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Indian Ocean: A Zone of Benefits or

Conflicts?

Russias role is significant in creating what nuclear-armed India is today. Russia as a major
contractor of submarines, warships plans and missile technology to India is generating a
suspicion in Chinese threat perception. There are relatively greater chances of naval arms
race if we consider historical Indo-Russian naval cooperation and contemporarily increased
exchange of naval collaboration between U.S. and India.

by Ahsan Ali Zahid and Hasan Ehtisham

( July 8, 2015, Islamabad, Sri Lanka Guardian) Indian


Ocean can be saved from becoming a zone of conflicts if India stops thinking it would
like to own it for its name. If the West allows New Delhi to build a blue water navy, it
would be just a matter of time that their creation would become their nightmare. Indian
Ocean ranks fifth largest, covering 20% of the water and approximately 60 islands
owned by different states and hosts four major waterways the Strait of Malacca, the
Strait of Hormuz, Bab-el Mandeb and the Suez Canal.

Interestingly, Indian Ocean had never been nuclearized even during the Cold War
between the two major powers. Maritime security and strategic realm has been
fronting a diverse challenge when India initiated the deployment of nuclear weapons in
Indian Ocean Region (IOR), against Pakistan and China. This could undermine the
nuclear balance between these three nuclear armed states and will definitely create a
risk of accidental exchange of nuclear weapons. Rapid shift of Indian nuclear weapons
capabilities from land to sea based will formulate a three party nuclear competition and
is likely to be more unsteady and possibly far more precarious.
India is modernizing its navy at a rapid pace, which in nominal terms, the Indian
navy budget has been increased up to 1,000 percent from 1991 ($468 millions) to
2011 ($4.8 billions). On the other hand China is far away from the potential to generate
a stir in contemporary strategic balance with respect to IOR. Therefore, prime reason
of Indian naval modernization is its aspiration of great power status by acquisition of
power projection capability in maritime capacity.
India is dragging IOR in an intense arms race by induction of first nuclear-powered
ballistic missile submarine INS Arihant in 2014; it is also in the process of building two
more Ship Submersible Ballistic Nuclear SSBNs. Furthermore, India was already on
the track to invest in Russian-made nuclear submarine in 2012. India by now has two
platforms, INS Subhadra and INS Suvarna, to launch Dhanush ship-based ballistic
missiles. Indian navy has the ability to launch BrahMos missile (a joint venture
between the Russia and India) which can carry both conventional and nuclear
payloads. In short, India is playing a dangerous game in pursuit of prestige and
international recognition in IOR where confidence-building or institutionalized conflictresolution mechanisms in the maritime realm is totally absent.
Apparently, Indian security situation is quite complex because of the two reasons.
One, its increasing conventional arms capability advantage over Pakistan has
struggled to meet several challenges and nuclear parity is favoring Pakistan. Second,
Chinese economic and military advantage is substantial over India. So all the
frustration in pursuit of regional hegemony is forcing India to become an offensive
military power. As a result of which India has accelerated the enrichment of Uranium
and fissile material to produce more and large nuclear weapons in short time.
Ultimately its nuclear expansion and militarization of Indian Ocean is making South
Asian region insecure.
In the backdrop of traditional rivalry, addition of the nuclear capable submarines in the
Indian naval fleet is a serious threat to Pakistan and China. International community
was reluctant to the fact that India is expanding its naval capabilities out of proportion
and Pakistan along with China will definitely reciprocate. This immature Indian
provocation would force Pakistan and other regional states to acquire similar capability
and thus mitigating nuclear threat and arms race in South Asia. Ultimately, it was not
surprising that China is willing to sell not nuclear but eight diesel-electric
submarines to Pakistan.
As mentioned earlier South Asia has no procedures against confrontational behavior

and permanent mechanism between the Indian and Pakistani navies. Under such
circumstances if India is resolute to take the route of sea based nuclear strike
capability then it is highly unlikely that escalation can be controlled. Pakistan and India
both rely on their mobile nuclear-capable missiles to materialize second strike
capability. Notwithstanding, sea based deterrence is always being considered as
assured second strike capability and advocates of sea based nuclear weapons are of
the view that it provide stability. Nonetheless the picture will be gloomy if other side will
invest heavily in ballistic missile defences, anti-submarine warfare and hypersonic
missiles.
Indian investment in nuclear submarine is a quite obvious step taken because for the
sea denial missions, submarine is a veracious choice of weapon. Factually sea based
deterrence is more favorable to Pakistans strategic advantages, as it serves many
implicit opportunities. The most vulnerable part of Indian defence is its coastal belt and
the ultimate deterrent in Pakistan strategic objectives could be its navy, which can
infiltrate deeper inside Indian Territory with the element of surprise attack.
During the period of cold war India was always reluctant to the presence of U.S. forces
in IOR. China is main factor which transformed the dynamic of Indian strategic thinking
and today, the interests of U.S. and India are congregating to generate more favorable
strategic environment for both countries against China.
Regardless of Russian and Chinese opposition, India has offered a foothold to the
U.S. in the Indian Ocean by signing the new ten-year Defense Framework Agreement
during recent Obama visit. Including the Logistics Support Agreement (LSA),
Communications Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISOMA)
and Basic Exchange and Co-Operation Agreement (BECA) which will not only allow
the refueling of the U.S. warships and U.S. Air Force planes but also regular joint
military exercises and exchange program for Services officers of two nations.
In Indian strategic thinking, Chinese entry into IOR is a vital aspect behind the IndoU.S. maritime cooperation. The Indian approach which project China as potential
threat in IOR has always being exaggerated and aggressively retaliated by the IndoU.S. policies. A profound analysis can easily determine that China is more focused in
Pacific and South China Sea instead of Indian Ocean. Traditionally Chinese approach
had been a peaceful maritime security and the only interest it has in IOR is trade
security. Realistically, China is still behind India and the U.S. in gaining the
geographical advantages and maritime power in IOR.
Indian Ocean Region is the oldest trade route used almost by entire world, therefore
not regarded as Indias exclusive sphere by China. Matter of concern over the years
has been the increasing Indo-U.S. strategic and defense partnership which means that
the U.S. navy can also influence the IOR. On the same note imaginary Chinese string
of pearls strategy is playing with the minds of Indian strategists. As in last year
November, regular patrol Chinese submarine was docked in Sri Lanka. Modi called up
a cabinet committee to clear $8 billion warships project to counter Chinese navy.
Considering the geographical gains which India is enjoying in IOR, the hypothesis of

chinas pursuit of naval dominance in Indian Ocean is implausible. With respect to the
U.S., pivot to Asia policy is more likely neo-colonialism in practice with the states
surrounding South China Sea and Indian Ocean Region. It wants to serve its interests
through agreements in all domains, i.e., technology, economics, politics, nuclear and
military to encircle China. Whereas for China, Pakistan is the best way out to reach
Indian Ocean near the Persian Gulf.
Russias role is significant in creating what nuclear-armed India is today. Russia as a
major contractor of submarines, warships plans and missile technology to India is
generating a suspicion in Chinese threat perception. There are relatively greater
chances of naval arms race if we consider historical Indo-Russian naval cooperation
and contemporarily increased exchange of naval collaboration between U.S. and
India. Now it is up to the global players especially U.S. and Russia, that either they
should promote the global peace by denying India the acquisition of deadly war
munitions like Akula-II or to sell their weaponry for making the world insecure.
About the authors:
Ahsan Ali Zahid is a M. Phil scholar in School of Politics and International Relations,
Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad, Pakistan.
Hasan Ehtisham is a M. Phil scholar in Department of Strategic Studies, Quaid-eAzam University, Islamabad, Pakistan.
Posted by Thavam

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