
industry that has experienced many environmental challenges over the past years.
In addition, the Take-Off 05 project, which was the focus of this study, was
modeled after the international civil aviation initiative known as corporatization,
which is closely related to New Public Management initiatives being introduced
into many industries. As such, many of the findings from this study should be generalizable to related industries and support theories about the importance of
culture/change matching in strategic change.
The decision to change the form for airport and air traffic control administration
in Norway was based on real change in the civil aviation environment. Discussions
to convert the government-administered civil aviation authority (Luftfartsverket)
into the government-owned, private company (Avinor) began within the Norwegian government in 2000, but the final decision to initiate the change was not made
until 2002, in response to deteriorating economic conditions affecting the entire
civil aviation industry post-9/11. This led to the creation of a new, government-owned, private company, Avinor, on 1 January 2003.
With a clear mandate from the government, and an urgent need for change based
on deteriorating economic results, the leadership communicated the following:
The economic situation within the civil aviation industry is serious. Since the civil
aviation industry and Avinors customers are having serious economic problems,
and the income levels for Avinor are, correspondingly, too low for the current
cost levels, the focus for Avinor is reduction of costs, and not increased income
growth through increased pricing for the airlines. With the new competitive situation
in the market, Avinors fees compose a larger and larger relative percentage of the
companys costs.
(Avinor Summary Report Take-Off 05 Design Phase, 27 October 2003)
This description by the leadership of the dire situation facing the civil aviation
industry, in general, and Avinor, in particular, was universally accepted within the
organization. There was broad support for a proposed change initiative known as
Take-Off 05 which officially kicked off in March 2003. Even the air traffic controller union, which had historically resisted all types of large-scale organizational
change within the organization, agreed, in principle, that large-scale change was
needed (Lofquist, 2008).
The Air Traffic Controller union (NFF) was of the opinion that it was absolutely
necessary to implement extensive changes within this poorly structured, overweight,
and increasingly more bureaucratic actifity, NFF, therefore, supported parts of the
Take-Off 05 project.
The results of the Take-Off 05 planning phase were accepted with relative consensus within Avinor as to both the method to be used in evaluating changes, and
the scope of changes to be evaluated. The process was also described by the leadership as participatory in nature:
Avinor has a comprehensive cooperation model with the employees and union representatives. These arenas are also used in association with the results improvement
program. The program has, in addition, worked out its own communications plans
both for the program as a whole, but also for the individual sub-projects. The
employees and union representatives are invited to come with contributions and recommendations during the entire process, and the central union representatives have
had meetings with the program leadership and project groups underway. This has
produced a significant engagement and there have been many solution recommendations by the employees from the entire country.
(Avinor Summary Report Take-Off 05, 2003: p. 3)
And the initial perception of participation was also reflected in the responses of
employees directly involved in the planning process:
We were very satisfied with our contribution. We worked hard during these brainstorming sessions to find as many potential cost savings as possible that would eventually be put into a comprehensive implementation plan that would go through an
extensive quality control and risk analysis process.(Sub-project planning member)
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In actuality, everything began very well with the whole Take-Off concept, and that
we would be more effective . . . and that we should have a more rational business
model, I was absolutely agreed.
(Sub-project planning member)
But the consensus for the change process was short-lived, and was essentially
destroyed when the final implementation plan was made public in November
2003. The final version of the Take-Off 05 plan called for a reduction of 725
man-years over a six-year period with 655 redundancies already realized within
the first two years of the implementation process. This represented over 25% of
the workforce. The leadership justified the magnitude of the cuts as such:
The total results improvement effect of the recommended measures is approximately
490 million Norwegian Kroner annually compared to the basis year 2002. As the
largest portion of the cost basis in Avinor is made of salary and personnel costs,
over 75% of the cost savings come from the reduction of the number of employees.
But the magnitude and speed of the changes did not match expectations, particularly since employees participated in every aspect of the planning process. Most
employees expressed a feeling of shock caused by the unexpected depth and
breadth of the cuts and changes contained in the final version of Take-Off 05
implementation plan. One participating member from one of the sub-projects
put it this way:
I was totally shocked by the final Take-Off 05 plan as it was presented by the leadership as it did not truthfully reflect the expectations of the employee members that
participated in the planning phase. The leadership simply took all of the potential
savings ideas and combined them into one plan that was not integrated, as expected,
and was not sufficiently analyzed for quality or potential risk to safety.
The loss of trust in the leadership led to resistance, and this was particularly
noticeable from Avinors most powerful subculture the air traffic controllers
(Lofquist, 2008). The air traffic controller subculture has a long history of dramatic work action that can potentially paralyze whole sectors of international airspace. In Norway, for example, prior work action by air traffic controllers, in the
form of strikes and work slow-downs, have created havoc due to Norways heavy
dependence on air travel as a normal form of communication. This demonstrated
that the organizational power possessed by air traffic controllers, in general, lies
embedded in both the long initial training period required to achieve air traffic
controller certification, and in the exacting demands and stress levels experienced
in performing air traffic control tasks. This power is amplified by the continual
focus on air safety, where air traffic controllers absorb a great part of the responsibility. Based on the internal power base that air traffic controllers have traditionally enjoyed, the literature would argue that this powerful subculture should be
included in the planning and implementation of planned change processes.
First, the air traffic controller union challenged the basis for the planned change
as published, particularly the number of air traffic controllers to be cut, stating that
there were, in fact, too few air traffic controllers to carry out operations. The union
also requested that implementation of the plan be delayed pending an investigation
of the data supporting the decisions:
The recommendations from this project are, in NFFs opinion, filled with essential
missing information and a lack of clarity, and is not an adequate or acceptable basis
for taking the important decision it is supposed to support.
The leadership rejected this challenge outright and moved forward with the
implementation phase of the Take-Off 05 project. The disagreement concerning
the number of air traffic controllers, in particular, served as the focus of
the tension between the leadership and Avinors most powerful union during
the remainder of the Take-Off 05 process. This also led to a letter of no confidence
in the CEO being sent to the Avinor Board of Directors on 15 June 2004, six
months into the implementation process. Although this initiative was led by the
air traffic controller union, it was supported and signed by all seven trade union
representatives in Avinor (Lofquist, 2008).
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A second issue that surfaced during the change process was the controversial
decision to close a second air traffic control center. The union, again, challenged
the basis upon which this decision was made. However, this challenge was also not
considered valid by the leadership, and the decision to close Norways largest and
most modern air traffic control center was delivered personally in a public
announcement to the affected units on 27 September 2004. The response from
individual air traffic controllers was swift and effective. A large majority of operative air traffic controllers on duty at the affected air traffic control center were so
overwhelmed by the surprising news of the impending closure that they no longer
felt capable of performing their duties in a safe manner. After all airborne traffic
over southern Norway landed safety at their destinations, the air traffic controllers
refused to accept new traffic and the Norwegian airspace in southern Norway was
closed for two days effectively stopping all air traffic in Norway (Lofquist,
2008).
The closing of the airspace over southern Norway marked a major turning point
in Take-Off 05 project. One reason that the air traffic controller union had been
so quiet about the change process prior to the effects of the airspace closure in
September 2004 was that they were not really sure how much power they had
retained in the new corporatized business model (Lofquist and Lines, 2009).
However, the reactions by the leadership in the media to the spontaneous airspace
closure reaffirmed their positional power and union resistance to the Take-Off 05
project steadily increased over the next 12 months (Lofquist, 2008). Formal communication between the leadership and the union effectively ceased over this
period and the only effective communication was transmitted back and forth
through the news media.
Another important issue related to power was that during this entire Take-Off 05
process the Avinor leadership enjoyed the full support of the ruling government.
This allowed the leadership to continue a top-down implementation of the
Take-Off 05 plan, even when there were obvious signs that the system was
under excessive stress (Lofquist, 2008). However, this situation changed suddenly
when a new labor-friendly government officially took power on 15 October 2005.
The incoming transport minister was seriously concerned about reports that safety
in the aviation industry was deteriorating and ordered an independent evaluation
of both the Take-Off 05 project and the performance of the Avinor leadership.
This effectively changed the power balance within Avinor and resulted in the
immediate resignation of the director of air navigation services, closely followed
by the unexpected forced departure of the CEO in December 2005. With the replacement of the Avinor chairman of the board in early spring 2006, the Take-Off 05
project was officially terminated.
Although the Take-Off 05 project collapsed in January 2006, due largely to
mounting pressure from employee resistance led by the air traffic controller
union, the project was not necessarily a complete failure. According to the leadership, 80% of the planned change was implemented, on time, with significant
increases in overall revenue. In addition, it can be argued that Avinor today is a
successfully corporatized entity. The successful changes that were accomplished
within the plan involved the parts of the organization where the literature argues
that a top-down approach was possible, and recommended. This included
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demand on the air traffic controllers who were already struggling with the new,
externally generated, administrative demands of the air traffic regulators.
Another important mistake acknowledged by one leader was the miscalculation by the Avinor leadership of the relative power of the air traffic controller subculture within the new business model. The air traffic controllers were not initially
opposed to the Take-Off 05 process, and in fact supported the idea of and need for
change. But this support evaporated during the change process when the air traffic
controllers ultimately disagreed with the breadth, scope and speed of the final
change plan. When their opposition to several decisions was not acknowledged
by the leadership, and a purely top-down implementation approach of the TakeOff 05 plan was initiated, this led to increasing resistance and the eventual collapse of the Take-Off 05 project.
Conclusion
understanding of the sources of power within the organization and how strong
subcultures might influence the change process. In the Avinor case, the air
traffic controller subculture had an established history of successful resistance
to change (Lofquist, 2008). However, with the new management model chosen
for the Take-Off 05 project (corporatization), enough confusion existed related
to balance of power that the leadership were initially successful with top-down
implementation. Eventually, the air traffic controller subculture began to understand their relative power and gradually increased their resistance to change
which in the end contributed to the collapse of the project.
Second, in the Avinor case, the building of consensus for change and trust
among the employees was initially successful, as confirmed in individual interviews. However, when the final implementation plan was made public, and it
did not reflect the expectations of the employee participants, this was received
with a general disbelief, and left some participants feeling personally betrayed.
This was a critical moment for the leadership to take corrective action. Instead,
the leadership chose to abandon the use of participation and changed to a
purely top-down implementation of the Take-Off 05 plan. Consensus and trust
were quickly destroyed, and internal resistance began to build. This eventually
led to external pressures from various stakeholders that ensured a final collapse
of the Take-Off 05 project.
A third area of interest could be described as the leaderships escalating commitment to a failed plan (Staw, 1976) where adjustments of the implementation
plan were not considered, even when internal tension began to indicate that something was seriously wrong. This was particularly evident in the public disagreement between the leadership and the air traffic controller union concerning
manning levels, but also extended to the disagreements over which air traffic
control centers should be shut down, the reasons for these choices and the
timing for these closures (Lofquist, 2008, 2010). This does not necessarily
mean that the original plan was flawed, as the planning process seemed adequate
and enjoyed early consensus from all parties involved. However, it was clear that
the leadership was either unobservant of the changes in the environment during the
implementation phase of the plan, or unwilling/unable to change the plan due to
some unexplained commitment by the top leadership. One leader referred to
keeping promises as one reason for not changing the timing of the implementation plan, but with no explanation as to whom these promises were made. In
another context, the issue of loyalty was mentioned, but with no clarification of
to whom this loyalty was owed. When the original assumptions upon which the
plan were founded were no longer valid, the plan could no longer achieve
the stated goals as envisioned, and this became more and more obvious as the
collapse approached.
A final lesson learned, that will be examined further in a new study, was the
devastating effect that large-scale organizational change can have on top
leaders and middle managers responsible for implementing change. Of the 15
leaders, representing all levels of management observed during the Take-Off 05
study, starting with the minister of transportation (representing the owner) to
the local chief air traffic controllers involved in the internal cases, only 1 remained
in their original leadership position at the time of the change collapse in 2006.
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The effects on the middle managers involved in the change process were particularly damaging from a career perspective, and many are still suffering professionally within the organization.
This study demonstrated that there is a need for more live studies of a longitudinal nature that follow mixed-methods change in complex organizations with
complex cultures. However, one problem is access, as leaders do not particularly
like to have their actions followed and potentially second guessed. That was not
the intention of this article, where the findings of this study are focused on leadership, in general, from a strategic change perspective and not on any one individual.
This study concluded that a deliberate strategic change process that fails to fully
understand, and account for, the importance of matching change method to
organizational culture is doomed to fail.
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