Phenomenology "Of" Aristotle

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The Phenomenology of Aristotle

Heideggers Early Engagement with Aristotle:
Phenomenological
Interpretations
in
Connection with Aristotle: An Indication of the
Hermeneutical Situation
Introduction
Heideggers Phenomenological Interpretations in Connection with Aristotle:
An Indication of the Hermeneutical Situation, hereafter, simply, the
Introduction, was written as an introduction and overview to a never
published book on Aristotle that he had laboured over from 1922 through
1924. It was based on seminars and lectures he delivered between 1921 and
1922. They include the seminar entitled Phenomenological Exercises for
Beginners in Connection with Aristotles De anima, the lecture course called
Phenomenological Interpretations in Connection with Aristotle: Introduction
to Phenomenological Research, and the lecture course entitled The
Phenomenological Interpretation of Selected Texts of Aristotle: Ontology and
Logic. At this time interest in Heidegger for academic positions in universities
of Marburg and Gttingen universities reached Freiburg. Theodore Kisiel
reports that Paul Natorp [from Marburg] had been impressed by Heideggers
[post-doctoral dissertation Duns Scotuss Theory of the Categories and of
Meaning].1 Although Heidegger had by the early 1920s acquired a reputation
for being an outstanding teacher, he had not published anything in the six or
seven years since the completion of his dissertation on Duns Scotus. Thus in
support of his candidacy for teaching positions at both universities, during a
period of three weeks, Heidegger composed his now famous Introduction to
a book on Aristotle.
Kisiel, Theodore J. The genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time. University of California
Press: Berkeley, 1993, p. 248
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Heideggers phenomenology of Aristotle in the Introduction must be taken

in two senses (in both senses of the genitive of in the title The
Phenomenology of Aristotle.) To begin with, it is a study of particular texts in
the Aristotelian corpus in order to deconstruct certain of his fundamental
philosophical concepts, for example, substance and accident, essence,
potentiality and actuality, matter and form, etc.,2 that have been passed
down to us in a distorted form through the history of Western philosophy,
without question. This is a deconstruction of the tradition which has
harboured Aristotelian thought from the period of classical Greece,
Scholasticism through to modernity, in the very sense of the term in which
Heidegger uses it the in the Introduction. That is, in the sense of abbauen,
to dismantle, Abbau, dismantling, Destruktion, destruction. As such,
Heideggers deconstructive reading of the history of philosophy and of
selected texts by Aristotle, sees itself directed to the task of loosening up the
reigning state of traditional interpretation today in order to penetrate into
the original motivational sources of these explications.3 The problem then is
not so much that Latin authors had difficulty translating ousia with substantia
[substance] or energeia with actus [act, activity, actuality.] Rather, the
Roman and Christian reception of Greek philosophy was a careless
appropriation and application of Greek thought into the domain of Roman and
Christian factical life with which it was simply incompatible. However, it is also
a deconstruction of Aristotelian concepts per se in so far as Aristotles also
stood within the tradition of Platonic, Socratic and Pre-Socratic thought. He is
in some way responsible for the distortion and positive transformation of the
fundamental Pre-Socratic conception of being. Heidegger writes, an individual
lives for the most part inwhat has been transmitted and reported to it from
the pastand learned in an average way.4 Second, the phenomenology of
Aristotle retrieves original possibilities in Aristotles philosophy which 1) lend
themselves to an augmentation of the method of phenomenology. Indeed
Walter Brogan argues, one could rightfully claim that it was [Heideggers]
reading of Aristotle that made it possible for him to redefine for himself the
task of phenomenology, a philosophical direction and method first articulated
byEdmund Husserl.5 In this sense, the phenomenology of Aristotle is a
study of Aristotles phenomenology, of Aristotle the phenomenologist. 2) The
original possibilities in Aristotles philosophy provide the impetus for a
renewed interest in the content of Aristotles works in order to deal with
contemporary philosophical problems. For example, Heidegger writes in
Pathmarks Aristotle's Physics is the hidden, and therefore never adequately
4
5
Brogan, Walter. Heidegger and Aristotle: the twofoldness of being. State University of New
York Press: Albany, N.Y., 2005, p. 5
Heidegger, Martin. Phenomenological Interpretations in Connection with Aristotle: An
Indication of the Hermeneutical Situation. trans. John van Buren, in ed. John van Buren
Supplements: from the earliest essays to Being and Time and beyond New York: State
University of New York Press, 2002, p. 124
Ibid., p. 122-3
Brogan, Walter. Heidegger and Aristotle: the twofoldness of being. State University of New
York Press: Albany, N.Y., 2005, p. 1
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studied, foundational book of Western philosophy.6 He describes book six of

Aristotles Nicomachean Ethics as a treatise on truth and the Rhetoric as
contributing to ontological research.
Critically speaking, however, Heidegger regards Aristotles conception of being
to be highly problematic. It is this point of contention that I will explore in this
chapter of my thesis. The questions Heidegger raises are:: what kind of being
did Aristotle think the human being was? Was this human being an object?
What kind of object? Did Aristotle understand the human being from the
perspective of human life and the experience of human life? Or did he
understand the human being as a particular instance of objects in general?
What, in general, was Aristotles understanding of being? In nuce Aristotle
understood being as being-produced according to the phenomenon of motion.
What is Heidegger writes amounts to what has been finished and made
readyand is now available for certain tendencies to use it.7 Aristotle
understood being in a pre-theoretical and thus practical sense: production,
praxis and utility. From the domain of production, Aristotle drew the basic
ontological structures and also the modes of addressing and defining for
approaching the object human life.8 The intention of this chapter is to
investigate both the hindrances, being as being-produced upon the basis of
motion, and the positive contributions to phenomenology in Aristotles works
through Heideggers interpretation of them. In later chapters I will look
specifically at the way in which Heidegger approaches the content of
Aristotles thought including but not limited to potentiality and actuality,
movement, truth and time. In this chapter I will address Heideggers first
approaches to Aristotle through the Introduction.
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Heidegger raises are
Heidegger himself calls the Phenomenology of Aristotle, investigations

serving the purpose of a history of ontology and logic.9 With respect to such
investigations, he sets himself a number of tasks in order to pursue his
deconstructive readings of Aristotle and the tradition, and the retrieval of
Aristotelian concepts that have been occluded by that tradition. Now this not
only seems ambitious, it is ambitious, overly ambitious. As mentioned above,
for next two years Heidegger presented seminars and gave lectures almost
entirely on Aristotle with the hope completing a book on him. That project
was later supplanted by Being and Time. Broadly speaking then, these tasks,
as found in the Introduction, are divided into three groups:
1.
2.
6
8
9
What is philosophy today (1922)?

Can we appropriate Aristotles philosophy for philosophy today (1922)?
Heidegger, Martin Pathmarks William McNeill (ed.) trans. John van Buren et al. Cambridge;
New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. 185
Ibid., p 128
Ibid., p 111
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3.
How do we appropriate Aristotles philosophy for philosophy today
(1922)?
Section 1
What Is Philosophy? Facticity, Factical Life, Philosophy,
History and Hermeneutics
According to the character of these investigations i.e., serving the purpose of
a history of ontology and logic, the essential questions that Heidegger raises
for further analysis are: What is the method of philosophy? What is the object
of philosophy? What is life? How do we have access to life through
philosophy? What have been the different interpretations of philosophy and
life? Heidegger addresses these questions by introducing and explicating
several important concepts which will later become central in his analysis of
Dasein and temporality in Being and Time. These are, in order of exposition,
the hermeneutic situation, factical life [later Dasein], care [Sorge], concern,
circumspection [Umsicht], inspection [Hinsicht], falling [Verfallen], the
everyone [das Man], death, the countermotion against falling, existence
[Existenz], worrying [Bekmmern], temporality10, and the facticity of
philosophy.
According to Heidegger philosophical research begins and ends with facticity
[Faktizitt], or factical life. Both terms are rather technical in nature and
Heidegger does not offer the reader a simple and clear definition of either of
them. He argues that by enumerating only the most constitutive elements of
facticity, what we mean by this term will be brought into view11 This seems
like he basically wants to avoid providing a definition so that he doesnt have
to justify any inconsistencies in his later arguments. However, this is simply
not the case for as Istvan Feher notes, Facticity is a term adopted to
substitute for the vague and ambiguous concept of life employed by lifephilosophy, as well as for that of existenceemployed by Jaspers and
Kierkegaard.12 Thus both facticity and factical signify life. Yet what is peculiar
to facticity and factical is that they refer to a human life in its hic et nunc in
the world. Heidegger writes Facticity is the designation we will use for the
character of the being of our own [being there],13 which pertains to both
10
11
12
13
Feher, Istvan. Phenomenology, Hermeneutics, Lebensphilosophie: Heidegger's
Confrontation with Husserl, Dilthey, and Jaspers in Theodore Kisiel and John van Buren
(eds.) Reading Heidegger from the Start essays in his earliest thought. Albany: State
Heidegger, Martin. Ontology: the hermeneutics of facticity trans. John van Buren,
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999 p. 5
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Comment [MO1]: Formal

Indication.
Comment [MO2]: What is
hermeneutics? GA56/57, 58,
59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 17.
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Comment [RS3]: Try not to

overuse the personal pronoun
heits the logic of
(phenomenological) analysis or
argumentation that is important,
rather than Heideggers authorial
intentions.
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my own individual life and my own times and generation.14 Facticity is the fact
of my own being alive here and now. Facticity signifies embeddedness. Hence
by using these terms Heidegger attempts to circumvent the meanings
signified by the traditional categories of metaphysics such as nature,
essence, human being, soul and man.
Having become acquainted with some dimension of the meaning of facticity
and factical life we can now turn our consideration to the constitutive
elements of factical life. Heidegger writes, [Factical] life is in such a way that
in the concrete temporalizing and maturation of its being it is concerned
about its being, even when it goes out of its way to avoid itself.15 At a basic
level, what factical life intends, what it is concerned about, what it relates
to, is this life itself and its being.16 Departing from Husserls undue
emphasis on the cognitive character of intentionality, Heidegger designates
the fundamental intentional character, or movement of factical life
[Lebensbewegtheit] as caring [Sorgen]. In its basic direction i.e., the towardwhich [das Worauf] of care [Sorge], factical lifes historically particular
world17 is also there. When factical life is concerned about itself it finds itself
in a particular time, the early 21st century, in a particular place, Sydney,
Australia, embedded in a particular culture and tradition, the Judeo-Christian
west, speaking a particular language, English, in a particular community,
family, friends and city, and in a particular way of going about and doing
things. That factical life goes about its dealings [Umgang] with the world,18 is
understood as the movement of caring [Sorgensbewegtheit]. This particular
mode of intentionality is designated as the movement of concern [die
Bewegheit des Besorgen]. How factical life goes about its dealings,
Heidegger calls the-with-which [das Womit] of dealings, or in a more
archaic English parlance, (the) wherewith, or by means of which, or the
means by which. Although wherewith is not used in most English
translations of womit in the written works of Heidegger, here wherewith
brings to our notice the important instrumental meaning of womit. Naturally,
the actualisation of the with-which of dealings falls under the purview of
concern. However, what is important to bear in mind in this interpretation of
the with-which of dealings is its articulation in being as being-produced in
Aristotle that Heidegger will investigate later in the Introduction and in
14
15
16
17
18

University of New York Press, 2002, p. 118 and 122
Heidegger, Martin. Phenomenological Interpretations to Aristotle: indication of the
hermeneutical situation. trans. and ed. Theodore J. Kisiel, in eds. Theodore J. Kisiel and
Thomas Sheehan Becoming Heidegger: on the trail of his early occasional writings, 19101927 Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 2007, p. 157
Ibid., p. 115
Ibid.
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Comment [MO4]: P1 This is

of utmost importance to the
being of being there and
temporality.
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Being and Time. Concern is the kind of intentionality exhibited when factical
life engages with things in the world, accompanied by the with-which of these
dealings. For example, the means by which I build a house, the way I am
related to every aspect of its construction, allotment, hammer, digging,
cement, wheel burrow, timber, nails, sawing etc. As we can see then, concern
has a narrower sphere than care, but a specific and rich domain.
Taking into consideration this characterisation of care, we have before us the
rudimentary structures of the world that factical life inhabits, that factical life
is, in a certain manner of speaking. Corresponding to the possible directions
of care, that is, going about its dealings; family, community and tradition; and
factical lifes concern about itself, this world then embraces respectively the
environing world [Umwelt], the with-world [Mitwelt], and the self-world
[Selbstwelt]. Obviously these three different senses of the world are to be
taken as inseparable from each other and cannot be understood in isolation,
for example, the self-world as autonomous from the environing world and the
with world. They are in a sense modes of the one world.
Such discussion of care, toward-which, dealings, concern and the with-which
may strike a discordant tone to the ear. Heidegger charitably supplements his
explication of the movement of caring with further concrete examples. He
writes caring is the care for ones livelihood, occupation, pleasuresnot
dying, being familiar with, knowing about, and arranging ones life with
respect to its ultimate goals.19 We can gather from these examples that care
is not only to be understood in its conventional sense, for example, to be
concerned, to be worried, to have regard for, but embraces the entire
spectrum of intentional standpoints such that it can be identified with
intentionality, but such intentionality is not merely formal as it is in the case
of Husserl. In the world care assumes the mode of concern such that factical
life goes about its dealings. However, when factical life goes about its
dealings in accordance with concern, these dealings are directed to routine
tasks and performing them. The examples Heidegger gives are tinkering
with, preparing for, production of, guaranteeing by, making use of,
utilizing for, taking possession of, safekeeping of, and loss of.20 Yet,
as will become clear shortly, dealings are not restricted to the performance of
routine tasks like cooking, digging, serving, chopping, or painting.
Concern is guided by circumspection, a key concept in both the
Introduction, and in particular in Being and Time. Circumspection translates
the German term Umsicht, literally looking around and seeing. It denotes
prudence, forethought or deliberation. However, in the world where factical
life goes about its dealings directed to carrying out everyday activities, it also
connotes the skills of production, using tools in general, in the sense of knowhow, familiarity, and acquaintance. So the with-which, the means by which of
dealings, is prefigured in circumspection. Heidegger writes, [in]
19
20
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Ibid.
Ibid.
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circumspection, the with-which of dealings is in advance grasped as,

oriented to, interpreted and laid out as.21 We can imagine in this context
a machinist, having been asked to produce a certain object, utilising his or her
skills to make such artefacts, evaluating this proposal. S/he thinks ahead to
the materials that will be required, the techniques that will be used and the
tools that will be employed. Heidegger argues that in objects having been
signified in this way or that waythe world is being encountered in this
character of significance.22 There is nothing in this that is theoretical. In fact,
it is pre-theoretical, as has been then case in much of the production of
artefacts and conduct of human affairs throughout pre-history and history of
humanity. The way factical life concernfully relates itself to the world is
through production and praxis.
Bearing in mind the generous sense that Heidegger accords the term care,
which includes concern aided by circumspection, he argues that there is in
factical life not only a possibility but an inclination of giving up this care for
gearing objects in the world in certain directions.23 Circumspection, looking
around and seeing, and the concernful dealings facilitated by it, do not merely
cease but are transformed into mere looking around [that] takes on the
character of looking at.24 The circumspection of production and action
undergoes a change in the nature of its being related to the world such that it
manifests itself as inspection [Hinsicht]. There are two important points to
note about this term. First, Hinsicht is formed from stem of the same word for
seeing in German as is Umsicht, sehen, to see. In the English translation of
these terms the words employed are of Latin derivation circum-spection and
in-spection. Here too they are formed from the Latin word to see, spectare.
For the purposes of rendering the meaning of the German terms into English,
circumspection and inspection satisfy the recurrent visual sense of the way in
which care unfolds itself in the world, looking around and seeing and looking
at. In this case the world simply is, through inspective care, in terms of its
look, its appearance [Aussehen].25 Note by look, appearance Heidegger also
has in mind both the Greek and . The second important point that
must be brought to our attention is that, when the dealings for gearing
objects oriented by circumspection are suspended, inspection, through the
determination of what has been looked at, what has been observed, can be
and is organised into a science, by collating and defining the objective
interrelation the ways of looking at the world. Such looking at is made
concrete in addressing and discussing the objects26 with which
circumspection deals. Heidegger writes: The world is always being
encountered in a particular manner of an address that has made certain
claims about it ().27 What must be understood in this context is the
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 115-6
Ibid., p. 116
Ibid.
Ibid.
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Comment [RS5]: At least in

the formal sense of application of a
theoretical approach to the object
grasped as occurent or in terms
of its Vorhendensein. That is not to
say that some kind of roughly
theoretical know-how is absent
(like knowing which materials are
approrpriate for a particular
building task, given their
properties, etc.).
Comment [RS6]: A big call,
and perhaps worth moderating or
nuancing somewhat.
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development of the dealings from out of circumspective concern to the

dealings of inspection. It describes the very genesis of the theoretical. The
dealings themselves take a break and make a sojourn that are autonomous
from the dealings of circumspective concern. Science does not gear things to
perform routine tasks but sojourns among them for the sake of defining
them.28 According to Heidegger the world met through inspection is
conceived of in terms of the objectivity of nature that has been stripped of all
significance.29 Such a relation to the world is the origin of epistemological and
ontological problems. This may strike one, averse to Heideggers approach to
philosophy, as being typical of his conservative temperament and
ideological loathing for the disciplines of modern science and technology.
The world is encountered in its significance not through inspection but
through circumspective concern when things are in advance grasped as
oriented to, interpreted and laid out as, signified in this way and that.
The world of significance for Heidegger pertains to the world of production
and the conduct of human affairs. Yet for all that science is also a mode of
dealingsa mode of the being of factical life.30 It is constitutive of the way in
which factical life has historically developed and unfolded itself.
Comment [RS7]: If you are

signalling this as a potential
misreading, then do make sure you
spell this out immediately in what
follows. Otherwise it can read as
though you are tacitly endorsing
the reading that takes this account
of the source of theoretical attitude
to be expressive of his
conservative temperament, etc.
Such discussions of our productive and practical being in the world, and the
genesis of the theoretical attitude may seem a little prosaic. However, it is
essential to have a grasp on this issue in order to see how Heidegger
illuminates his investigation of being as being-produced and being as motion
in Aristotle. Though Aristotle may be interpreted as having derived his
conception of time from beings as beings-produced in the Physics and the
Metaphysics, Heidegger will now move to a discussion of what could properly
be called the existential complexion of factical life in the Introduction.
Here the temporality peculiar to human Dasein is explicated according to
factical life having death imminently before one. This existential disposition of
factical life is characterised by its concern about its being even when it goes
out of its way to avoid itself. Factical life finds itself hard to bear.31 That it
finds life difficult, burdensome, onerous is in accord with the basic sense of
its being.32 Concerning itself with its being and finding life hard to bear,
factical life makes itself easy for itself.33 It goes out of its way to avoid itself.
Being concerned about its being does not mean that factical life does not
attempt to evade itself. Even when it avoids itself it is still concerned about its
being. Factical life leans toward the seduction of the world and the refuge
found in it. It has the propensity toward being engrossed in the world and
lead along by it. This, Heidegger writes, is a basic factical tendency in
[factical] life toward falling away from itselffalling into the world and itself
falling into ruin.34 Factical life is falling [Verfallen]. By no means should we
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 117
Ibid., p 113
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 117
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understand falling to be an event or occurrence. Falling is in a certain sense a

way of the movement of caring, a way of factical lifes being-related to.
Heidegger describes falling as an intentional how.35 His condemnation of our
tendency to view the burden of our lives as something from which we could
liberate ourselves as utopian may be perceived as strongly conservative. Yet,
if factical life could be shaped according to ideals of progress or perfection
then, argues Heidegger, we risk conceiving of life as an object of dealings
able to be produced in some ideal form.36 One only need think of the history
of modern eugenics to realise how fantastic a view of life we have
entertained. Of course such views pervade our being in the world today only
because we are falling. Factical life is falling. Falling cannot be cut out of, or
neutralised in factical life. However, since we are falling, and since in falling
we seek sanctuary from the difficulty of life, we only need be reminded of the
explosion in the development of reproductive and gene technologies, in order
to pause and give further thought to how we understand our factical life.
The world of significance [Bedeutsamkeit] interpreted according to falling, is
tempting [versucherisch] for factical life itself. It seduces falling factical life
with all the promise of the heavens and earth into making things easy for
itself. Such possibilities are familiar in the propositions made to us by
government, political parties, the free market, communal economics, moral
imperatives, religious creeds, and techno-scientific and mystical discourse
proffering contentment and security. As tempting it is also tranquillizing
[beruhigend]. Factical life is held fast in falling. It is lead to view such a
circumstance as secure and comfortable. In turn, as a manifestation the
falling of factical life, such tranquillising is alienating [entfremdend]. As it
engrosses itself in the world, at the expense of itself, factical life loses its
integrity and becomes more and more alienated from itself, such that the
hubbub of life, Heidegger writes, takes away the possibility that life can, in
worrying [Bekmmerung] about itselftake itself upand appropriate.37
Falling and its tripartite configuration inflects the entire movement of caring,
including concern, circumspection and inspection, which then views factical
life as mere occurrence. In an incredibly short and dense paragraph,
Heidegger then characterises falling factical life as the everyone [Das Man]
or the they as readers of the first English translation of Being and Time
would be familiar. The falling of factical life, which as Heidegger says is in
each case properly the factical life of the individual, is for the most part not
lived as such.38 Though the individual factical life is predominantly not lived,
the factical life of the individual lives the life of the everyone. It is lived as
such since the individual factical life lives its life as the movement of caring,
going about its dealings, and circumspection to which, argues Heidegger, a
certain averagenessbelongs. Again, this is the influence of the fashion of
views of the world. I drive a car because everyone drives a car. The way I
35
36
37
38
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 118
Ibid.
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Comment [RS8]: Including its

latest incarnation: liberal eugenics!
Comment [RS9]: What is it

that prompts Dasein to make
things easy for itself? Much of the
activity and striving Dasein
engages in would seem to suggest
the opposite, though this might
simply be a mode of distraction
from whatever it is that Dasein is
avoiding, fleeing from, covering
over, etc (finitude?).
Comment [RS10]: Still rather
mysterious what Heidegger means
here concerning Daseins tendency
towards falling, tranquillising
alienation, etc.
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get about, have to get about, is the way everyone gets about. I am married
and have children, because everyone is married and has children. Since I do
what everyone does, everyone is no one. Perhaps now we can begin to
makes sense of this puzzling clause even when it goes out of its way to avoid
itself, at the end of the sentence in which Heidegger describes factical life as
concerned about its being39 Heidegger argues that Life conceals itself from
itself inthe tendency toward falling.40 How is factical such that it conceals
from itself?
Not only does factical life flee from itself, conceal itself because it finds life
hard, difficult to bear, but because factical life must die. Death presents
factical life its most terrifying possibility. In the language of Being and Time,
Death is the possibility of the absolute impossibility of Dasein.41 Yet what
accentuates such distress is death is not a cessation of factical life, if we
imagine that it is, for any of us, a child, an adult, or an elderly person, some
way off into the future. Factical life has no use-by date, like prepared food,
batteries or some kind of appliance. Furthermore, factical life is not produced
like an artefact, such that the length of its production can be quantitatively
determined, e.g., 75 years. It is not any kind of process with a determinate
termination. Such an end is utterly indeterminable, and yet death looms
before factical life as that from which we cannot turn back [Unabwendbar].
Death, Heidegger writes is imminent for factical life, standing before it as
inevitable [Unabwendbar].42 I am born to die.43 Death is interior to who I
am. It is constitutive of factical life in just the same way as caring and falling
are constitutive of factical life. However, factical life, falling, seeks refuge
from the thought of death44 by being preoccupied with going about its
dealings in the world. Factical life ignores death and says death is some way
39
40
41
42
43
44

Heidegger, Martin Being and Time trans. John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson, Oxford:
Blackwell, 1962, p 250/294
Cf Johannes von Tepl als balde ein mensche geboren wirddas es sterben sol [as soon as
a human being is bornit is to die.] Cited in Kisiel and van Buren 1999 p. 361; Martin
Luther Statim enim ab utero matris mori incipimus [For as soon as we abandon our
mothers womb we begin to die.] Cited in Kisiel and van Buren 1999 p. 361
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10
Comment [RS11]: Now were

getting warmer!
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off into the future. Although, by seizing upon life in order to distract oneself
from, to look away from death, one simply evades life all the more.
Heidegger makes two important ontological claims about the being45 of death.
Both are important to our understanding of the Introduction on various
levels. Beyond its sphere these arguments concerning death signal their place
along the development of the interpretations of temporality, history and time
that culminate in Being and Time. We will have many more opportunities to
scrutinise such interpretations, and in particular their relationship to Aristotles
concept of being as being-produced understood according to motion, in later
chapters. According to the first point death is encountered as a how of life.46
What must be borne in mind with such a claim is that Heidegger situates
death in the movement of factical life as a structural element, which gives
fundamental perspective to life. This can only take place when factical life
worries itself about death, has death before it as certain and lays hold of it.
Heidegger argues, in the fundamental perspective given to life by death,
ones life becomes visible in itself [wird das Leben an ihm selbst sichtbar].47
What does factical life see in death? How does it see what it sees? Is
not ones life visible without peering through the lens of death? Heidegger
argues when factical life lays hold of death as a certain possession by
worrying about it, death constantly leads [factical life] before its ownmost
present and past.48 According to factical life having its present and past made
visible to it in worrying about its death, death is the key phenomenon in
which the specific kind of temporality belonging to human Dasein is to be
brought into relief and explicated.49 Obviously then, through death factical
lifes finitude is disclosed to it. What is unique about factical lifes temporality
is that factical life temporalizes50 its being in accordance with its finitude, its
death. In a footnote Heidegger attempts to heighten such finitude, such
decisive singularity [entscheidend Einmaligkeit]51 by expressing it in almost
an imperative mood as the one-time-only [Einmaligkeit] and the once only
[Einmal] of factical life. Though not pursued for more than one mere
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
Ibid., p. 119
Ibid., p. 118-9
How does one explain the visual and ocular metaphors with respect to death, temporality
and history? This is beyond the scope of the present chapter. However, it will be
addressed in connection with Heideggers discussion of death, truth and time in Being and
Time.
Ibid., p. 119
University of New York Press, 2002, p. 192 translators note 2
Thomas Sheehan Becoming Heidegger: on the trail of his early occasional writings, 19101927 Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 2007, p. 479 n. 20
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comment, clearly the temporality of factical life is contrary to the view it is

ultimately reducible to the numerical relationships and succession of nows
on a linear time-line, familiar to us from physics or the rise and fall of stock
markets. What concerns the temporality of factical life is a matter of
existentiell factical leaps. The continuity of the and so forth is in each
instance a leap (proairesis [resolution, deliberation]), the how of expecting.52
On the one hand, factical life through caring is falling away from itself, falling
into the world and itself falling into ruin. By immersion in the world of going
about its dealings it conceals itself. It avoids itself. It avoids death. Yet, on
the other hand, in the movement of caring it is concerned about its being. As
Heidegger says, there is no contradiction in this description of the categories
of factical life. Factical life is embedded in the world, in its historically
particular world, and moves at any particular time within a certain state of
having-been-interpreted.53 Again such having-been-interpreted possesses a
wholly historical character. Thus it refers to the factical life of the individual
and to facticity in the sense of factical lifes own times and generation.
Remaining for the moment with the individual, factical life, absorbed in the
world by its concern and moving within a state of having-been-interpreted,
does not escape life. In fact, factical life stumbles upon itself, that is, life in its
having-been-interpreted by attempting to avoid life in the world of concern.
However, it only runs up against its past, its one time only. In a sense, at
the same time as death discloses factical lifes past and present, factical life
encounters death through its past, its having been, its only once. Both
accentuate each other. As a result, factical life worries about not getting lost
[das Nichtinverlustgeraten], not squandering itself. Heidegger says that
through such a transformation factical life is on the path of a detour through
a motion running counter to the falling of care.54 This is the manner in which
factical life, as falling away from itself, returns to itself. Factical life becomes
its own project. It is only when factical worries about not frittering itself away
that the possible and seized being proper to life comes to maturity and
temporalizes itself.55 Such possible and seized being of factical life is
designated existence [Existenz.] Kisiel points out that existence as it is
discussed in the Introduction has the narrower meaning of lifes most
unique and authentic possibility, just one of the possibilities which can be
temporalized within lifes facticity56 than the one it is given in Being and Time.
Hence existence does not mean facticity. As one of the possibilities of factical
52
53
54
55
56
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 119
Press: Berkeley, 1993, p. 249-50
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12
Comment [RS12]: Interesting

how Existenz is qualified factical
life, suggestive even of
Eigentlichkeit!
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life, existence is something that life can fail at.57 The possibility of existence
and of failing to exist is in principle something that warrants questioning.58
Therefore, in order to seize its existence, factical life must be rendered
questionablethrough a concrete destruction of facticity.59 This means that,
as a result of the panic instilled in factical life by it worrying about not wasting
its life away, it must critically approach its self-interpretation and its
immersion in the having-been-interpreted of facticity. The authenticity of
factical life, as its possible and seized being, is then the problem of
philosophy. However, before we take up Heideggers analysis of factical life as
it is discussed in Aristotle, we must attend to the second important claim he
makes about the being of death, which flows on from the first claim. It is
according to the unique kind of temporality belonging to factical life and
disclosed to it by death that the basic sense of the historical needs to be
defined.60 This has several important consequences regarding hermeneutics,
history and philosophy that we must address.
Heidegger goes to some length spelling out the methodology of philosophy.
The explication of the modus operandi of philosophy spans the entire
Introduction. He raises several questions regarding its principles: what it
involves, the character of the time in which philosophy is pursued, and the
approach of philosophy to history. The thread that runs through Heideggers
analysis of what philosophy is is factical life. He writes, This basic direction of
philosophical questioningneeds to be understood as an explicit taking up of
a basic movement of factical life.61 Philosophical questioning is a category or,
if you will, an existential of factical life. The essential problem with the
philosophy is what is its object of research, how is it able to access it, that is,
the methodology that is appropriate to it, and having investigated its object,
what and how are the results to be understood. Since philosophy is a basic
movement of factical life, it moves within the same state of having-beeninterpreted. However, philosophy adopts an ambiguous position in relation to
history. Heideggers novel approach to philosophy and history is to state that
philosophical research takes the form of historical knowing in the radical
sense of the term.62
Moreover, since philosophical research is an
investigation of the being of factical life, an ontology of facticity,63
fundamentally then, for Heidegger, philosophy is identified with ontology and
ontology is identified with history.64
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64

Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 119
Ibid., p. 113
Ibid., p. 124
Ibid., p. 121
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Yet we come across a serious problem with such an identification when we

recall that for Heidegger the basic sense of the historical must be defined in
relation to the unique kind of temporality belonging to factical life and
revealed to it by death. According to such a conception of history,
philosophical research is not conducted according to other modes of time that
we usually also employ, for example, chronological time, calendrical time or
time as a sequence of now points. Obviously, the working day is arranged
according to chronological time, so too the economy and the financial
markets, and we engineer all our machine and information technology with
respect to it as well. According to this time-scale the problems of philosophy
would be raised and solved in a progressive fashion such that the results of
this research would be available for future use and reference. However, the
problems of each time are unique to itself. A time, Heidegger writes, can
never borrow from another time,65 with the exception, of course, of the
demands of pedagogy. What this amounts to is a solipsism of time and
history. It suggests the utter inability of a time, a generation to communicate
between past and future times and generations. Of course, the smug
assumption of philosophy hitherto is its belief that it can solve all the
problems that have and will weigh down factical life. Heidegger is adamant
about cutting down this tall poppy. In others words, philosophical research
would never step forward with the claim that it be allowed to and is able to
relive future times of the burden of having to worry about radical
questioning.66 As we are well aware by now factical life is only as ones own67
factical life and never the factical life of some universal humanity.68 Factical
life then can never be relived of the worry, the problem concerning its being,
its finitude, of its one-time-only. This is a situation that confronts the time
of each factical life. Each factical life must deal with this on its own terms.
That being said, since facticity is having-been interpreted, since philosophy is
history, philosophical researchs relationship to history must be understood in
another way.
Comment [RS13]: This sounds

somewhat overstated. It is true that
each time has its own unique
problems, hence we cannot simply
apply the knowledge or thought of
the past to our own time. But this
is not the same thing as saying that
there is a solipsism of time and
history. What about the
Wiederholumg? Retrieving the
impulses of Greek thinking, for
instance with Aristotle? [as you
remark below]
Comment [RS14]: Or perhaps
of science/theory more generally.
What has happened in philosophical investigation is that past research has

been transmitted to it in an average way.69 If past philosophical research is to
serve as the object of interpretation for contemporary research into
philosophical problems, the correct approach to their interpretation must be
used, and the context of the current philosophical problems has to have
already been surveyed and elucidated. If these first steps are not clarified
then confusion will be the only result. Yet the nature of interpretive activity
involves a number of factors that, while they pose obstructions to it, are in
fact intrinsic to the interpretive act. The access to the object-field of
philosophy and access to past philosophical research then is always the living
situation of the present.70 The present is the present, so to speak, only by
65
66
67
68
69
70
Ibid.,
Ibid.
Ibid.,
Ibid.
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
p. 113
p. 114
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p. 123
p. 112
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confronting the past. This inevitably leads to reading the present into the
past. Undoubtedly, this raises many important issues, the most obvious being
distortion in the very production of narratives about the past. What we end
up with is historical constructivism and relativism. Yet, Heidegger claims, such
reading into the past is the basic condition for getting the past to speak to us
at all.71 In fact, the present will be taken up uncritically in our interpretation
of the past despite our protestation to the contrary. As interpreters we must
become cognisant of this phenomenon. The development of methodological
approaches to the investigation of past prevent such interpretive activity from
producing confusion in the results of historical research. Heidegger argues,
that now past philosophical research will have an impact on the future of
research can never consist in its results as such.72 The circumstances
surrounding philosophy indicate that the results of its research are not just
applied to philosophical problems from a particular time to a particular
time over and over again, according to the unique time of factical life and
its generation. Present philosophical investigation attempts to understand
radically what a particular kind of past philosophical research put forward at a
particular time in and for its situation in worrying itself with the basic things it
did.73Again the results are not what are important. Factical life, in order to
retrieve its existence as a possibility of its being which finds its source in
having-been-interpreted, retrieves from past philosophical research in an
original manner what is understood in the past in terms of and for the sake of
ones very own situation.74 This is the manner in which Heidegger approaches
Aristotle.
Comment [MO15]: This must

be supplemented with a
general discussion of nature of
phenomenology. GA56/57, 58,
59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 17.
Section 2
The Phenomenology
Phenomenology
of
Aristotle
and
Aristotles
Section 2.1
Prologue
Greek Conceptuality and the History of Western Philosophy
In the second and third parts of the Introduction, Heidegger turns to an
examination of whether philosophy today (1922) should and can authentically
appropriate Aristotles thinking, and if this is possible, how does philosophy
today accomplish such an authentic retrieval of Aristotles concepts and
71
72
73
74
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 113
Ibid., p. 114
Ibid., p. 114
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thought. Let us now briefly turn to the second part of the Introduction
where Heidegger states his reasons for the relevance of an interpretation of
Aristotles work today, and where he traces the influence of Aristotle on
various figures and world views in the history of western Judeo-Christian
theology and philosophy. We will then move to third and final part of the
essay to focus our attention at length on Heideggers outline of an
interpretation of selected texts from the Aristotelian corpus.
With his bearings fixed firmly on the initial position [Blickstand], facticity,
factical life and its constitutive elements, Heidegger now proceeds to
determine both the direction of looking [Blickrichtung] and the scope of
looking [Sichtweite.] In the elucidation of the initial position, it was
demonstrated that the basic direction of philosophical research itself cotemporalizes and helps unfold the concrete and historically particular being of
life itself.75 In being so constituted, philosophical research, then, is a basic
direction of factical life. Yet, not only is philosophy life and life philosophy,
factical life moves at any particular time within a certain state of havingbeen-interpreted.76 Life is philosophy is history. There are, however, further
structures of factical life that have particular relevance in shaping the
direction of looking, structures that pose both an unavoidable obstruction,
and yet offer the possibility to factical life of authentically retrieving the being
of its life, its existence. It was shown that factical life has the tendency
toward falling [Verfallen.] In the propensity toward falling factical life lives for
the most part in what is inauthentic.77 That is, factical life does not live in
what is authentic. Its life is not lived singularly and originally. This also
pertains to factical lifes relationship to its own history and to its own
interpretation of its history. In falling, recall, as a fundamental characteristic
of the movement of caring from which it cannot be released, factical life
livesin what has been handed down to it, in what has been transmittedto
it from the pastin an average way.78 History and the interpretation of
history becomes levelled out, homogenised, average and becomes the
possession of the everyone. Philosophy, as life, as having-been-interpreted,
as history, is falling too. Falling leaves its mark on the text of philosophy.
Heidegger now delivers an apposite segue of premises, statements and
evidence in the next section of his argument to determine the direction of
looking. The argument steps swiftly from the object of philosophy; to the
articulation of the human; to the intellectual history in which the concept of
nature is steeped; to the mischaracterisation of Aristotles discussion of
; to the concepts that have sprung from experiences of objects79 no
longer available to us, in which life circulates; and finally, to the inauthentic
dwelling of contemporary philosophy within Greek conceptuality. In as much
as such discussions endeavour to establish the direction of looking, this has to
75
76
77
78
79
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
p.
p.
p.
p.
p.
115
116
122
122-3
123
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a certain extent already been gained in the initial position. Remember, at the
beginning of the Introduction, Heidegger stated the object of philosophical
research is human Dasein, factical life with respect to the character of its
being.80 Human Dasein is the a priori, singular concern of philosophy.
Historically speaking, in the explanation of the human, such discourse is given
by analogy with objects from in the world, from nature. By nature we are
given to understand worldly occurrence, and nature as essence, in such
locutions as the nature of man, the nature of life, the nature of spirit,
the nature of the soul, and the nature of things. Yet, Heidegger argues,
the discourse of this kind of objectivity,81 of the discourse of human, spirit,
soul and thing employs categories developed froma particular way of
looking at nature.82 The rich philosophical history of this concept, nature,
should bespeak great volumes. The concept of object, of thing itself also has
been obscured in the fallen history of interpretation. Whether objects were
crudely spoken of as substances [] (a way of speaking Aristotle was,
Heidegger writes far removed than is generally taught)83 they, and life, are
interpreted by concepts drawn from experiences of objects that are
occluded by the fact of history, and to which we have limited access.
Heidegger argues then, that contemporary philosophy moves inauthentically
within Greek conceptuality.84 Yet contemporary philosophy continues to
discuss objects, given to it in experiences through its own facticity, by means
of Greek conceptuality. Greek thought articulated a restricted field of
experiences of an equally restricted field of things. 85 Even though the singular
way in which the Greeks experienced the objects in their world, both natural
and artefactual, in their facticity, is inaccessible. Even though such basic
concepts have been transformed greatly through interpretation and reinterpretation, so that they are almost unrecognizable, Heidegger argues that
a certain aspect of their provenanceof their original sense86 perdures. The
facticity of contemporary philosophy, by establishing itself on the ideas of
man and the ideals of life, is most certainly indebted to the heritage of Greek
ethics and the Christian interpretation of life, although this conceptuality has
itself become obscured for the above reasons. Both the anti-Greek and antiChristian world-views are also inheritors of this conceptuality. Implicated
and cited as aiding in the development of the Graeco-Christian interpretation
of life, Heidegger lists German Idealism, Transcendental Idealism, Luthers
theology and his confrontation with late Scholasticism through his
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
Ibid., p. 113
Ibid., p. 123
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
In a sense, the manner in which entire history of perception (that is, looking [sehen,
Umsicht, Hinsicht] Included in this history is the transformation of the means by which of
perception, instrumentality and artefactuality) has unfolded, composes and recomposes
the field of objects, and therefore world, nature and object-hood itself. Added to this is
the reception of new experiences in facticity of objects and the further development of a
conceptuality to communicate such experiences. This is, to a certain extent, analysed in
the first division of Being and Time.
Ibid., p. 123-4
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interpretations of Paul and Augustine, late Scholasticism itself, Thomas

Aquinas, Neo-Platonism and the early Fathers of the Church. He argues that
the idea of man that was assumed in many philosophical and theological
problems during the course of western history was based on [the]
Aristotelian corpus that was treated in aselective manner and worked with
on the basis of a particular interpretation of them.87 In other words, for
Heidegger, Aristotle was decisively influential88 on western philosophy.
Aristotles ontology and logic permeated the history of philosophical
anthropology89 Yet, both the surviving texts of Aristotle and Greek
conceptuality, in general, as we have seen Heidegger reiterate many times,
suffered distortion by being obscured through interpretation and
misinterpretation. Factical life can authentically appropriate the teachings of
Aristotle and Greek conceptuality by it seizing the possibility of its existence.
That is, philosophy gains understanding of the past by repeating in an
original manner what is understood in the past in terms of and for the sake of
ones very own situation.90 Again, the prescribed method is the
phenomenological hermeneutics of facticity. It proceeds by way of an
authentic appropriation of the past, what, as we know, Heidegger calls a
deconstructive regress. The past is disclosed in this way by shaking loose
the reigning state of traditional interpretation today in order to penetrate
into the original motivational sources of these explications.91 The past
retrieved authentically then, poses to the present, to factical life the
permanent question of the extent of its worry [Bekmmerung] about
appropriating radical possibilities of founding experiences and of their
interpretation, which Heidegger states, provides a critical clarification of a
radical logic of origins and the formation of ontologies.92 In sum, the
interpretation of factical life is steeped in the interpretative history of Greek
ethics and Christianity. By way of an analogy with the concepts of objects
found in the world, both the ceaseless elaboration and occlusion of the
interpretation of human Dasein unfolds. In order to penetrate the complexity
of these interpretations that history has bequeathed, to gain access to the
provenance and original sense of Greek conceptuality, it is imperative that a
thorough analysis of Aristotles works on physics, ethics, psychology and
ontology be undertaken. With these points having been sufficiently explicated
and clarified, the direction of looking has been established.
Comment [RS16]: Where does

H use this phrase? Is it the
Destruktion of SZ?
Section 2.2
The Meaning of Being as Being-produced Understood on the Basis of Motion
in Greek Philosophy, and in Aristotle in Particular
87
88
89
90
91
92
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.
p. 125
p. 126
p. 114
p. 124
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Let us remind ourselves of the questions Heidegger raises with respect to

Aristotle and his understanding of being in any sense whatsoever and the
human being in particular, that is, factical life. However, this time we will for
the phrasing of these questions a little more closely. How was the being of
the human being experienced? As what kind of object was (the being of) the
human being interpreted? How did Aristotle explicate in concepts the being of
the human being? From where did the concepts of this explication arise?
Which categories of being grew out of such explication? Did Aristotle draw the
sense of being to explicate the being of the human being from a basic
experience [Grunderfahrung] of this object [Gegenstand] and its genuine
being?93 Or did he understand the human being as only one being within a
more comprehensive domain of being, i.e. did Aristotle apply to it a sense of
being that he took to be archontic?94 What, in general, did being mean for
Aristotle, and how did he go about gaining access to, conceiving and defining
it?
Heidegger begins his analysis Aristotles Ethica Nicomachea , Metaphysica
1-2 and Physica, , and 1-3 by offering a summary of the outline of their
interpretation. Obviously he does not restrict himself to only these texts in the
main body of the outline. For example in his discussion of the five dianoetic
virtues, he makes frequent reference to De anima, and in the analysis of
Metaphysica, 1-2 and Physica, , and 1-3 he refers to other books of
the said texts and De anima, De motu animalium, De interpretatione,
Analytica priora and Analytica posteriora
During the course of the summary, Heidegger makes several important
claims. The first chief assertion of the Introduction with respect to his
Aristotle interpretation is stated as follows: The domain of objects supplying
the primordial sense of being [for Aristotle] was the domain of those objects
produced [hergestellt] and put into use in dealings.95 Everything turns on this
point. By arguing that the field of objects in which the sense of being was
primordially experienced and interpreted is the domain of objects having been
produced, Heideggers intention is to show that the concepts of being did not
have their genesis purely in theoretical activity and exchange. The original
experience of beings for the human being, to which its attention was directed,
was the world encountered in going about dealings that produce, direct
themselves to routine tasks.96 That is, the sense of being the human being
primordially encountered was the sense of being experienced in the mundane
world. In other words, the sense of being that the human being first
encounters is being-in-the-world. Heidegger argues that what is, the sense of
being, is a work (), a product, a tool (), or, in general, a thing. I
shall cite at length the passage where he states this argument:
93
94
95
96
Ibid., p. 127
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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Comment [RS17]: Same point

is made concerning the
understanding of tools and the
thing as formed matter in Greek
thought.
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What is amounts to what has been finished [Fertiggeworden] and made ready in the
movement of the going about the dealings of production () [in der
Umgangsbewegtheit des Herstellens], i.e. what has come into a being-on-hand
[Vorhandensein] and is now available for certain tendencies to use it.97
In all three characteristics of being as being-produced [Hergestelltsein] (the

movement of production, being-on-hand and being ready and available for
use in different ways) the various things, products and tools of circumspective
concern are signified in various ways by factical life. Through such
circumspective dealings, factical life encounters the world in character of
significance. This reflects Heideggers discussion in section one of the
discussion of the movement of caring and concern. Thus, according to this
logic, further elements of factical life are interrogated with respect to their
interpretation by Aristotle. In inspection (circumspection in its autonomy from
dealings directed to routine tasks and performing them), or understanding
(, ) beings are addressed () with respect to the way they look
( [idea, form]).98 To address and discuss the looking at is [to
speak, to say.] The connection between discourse and is such that the
what it is of a being in discourse is identical to its , which is the
authentic sense of these beings.99 In its discussion of beings, what
does is to bring the beingness ( [Seinshaftigkeit] usually rendered into
English as substance) of the appearance of beings into the safeguarding of
truth [Verwahrung].100 This is a remarkably familiar discussion of truth by
Heidegger, which is found throughout the entirety of his works. The same
cannot be said of beingness. It comes under a sustained criticism during the
ensuing years. Equally important is Heideggers evocation of the partially
occluded original meaning of [Seinshaftigkeit (beingness, substance)],
found in Aristotle and later, as that which is ones own, ones substance,
property; frequently used of estates; goods, possessions; or what is at
Comment [MO18]: P1 This is

fundamental to Heideggers
interpretation of Aristotles
views about being and time,
and to Heideggers critique of
its traditional interpretation,
and to Heideggers critique of
Aristotles claims concerning
being and time, once he has
brushed away the millennia of
misinterpretation.
97
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 128
99
Ibid., p. 123
100
In his summary of the Introduction The Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time
University of California Press: Berkeley, 1993, p. 265, Kisiel translates Verwahrung as
troth with which truth, truce and trust are cognate, which demonstrates by analogy the
other hidden meanings Heidegger retrieves for this term. See true. (2006). In Word
London:
A&C
Black.
Retrieved
June
30,
2009,
from
Origins.
http://www.credoreference.com/entry/acbwordorig/true and troth, n. (1989). In The
Oxford English Dictionary. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Retrieved June 30, 2009, from
http://dictionary.oed.com.simsrad.net.ocs.mq.edu.au/cgi/entry/50258757. However, we
must not be tempted by hast but remain cautious. The most important term that
Heidegger discusses in the Introduction, in connection with truth, is usually
translated into German as Wahrheit and into English as truth. He translates [true]
als unverborgen da-seinunverhulltes in Verwahrung nehmen (being-there as
unconcealedto take unveiled into true safekeeping.) Phnomenologische
Interpretationen zu Aristoteles. Anzeige der hermeneutischen Situation. Dilthey-Jahrbuch
fr Philosophie und Geschichte der Geisteswissenschaften 6 (1989) pp. 255-6 and
Phenomenological Interpretations in Connection with Aristotle: An Indication of the
Hermeneutical Situation. trans. John van Buren, in ed. John van Buren Supplements:
from the earliest essays to Being and Time and beyond New York: State University of New
York Press, 2002, pp. 130-1
98
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ones disposal for use in ones environing world.101 This argument loops back
into the production model, whereby objects produced provide the sense of
being. The beingness of beings, which comes into the true safekeeping that
deals with them,102 that which gives beings the character of possessions, is
the being-produced of beings. Beings are goods, possessions, and property
by having been produced. Obviously this is not the position of Heidegger. He
will set out to deconstruct this very interpretation of being. In fact, according
to Heidegger, Aristotle developed his ontology of human life on being as
being-produced. However, Heideggers most important findings concern the
sense of being as movement (). Aristotles research takes its departure
from the premise that the basic sense of beings is beings in motion, upon
which he founds his ontology. This research, and from which Aristotle
fashions his ontology and logic, is expounded in his Physica.
Comment [MO19]: NOTE

YOU MUST INDICATE HERE
HEIDEGGERS LATER
INTERPRETIVE
IDENTIFICATION OF
WITH PRESENCE THROUGH
SUCH THAT TIME IS A
POSSIBLE HORIZON FOR THE
UNDERSTANDING OF BEING,
WHICH OCCURS SHORTLY
AFTER THE COMPOSITION OF
THIS TEXT.
On the one hand, Heidegger introduced his discussion of Aristotle by

explicating the kernel of his interpretation i.e. being-produced (), a
work (), beingness () and movement (). On the other hand,
he proceeds to analyse Aristotles methodology, of which he mentioned two
crucial concepts in passing discourse, address () and that which is seen
(). It is imperative, in order to understand Aristotles ontology, to
investigate the manner in which he pursued his research. We are familiar with
the origin of theory from the arrest of dealings directed to routine tasks and
performing them. Research, as carried out by Aristotle in the Physics, is
observing determining understanding ( [hinsehennd bestimmende
Vehrstehen]), or science. Note the exchange between the retrieval of
and inspection [Hinsicht]. Exactly how does science investigate
something from the point of view of its in what way ( [Inwiefern
(cause)]) and its from out of which ( [Vonwoaus (origin, first
principle)])103 Met. 1-2? At this point Heidegger calls attention to Aristotles
description of the kinds of being which corresponds to scientific knowledge:
studies beings not capable of being otherwiseTherefore the object
of knowledge is of necessity. Therefore it is eternal. (Eth. Nic. 1139b20-3)104
Obviously, there are other modes of knowledge of different kinds of beings
that secure different kinds of truth. Art () concerns beings that can be
otherwiseAll art is concerned with coming into being, i.e. with contriving
and considering how something may come into being. (Eth. Nic. 1140a1-12)
By this, Aristotle means the coming into being of beings by and not
(nature). These two different kinds of beings require, then, two
different kinds of methodology to investigate them, two different kinds of
101
102
103
104

Ibid.
Ibid., p. 129
The Complete Works of Aristotle: the revised Oxford translation 2 vols. Princeton
University Press: Princeton, N.J., 1984. Unless otherwise noted references to Aristotles
works are taken from this English language edition.
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knowledge and . Heidegger argues that in his interpretation of

selected texts by Aristotle he hopes to gain access the phenomenal horizon
within which research and theoretical knowing need to be located as modes
of (literally, in which the soul trues.) (Eth. Nic.
1139b15.)105 During our exposition of Heideggers analysis of Aristotles
methodology it will be demonstrated that it both augments his own
phenomenology and shows Aristotle to have employed a protophenomenological method. Such an analysis of the research methodology of
Aristotle focuses in on Ethica Nicomachea , De anima , and Met. 1-2.
Comment [RS20]: Maybe

better rendered with unconceals
or something similar?
Section 2.3
: Aristotles Phenomenological Method
For Aristotle both and , constitute two of the five so-called
dianoetic virtues ( ) or intellectual virtues, the other
three being prudence, or practical wisdom (), wisdom (), and
intelligence (). The intellectual virtues are (habits, dispositions,
states). In accordance with interpretation that repeats in an original way what
was understood in the past, Heidegger sets about translating Aristotles
discussion of the various modes of intelligence. As we noted above, they are
different ways in which the soul trues. Heideggers German translation can be
rendered into English thus: the intellectual virtues are capabilities to actualise
[vollziehen]106 a genuine true safe-keeping of being.107 He argues that
and are modes of . Each of the five intellectual virtues is given
a preliminarily definition.
(art):
procedures in which one is directed to certain tasks and produces;
(science):
defining by way of looking at, discussing, and identifying;
(prudence):
seeing around one which has to do with care for human well-being
[Umsicht (circumspection)];
(wisdom):
understanding which sees in an authentic manner;
(intelligence):
pure and simple perceiving;108
Comment [RS21]: See above.
They each give the given being, in their own particular manner, to original
safekeeping [Verwahrung].109 Understandably, the intellectual virtue
105
106
107
108
109

The word that Heidegger uses here is Vollzug, which is translated as actualizing.
Ibid., p. 129
Ibid., p. 130
This is my own close paraphrase in English of the passage as it appears in the first
German edition of the Introduction Phnomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles.
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Heidegger spends the most time discussing is , since it is concerns

care as the movement of factical life, or care for human well-being. Before
he gives a concrete interpretation of it, he states that in order to understand
the movements of each of the intellectual virtues, and in particular,
an analysis of true (), truth (), , sensory perception
() and is imperative. The analysis is familiar to those acquainted
with Heideggers discussion of . Aristotle is not the chief arbiter of
truth [Wahrheit], if we mean by this that he held the view: veritas est
adaequatio rei et intellectus (truth is the equation of thing and intellect),110
and Sed quando adaequatur ei quod est extra in re, dicitur iudicium verum (A
judgment is said to be true when it conforms to the external reality; But when
therefore it is made equal with something external, it is said judgment is
truth)111 Expressed somewhat formally x is true iff x corresponds to some
fact,112 where x is a statement. Notice that in these definitions truth is located
primarily in the judgment and not in a being or event to which it corresponds.
No one asked whether it is the object that stamps itself on the proposition, or
whether we hold a nave view of judgments. Such then is the classic definition
of the correspondence theory of truth. In the Introduction Heidegger holds
that Aristotle neither thought that truth resides in a statement nor that truth
is the correspondence between such a statement and the facts about an
object in reality.113 True in Attic Greek is , which Heidegger translates
als unverborgen da-sein, bzw. an ihm selbst vermeintsein (being-there as
unconcealed, i.e., being-meant in itself)114 This implies that beings are naked.
110
111
112
113
114
Anzeige der hermeneutischen Situation. Dilthey-Jahrbuch fr Philosophie und Geschichte

der Geisteswissenschaften 6 (1989) p. 255
Aquinas, Thomas. Opera omnia iussu impensaque Leonis XIII P. M. edita ..., t. 4: Pars
prima Summae Theologiae a quaestione I ad quaestionem XLIX ad codices manuscriptos
Vaticanos exacta cum Commentariis Thomae de Vio Caietani, Ordinis Praedicatorum, S. R.
E. cardinalis (Ex Typographia Polyglotta S. C. de Propaganda Fide, Romae, 1888) XV, I
q. 16 a. 1 co.
Aquinas, Thomas. Opera Omnia iussu Leonis XIII P. M. edita. Tomus XXII Quaestiones
Disputatae de Veritate. Vol. I. Fasc. 2 QQ. 1-7. Rome, ad Sanctae Sabinae: [Commissio
Leonina], 1970, q. 1 a. 3 co.
David, Marian, "The Correspondence Theory of Truth", The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), forthcoming URL =
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/truth-correspondence/>.
In the Heideggers lectures on the Sophist, Plato's Sophist trans. Richard Rojcewicz and
Andr Schuwer, Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1997, Heidegger writes
Aristotle was the first to emphasize: truth is a judgement; the determinations true or false
primarily apply to judgements. Truth is judgemental truth (My italics.) p. 15/10 It would
be careless to simply cite this as evidence for the claim that this is the interpretation of
truth that Heidegger discovers and affirms in Aristotle. Yet this just what Drew Hyland
does in Questioning Platonism: continental interpretations of Plato Albany, N.Y.: State
University of New York Press, 2004, p. 37. Heidegger prefaces this statement with the
following remarks From the tradition of logic, as it is still alive today, we know that truth
is determined explicitly with reference to Aristotle (My italics.) p. 15/10 That is, everyone
has merely assumed that this is indeed Aristotle determination of truth. However, as
Heidegger points out, We will see later to what extent this determination is in a sense
correct, though superficial: on the basis of judgmental truth the phenomenon of truth
will be discussed and founded (My italics.) p. 15/10
Heidegger, Martin. Phnomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles. Anzeige der
hermeneutischen Situation. Dilthey-Jahrbuch fr Philosophie und Geschichte der
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In themselves beings are unveiled so that truth lies in beings. Being unable to
form truth in judgment then, factical life is impotent before the nudity of
beings. Yet this conflicts with the very doctrine of the intellectual virtues,
which states that the intellectual virtues are ways in which
[the soul trues.] Here the emphasis is decidedly on the role plays in
truth, truing. Thus, means to take the beings meant in each case
and as such into true safekeeping as unveiled.115 It must be stressed,
however, such activity is not sich der Wahrheit bemchtigen (to violently size
hold of truth)116 through a proposition. Furthermore, this does not invalidate
the claim that is not conceived on the basis of a judgment i.e., xF(x),
xF(x), etc., nor does it originally reside in it or refer to it.117 In its
communion with things, beings ( ), the soul trues ( ).
By the soul truing, beings as unconcealed are gathered together into true
safe-keeping.
Most readers acquainted with Heideggers discussion of truth will recall that
he draws our attention to the privative manner in which the Greeks
determined truth, that is, through privation (), falsehood ()
and non-being ( .) As Drew Hyland points out the world is initially
experienced by the Greeks as fundamentally hidden. Knowledge isto bring
things to unhiddenness, aletheuein (PS, 10-12).118 This suggests that sensory
perception () is both the origin and cause of the hiddenness of the
world. In a manner akin to Platos allegory of the Similes of the Sun, Line and
Cave is condemned to inhabiting a realm of illusions, shadows and
reflections. Yet Aristotle argues that
(for perception of the individual things is always true) (De An. 427b12).
Heidegger stipulates the manner in which we must interpret this passage as
follows sondern sie [] ist ihrem eigentlichen intentionales Charakter
nach das, was in sich selbst ursprnglich sein intentionales Worauf originr
gibt.119 We can translate this into English as rather, according to its own
proper intentional character, it [] is that which originally in itself gives
Geisteswissenschaften 6 (1989) pp. 256 and Phenomenological Interpretations in
115
116
117
118
119
Connection with Aristotle: An Indication of the Hermeneutical Situation. trans. John van
Buren, in ed. John van Buren Supplements: from the earliest essays to Being and Time
and beyond New York: State University of New York Press, 2002, pp. 131
Geisteswissenschaften 6 (1989) pp. 256
Hyland, Drew, op. cit., p. 37
Geisteswissenschaften 6 (1989) pp. 256
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its original intentional toward-which120 Furthermore, the intentionality of

means ein Gegenstndliches als ein unverhlltes Geben [giving an
objective something as an uncovered something]121 With respect solely to
then, everything given in it, everything perceived through it, is
perceived unverhlltes, uncovered. That is, everything given in it is perceived
to be true. The intentional character of is the indication of beings
simpliciter. The white qua white given by is a priori true. Aristotle
writes , (for on the one hand that [there is]
white, does not deceive) (Ibid. 428b20).122 Yet, as Heidegger says, simply to
identify white is white in amounts to very little. Falsehood on the
other hand occurs through a much more complex set of relationships as
opposed to the simple perception () of the individual that is always
true. Aristotle argues (for falsehood always
involves a synthesis) (Ibid. 430b). Falsehood can only arise in a synthesis
()123 of the actualization of perceiving (Vernehmen)124 in . In
this context is understood as assertion (.) We are urged to
interpret quite literally. In conjunction with , giving an
objective something as an uncovered something, lets the object
appear for itself (middle voice) from out of itself and as it is in itself.125
: what is said about something on the basis of having been drawn
from () it.126 There is an allusion here to Heideggers realist metaphysics in
120
121
122
123
124
125
126

University of New York Press, 2002, pp. 131, translation modified.
Geisteswissenschaften 6 (1989) pp. 256 and Phenomenological Interpretations in
Connection with Aristotle: An Indication of the Hermeneutical Situation. trans. John van
Buren, in ed. John van Buren Supplements: from the earliest essays to Being and Time
and beyond New York: State University of New York Press, 2002, pp. 131, translation
modified.
My translation. J. A. Smith translates this as for while the perception that there is white
before us cannot be false
Heidegger describes the process of as a Zusammennehmen (taking together)
and Mitnehmen (taking with).
Heidegger translates both and (mind, intellect, reason) as Vernehmen.
Shortly we will address the complex relationship between , , and
, and Heideggers interpretation of it. Furthermore, in the larger context of the
subject of this thesis we must investigate Aristotles ontological treatment of the various
modes of the mind (): art (), science (), practical wisdom
(), wisdom (), and intelligence () in connection with i.e. and
. That is, the kinds of being of these various aspects of being-in-the-world.
University of New York Press, 2002, pp. 131-2.
Ibid. Heidegger goes onto argue This is of importance for our interpretation of
[imagination.] p 132. Cf Heidegger, Martin Ontology: The Hermeneutics of Facticity,
trans. John van Buren, Indiana University Press: Bloomington, 1999, The word
phenomenon has its origin in the Greek term which derives from ,
showing itself. A phenomenon is thus that which shows itself as something showing itself.
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his interpretation of Aristotles discussion of truth. Therefore simply by stating

that p it would be difficult to encounter falsehood, as in the case of white,
when one merely states that white is white. Yet, prima facie, this appears as
a rather simple model of language, one in which one assumes the fidelity of
the union between word and referent. Once, however, we take into account
the numerous elements of language and the fecundity of perception, the
complexity of their relationship increases n-fold. , then, indicates
the object as this or that.127 That is, it takes place by means of a
substitution, as (als, ) something, as-what. Let us return to Aristotles
example of the perception of white. In the case of falsehood Aristotle states
, ([on the other hand] the
perception that what is white is this or that maybe false) (Ibid. 428b20).
Thus, that Socrates is white may be false. Socrates, a something, is perceived
and addressed as white, as something other than and in addition to the
statement that Socrates. Being in the world, embedded in a community,
tradition and language, it is easy to see that a deceptive what may be,
indeed has been, interposed between language and thing, and thus truth, for
example, ancient astronomy. In this regard Heidegger argues that the
being-true of the of addressing is constituted only circuitously
through a reference to .128 Fundamentally, the Greeks experienced the
world from the perspective of being-concealed, hiddeness. must be
understood by recourse to this being-concealed. Falsehood and truth,
therefore, are only founded on the operation of the as-what in relationship
between language sense-perception. On condition that a deceptive what is
not interposed between discourse and perception, gives beings in their
unveiled as-what.129
Section 2.3.1
The Problem Concerning , , , and
Recall that for Aristotle , , and are
(intellectual virtues.) Heidegger argues that these phenomena are in
127
128
129
This means that it is itself there and is not merely represented in some manner, examined
indirectly, or somehow reconstructed. Phenomenon is a mode of being-an-object and
indeed a distinctive one: being-present as an object from out of itself. This initially says
nothing at all about the content of the subject matter, it gives no directive to a definite
domain of subject matter. Phenomenon means a distinctive mode of being-an-object. p.
53
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 132. This preliminary discussion of truth essentially encapsulates the protophenomenology of Aristotle. Cf. Heidegger, Martin Ontology: The Hermeneutics of
Facticity, trans. John van Buren, Indiana University Press: Bloomington, 1999,
Phenomenon is thus not primarily a category, but initially has to do with the how of
access, of grasping and bringing into true safekeeping. Phenomenology is therefore
initially nothing other than a mode of research, namely: addressing something just as it
shows itself and only to the extent that it shows itself. Hence an utter triviality for any
scientific discipline, and yet since Aristotle it has slipped further and further out of the
grasp of philosophy. p. 56 ff.
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each case concrete ways of actualizing [Vollzugsweisen] the underlying

vitality of perceiving as such (, ).130 In other words, he seems to
suggest here that is not one of the , but rather what
is common to and is realized through , , and .
He also claims gives to all concrete discussing its possible about-which,
even though is without discourse ( ).131 Furthermore, he
argues is (perception of something), a perceiveing which
at any particular time initially gives the look of object in a simple manner.132
However, in order for Heidegger to assert that the are
ways (in which the soul trues), he must show whether
and how Aristotle claims there is relationship between, on the one hand,
, and , and on the other hand. Once this position
has been defended, Heidegger must further show that is actualized as
one of the four modes of knowledge, strictly speaking, i.e. , ,
and . How, then, could the entire structure of the occurrence
of truth function in the context of , that is, perception [Vernehmen],
when traditionally has been understood to be 1) opposed to , 2)
without discourse ( ), and 3) one of five intellectual virtues? Drew
Hyland has criticised Heidegger on precisely these points, albeit briefly,
regarding his interpretation of Eth. Nic. in Heideggers 1924-25 summer
semester lecture Interpretation Platonischer Dialoge (, )133
Hyland argues that Heideggers interpretation is characteristically
unorthodox,134 and in fact fails to gain a sufficient understanding of .
Typically has been translated into English as mind, intellect, reason,
apprehension, thought/thinking, insight or understanding. As we are well
aware Heidegger translates as perception [Vernehmen]. In the lecture
course on the Sophist he translates it as perceptual thinking [vernehmendes
Vermeinen]. Alternatives in German are Sinn [sense, mind or meaning],
Gesinnung [attitude or disposition], Verstand [understanding, mind, reason
thought, sense or apprehension], Klugheit [intelligence or wisdom],
berlegung [consideration, thought, reflection or observation] and Absicht
[mind] among others. By arguing that is das Vermeinen, welches das
Vermeinte vernimmt (a discernment that discerns by way of perception.) [GA
19 22-3/16],135 Heidegger attempts to emphasize its literal sense of
130
131
132
133
134
135

University of New York Press, 2002, p. 130.
Ibid., p. 133
Ibid.
Originally published in German as Gesamtausgabe Bd 19 Platon: Sophistes. hrsg. von
Ingeborg Schler. Frankfurt am Main: Victorio Klostermann. 1992. Translated into English
by Richard Rojcewicz and Andr Schuwer as Platos Sophist, Indiana University Press:
Bloomington, 1997
Hyland, Drew. Questioning Platonism: continental interpretations of Plato Albany, N.Y.:
State University of New York Press, 2004, p. 38
Cited in Hyland, Drew. Questioning Platonism: continental interpretations of Plato Albany,
N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 2004, p. 38
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Comment [MO22]: I spend

far too much time on this topic.
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perception,136 the literal interpretation of as sense perception. Strangely,

Hyland pursues this line of thought by pulling up the semantic thread that
binds together the various English and German translations of , and
. We are told that is translated into English as insight, and as
intuitive reason by W. D. Ross. Heidegger translates as Einsicht
[insight.] It is claimed the trope of seeing that is common to these
translations, a metaphor used by the pre-Socratics for knowing Hyland notes,
bolsters Heideggers argument. According to Hyland, although Aristotle does
link nous to certain kind of perception (aisthesis)hecarefully distinguishes
the sense of aisthesis linked to nous from any sense perception
(Nichomachean Ethics, 1142a25ff, 1143b15).137 Heideggers position is
ambivalent. It is possible to take his reading to suggest that the relationship
between sense perception and is literal rather than figurative, as in the
case of Aristotle. However, Heidegger does not merely generalize the analogy
between and in order to cement their identification. What is far
more important is the possibility of apprehending first principles (),
which takes place in the relationship between , and .
According to Hyland then, not only is Heidegger in danger of identifying
with , it is also claimed that Heidegger understands , ,
and as merely modes of accomplished through . Is
this perhaps because , , and can only be
articulated in ? As we have already pointed out, Hyland argues that
is without discourse ( ). The basic problem is how to grasp
through and have them available to , ,
and , or, what comes to the same thing, how these remaining four
, as modalities of , take hold of the . Hylands
main point of content is that Heidegger has excluded qua , without
discourse, as one of the five ways in which the soul trues. In other words, he
disagrees with Heidegger that nous, pure perception, is as such not possible
for man, the zoon logon echon. [GA 19 22-3/16].138 Hyland argues that it is
not true for Aristotle that no mode of access to truth is available to us that is
not linguistic139 Essentially, he wishes to maintain the traditional
understanding of , that is without discourse, and is a possibility for
human beings, through which human beings intuit first principles as
universals.
Against the traditional view that and are mutually exclusive,
Richard A. Lee and Christopher P. Long have argued quite convincingly that
we must interpret as being bound up more closely with .140 This
entails that relates to both the universal and the singular through
136
137
138
139
140
Ibid.
Ibid.
Cited in Hyland, Drew. Questioning Platonism: continental interpretations of Plato Albany,
N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 2004, p. 39
Ibid.
Lee, Richard A and Long, Christopher P. Nous and Logos in Aristotle, in Freiburger
Zeitschrift fr Philosophie und Theologie Band 54 Heft 3 (2007) pp. 348-367.
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, (induction)141 and . Much of the argument is actually

presupposed by Heidegger in his own interpretation of in the
Introduction.142 Therefore it will be profitable for us to turn to Lee and
Longs discussion in order to elucidate Heideggers own understanding of
Aristotelian facticity. Lee and Long argue is commonly understood to be
a faculty that provides an immediate grasp of universals. Since Aristotle
argues that (demonstration is not a principle
of demonstration)(An. Post. 19 100a1-5), must be provided with
universal first principles by in order to perform apodictic demonstrations,
otherwise it would be caught in an endless retreat back into fundamental
principles.143 That is, does not on its own produce universals. They are
intellectually intuited by . Universal first principles are axiomatic.
Therefore it would impossible for them to be demonstrated by . If it is
assumed that merely supplies universals to and independently of
it in order to execute apodictic inferences then this implies that 1) it is a
purely alogical capacity;144 and 2) it functions merely to serve apodictic logos145 The argument focuses on selected passages from the Analytica
posteriora 19, Ethica Nicomachea, De Anima, and Metaphysica. What
becomes apparent from these texts is the vitally important, yet complex
relationship between , and the individual. The individual mediates
the translation of singular into the particular. Singularity only ever is as the
appearing of the individual in the interface between and . Lee and
Long argue that the singular cannot appear qua itself, but only as the
individual, even though singularity conditions all appearance.146 Although the
concrete147 individual appears as individual in , the individual qua
individual is no longer singular, it is also not yet particular, a mere
instantiation of the universal.148
The problem then becomes how to
comprehend individuality through and , and to determine the
relationship between and in such comprehension. This is of the
utmost relevance since the individual, for the most part, becomes a matter for
concern when it, as Lee and Long indicate falls, along with the universal,
within the consideration of .
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
is, as Heidegger points out, a bringing on or to, a letting be seen of

University of New York Press, 2002, p. 133. Lee and long argue that is the
bringing together of perceived individuals such that insight into something common to all
of them is gained. Lee, Richard A and Long, Christopher P. Nous and Logos in Aristotle,
in Freiburger Zeitschrift fr Philosophie und Theologie Band 54 Heft 3 (2007) p. 354
There is further discussion of by Heidegger in Heidegger, Martin. Platos Sophist,
trans. Richard Rojcewicz and Andr Schuwer, Indiana University Press: Bloomington, 1997
Zeitschrift fr Philosophie und Theologie Band 54 Heft 3 (2007) p. 348
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 349
Ibid.
Ibid.
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[ in the Posterior Analytics]
Comment [MO23]:
TEMPORARY HEADINGS
This re-interpretation of the relationship between and produces its

most controversial results in the context of Analytica posteriora 19 and De
Anima 6. Today it may seem preposterous to state Aristotle held that
universals are grasped by independently of any other modes of
cognition, even if one disagrees with this view adduced to Aristotle. However,
many interpreters do in fact hold this position.149 We can admit at least this
much about universals in scientific demonstration: they are indeed
immediately brought to bear, through an act of noetic intuition, on scientific
inference. In other words, first principles cannot be the result of prior
demonstrations.150 Yet we cannot concede the role , and
play in the constitution of universals. Lee and Long argue that Aristotle
appeals to a conception of nous as a hexis, or active condition151 by means of
which universals are established. In a Humean move, Aristotle argues that the
production of universal principles begins with sense impressions. Let us cite in
full the passage from Analytica posteriora 19, as it appears in Lee and
Longs paper, which they adduce as evidence for their argument. We shall
then round this off with a further selection that immediately follows the said
passage, which Lee and Long omit at this point.
Comment [RS24]: Attributed?
When many such [sense impressions] have come into beingfor some [animals] a logos
comes to be from the retention of these sorts [of sense impressions] from a perception,
memory comes into beingfrom many memories of the same thing experience comes into
being (An. Post. 19 100a1-5)152
Aristotle continues
149
150
151
152
That is, the empirical constitution of universals is held to be inconsistent with . Cf.
ibid., p. 348, n. 1
Ibid. In note 9 Lee and Long state At beginning the beginning of Posterior Analytics 11.
19 Aristotle says that the knowing habit, of first principles will be
made clear after some preliminary considerations (991b18). At the end of II.19 he
considers one of the thinking habits (100b5-14). Although for the
most part we leave untranslated in the text, we offer the translation active
condition here to emphasize that is a natural capacity that can only be acquired
through active practice and, indeed, an effort of concentration attention. This active
understanding of can be lost if it is translated simply as habit. To emphasize as
a that is acquired through active work and concentration is to recognize that this
thinking habit is not something that merely happens to one, but arises from intense,
focused effort.
Cited in Lee, Richard A and Long, Christopher P. Nous and Logos in Aristotle, in
Freiburger Zeitschrift fr Philosophie und Theologie Band 54 Heft 3 (2007) p. 351. Cf
Freuds discussion of perception, memory, repression and writing in A Note Upon the
Mystic Writing Pad in ed. James Strachey The Standard Edition of Freuds Works, vol. 19,
London: The Hogarth Press, 1961, pp. 227232, and Derridas analysis of it in Freud and
the Scene of Writing in Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass, Routledge and Kegan
Paul: London, 1978.
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And from experience, or from the whole universal that has come to rest in the soulthere
comes a principle of skill () and of understanding () of skill if it deals with
how things come about, of understanding if it deals with what is the case. (Ibid. 19 100a6-9)153
This is, generally speaking, an unproblematic account of the production

memory, cognition and skill that would sit as an unquestioned assumption in
contemporary cognitive science and neurobiology. Obviously we can see here,
especially in the second passage, the affinities between Aristotles description
of the formation of memory, the knowledge of universals and the
development of skill and cognition, on the one hand, and Heideggers
discussion of circumspection [Umsicht] (technical dealings, production and
action), inspection [Einsicht] (science), and even having-been-interpreted, on
the other hand.
Comment [MO25]: This

needs to be fleshed out.
The process by which universals are grasped through the appearance of

individuals is induction (). As we have already stated,154 is,
as Heidegger points out, a bringing on or to, a letting be seen of155 Lee
and Long translate as the bringing together of perceived individuals
such that insight into something common to all of them is gained.156 By
means of , individuals repeatedly perceived through give
rise to retention, memory and . However, recall it is singularity that
conditions all appearance.157 For its part, ,158 in order to play a role in
the formation of universals, must already be, to a certain extent, noetic.
However, the reverse is true as well. is constituted by perception,
retention and memory. In fact, we should realise that this logos comes to
be (gignetai) for beings with the capacity to organize perceptions in a
coherent waya logos that is grounded in the perception of appearing
individuals.159 By the same token constitutes memory and experience,
and this very logical character pervades . Thus, having established the
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
My italics.
See note 142
Zeitschrift fr Philosophie und Theologie Band 54 Heft 3 (2007) p. 354; After citing the
following passage from the Ethica Nicomachea is indeed the source [] of
the universal, while the syllogism is from universals. Therefore, there are sources from
which the syllogism [proceeds] that are not from syllogisms, this is , Eth. Nic.
1139b20-3, Lee and Long reinforce their thesis concerning the role of the individual in the
formation of universal As the arch of the universal, epagg gives rise to the universal
by bring together perceived individuals. p. 356
Ibid., p. 349
Etymology should only really be performed by an expert in the field. Nevertheless, it is
interesting to note that is a verbal noun of , which has among its various, and
for us pertinent meanings the following: gather, pick up or gather for oneself
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means by which universals arise, Lee and Long go on to conclude that in

order for this to take place and must interpenetrate each other.
[ in the Ethics]
Comment [MO26]: This

needs to be fleshed out.
Apart from the formation of universals, we must now investigate if and how
and/or ; can grasp singularity and contingency in moral deliberation,
without the loss of such singularity and contingency in, as discussed by
Aristotle in Ethica Nicomachea. This has a particularly strong bearing on
Heideggers discussion of . Once we turn our attention away from
, nous theoretikos ( [theoretical intelligence]), which
serves apodictic logos in its demonstrations, we move to ethical deliberation,
to as nous praktikos ( [practical intelligence]). ,
as that which brings into true safe-keeping the toward-which and the how of
, that is, going about those dealings that human life has with itself,160
or human well-being, Lee and Long argue, must attend to both universals
and individuals.161 An ethics unable to respond to singularity would not
deserve the name ethics.
Lee and Long argue that concerns both the individual and universal.
In the Ethica Nicomachea Aristotle states that nous is of ultimate terms
[horn] of which there is no articulation [logos], but phronsis is of the
ultimate individual [eschatou] of which there is no epistm, but only
perception [aisthsis] (Eth. Nic. 1140a1-12)162 This appears to contradict the
claims made by Lee and Long 1) the identification that Lee and Long wish to
make between and and 2) the imputed domain of universality and
individuality that both pertain to . However, as has been made clear,
through , and universals and are formed, in the
sense of the acquisition of a , an education. So even though is
formed through (and alongside) , noetic insight is achieved
independently of . According to the second problem, is firmly
established on the side of , such that does not deliberate
according to universals. This is not the case. Aristotle writes And is
directed toward what is ultimate [ ] in both directions, for
is of the first terms and ultimate individuals [ ] (Eth. Nic.
1143a35-43b5)163 Concerning , he writes Practical wisdom []
is not of the universal alone, but it must also recognize the individual; for it is
practical and practice [] concerns that which is individual. (Eth. Nic.
160
161
162
163

Freiburger Zeitschrift fr Philosophie und Theologie Band 54 Heft 3 (2007) p. 357
Ibid., p. 357. My italics.
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1141b14-16)164 This generous textual evidence clearly demonstrates that ,

and hence , are both bi-directional.
[, Proper Sensibles, , Being]
This discussion of the genesis of universals and from and
in the Posterior Analytics II 19, and the demonstration of noetic insight into
individuals in the Ethics does not account for the relationship between
and , upon which these arguments depend. It is this relationship
which is most important for the overall argument since it posits a continuum
between sense perception and noetic perception, and, furthermore, it is
perhaps the most controversial. Moreover, our investigation will clarify why
Lee and Long argue that the sense of the presence of the individual lies
beyond the gathering power of logos.165 The complexity of the argument is
considerable, involving Aristotles discussion of truth166 and falsehood, being,
composites and incomposites and . In order for to be thought of as
(perception) it must have a proper sensible. The proper sensible of
must 1) not admit of being perceived by another sense as color is
to seeing and 2) concerning which it is not possible to be mistaken.167 Lee
and Long argue that Aristotle affirms the first characteristic of in De
Anima 6 and the second characteristic of in Metaphysics 10. They
begin their argument with the analysis of 10. Aristotles explication of
incomposite is notorious for being unclear about what he exactly meant by
such a concept.168 The manner in which being-as-truth pertains to composites
was addressed by Aristotle in Metaphysics 4, and he ended that chapter by
stating that he would consider later being-as-truth in its relation to
incomposites (Met. 1027b27-9)169 Briefly Aristotles account of being as truth
with regard to composites is as follows. There are three components to beingas-truth: 1) broadly speaking truth and falsehood are properties of a
statement and are not in things, that is they are linguistic 2) truth and
falsehood are in thought, that is they are properties of noetic, mental or
psychological phenomena 3) truth and falsehood are parasitic on the full
sense of being. Regarding the first point Aristotle writes since that which is in
Deleted: Aristotle
164
Ibid., p 358. My italics.

Ibid.
166
For a discussion of being as truth and why we must reject the notion that truth is a
properties of things but affirm that it is only a property of statements, see Giles Pearson
Aristotle on Being-as-Truth, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Vol. 28, 2005, 201231. In particular, Pearsons explication of incomposite is especially helpful. Heidegger
addresses the same text in Chapter Two, 9 of Vom Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit.
Einleitung in die Philosophie. Gesamtausgabe, Bd.33 Hrsg. Hartmut Tietjen, Vittorio
Klostermann: Frankfurt, 1982. English translation: The Essence of Human Freedom: an
introduction to philosophy trans. Ted Sadler, Continuum: London, 2002. We will discuss
this section in detail in relation to in chapter two. For the moment we will restrict
ourselves to Lee and Longs account of incomposites and .
167
Ibid., p 360
168
Zeitschrift fr Philosophie und Theologie Band 54 Heft 3 (2007) p. 361 See also Ross
1924.
169
Pearson 2005 p. 215
165
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the sense of being true, or is not in the sense of being false, depends on
combination and separation, and truth and falsehood together are concerned
with the apportionment of a contradiction (for truth has the affirmation in the
case of what is compounded and negation in the case of what is divided,
while falsity has the contradiction of this apportionment) (Met. 1027b17-22)
This may sound a little dense, however, it simply means that truth holds for
an affirmative or negative statement if and only if either the affirmative or
negative statement corresponds to the actual arrangement of things or state
of affairs described in either the affirmative or negative statement. Falsehood
is the contradiction of either the affirmation or denial. Following Pearson we
could set out the veridical possibilities thus
a) Socrates is white [affirmation] is true iff Socrates and white are
compounded [State of Affairs (STAF).]
b) Socrates is white [affirmation] is false iff Socrates and white are divided
[STAF]
c) Socrates is not white [denial] is true iff Socrates and white are divided
[STAF]
d) Socrates is not white [denial] is false iff Socrates and white are
compounded [STAF]170
Notwithstanding the manner in which Pearson utilises this schema, i.e. to
demonstrate there is not a signification of is in statements in which it
signifies truth,171 it effectively explains Aristotles discussion of truth with
regard to composites in both 4 and 10. So, Pearsons point is that we
should not confuse being-as-truth with affirmation, x is y, and not-being-asfalsehood with negation, x is not y. In the first half of the 10 Aristotle
simply rehearses the argument he stated in 4. However, this account of
truth as summarily stated in point 1) above presupposes point 2) truth and
falsehood are not in thingsbut in thought (Met. 1027b19-20). Yet what does
it meant for Aristotle to claim that truth and falsehood are in thought? Does
this mean they are in thought as in they are in language? Or Does this mean
they are in thought as in they are embedded in some brain process?
Aristotles answer with respect to 4 and 10 is not very enlightening. He
writes truth is some affection of the thought (Met. 1028a1). If we look to the
Greek we might find some clues: . For the sake of
simplicity, this could perhaps be better translated as truth is a property of
thought. By thought, , Aristotle means the process of thinking,
which takes place in . As Heidegger argues i.e., , is the
way [perceiving] actualizes itself.172 Since being-as-truth is linguistic170
171
172
Ibid., p. 204
Ibid., p. 201
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noetic it is actually parasitic on being in the full sense. Truth is at one step
remove, namely, in thought. It is therefore dependent on being in this
sense.173 This, argues Pearson, licenses Aristotle to eliminate being-as-truth
from his inquiry into the science of being qua being. It remains to investigate
being-as-truth with regard to incomposites.
Thus, as Pearson argues, at the beginning of 10 Aristotle offers a
recapitulation of being-as-truth with regard to composites before returning to
the inquiry into incomposites he had postponed in 4.174 Here states what
incomposite is not. He writes [incomposite] is not a composite so as to be
when it is composed and not to be when it is separated, like the white wood
or the incommensurable diagonal; nor will truth and falsity belong to it as in
the above case. (Met. 1051b17-22)175 Here Aristotle dismisses what an
incomposite is, and emphasises that the truth which pertains to them is
different from that which pertains to composites. The first thing to note is
that the kind of statements () which pertain to composites are
(affirmations) and (denials). Incomposites, on the
other hand, are, or correspond to (expression, utterance) Aristotle
writes, in connection with incomposites and truth, contact [] and
assertion [] are truth (assertion [] not being the same as
affirmation [ ]) (Met. 1051b23-4) Unfortunately this tells us very
little about what incomposites in fact are. However, it does point us in the
right direction. Essentially, is the utterance about or expression of the
simplest things we discuss. By simple I mean those single things that I talk
about in discourse, even though those things may in fact be complex, for
example, log, white, or Socrates, from which I can make complex statements:
the log is white. In the case of merely uttering Socrates, we say very little.
However, what little we do say must have some significance. Pearson argues
that such an utterance Socrates impliessome basic grasp of the
[utterances] signification.176 This is augmented by the fact that Aristotle uses
the word (to touch, to take hold of) i.e. conceptualise, apprehend,
which, metaphorically speaking, is suggested by the very word concept being
able to grasp, having some grip on, having a hold on.177 Yet, according to
Aristotle, truth is different for both incomposites, in general, as in the above
case, qualities, quantities, accidental properties, etc, and substances. He
writes For it is not possible to be in error regarding the question what a thing
is, save in an accidental sense; and the same holds good regarding noncomposite substances [ ]. (Met. 1051b23-4) The
answer to the question, what is incomposite substance, is given by Aristotle
twice in 10. I shall first cite the Greek and then the translation In the first
173
174
175
176
177

Pearson 2005 p. 208
Ibid., p. 215
Freiburger Zeitschrift fr Philosophie und Theologie Band 54 Heft 3 (2007) p. 361
Pearson 2005 p. 218; My Italics
Ibid.
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place Aristotle writes . (Met.

1051b25-6) A little further down, he writes
, (Met. 1051b30-1) Ross translates
these, respectively, as For it is not possible to be in error regarding the
question what a thing is and About the things, then, which are essences and
exist in actuality, it is not possible to be in error. Pearson argues that
, in the first passage, should not understood as something to do
with definition in the formal sense. Rather it indicates that one must have a
basic understanding of the thing in question.178 This is an important point to
which we shall return in moment. In the first place Lee and Long dispute the
traditional translations of the second passage as highly problematic. They
claim that is translated as if it solely meant incomposite
and is translated as if it meant actualities, although as we can see
is not in the passage cited. However, the problem is to understand
Aristotles definition of incomposite substance. Pearsons reconstruction of
Aristotles argument in the second half of 10 regarding incomposite is
almost as complex and involved as Aristotles argument. Briefly, Aristotles
invocation of incomposite substance seems redundant.179 The previous
discussion of incomposites per se includes incomposite substance. Pearson
writes all substances are incomposite in the sense that they are not combined
with something else.180 In this case, though, Aristotle is attempting to isolate
substance from sensible substance, substance predicated by any of the
categories, material substance, or matter, or substance determined by a
compound of matter and form. Pearson argues that by incomposite substance
Aristotle means form. Aristotle writes We must not forget that sometimes it is
not clear whether a name signifies the composite substanceor the actuality
and form. (Met. 1043b29-33)181 The example given is a house. It can signify
either a composite substance: matter, form and actuality or, the pre-existent,
indestructible form and actuality of the house. However, there is no real
possibility that [the name house] could signify the matter: house always
signifies more than just bricks and stones.182 For the house to exist the
matter, bricks and timber, is actualised by the shape of a house. Therefore,
by form, Pearson argues, Aristotle means essence , Met. 1051b30
= .183 The name house is an essence since it is whatsomething-is 4 1030a30), and this is a this, e.g. a covering, a shelter that
could be made out of anything.184 Now the expression () of incomposite
substance, Pearson argues is noetic and linguistic as in the case of composite
substance. The truth and falsity of composite substance and the truth of
incomposite substance is not in things but in language and thought. This
discussion on incomposite substance has a fundamental bearing on the
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
Ibid. n. 29
Ibid., p. 222
Ibid.
Cited in Pearson 2005 p. 224
Pearson 2005 p. 224
Ibid., p 225; suggests constant presence. Cf Hamlyn 1993, p. 86, Hicks
1907, p 315; Cf n. 184
Ibid.
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discussion of truth, presence and actuality in Heidegger that Pearson

neglects, which we will address in the next chapter.185
Returning now to our analysis of Lee and Longs account and , for
the moment, we realise, in so far as we want to determine whether can
be thought of as , we have partially demonstrated, by analogy with
the proper sensible of , does not admit of being perceived by
another sense as color is to seeing.186 apprehends the essence
= of the incomposite,187 and incomposite substance. As
Lee and Long argue, the is the of in an analogy with
the proper sensible of . However, if the claim that is
more needs to be said. Furthermore, we have yet to demonstrate that in the
intellectual intuition of the essence of incomposites it is not possible for
to be mistaken.188
So, beginning with the second point, truth for incomposites, argues Aristotle,
is contact and assertion, or expression. There is no error, no falsehood. There
is only non-contact and therefore ignorance. This depends, again, on the
difference between and . For composites, one either affirms
() something of something, which is true or false according to the
certain state of affairs, or one denies () something of something.
This, however, is not as matters stand with incomposites. One expresses
() an incomposite. Here there is no possibility of affirming something of
something; no possibility of confusion, I simply express log or white,189 or I
am ignorant of either. Even the definition of truth for incomposites as to
contact, to touch () does leave any possibility of falsehood or error,
simply because by not expressing or not making contact with an incomposite,
185
186
187
188
189
In The Essence of Human Freedom, in which we find Heideggers most thorough

interpretation of 10 (translators introduction p. xv), he argues that incomposites (
, simples, is the term Aristotle uses in 4. In 10, he uses, , indivisibles)
are the beings themselves considered purely in their being. p. 72 is the
unconcealment of incomposite substance, the presence of the simple in and of itself. This
presence is absolutely unmediated, i.e. nothing can interveneis prior to all other
presencethis completely unmediated constant presence of itself, this most constant
purest presence, is nothing else but the highest and most proper being. p. 72. Being, as
is disclosed through incomposite substance, is the ground of the possibility of and prior to
every actual and conceivable being. p. 72 As we pointed out earlier, Pearson makes some
interesting comments in a footnote regarding Aristotles mention of . He comes
close to Heideggers own interpretation, when he says we should not understand what-itis at 1051b26 as a technical term, such that Aristotles point would be one about definition
[my italics]; but simply as indicating that one must have some basic understanding of
thing in question. p. 218 n That is, the presence, the being-there prior to the thing in
question. Later, Pearson writes, we should understand being-as-truth for incomposites as
follows: a true apprehension correlates with the fact that the thing is (i.e. has the specific
manner of being peculiar to it) as the apprehension grasps it to be. p. 228.
Zeitschrift fr Philosophie und Theologie Band 54 Heft 3 (2007), p 360
Ibid., p 362; Lee and Long argue that the apprehension of pertains to sensible
individuals, and accidental qualities, substance or God.
Ibid., p 360
Pearson 2005 p. 219
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one merely does not know the incomposite; one is ignorant of the
incomposite. This has two further parts. , argues Pearson, depends on
its actual occurrence.190 Therefore, we should not assume that Aristotle is
mistaken about falsehood because we could argue that if the ability to
express is co-ordinate with truth then the inability to express would be
falsehood. The expression () of the truth of an incomposite through
is also situational. Pearson writes ignorance isjust failing to grasp a
particular item that others can. This ignorance is local (like looking in the
wrong direction, or having ones eyes shut).191 Even after these qualifications,
Pearson argues one may still question why Aristotle does not call ignorance
falsehood. Let us return to the distinction between , which is true but
not false on the one hand and (an actually uttered affirmation),
which is either true or false and (an actually uttered denial), which
is either true or false, on the other. lacks a contradictory term. One
either expresses (truth) or one does not (ignorance). Since in both cases
truth and truth/falsity are applied only to the actual event of
utteranceAristotles reluctance to speak of falsity [in connection with
incomposites and ] could be explained by the fact thatno actual event
takes place.192 Hence, there is no defect in Aristotles argument that there is
no possibility of being false or in error regarding the expression, the saying of
incomposites. However, impossibility of being false or in error of incomposite
substances is subtly different. Incomposite substance is essence (
). Essence, in turn, is the thought, or object () of intellectual
perception (). One thinks or does not ( (Met. 1051b23))
incomposite substances, which are uttered or asserted (). To think
() the essence of an incomposite substance (say, for example, human,
rational biped animal) entails assertion (). That is, as Pearson argues,
isanalogous to the use of it involves grasping a single
thing.193 Essence is a single thing. There is no combination in essence. Again,
the difference between and must be borne in mind:
affirmation/denial each of which can be true or false or utterance, saying,
which can only be true. So here we have Aristotles account of the truth
pertaining to incomposites and incomposite substances, and why cannot
be in error concerning them. It now remains to discuss whether does
not admit of being perceived by another sense as color is to seeing194 such
that is understood as being on the same axis as .
We actually know that is not in error or false in apprehension.
Furthermore, we know what is uniquely apprehended by : essence.
However, this does demonstrate that is . Recall that for Lee and
Long, in their reading of Aristotle on and , both and
apprehend the first terms and ultimate individuals [ ] (Eth. Nic.
190
191
192
193
194
Ibid., p. 220
Ibid., p. 221
Ibid., p. 221
Ibid., p. 226
Zeitschrift fr Philosophie und Theologie Band 54 Heft 3 (2007), p 360
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1143a35-43b5).195 For this to make sense must be understood as

. Thus, in order to show the identification of with , Lee
and Long analyse two examples by Aristotle on the nature of sensory
perception. The first example which Lee and Long cite is drawn in De anima
Book III Chapter 6. It supplements the argument that perceives that
which is proper to it, this being essence. Here Aristotle writes (intellectual
perception) [] of the what it is according to its what-was-being
[ ] is true just as the seeing of something
proper to sight is true. (De An. 430b26-30)196 Aristotles point is that the
objects of sight are images, thus, the seeing of images is true. By the same
token cannot be mistaken by the intellectual perception of essence. This
connection between and is strengthened by an example of
tactile perception. The analogy of contact () for the truth perceived by
in 10 is extended by Lee and Long with an analysis of Aristotles
discussion on and in De anima Book II Chapter 11. Obviously,
however, the fact that Aristotle talks about intellectual perception in terms of
touch, contact, already indicates that he views as somehow being
connected to . According to Lee and Long, Aristotles discussion and
example augments and accentuates the immediacy with which
apprehends singular incomposites and articulates them through an utterance
(). The example they cite concerns a soldier being wounded by a spear,
yet protected by a shield. The analogy attempts to illustrate the curious
position the sensory perception of contact, touch occupies in relation to
the incomposite and its utterance. To paraphrase Aristotles argument, the
medium (skin) of touch differs from the media of hearing (ears) and sight
(eyes). Sound and vision are perceived through the latter. Obviously, the
deciding factor is contiguity. Seeing and hearing are not contiguous in the
immediate sense that touch and its object are. The object of touch is
perceived simultaneously with the medium. The example Aristotle is that of a
soldier being struck by spear through her/his shield, both soldier and shield
are struck simultaneously. Here then the link between and is
contact, grasp, touch (). Of particular note is the resistive character of
. In fact the medium of touch acts as a boundary or barrier to sensible
objects, though it actually presents the sensible in its immediacy. For
example, when I touch a surface I sense both the surface and my skin. Yet
the surface, relative to the normal forces impacting on my skin, does not
penetrate the barrier, as in the case of the shield. Neither does my skin or the
shield destroy the sensible object or spear in the act of perception. Lee and
Long write In touch, however, the medium mediates not by presenting the
sensible, but by holding its action back just enough to allow the sensible to
act directly on its sense.197
Let us return briefly, to the process by which the universal is constituted by
and . Through sensation () we perceive individuals and
195
196
197

Cited in ibid., p. 363
Ibid., p. 363; My italics.
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singular sensory objects. Aristotle argues that a logos comes to be from the
retention of these sorts [of sense impressions] from a perception (An. Post.
19 100a1-5)198. From this follows the development and organisation of
memory and experience, universals and ultimately . This process, as was
demonstrated earlier, is called . , therefore, pervades . By
the same token, must be noetic since it presupposes an insight into a
certain commonality. is involved in the generation of universals, but it
cannot demonstrate such universals itself. That is, the intellectual intuition
does not involve .199 Aristotle writes is indeed the of the
universal, while the syllogism is from universals. Therefore, there are sources
from which the syllogism [proceeds] that are not from syllogisms, this is
.(Eth. Nic. 1139b28-31)200 In their interpretation of and ,
the central concern of Lee and Long was to establish a link between and
in order to demonstrate both and apprehend the first
terms and ultimate individuals [ ] (Eth. Nic. 1143a35-43b5).201
This goes a long way to understanding their claim concerning the slippages
that occur between and . They argue that the intellectual
perception of the presence of the individual [lies] outside the gathering
power of .202 Furthermore, Lee and Long argue that in the
Nicomachean Ethics the noetic sense for the singularity of the individual is
the condition for the possibility gains access to that which
cannot grasp.203 The above analysis has shown that the truth peculiar
to involves and , and cannot be mistaken in regard to that
which it perceives, unlike being-as-truth in which something is thought of as
something (). Such an interpretation explains the strange locution
used by Aristotle at De An. 430b26-30. (intellectual perception) [] of the
what it is according to its what-was-being [ ] is
true just as the seeing of something proper to sight is true.204 Lee and
Long argue that we should understand the site at which
human gives way to .205 This is explained by the Greek words
and . The phrase is generally translated by the English
word essence. The past tense of , that is, , is taken to signify continuity,
hence, the being or the to be ( ) what it was ( ). Lee and Long
stress should not be understood to mean affirming something of
something (, or ). Rather should be understood as,
literally, down to. Putting these two together, retains access to both
universals (which include substances and essences), generated through
, and individual things (which also include [incomposite] substances,
essences as well as haecceity), which are beyond the grasp of ,
understood as . Lee and Long write having gone down to ()
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
Cited in ibid., p. 351.

Ibid., p. 357
Cited in ibid., p. 356; ; My italics.
Ibid., p. 358
Ibid., p. 359
Cited in ibid., p. 363
Ibid., p. 364
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the individual, having encountered it in and building up from this to

experience, we are led to an insight into what the being itself in fact
is. The insight is beyond , yet is only possible through .206
We feel that the position Lee and Long have articulated concerning
makes far more sense than the criticisms levelled by Drew Hyland against
Heideggers interpretation of . Along several interpretive points Lee and
Longs reading agrees with that of Heidegger. Heidegger recognizes that
is (perception of something), a perceiving which at any
particular time initially gives the look of object in a simple manner.207
Heidegger realises that when Aristotle claims is without discourse (
) this should be understood to mean without the mode of addressing
something with respect to its as-what-definitions ( [it is not
the assertion of something about something]) (De an. G 6, 430b28).208 Of
course, Heidegger at certain points in his very brief discussion of the
intellectual virtues goes beyond what is claimed by Lee and Long. For
example, he claims , , and are in each case
concrete ways of actualizing [Vollzugsweisen] the underlying vitality of
perceiving as such (, ).209 Heidegger makes this claim in connection
with Aristotles assertion that is [what is proper to
human being] (Eth. Nic. 1139a18).210 From this Heidegger further claims that
is the a-lethaic, phenomenological condition that movement of factical
life presupposes.211
Deleted: s
In essence Heideggers analysis of Aristotles discussion of the ways the soul

trues, and in particular the concepts , , , and ,
suggests that Heidegger interprets Aristotle as the earliest precursor to
phenomenology. Echoing Brogan, as cited above, Kisiel states, Bringing his
earlier interpretations of the dynamized facticity of life to bear upon these
texts, [Heidegger] found in [Aristotle the] life-philosopher with a sense of the
history of philosophical problems a proto-phenomenologist as well!212 Of
course, for Heideggers analysis of the terms , , we must
turn to texts including but not limited to Ontologie. Hermeneutik der
Faktizitt, Einfhrung in die phnomenologische Forschung, Logik. Die Frage
nach der Wahrheit, and Sein und Zeit. Having established the kernel of
Aristotles proto-phenomenology, Heidegger now traces the path of the
various ways in which the soul trues, and their fate in history. Aristotles
history of philosophy is also point on which Heidegger is swayed. He finds a
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 130
Cited in ibid., p 132-3
Ibid. p. 132-4
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strong hermeneutic character to Aristotles explication of the problems in

ontology; say for example motion, which are addressed by turning to the
extant record of research, in this case, Parmenides and the Eleatics or the
Megarians. These then are remaining tasks Heidegger now peruses in the
Introduction.
Section 2.4
The Highest Ways in which the soul Trues: and , Motion,
the Temporality [Zeitlichkeit] of Dasein and the Relationship between
Temporality and Historicality [Geschichtlichkeit], and Being as BeingProduced.
In the remaining fundamental sections of the Introduction Heidegger argues
that Beings in the how of their being-moved became the central phenomenon
for Aristotle, and the explication of this phenomenon was the main topic of
his physics.213 As we indicated before, according to Heidegger, Aristotles
logic and ontology originated in his investigation of the phenomenon of
motion in his Physics.214 Moreover, one can locate Aristotles primordial
sense of the concept of truth in his approach to the problem of research in
physics.215
Returning to his earlier analysis of philosophys access to its field of research
(factical life), Heidegger argues that Aristotle grounds such access through
. The dealings of factical life have a tendency, by simply looking
around, to merely see the world from the point of view of its look, its
appearance. The look or appearance of objects looks out [es sieht aus] at
one by means of .216 The of the looks of objects determines their
, the from-out-of-whiches and the from-the-point-of-view-of-whiches
of beings, and of factical life in particular, which are taken into true
safekeeping in ( [induction of the first principle])
(Eth. Nic. 1139b20-3)217 In other words, the origins, principles and causes of
beings are determined and added to the fund of knowledge, not that
Heidegger would put it that way, however, it is indispensable we use such a
rendering in order to understand his point. Here the various ways in which
the soul trues come into play. Assuming that is a perceiving as such,
and that, furthermore, the other four intellectual virtues are modalities of it,
the highest achievement of is to bring into true safekeeping .
These modes of are temporalized and unfolded in discursivity. However,
the highest merit of bringing into true safekeeping belongs to
213
214
215
216
217

Ibid.
Ibid., p. 140
Ibid., p. 133
Ibid.
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and . Recall that Heidegger defines as understanding which sees

in an authentic manner, which is now reformulated as: a pure and simple
looking at[that] brings into safekeeping those beings whose from-out-ofwhich is, as they themselves are, in such a way that it necessarily always is
what it is.218 That is, that which cannot be otherwise, both the and
those beings understood in accordance with these . The same is said of
. Aristotle states that it studies beings not capable of being
otherwiseTherefore the object of knowledge is of necessity. Therefore it is
eternal. (Eth. Nic. 1139b20-3)219 In contradistinction to Heidegger
originally interpreted Aristotles definition of as seeing around one
which has to do with care for human well-being, to which he now adds:
bringing into true safekeeping those beings which, along with their fromout-of-which, can in themselves be otherwise.220 This is also true of .
Aristotle argues that it concerns beings that can be otherwise All art is
concerned with coming into being, i.e. with contriving and considering how
something may come into being. (Eth. Nic. 1140a10-14) However, there is a
crucial difference between and . s sphere of activity
() is production (). The of is other than itself.
The toward-which that takes into guardianship are the dealings
() of human factical life. Therefore the of is itself.
is non-productive. The distinction then is between the pairs -
on the one hand, and - on the other hand.
Heidegger argues that the being of the with-which of factical life going about
its dealings, that is, the means by which of praxis and production is defined
as capable of being-otherwise than it is and thus not necessarily and
always what it is. 221 This being otherwise is contrasted negatively with being
that is considered to be being in the authentic sense.222 Such authentic being
springs from an ontological radicalisation of the idea of beings that are
moved.223 However, this being is not understood on the basis of the being of
human being, that is factical life. It is not even upon the phenomenon of the
movement of factical life that this authentic sense of being is to be
understood. Rather, it is the motion of production that is takenas
exemplary for these kinds of being.224 Thus, it is on this premise that
Heidegger sees in Aristotle being being defined as being-produced, or as
being-finished-and-ready, a kind of being in which motion has arrived at its
218
Ibid., p. 134
219
The Complete Works of Aristotle: the revised Oxford translation 2 vols. Princeton
University Press: Princeton, N.J., 1984. Unless otherwise noted references to Aristotles
works are taken from this English language edition.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
220
221
222
223
224
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end,225. Not only are we to think of beings in motion broadly speaking,

natural beings and beings as artefacts produced or used, the being of factical
life, including its intentional structure, is seen as movement.226 Indeed,
Heidegger argues intentionality comes into view for Aristotle as a how of
the movement of life that is somehow noetically illuminated when it goes
about its dealings.227 If then we think for a moment of human life having
arrived at its end with regard to its own possibility of motion,228 we can take
this in a number of different directions, e.g. being-toward-death and death.
However, in this case Heidegger argues that for Aristotle human life reaches
its end with regard to its own possibility of motion in the of ,229
which is actualised as . is interpretated as an . In this
case, factical life is not the toward-which of . Factical life can be
otherwise. The toward-which of is that of beings, as they
themselves are, that necessarily always is what it is. Yet Heidegger argues
that Aristotle demands life be understood according to the temporalizing and
unfolding of . Life must be conceived of as but it is not that to
which is directed. Facticity is the toward-which of . This is
because as is in its genuine movement when it has given up all
concern for gearing beings in certain directions and only perceives.230 As
movement that has come to its end, it does not cease.231 Rather, as
the movement that has come to its own end is motion for the first time.232
Having-moved provides the authentic sense of movement. This is not a
paradox. End here is to be read as destination, or goal. Thus, we must
conceive of movement beyond the narrow confines of locomotion.
Thus, on the one hand, walking, learning, or making something, is movement
that has an end other than itself which it has not reached. On the other hand,
Heidegger writes having-seen is at the same time as and along with the
seeing.233 Seeing is its own goal whereas making something has a goal other
than itself. Since the having-moved of seeing is its own , seeing does
not cease to see. Seeing is a kind of movement, or an activity as
opposed to walking or making something, which is movement as such,
, in the sense that walking is no longer walking once one has got to
where they have walked, whereas seeing is seeing at the same time as
having seen. This kind of movement, or activity, characterises as
, It is a tarrying alongside and pure perceiving of the archai of those
beings that always are, a tarrying that is unworried and always has time to
spare (schole [leisure]).234
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
234
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 143-4
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.; We shall say more about this later.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 137
Ibid., p. 137
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This corresponds to the development of the dealings of inspection from out of

circumspective concern to. That is, the genesis of the theoretical out of the
productive and the practical. The very structure of the highest intellectual
virtue is based on a concept of movement taken from beings as beingsproduced, the theatre of skill and production. So, on the one hand we have
the kind of movement which distinguishes the intellectual virtues, or the
modes of comport of factical life. On the other hand, we must determine the
trajectory which is taken from the dealings of concern to the dealings of
inspection. How does the transformation and division of dealings take place,
from circumspection to inspection?
Heidegger argues that factical life is anxiously concerned about developing its
dealings [both productive and practical] intoa looking and a seeing more.235
That is, wanting to know more, wanting to become wiser ( is
the phrase Aristotle uses.) On account of the desire, , to see more,
factical life gives up the care of directing itself to routine tasks.236 The kind of
routine tasks Heidegger has in mind are obviously and guided
by and respectively. In this case, know-how becomes
separated from its performance and is transformed into a unique and
autonomous set of dealings. What is crucial here then is the desire to know
more, which is a looking atfor its own sake,237 and which considers the
ultimate viewpoints in which beings can in themselves be defined.238 Such a
movement is a sojourn that is at the expense of the care directed to going
about factical lifes dealings and the performance of routine tasks. This
sojourn from and is accomplished in and . For
Aristotle, argues Heidegger, the human being has become what it
authentically is in the pure temporalizing and unfolding of .239 In terms
of the activity appropriate to each intellectual virtue then, is .
This then corresponds directly to the development of the dealings from out of
circumspective concern to the dealings of inspection. Heidegger repeats in his
interpretation of Aristotle [a retrieval] what he had discovered in his
investigation of the initial position [Blickstand]: there is a tendency in factical
life for circumspective concern (production and practical) to become
inspection (theoretical.) That is, the genesis of the theoretical out of the
productive and practical.
So far movement has been discussed in terms of beings as being-produced.
This led to an examination of the movement of factical life. That is, the
movement that characterises care or the intellectual virtues. We also
observed how the dealings of factical life change and develop into
autonomous kinds of dealings as in the case of circumspection and inspection.
That is, the movement from circumspection to inspection Obviously,
235
236
237
238
239
Ibid., p. 138
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 136
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Heidegger realises the importance of ontology of movement both in Aristotle,

and in his own investigation of being. Moreover, movement becomes for
Heidegger the site of the analysis of being, first as a result of its
misinterpretation by the tradition, and second by his own retrieval of the
concept of motion. He leaves little doubt about this in the remaining section
of the Introduction. This final section outlines the interpretations of Physics
, , chapters 1-3 and Metaphysics , and . Again the last sections are
replete with promises for a book on Aristotle. Fortunately they have come
down to us in the form of the recent publication of lectures from the same
period. Furthermore, their impact cannot only be felt in Being and Time but in
further lectures which are held after the publication of Being and Time. It is
with regard to Aristotles discussion of motion that we are led to consider
being as being-potential ( ) and being-actual ( ).
The final section of the Introduction is brief with respect to analyses of
particular selections of Aristotles work and the concepts contained there in
comparison to the previous section, in particular Nicomachean Ethics Book 6.
Here we are offered tentative, yet important interpretive hypotheses.
Heidegger states that his interpretation of the Physics will analyse the
following points:
1. the initial approach to movement in the ancient Greek research into this
phenomenon, [what is moving]240 which reiterates the
conditions that must be satisfied for the research of ancient Greeks that
were stated at the beginning of the Introduction under rubrics of
ontology as a phenomenological hermeneutics; that is, understanding
radically what a particular kind of past philosophical research put forward
at a particular time in and for its situation in worrying itself with the basic
things it did.241 Heidegger intends to repeat Aristotles strategy of a
historical critique of philosophical problems as undertaken in both the
Metaphysics and the Physics. This involves:
a. The research into motion is called -research, the true safekeeping of the from-out-of-whiches and from-the-points-ofview-of-which on the basis of which the comes to be
seen.242 This is the task of and not . research involves the question of access.243
i. forehaving: the thematic domain of objects in the how of
the basic phenomenal character of the their content.244
240
241
242
243
244
Ibid., p 140
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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ii. foreconception: the pre-given interpretation of

and the prior conceptualisation into which the research and
interpretation of motion will be placed.245
Heidegger states that such an initial position of research is fundamental
historical critique of principles.246 He argues that Aristotle knew all
research moves within a particular level of some pregiven interpretation
of life and within certain pregiven ways of discussing the world,247 and,
indeed, practiced historical-critical research himself. In order to evaluate
past research into motion, Aristotle asks whether the approach to it was
directed to the [natural beings] such that their decisive
phenomenal character, namely, motion wasexplicated in a primordial
manner.248 The answer is in the negative. In fact, Heidegger emphasises,
as is clear from his rather critical tone, the research of Aristotles
predecessors moved from the outset within theories and thematic
principles that not only were not drawn this domain of being itself but
blocked almost all access to it.249 Such then is the attitude of the Eleatics.
2. Heidegger now proceeds to underscore a number of significant results
from Aristotles analysis of his critical historical encounter with the
understanding of movement in Pre-Socratic philosophy. Aristotle does not,
as Heidegger argues contra Bonitz, address the Pre-Socratic tradition, and
the Eleatics in particular, because their position is weak and easily
refutable. Rather the principal Eleatic thesis that all things are one (
) (Phys. 185a23) in essence obstructs access to the thematic domain
of objects. Aristotle states we assume from the outset that there are
beings in motion (Phys. A 2, 185a13). From the fact of , i.e. the
very otherness explicit in change, there is more than one being, beings are
multiple. The account of the of then, the from-out-of-which
for something,250 must address the difference and multiplicity therein.
Heidegger argues Aristotle sought to establish the horizon that is decisive
for looking at all subsequent problems in physics: namely, that of ,
i.e., as .251 The research into beings in movement
dictates this occurs through the as-structure of apophansis. Recall, in this
manner, something is addressed as something. The cleavage in
must be able to be captured in the flexibility of .
Heidegger writes, Beings are always categorially something as such and
such, and this means that their sense of being is in principle manifold.252
The Eleatic thesis precludes this from occurring.
245
246
247
248
249
250
251
252
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.; recall that Heidegger argued earlier on in the Introduction Factical life moves at
any particular time within a certain state of having-been-interpreted. p. 116
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 141
Ibid.
Ibid.
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3. The last important result is to investigate Aristotles explication of motion

per se. Heidegger argues that Aristotles does not address motion
according to being and non-being. Rather he utilises a variety of other
concepts, some of his own coinage, in order to avoid falling into any
paradox that may result if motion were to be understood according to
being and non-being. The structure of motion then is articulated
according to (privation), the in each case particular
availability of , the putting to work of this availability, and
the maintaining (in true safekeeping) of this availability that
has been put to work.253 We will subject this to a rigorous analysis in the
following two chapters, in relation to both and of
both Dasein and being (Sein).
Heideggers critique of the within-time-ness as the source of the ordinary
conception of time in Being and Time focuses on Aristotles model of time that
arises from his prior articulation of the structure of motion. According to
Aristotles vulgar254 theory of time, time is the numbered of movement. Stated
in full he writes: For this is time: that which is counted in the movement
which we encounter within the horizon of the earlier and the later. (Phys.
219b1)255 This contradicts with what Heidegger finds in Aristotles discussion
on . According to the kind of dealings apparent in factical life
or , or co-temporalize and unfold factical life in a
particular manner. temporalizes and unfolds in factical life in
terms of or Augenblick [timeliness, the moment]. It gives an overall
view of the moment from the point of view of the end of action in
question256The (actions [in ]) are not yet being such and
such. At the moment in which the are in they characterize
the situation that factical life encounters. They anticipate what will transpire
at the time. Moreover they also provide the direction for the intentionality of
factical life, its toward-which. Such or Augenblick carry with them a
sense of urgency. This can be construed as the normative character of the
temporalization and unfolding of . Heidegger argues is
epitactic,257 in other words, it discloses something one should be concerned
about.258 Therefore the way in which the soul trues, that is, the beings
brought into unconcealment and true safe-keeping, according to is
practical truth ( ). The is the whole
253
254
255
256
257
258
Ibid., p. 143
Blackwell, 1962, p 250/294
Cited in Heidegger, Martin Being and Time trans. John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson,
Oxford: Blackwell, 1962, p 250/294
Ibid.
Ibid.
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unveiled moment (at the particular time) of factical life in the how of its
decisive readiness for dealings with itself.259
Formatted: Font:
The formal temporal structure of the are at the same time already
such and such, i.e., insofar as they are a toward-which that belongs to a
concrete readiness for dealings.260 In we are always in between, or
at the same time in a moment of anticipation, expectation and launching into
going about our dealings. Heidegger argues that the not-yet and the
already need to be understood in their unity.261 This looks forward to the
three ecstasies of temporality. Yet here in the Introduction, in reference to
Aristotle, they are placed under the determinate aspects of movement. To
which belongs the very important concept . Onto already we can
map other familiar temporal concepts: before and earlier (); onto
not yet being such and such after and later (). Both already [past]
and not yet being such and such [future] are . What is not
discussed is the [now]. This is because, as Kisiel argues, at this time
Heidegger has not yet equated [Seinshaftigkeit (beingness)] with
constant presence.262 Thus we have here, in nuce, what will occupy
Heidegger for his entire career the play between absence and presence.
Combining the existential and formal temporal elements disclosed through
and about , we could say it temporalizes and brings about in
factical life in terms of the three ecstasies of temporality.
This temporal movement gives way to, or entails the historical movement of
factical life in Aristotles analysis of it, and is encapsulated in the terms chance
() and spontaneity (). These are terms Heidegger argues are
utterly untranslatable when it comes to their authentic meaning.263 Looking
forward to our thorough analysis of Zeitlichkeit and Geschichtlichkeit in Being
and Time let us offer some provisional translations of these utterly
untranslatable terms. First, can be translated by Schicksal, Zufall,
Fgung or Glck. Schicksal, in particular, plays an important role in Being and
Time where it denotes the fateful occurrence of Dasein.264 Similarly,
can be translated thus aus eigenem Antrieb, freiwillig,
ungeheien, von selbst or zufllig. These terms, however, do not figure as
259
260
261
262
263
264
Ibid., p. 135
Ibid.
Ibid.
Cf Only freedom for deaththrusts existence into [Daseins] finitude. Once grasped, the
finitude of existencebrings it into the simplicity of its fate [Schicksals]. This is what we
call Dasein's original happening [Geschehen], the happening that lies in authentic
resoluteness and in which Dasein hands itself down to itself, free for death, in an
inherited, yet chosen possibility Heidegger, Martin Being and Time trans. John Macquarrie
& Edward Robinson, Oxford: Blackwell, 1962, p 384/435
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prominently as the previous set of terms in Heideggers work up to and

beyond Being and Time. This perhaps is where Heideggers retrieval is at its
most intense. This hermeneutic exploration yields a striking consistency in
Heideggers thinking during the early twenties. However, our concern here is
not the development of his thought. What should interest us is the thematic
continuum apparent in this early work, in order to determine Aristotles
influence upon, positive or negative. The entire Introduction arches over
such that temporality and historicality are propelled back into the very
question of the meaning of philosophy, its domain of research and questions
surrounding its methodology. Heidegger argues, in a manner that recalls the
discussion of the historical character of factical life at the beginning of the
Introduction, Aristotle ontologically explicates the historical movement of
factical life, i.e., the movement of what happens and can happen in such and
such a way to someone everyday (Phys. 198b36).265
The way temporalizes and unfolds in factical life, especially if
we extend its influence to the conceptualization of care (Sorge) and concern
(Besorgen) in Being and Time, thus differs somewhat from the manner in
which brings about . That is, we could say that
temporalizes in factical life according to the vulgar conception of time,
which is grounded in the temporality of Dasein. However, only the dealings
that take a sojourn and become autonomous would ensure this one particular
interpretation of time comes to dominate the history of ontology and logic,
the dealings of and actualized as . There is a tension
here which Heidegger will explore further in relation to the constitution of the
temporality of Dasein, and ultimately time as the horizon for the meaning of
being. As Kisiel writes In his reading of Aristotle's account of the different
kinds of truth in Nicomachean Ethics 6, Heidegger thought he also found an
original experience of the paralleling that of primitive Christianity. And
yet Physics 4, with its understanding of time as a series of nows, betrayed an
ontological option which in its "leveling" character only obscured that original
experience.266
As we can see the phenomenon of movement plays a central role in
Heideggers further interpretation of Aristotle. In fact, it is one of the
fundamental concepts that occupies Heidegger in his interpretation of
Aristotle from the early 1920 to the early 1930s in his investigation of being
qua being. The direction in which is twists and pulls the concept of motion are
numerous: 1) the movement of Greek factical life through the intellectual
virtues in production (), action () and contemplation (); 2)
the historical development of the intellectual virtues, from circumspection to
inspection, from and to and ; 3) motion per
265
266

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se, that is, artefacts, natural beings and being qua being. As we just saw this
relates directly to Heideggers interpretation of time in Aristotle, the contrary
pair numbered of movement and and . Ultimately, then,
Heidegger claims that Aristotle privileges a particular kind of motion, of a
particular kind of being from which what developed came to be regardedas
the one and true ontology and the one and true logic. Such being is beingproduced. Such movement is the movement of the production of beings.
Conclusion
Thus, Heideggers reading of Aristotle, as presented here in an interpretation
of this very earlier text, is both a phenomenological hermeneutics of Aristotle
and a retrieval of Aristotles proto-phenomenology. Both assume the critical
hermeneutics Heidegger fashions in his explication of factical life, especially
since it is factical life that is the object of philosophy. However, the
phenomenological hermeneutics of Aristotle is critical in several senses.
Heidegger argues, traditionally, philosophy has obscured Aristotles research
into and interpretation of factical life. This is made apparent in the way
several important Greek concepts were misinterpreted. As we said at the
beginning of Chapter Two, this is a critique of Western philosophy from the
period of classical Greece, Scholasticism through to modernity. Heidegger
writes: That today we still speak of the nature of man, the nature of the
soul, and more generally the nature of things, this has its motives in
intellectual history.267 It is not so much that philosophy has long ago dissolved
problems that were an issue for Aristotle of Aquinas, which therefore licences
philosophy to disconnect itself from history (Geschichte). Nor that we can
simply clarify conceptually such questions in order to be assured of the finality
of our solutions to challenges in philosophy. Even when Heidegger writes
philosophy moves inauthentically within Greek conceptuality and, indeed, this
conceptuality has been permeated by a chain of diverse interpretations of
it,268 we cannot escape the hold that history has on the problems that are
raised in factical life nor on the necessity of having to engage these issues
that are pertinent to factical in terms of history. There many obvious
distortions of Aristotle in the history of philosophy. The concept of man is a
case in point, a concept that Heidegger himself had recoiled from engaging in
a more radical deconstruction. In the context of the Introduction, Heidegger
underscores the following concepts that were obscured by the tradition. He
writes When defining what truth [Wahrheit] means, one usually appeals
to Aristotle as the source of its original meaning.269 Everything that is
assumed to have been said by Aristotle concerning truth is wrong and has no
support in his texts. Aristotle did not say that in toto truth occurs in
267
268
269

Ibid.
Ibid., p. 130
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judgment and is more precisely the agreement of thought with its

object.270 Aristotle does not hold a representationalist or correspondence
theory of truth. Whatever is then subsequently discussed about Aristotle and
truth simply occludes the meaning of and the manner in which this
operated in Aristotles discussion of being. Yet Heidegger argues not only
does the philosophical tradition, to say nothing of modern philosophy,
perpetuate a distorted interpretation of Aristotle with regard to truth and
many other concepts, without completely being aware of it, philosophy
assumes a body of conceptuality of which it can barely identify its birth
certificate. It is not only secular philosophy which is guilty of this. Early
Christian philosophy and theology moved inauthentically within Greek
conceptuality. Heidegger argues, the kinetic ontology, of which he is
investigating, is the motivational source of the basic ontological structures
that later decisively influenced the notion of divine being in the specifically
Christian sense.271 Yet, and this is the fundamental point that Heidegger
wishes to make, is such conceptuality pertinent to Christian theology? He
writes Christian theology and the philosophical speculation standing under
its influence all speak in borrowed categories that are foreign to their own
domains of being.272
Yet, the phenomenology of Aristotle attempts to retrieve concepts in
Aristotles philosophy which fundamentally deepen the method of
phenomenology itself. In particular, Heideggers novel interpretation of
is fundamental to phenomenology. This, as Kisiel points out had
Georg Misch place question marks on his copy of the Einleitung at the point
where this translation first appears, whereas [Paul] Natorp, who had been
utilizing this translation in his courses at least since 1917, naturally accepts it
without question.273 In this sense, the phenomenology of Aristotle is a study
of Aristotles phenomenology, of Aristotle the phenomenologist. Furthermore,
it is not merely the development of phenomenology as a method of
philosophy that Heidegger sees in Aristotle. Rather, as we have seen
movement, and play a fundamental role in Heideggers
interrogation of being qua being. Crucially, we ourselves will, in much greater
detail and in a much more rigorous manner, analysis the relationship of
movement, and with, on the one hand, and ,
and temporality and historicality on the other hand.
However, the phenomenological hermeneutics of Aristotle is also a critique of
Aristotelian concepts per se in so far as Aristotles also stood within the
tradition of ancient Greek thought. Heidegger considers Aristotles conception
of being to be highly problematic. Essentially, Aristotle understood being as
being-produced according to the phenomenon of motion. What is Heidegger
writes amounts to what has been finished and made ready and is now
Deleted: d
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Comment [MO27]: This is a

problem. It is a problem if
Heidegger thinks this Greek
conceptuality has no place in
modern German philosophy or
German Christian theology,
because it is Greek and thus

foreign. However, to speak of
philosophy, to philosophise is
already Greek. German
philosophy, French philosophy,
English Philosophy, European
philosophy, Western philosophy
is already Greek philosophy. Yet
it may mean the categories
themselves, whether they are
Greek, Hindu or Chinese is
irrelevant, are borrowed
categories and are thus foreign
to Christian theology. Do we
not, following Derrida, already
philosophise, when we speak,
write, discuss, etc? Of course
Heidegger might reply by
saying theology, anthropology
is a regional ontology, and what
he means is that these are the
categories of ontology
simpliciter. If one wishes to
discuss theology or
anthropology this must be
conducted according to its
specific conceptuality that has
arise according its particular
way of approaching the beings
that are its theme of
investigation.
Deleted: s
270
271
272
273
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 139
Ibid.
Press: Berkeley, 1993, p. 247.
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52
Comment [RS28]: Phrasing

not quite clear.
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0001zi.doc
available for certain tendencies to use it.274 Aristotle understood being from
the perspective of the everyday dealings of factical life: production, praxis and
utility. From the domain of production, Aristotle drew the basic ontological
structures and also the modes of addressing and defining for approaching the
object human life.275 However, Heidegger does not come to his fundamental
insight concerning his critique of Aristotles discussion of being in the
Introduction. That is, Entities are grasped in their Being as presence; this
means that they are understood with regard to a definite mode of time the
Present.276 This will be investigated thoroughly investigated in the following
chapters. In the next later chapter I will present a thematic analysis of the
way in which Heidegger interprets Aristotles concepts of being, potentiality
and actuality, movement and truth as such interpretation presents itself in his
later lectures on Aristotle. Specifically I will be looking at Basic Concepts of
Aristotelian Philosophy, Logic. The Question of Truth, Basic Concepts of
Ancient Philosophy, The Essence of Human Freedom and Aristotle's
Metaphysics Theta 1-3 On the Essence and Actuality of Force.
274
275
276

Ibid., p 128
Blackwell, 1962, p 25/47
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12/12/2012
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Phenomenology "Of" Aristotle

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Draft_Chapter_Two_0001zi_rs.

Deleted: Draft Chapter Two

This Is A Draft Only.

Do not cite without the author's

Formatted: Font: (Default)

The Phenomenology of Aristotle

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Heideggers phenomenology of Aristotle in the Introduction must be taken

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studied, foundational book of Western philosophy.6 He describes book six of

Deleted: The questions

Heidegger himself calls the Phenomenology of Aristotle, investigations

What is philosophy today (1922)?

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Comment [MO1]: Formal

Comment [RS3]: Try not to

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Heidegger, Martin. Phenomenological Interpretations in Connection with Aristotle: An

Comment [MO4]: P1 This is

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circumspection, the with-which of dealings is in advance grasped as,

Comment [RS5]: At least in

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development of the dealings from out of circumspective concern to the

Comment [RS7]: If you are

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understand falling to be an event or occurrence. Falling is in a certain sense a

Comment [RS8]: Including its

Comment [RS9]: What is it

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Heidegger, Martin. Phenomenological Interpretations to Aristotle: indication of the

Comment [RS11]: Now were

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comment, clearly the temporality of factical life is contrary to the view it is

Comment [RS12]: Interesting

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Heidegger, Martin. Phenomenological Interpretations in Connection with Aristotle: An

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Yet we come across a serious problem with such an identification when we

Comment [RS13]: This sounds

What has happened in philosophical investigation is that past research has

Deleted: Draft Chapter Two

Comment [MO15]: This must

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interpretations of Paul and Augustine, late Scholasticism itself, Thomas

Comment [RS16]: Where does

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Let us remind ourselves of the questions Heidegger raises with respect to

Comment [RS17]: Same point

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In all three characteristics of being as being-produced [Hergestelltsein] (the

Comment [MO18]: P1 This is

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Comment [MO19]: NOTE

On the one hand, Heidegger introduced his discussion of Aristotle by

Heidegger, Martin. Phenomenological Interpretations in Connection with Aristotle: An

Deleted: Draft Chapter Two

knowledge and . Heidegger argues that in his interpretation of

Comment [RS20]: Maybe