Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-14595

May 31, 1960

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE GREGORIO MONTEJO, Judge, Court of First Instance,
Zamboanga City and Basilan City, MAYOR LEROY S. BROWN,
DETECTIVE JOAQUIN R. POLLISCO, PATROLMAN GRACIANO
LACERNA aliasDODONG, PATROLMAN MOHAMAD HASBI, SPECIAL
POLICEMAN DIONISIO DINGLASA, SPECIAL POLICEMAN HADJARATIL,
SPECIAL POLICEMAN ALO, and JOHN DOES, respondents.
Acting City Atty. Perfecto B. Querubin for petitioner.
Hon. Gregorio Montejo in his own behalf.
C. A. S. Sipin, Jr. for the other respondents.
CONCEPCION, J.:
This is a special civil action for certiorari , with mandamus and
preliminary injunction, against Hon. Gregorio Montejo, as Judge of the
Court of First Instance of the cities of Zamboanga and Basilan, and the
defendants in Criminal Case No. 672 of said court.
In the petition herein, which was filed by the prosecution in said criminal
case, it is prayed that, pending the final determination thereof, a writ of
preliminary injunction issue, enjoining respondent Judge from
proceeding with the trial of said case; that, after due hearing, the rulings
of respondent Judge, rejecting some evidence for the prosecution therein
and not permitting the same to propound certain questions, be set aside;
that said respondent Judge be ordered to admit the aforementioned
evidence and permit said questions; and that Senator Roseller Lim be
declared, contrary to another ruling made by respondent Judge,
disqualified by the Constitution from appearing as counsel for the
accused in said criminal case. Soon, after the filing of the petition, we
issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for, without bond.
In their respective answers, respondents alleged, in substance, that the
ruling complained of are in conformity with law.
Respondents Leroy S. Brown, Mayor of Basilan City, Detective Joaquin R.
Pollisco, Patrolman Graciano Lacerna (alias Dodong) and Mohamad Hasbi,
Special Policemen Dionisio Dinglasa, Moro Yakan, Hadjaratil, Moro Alo
and several John Does, are charged, in said Criminal Case No. 672, with
murder. It is alleged in the information therein that, during May and June,
1958, in the sitio of Tipo-Tipo, district of Lamitan, City of Basilan, Mayor
Brown "organized groups of police patrol and civilian commandoes",
consisting of regular and special policemen, whom he "armed with pistols
and high power guns", and then "established a camp", called sub-police
headquarters hereinafter referred to as sub-station at Tipo-Tipo,
Lamitan, which was placed under his command, orders, direct
supervision and control, and in which his codefendants were stationed;
that the criminal complaints were entertained in said sub-station, in
which defendant Pollisco acted as investigating officer and exercised
authority to order the apprehension of persons and their detention in the
camp, for days or weeks, without due process of law and without bringing
them to the proper court; that, on or about June 4, and 5, 1958; one Yokan
Awalin Tebag was arrested by order of Mayor Brown, without any
warrant or complaint filed in court, and then brought to, and detained in,
the aforementioned sub-station; that while on the way thereto, said
Awalin Tebag was maltreated, pursuant to instructions of Mayor Brown,
concurred in by Pollisco, to the effect that Tebag be mauled until such
time as he shall surrender his gun; that, once in the sub-station, Tebag,

whose hands were securely tied, was subjected, by defendants Lacerna,

Hasbi, Pollisco, Dinglasa, and other special policemen, to further and
more severe torture, in consequence of which Tebag died; that, in order
to simulate that Tebag had been killed by peace officers in the course of
an encounter between the latter and a band of armed bandits of which he
formed part, the body of Tebag was brought, early the next morning, to a
nearby isolated field, where defendant Hasbi fired twice at said dead
body from behind, and then an old Japanese rifle, supplied by Mayor
Brown, was placed beside said body; and that, in furtherance of the
aforementioned simulation, a report of said imaginary encounter,
mentioning Tebag as the only member of a band of armed bandits whose
identity was known, was submitted and respondent Hasbi caused one of
his companions to shoot him on the left arm.
During the trial of said criminal case, respondent Judge rejected the
following evidence for the prosecution therein:
1. Exhibit A A report of Capt. F. G. Sarrosa, Commanding Officer of the
PC Detachment in Basilan City, who investigated the case, showing that
on June 5, 1958, he and Lt. Clemente Antonio, PAF, found nine (9)
detainees in the Tipo-Tipo sub-station. This was part of the chain of
evidence of the prosecution to prove that persons used to be detained in
the aforementioned sub-station by the main respondents herein, without
either a warrant of arrest or a complaint filed in court.
2. Exhibit C Letter of Atty. Doroteo de Guzman to the officer in charge
of the sub-station, dated June 4, 1958, inquiring as to the whereabouts of
Awalin Tebag, who, according to the letter, was arrested in his house, by
policemen, on June 4, 1958. Capt. Sarrosa took possession of this letter in
the course of his aforementioned investigation.
3. Exhibits G, G-1, G-2 and G-3 These are the transcript of the testimony
of Tebag's mother, before the City Fiscal of Basilan City, when she asked
an autopsy of the body of her son.
4. Exhibits J to V Consisting of the following, namely: a sketch of the
sub-station; pictures of several huts therein, indicating their relative
positions and distances; a picture depicting how the body of Tebag was
taken from a camarin in the sub-station; a picture showing how
Patrolman Hasbiwas shot by a companion, at this request; and a picture,
Exhibit T, demonstrating how Mayor Brown allegedly gave the Japanese
rifle, Exhibit Y, to Hasbi, to be planted beside Tebag's body.
Although referred to by Yakan Carnain, Arit, Lianson, Kona Amenola, and
Asidin, in the course of their testimony as witnesses for the prosecution,
these exhibits were not admitted in evidence, which were presented to
show how they were able to observe the movements in the sub-station,
the same being quite small.
5. Exhibits X (a "barong") and X-1 (a scabbard) Amenola said that these
effects were given to him by Mayor Brown in the latter's office, and that
he then saw therein the Japanese rifle, Exhibit Y, which was later placed
beside the dead body of Awalin Tebag.
6. Exhibits DD, DD-1, FF, JJ, KK and LL These show that on April 28,
1958, Yakan Kallapattoh and Fernandez (Pilnandiz) executed affidavits
admitting participation in a given robbery; that an information therefor
(Exh. KK) was filed against them on May 2, 1958, with the municipal court
of Basilan City (Criminal Case No. 1774); and that, in compliance with
warrants for their arrest then issued, they were apprehended and
detained in the sub-station, thus corroborating the testimony of
prosecution witness Yakans Amenola, Carnain Asidin and Arip to the
effect that Kallapattoh and Fernandez (Pilnandiz) were together with
them, in the aforementioned sub-station, when Tebag was maltreated and
died therein, on June 4, 1958, as well as confirming Pollisco's statement,
Exhibit TT-18, before the City Fiscal of Basilan city, on June 21, 1958,
admitting that Fernandez was in the sub-station on June 5, 1958, on

account of the warrant of arrest adverted to. Through the exhibits in

question the prosecution sought, also, to bolster up its theory that
Kallapattoh and Fernandez disappeared from the sub-station after
Tebag's death, because the main respondents herein illegally released
them to prevent them from revealing the circumstances surrounding said
event.
7. Exhibits II, II-1, and MM These are sketches of a human body and
pictures purporting to show the points of entrance, as well as of exit, of
two (2) bullets wounds found on the body of Tebag. Respondent Judge
rejected these exhibits and did not allow Dr. Rosalino Reyes, Chief of the
Medico-Legal Section of the National Bureau of Investigation, to answer
questions asked by the prosecution, to establish that the trajectories of
said bullets wounds were parallel to each other, which, the prosecution
claims, would have been impossible had Tebag been alive when he
sustained said wounds..
8. Respondent Judge sustained, also, the objections to certain questions
propounded to said Dr. Reyes, to show that the injuries sustained by
Tebag in the large intestines must have been inflicted when Tebag was
dead already, and did not allow Dr. Reyes to draw lines on Exhibits II and
MM, indicating the connection between the points of entrance and those
of exit of said wounds.
9. Exhibits Z, Z-1, Z-2 These are records of the office of the City Fiscal of
Basilan City showing that the Japanese rifle, Exhibit Y, two rounds of
ammunitions and one empty shell were received by said Office from the
Police Department of Basilan City on June 17, 1958. These exhibits were
presented to show that said rifle tallies with the description thereof given
by prosecution witness Kona Amenola, in his affidavit, dated June 14,
1958, when said weapon was still in the possession of respondent
Pollisco, and hence, to establish Amenola's veracity.
Likewise, the following rebuttal evidence for the prosecution were
rejected by respondent Judge, viz:
1. Exhibits OO to OO-8 These are daily records of events of the police
department, Lamitan District, Basilan City, including the Tipo-Tipo region.
They do not mention the killing therein, by the police patrol, of any
outlaw on June 5, 1958, thereby contradicting the reports (Exhs. 12 and
12-A) of respondent Pollisco and Hasbi about it. Respondent Judge did
not allow the record clerk of the City Fiscal's office to identify said
exhibits, upon the ground that it was too late to present him although
when the exhibits were marked by the prosecution it reserved the right
to identify them as part of official records.
2. Exhibits PP, QQ to QQ-3 Respondent Pollisco had testified that on
June 4, 1958, Hadji Aisa inquired about one Awalin; that he told Aisa that
Awalin was taken by Mayor Brown to the seat of the city government; and
that he (Pollisco) suggested that Datu Unding be advised not to worry,
because there was no evidence against Awalin. To impeach the veracity of
Pollisco, the prosecution presented the exhibits under consideration, for
the same show that one Dong Awalin (who is different from Awalin Tebag)
was apprehended on May 27, 1958, and released on bail on June 23, 1958;
that Pollisco could not have truthfully informed Aisa on June 4, 1958,
what Dong Awalin had been taken by Mayor Brown to the seat of the city
government and that there was no evidence against him; for he was then
a detention prisoner; and that Pollisco could not have had in mind,
therefore, said Dong Awalin as the Awalin about whom Aisa had inquired.
Indeed, Exhibits TT-13 to TT-16 show that, testifying before the City
Fiscal, respondent Pollisco said that he twice ordered Patrolman Lacerna
on June 4, 1958, to bring Awalin Tebag to him (Pollisco) for investigation.
3. Exhibits SS to SS-7 These are the testimonies before the City Fiscal, of
defense witness Mohammad Sali who, on cross examination by the
prosecution, denied having given it. Thus the predicate therefor was

established by the prosecution which sought thereby to impeach Sali's

veracity.
4. Exhibits TT, TT-1 to TT-25 These are the testimonies, before the City
Fiscal of the main respondents herein, who gave a different story before
respondent Judge. The prosecution thus sought to impeach their veracity
as witnesses in their own behalf, after laying down the predicate in the
course of their cross examination.
5. Exhibits UU, UU-1 to UU-3 These are sworn statements made by
defendant Hasbi before the City Fiscal. They were presented in rebuttal,
after laying down the predicate, to impeach his testimony in court.
6. Exhibits RR, RR-1, XX and XX-1 With these exhibits the prosecution
tried to rebut Pollisco's testimony to the effect that prosecution witness
Lianson Arip had a grudge against him, he (Pollisco) having charged him
with theft in the City Fiscal's Office. It appears from said exhibits that
Arip's affidavit, implicating Pollisco, was dated June 8, 1958, whereas
Pollisco's affidavit charging Arip with theft, was dated June 20, 1958, so
that said statement of Arip could not have been influenced by
Pollisco's subsequent act.
In contrast with the severe and rigorous policy used by respondent Judge
in dealing with the aforementioned evidence for the prosecution,
petitioner herein cites the liberality with which the lower court admitted,
as evidence for the defense, records of supposed achievements of the
Tipo-Tipo sub-station (Exhibits 9 to 9-G, 10 to 10-I, 17 to 17-C, 19 to 19-A,
20 to 20-I 21 and 22), a congratulatory communication (Exh. 24), and a
letter of commendation to a peace officer assigned thereto (Exh. 7),
including an article in the Philippine Free Press (Exhs. 23 and 23-A).
Upon a review of the record, we are fully satisfied that the lower court
had, not only erred, but, also, committed a grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the resolutions complained of, in rejecting the aforementioned
direct and rebuttal evidence for the prosecution, and in not permitting
the same to propound the questions, already adverted to. It is obvious to
us that said direct and rebuttal evidence, as well as the aforementioned
questions, are relevant to the issues involved in Criminal Case No. 627.
Although it is not possible to determine with precision, at this stage of the
proceedings, how far said exhibits may affect the outcome of that case, it
is elemental that all parties therein are entitled to a reasonable
opportunity to establish their respective pretense. In this connection it
should be noted that, in the light of the allegations of the amended
information in said case and of the records before us, the issue of the guilt
or innocence of the accused therein is bound to hinge heavily upon the
veracity of the opposing witnesses and the weight attached to their
respective testimony. Hence, the parties should be allowed a certain
latitude in the presentation of their evidence lest they may be so
hampered that the ends of justice may eventually be defeated or appear
to be defeated. The danger of leading to such result must be avoided,
particularly in cases of the nature, importance and significance of the one
under consideration.
With respect to the question whether or not Senator Roseller Lim may
appear as counsel for the main respondents herein, as defendants in said
criminal case, the Constitution provides that no Senator or Member of the
House of Representatives shall "appear as counsel ... in any criminal case
wherein an officer or employee of the Government is accused of an
offense committed in relation of his office ... (Art. VI, Sec. 17, Const. of the
Phil.). The issue, therefore, is whether the defendants in Criminal case No.
672 are "accused of an offense committed in relation" to their office.
A mere perusal of the amended information therein readily elicits an
affirmative answer. It is alleged in said amended information that "Leroy
S. Brown, City Mayor of Basilan City, as such, has organized groups of
police patrol and civilian commandoes consisting of regular policemen
and ... special policemen, appointed and provided by him with pistols and

high power guns" and then "established a camp ... at Tipo-Tipo," which is
under his "command, ... supervision and control," where his codefendants
were stationed, entertained criminal complaints and conducted the
corresponding investigations, as well as assumed the authority to arrest
and detain persons without due process of law and without bringing
them to the proper court, and that, in line with this set-up established by
said Mayor of Basilan City as such, and acting upon his orders, his
codefendants arrested and maltreated Awalin Tebag, who died in
consequence thereof.
It is apparent from these allegations that, although public office is not an
element of the crime of murder in abstract, as committed by the main
respondents herein, according to the amended information, the offense
therein charged is intimately connected with their respective offices and
was perpetrated while they were in the performance, though improper or
irregular, of their official functions. Indeed, they had no personal motive
to commit the crime and they would not have committed it had they not
held their aforesaid offices. The co-defendants of respondent Leroy S.
Brown, obeyed his instructions because he was their superior officer, as
Mayor of Basilan City.
The case of Monllito vs. Hilario and Crisologo, 90 Phil., 49, relied upon by
respondent Judge, in overruling the objection of the prosecution to the
appearance of Senator Roseller Lim, is not in point, for, as stated in the
decision therein:
From the allegations of the information it does not appear that the official
positions of the accused were connected with the offense charged. In fact,
the attorneys for the prosecution stated that the motives for the crimes
were personal with political character. It does not even appear, nor is
there assertion, that the crimes were committed by the defendants in line
of duty or in the performance of their official functions. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Such is not the situation obtaining in the case at bar.
Wherefore, the rulings complained of are set aside and reversed and
respondent Judge is hereby enjoined to admit the aforementioned direct
and rebuttal evidence for the prosecution, as well as to permit the
formulation, of the questions already referred to, with costs against the
respondents herein. It is so ordered.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. Nos. 111771-77 November 9, 1993

ANTONIO L. SANCHEZ, petitioner,
vs.
The Honorable HARRIET O. DEMETRIOU (in her capacity as
Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court, NCR, Branch 70, Pasig), The
Honorable FRANKLIN DRILON (in his capacity as Secretary of
Justice), JOVENCITO R. ZUO, LEONARDO C. GUIYAB, CARLOS L. DE
LEON, RAMONCITO C. MISON, REYNALDO J. LUGTU, and RODRIGO P.
LORENZO, the last six respondents in their official capacities as
members of the State Prosecutor's Office), respondents.
Mario E. Ongkiko and Marciano P. Brion, Jr. for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.

CRUZ, J.:
There is probably no more notorious person in the country today than
Mayor Antonio L. Sanchez of Calauan, Laguna, who stands accused of an
unspeakable crime. On him, the verdict has already been rendered by
many outraged persons who would immediately impose on him an angry
sentence. Yet, for all the prejudgments against him, he is under our
Constitution presumed innocent as long as the contrary has not been
proved. Like any other person accused of an offense, he is entitled to the
full and vigilant protection of the Bill of Rights.
Sanchez has brought this petition to challenge the order of the
respondent judge denying his motion to quash the informations for rape
with homicide filed against him and six other persons. We shall treat it as
we would any other suit filed by any litigant hoping to obtain a just and
impartial judgment from this Court.
The pertinent facts are as follows:
On July 28, 1993, the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission requested the
filing of appropriate charges against several persons, including the
petitioner, in connection with the rape-slay of Mary Eileen Sarmenta and
the killing of Allan Gomez.
Acting on this request, the Panel of State Prosecutors of the Department
of Justice conducted a preliminary investigation on August 9, 1993.
Petitioner Sanchez was not present but was represented by his counsel,
Atty. Marciano Brion, Jr.
On August 12, 1993, PNP Commander Rex Piad issued an "invitation" to
the petitioner requesting him to appear for investigation at Camp Vicente
Lim in Canlubang, Laguna. It was served on Sanchez in the morning of
August 13,1993, and he was immediately taken to the said camp.
At a confrontation that same day, Sanchez was positively identified by
Aurelio Centeno, and SPO III Vivencio Malabanan, who both executed
confessions implicating him as a principal in the rape-slay of Sarmenta
and the killing of Gomez. The petitioner was then placed on "arrest
status" and taken to the Department of Justice in Manila.
The respondent prosecutors immediately conducted an inquest upon his
arrival, with Atty. Salvador Panelo as his counsel.
After the hearing, a warrant of arrest was served on Sanchez. This
warrant was issued on August 13, 1993, by Judge Enrico A. Lanzanas of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 7, in connection with Criminal
Cases Nos. 93-124634 to 93-124637 for violation of Section 8, in relation
to Section 1, of R.A. No. 6713. Sanchez was forthwith taken to the CIS
Detention Center, Camp Crame, where he remains confined.
On August 16, 1993, the respondent prosecutors filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, seven informations charging Antonio L.
Sanchez, Luis Corcolon, Rogelio Corcolon, Pepito Kawit, Baldwin Brion, Jr.,
George Medialdea and Zoilo Ama with the rape and killing of Mary Eileen
Sarmenta.
On August 26, 1993, Judge Eustaquio P. Sto. Domingo of that court issued
a warrant for the arrest of all the accused, including the petitioner, in
connection with the said crime.
The respondent Secretary of Justice subsequently expressed his
apprehension that the trial of the said cases might result in a miscarriage
of justice because of the tense and partisan atmosphere in Laguna in
favor of the petitioner and the relationship of an employee, in the trial
court with one of the accused. This Court thereupon ordered the transfer
of the venue of the seven cases to Pasig, Metro Manila, where they were
raffled to respondent Judge Harriet Demetriou.

On September 10, 1993, the seven informations were amended to include

the killing of Allan Gomez as an aggravating circumstance.
On that same date, the petitioner filed a motion to quash the informations
substantially on the grounds now raised in this petition. On September 13,
1993, after oral arguments, the respondent judge denied the motion.
Sanchez then filed with this Court the instant petition for certiorari and
prohibition with prayer for a temporary restraining order/writ of
injunction.
The petitioner argues that the seven informations filed against him
should be quashed because: 1) he was denied the right to present
evidence at the preliminary investigation; 2) only the Ombudsman had
the competence to conduct the investigation; 3) his warrantless arrest is
illegal and the court has therefore not acquired jurisdiction over him, 4)
he is being charged with seven homicides arising from the death of only
two persons; 5) the informations are discriminatory because they do not
include Teofilo Alqueza and Edgardo Lavadia; and 6) as a public officer,
he can be tried for the offense only by the Sandiganbayan.
The respondents submitted a Comment on the petition, to which we
required a Reply from the petitioner within a non-extendible period of
five days. 1 The Reply was filed five days late. 2 The Court may consider
his non-compliance an implied admission of the respondents' arguments
or a loss of interest in prosecuting his petition, which is a ground for its
dismissal. Nevertheless, we shall disregard this procedural lapse and
proceed to discuss his petition on the basis of the arguments before us.
The Preliminary Investigation.
The records of the hearings held on August 9 and 13, 1993, belie the
petitioner's contention that he was not accorded the right to present
counter-affidavits.
During the preliminary investigation on August 9, 1993, the petitioner's
counsel, Atty. Marciano Brion, manifested that his client was waiving the
presentation of a counter-affidavit, thus:
Atty. Brion, Jr.:
[W]e manifest that after reviewing them there is nothing to rebut or
countermand all these statements as far as Mayor Sanchez is concerned,
We are not going to submit any counter-affidavit.
ACSP Zuo to Atty. Brion:
xxx xxx xxx
Q. So far, there are no other statements.
A. If there is none then, we will not submit any counter-affidavit because
we believe there is nothing to rebut or countermand with all these
statements.

ACSP Zuo:
For the record, we are furnishing to you the sworn statement of witness
Aurelio Centeno y Roxas and the sworn statement of SPO3 Vivencio
Malabanan y Angeles.
Do I understand from you that you are again waiving the submission of
counter-affidavit?
Atty. Panelo:
Yes.
ACSP Zuo:
So, insofar as the respondent, Mayor Antonio Sanchez is concerned, this
case is submitted for resolution. 4
On the other hand, there is no support for the petitioner's subsequent
manifestation that his counsel, Atty. Brion, was not notified of the inquest
held on August 13, 1993, and that he was not furnished with the affidavits
sworn to on that date by Vivencio Malabanan and Aurelio Centeno, or
with their supplemental affidavits dated August 15, 1993. Moreover, the
above-quoted excerpt shows that the petitioner's counsel at the hearing
held on August 13, 1993, was not Atty. Brion but Atty. Panelo.
The petitioner was present at that hearing and he never disowned Atty.
Panelo as his counsel. During the entire proceedings, he remained quiet
and let this counsel speak and argue on his behalf. It was only in his tardy
Reply that he has suddenly bestirred himself and would now question his
representation by this lawyer as unauthorized and inofficious.
Section 3, Paragraph (d), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, provides that if
the respondent cannot be subpoenaed or, if subpoenaed, does not submit
counter-affidavits, the investigating officer shall base his resolution on
the evidence presented by the complainant.
Just as the accused may renounce the right to be present at the
preliminary investigation 5, so may he waive the right to present counteraffidavits or any other evidence in his defense.
At any rate, it is settled that the absence of a preliminary investigation
does not impair the validity of the information or otherwise render the
same defective and neither does it affect the jurisdiction of the court over
the case or constitute a ground for quashing the information. 6
If no preliminary investigation has been held, or if it is flawed, the trial
court may, on motion of the accused, order an investigation or
reinvestigation and hold the proceedings in the criminal case in
abeyance. 7 In the case at bar, however, the respondent judge saw no
reason or need for such a step. Finding no arbitrariness in her factual
conclusions, we shall defer to her judgment.
Jurisdiction of the Ombudsman

Q. So, you are waiving your submission of counter-affidavit?

A. Yes, your honor, unless there are other witnesses who will come up
soon. 3
Nonetheless, the head of the Panel of Prosecutors, respondent Jovencito
Zuo, told Atty. Brion that he could still file a counter-affidavit up to
August 27, 1993. No such counter-affidavit was filed.
During the hearing on August 1'3, 1993, respondent Zuo furnished the
petitioner's counsel, this time Atty. Salvador Panelo, with copies of the
sworn statements of Centeno and Malabanan, and told him he could
submit counter-affidavits on or before August 27, 1993. The following
exchange ensued:

Invoking the case of Deloso v. Domingo, 8 the petitioner submits that the
proceedings conducted by the Department of Justice are null and void
because it had no jurisdiction over the case. His claim is that it is the
Office of the Ombudsman that is vested with the power to conduct the
investigation of all cases involving public officers like him, as the
municipal mayor of Calauan, Laguna.
The Ombudsman is indeed empowered under Section 15, paragraph (1)
of R.A. 6770 to investigate and prosecute, any illegal act or omission of
any public official. However, as we held only two years ago in the case
ofAguinaldo v. Domagas, 9 this authority "is not an exclusive authority but

rather a shared or concurrent authority in. respect of the offense

charged."
Petitioners finally assert that the information and amended information
filed in this case needed the approval of the Ombudsman. It is not
disputed that the information and amended information here did not
have the approval of the Ombudsman. However, we do not believe that
such approval was necessary at all. In Deloso v. Domingo, 191 SCRA. 545
(1990), the Court held that the Ombudsman has authority to investigate
charges of illegal or omissions on the part of any public official, i.e., any
crime imputed to a public official. It must, however, be pointed out that
the authority of the Ombudsman to investigate "any [illegal] act or
omission of any public official" (191 SCRA at 550)
isnot an exclusive authority but rather a shared or concurrent authority in
respect of the offense here charged, i.e., the crime of sedition. Thus, the
non-involvement of the office of the Ombudsman in the present case does
not have any adverse legal consequence upon the authority the panel of
prosecutors to file and prosecute the information or amended
information.
In fact, other investigatory agencies, of the government such as the
Department of Justice, in connection with the charge of sedition, 10 and
the Presidential Commission on Good Government, in ill-gotten wealth
cases, 11 may conduct the investigation,
The Arrest
Was petitioner Sanchez arrested on August 13, 1993?
"Arrest" is defined under Section 1, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court as the
taking of a person into custody in order that he may be bound to answer
for the commission of an offense. Under Section 2 of the same Rule, an
arrest is effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by
his voluntary submission to the custody of the person making the arrest.
Application of actual force, manual touching of the body, physical
restraint or a formal declaration of arrest is not, required. It is enough
that there be an intent on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other
and an intent onthe part of the other to submit, under the belief and
impression that submission is necessary. 12
The petitioner was taken to Camp Vicente Lim, Canlubang, Laguna, by
virtue of a letter-invitation issued by PNP Commander Rex Piad
requesting him to appear at the said camp for investigation.
In Babst v. National Intelligence Board 13 this Court declared:
Be that as it may, it is not idle to note that ordinarily, an invitation to
attend a hearing and answer some questions, which the person invited
may heed or refuse at his pleasure, is not illegal or constitutionally
objectionable. Under certain circumstances, however, such an invitation
can easily assume a different appearance. Thus, where the invitation
comes from a powerful group composed predominantly of ranking military
officers issued at a time when the country has just emerged from martial
rule and when the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus has not entirely been lifted, and the designated interrogation site is
a military camp, the same can be easily taken, not as a strictly voluntary
invitation which it purports to be, but as an authoritative command which
one can only defy at his peril. . . . (Emphasis supplied)
In the case at bar, the invitation came from a high-ranking military official
and the investigation of Sanchez was to be made at a military camp.
Although in the guise of a request, it was obviously a command or an
order of arrest that the petitioner could hardly he expected to defy. In fact,
apparently cowed by the "invitation," he went without protest (and in
informal clothes and slippers only) with the officers who had come to
fetch him.

It may not be amiss to observe that under R.A. No. 7438, the requisites of
a "custodial investigation" are applicable even to a person not formally
arrested but merely "invited" for questioning.
It should likewise be noted that at Camp Vicente Lim, the petitioner was
placed on "arrest status" after he was pointed to by Centeno and
Malabanan as the person who first raped Mary Eileen Sarmenta.
Respondent Zuo himself acknowledged during the August 13, 1993
hearing that, on the basis of the sworn statements of the two state
witnesses, petitioner had been "arrested."
We agree with the petitioner that his arrest did not come under Section 5,
Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, providing as follows:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escapes from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another.
It is not denied that the arresting officers were not present when the
petitioner allegedly participated in the killing of Allan Gomez and the
rape-slay of Mary Eileen Sarmenta. Neither did they have any personal
knowledge that the petitioner was responsible therefor because the basis
of the arrest was the sworn statements of Centeno and Malabanan.
Moreover, as the rape and killing of Sarmenta allegedly took place on June
28-June 29, 1993, or forty-six days before the date of the arrest, it cannot
be said that the offense had "in fact just been committed" when the
petitioner was arrested.
The original warrantless arrest of the petitioner was doubtless illegal.
Nevertheless, the Regional Trial Court lawfully acquired jurisdiction over
the person of the petitioner by virtue of the warrant of arrest it issued on
August 26, 1993 against him and the other accused in connection with the
rape-slay cases. It was belated, to be sure, but it was nonetheless legal.
Even on the assumption that no warrant was issued at all, we find that the
trial court still lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the person of the
petitioner. The rule is that if the accused objects to the jurisdiction of the
court over his person, he may move to quash the information, but only on
that ground. If, as in this case, the accused raises other grounds in the
motion to quash, he is deemed to have waived that objection and to have
submitted his person to the jurisdiction of that court. 14
The Court notes that on August 13, 1993, after the petitioner was
unlawfully arrested, Judge Lanzanas issued a warrant of arrest against
Antonio L. Sanchez in connection with Criminal Cases Nos. 93-124634 to
93-124637 for violation of R.A No. 6713. 15 Pending the issuance of the
warrant of arrest for the rape-slay cases, this first warrant served as the
initial justification for his detention.
The Court also adverts to its uniform ruling that the filing of charges, and
the issuance of the corresponding warrant of arrest, against a person
invalidly detained will cure the defect of that detention or at least deny
him the right to be released because of such defect. * Applicable by
analogy to the case at bar is Rule 102 Section 4 of the Rules of Court that:

Sec, 4. When writ is not allowed or discharge authorized. If it appears

that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of
an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a
judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had
jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order,
the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ
is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any
informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall,
anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person
charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines or of a person
suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.
In one case, 16 the petitioner, sued on habeas corpus on the ground that
she had been arrested by virtue of a John Doe warrant. In their return, the
respondents declared that a new warrant specifically naming her had
been issued, thus validating her detention. While frowning at the tactics
of the respondents, the Court said:
The, case has, indeed, become moot and academic inasmuch as the new
warrant of arrest complies with the requirements of the Constitution and
the Rules of Court regarding the particular description of the person to be
arrested. While the first warrant was unquestionably void, being a
general warrant, release of the petitioner for that reason will be a futile
act as it will be followed by her immediate re-arrest pursuant to the new
and valid warrant, returning her to the same prison she will just have left.
This Court will not participate in such a meaningless charade.
The same doctrine has been consistently followed by the Court, 17 more
recently in the Umil case. 18
The Informations
The petitioner submits that the seven informations charging seven
separate homicides are absurd because the two victims in these cases
could not have died seven times.
This argument was correctly refuted by the Solicitor General in this wise:
Thus, where there are two or more offenders who commit rape, the
homicide committed on the occasion or by reason of each rape, must be
deemed as a constituent of the special complex crime of rape with
homicide. Therefore, there will be as many crimes of rape with homicide
as there are rapes committed.
In effect, the presence of homicide qualifies the crime of rape, thereby
raising its penalty to the highest degree. Thus, homicide committed on
the occasion or by reason of rape, loses its character as an independent
offense, but assumes a new character, and functions like a qualifying
circumstance. However,by fiction of law, it merged with rape to constitute
an constituent element of a special complex crime of rape with homicide
with a specific penalty which is in the highest degree, i.e. death (reduced
to reclusion perpetua with the suspension of the application of the death
penalty by the Constitution).

allegation of the prosecution is that the girl was raped seven times, with
each of the seven accused taking turns in abusing her with the assistance
of the other six. Afterwards, their lust satisfied, all seven of them decided
to kill and thus silence Sarmenta.
Every one of the seven accused is being charged separately for actually
raping Sarmenta and later killing her instead of merely assisting the
petitioner in raping and then slaying her. The separate informations filed
against each of them allege that each of the seven successive rapes is
complexed by the subsequent slaying of Sarmenta and aggravated by the
killing of Allan Gomez by her seven attackers. The separate rapes were
committed in succession by the seven accused, culminating in the slaying
of Sarmenta.
It is of course absurd to suggest that Mary Eileen Sarmenta and Allan
Gomez were killed seven times, but the informations do not make such a
suggestion. It is the petitioner who does so and is thus hoist by his own
petard.
The Alleged Discrimination
The charge of discrimination against the petitioner because of the noninclusion of Teofilo Alqueza and Edgardo Lavadia in the informations
must also be dismissed.
While the prosecuting officer is required by law to charge all those who in
his opinion, appear to be guilty, he nevertheless cannot be compelled to
include in the information a person against whom he believes no
sufficient evidence of guilt exists. 19 The appreciation of the evidence
involves the use of discretion on the part of the prosecutor, and we do not
find in the case at bar a clear showing by the petitioner of a grave abuse
of such discretion. 20
The decision of the prosecutor may be reversed or modified by the
Secretary of Justice or in special cases by the President of the
Philippines. 21 But even this Court cannot order the prosecution of a
person against whom the prosecutor does not find sufficient evidence to
support at least a prima facie case. The courts try and absolve or convict
the accused but as a rule have no part in the initial decision to prosecute
him.
The possible exception is where there is an unmistakable showing of a
grave abuse of discretion that will justify judicial intrusion into the
precincts of the executive. But in such a case the proper remedy to call for
such exception is a petition for mandamus, not certiorari or
prohibition. 22 Moreover, before resorting to this relief, the party seeking
the inclusion of another person as a co-accused in the same case must
first avail itself of other adequate remedies such as the filing of a motion
for such inclusion. 23
At any rate, it is a preposterous contention that because no charges have
been filed against Alqueza and Lavadia, the charges against the petitioner
and his co-accused should also be dropped.

It is clearly provided in Rule 110 of the Rules of Court that:

Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan

Sec. 13. Duplicity of offense. A complaint or information must charge but

one offense, except only in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a
simple punishment for various offenses.

The petitioner argued earlier that since most of the accused were
incumbent public officials or employees at the time of the alleged
commission of the crimes, the cases against them should come under the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and not of the regular courts. This
contention was withdrawn in his Reply but we shall discuss it just the
same for the guidance of all those concerned.

Rape with homicide comes within the exception under R.A. 2632 and R.A.
4111, amending the Revised Penal Code.
The petitioner and his six co-accused are not charged with only one rape
committed by him in conspiracy with the other six. Each one of the seven
accused is charged with having himself raped Sarmenta instead of simply
helping Sanchez in committing only one rape. In other words, the

Section 4, paragraph (a) of P.D. No, 1606, as amended by P.D. No.1861,

provides:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise:

a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

(1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code:

irregular, of their official functions. Indeed they had no personal motive

to commit the crime and they would not have committed it had they not
held their aforesaid offices. The co-defendants of respondent Leroy S.
Brown, obeyed his instructions because he was their superior officer, as
Mayor of Basilan City. (Emphasis supplied).

(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and

employees in relation to their office, including those employed in
government-owned or controlled corporations, whether simple or
complexed with other crimes, where the penalty prescribed by law is
higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years, or a
fine of P6,000.00. . . . (Emphasis supplied)

We have read the informations in the case at bar and find no allegation
therein that the crime of rape with homicide imputed to the petitioner
was connected with the discharge of his functions as municipal mayor or
that there is an "intimate connection" between the offense and his office.
It follows that the said crime, being an ordinary offense, is triable by the
regular courts and not the Sandiganbayan.

The crime of rape with homicide with which the petitioner stands
charged obviously does not fall under paragraph (1), which deals with
graft and corruption cases. Neither is it covered by paragraph (2) because
it is not an offense committed in relation to the office of the petitioner.

Conclusion

In Montilla v, Hilario, 24 this Court described the "offense committed in

relation to the office" as follows:
[T]he relation between the crime and the office contemplated by the
Constitution is, in our opinion, direct and not accidental. To fall into the
intent of the Constitution, the relation has to be such that, in the legal
sense, the offense cannot exist without the office. In other words, the
office must be a constituent element of the crime as defined in the statute,
such as, for instance, the crimes defined and punished in Chapter Two to
Six, Title Seven, of the Revised Penal Code.
Public office is not of the essence of murder. The taking of human life is
either murder or homicide whether done by a private citizen or public
servant, and the penalty is the same except when the perpetrator. being a
public functionary took advantage of his office, as alleged in this case, in
which event the penalty is increased.
But the use or abuse of office does not adhere to the crime as an element;
and even as an aggravating circumstance, its materiality arises not from
the allegations but on the proof, not from the fact that the criminals are
public officials but from the manner of the commission of the crime
There is no direct relation between the commission of the crime of rape
with homicide and the petitioner's office as municipal mayor because
public office is not an essential element of the crime charged. The offense
can stand independently of the office. Moreover, it is not even alleged in
the information that the commission of the crime charged was intimately
connected with the performance of the petitioner's official functions to
make it fall under the exception laid down in People v. Montejo. 25

As above demonstrated, all of the grounds invoked by the petitioner are

not supported by the facts and the applicable law and jurisprudence.
They must, therefore, all be rejected. In consequence, the respondent
judge, who has started the trial of the criminal cases against the
petitioner and his co-accused, may proceed therewith without further
hindrance.
It remains to stress that the decision we make today is not a decision on
the merits of the criminal cases being tried below. These will have to be
decided by the respondent judge in accordance with the evidence that is
still being received. At this time, there is yet no basis for judgment, only
uninformed conjecture. The Court will caution against such irrelevant
public speculations as they can be based only on imperfect knowledge if
not officious ignorance.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The respondent judge is
DIRECTED to continue with the trial of Criminal Cases Nos. 101141,
101142, 101143, 101144, 101145, 101146 and 101147 and to decide
them with deliberate dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 128096 January 20, 1999

PANFILO M. LACSON, petitioner,

In that case, a city mayor and several detectives were charged with
murder for the death of a suspect as a result of a "third degree"
investigation held at a police substation. The appearance of a senator as
their counsel was questioned by the prosecution on the ground that he
was inhibited by the Constitution from representing them because they
were accused of an offense committed in relation to their office. The
Court agreed. It held that even if their position was not an essential
ingredient of the offense, there was nevertheless an intimate connection
between the office and the offense, as alleged in the information, that
brought it within the definition of an offense "committed in relation to the
public office."

vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SANDIGANBAYAN, OFFICE OF THE
SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MYRNA
ABALORA, NENITA ALAP-AP, IMELDA PANCHO MONTERO, and THE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
ROMEO M. ACOP AND FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR., petitioner-intervenors.

As Chief Justice Concepcion said:

MARTINEZ, J.:

It is apparent from these allegations that, although public office is not an

element of the crime of murder in abstract, as committed by the main
respondents herein, according to the amended information, the offense
therein charged is intimately connected with their respective offices and
was perpetrated while they were in the performance, though improper or

The constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of Republic Act No. 8249 an

act which further defines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is
being challenged in this petition for prohibition and mandamus.
Petitioner Panfilo Lacson, joined by petitioners-intervenors Romeo Acop
and Francisco Zubia, Jr., also seeks to prevent the Sandiganbayan from

proceedings with the trial of Criminal Cases Nos. 23047-23057 (for

multiple murder) against them on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
The antecedents of this case, as gathered from the parties' pleadings and
documentary proofs, are as follows:
In the early morning of May 18, 1995, eleven (11) persons believed to be
members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang, reportedly an organized crime
syndicate which had been involved in a spate of bank robberies in Metro
Manila, where slain along Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City by
elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG)
headed by Chieff Superintendent Jewel Canson of the Philippine National
Police (PNP). The ABRITG was composed of police officers from the
Traffic Management Command (TMC) led by petitioner-intervenor Senior
Superintendent Francisco Zubia, Jr.; Presidential Anti-Crime Commission
Task Force Habagat (PACC-TFH) headed by petitioner Chief
Superintendent Panfilo M. Lacson; Central Police District Command
(CPDC) led by Chief Superintendent Ricardo de Leon; and the Criminal
Investigation Command (CIC) headed by petitioner-intervenor Chief
Superintendent Romeo Acop.
Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of the
CIC, that what actually transpired at dawn of May 18, 1995 was a
summary execution (or a rub out) and not a shoot-out between the
Kuratong Baleleng gang members and the ABRITG, Ombudsman Aniano
Desierto formed a panel of investigators headed by the Deputy
Ombudsman for Military Affairs, Bienvenido Blancaflor, to investigate the
incident. This panel later absolved from any criminal liability all the PNP
officers and personal allegedly involved in May 18, 1995 incident, with a
finding that the said incident was a legitimate police operation. 1
However, a review board led by Overall Deputy Ombudsman Francisco
Villa modified modified the Blancaflor panel's finding and recommended
the indictment for multiple murder against twenty-six (26) respondents,
including herein petitioner and intervenors. The recommendation was
approved by the Ombudsman except for the withdrawal of the charges
against Chief Supt. Ricardo de Leon.
Thus, on November 2, 1995, petitioner Panfilo Lacson was among those
charged as principal in eleven (11) information for murder 2 before the
Sandiganbayan's Second Division, while intervenors Romeo Acop and
Francisco Zubia, Jr. were among those charged in the same informations
as accessories after-in-the-fact.
Upon motion by all the accused in the 11 information, 3 the
Sandiganbayan allowed them to file a motion for reconsideration of the
Ombudsman's action. 4
After conducting a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed on March 1,
1996 eleven (11) amended informations 5before the Sandiganbayan,
wherein petitioner was charged only as an accessory, together with
Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr. and other. One of the accused 6 was
dropped from the case.
On March 5-6, 1996, all the accused filed separate motions questioning
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the amended
informations, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Court pursuant to Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of Republic Act No.
7975. 7 They contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan to cases where one or more of the "principal accused" are
government officials with Salary Grade (SG) 27 or higher, or PNP officials
with the rank of Chief Superintendent (Brigadier General) or higher. The
highest ranking principal accused in the amended informations has the
rank of only a Chief Inspector, and none has the equivalent of at least SG
27.

Thereafter, in a Resolution 8 dated May 8, 1996 (promulgated on May 9,

1996), penned by Justice Demetriou, with Justices Lagman and de Leon
concurring, and Justices Balajadia and Garchitorena dissenting, 9 the
Sandiganbayan admitted the amended information and ordered the cases
transferred to the Quezon City Regional Trial Court which has original
and exclusive jurisdiction under R.A. 7975, as none of the principal
accused has the rank of Chief Superintendent or higher.
On May 17, 1996, the Office of the Special Prosecutor moved for a
reconsideration, insisting that the cases should remain with the
Sandiganbayan. This was opposed by petitioner and some of the accused.
While these motions for reconsideration were pending resolution, and
even before the issue of jurisdiction cropped up with the filing of the
amended informations on March 1, 1996, House Bill No. 2299 10 and No.
1094 11(sponsored by Representatives Edcel C. Lagman and Lagman and
Neptali M. Gonzales II, respectively), as well as Senate Bill No.
844 12 (sponsored by Senator Neptali Gonzales), were introduced in
Congress, defining expanding the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Specifically, the said bills sought, among others, to amend the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan by deleting the word "principal" from the phrase
"principal accused" in Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of R.A. No. 7975.
These bills were consolidated and later approved into law as R.A. No.
8249 13 by the President of the Philippines on February 5, 1997.
Subsequently, on March 5, 1997, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a
Resolution 14 denying the motion for reconsideration of the Special
Prosecutor, ruling that it "stands pat in its resolution dated May 8, 1996."
On the same day 15 the Sandiganbayan issued and ADDENDUM to its
March 5, 1997 Resolution, the pertinent portion of which reads:
After Justice Lagman wrote the Resolution and Justice Demetriou
concurred in it, but before Justice de Leon. Jr. rendered his concurring
and dissenting opinion, the legislature enacted Republic Act 8249 and the
President of the Philippines approved it on February 5, 1997. Considering
the pertinent provisions of the new law, Justices Lagman and Demetriou
are now in favor of granting, as they are now granting, the Special
Prosecutor's motion for reconsideration. Justice de Leon has already done
so in his concurring and dissenting opinion.
xxx xxx xxx
Considering that three of the accused in each of these cases are PNP Chief
Superintendents: namely, Jewel T. Canson, Romeo M. Acop and Panfilo M.
Lacson, and that trial has not yet begun in all these cases in fact, no
order of arrest has been issued this court has competence to take
cognizance of these cases.
To recapitulate, the net result of all the foregoing is that by the vote of 3
of 2, the court admitted the Amended Informations in these cases by the
unanimous vote of 4 with 1 neither concurring not dissenting, retained
jurisdiction to try and decide the cases 16 (Empahasis supplied)
Petitioner now questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A. No.
8249, including Section 7 thereof which provides that the said law "shall
apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial has not begun as
to the approval hereof." Petitioner argues that:
a) The questioned provisions of the statute were introduced by the
authors thereof in bad faith as it was made to precisely suit the situation
in which petitioner's cases were in at the Sandiganbayan by restoring
jurisdiction thereof to it, thereby violating his right to procedural due
process and the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Further, from
the way the Sandiganbayan has foot-dragged for nine (9) months the
resolution of a pending incident involving the transfer of the cases to the

Regional Trial Court, the passage of the law may have been timed to
overtake such resolution to render the issue therein moot, and frustrate
the exercise of petitioner's vested rights under the old Sandiganbayan law
(RA 7975)
b) Retroactive application of the law is plan from the fact that it was again
made to suit the peculiar circumstances in which petitioner's cases were
under, namely, that the trial had not yet commenced, as provided in
Section 7, to make certain that those cases will no longer be remanded to
the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, as the Sandiganbayan alone should
try them, thus making it an ex post facto legislation and a denial of the
right of petitioner as an accused in Criminal Case Nos. 23047-23057 to
procedural due process.
c) The title of the law is misleading in that it contains the aforesaid
"innocuous" provisions in Sections 4 and 7 which actually expands rather
than defines the old Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975), thereby violating the
one-title one-subject requirement for the passage of statutes under
Section 26 (1), Article VI of the Constitution. 17
For their part, the intervenors, in their petition-in-intervention, add that
"while Republic Act No. 8249 innocuously appears to have merely
expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the introduction of
Section 4 and 7 in said statute impressed upon it the character of a class
legislation and an ex-post facto statute intended to apply specifically to
the accused in the Kuratong Baleleng case pending before the
Sandiganbayan. 18 They further argued that if their case is tried before the
Sandiganbayan their right to procedural due process would be violated as
they could no longer avail of the two-tiered appeal to the Sandiganbayan,
which they acquired under R.A. 7975, before recourse to the Supreme
Court.
Both the Office of the Ombudsman and the Solicitor-General filed
separate pleadings in support of the constitutionality of the challenged
provisions of the law in question and praying that both the petition and
the petition-in-intervention be dismissed.

The said special court is retained in the new (1987) Constitution under
the following provisions in Article XI, Section 4:
Sec. 4. The present anti-graft court known as the Sandiganbayan shall
continue to function and exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may
be provided by law.
Pursuant to the constitutional mandate, Presidential Decree No.
1486 21 created the Sandiganbayan. Thereafter, the following laws on the
Sandiganbayan, in chronological order, were enacted: P.D. No.
1606, 22 Section 20 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 123, 23 P.D. No. 1860, 24 P.D. No.
1861, 25 R.A. No. 7975, 26 and R.A. No. 8249. 27 Under the latest
amendments introduced by Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, the Sandiganbayan
has jurisdiction over the following cases:
Sec 4. Section 4 of the same decree [P.D. No. 1606, as amended] is hereby
further amended to read as follows:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction in all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and
Chapter II, Section 2, Titile VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code,
where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following
positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim
capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional
director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade "27" and higher, of the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No.
6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other
provincial department heads;

This Court then issued a Resolution 19 requiring the parties to file

simultaneously within a nonextendible period of ten (10) days from
notice thereof additional memoranda on the question of whether the
subject amended informations filed a Criminal Case Nos. 23047-23057
sufficiently allege the commission by the accused therein of the crime
charged within the meaning Section 4 b of Republic Act No. 8249, so as to
bring the said cases within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.

(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod,

city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;

The parties, except for the Solicitor General who is representing the
People of the Philippines, filed the required supplemental memorandum
within the nonextendible reglementary period.

(e) Officers of the Philippines National Police while occupying the

position of provincial director and those holding the rank of senior
superintendent or higher.

The established rule is that every law has in its favor the presumption of
constitutionality, and to justify its nullification there must be a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative
one. 20 The burden of proving the invalidity of the law lies with those who
challenge it. That burden, we regret to say, was not convincingly
discharged in the present case.
The creation of the Sandiganbayn was mandated in Section 5, Article XIII
of the 1973 Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 5. The Batasang Pambansa shall create a special court, to be known
as Sandiganbayan, which shall have jurisdiction over criminal and civil
cases involving graft and corrupt practices and such other offenses
committed by public officers and employees including those in
government-owned or controlled corporations, in relation to their office
as may be determined by law.

(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and
higher;
(d) Philippine Army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers
of higher rank;

(f) City of provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and
prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees or managers of government-owned
or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions
or foundations;
(2) Members of Congress or officials thereof classified as-Grade "27" and
up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution;
(4) Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions, without
prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" or higher
under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.

b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other

crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in
Subsection a of this section in relation to their office.
c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and connection with Executive
Orders Nos. 1,2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions
corresponding to salary Grade "27" or higher, as prescribed in the said
Republic Act 6758, or military and PNP officers mentioned above,
exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper
regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and
municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their
jurisdictions as privided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over
final judgments, resolutions or orders of regional trial courts whether in
the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate
jurisdiction as herein provided.
The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over
petitions of the issuance of the writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari,
habeas corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary writs and processes in aid
of its appellate jurisdiction and over petitions of similar nature,
including quo warranto, arising or that may arise in cases filed or which
may be filed under Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in
1986: Provided, That the jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be
exclusive of the Supreme Court.
The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the
implementing rules that the Supreme Court has promulgated and may
hereafter promulgate, relative to appeals/petitions for review to the
Court of Appeals, shall apply to appeals and petitions for review filed with
the Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan and from
the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman,
through its special prosecutor, shall represent the People of the
Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14,
and 4-A, issued in 1986.
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or
accessories with the public officers or employee, including those
employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be
tried jointly with said public officers and employees in the proper courts
which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them.
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied)
Sec. 7 of R.A. No. 8249 states:
Sec. 7. Transitory provision This act shall apply to all cases pending in
any court over which trial has not begun as of the approval hereof.
(Emphasis supplied)
The Sandiganbayan law prior to R.A. 8249 was R.A. 7975. Section 2 of R.A.
7975 provides:
Sec. 2. Section 4 of the same decree [Presidential Decree No. 1606, as
amended) is hereby further amended to read as follows:
Sec 4. Jurisdiction The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction in all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code,
where one or more of the pricipal accused are afficials occupying the

following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or

interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional
director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade "27" and higher, of the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No.
6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineer, and other
provincial department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod,
city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and
higher;
(d) Philippine Army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers
of higher rank;
(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and
prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned
or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions
or foundations;
(2) Members of Congress or officials thereof classified as Grade "27" and
up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution;
(4) Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions, without
prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" or higher
under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials and
employees mentioned in Subsection a of this section in relation to their
office.
c. Civil and criminal cases files pursuant to and in connection with
Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 4-A.
In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying positions
corresponding to salary Grade "27" or higher, as presribed in the said
Republic Act 6758, or PNP officers occupying the rank of superintendent
or higher, or their equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be
vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court,
municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be,
pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129.
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction on
appelas from the final judgment, resolutions or orders of regular court
where all the accused are occupying positions lower than grade "27," or
not otherwise covered by the preceding enumeration.
xxx xxx xxx
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or
accessories with the public officers or employees, including those
employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be

tried jointly with said public officers and employees in the proper courts
which shall have exclusive jurisdiction over them.
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied)

It is an established precept in constitutional law that the guaranty of the

equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on
reasonable classification. The classification is reasonable and not
arbitrary when there is concurrence of four elements, namely:

Sec. 7 of R.A. No. 7975 reads:

(1) it must rest on substantial distinction;

Sec. 7. Upon the effectivity of this Act, all criminal cases in which trial has
not begun in the Sandiganbayan shall be referred to the proper courts.

(2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law;

(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only, and

Under paragraphs a and c, Section 4 of R.A. 8249, the word "principal"

before the word "accused" appearing in the above-quoted Section 2
(paragraphs a and c) of R.A. 7975, was deleted. It is due to this deletion of
the word "principal" that the parties herein are at loggerheads over the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner and intervenors, relying on
R.A. 7975, argue that the Regional Trial Court, not the Sandiganbayan, has
jurisdiction over the subject criminal cases since none of the principal
accused under the amended information has the rank of
Superintendent 28 or higher. On the other hand, the Office of the
Ombudsman, through the Special Prosecutor who is tasked to represent
the People before the Supreme Court except in certain cases, 29 contends
that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction pursuant to R.A. 8249.
A perusal of the aforequoted Section 4 of R.A. 8249 reveals that to fall
under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the
following requisites must concur: (1) the offense committed is a violation
of (a) R.A. 3019, as amended (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), (b)
R.A. 1379 (the law on ill-gotten wealth), (c) Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII,
Book II of the Revised Penal Code (the law on bribery), 30 (d) Executive
Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 14-A, issued in 1986 (sequestration cases), 31 or
(e) other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other
crimes; (2) the offender comitting the offenses in items (a), (b), (c) and (e)
is a public official or employee 32 holding any of the positions enumerated
in paragraph a of Section 4; and (3) the offense committed is in relation to
the office.
Considering that herein petitioner and intervenors are being charged
with murder which is a felony punishable under Title VIII of the Revised
Penal Code, the governing on the jurisdictional offense is not paragraph a
but paragraph b, Section 4 of R.A. 8249. This paragraph b pertains to
"other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other
crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in
subsection a of (Section 4, R.A. 8249) in relation to their office. "The
phrase" other offenses or felonies" is too broad as to include the crime of
murder, provided it was committed in relation to the accused's officials
functions. Thus, under said paragraph b, what determines the
Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction is the official position or rank of the
offender that is, whether he is one of those public officers or
employees enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4. The offenses
mentioned in pargraphs a, b and c of the same Section 4 do not make any
reference to the criminal participation of the accused public officer as to
whether he is charged as a principal, accomplice or accessory. In enacting
R.A. 8249, the Congress simply restored the original provisions of P.D.
1606 which does not mention the criminal participation of the public
officer as a requisite to determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner and entervenors' posture that Section 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249
violate their right to equal protection of the law 33 because its enactment
was particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases in the
Sandiganbayan, is a contention too shallow to deserve merit. No concrete
evidence and convincing argument were presented to warrant a
declaration of an act of the entire Congress and signed into law by the
highest officer of the co-equal executive department as unconstitutional.
Every classification made by law is presumed reasonable. Thus, the party
who challenges the law must present proof of arbitrariness. 34

(4) must apply equaly to all members of the same class, 35

all of which are present in this case.
The challengers of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 failed to rebut the
presumption of constitutionality and reasonables of the questioned
provisions. The classification between those pending cases involving the
concerned public officials whose trial has not yet commence and whose
cases could have been affected by the amendments of the Sandiganbayan
jurisdiction under R.A. 8249, as against those cases where trial had
already started as of the approval of the law, rests on substantial
distinction that makes real differences. 36 In the first instance, evidence
against them were not yet presented, whereas in the latter the parties
had already submitted their respective proofs, examined witnesses and
presented documents. Since it is within the power of Congress to define
the jurisdiction of courts subject to the constitutional limitations, 37 it can
be reasonably anticipated that an alteration of that jurisdiction would
necessarily affect pending cases, which is why it has to privide for a
remedy in the form of a transitory provision. Thus, petitioner and
intervenors cannot now claim that Sections 4 and 7 placed them under a
different category from those similarly situated as them. Precisely,
paragraph a of Section 4 provides that it shall apply to "all case involving"
certain public officials and, under the transitory provision in Section 7, to
"all cases pending in any court." Contrary to petitioner and intervenors'
argument, the law is not particularly directed only to the Kuratong
Baleleng cases. The transitory provision does not only cover cases which
are in the Sandiganbayan but also in "any court." It just happened that
Kuratong Baleleng cases are one of those affected by the law. Moreover,
those cases where trial had already begun are not affected by the
transitory provision under Section 7 of the new law (R.A. 8249).
In their futile attempt to have said sections nullified, heavy reliance is
premised on what is perceived as bad faith on the part of a Senator and
two Justices of the Sandiganbaya 38 for their participation in the passage
of the said provisions. In particular, it is stressed that the Senator had
expressed strong sentiments against those officials involved in the
Kuratong Baleleng cases during the hearings conducted on the matter by
the committee headed by the Senator. Petitioner further contends that
the legislature is biased against him as he claims to have been selected
from among the 67 million other Filipinos as the object of the deletion of
the word "principal" in paragraph a, Section 4 of P.D. 1606, as amended,
and of the transitory provision of R.A. 8249. 39 R.A 8249, while still a bill,
was acted, deliberated, considered by 23 other Senators and by about 250
Representatives, and was separately approved by the Senate and House
of Representatives and, finally, by the President of the Philippines.
On the perceived bias that the Sandiganbayan Justices allegedly had
against petitioner during the committe hearings, the same would not
constitute sufficient justification to nullify an otherwise valid law. Their
presence and participation in the legislative hearings was deemed
necessary by Congress since the matter before the committee involves
the graft court of which one is the head of the Sandiganbayan and the
other a member thereof. The Congress, in its plenary legislative powers, is
particularly empowered by the Constitution to invite persons to appear
before it whenever it decides to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. 40

Petitioner and entervenors further further argued that the retroactive

application of R.A. 8249 to the Kuratong Baleleng cases constitutes an ex
post facto law 41 for they are deprived of their right to procedural due
process as they can no longer avail of the two-tiered appeal which they
had allegedly acquired under R.A. 7975.
Again, this contention is erroneous. There is nothing ex post facto in R.A.
8249. In Calder v. Bull, 42 an ex post factolaw is one
(a) which makes an act done criminal before the passing of the law and
which was innocent when committed, and punishes such action; or
(b) which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than when it was
committed; or
(c) which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than
the law annexed to the crime when it was committed.
(d) which alters the legal rules of evidence and recieves less or different
testimony that the law required at the time of the commission of the
offense on order to convict the defendant. 43
(e) Every law which, in relation to the offense or its consequences, alters
the situation of a person to his disadvantage. 44
This Court added two more to the list, namely:
(f) that which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only but in
effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right which when done was
lawful;
(g) deprives a person accussed of crime of some lawful protection to
which he has become entitled, such as the protection of a former
conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of a amnesty. 45
Ex post facto law, generally, prohibits retrospectivity of penal laws. 46 R.A.
8249 is not penal law. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is not
penal in character. Penal laws are those acts of the Legislature which
prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their violations; 47 or
those that define crimes, treat of their nature, and provide dor their
punishment.48 R.A 7975, which amended P.D. 1606 as regards the
Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and other procedural
matters, has been declared by the Court as not a penal law, but clearly a
procedural statute, i.e. one which prescribes rules of procedure by which
courts applying laws of all kinds can properly administer justice. 49 Not
being a penal law, the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 cannot be
challenged as unconstitutional.
Petitioner's and entervenors' contention that their right to a two-tiered
appeal which they acquired under R.A. 7975 has been diluted by the
enactment of R.A. 8249, is incorrect. The same contention has already
been rejected by the court several times 50 considering that the right to
appeal is not a natural right but statutory in nature that can be regulated
by law. The mode of procedure provided for in the statutory right of
appeal is not included in the prohibition against ex post facto laws. 51 R.A.
8249 pertains only to matters of procedure, and being merely an
amendatory statute it does not partake the nature of an ex post facto law.
It does not mete out a penalty and, therefore, does not come within the
prohibition. 52 Moreover, the law did not alter the rules of evidence or the
mode of trial. 53 It has been ruled that adjective statutes may be made
applicable to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their
passage. 54
In any case; R.A. 8249 has preserved the accused's right to appeal to the
Supreme Court to review questions of law. 55 On the removal of the
intermediate review of facts, the Supreme Court still has the power of

review to determine if he presumption of innocence has been convincing

overcome. 56
Another point. The challenged law does not violate the one-title-onesubject provision of the Constitution. Much emphasis is placed on the
wording in the title of the law that it "defines" the Sandiganbayan
jurisdiction when what it allegedly does is to "expand" its jurisdiction.
The expantion in the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, if it can be
considered as such, does not have to be expressly stated in the title of the
law because such is the necessary consequence of the amendments. The
requirement that every bill must only have one subject expressed in the
title 57 is satisfied if the title is comprehensive enough, as in this case, to
include subjects related to the general purpose which the statute seeks to
achieve. 58 Such rule is liberally interpreted and should be given a
practical rather than a technical construction. There is here sufficient
compliance with such requirement, since the title of R.A. 8249 expresses
the general subject (involving the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and
the amendment of P.D. 1606, as amended) and all the provisions of the
law are germane to that general subject. 59 The Congress, in employing
the word "define" in the title of the law, acted within its power since
Section 2, Article VIII of the Constitution itself empowers the legislative
body to "define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of various
courts. 60
There being no unconstitutional infirmity in both the subject amendatory
provision of Section 4 and the retroactive procedural application of the
law as provided in Section 7 of R.A. No. 8249, we shall now determine
whether under the allegations in the Informations, it is the
Sandiganbayan or Regional Trial Court which has jurisdictions over the
multiple murder case against herein petitioner and entervenors.
The jurisdiction of a court is defined by the Constitution or statute. The
elements of that definition must appear in the complaint or information
so as to ascertain which court has jurisdiction over a case. Hence the
elementary rule that the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the
allegations in the complaint or informations, 61 and not by the evidence
presented by the parties at the trial. 62
As stated earlier, the multiple murder charge against petitioner and
intervenors falls under Section 4 [paragraph b] of R.A. 8249. Section 4
requires that the offense charged must be committed by the offender in
relation to his office in order for the Sandiganbayan to have jurisdiction
over it. 63 This jurisdictional requirement is in accordance with Section 5,
Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution which mandated that the
Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction over criminal cases committed by
the public officers and employees, including those in goverment-owned
or controlled corporations, "in relation to their office as may be
determined by law." This constitutional mandate was reiterated in the
new (1987) Constitution when it declared in Section 4 thereof that the
Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and exercise its jurisdiction as
now or hereafter may be provided by law.
The remaining question to be resolved then is whether the offense of
multiple murder was committed in relation to the office of the accussed
PNP officers.
In People vs. Montejo, 64 we held that an offense is said to have been
committed in relation to the office if it (the offense) is "intimately
connected" with the office of the offender and perpetrated while he was
in the performance of his official functions.65 This intimate relation
between the offense charged and the discharge of official duties "must be
alleged in the informations." 66
As to how the offense charged be stated in the informations, Section 9,
Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court mandates:

Sec. 9 Couse of accusation The acts or omissions complied of as

constituting the offense must be stated in ordinary and concise
language without repetition not necessarily in the terms of the statute
defining the offense, but in such from as is sufficient to enable a person of
common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged,
and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment. (Emphasis supplied)
As early as 1954 we pronounced that "the factor that characterizes the
charge is the actual recital of the facts." 67The real nature of the criminal
charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the
informations nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to
have been violated, they being conclusions of law, but by the actual recital
of facts in the complaint or information. 68
The noble object or written accusations cannot be overemphasized. This
was explained in U.S. v. Karelsen: 69
The object of this written accusations was First; To furnish the accused
with such a descretion of the charge against him as will enable him to
make his defense and second to avail himself of his conviction or acquittal
for protection against a further prosecution for the same cause and third,
to inform the court of the facts alleged so that it may decide whether they
are sufficient in law to support a conviction if one should be had. In order
that the requirement may be satisfied, facts must be stated, not
conclusions of law. Every crime is made up of certain acts and intent these
must be set forth in the complaint with reasonable
particularly of time, place, names (plaintiff and defendant) and
circumstances. In short, the complaint must contain a specific
allegation of every fact andcircumstance necessary to constitute the crime
charged. (Emphasis supplied)
It is essential, therefore, that the accused be informed of the facts that are
imputed to him as "he is presumed to have no indefendent knowledge of
the facts that constitute the offense." 70
Applying these legal principles and doctrines to the present case, we find
the amended informations for murder against herein petitioner and
intervenors wanting of specific factual averments to show the intimate
relation/connection between the offense charged and the discharge of
official function of the offenders.
In the present case, one of the eleven (11) amended informations 71 for
murder reads:
AMENDED INFORMATIONS
The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer III. Office of the Ombudsman
hereby accuses CHIEF INSP. MICHAEL RAY AQUINO, CHIEF INSP. ERWIN
T. VILLACORTE, SENIOR INSP. JOSELITO T. ESQUIVEL, INSP. RICARDO G.
DANDAN, SPO4 VICENTE P. ARNADO, SPO4 ROBERTO F. LANGCAUON,
SPO2 VIRGILIO V. PARAGAS, SPO2 ROLANDO R. JIMENEZ, SPO1
WILFREDO C. CUARTERO, SPO1 ROBERTO O. AGBALOG, SPO1 OSMUNDO
B. CARINO, CHIEF SUPT. JEWEL F. CANSON, CHIEF SUPT. ROMEO M.
ACOP, CHIEF SUPT. PANFILO M. LACSON, SENIOR SUPT. FRANCISCO G.
ZUBIA JR., SUPT. ALMARIO A. HILARIO, CHIEF INSP. CESAR O. MANCAO
III, CHIEF INSP. GIL L. MENESES, SENIOR INSP. GLENN DUMLAO, SENIOR
INSP. ROLANDO ANDUYAN, INSP. CEASAR TANNAGAN, SPO3 WILLY
NUAS, SPO3 CICERO S. BACOLOD, SPO2 NORBERTO LASAGA, PO2
LEONARDO GLORIA, and PO2 ALEJANDRO G. LIWANAG of the crime of
Murder as defined and penalize under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code committed as follows
That on or about May 18, 1995 in Mariano Marcos Avenue, Quezon City
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of his Honorable Court, the
accused CHIEF INSP. MICHAEL RAY AQUINO, CHIEF INSP. ERWIN T.
VILLACORTE, SENIOR INSP. JOSELITO T. ESQUIVEL, INSP. RICARDO G.
DANDAN, SPO4 VICENTE ARNADO, SPO4 ROBERTO F. LANGCAUON,

SPO2 VIRGILIO V. PARAGAS, SPO2 ROLANDO R. JIMENEZ, SPO1

WILFREDO C. CUARTERO, SPO1 ROBERTO O. AGBALOG, and SPO1
OSMUNDO B. CARINO, all taking advantage of their public and official
positions as officers and members of the Philippine National Police and
committing the acts herein alleged in relation to their public office,
conspiring with intent to kill and using firearms with treachery evident
premeditation and taking advantage of their superior strenghts did then
and there willfully unlawfully and feloniously shoot JOEL AMORA,
thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds which caused his
instantaneous death to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said
victim.
That accused CHIEF SUPT. JEWEL F. CANSON, CHIEF SUPT. ROMOE M.
ACOP, CHIEF SUPT. PANFILO M. LACSON, SENIOR SUPT. FRANCISCO G.
ZUBIAM JR., SUPT. ALMARIO A. HILARIO, CHIEF INSP. CESAR O. MANCAO
II, CHIEF INSP. GIL L. MENESES, SENIOR INSP. GLENN DUMLAO, SENIOR
INSP. ROLANDO ANDUYAN, INSP. CEASAR TANNAGAN, SPO3 WILLY
NUAS, SPO3 CICERO S. BACOLOD, PO2 ALEJANDRO G. LIWANAG
committing the acts in relation to office as officers and members of the
Philippine National Police are charged herein as accessories after-the-fact
for concealing the crime herein above alleged by among others falsely
representing that there where no arrest made during the read conducted
by the accused herein at Superville Subdivision, Paranaque, Metro Manila
on or about the early dawn of May 18, 1995.
CONTRARY LAW.
While the above-quoted information states that the above-named
principal accused committed the crime of murder "in relation to thier
public office, there is, however, no specific allegation of facts that the
shooting of the victim by the said principal accused was intimately
related to the discharge of their official duties as police officers. Likewise,
the amended information does not indicate that the said accused arrested
and investigated the victim and then killed the latter while in their
custody.
Even the allegations concerning the criminal participation of herein
petitioner and intevenors as among the accessories after-the-facts, the
amended information is vague on this. It is alleged therein that the said
accessories concelead "the crime herein-above alleged by, among others,
falsely representing that there were no arrests made during the raid
conducted by the accused herein at Superville Subdivision, Paranaque
Metro Manila, on or about the early dawn of May 18, 1995." The sudden
mention of the "arrests made during the raid conducted by the accused"
surprises the reader. There is no indication in the amended information
that the victim was one of those arrested by the accused during the "raid."
Worse, the raid and arrests were allegedly conducted "at Superville
Subdivision, Paranaque, Metro Manila" but, as alleged in the immediately
preceding paragraph of the amended information, the shooting of the
victim by the principal accused occurred in Mariano Marcos Avenue,
Quezon City." How the raid, arrests and shooting happened in the two
places far away from each other is puzzling. Again, while there is the
allegation in the amended information that the said accessories
committed the offense "in relation to office as officers and members of
the (PNP)," we, however, do not see the intimate connection between the
offense charged and the accused's official functions, which, as earlier
discussed, is an essential element in determining the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.
The stringent requirement that the charge be set forth with such
particularly as will reasonably indicate the exact offense which the
accused is alleged to have committed in relation to his office was, sad to
say, not satisfied. We believe that the mere allegation in the amended
information that the offense was committed by the accused public officer
in relation to his office is not sufficient. That phrase is merely a
conclusion between of law, not a factual avernment that would show the

close intimacy between the offense charged and the discharge of the
accused's official duties.
In People vs. Magallanes, 72 where the jurisdiction between the Regional
Trial Court and the Sandiganbayan was at issue, we ruled:
It is an elementary rule that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations
in the complaint or information and not by the result of evidence after
trial.
In (People vs) Montejo (108 Phil 613 (1960), where the amended
information alleged
Leroy S. Brown City Mayor of Basilan City, as such, has organized groups
of police patrol and civilian commandoes consisting of regular policeman
and . . . special policemen appointed and provided by him with pistols and
higher power guns and then established a camp . . . at Tipo-tipo which is
under his command . . . supervision and control where his co-defendants
were stationed entertained criminal complaints and conducted the
corresponding investigations as well as assumed the authority to arrest
and detain person without due process of law and without bringing them
to the proper court, and that in line with this set-up established by said
Mayor of Basilan City as such, and acting upon his orders his codefendants arrested and maltreated Awalin Tebag who denied in
consequence thereof.
we held that the offense charged was committed in relation to the office
of the accused because it was perpetreated while they were in the
performance, though improper or irregular of their official functions and
would not have been committed had they not held their office, besides,
the accused had no personal motive in committing the crime thus, there
was an intimate connection between the offense and the office of the
accused.
Unlike in Montejo the informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 15562 and
15563 in the court below do not indicate that the accused arrested and
investigated the victims and then killed the latter in the course of the
investigation. The informations merely allege that the accused for the
purpose of extracting or extortin the sum of P353,000.00 abducted,
kidnapped and detained the two victims, and failing in their common
purpose they shot; and killed the said victims. For the purpose of
determining jurisdiction, it is these allegations that shall control, and not
the evidence presented by the prosecution at the trial.
In the aforecited case of People vs. Montejo, it is noteworthy that the
phrase committed in relation to public office "does not appear in the
information, which only signifies that the said phrase is not what
determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. What is controlling is
the specific factual allegations in the information that would indicate the
close intimacy between the discharge of the accused's official duties and
the commission of the offense charged, in order to qualify the crime as
having been committed in relation to public office.
Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations that the
charge of murder was intimately connected with the discharge of official
functions of the accused PNP officers, the offense charged in the subject
criminal cases is plain murder and, therefore, within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, 73 not the Sandiganbayan.
WHEREFORE, the constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 is
hereby sustained. The Addendum to the March 5, 1997 Resolution of the
Sandiganbayan is REVERSED. The Sandiganbayan is hereby directed to
transfer Criminal Cases Nos. 23047 to 23057 (for multiple murder) to the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which has exclusive original
jurisdiction over the said cases.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-62075 April 15, 1987
NATIVIDAD CORPUS, AURORA FONBUENA, JOSIE PERALTA,
CRESENCIA PADUA, DOMINADOR BAUTISTA, LEOLA NEOG, EPIFANIO
CASTILLEJOS AND EDGAR CASTILLEJOS, petitioners,
vs.
TANODBAYAN OF THE PHILIPPINES, FISCAL JUAN L. VILLANUEVA, JR.,
AND ESTEBAN MANGASER,respondents.
Simplicio M. Sevilleja for respondent E. Mangaser.
RES OL UT I ON

CORTES, J.:
Petitioners Natividad Corpuz, Aurora Fonbuena, Josie Peralta, Cresencia
Padua, Dominador Bautista and Leola Neog were members of the Citizens
Election Committee of Caba, La Union in the January 30, 1980 elections;
petitioner Epifanio Castillejos was Director of the Bureau of Domestic
Trade and petitioner Edgar Castillejos was then a candidate and later
elected mayor in the same election. Private respondent Esteban Mangaser,
an independent candidate for vice. mayor of the same municipality sent a
letter to President Ferdinand E. Marcos charging the petitioners with
violation of the 1978 Election Code, specifically for electioneering and/or
campaigning inside the voting centers during the election. On instruction
from the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) the Regional Election
Director of San Fernando, La Union, conducted a formal investigation and
on September 29, 1981 submitted its report recommending to the
COMELEC the dismissal of the complaint. On October 29, 1981, private
respondent Mangaser formally withdrew his charges filed with the
COMELEC stating his intention to refile it with the Tanodbayan. On
November 26, 1981 the COMELEC dismissed the complaint for
insufficiency of evidence.
Subsequently the assistant provincial fiscal started a preliminary
investigation of a complaint filed by Mangaser with the Tanodbayan
against the same parties and on the same charges previously dismissed
by the COMELEC. The COMELEC Legal Assistance Office entered its
appearance for the respondents (except Director Epifanio Castillejos and
Edgar Castillejos) and moved for dismissal of the complaint. The motion
was denied. The TANODBAYAN asserting exclusive authority to prosecute
the case, stated in a letter to the COMELEC Chairman that a lawyer of the
COMELEC if not properly deputized as a Tanodbayan prosecutor has no
authority to conduct preliminary investigations and prosecute offenses
committed by COMELEC officials in relation to their office. (Rollo, p. 102)
A motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, the present petition for
certiorari and preliminary injunction. This Court after considering the
pleadings filed and deliberating on the issues raised considered the
comment of the Solicitor General an Answer to the petition and
considered the case submitted for decision.
In the landmark case of the De Jesus v. People (No. L-61998, February 28,
1983, 120 SCRA 760) this Court dealt with the following question of first
impression relative to the rival claim of jurisdiction over election offenses
committed by public officials:
Which of these entities have the power to investigate, prosecute and try
election offenses committed by a public officer in relation to his office

the Commission on Elections and the Court of First Instance (now the
regional trial court) or the Tanodbayan and the Sandiganbayan?

Section 4 (paragraph 3) of Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended,

provides in part that 1

This Court rejected the assertion that no tribunal other than the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over offenses committed by public
officers and employees in relation to their office, thus:

In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or

accessories with public officers or employees, including those employed
in government-owned or controlled corporations,they should be tried
jointly with said public officers or employees.

The grant to the COMELEC of the power, among others, to enforce and
administer all laws relative to the conduct of election and the
concomittant authority to investigate and prosecute election offenses is
not without compelling reason. The evident constitutional intendment in
bestowing this power to the COMELEC is to insure the free, orderly and
honest conduct of elections, failure of which would result in the
frustration of the true will of the people and make a mere Idle ceremony
of the sacred right and duty of every qualified citizen to vote. To divest
the COMELEC of the authority to investigate and prosecute offenses
committed by public officials in relation to their office would thus
seriously impair its effectiveness in achieving this clear constitutional
mandate.
From a careful scrutiny of the constitutional provisions relied upon by the
Sandiganbayan, We perceived neither explicit nor implicit grant to it and
its prosecuting arm, the Tanodbayan, of the authority to investigate,
prosecute and hear election offenses committed by public officers in
relation to their office as contradistinguished from the clear and
categorical bestowal of said authority and jurisdiction upon the COMELEC
and the courts of first instance under Sections 182 and 184, respectively,
of the Election Code of 1978.
An examination of the provisions of the Constitution and the Election
Code of 1978 reveals the clear intention to place in the COMELEC
exclusive jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute election offenses
committed by any person, whether private individual or public officer or
employee, and in the latter instance, irrespective of whether the offense is
committed in relation to his official duties or not. In other words, it is the
nature of the offense and not the personality of the offender that matters.
As long as the offense is an election offense jurisdiction over the same
rests exclusively with the COMELEC, in view of its all-embracing power
over the conduct of elections.
WHEREFORE, inasmuch as the charge of electioneering filed against the
petitioners had already been dismissed by the COMELEC for insufficiency
of evidence, the petition is hereby granted and the complaint filed by
private respondent being investigated anew by the Tanodbayan charging
the petitioners with the same election offense, DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 71163-65 November 9, 1990
CARLITO P. BONDOC, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN AND THE HONORABLE
TANODBAYAN, respondents.
Lorenzo G. Timbol for petitioner.

NARVASA, J.:

Whether or not compliance with this requirement is mandatory in every

instance, and is indeed so essential as to cause the Sandiganbayan to lose
jurisdiction over a specific criminal case in the event of its non-fulfillment,
is the main issue presented by the special civil action of certiorari at bar.
The issue is raised in the context of the undisputed facts hereunder
narrated.
Two (2) employees of the Central Bank Manuel Valentino and Jesus
Estacio and nine (9) private individuals, were charged with several
felonies of estafa thru falsification of public documents in three (3)
separate informations filed by the Tanodbayan with the Sandiganbayan
on April 15, 1982. The actions were docketed as Criminal Cases
Numbered 5949 to 5951. They were assigned to the Second Division of
the Sandiganbayan.
Before the prosecution rested its case, the Tanodbayan filed with the
Sandiganbayan on August 23, 1984, another set of three (3) indictments,
this time against Carlito P. Bondoc (Assistant Manager of the Greenhills
Branch of CITIBANK) and Rogelio Vicente, also a private individual,
charging them with the same crimes involved in Cases No. 5949 to 5951
as principals by indispensable cooperation. The actions against Bondoc
and Vicente were docketed as Criminal Cases Numbered 9349 to 9351.
They were assigned to the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan.
Bondoc moved to quash the informations on January 3, 1985 on the basic
theory that as a private individual charged as co-principal with
government employees, he should be tried jointly with the latter
pursuant to Section 4 (paragraph 3) of PD 1606, as amended, supra;
hence, the separate proceedings commenced against him were invalid, for
lack of jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over the offenses and his person.
The Third Division denied Bondoc's motion to quash, by Resolution dated
February 22, 1985. 2 It ruled that (a) the joint trial of private individuals
and public employees charged as co-principals, dealt with in the cited
provision of law, is not a jurisdictional requirement; (b) Bondoc's theory
would practically make the Court's "jurisdiction over a private individual
charged as co-principal, accomplice or accessory with a public officer or
employee dependent upon such private individual" (as by evading service
of legal processes until "joint trial is no longer feasible"); and (c) it is the
intention of the law, manifested in the same Section 4, "to avert split
jurisdiction (and) thus avoid multiplicity of suits."
Bondoc moved for reconsideration on March 4, 1985. His motion was
denied by Resolution dated March 28, 1985. However, in order to obviate
his objection to a separate trial, which was the principal basis of his
motion to quash, the Third Division, in the same resolution, referred
Bondoc's cases (No. 9349 to 9351) to the Second Division for
consolidation with Cases Numbered 5949 to 5951. 3
But by that time, the trial of Criminal Cases No. 5949 to 5951 had been
terminated. The Second Division thus resolved, on June 4, 1985, 4 to deny
the proposed consolidation of the actions and to return Criminal Cases No.
9349 to 9351 to the Third Division. In its Resolution, the Second Division
also made the following observation, to wit:
In Our resolution dated April 9,1985, We accepted the transfer of these
cases and directed the accused and counsel to ascertain the advisability of
having them consolidated and jointly tried with Criminal Cases Nos. 5949
to 5951 which have been previously ordered reopened. However, at the

hearing held on April 1, 1985, counsel for accused Rogelio G. Vicente

manifested that there is no possibility of the instant cases being
consolidated with Criminal Cases Nos. 5949 to 5951 or the adoption of
prosecution's evidence adduced in said cases, as well as the fact that said
accused has a pending motion for reinvestigation with the Tanodbayan ...
On receiving the criminal cases back from the Second Division, the Third
Division set the cases for arraignment and trial on August 1 and 2, 1985.
On June 26, 1985, Bondoc filed with this Court the petition
for certiorari and prohibition at bar.
He argues that the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion in
seeking to try him separately from the Central Bank employees:
1. In accordance with the clear phraseology of paragraph 3, Section 4, PD
1606, it is required that heshall be tried jointly with the government
employees involved in the same offenses, namely: Manuel Valentino and
Jesus Estacio; the language is mandatory, the requirement jurisdictional.

The Solicitor General, for his part

1) brands as absurd the petitioner's argument that the Sandiganbayan
may acquire jurisdiction only by a joint trial, this being contrary to the
rule that in criminal cases jurisdiction of the person is acquired by his
arrest (or voluntary submission to the Court), and over the offense, by the
filing of the indictment; and
2) asserts that Section 4 (3), PD 1606 merely prescribes the procedure
when a private individual is charged with a public officer or employee;
once jurisdiction is acquired, it is not lost by procedural error (Ramos, et
al., v. CB, 41 SCRA 565; Dioquino v. Cruz, et al., 116 SCRA 451).
Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606 vests the Sandigan-bayan with
exclusive original jurisdiction over specific crimes and, as the
Sandiganbayan has pointed out, supra, provides against split jurisdiction
as regards the civil liability arising from the crime. It declares that the
Sandiganbayan shall have
Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

2. Being mandatory and jurisdictional, the provision should be given a

strict construction, citing American authorities, 5 to the effect that if
mandatory provisions prescribed by law are not followed, the
proceedings to winch they relate are illegal and void.

(1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as

the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code;

3. Since the Sandiganbayan is a special court, with jurisdiction over

special cases which are removed from the jurisdiction of regular courts;
and since the governing law allows only one appeal from its judgments of
conviction and therefore the defendant's chances of eventual acquittal is
thereby lessened, the law creating said Sandiganbayan should be subject
to strict interpretation because in derogation of general jurisdiction and
of rights of individuals. 6

(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees

in relation to their office, including those employed in government-owned
or controlled corporations, whether simple or complexed with other
crimes, where the penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision
correccionalor imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00.

4. In sum, before the Sandiganbayan may lawfully try a private individual

under PD 1606, the following requisites must be satisfied:

Any provision of law or the Rules of Court to the contrary

notwithstanding, the criminal action and the corresponding civil action
for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall at
all times be simultaneously instituted with, and jointly determined in the
same proceeding by the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts (also
vested with jurisdiction over crimes committed by public officers and
employees), the filing of the criminal action being deemed to necessarily
carry with it the filing of the civil action, and no right to reserve the filing
of such civil action separately from the criminal action shall be
recognized; Provided, However, That where the civil action had
heretofore been filed separately but judgment therein has not yet been
rendered, and the criminal case is hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan
or the appropriate court, said civil action shall be transferred to the
Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, as the case may be, for
consolidation and joint determination with the criminal action, otherwise
the separate civil action shall be considered abandoned.

a) he must be charged with a public officer/employee, and

b) he must be tried jointly.
Otherwise, ordinary courts should have jurisdiction. Any other
interpretation would render the provision in question 'useless,
meaningless and nugatory.
5. The Third Division itself recognized the need for a joint trial when it
referred his cases to the Second Division for consolidation.
6. Since a joint trial was then already impossible, said mandatory and
jurisdictional provision can no longer be complied with; therefore, the
Sandiganbayan cannot exercise jurisdiction over the offense and the
person of the petitioner.
7. Under these circumstances, the petitioner has a right to be tried by civil
courts where his chances of acquittal are greater considering that therein,
there are at least two levels of appeal.
8. The prosecution should have amended the informations in Criminal
Cases No. 5949 to 5951 to include Bondoc as additional accused (this
being only an amendment in form); then it could ask for suspension of the
proceedings, so the evidence can be re-introduced as against Bondoc.
9. Finally, the only public employee charged in Criminal Cases 5949-5951
is janitor-messenger, Estacio. The other Central Bank employee,
Valentino, had already been discharged as a state witness. He (Bondoc)
was being made to stand trial in the Sandiganbayan simply because an
"errand boy" in the Central Bank has also been accused of some
complicity in the crime.

It also declares that

Now, the crime with which Bondoc is charged as co-principal by

indispensable cooperation with the Central Bank employees above
mentioned (Valentino and Estacio)in each of the three (3) indictments
against him is the complex felony of estafa thru falsification of public
documents under Article 171 7 in relation to Articles 315 8 and 489 of the
Revised Penal Code.
The crimes are "offenses or felonies committed by public officers and
employees in relation to their office," in confabulation and conspiracy
with him (Bondoc) and other private persons. The penalty prescribed by
law for each of the three offenses is higher than the penalty set out in
Section 4 of PD 1606 above cited, i.e., prision correccional or six years, or a
fine of P6,000.00. 10 Each offense is therefore within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
It is indisputable that the Sandiganbayan acquired jurisdiction of the
offenses charged in the informations against Bondoc and his co-accused,

based on the nature of the crimes as described in the indictments and the
penalty prescribed therefor by law. Also incontrovertible is that the
Sandiganbayan acquired jurisdiction of the persons of the accused
through their arrest by virtue of a warrant, or voluntary submission to
the Court's authority.
It is true that the law requires that Bondoc and Vicente, as private
individuals charged as co-principals with public officers or employees,
"be tried jointly with said public officers or employees." Given the
peculiar circumstances of their cases, i.e., they (Bondoc and Vicente) were
not investigated and indicted until long after the criminal proceedings
against their co-principals had commenced, and the latter's cases had
already been submitted for decision when Bondoc's and Vicente's own
cases came up for trial-the question that now raises is whether or not the
declaration of the Sandiganbayan that it was no longer possible or legally
feasible to try them jointly with the government employees accused of
the same offenses, had the effect of causing the Sandiganbayan to lose
jurisdiction over Bondoc's cases, and whether or not, as a consequence,
those cases became cognizable by the regular courts and should be
transferred thereto for trial and adjudgment.
It must at once be evident that the seeming impossibility of a joint trial
cannot and does not alter the essential nature of the crimes in question,
as felonies perpetrated by public officers or employees in confabulation
with private persons. It should be as obvious, too, that assuming it is
correct to construe the law in a strictly literal sense, the indicated course
of action would be to insist on holding a joint trial regardless of whatever
circumstances may appear to make such a joint trial inappropriate,
inconvenient, unfeasible. Thus, for instance, the cases in the Second
Division, although already submitted for decision, should be reopened to
allow for the consolidation of Bondoc's cases with those of the defendants
therein, and the reception of evidence against and for Bondoc. Indeed,
even in the extreme hypothesis of appeal having already been taken by
Bondoc's co-accused, the course of action dictated by a literal
construction of the provision on joint trial is the remand of the appealed
case to the Sandiganbayan so that the joint trial may be conducted.
To construe the law in the manner indicated, however, would be
unreasonable, if not absurd (what of the case, for instance, where the
accused public officers or employees have already been convicted and
have appealed, or are already serving sentence, or have been acquitted),
and settled is the rule that courts should not give a statute a meaning that
would lead to absurdities; 11 general terms of a statute should be so
limited in their application as precisely to avoid absurdities, and it will
always be presumed that the legislature intended exceptions to its
language which would avoid consequences of this character. 12 The
provision in question should thus be read as requiring that private
individuals accused in the Sandiganbayan, together with public officers or
employees, must be tried jointly with the latter unless the attendant
circumstances have made impossible or impracticable such a joint trial,
as in the cases at bar, in which event the trial of said private persons may
proceed separately from the public officers or employees whose own
trials have been concluded.
Besides, there is nothing so sacrosanct or important about a joint trial as
to justify a radical deviation from ordinary, orderly court processes in
order to have it, or as to affect the very jurisdiction of the Court required
to conduct it. The evidence of the State or of the accused does not become
weaker or stronger whether presented at a joint or separate trial; the
rights of the accused are not enhanced or diluted by the character of a
trial as joint or separate; the procedure prescribed in either situation is
essentially the same. Indeed, it is a gauge of the importance of a joint trial,
in the eyes of trial attorneys and of the law itself, that there are as many
lawyers moving for a separate trial as there are, for a joint trial, and that
courts are granted the discretion, in cases where two or more accused are
jointly charged with an offense, to order separate trials instead of a joint
trial, on motion of the fiscal or any accused. 13

Furhermore, it is not legally possible to transfer Bondoc's cases to the

Regional Trial Court, for the simple reason that the latter would not have
jurisdiction over the offenses. As already above intimated, the inability of
the Sandiganbayan to hold a joint trial of Bondoc's cases and those of the
government employees separately charged for the same crimes, has not
altered the nature of the offenses charged, as estafa thru falsification
punishable by penalties higher than prision correccional or imprisonment
of six years, or a fine of P6,000.00, committed by government employees
in conspiracy with private persons, including Bondoc. These crimes are
within the exclusive, original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. They
simply cannot be taken cognizance of by the regular courts, apart from
the fact that even if the cases could be so transferred, a joint trial would
nonetheless not be possible.
As to Bondoc's only other argument, that his cases should be transferred
to the regular courts because he would there have two levels of appeal
(i.e., the Court of Appeals, and then the Supreme Court), unlike in the
Sandiganbayan where his appellate recourse is only one, to the Supreme
Court, it suffices to point out, as the Sandiganbayan has, that the matter
has long since been laid to rest, in Nunez v. Sandiganbayan. 14
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit, with costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 116033 February 26, 1997

ALFREDO L. AZARCON, petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and JOSE C.
BATAUSA, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:
Does the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction over a private individual who
is charged with malversation of public funds as a principal after the said
individual had been designated by the Bureau of Internal Revenue as a
custodian of distrained property? Did such accused become a public
officer and therefore subject to the graft court's jurisdiction as a
consequence of such designation by the BIR?
These are the main questions in the instant petition for review of
Respondent Sandiganbayan's Decision 1 in Criminal Case No. 14260
promulgated on March 8, 1994, convicting petitioner of malversation of
public funds and property, and Resolution 2 dated June 20, 1994, denying
his motion for new trial or reconsideration thereof.
The Facts
Petitioner Alfredo Azarcon owned and operated an earth-moving
business, hauling "dirt and ore." 3 His services were contracted by the
Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines (PICOP) at its concession
in Mangagoy, Surigao del Sur. Occasionally, he engaged the services of
sub-contractors like Jaime Ancla whose trucks were left at the former's
premises. 4 From this set of circumstances arose the present controversy.

. . . It appears that on May 25, 1983, a Warrant of Distraint of Personal

Property was issued by the Main Office of the Bureau of Internal Revenue
(BIR) addressed to the Regional Director (Jose Batausa) or his authorized
representative of Revenue Region 10, Butuan City commanding the latter
to distraint the goods, chattels or effects and other personal property of
Jaime Ancla, a sub-contractor of accused Azarcon and, a delinquent
taxpayer. The Warrant of Garnishment was issued to accused Alfredo
Azarcon ordering him to transfer, surrender, transmit and/or remit to
BIR the property in his possession owned by taxpayer Ancla. The Warrant
of Garnishment was received by accused Azarcon on June 17, 1985. 5

and committed to surrender and transfer to this office. Your failure

therefore, to observe said provisions does not relieve you of your
responsibility. 9
Thereafter, the Sandiganbayan found that

(I), the undersigned, hereby acknowledge to have received from Amadeo

V. San Diego, an Internal Revenue Officer, Bureau of Internal Revenue of
the Philippines, the following described goods, articles, and things:

On 11 June 1986, Mrs. Marilyn T. Calo, Revenue Document Processor of

Revenue Region 10 B, Butuan City, sent a progress report to the Chief of
the Collection Branch of the surreptitious taking of the dump truck and
that Ancla was renting out the truck to a certain contractor by the name
of Oscar Cueva at PICOP (Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines,
the same company which engaged petitioner's earth moving services),
Mangagoy, Surigao del Sur. She also suggested that if the report were true,
a warrant of garnishment be reissued against Mr. Cueva for whatever
amount of rental is due from Ancla until such time as the latter's tax
liabilities shall be deemed satisfied. . . However, instead of doing so,
Director Batausa filed a letter-complaint against the (herein Petitioner)
and Ancla on 22 January 1988, or after more than one year had elapsed
from the time of Mrs. Calo's report. 10

Kind of property Isuzu dump truck

Motor number E120-229598
Chassis No. SPZU50-1772440
Number of CXL 6
Color Blue
Owned By Mr. Jaime Ancla

Provincial Fiscal Pretextato Montenegro "forwarded the records of the

complaint . . . to the Office of the Tanodbayan" on May 18, 1988. He was
deputized Tanodbayan prosecutor and granted authority to conduct
preliminary investigation on August 22, 1988, in a letter by Special
Prosecutor Raul Gonzales approved by Ombudsman (Tanodbayan)
Conrado Vasquez. 11

the same having been this day seized and left in (my) possession pending
investigation by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue or his duly
authorized representative. (I) further promise that (I) will faithfully keep,
preserve, and, to the best of (my) ability, protect said goods, articles, and
things seized from defacement, demarcation, leakage, loss, or destruction
in any manner; that (I) will neither alter nor remove, nor permit others to
alter or remove or dispose of the same in any manner without the express
authority of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue; and that (I) will
produce and deliver all of said goods, articles, and things upon the order
of any court of the Philippines, or upon demand of the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue or any authorized officer or agent of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue. 6

Along with his co-accused Jaime Ancla, Petitioner Azarcon was charged
before the Sandiganbayan with the crime of malversation of public funds
or property under Article 217 in relation to Article 222 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC) in the following Information 12 filed on January 12,
1990, by Special Prosecution Officer Victor Pascual:

Petitioner Azarcon, in signing the "Receipt for Goods, Articles, and Things
Seized Under Authority of the National Internal Revenue," assumed the
undertakings specified in the receipt the contents of which are
reproduced as follows:

Subsequently, Alfredo Azarcon wrote a letter dated November 21, 1985

to the BIR's Regional Director for Revenue Region 10 B, Butuan City
stating that
. . . while I have made representations to retain possession of the property
and signed a receipt of the same, it appears now that Mr. Jaime Ancla
intends to cease his operations with us. This is evidenced by the fact that
sometime in August, 1985 he surreptitiously withdrew his equipment
from my custody. . . . In this connection, may I therefore formally inform
you that it is my desire to immediately relinquish whatever
responsibilities I have over the above-mentioned property by virtue of
the receipt I have signed. This cancellation shall take effect
immediately. . . . 7
Incidentally, the petitioner reported the taking of the truck to the security
manager of PICOP, Mr. Delfin Panelo, and requested him to prevent this
truck from being taken out of the PICOP concession. By the time the order
to bar the truck's exit was given, however, it was too late. 8
Regional Director Batausa responded in a letter dated May 27, 1986, to
wit:
An analysis of the documents executed by you reveals that while you are
(sic) in possession of the dump truck owned by JAIME ANCLA, you
voluntarily assumed the liabilities of safekeeping and preserving the unit
in behalf of the Bureau of Internal Revenue. This is clearly indicated in the
provisions of the Warrant of Garnishment which you have signed, obliged

That on or about June 17, 1985, in the Municipality of Bislig, Province of

Surigao del Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, accused Alfredo L. Azarcon, a private individual but who, in his
capacity as depository/administrator of property seized or deposited by
the Bureau of Internal Revenue, having voluntarily offered himself to act
as custodian of one Isuzu Dumptruck (sic) with Motor No. E120-22958,
Chasis No. SPZU 50-1772440, and number CXL-6 and was authorized to
be such under the authority of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, has
become a responsible and accountable officer and said motor vehicle
having been seized from Jaime C. Ancla in satisfaction of his tax liability in
the total sum of EIGHTY THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED THIRTY ONE
PESOS and 59/100 (P80,831.59) became a public property and the value
thereof as public fund, with grave abuse of confidence and conspiring and
confederating with said Jaime C. Ancla, likewise, a private individual, did
then and there wilfully, (sic) unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate,
misapply and convert to his personal use and benefit the aforementioned
motor vehicle or the value thereof in the aforestated amount, by then and
there allowing accused Jaime C. Ancla to remove, retrieve, withdraw and
tow away the said Isuzu Dumptruck (sic) with the authority, consent and
knowledge of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, Butuan City, to the damage
and prejudice of the government in the amount of P80,831.59 in a form of
unsatisfied tax liability.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The petitioner filed a motion for reinvestigation before the
Sandiganbayan on May 14, 1991, alleging that: (1) the petitioner never
appeared in the preliminary investigation; and (2) the petitioner was not
a public officer, hence a doubt exists as to why he was being charged with
malversation under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code. 13The
Sandiganbayan granted the motion for reinvestigation on May 22,
1991. 14 After the reinvestigation, Special Prosecution Officer Roger
Berbano, Sr., recommended the "withdrawal of the information" 15 but
was "overruled by the Ombudsman." 16

A motion to dismiss was filed by petitioner on March 25, 1992 on the

ground that the Sandiganbayan did not have jurisdiction over the person
of the petitioner since he was not a public officer. 17 On May 18, 1992; the
Sandiganbayan denied the motion. 18
When the prosecution finished presenting its evidence, the petitioner
then filed a motion for leave to file demurrer to evidence which was
denied on November 16, 1992, "for being without merit." 19 The
petitioner then commenced and finished presenting his evidence on
February 15, 1993.
The Respondent Court's Decision
On March 8, 1994, Respondent Sandiganbayan 20 rendered a
Decision, 21 the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Alfredo Azarcon y Leva GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt as principal of Malversation of Public Funds
defined and penalized under Article 217 in relation to Article 222 of the
Revised Penal Code and, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and in
view of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, the Court
hereby sentences the accused to suffer the penalty of imprisonment
ranging from TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor in its
maximum period to SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and
ONE (1) DAY of Reclusion Temporal. To indemnify the Bureau of Internal
Revenue the amount of P80,831.59; to pay a fine in the same amount
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; to suffer special
perpetual disqualification; and, to pay the costs.
Considering that accused Jaime Ancla has not yet been brought within the
jurisdiction of this Court up to this date, let this case be archived as
against him without prejudice to its revival in the event of his arrest or
voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of this Court.

III. No proof was presented during trial to prove that the distrained
vehicle was actually owned by the accused Jaime Ancla; consequently, the
government's right to the subject property has not been established.
IV. The procedure provided for in the National Internal Revenue Code
concerning the disposition of distrained property was not followed by the
B.I.R., hence the distraint of personal property belonging to Jaime C. Ancla
and found allegedly to be in the possession of the petitioner is therefore
invalid.
V. The B.I.R. has only itself to blame for not promptly selling the
distrained property of accused Jaime C. Ancla in order to realize the
amount of back taxes owed by Jaime C. Ancla to the Bureau. 24
In fine, the fundamental issue is whether the Sandiganbayan had
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the controversy. Corollary to this is
the question of whether petitioner can be considered a public officer by
reason of his being designated by the Bureau of Internal Revenue as a
depositary of distrained property.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
It is hornbook doctrine that in order "(to) ascertain whether a court has
jurisdiction or not, the provisions of the law should be inquired
into." 25 Furthermore, "the jurisdiction of the court must appear clearly
from the statute law or it will not be held to exist. It cannot be presumed
or implied." 26 And for this purpose in criminal cases, "the jurisdiction of a
court is determined by the law at the time of commencement of the
action." 27

Petitioner, through new counsel, 22 filed a motion for new trial or

reconsideration on March 23, 1994, which was denied by the
Sandiganbayan in its Resolution 23 dated December 2, 1994.

In this case, the action was instituted with the filing of this information on
January 12, 1990; hence, the applicable statutory provisions are those of
P.D. No. 1606, as amended by P.D. No. 1861 on March 23, 1983, but prior
to their amendment by R.A. No. 7975 on May 16, 1995. At that time,
Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606 provided that:

Hence, this petition.

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise:

The Issues

(a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

The petitioner submits the following reasons for the reversal of the
Sandiganbayan's assailed Decision and Resolution:

(1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as

the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code;

SO ORDERED.

I. The Sandiganbayan does not have jurisdiction over crimes committed

solely by private individuals.
II. In any event, even assuming arguendo that the appointment of a
private individual as a custodian or a depositary of distrained property is
sufficient to convert such individual into a public officer, the petitioner
cannot still be considered a public officer because:
[A]
There is no provision in the National Internal Revenue Code which
authorizes the Bureau of Internal Revenue to constitute private
individuals as depositaries of distrained properties.
[B]
His appointment as a depositary was not by virtue of a direct provision of
law, or by election or by appointment by a competent authority.

(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees

in relation to their office, including those employed in government-owned
or controlled corporations, whether simple or complexed with other
crimes, where the penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision
correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00:
PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that offenses or felonies mentioned in this
paragraph where the penalty prescribed by law does not exceed prision
correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years or a fine of P6,000.00 shall
be tried by the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court,
Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court.
xxx xxx xxx
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or
accessories with the public officers or employees, including those
employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be
tried jointly with said public officers and employees.
xxx xxx xxx

The foregoing provisions unequivocally specify the only instances when

the Sandiganbayan will have jurisdiction over a private individual, i.e.
when the complaint charges the private individual either as a co-principal,
accomplice or accessory of a public officer or employee who has been
charged with a crime within its jurisdiction.
Azarcon: A Public Officer or A Private Individual?
The Information does not charge petitioner Azarcon of being a coprincipal, accomplice or accessory to a public officer committing an
offense under the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction. Thus, unless petitioner be
proven a public officer, the Sandiganbayan will have no jurisdiction over
the crime charged. Article 203 of the RPC determines who are public
officers:
Who are public officers. For the purpose of applying the provisions of
this and the preceding titles of the book, any person who, by direct
provision of the law, popular election, popular election or appointmentby
competent authority, shall take part in the performance of public
functions in the Government of the Philippine Islands, or shall perform in
said Government or in any of its branches public duties as an employee,
agent, or subordinate official, of any rank or classes, shall be deemed to
be a public officer.
Thus,
(to) be a public officer, one must be
(1) Taking part in the performance of public functions in the government,
or
Performing in said Government or any of its branches public duties as
an employee, agent, or subordinate official, of any rank or class; and
(2) That his authority to take part in the performance of public functions
or to perform public duties must be
a. by direct provision of the law, or
b. by popular election, or
c. by appointment by competent authority. 28
Granting arguendo that the petitioner, in signing the receipt for the truck
constructively distrained by the BIR, commenced to take part in an
activity constituting public functions, he obviously may not be deemed
authorized by popular election. The next logical query is whether
petitioner's designation by the BIR as a custodian of distrained property
qualifies as appointment by direct provision of law, or by competent
authority. 29 We answer in the negative.
The Solicitor General contends that the BIR, in effecting constructive
distraint over the truck allegedly owned by Jaime Ancla, and in requiring
Petitioner Alfredo Azarcon who was in possession thereof to sign a pro
forma receipt for it, effectively "designated" petitioner a depositary and,
hence, citing U.S. vs. Rastrollo, 30 a public officer. 31 This is based on the
theory that
(t)he power to designate a private person who has actual possession of a
distrained property as a depository of distrained property is necessarily
implied in the BIR's power to place the property of a delinquent tax payer
(sic) in distraint as provided for under Sections 206, 207 and 208
(formerly Sections 303, 304 and 305) of the National Internal Revenue
Code, (NIRC) . . . . 32
We disagree. The case of U.S. vs. Rastrollo is not applicable to the case
before us simply because the facts therein are not identical, similar or

analogous to those obtaining here. While the cited case involved

a judicialdeposit of the proceeds of the sale of attached property in the
hands of the debtor, the case at bench dealt with the BIR's administrative
act of effecting constructive distraint over alleged property of taxpayer
Ancla in relation to his back taxes, property which was received by
Petitioner Azarcon. In the cited case, it was clearly within the scope of
that court's jurisdiction and judicial power to constitute the judicial
deposit and give "the depositary a character equivalent to that of a public
official." 33 However, in the instant case, while the BIR had authority to
require Petitioner Azarcon to sign a receipt for the distrained truck, the
NIRC did not grant it power to appoint Azarcon a public officer.
It is axiomatic in our constitutional framework, which mandates a limited
government, that its branches and administrative agencies exercise only
that power delegated to them as "defined either in the Constitution or in
legislation or in both." 34 Thus, although the "appointing power is the
exclusive prerogative of the President, . . ." 35 the quantum of powers
possessed by an administrative agency forming part of the executive
branch will still be limited to that "conferred expressly or by necessary or
fair implication" in its enabling act. Hence, "(a)n administrative officer, it
has been held, has only such powers as are expressly granted to him and
those necessarily implied in the exercise thereof." 36Corollarily, implied
powers "are those which are necessarily included in, and are therefore of
lesser degree than the power granted. It cannot extend to other matters
not embraced therein, nor are not incidental thereto." 37 For to so extend
the statutory grant of power "would be an encroachment on powers
expressly lodged in Congress by our Constitution." 38 It is true that Sec.
206 of the NIRC, as pointed out by the prosecution, authorizes the BIR to
effect a constructive distraint by requiring "any person" to preserve a
distrained property, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
The constructive distraint of personal property shall be effected by
requiring the taxpayer or any person having possession or control of such
property to sign a receipt covering the property distrained and obligate
himself to preserve the same intact and unaltered and not to dispose of
the same in any manner whatever without the express authority of the
Commissioner.
xxx xxx xxx
However, we find no provision in the NIRC constituting such person a
public officer by reason of such requirement. The BIR's power
authorizing a private individual to act as a depositary cannot be stretched
to include the power to appoint him as a public officer. The prosecution
argues that "Article 222 of the Revised Penal Code . . . defines the
individuals covered by the term 'officers' under Article 217 39 . . ." of the
same Code. 40 And accordingly, since Azarcon became "a depository of the
truck seized by the BIR" he also became a public officer who can be
prosecuted under Article 217 . . . ." 41
The Court is not persuaded. Article 222 of the RPC reads:
Officers included in the preceding provisions. The provisions of this
chapter shall apply to private individuals who, in any capacity whatever,
have charge of any insular, provincial or municipal funds, revenues, or
property and to any administrator or depository of funds or property
attached, seized or deposited by public authority, even if such property
belongs to a private individual.
"Legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a
statute. Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the
law is applied according to its express terms, and interpretation would be
resorted to only where a literal interpretation would be either impossible
or absurd or would lead to an injustice." 42 This is particularly observed in
the interpretation of penal statutes which "must be construed with such

strictness as to carefully safeguard the rights of the defendant . . . ." 43 The

language of the foregoing provision is clear. A private individual who has
in his charge any of the public funds or property enumerated therein and
commits any of the acts defined in any of the provisions of Chapter Four,
Title Seven of the RPC, should likewise be penalized with the same
penalty meted to erring public officers. Nowhere in this provision is it
expressed or implied that a private individual falling under said Article
222 is to be deemed a public officer.
After a thorough review of the case at bench, the Court thus finds
Petitioner Alfredo Azarcon and his co-accused Jaime Ancla to be both
private individuals erroneously charged before and convicted by
Respondent Sandiganbayan which had no jurisdiction over them. The
Sandiganbayan's taking cognizance of this case is of no moment since
"(j)urisdiction cannot be conferred by . . . erroneous belief of the court
that it had jurisdiction." 44 As aptly and correctly stated by the petitioner
in his memorandum:
From the foregoing discussion, it is evident that the petitioner did not
cease to be a private individual when he agreed to act as depositary of the
garnished dump truck. Therefore, when the information charged him and
Jaime Ancla before the Sandiganbayan for malversation of public funds or
property, the prosecution was in fact charging two private individuals
without any public officer being similarly charged as a co-conspirator.
Consequently, the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the
controversy and therefore all the proceedings taken below as well as the
Decision rendered by Respondent Sandiganbayan, are null and void for
lack of jurisdiction. 45
WHEREFORE, the questioned Resolution and Decision of the
Sandiganbayan are hereby SET ASIDE and declared NULL and VOID for
lack of jurisdiction. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 144261-62

May 9, 2001

PRUDENTE D. SOLLER, M.D., PRECIOSA M. SOLLER, M.D., RODOLFO I.

SALCEDO, JOSEFINA B. MORADA, MARIO M. MATINING, and ROMMEL
M. LUARCA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
This special civil action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus raises
the issue of the propriety of the assumption of jurisdiction by the
Sandiganbayan1 in Criminal Cases Nos. 25521 and 25522 both entitled
"People of the Philippines vs. Prudente D. Soller, Preciosa M. Soller,
Rodolfo Salcedo, Josefina Morada, Mario Matining and Rommel Luarca"
wherein petitioners are charged with Obstruction of Apprehension and
Prosecution of Criminal Offenders as defined and penalized under P.D. No.
1829. The grounds for petitioners' Motion to Quash the Informations
against them are that only petitioner Prudente D. Soller occupied a
position classified as Grade 27 and higher and because the offenses
charged were not committed by him in violation of his office as Municipal
Mayor of Bansud, Oriental Mindoro.1wphi1.nt
It appears that in the evening of March 14, 1997, Jerry Macabael a
municipal guard, was shot and killed along the national highway at

Bansud, Oriental Mindoro while driving a motorcycle together with

petitioner Soller's son, Vincent M. Soller. His body was brought to a
medical clinic located in the house of petitioner Dr. Prudente Soller, the
Municipal Mayor, and his wife Dr. Preciosa Soller, who is the Municipal
Health Officer. The incident was reported to and investigated by
petitioner SPO4 Mario Matining. An autopsy was conducted on the same
night on the cadaver of Jerry by petitioner Dr. Preciosa Soller with the
assistance of petitioner Rodolfo Salcedo, Sanitary Inspector, and
petitioner Josefina Morada, Rural Health Midwife.
On the basis of the foregoing incident, a complaint was later filed against
the petitioners by the widow of Jerry Macabael with the Office of the
Ombudsman charging them with conspiracy to mislead the investigation
of the fatal shootout of Jerry Macabael by (a) altering his wound (b)
concealing his brain; (c) falsely stating in police report that he had several
gunshot wounds when in truth he had only one; and d) falsely stating in
an autopsy report that there was no blackening around his wound when
in truth there was.
Petitioners spouses Soller denied having tampered with the cadaver of
Jerry Macabael, and claimed, among others that Jerry Macabael was
brought to their private medical clinic because it was there where he was
rushed by his companions after the shooting, that petitioner Prudente
Soller, who is also a doctor, was merely requested by his wife Preciosa
Soller, who was the Municipal Health Officer, to assist in the autopsy
considering that the procedure involved sawing which required male
strength, and that Mrs. Macabael's consent was obtained before the
autopsy. The two (2) police officers denied having planted three (3) shells
at the place where the shooting took place.
The Office of the Ombudsman recommended the filing of an Information
for Obstruction of Justice (Violation of P.D. 1829), and two (2)
Informations 2 were filed with the Sandiganbayan which were docketed as
Criminal Cases Nos. 25521 and 25522. The two (2) informations
respectively read as follows:
"Criminal Case No. 25521
The undersigned Graft Investigation Officer I, Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon, hereby accuses PRUDENTE SOLLER, PRECIOSA
SOLLER, MARIO MATINING, ROMMEL LUARCA, RODOLFO SALCEDO, and
JOSIE MORADA, of committing the offense of Obstruction of
Apprehension and Prosecution of Criminal Offenders as defined and
penalized under Section 1, Paragraph b of P.D. 1829, committed as
follows:
That on or about March 14, 1997, prior or subsequent thereto, at the
Municipality of Bansud, Oriental Mindoro and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above name accused, all public officers, then
being the Municipal Mayor, Municipal Health Officer, SPO II, PO 1,
Sanitary Inspector and Midwife, respectively, all of said municipality,
conspiring and confederating with one another, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully, and criminally alter and suppress the gunshot wound
and conceal the brain of JERRY MACABAEL with intent to impair its
veracity, authenticity, and availability as evidence in the investigation of
criminal case for murder against the accused Vincent Soller, the son of
herein respondents.
CONTRARY TO LAW."
"Criminal Case No. 25522
The undersigned Graft Investigation Officer, I, Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon, hereby accuses PRUDENTE SOLLER, PRECIOSA
SOLLER, MARIO MATINING, ROMMEL LUARCA, RODOLFO SALCEDO, and
JOSIE MORADA, of committing the offense of Obstruction of
Apprehension and Prosecution of Criminal Offenders as defined and

penalized under Section 1, Paragraph b of P.D. 1829, committed as

follows:
That on or about March 14, 1997, prior or subsequent thereto, at the
Municipality of Bansud, Oriental Mindoro and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above name accused, all public officers, then
being the Municipal Mayor, Municipal health Officer, SPO II, PO 1, Sanitary
Inspector and Midwife, respectively, all of said municipality, conspiring
and confederating with one another, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully, and criminal give false and fabricated information in the
autopsy report and police report to mislead or prevent the law
enforcement agency, from apprehending the offender by reporting that
there are several gunshot wounds in the body of the victim, JERRY
MACABAEL and that there is no tattooing (blackening) around the wound
of the said victim when in truth and in fact, there is only one gunshot
wound and there is tattooing (blackening) around the wound which
would indicate that the victim was shot by Vincent Soller, the son of the
herein respondents spouses Prudente and Preciosa Soller.

"RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF

JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT IT HAS JURISDICTION OVER
THE OFFENSE CHARGED IN SUBJECT CRIMINAL CASES NOS. 25521 and
25522."4
Citing Section 4 of P.D. 1606 as amended, which defines the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan, petitioners claim that for an offense to fall within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the offense must have been committed
by the officials enunciated in paragraph (a) "in relation to their office", i.e.
it should be intimately connected with the office of the offender, and
should have been perpetrated while the offender was in the performance
of his official functions. Moreover, these requisites must all be alleged in
the information. Petitioners assert that in the subject criminal cases, the
Informations do not contain factual averments showing that they
committed the acts charged in relation to their office, i.e., the acts charged
are intimately connected with their respective offices and were
perpetrated by them while they were in the performance of their duties
and functions.

CONTRARY TO LAW."
Petitioners filed a Motion to Quash on the principal ground that the
Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the offenses charged; this motion
was opposed by respondent People. In its assailed Order dated April 14,
2000, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioners' Motion to Quash on the
ground that the accusation involves the performance of the duties of at
least one (1) of the accused public officials, and if the Mayor is indeed
properly charged together with that official, then the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction over the entire case and over all the co-accused. The Order
stated that "the accused is the Mayor of the municipality where the
alleged incident took place and, therefore, any attempt to deviate or to
present false evidence in connection with a criminal offense committed in
his municipality for which he is charged would be an offense also in
which the accused Mayor would be probably held accountable before this
Court."
Motion for Reconsideration of the above order was filed on the premise
that it is not among the functions of the mayor to conduct autopsies so
that any misdeed, if indeed there was any, could not be an offense which
would put him under the jurisdiction of the court. Motion for
Reconsideration was denied, the Sandiganbyan ruling that:
"The enumeration of the functions of the mayor indicate very clearly that
he is the primary executive and, therefore, necessarily the primary peace
officer of the municipality, for which reason, any action on his part which
deviates from that function is an office-related offense. In this particular
instance, the accused is charged for having cooperated or co-participated
with another public official of lower rank in the same municipality in the
supposed falsification of the results of an autopsy. Additionally, even if
the functions of an autopsy were totally unrelated to any of the
administrative or executive functions over which the mayor may have
supervision and, more specially, control, the fact of the matter is that the
jurisdiction of the Court covers not only the offenses committed by the
officials of Grade Level 27 or higher as the principal accused but even
where such officials are also accused together with some other public
officials who may be at a level below Grade Level 27 in connection with
the performance of their duties.
In this instance, accused Mayor Prudente D. Soller, Sr. who occupies a
position at Grade Level 27, is co-accused with his wife, the Municipal
Health Officer who occupies a position at Grade Level 24, so that,
necessarily, the offense attributed to the lower ranking officer elevates
the entire case to this Court primarily because somebody over whom this
Court has jurisdiction, the Mayor, is accused together with the lower
ranking officer."3
Hence, this petition alleging that-

On the other hand, respondent People of the Philippines, represented by

the Office of the Ombudsman, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor,
posits that even if the offense charged was not committed by the accused
while in the performance of his official functions, the same could still be
considered done in relation to his office if the acts were committed in line
of duty. Respondent's position is that an offense may be considered
committed in relation to office if it arose from misuse or abuse of public
office or from non-performance of an official duty or function; thus the
offense of falsifying autopsy and police reports is office-related
considering that among the duties and functions of the municipal mayor
in the exercise of general supervision and control over all programs,
projects, services and activities of the municipal government, is that he
shall ensure that all executive officials and employees of the municipality
faithfully discharge their duties and functions. The fact that the
informations do not allege that the acts charged were committed by
petitioner Prudente Soller while he was in the performance of his official
functions or duties is not a fatal defect, as the conclusion of law that his
acts are in violation of his duties as municipal mayor could necessarily be
deduced from the informations.
Petitioners, in their Reply, reiterate that the factual averments in the
Information were fatally defective in view of the absence of any specific
allegation that would indicate that the crimes charged were committed by
the defendants in line of duty or in the performance of their official
functions.
The petition is meritorious.
The rule is that in order to ascertain whether a court has jurisdiction or
not, the provisions of the law should be inquired into.5 Furthermore, the
jurisdiction of the court must appear clearly from the statute law or it will
not be held to exist. It cannot be presumed or implied. For this purpose in
criminal cases, the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the law at
the time of the commencement of the action.6
The action here was instituted with the filing of the Informations on May
25, 1999 charging the petitioners with the offense of Obstruction of
Apprehension and Prosecution of Criminal Offenders as defined and
penalized under Section 1, Paragraph b of P.D. 1829. The applicable
statutory provisions are those of P.D. No. 1606 as last amended by the
Republic Act No. 8249. Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606 as amended provides
insofar as pertinent:
"SEC. 4. Jurisdiction - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction in all cases involving:

a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as

the Anti-Graft and Corruption Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where
one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions
in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at
the time of the commission of the offense:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" and
higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
xxx xxx xxx
b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other
crime committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in
subsection a of this section in relation to their office.
xxx xxx xxx
In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions
corresponding to salary Grade "27" or higher, as prescribed in the said
Republic Act 6758, or military and PNP officers mentioned above,
exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper
regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and
municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their
jurisdictions as provided by Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, amended.
xxx xxx xxx"
In Binay vs. Sandiganbayan,7 this Court held that the Municipal Mayor,
who occupies Salary Grade 27 in the hierarchy of positions in the
government under Republic Act No. 6758 and the Index of Occupational
Services. Position Titles and Salary Grades, falls within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
The bone of contention here is whether the offenses charged may be
considered as committed "in relation to their office" as this phrase is
employed in the above-quoted Section 4.
As early as Montilla vs. Hilario,8 this Court has interpreted the
requirement that an offense be committed in relation to the office to
mean that "the offense cannot exist without the office "or" that the office
must be a constituent element of the crime" as defined and punished in
Chapter Two to Six, Title Seven of the Revised Penal Code (referring to
the crimes committed by the public officers). People vs.
Montejo 9 enunciated the principle that the offense must be intimately
connected with the office of the offender and perpetrated while he was in
the performance, though improper or irregular of his official functions.
The Court, speaking through Chief Justice Concepcion said that although
public office is not an element of the crime of murder in (the) abstract,
the facts in a particular case may show that "xxx the offense therein charged is intimately connected with (the
accused's) respective offices and was perpetrated while they were in the
performance though improper or irregular, of their official functions.
Indeed (the accused) had no personal motive to commit the crime and
they would not have committed it had they not held their aforesaid
offices. The co-defendants of respondent Leroy S. Brown obeyed his
instructions because he was their superior officer, as Mayor of Basilan
City."10
The cited rulings in Montilla vs. Hilario and in People vs. Montejo were
reiterated in Sanchez vs. Demetriou,11Republic vs. Asuncion,12 and Cunanan
vs. Arceo.13 The case of Republic vs. Asuncion categorically pronounced
that the fact that offense was committed in relation to the office must be
alleged in the information:

"That the public officers or employees committed the crime in relation to

their office, must, however, be alleged in the information for the
Sandiganbayan to have jurisdiction over a case under Section 4 (a) (2).
This allegation is necessary because of the unbending rule that
jurisdiction is determined by the allegations of the information."14
For this purpose what is controlling is not whether the phrase
"committed in violation to public office" appears in the information; what
determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is the specific factual
allegation in the information that would indicate close intimacy between
the discharge of the accused's official duties and the commission of the
offense charged in order to qualify the crime as having been committed in
relation to public office.15
In this case, the Informations subject of Criminal Cases Nos. 25521 and
25522 quoted earlier, fail to allege that petitioners had committed the
offenses charged in relation to their offices. Neither are there specific
allegations of facts to show the intimate relation/connection between the
commission of the offense charged and the discharge of official functions
of the offenders, i.e. that the obstruction of and apprehension and
prosecution of criminal offenders was committed in relation to the office
of petitioner Prudente Soller, whose office as Mayor is included in the
enumeration in Section 4 (a) of P.D. 1606 as amended. Although the
petitioners were described as being "all public officers, then being the
Municipal Mayor, Municipal Health Officer, SPO II, PO I, Sanitary
Inspector and Midwife", there was no allegation that the offense of
altering and suppressing the gunshot wound of the victim with intent to
impair the veracity, authenticity and availability as evidence in the
investigation of the criminal case for murder (Criminal Case No. 25521)
or of giving false and fabricated information in the autopsy report and
police report to mislead the law enforcement agency and prevent the
apprehension of the offender (Criminal Case No. 25522) was done in the
performance of official function. Indeed the offenses defined in P.D. 1829
may be committed by any person whether a public officer or a private
citizen, and accordingly public office is not an element of the offense.
Moreover, the Information in Criminal Case No. 25522 states that the
fabrication of information in the police and autopsy report "would
indicate that the victim was shot by Vincent Soller, the son of herein
petitioners spouses Prudente and Preciosa Soller". Thus there is a
categorical indication that the petitioners spouses Soller had a personal
motive to commit the offenses and they would have committed the
offenses charged even if they did not respectively hold the position of
Municipal Mayor or Municipal Health Officer.
A cursory reading of the duties and functions of the Municipal Mayor as
enumerated in Section 444 of the Local Government Code will readily
show that the preparation of police and autopsy reports and the
presentation and gathering of evidence in the investigation of criminal
cases are not among such duties and functions, and the broad
responsibility to maintain peace and order cannot be a basis for
construing that the criminal acts imputed to petitioner Mayor fall under
his functions as Municipal Mayor.16 What is obvious is that petitioners
spouses probably acted as the parents of the alleged assailant and if at all,
were motivated by personal reasons rather than official duty.
Consequently, for failure to show in the informations that the charges
were intimately connected with the discharge of the official functions of
accused Mayor Soller, the offenses charged in the subject criminal cases
fall within the exclusive original function of the Regional Trial Court, not
the Sandiganbayan.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the challenged orders
are SET ASIDE and declared NULL and VOIDfor lack of jurisdiction. No
costs.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.1wphi1.nt

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

information under which he is sought to be held liable having admittedly

been filed in court more than two months after the commission and
discovery of the offense.lawphil.net

EN BANC

Wherefore, the sentence appealed from is reversed and the case

dismissed, with costs de oficio.

G.R. No. L-15140

December 29, 1960

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JUAN DEL ROSARIO, defendant-appellant.
Jose A. Solomon for appellant.
Office of the Assistant Solicitor General F. Villamor and Solicitor F. V. Sian
for appellee.

GUTIERREZ DAVID, J.:

Defendant Juan del Rosario was, in an information filed with the Court of
First Instance of La Union on October 24, 1957, charged with
"maltreatment of a detention prisoner." It is alleged in the information
"that on or about the 28th of March, 1957, in the Municipality of
Naguilian, Province of La Union," said defendant, then a policeman, "took
and confined one Emilio Sy as detention prisoner in the municipal jail
thereat and once inside the jail and for the purpose of extorting a
confession from the latter, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
maltreated said Emilio Sy by giving him several fist blows, kicked him
several times and pulled him by the hair and head and as a result of which
said Emilio Sy sustained injuries on the different parts of his body which
needed medical treatment for a period from three to four days."
After trial, the lower court found the defendant guilty of mauling Emilio
Sy and inflicting upon him the injuries alleged in the information. It did
not, however, convict said defendant of the offense charged there
being no showing that the offended party was a prisoner or detention
prisoner under his charge but only of slight physical injuries under
Article 266, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code and sentenced him to
suffer the penalty of 15 days of arresto menor, plus costs. From this
sentence, defendant appealed directly to this Court.
In his brief, defendant admits liability for slight physical injuries, a light
offense, but contends that the crime has already prescribed, the
information against him having been filed more than 6 months after its
commission, or beyond the 2-month prescriptive period provided for
light offenses.
The Solicitor General, on the other hand, argues that the filing of the
complaint or accusation with the office of the Provincial Fiscal for
preliminary investigation sometime before April 25, 1957 interrupted the
running of the prescriptive period.
Under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, light offenses prescribe in
two months. Article 91 of the same Code provides that "the period of
prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is
discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and
shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information, and
shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without
the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for
any reason not imputable to him." The complaint or information referred
to in the above quoted provisions which interrupts the running of the
prescriptive period, as ruled in the case of People vs. Tayco (73 Phil., 509),
is that which is filed in the proper court and not the denunciaor
accusation lodged by the offended party in the Fiscal's Office.
Conformably to this ruling, the defendant cannot legally be convicted of
the crime of slight physical injuries, which is a light offense, the

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-16456

June 29, 1963

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
DOLORES COQUIA, defendant-appellee.
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellant.
M. B. Palma for defendant-appellee.
REGALA, J.:
From an incident which occurred on July 1, 1957, one David C. Naval filed
with the Municipal Court of the City of Naga a complaint for grave oral
defamation against the herein defendant-appellee, Dolores Coquia.
Thereafter and by virtue of that complaint, the same court ordered her
arrest. On July 22, 1957, however, the same court forwarded the records
of the case to the Court First Instance of Camarines Sur for the
continuance of the proceedings since the accused had renounced her
right to the second stage of preliminary investigation. In turn, on August 2,
1957, the last mentioned court endorsed the case to the Office of the City
Attorney for reinformation. For some explained reasons, the case was left
completely unacted on by the City Fiscal's office until January 26, 1959
when the City Fiscal filed with the Court of First Instance of Camarines
Sur the corresponding, information for grave oral defamation against the
accused, appellee herein.
The defense filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of prescription
which was opposed by the prosecution Ruling on the motion, the court a
quo sustained the movant and dismissed the case. A motion for
reconsideration therefor having been denied, the City Attorney,
represented by the Solicitor General's Office, appealed to this
Court.1wph1.t
The Solicitor General concedes that the delay in the filing of the
information for this case had been unduly long. Quite subtly even, the
concession extends to an admission that prescription had indeed set in. It
was expressed, however, that the instant appeal was nevertheless
interposed so that a ruling may be secured as to the precise period when
a criminal proceeding should be considered as having been "unjustifiably
stopped to mark the resumption of the running of the period of
prescription" pursuant to the provisions of Article 91 of the Revised Penal
Code, hereunder quoted:
ART. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. The period of
prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is
discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and
shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information, and
shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without
the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for
any reason not imputable to him.
The term of prescription shall not run when the offender is absent from
the Philippine Archipelago.

We do not believe that the facts of this case warrant a resolution of the
issue raised. It is sufficient to indicate and conformably to the doctrine
expressed in the case of People v. Juan del Rosario, G. R. No. L-15140,
December 29, 1960, the prescriptive period for the case at bar was never
interrupted. In the said case, We declared that
Under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, light offenses prescribe in
two months. Article 91 of the same Code provides that "the period of
prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime was
discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and
shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information, and
shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without
the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for
any reason not imputable to him." The complaint or information referred
to in the above provisions which interrupts the running of the
prescriptive period, as ruled in the case of People v. Tayco (73 Phil. 509),
is that which is filed in the proper court and not the denuncia or
accusation lodged by the offended party in the Fiscal's Office . . . .
It should be recalled that the proper court in the present litigation was
the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur. The records of this case
clearly show that no formal complaint or information is contemplated by
the aforementioned Article 91 of the Penal Code was ever filed therein
within the reglementary period. As a matter of fact, the said formal
complaint or information was filed only after the lapse of more than one
year. Considering that under the Code, the prescriptive period for grave
oral defamation is six months (Art. 90, Revised Penal Code), the only
conclusion deducible is that the same has prescribed.
Applying the principle laid down in the aforecited case of People v. Del
Rosario, supra, We can not speak of the resumption of the prescriptive
period since it has never been interrupted.
WHEREFORE, the appeal taken by the Government is hereby dismissed
and the order dismissing the information is hereby affirmed in full.
Costs de oficio.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-13027

June 30, 1960

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff.

VISITACION M. MERIS, offended party-appellant,
vs.
ASCENCION P. OLARTE, defendant-appellee.
Acting Solicitor General Guillermo E. Torres and Solicitor Pacifico P. de
Castro for plaintiff.
Espique, Asuncion and Meris and Mariano S. Revilla for appellant.
Chuidian and Corpus, Sison, Acua, de Leon and Caldito for appellee.
CONCEPCION, J.:
Defendant Ascencion P. Olarte is charged with libel. It is alleged in the
information that "on or about the 24th day of February, 1954 and
subsequently thereafter", said defendant had wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously written certain letters which were libelous, contemptuous
and derogatory to Miss Visitacion M. Meris, "with evident and malicious
purpose of insulting, dishonoring, humiliating and bringing into contempt
the good name and reputation" of said complainant.
It appears that on January 7, 1956, Miss Meris lodged the corresponding
charge of libel with the provincial fiscal of Pangasinan, who assigned it to

an assistant provincial fiscal; that upon the latter's advice, on February 22,
1956, she filed with the Justice of the Peace Court of Pozorrubio,
Pangasinan, a complaint for libel against Ascencion P. Olarte; that the
defendant waived her right to a preliminary investigation, whereupon the
justice of the peace court forwarded the case to the Court of First Instance
of Pangasinan, in which the corresponding information was filed on July 3,
1956; that the defendant seasonably moved to quash the information
upon the ground of prescription of the offense; and that, after due he aring,
the court of first instance granted said motion and dismissed the case,
with costs de oficio. Hence, this appeal by complainant Miss Meris, with
the conformity of the special counsel of the office of the provincial fiscal
of Pangasinan, who represented the prosecution in said court.
Subsequently, defendant filed a motion to dismiss the appeal upon the
ground that the brief filed by appellant was prepared, and the steps
leading to its presentation were taken, by the private prosecutors, not by
the Solicitor General, and that, as a consequence, said brief and steps
were allegedly null and void. Upon the filing of the Solicitor General's
opposition to said motion, this Court resolved to act upon the same
"when the case is considered on the merits". Thereafter, the Solicitor
General adopted said brief for the appellant as its own. It appearing from
the foregoing that the office of said provincial fiscal and the Solicitor
General had thus acquiesced in and supported the action taken by the
complainant, the motion to dismiss the appeal is hereby denied.
It is conceded that, as provided in Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code,
"the crime of libel ... shall prescribe in two (2) years", which, pursuant to
Article 91 of the same Code, "shall commence to run from the day on
which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities or
their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or
information ... ." In an affidavit, attached to complaint filed with the justice
of the peace court, Miss Meris stated that one defamatory letter was
received by her on February 27, 1954 and that there were other libelous
letters, seemingly written after the first. According to another affidavit,
likewise, attached to said complaint, the subsequent letters were received
on or about March 1 and 13, April 26 and May 9, 1954. The issue in the
lower court, as well as in this appeal, is whether the statute of limitations
was suspended by the filing of the complaint of the peace court on
February 22, 1956, as claimed by appellant, or continued to run until July
3, 1956, when the information was filed with the court of first instance, as
contended by the defendant. His Honor, the trial judge adopted the latter
alternative, and, accordingly, held that the prescriptive period had
expired before the filing of said information.
In support of this view, it is argued that, construing said Article 91 of the
Revised Penal Code, it was held, inPeople vs. Tayco (73 Phil., 509, 510):
. . . it is clear that the complaint or information referred to in article 91 is
that which is filed in the proper court and not the denuncia or accusation
lodged by the offended party in the City Fiscal's Office. It is needless to
add that such accusation in the city Fiscal's Office cannot end there in the
acquittal or conviction of the accused;
that the "proper court", for the purpose of suspending the running of the
statute of limitations in libel cases, is the court of first instance not the
justice of the peace court, because Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code
originally provided:
Persons responsible.Any person who shall publish, exhibit or cause the
publication or exhibition of any defamation in writing or by similar
means, shall be responsible for the same.
The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the editor or business
manager of a daily newspaper, magazine or serial publication, shall be
responsible for the defamation contained therein to the same extent as if
he were the author thereof.

The criminal action and the civil action for damages in cases of written
defamation, as provided in this chapter, may be filed simultaneously or
separately with the court of first instance of the province wherein the
libel was published, displayed or exhibited, regardless of the place where
the same was written, printed or composed.

criminal cases for libel, despite the silence of said Act No. 277 thereon,
inasmuch as section 56 (6) of Act No. 136 of the Philippine Commission
vested upon said courts original jurisdiction over "all criminal cases in
which a penalty of more than six months' imprisonment or a fine
exceeding one hundred dollars may be imposed."

No criminal action for defamation which consists in the imputation of a

crime which cannot be prosecuted de oficio shall be brought except at the
instance of and upon complaint expressly filed by the offended Party.

Pursuant to Act No. 277, civil actions for libel were, however, within the
original jurisdiction of courts of first instance regardless of the amount
involved, despite the provisions of Act No. 136 (section 56 [3], under
which said courts had no original jurisdiction over civil cases, except
when "the demand exclusive of interest, or the value of the property in
controversy, amounts to one hundred dollars or more". Section 11 of said
Act No. 277 provided:

and that, on June 15, 1955, it was amended by Republic Act No. 1289, to
read:
Persons responsible.The person who shall publish, exhibit or cause the
publication or exhibition of any defamation in writing or by similar
means, shall be responsible for the same.
The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the editor or business
manager of a daily newspaper, magazine or serial publication, shall be
responsible for the defamation contained therein to the same extent as if
he were the author thereof.
The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written defamation
as provided for in this chapter, shall be filed simultaneously or separately
with the court of first instance of the province or city where any of the
accused or any of the offended parties resides at the time of the
commission of the offense: Provided, however, That were the libel is
published, circulated, displayed, or exhibited in a province or city
wherein neither the offender nor the offended party resides the civil and
criminal actions may be brought in the court of first instance
thereof: Provided, further, That the civil action shall be filed in the same
court where the criminal action is filed and vice versa: Provided,
furthermore, That the court where the criminal action or civil action for
damages is first filed, shall acquire jurisdiction to the exclusion of other
courts: And provided, finally, That this amendment shall not apply to cases
of written defamation, the civil and /or criminal actions to which, have
been filed in court at the time of the effectivity of this law.
No criminal action for defamation which consists in the imputation of a
crime which cannot be prosecuted de oficio shall be brought except at the
instance of and upon complaint expressly filed by the offended party.
Defendant and the lower court deduced from this amendment,
particularly from the substitution of the verb "shall" in lieu of the term
"may", appearing in the third paragraph of the original provision, that itis
the filing of the information with the Court of First Instance that
interrupts the running of the prescriptive period, not the presentation of
the complaint in the justice of the peace court, or the receipt in the Court
of First Instance of the record forwarded by said inferior court, because
the proceedings in the justice of the peace court merely seek to ascertain
the existence of probable cause, and the prosecution still has to file an
information with the Court of First Instance, before the latter can proceed
with the determination of the merits of the case. It has, also, been urged,
in support of defendant's pretense, that the Revised Penal Code, as
originally enacted, as well as amended, would have merely provided that
the criminal and civil actions for written defamation may or should be
filed with the "proper court", instead of naming, particularly the "court of
first instance", had the framers of the law not intended to divest justice of
the peace courts of the authority to conduct preliminary investigation in
criminal actions for libel. However, the majority of the members of this
Court find the theory of the defense untenable.
Prior to the approval of said Code, on December 8, 1930, the crime of libel
was governed by Act No. 277 of the Philippine Commission, which
prescribed therefor, in section 2 therefor, "a fine of not exceeding two
thousand dollars or imprisonment for not exceeding one year, or both."
Courts of first instance had originally jurisdiction to hear and decide

In addition to the criminal action hereby prescribed, a right of civil action

is also hereby given to any person libeled as hereinbefore set forth
against the person libeling him for damages sustained by such libel, and
the person so libeled shall be entitled to recover in such civil action not
only the actual pecuniary damages sustained by him but also damages for
injury to his feelings and reputation, and in addition such punitive
damages as the court may think will be a just punishment to the libeler
and an example to others. Suit may be brought in any Court of First
Instance having jurisdiction of the parties. The presumptions, rules of
evidence, and special defenses herein provided for criminal prosecutions
shall be equally applicable in civil actions under this section. (Emphasis
ours.)
Thus criminal actions, as well as civil actions, for libel were originally
cognizable by courts of first instance under said Act No. 277. The
jurisdiction of such courts over both kinds of action was maintained by
the Revised Penal Code. Although the same repealed Act No. 277, sections
2 and 11 of the latter were, in effect, incorporated into the third
paragraph of Article 360 of said Code, as originally enacted, with a
qualification only as to venue, namely: "the criminal action and civil action
for damages in cases of a written defamation ... may be filed
simultaneously or separately with the Court of Firsts Instance of the
province wherein the libel was published, displayed or exhibited, regardless
of the place where the same was written, printed or composed.
Said Article 360 specified the court which both actions could be filed,
instead of referring merely to the "proper court", because the latter
expression would have had the effect of amending the existing law on the
authority to hear and decide civil actions for libel, the same being,
pursuant to Act No. 277, within the original jurisdiction of courts of first
instance, regardless of the amount involved, whereas, under the general
laws then in force, said courts had no such jurisdiction over civil actions
when the demand, exclusive of interest, amounted to less than $100.00 As
regards the criminal action for libel, the specific mention of the Court of
First Instance in Article 360 was unnecessary, because the penalty
prescribed for libel, in Article 355 of said Code was prision correccional in
its minimum and medium periods or a fine ranging from P200 to P600, or
both, and hence, the offense was within the original jurisdiction of the
aforementioned. The same had to specified, however, in said Article 360,
inasmuch as both actions were dealt with thereinunlike Act No. 277,
section 2 of which regulated the criminal action whereas section 11
governed civil actionsso that there was no means of saying that civil
action was triable before courts of first instance, without applying the
statement to the criminal action.
At any rate, it is apparent, from a perusal of the three (3) provisions
aforementioned, that the framers of Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code
intended to introduce no substantial change in the existing law, except as
regardsvenue, and that, in all other respects, they meant
to preserve and continue the status quo under sections 2 and 11 of Act No.
277. Such was, also, the purpose of Congress in passing House Bill No.
2695, which eventually became Republic Act No. 1289. The explanatory
note to said bill is too clear to admit of any doubt about it. It reads:

Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code which permits the offended party to
file as many civil and criminal complaints for libel in as many places as the
writing complained of has been circulated, has been abused so as to
harass and indirectly muzzle newspapers, their editors and reporters.
The spectre of having to defend themselves at great expense in time and
money in many courts far away from their place of publication, has often
caused many a newspaper to adopt a less courageous and militant
attitude and to temporize too long before exposing fraud, corruptions and
other venalities in all nooks and corners of our country.
It is for the purpose of remedying this anomalous procedural situation
which undoubtedly lessens the effectiveness of our free press to ferret
out the evil and the wrong in our nation that this accompanying measure
is presented. If passed, it would limit the venue of both civil and criminal
complaints for libel to the province or municipality where any of the
accused or any of the offended party resides. (Emphasis ours.)
Inasmuch as the framers of Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, and
those of Republic Act No. 1298, did not intend to modify the conditions
obtaining under Act No. 277 of the Philippine Commission, insofar as
jurisdiction to hear and determine criminal and civil actions for libel are
concerned, the issue in the case at bar narrows, therefore, to whether or
not justice of the peace courts had authority to conduct preliminary
investigation of violations of our original libel law allegedly committed
within their respective municipalities.
In this connection, it should be noted that, barely two (2) months prior to
the passage of Act No. 277, or on August 10, 1901, the Philippine
Commission had approved Act No. 194, section 1 of which vested in
"every justice of the peace in the Philippine Islands" the "authority to
make preliminary investigation of any crime alleged to have been
committed within his municipality, jurisdiction to hear and determine
which is by law ... vested in the judges of Courts of First Instance." It will
be recalled, also, that Act No. 277 did not particularize the class of court
that would hear and determine criminal actions merely from the penalty
prescribed for said offense in Act No. 277, considered in relation to Act
No. 136. The result was that, in view of the nature of said penalty and the
provisions of section 56 of Act No. 136, criminal cases for libel wereand
still arewithin the original jurisdiction of courts of first instance, Now,
then, can we justly hold that by fixing for said offense a penalty falling
under the original jurisdiction of courts of first instance, the framers of
section 2 of Act No. 277 had evinced the intent , either to establish an
exception to the provisions of Act No. 194, authorizing every justice of the
peace "to make preliminary investigation of any crime alleged to have
been committed within his municipality, jurisdiction to hear and
determine which is by law ... vested in the judges of Courts of First
Instance," or to divest justices of the peace of such authority, as regards
the crime of libel?
It is obvious to us that such inference is unwarranted. To begin with,
there is absolutely nothing in Act No. 277 to indicate the aforementioned
intent. Secondly, repeals or amendments by implication are neither
presumed nor favored. On the contrary, every statute should be
harmonized with other laws, in the absence of a clear inconsistency
between them. Thirdly, the jurisdiction of courts of first instance to hear
and determine criminal actions within the original jurisdiction thereof is
far from inconsistent with the authority of justices of the peace to make
preliminary investigation in such actions. What is more, this authority has
been vested to relieve courts of first instance of the duty to hear cases
which are devoid of probable cause, thereby paving the way for the
effective exercise of the original jurisdiction of said courts and
the expeditious disposal by the same of criminal cases which are prima
facie meritorious.
Why, it has been asked, has Republic Act No. 1289 amended the third
paragraph of Article 360pursuant to which the criminal action and the
civil action for libel " may be filed ... with the court of first instance"to

provide that such actions "shall" be filed with the aforementioned court?
Does the substitution of "shall" in lieu of "may" not show that the criminal
action cannot be instituted in any other court, that a complaint for libel
filed with a justice of the peace court is not the action contemplated in
said Article 360, as amended by Republic Act No. 1289, and that,
accordingly, the filing of said complaint did not suspend the running of
the statute of limitations, despite the provision of Article 91 of the
Revised Penal Code to the contrary?
The foregoing questions overlook the fact that, under Article 360 of the
Revised Penal Code, prior to its amendment, and even under Act No. 277,
which did not name the court that could hear and determine criminal
actions for libel, the same fell under the original jurisdiction of courts of
first instance. The possession of such jurisdiction by these courts is due,
therefore, neither to said change from "may" to "shall", nor to the specific
mention of said courts in Article 360. The nature of the penalty
imposable sufficed to confer said jurisdiction upon courts of first instance,
to the exclusion of all other courts.
Moreover, said questions fail to take into account the difference between
jurisdiction to hear and decide a criminal case, on the one hand, and the
authority to make in such case a preliminary investigation, on the other.
Worse still, the questions propounded assume that the grant to courts of
first of original jurisdiction to determine criminal cases for libel, is not
only a denial, to justices of the peace, of the authority to conduct
preliminary investigation in such cases, but, also, a withdrawal of said
authority, vested upon justices of the peace by Act No. 194, insofar as the
aforementioned cases are concerned, which is the very point in dispute.
Thus, the aforementioned questions beg the issue, instead of
demonstrating the validity of defendant's pretense.
Apart from the foregoing, the theory of defendant herein is belied by the
history of the legal precepts under consideration. Act No. 277 contained
no provision regulating the venue in criminal cases for libel. Under the
pertinent jurisprudence, the same could be brought "in any jurisdiction
where the libelous article was published or circulated, irrespective of
where such article was written or printed." (33 Am. Jurs. 301.) As regards
the suit for damages, it had to be filed, according to section 11 of Act No.
277, with "any Court of First Instance having jurisdiction of the parties",
that is to say, in the province in which either of them resided (Section 377,
Act No. 190). Said provision governing civil action for written defamation
was amended by Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, pursuant to
which both actions, civil and criminal "may be filed" with "the province
wherein the libel was published, displayed or exhibited, regardless of the
place where the same was written, printed or composed."
In the course of time, the new policy appeared to be unwise, as regards
newspapers of general circulation. Indeed, under said Article 360, as
originally enacted, an offended party residing, let us say, in the province
of Cagayan, couldfor the purpose of causing undue harassment
commence, in the province of Batanes, a civil action against the publisher
of newspaper edited in Manila. At the same time, said offended party
could institute a criminal action in the Court of First Instance in Sulu. To
avoid these evils, Article 360 was amended by Republic Act No. 1289.
Pursuant thereto, both actions must be filed with the same court of first
instance, and this must be that of "the province or city where any of the
accused or any of the offended parties resides at the time of the
commission of the offense", unless "the libel is published circulated,
displayed or exhibited in the province or city wherein neither the
offender nor the offended resides", in which case "the civil and criminal
action may be brought in the court of first instance thereof". That these
were the only objectives of Congress in passing House Bill No. 2695,
which later became Republic Act No. 1289, is manifest, not only from the
above quoted explanatory note to said bill, but also, from the
Congressional Record pertinent thereto. Thus, Congressman Pedro Lopez,
who sponsored the bill in the House of Representatives, stated on the
floor thereof:

. . . As a fitting, not merely lip service, contribution that the House could
give to strengthen the arm of the Fourth Estate of our country, it has been
suggested that we take up for consideration on the floor tonight this bill ...
which will help keep our press unshackled in fulfilling their mission as
the eyes, ears, nose, voice and conscience of our people.
This amendment consists in deleting the third paragraph of Article 360 of
the Revised Penal Code which, under the present law, would permit any
offended party to file as many libel charges in the court of first instance of
any province where the libelous article is supposed to have been
circulated, exhibited or displayed, irrespective of whether it is not the
place where the article was composed, published or printed. This
provision, gentlemen of the House, has in the past been abused in order
to harass and muzzle the free press. It has been abused to such an extend
that on offended party files it not only in the province where he lives but
also files it in Cagayan up to north, down to Davao in the south. Under the
proposed amendment, it is intended that this extreme measure against the
press be lightened so that the offended party, while given all due protection
under the law in order to cleanse his name and vindicate himself before our
courts, may file the charges only in the court first instance where he resides
or in the court of first instance where the accused resides. (House of
Representatives' Congressional Record, Third Congress, Second Session
[February 21, 1955], Vol. II, No. 21, p. Emphasis ours.)
This view was reiterated by his counterpart in the Senate, Senator
Lorenzo Sumulong, who used the following, language:
Mr. President, this is a bill amending the present statutory provision
on venue of libel cases. At present a civil or criminal action for libel had to
be presented in the place where the alleged libel was published
irrespective of where it was composed, printed or issued. This provision in
our existing law has oftentimes subjected to harassment or hardship
reporters or publishers of newspapers who are accused of libel because
under the law when an alleged libel in the newspaper which circulated
throughout the Philippines is filed, the action whether criminal or civil may
be presented in any place where the libel was published and it can well
happen that the libel suit whether criminal or civil may be filed in a
province or district far away from the residence of the accused. It may
also happen under our present law that the alleged offended party may
divide his complaint by filing a criminal action in once province where the
libel was published and then filing a civil action in another province very
far away from the province where the criminal case was filed and this will
largely work hardship and tremendous expenses as well as difficulties to
the accused. And it if for this reason that this bill was originally filed in the
Lower House where it has been passed and it is now being submitted to the
Senate for favorable action. . . . .
x xx

x xx

x xx

. . . if this bill is approved with the amendment recommended by your

Committee the effect will be that in cases of libel, the place of trial has to
be either residence of the offended party or the residence of the accused,
and if the criminal action is brought in one province, the civil action has
necessarily to be presented in the same court and in the same province.
And if there are two salas, it is the intention of this bill, as amended, that
the judge who took cognizance of the criminal case should also be the one
to take cognizance of the civil case. Moreover, in case a libel suit is filed in
one court, then the court where that case was first filed will acquire
jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts. (Senate Congressional
Record, Third Congress, Second Session [May 3, 1955], Vol. II, No. 66, pp.
921-922; Emphasis ours.)
Indeed, the deliberations in Congress were replete with statements of
members thereof, indicating , in the most indubitable manner, that, in
approving said House Bill No. 2695, they were concerned with no other
matter than the "place" where the civil and criminal actions for written
defamation may or should be filed (House of Representatives'

Congressional Record [Feb. 21 and 22, 1955], Third Congress, Second

Session, Vol. II, Nos. 21 & 22, pp. 598-602, 618-624; Senate Congressional
Record [May 3, 1955], Vol. II, No. 66, pp. 921-924, and 926). Their
attention was so focused on this subject that a member of the Lower
House had occasion to remark: "We are now talking about venue, not
jurisdiction" (House of Representatives' Congressional Record, supra, p.
601). What is more, a member of the Upper House sought to amend the
Bill, with a view to providing for the case when the amount involved in
the civil action was less than that instance. He, however, made the
following significant observation, upon being informed by Senator
Sumulong that, under Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, courts of
first instance have original jurisdiction over all civil actions for libel,
regardless of the amount of the demand: "If that is the present law, then I
withdraw my amendment." (Senate Congressional Record, supra, p. 922.)
In short, Congress did not intend to disturb the status quo as regards
jurisdiction over criminal and civil actions for libel. This being the case,
we cannot see how Republic Act No. 1289 should be construed as
depriving justices of the peace of their authority, under Act No. 134, as
well as under the Revised Judiciary Act of 1948 (Republic Act No. 296, sec.
87, as amended by Republic Act No. 2613), to conduct preliminary
investigations for any offense alleged to have been committed within
their respective municipalities, without regard to the limits of imposable
punishment.
Again, most of our legislators have consistently been Members of the Bar,
and, as such, were and are familiar with pertinent jurisprudence and the
practice prevailing in the jurisdiction. In U. S. vs. Lazada (9 Phil., 509, 511),
this Court said:
. . . It appears, however, that the complaining wishes reported the incident
to the justice of the peace on the day of its occurrence, and that the
preliminary proceedings upon which the information filed in the Court of
First Instance was based were had within sixty days after the commission
of the offense; it can not be said, therefore, that the time of the
prescriptive period has extinguished the penal liability of the
accused because the prescriptive period was interrupted by the institution
of criminal proceedings, and suspended during the continuance
thereof. (Penal Code, Art. 131.) (Emphasis ours.)
This doctrine was even broaden in People vs. Parao (52 Phil., 712, 715), in
which it was declared that the "steps taken by the municipal president"
pursuant to his authority, under Section 7 of Act No. 2041, to conduct
preliminary investigations in the absence of the justice of the peace and
the auxiliary justice of the peace"directed towards the investigation of
the crime and the apprehension of the criminals, partakes of the nature of
a judicial proceeding," which interrupts the running of the statute of
limitations. In People vs. Joson (46 Phil., 380, 385), this Court held that "the
filing of the complaint ... had the effect of interrupting the running of the
prescriptive period", so that an information was not necessary therefor. If
our lawmakers intended to change the laws, the jurisprudence and the
established practice concerning preliminary investigations in criminal
actions for libel and the interruption of the period of prescription for said
offense, they would have enacted a provision analogous to that of section
187 of Republic Act No. 180 (Revised Election Code), reading:
Jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance.The Court of First Instance
shall have exclusive original jurisdiction to make preliminary investigations,
issue warrants of arrest and try and decide any criminal action or
proceeding for violation of this Code. From its decision an appeal shall lie
as in other criminal cases. (Emphasis ours.)
Apart from the fact that Republic Act No. 1289 contains no such provision,
the comments made in Congress during the discussion of said law leave
no room for doubt that its framers did not have the aforesaid intent.
Needless to say, the Tayco case, cited by the defendant, is not in point.
The offended party therein merely lodged an "accusation" with the Office

of the City Fiscal of Manila, without a complaint, in the sense in which this
term is used in the Rules of Court (Rule 106, section 2), and said
accusation was not filed with a court of justice. In the case at bar, there
was a formal complaint, and the same was filed with a justice of the peace
court.
The case of People vs. Felisa Te, et al., 107 Phil., 355; 60 Off. Gaz. (25) 3590,
involved a libelous article which was published on August 12, 1954. A
complaint for libel was filed with the Justice of the Peace Court of Balayan,
Batangas, on March 4, 1955, and the corresponding information was filed
with the Court of First Instance of Batangas on July 8, 1955; but, prior
thereto, or on may May 18, 1955, another information for the same
offense had been filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila, where
the writer of the article, as well as the offended party, resided. The Court
of First Instance of Batangas dismissed the case, on motion of the accused,
for lack of venue, pursuant to Republic Act No. 1289, none of the parties
being a resident of Batangas. Inasmuch as the proceedings began in the
Justice of the Peace Court of Balayan, Batangas, on March 4, 1955, the
issued hinged on the applicability of Republic Act No. 1289, approved on
June 15, 1955, which inserted, at the end of the third paragraph of Article
360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended a proviso to the effect that
such amendment "shall not apply to cases of written defamation, the civil
and/or criminal actions to which have been filed in court at the time of
the effectivity" thereof. This question was resolved in the affirmative,
upon the ground that the phrase "have been filed in court", contained in
said proviso, referred to the filing of the civil and criminal actions with
the court of first instance, mentioned in the opening sentence of said
paragraph, as amended.
The doctrine laid down in that case has no bearing on the question
whether the filing of a complaint with a justice of the peace court
interrupts the running of the period of prescription in cases of written
defamation. The same was neither decided nor in issue in the Te case,
which does not constitute, therefore, a precedent insofar as the aforesaid
question is concerned. It is argued that the proceedings in the justice of
the peace court in said case were, in effect, regarded therein as an
absolute nullity, and that, accordingly, said court had no authority
whatsoever to entertain the aforementioned complaint. Neither such
authority, nor the validity of said proceedings, was, however, assailed in
the Te case, or sought to be determined therein. Moreover, the
aforementioned argument is refuted by the very language of our decision
in said case, in which we declared that "the justice of the peace merely
conducted, as it was his duty, the preliminary investigation whose
purpose was to determine whether or not there was reasonable grounds
fro proceeding formally against the accused." Obviously, it could not have
been the duty of the justice of the peace to conduct said investigation if
as contended by the defendant hereinsaid officer, not only had no
authority, but, was also, not allowed by Republic Act No. 1289, to
undertake said investigation. Hence, the Te case, in fact, acknowledges the
power of justices of the peace to conduct preliminary investigation in libel
cases.
The statement in said decision to the effect that "the filing of the
complaint ... for purposes of preliminary investigation by the justice of the
peace can not be said to be the commencement of the criminal action",
must be read in relation to the institution of the action as contemplated in
the aforementioned proviso, which was the object of our interpretation,
and had reference, not to the prescription of offenses or to the
interruption thereof, or even to jurisdiction or to venue, but to the
retrospective operation of Republic Act No. 1289. Then, again, under the
American law, upon which our system of criminal procedure is based, the
preliminary investigation is not strictly a "judicial" proceeding, but, more
of a quasi-judicial one, oftentimes conducted before a grand jury, which is
neither a court nor a part of the judiciary. From the legal viewpoint,
therefore, said investigation does not mark the commencement of a
criminal "action", in the sense that an "action means an ordinary suit in
a court of justice, by which one party prosecutes another for the

enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a

wrong," as defined in Rule 2, section 1, of the Rules of Court. Although the
Philippine laws have vested the power to conduct preliminary
investigations in justices of the peace, which are part of our judicial
system, as well as upon city and provincial fiscals, which belong to the
executive department, still such investigations are not part of the action
proper, as this term is used in said Rule, it being merely a
step preliminary to the proceedings for the redress of a wrong, and, hence,
neither the government nor the offended party may secure such redress
in the course of said investigation. As a consequence, the same does not
place the accused in jeopardy of punishment, thus retaining the essence
of its American counterpart.
In view of the foregoing, it is our considered opinion that the filing of the
complaint with the justice of the peace court of Pozorrubio, Pangasinan,
interrupted the running of the statute of limitations, as regards the crime
of libel with which defendant herein is charged, and that said crime has
not been extinguished, therefore, by prescription, for which reason the
order appealed from is reversed, and the records of this case are hereby
remanded to the lower court for further proceedings, conformably to law.
It is so ordered.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 102342 July 3, 1992

LUZ M. ZALDIVIA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ANDRES B. REYES, JR., in his capacity as Acting Presiding Judge
of the Regional Trial Court, Fourth Judicial Region, Branch 76, San
Mateo, Rizal, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

CRUZ, J.:
The Court is asked to determine the applicable law specifying the
prescriptive period for violations of municipal ordinances.
The petitioner is charged with quarrying for commercial purposes
without a mayor's permit in violation of Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1988,
of the Municipality of Rodriguez, in the Province of Rizal.
The offense was allegedly committed on May 11, 1990. 1 The referralcomplaint of the police was received by the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Rizal on May 30, 1990. 2The corresponding information
was filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez on October 2,
1990. 3
The petitioner moved to quash the information on the ground that the
crime had prescribed, but the motion was denied. On appeal to the
Regional Trial Court of Rizal, the denial was sustained by the respondent
judge. 4
In the present petition for review on certiorari, the petitioner first argues
that the charge against her is governed by the following provisions of the
Rule on Summary Procedure:
Sec. 1. Scope This rule shall govern the procedure in the Metropolitan
Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts in the following cases:

xxx xxx xxx

B. Criminal Cases:
1. Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations;
2. Violations of rental law;
3. Violations of municipal or city ordinances;
4. All other criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by law for the
offenses charged does not exceed six months imprisonment, or a fine of one
thousand pesos (P1,000.00), or both, irrespective of other imposable
penalties, accessory or otherwise, or of the civil liability arising
therefrom. . . . (Emphasis supplied.)
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 9. How commenced. The prosecution of criminal cases falling
within the scope of this Rule shall be either by complaint or by
information filed directly in court without need of a prior preliminary
examination or preliminary investigation: Provided, however, That in
Metropolitan Manila and chartered cities, such cases shall be commenced
only by information; Provided, further, That when the offense cannot be
prosecuted de oficio, the corresponding complaint shall be signed and
sworn to before the fiscal by the offended party.
She then invokes Act. No. 3326, as amended, entitled "An Act to Establish
Periods of Prescription for Violations Penalized by Special Acts and
Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin to
Run," reading as follows:
Sec. 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless provided in such
acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules: . . . Violations
penalized by municipal ordinances shall prescribe after two months.
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of
the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from
the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its
investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted
against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings
are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.
Sec. 3. For the purposes of this Act, special acts shall be acts defining and
penalizing violations of law not included in the Penal Code. (Emphasis
supplied)
Her conclusion is that as the information was filed way beyond the
two-month statutory period from the date of the alleged commission of
the offense, the charge against her should have been dismissed on the
ground of prescription.
For its part, the prosecution contends that the prescriptive period was
suspended upon the filing of the complaint against her with the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor. Agreeing with the respondent judge, the
Solicitor General also invokes Section 1, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure, providing as follows:
Sec. 1. How Instituted For offenses not subject to the rule on summary
procedure in special cases, the institution of criminal action shall be as
follows:
a) For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court,
by filing the complaint with the appropriate officer for the purpose of
conducting the requisite preliminary investigation therein;

b) For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, by filing the complaint directly with
the said courts, or a complaint with the fiscal's office. However, in
Metropolitan Manila and other chartered cities, the complaint may be
filed only with the office of the fiscal.
In all cases such institution interrupts the period of prescription of the
offense charged. (Emphasis supplied.)
Emphasis is laid on the last paragraph. The respondent maintains that the
filing of the complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor comes
under the phrase "such institution" and that the phrase "in all cases"
applies to all cases, without distinction, including those falling under the
Rule on Summary Procedure.
The said paragraph, according to the respondent, was an adoption of the
following dictum in Francisco v. Court of Appeals: 5
In view of this diversity of precedents, and in order to provide guidance
for Bench and Bar, this Court has re-examined the question and, after
mature consideration, has arrived at the conclusion that the true doctrine
is, and should be, the one established by the decisions holding that the
filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court, even if it be merely for
purposes of preliminary examination or investigation, should, and does,
interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if
the court where the complaint or information is filed can not try the case
on its merits. Several reasons buttress this conclusion: first, the text of
Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, in declaring that the period of
prescription "shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or
information" without distinguishing whether the complaint is filed in the
court for preliminary examination or investigation merely, or for action
on the merits. Second, even if the court where the complaint or
information is filed may only proceed to investigate the case, its
actuations already represent the initial step of the proceedings against
the offender. Third, it is unjust to deprive the injured party of the right to
obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under his control. All
that the victim of the offense may do on his part to initiate the
prosecution is to file the requisite complaint.
It is important to note that this decision was promulgated on May 30,
1983, two months before the promulgation of the Rule on Summary
Procedure on August 1, 1983. On the other hand, Section 1 of Rule 110 is
new, having been incorporated therein with the revision of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure on January 1, 1985, except for the last paragraph,
which was added on October 1, 1988.
That section meaningfully begins with the phrase, "for offenses not
subject to the rule on summary procedure in special cases," which plainly
signifies that the section does not apply to offenses which are subject to
summary procedure. The phrase "in all cases" appearing in the last
paragraph obviously refers to the cases covered by the Section, that is,
those offenses not governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure. This
interpretation conforms to the canon that words in a statute should be
read in relation to and not isolation from the rest of the measure, to
discover the true legislative intent.
As it is clearly provided in the Rule on Summary Procedure that among
the offenses it covers are violations of municipal or city ordinances, it
should follow that the charge against the petitioner, which is for violation
of a municipal ordinance of Rodriguez, is governed by that rule and not
Section 1 of Rule 110.
Where paragraph (b) of the section does speak of "offenses falling under
the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts," the obvious reference is to Section 32(2) of B.P. No. 129, vesting
in such courts:

(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with

imprisonment of not exceeding four years and two months, or a fine of
not more than four thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment,
regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the
civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon,
irrespective of kind, nature, value, or amount thereof; Provided, however,
That in offenses involving damage to property through criminal
negligence they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction where the
imposable fine does not exceed twenty thousand pesos.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the challenged Order dated

October 2, 1991 is SET ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 90-089 in the Municipal
Trial Court of Rodriguez, Rizal, is hereby DISMISSED on the ground of
prescription. It is so ordered.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

These offenses are not covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure.

Under Section 9 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, "the complaint or
information shall be filed directly in court without need of a prior
preliminary examination or preliminary investigation." 6 Both parties
agree that this provision does not prevent the prosecutor from
conducting a preliminary investigation if he wants to. However, the case
shall be deemed commenced only when it is filed in court, whether or not
the prosecution decides to conduct a preliminary investigation. This
means that the running of the prescriptive period shall be halted on the
date the case is actually filed in court and not on any date before that.
This interpretation is in consonance with the afore-quoted Act No. 3326
which says that the period of prescription shall be suspended "when
proceedings are instituted against the guilty party." The proceedings
referred to in Section 2 thereof are "judicial proceedings," contrary to the
submission of the Solicitor General that they include administrative
proceedings. His contention is that we must not distinguish as the law
does not distinguish. As a matter of fact, it does.
At any rate, the Court feels that if there be a conflict between the Rule on
Summary Procedure and Section 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure, the former should prevail as the special law. And if there be a
conflict between Act. No. 3326 and Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure, the latter must again yield because this Court, in the exercise
of its rule-making power, is not allowed to "diminish, increase or modify
substantive rights" under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the Constitution.
Prescription in criminal cases is a substantive right. 7
Going back to the Francisco case, we find it not irrelevant to observe that
the decision would have been conformable to Section 1, Rule 110, as the
offense involved was grave oral defamation punishable under the Revised
Penal Code with arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum period. By contrast, the prosecution in the
instant case is for violation of a municipal ordinance, for which the
penalty cannot exceed six months, 8 and is thus covered by the Rule on
Summary Procedure.
The Court realizes that under the above interpretation, a crime may
prescribe even if the complaint is filed seasonably with the prosecutor's
office if, intentionally or not, he delays the institution of the necessary
judicial proceedings until it is too late. However, that possibility should
not justify a misreading of the applicable rules beyond their obvious
intent as reasonably deduced from their plain language. The remedy is
not a distortion of the meaning of the rules but a rewording thereof to
prevent the problem here sought to be corrected.
Our conclusion is that the prescriptive period for the crime imputed to
the petitioner commenced from its alleged commission on May 11, 1990,
and ended two months thereafter, on July 11, 1990, in accordance with
Section 1 of Act No. 3326. It was not interrupted by the filing of the
complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor on May 30, 1990,
as this was not a judicial proceeding. The judicial proceeding that could
have interrupted the period was the filing of the information with the
Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez, but this was done only on October 2,
1990, after the crime had already prescribed.

G.R. No. 125066 July 8, 1998

ISABELITA REODICA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

On the evening of 17 October 1987, petitioner Isabelita Reodica was
driving a van along Doa Soledad Avenue, Better Living Subdivision,
Paraaque, Metro Manila. Allegedly because of her recklessness, her van
hit the car of complainant Norberto Bonsol. As a result, complainant
sustained physical injuries, while the damage to his car amounted to
P8,542.00.
Three days after the incident, or on 20 October 1987, the complainant
filed an Affidavit of Complaint 1 against petitioner with the Fiscal's Office.
On 13 January 1988, an information 2 was filed before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Makati (docketed as Criminal Case No. 33919) charging
petitioner with "Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property
with Slight Physical Injury." The information read:
The undersigned 2nd Asst. Fiscal accuses Isabelita Reodica of the crime of
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Slight
Physical Injury as follows:
That on or about the 17th day of October, 1987 in the Municipality of
Paraaque, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the abovementioned accused, Isabelita Velasco Reodica,
being then the driver and/or person in charge of a Tamaraw bearing
plate no. NJU-306, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
drive, manage and operate the same in a reckless, careless, negligent and
imprudent manner, without regard to traffic laws, rules and regulations
and without taking the necessary care and precaution to avoid damage to
property and injuries to person, causing by such negligence, carelessness
and imprudence the said vehicle to bump/collide with a Toyota Corolla
bearing plate no. NIM-919 driven and owned by Norberto Bonsol, thereby
causing damage amounting to P8,542.00, to the damage and prejudice of
its owner, in the aforementioned amount of P8,542.00.
That as further consequence due to the strong impact, said Norberto
Bonsol suffered bodily injuries which required medical attendance for a
period of less that nine (9) days and incapacitated him from performing
his customary labor for the same period of time.
Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial then
ensued.

On 31 January 1991, the RTC of Makati, Branch 145, rendered a

decision 3 convicting petitioner of the "quasi offense of reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property with slight physical
injuries," and sentencing her:
[t]o suffer imprisonment of six (6) months of arresto mayor, and to pay
the complainant, Norberto Bonsol y Atienza, the sum of Thirteen
Thousand Five Hundred Forty-Two (P13,542), Philippine Currency,
without subsidiary impairment in case of insolvency; and to pay the
costs. 4
The trial court justified imposing a 6-month prison term in this wise:
As a result of the reckless imprudence of the accused, complainant
suffered slight physical injuries (Exhs. D, H and I). In view of the resulting
physical injuries, the penalty to be imposed is not fine, but imprisonment
(Gregorio, Fundamental of Criminal Law Review, Eight Edition 1988, p.
711). Slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence is now punished
with penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period (People v. Aguiles,
L-11302, October 28, 1960, cited in Gregorio's book, p. 718). 5
As to the sum of P13,542.00, this represented the cost of the car repairs
(P8,542.00) and medical expenses (P5,000.00).
Petitioner appealed from the decision to the Court of Appeals, which
docketed the case as CA-G.R. CR No. 14660. After her motions for
extension of time to file her brief were granted, she filed a Motion to
Withdraw Appeal for Probation Purposes, and to Suspend, Ex Abundanti
Cautela, Period for Filing Appellant's Brief. However, respondent Court of
Appeals denied this motion and directed petitioner to file her brief. 6
After passing upon the errors imputed by petitioner to the trial court,
respondent Court of Appeals rendered a decision 7 on 31 January 1996
affirming the appealed decision.
Petitioner subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration 8 raising new
issues, thus:
NOW THAT AN ACQUITTAL SEEMS IMPOSSIBLE, MAY WE REVISIT THE
PENALTY AND MOVE THAT IT BE REVIEWED AND SET ASIDE SINCE IT
IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED TO BE ERROR TO COMPLEX DAMAGE TO
PROPERTY AND SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES, AS BOTH ARE LIGHT
OFFENSES, OVER WHICH THE RESPONDENT COURT HAD NO
JURISDICTION AND EVEN ASSUMING SUCH JURISDICTION, IT CANNOT
IMPOSE A PENALTY IN EXCESS OF WHAT IS AUTHORIZED BY LAW. 9
xxx xxx xxx
REVERSAL OF THE DECISION REMAINS POSSIBLE ON GROUNDS OF
PRESCRIPTION OR LACK OF JURISDICTION. 10
In its Resolution of 24 May 1996, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's
motion for reconsideration for lack of merit, as well as her supplemental
motion for reconsideration. Hence, the present petition for review
on certiorariunder Rule 45 of the Rules of Court premised on the
following grounds:
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION DATED JANUARY 31, 1996
AND MORE SO ITS RESOLUTION DATED MAY 24, 1996, ARE CONTRARY
TO LAW AND GROSSLY ERRONEOUS IN THAT THEY IMPOSED A
PENALTY IN EXCESS OF WHAT IS AUTHORIZED BY LAW FOR THE CRIME
OF RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING IN SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES,
ON THE BASIS OF A CLERICAL ERROR IN A SECONDARY SOURCE.
A. IN THE CASE OF PEOPLE V. AGUILAR, 11 THE SAME CASE WHERE THE
COURT A QUO BASED ITS FINDING OF A PENALTY WHEN IT AFFIRMED
THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, WHAT WAS STATED IN

THE ORIGINAL TEXT OF SAID CASE IS THAT THE PENALTY FOR SLIGHT
PHYSICAL INJURIES THROUGH RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE IS ARRESTO
MENOR AND NOT ARRESTO MAYOR. IT IS GRAVE ERROR FOR THE
RESPONDENT COURT TO PUNISH PETITIONER MORE THAN SHE
SHOULD OR COULD BE PUNISHED BECAUSE OF A CLERICAL ERROR
COPIED FROM A SECONDARY SOURCE.
B. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION WHEN IT COMPLEXED THE CRIME OF RECKLESS
IMPRUDENCE RESULTING IN DAMAGE TO PROPERTY AND SLIGHT
PHYSICAL INJURIES IMPOSING A SINGLE EXCESSIVE PENALTY IN ITS
ELLIPTICAL RESOLUTION OF MAY 24, 1996.
C. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT
AFFIRMED THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION NOTWITHSTANDING THE
DEFENSE OF PRESCRIPTION AND LACK OF JURISDICTION.
Anent the first ground, petitioner claims that the courts below misquoted
not only the title, but likewise the ruling of the case cited as authority
regarding the penalty for slight physical injuries through reckless
imprudence. Concretely, the title of the case was not People v. Aguiles,
but People v. Aguilar; while the ruling was that the penalty for
such quasi offense was arresto menor not arresto mayor.
As regards the second assigned error, petitioner avers that the courts
below should have pronounced that there were two separate light
felonies involved, namely: (1) reckless imprudence with slight physical
injuries; and (2) reckless imprudence with damage to property, instead of
considering them a complex crime. Two light felonies, she insists, "do
not . . . rate a single penalty of arresto mayor or imprisonment of six
months," citing Lontok v. Gorgonio, 12 thus:
Where the single act of imprudence resulted in double less serious
physical injuries, damage to property amounting to P10,000.00 and slight
physical injuries, a chief of police did not err in filing a separate complaint
for the slight physical injuries and another complaint for the lesiones
menos graves and damage to property (Arcaya vs. Teleron, L-37446, May
31, 1974, 57 SCRA 363, 365).
The case of Angeles vs. Jose, 96 Phil. 151, cited by investigating fiscal, is
different from the instant case because in that case the negligent act
resulted in the offenses of lesiones menos graves and damage to property
which were both less grave felonies and which, therefore, constituted a
complex crime.
In the instant case, following the ruling in the Turla case, the offense
of lesiones leves through reckless imprudence should have been charged
in a separate information.
She then suggests that "at worst, the penalties of two light offenses, both
imposable in their maximum period and computed or added together,
only sum up to 60 days imprisonment and not six months as imposed by
the lower courts."
On the third assigned error, petitioner insists that the offense of slight
physical injuries through reckless imprudence, being punishable only
by arresto menor, is a light offense; as such, it prescribes in two months.
Here, since the information was filed only on 13 January 1988, or almost
three months from the date the vehicular collision occurred, the offense
had already prescribed, again citing Lontok, thus:
In the instant case, following the ruling in the Turla case, the offense
of lesiones leves through reckless imprudence should have been charged
in a separate information. And since, as a light offense, it prescribes in
two months, Lontok's criminal liability therefor was already extinguished
(Arts. 89[5], 90 and 91, Revised Penal Code in relation to sec. 2[e] and [f],
Rule 117, Rules of Court). The trial court committed a grave abuse of

discretion in not sustaining Lontok's motion to quash that part of the

information charging him with that light offense.

IV. Whether the duplicity of the information may be questioned for the
first time on appeal.

Petitioner further claims that the information was filed with the wrong
court, since Regional Trial Courts do not deal with arresto menor cases.
She submits that damage to property and slight physical injuries are light
felonies and thus covered by the rules on summary procedure; therefore,
only the filing with the proper Metropolitan Trial Court could have tolled
the statute of limitations, this time invoking Zaldivia v. Reyes. 13

V. Whether the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction over the offenses in
question.

In its Comment filed on behalf of public respondents, the Office of the

Solicitor General (OSG) agrees with petitioner that the penalty should
have been arresto menor in its maximum period, instead of arresto mayor,
pursuant to Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.

We agree with both petitioner and the OSG that the penalty of six months
of arresto mayor imposed by the trial court and affirmed by respondent
Court of Appeals is incorrect. However, we cannot subscribe to their
submission that the penalty of arresto menor in its maximum period is the
proper penalty.

As to the second assigned error, the OSG contends that conformably

with Buerano v. Court of Appeals, 14 which frowns upon splitting of crimes
and prosecution, it was proper for the trial court to "complex" reckless
imprudence with slight physical injuries and damage to property because
what the law seeks to penalize is the single act of reckless imprudence,
not the results thereof; hence, there was no need for two separate
informations.
To refute the third assigned error, the OSG submits that although the
Municipal Trial Court had jurisdiction to impose arresto menor for slight
physical injuries, the Regional Trial Court properly took cognizance of
this case because it had the jurisdiction to impose the higher penalty for
the damage to property, which was a fine equal to thrice the value of
P8,542.00. On this score, the OSG cites Cuyos v. Garcia. 15
The OSG then debunks petitioner's defense of prescription of the crime,
arguing that the prescriptive period here was tolled by the filing of the
complaint with the fiscal's office three days after the incident, pursuant
to People v. Cuaresma 16 and Chico v. Isidro. 17
In her Reply to the Comment of the OSG, petitioner expressed gratitude
and appreciation to the OSG in joining cause with her as to the first
assigned error. However, she considers the OSG's reliance on Buerano v.
Court of Appeals 18 as misplaced, for nothing there validates the
"complexing" of the crime of reckless imprudence with physical injuries
and damage to property; besides, in that case, two separate informations
were filed one for slight and serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence and the other for damage to property through reckless
imprudence. She then insists that in this case, following Arcaya v.
Teleron 19 and Lontok v. Gorgonio, 20 two informations should have been
filed. She likewise submits that Cuyos v. Garcia 21 would only apply here
on the assumption that it was proper to "complex" damage to property
through reckless imprudence with slight physical injuries through
reckless imprudence. Chico v. Isidro 22 is likewise "inapposite," for it deals
with attempted homicide, which is not covered by the Rule on Summary
Procedure.
Petitioner finally avers that People v. Cuaresma 23 should not be given
retroactive effect; otherwise, it would either unfairly prejudice her or
render nugatory the en banc ruling in Zaldivia 24 favorable to her.
The pleadings thus raise the following issues:
I. Whether the penalty imposed on petitioner is correct.
II. Whether the quasi offenses of reckless imprudence resulting in damage
to property in the amount of P8,542.00 and reckless imprudence
resulting in slight physical injuries are light felonies.
III. Whether the rule on complex crimes under Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code applies to the quasi offenses in question.

VI. Whether the quasi offenses in question have already prescribed.

I. The Proper Penalty

Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Art. 365. Imprudence and negligence. Any person who, by reckless
imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been intentional, would
constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period; if it would
have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its
minimum and medium periods shall be imposed; if it would have
constituted a light felony, the penalty of arresto menor in its maximum
period shall be imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act
which would otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty
of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods; if it would have
constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its
minimum period shall be imposed.
When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only
resulted in damage to the property of another, the offender shall be
punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of said
damages to three times such value, but which shall in no case be less than
25 pesos.
A fine not exceeding 200 pesos and censure shall be imposed upon any
person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall cause some wrong
which, if done maliciously, would have constituted a light felony.
In the imposition of these penalties, the courts shall exercise their sound
discretion, without regard to the rules prescribed in Article 64.
The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable:
1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than
those provided in the first two paragraphs of this article, in which case
the courts shall impose the penalty next lower in degree than that which
should be imposed in the period which they may deem proper to apply.
According to the first paragraph of the aforequoted Article, the penalty
for reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries, a light felony,
is arresto menor in its maximum period, with a duration of 21 to 30 days.
If the offense of slight physical injuries is, however, committed
deliberately or with malice, it is penalized with arresto menor under
Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code, with a duration of 1 day to 30 days.
Plainly, the penalty then under Article 266 may be either lower than or
equal to the penalty prescribed under the first paragraph of Article 365.
This being the case, the exception in the sixth paragraph of Article 365
applies. Hence, the proper penalty for reckless imprudence resulting in
slight physical injuries is public censure, this being the penalty next lower
in degree to arresto menor. 25

As to reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in the amount

of P8,542.00, the third paragraph of Article 365, which provides for the
penalty of fine, does not apply since the reckless imprudence in this case
did not result in damage to property only. What applies is the first
paragraph of Article 365, which provides for arresto mayor in its
minimum and medium periods (1 month and 1 day to 4 months) for an
act committed through reckless imprudence which, had it been
intentional, would have constituted a less grave felony. Note that if the
damage to the extent of P8,542.00 were caused deliberately, the crime
would have been malicious mischief under Article 329 of the Revised
Penal Code, and the penalty would then be arresto mayor in its medium
and maximum periods (2 months and 1 day to 6 months which is higher
than that prescribed in the first paragraph of Article 365). If the penalty
under Article 329 were equal to or lower than that provided for in the
first paragraph, then the sixth paragraph of Article 365 would apply, i.e.,
the penalty next lower in degree, which is arresto menor in its maximum
period to arresto mayor in its minimum period or imprisonment from 21
days to 2 months. Accordingly, the imposable penalty for reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property to the extent of P8,542.00
would bearresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, which could
be anywhere from a minimum of 1 month and 1 day to a maximum of 4
months, at the discretion of the court, since the fifth paragraph of Article
365 provides that in the imposition of the penalties therein provided "the
courts shall exercise their sound discretion without regard to the rules
prescribed in article 64."
II. Classification of the Quasi Offense in Question.
Felonies committed not only by means of deceit (dolo), but likewise by
means of fault (culpa). There is deceit when the wrongful act is
performed with deliberate intent; and there is fault when the wrongful
act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight or lack of
skill. 26
As earlier stated, reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries
is punishable by public censure only. Article 9, paragraph 3, of the
Revised Penal Code defines light felonies as infractions of law carrying
the penalty ofarresto menor or a fine not exceeding P200.00, or both.
Since public censure is classified under Article 25 of the Code as a light
penalty, and is considered under the graduated scale provided in Article
71 of the same Code as a penalty lower than arresto menor, it follows that
the offense of reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries is a
light felony.
On the other hand, reckless imprudence also resulting in damage to
property is, as earlier discussed, penalized with arresto mayor in its
minimum and medium periods. Since arresto mayor is a correctional
penalty under Article 25 of the Revised Penal Code, the quasi offense in
question is a less grave felony not a light felony as claimed by
petitioner.
III. Applicability of the Rule on Complex Crimes.
Since criminal negligence may, as here, result in more than one felony,
should Article 48 of the Revised Code on complex crimes be applied?
Article 48 provides as follows:
Art. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. When a single act constitutes two
or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is necessary a
means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime
shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.
Clearly, if a reckless, imprudent or negligent act results in two or more
grave or less grave felonies, a complex crime is committed. However,
in Lontok v. Gorgonio, 27 this Court declared that where one of the
resulting offenses in criminal negligence constitutes a light felony, there is
no complex crime, thus:

Applying article 48, it follows that if one offense is light, there is no

complex crime. The resulting offenses may be treated as separate or the
light felony may be absorbed by the grave felony. Thus, the light felonies
of damage to property and slight physical injuries, both resulting from a
single act of imprudence, do not constitute a complex crime. They cannot
be charged in one information. They are separate offenses subject to
distinct penalties (People vs. Turla, 50 Phil. 1001; See People vs. Estipona,
70 Phil. 513).
Where the single act of imprudence resulted in double less serious
physical injuries, damage to property amounting to P10,000 and slight
physical injuries, a chief of police did not err in filing a separate complaint
for the slight physical injuries and another complaint for the lesiones
menor graves and damage to property [Arcaya vs. Teleron, L-37446, May
31, 1974, 57 SCRA 363, 365].
Hence, the trial court erred in considering the following felonies as a
complex crime: the less grave felony of reckless imprudence resulting in
damage to property in the amount of P8,542.00 and the light felony of
reckless imprudence resulting in physical injuries.
IV. The Right to Assail the Duplicity of the Information.
Following Lontok, the conclusion is inescapable here, that
the quasi offense of reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical
injuries should have been charged in a separate information because it is
not covered by Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. However, petitioner
may no longer question, at this stage, the duplicitous character of the
information, i.e., charging two separate offenses in one information, to wit:
(1) reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property; and (2)
reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries. This defect was
deemed waived by her failure to raise it in a motion to quash before she
pleaded to the information. 28 Under Section 3, Rule 120 of the Rules of
Court, when two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or
information and the accused fails to object to it before trial, the court may
convict the accused of as many offenses as are charged and proved and
impose on him the penalty for each of them. 29
V. Which Court Has Jurisdiction Over the
Quasi Offenses in Question.
The jurisdiction to try a criminal action is to be determined by the law in
force at the time of the institution of the action, unless the statute
expressly provides, or is construed to the effect that it is intended to
operate as to actions pending before its enactment. 30
At the time of the filing of the information in this case, the law in force
was Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as "The Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980." Section 32(2) 31 thereof provided that
except in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Courts and of the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial
Courts (MTCs), Municipal Trial Courts (MTCs), and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts (MCTCs) had exclusive original jurisdiction over "all offenses
punishable with imprisonment of got exceeding four years and two
months, or a fine of not more than four thousand pesos, or both fine and
imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties,
including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated
thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof."
The criminal jurisdiction of the lower courts was then determined by the
duration of the imprisonment and the amount of fine prescribed by law
for the offense charged. The question thus arises as to which court has
jurisdiction over offenses punishable by censure, such as reckless
imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries.
In Uy Chin Hua v. Dinglasan, 32 this Court found that a lacuna existed in the
law as to which court had jurisdiction over offenses penalized

with destierro, the duration of which was from 6 months and 1 day to 6
years, which was co-extensive with prision correccional. We then
interpreted the law in this wise:
Since the legislature has placed offenses penalized with arresto
mayor under the jurisdiction of justice of the peace and municipal courts,
and since by Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section
3 of Commonwealth Act No. 217, it has placed destierro below arresto
mayor as a lower penalty than the latter, in the absence of any express
provision of law to the contrary it is logical and reasonable to infer from
said provisions that its intention was to place offenses penalized
withdestierro also under the jurisdiction of justice of the peace and
municipal courts and not under that of courts of first instance.
Similarly, since offenses punishable by imprisonment of not exceeding 4
years and 2 months were within the jurisdictional ambit of the MeTCs,
MTCs and MCTCs, it follows that those penalized with censure, which is a
penalty lower than arresto menor under the graduated scale in Article 71
of the Revised Penal Code and with a duration of 1 to 30 days, should also
fall within the jurisdiction of said courts. Thus, reckless imprudence
resulting in slight physical injuries was cognizable by said courts.
As to the reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in the
amount of P8,542.00, the same was also under the jurisdiction of MeTCs,
MTCs or MCTCs because the imposable penalty therefor was arresto
mayor in its minimum and medium periods the duration of which was
from 1 month and 1 day to 4 months.
Criminal Case No. 33919 should, therefore, be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction on the part of the RTC of Makati.
VI. Prescription of the Quasi Offenses in Question.
Pursuant to Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, reckless imprudence
resulting in slight physical injuries, being a light felony, prescribes in two
months. On the other hand, reckless imprudence resulting in damage to
property in the amount of P8,542.00, being a less grave felony whose
penalty is arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, prescribes
in five years.
To resolve the issue of whether these quasi offenses have already
prescribed, it is necessary to determine whether the filing of the
complaint with the fiscal's office three days after the incident in question
tolled the running of the prescriptive period.

directly with the MeTC, RTC or MCTC without need of a prior preliminary
examination or investigation; provided that in Metropolitan Manila and
Chartered Cities, said cases may be commenced only by information."
However, this Section cannot be taken to mean that the prescriptive
period is interrupted only by the filing of a complaint or information
directly with said courts.
It must be stressed that prescription in criminal cases is a matter of
substantive law. Pursuant to Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution,
this Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, is not allowed to
diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. 37 Hence, in case of
conflict between the Rule on Summary Procedure promulgated by this
Court and the Revised Penal Code, the latter prevails.
Neither does Zaldivia control in this instance. It must be recalled that
what was involved therein was a violation of a municipal ordinance; thus,
the applicable law was not Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, but Act.
No. 3326, as amended, entitled "An Act to Establish Periods of
Prescription for Violations Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal
Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin to Run." Under
Section 2 thereof, the period of prescription is suspended only when
judicial proceedings are instituted against the guilty party. Accordingly,
this Court held that the prescriptive period was not interrupted by the
filing of the complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, as such
did not constitute a judicial proceeding; what could have tolled the
prescriptive period there was only the filing of the information in the
proper court.
In the instant case, as the offenses involved are covered by the Revised
Penal Code, Article 91 thereof and the rulings
in Francisco and Cuaresma apply. Thus, the prescriptive period for
the quasi offenses in question was interrupted by the filing of the
complaint with the fiscal's office three days after the vehicular mishap
and remained tolled pending the termination of this case. We cannot,
therefore, uphold petitioner's defense of prescription of the offenses
charged in the information in this case.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The challenge decision of
respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 14660 is SET ASIDE as the
Regional Trial Court, whose decision was affirmed therein, had no
jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 33919.
Criminal Case No. 33919 is ordered DISMISSED.
No pronouncement as to costs.

Art. 91 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. The period of
prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is
discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents,
and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint of information, and
shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without
the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped by
any reason not imputable to him. (emphasis supplied)
Notably, the aforequoted article, in declaring that the prescriptive period
"shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information," does
not distinguish whether the complaint is filed for preliminary
examination or investigation only or for an action on the merits. 33 Thus,
in Francisco v. Court of Appeals 34 and People v. Cuaresma, 35 this Court
held that the filing of the complaint even with the fiscal's office suspends
the running of the statute of limitations.
We cannot apply Section 9 36 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, which
provides that in cases covered thereby, such as offenses punishable by
imprisonment not exceeding 6 months, as in the instant case, "the
prosecution commences by the filing of a complaint or information

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 116259-60

February 20, 1996

SALVADOR P. SOCRATES, petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, THIRD DIVISION, and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x
G.R. Nos. 118896-97

February 20, 1996

SALVADOR P. SOCRATES, petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
D EC I S I O N
REGALADO, J.:
Before us are two consolidated original actions for certiorari and
prohibition filed by petitioner Salvador P. Socrates assailing the orders
and resolution issued by respondent Sandiganbayan in Criminal Cases
Nos. 18027 and 18028, both entitled "People of the Philippines vs.
Salvador P. Socrates." In G.R. Nos. 116259-60, petitioner assails the
legality of (a) the order dated February 9, 1994 denying petitioner's
Amended and Consolidated Motion to Quash the Informations; 1 (b) the
order dated May 24, 1994 denying the Motion for Reconsideration
and/or Reinvestigation; 2 and (c) the order dated July 20, 1994 denying
the Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the Order of May 24, 1994. 3 On
the other hand, in G.R. Nos. 118896-97, petitioner seeks the annulment of
the Resolution dated December 23, 1994 4 ordering the preventive
suspension of petitioner as Provincial Governor of Palawan for a period of
ninety (90) days, and to enjoin respondent court from enforcing the same.
The antecedent facts, as may be culled from the Comment filed by the
Solicitor General in G.R. Nos. 116259-60, are as follows:
Petitioner who is the incumbent governor of Palawan, was first elected
governor of the said province in 1968 and was again reelected in both the
1971 and 1980 elections, until he was replaced by private complainant
Victoriano Rodriguez as Officer-In-Charge Governor after the EDSA
Revolution in February 1986. Subsequently, both petitioner and
Rodriguez ran for governor in the 1988 elections where the latter
emerged victorious. In the 1992 synchronized national and local elections,
the two again contested the gubernatorial post; and this time, it was
petitioner who won.
Meanwhile, at the time Rodriguez was still the OIC Governor of the
province, the Provincial Government of Palawan, as represented by
Rodriguez and the Provincial Board Members of Palawan, filed before the
Office of the Tanodbayan two (2) complaints both dated December 5,
1986 and docketed as TBP No. 86-01119. The first complaint charged
petitioner with violation of Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and the
second charged petitioner, together with several other provincial officers,
with violation of Section 3(a) and (g) of the same law (Annexes "A" & "A1", respectively, Petition).
Instead of filing a counter-affidavit as directed, petitioner filed a Motion
to Suspend Preliminary Investigation dated September 3, 1987 on the
ground that upon the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, the present
Tanodbayan has been transformed into the Office of the Special
Prosecutor and has, therefore, lost his power to conduct preliminary
investigation (Annex "C", ibid.).
In a letter to the Honorable Tanodbayan dated June 23, 1988, however,
Nelia Yap-Fernandez, the Deputized Tanodbayan Prosecutor from the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa City, requested that she
be allowed to inhibit herself from handling the preliminary investigation
of the present case considering that petitioner appears to be her coprincipal sponsor in a wedding ceremony held last May 28, 1988 (Annex
"C-3", ibid.).
On January 16, 1989, the Office of the Ombudsman received a letter from
Rodriguez, who was then the incumbent governor of the province,
inquiring about the present status of TBP No. 86-01119 (Annex "D",ibid.).
In its 4th Indorsement dated February 7, 1989, the Ombudsman referred
the matter of continuing and terminating the investigation of the present

case to the newly deputized Tanodbayan Prosecutor, Sesinio Belen from

the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor (Annex "D-1", ibid.). However, the
latter, in his 5th Indorsement dated February 27, 1989 to the
Ombudsman, requested that the present case be reassigned to another
Prosecutor considering that he is a long time close friend and "compadre"
of petitioner and that one of the complainants therein Eustaquio Gacott,
Jr., who was formerly a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, is now
the Provincial Prosecutor of Palawan, his present superior (Annex "D2", ibid.).
On April 25, 1989, petitioner was directed by the Ombudsman to
comment on the letter-manifestation dated April 4, 1989 filed by
Rodriguez requesting that an amendment be effected on certain portions
of the present complaint (Annexes "E" & "E-2", ibid.). No comment having
been received by the Ombudsman as of May 24, 1989, petitioner, on an
even date, was again directed to comment thereon (Annex "E-1", ibid.).
Finally, petitioner filed his required comment dated June 2, 1989 (Annex
"E-3", ibid.).
Based on the Resolution dated August 27, 1992 of Special Prosecution
Officer I Wendell Barreras-Sulit (Annex "F-2", ibid.), which affirmed the
Resolution dated February 21, 1992 rendered by Ombudsman
Investigator Ernesto Nocos recommending the filing of appropriate
charges against petitioner, the Office of the Special Prosecutor filed on
September 16, 1992 with the respondent Court two (2) Informations
against petitioner, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 18027 and 18028. The
first was for violation of Section 3(h) of Republic Act No. 3019, and the
second for violation of Section 3(e) of the same law (Annexes "F" & "F1",ibid.).
Before his arraignment could be set, petitioner initially filed an "Urgent
Motion for Quashal of Information and/or Reinvestigation in the Light of
Supervening Facts." However, when the said motion was subsequently
called for hearing, petitioner's counsel was made to choose which of the
aforesaid two (2) conflicting motions he preferred to take up with
respondent Court. Thus, on January 18, 1993, petitioner filed an
"Amended and Consolidated Motion to Quash the Information in the
Above-entitled Cases." After an Opposition and a Reply were filed by the
prosecution and petitioner, respectively, respondent court issued its first
assailed Resolution on February 9, 1994, denying the same (Annex
"G", ibid.).
On March 15, 1994, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or
Reinvestigation, which was subsequently denied by respondent court in
its second assailed Resolution issued on May 24, 1992 (Annex "H1", ibid.). 5
Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition, docketed as
G.R. Nos. 116259-60, challenging the aforementioned orders of the
Sandiganbayan for allegedly having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It was likewise
prayed that respondent court be enjoined from taking cognizance of and
from proceeding with the arraignment of petitioner and the trial and
hearing of Criminal Cases Nos. 18027-28 pending before it. Respondents
thereafter filed their Comment to which a Reply was submitted by
petitioner.
In the meantime, no temporary restraining order having been issued by
this Court in G.R. Nos. 116259-60, respondent court proceeded with the
arraignment of herein petitioner on October 5, 1994 wherein a plea of not
guilty was entered for him by the court after he refused to do so.
Thereafter, with the denial of petitioner's motion to quash the
informations, the prosecution filed on October 11, 1994 before
respondent court a Motion to Suspend Accused Pendente Lite 6 pursuant
to Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019. Petitioner opposed said motion on
the ground that the validity of the informations filed against him is still
pending review before the Supreme Court. He further contended therein

that Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019, on which the motion to suspend
is based, is unconstitutional in that it constitutes an undue delegation of
executive power and is arbitrary and discriminatory.
In view of the filing of the motion for his suspension, petitioner filed on
October 14, 1994 in G.R. Nos. 116259-60 a Supplemental
Petition 7 questioning the veracity of and seeking to restrain respondent
court from acting on said motion to suspend pendente lite, the hearing of
which was scheduled on October 17, 1994. However, before respondents
could file their comment thereto as required by this Court, petitioner,
who initially sought the holding in abeyance of further action on his
supplemental petition until after respondent court shall have resolved the
motion to suspend pendente lite, eventually decided to withdraw the
same purportedly in order not to delay the disposition of the main
petition. Hence, on January 16, 1995, this Court issued a
resolution 8 granting the motion to withdraw the supplemental petition
and considering the petition in G.R. Nos. 116259-60 as submitted for
resolution.
In the interim, petitioner filed before respondent court on November 28,
1994 an amended motion to include as co-principals: (a) in Criminal Case
No. 18028, the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan who
authorized the purchase and repair of the vessel in question; and (b) in
Criminal Case No. 18027, the Board of Directors of ERA Technology and
Resources Corporation which entered into a contract with the Province of
Palawan. 9 Petitioner argued that the non-inclusion of these co-principals
violates his right to due process and equal protection of the laws which
thus rendered the informations null and void. It appears that the
prosecution did not oppose nor object to this amended motion.
On December 23, 1994, respondent court, without ruling on petitioner's
motion to include co-principals, issued its questioned resolution granting
the motion to suspend pendente lite and ordering the suspension of
petitioner as Provincial Governor of Palawan for a period of ninety (90)
days from notice.
His motion for the reconsideration thereof having been denied, another
petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a restraining order
was filed by petitioner on February 20, 1995 against the same
respondents, docketed as G.R. Nos. 118896-97, and which seeks to annul
as well as to enjoin respondent court from enforcing its resolution dated
December 23, 1994 ordering his suspension pendente lite. On March 8,
1995, the Court resolved to consolidate this second petition with G.R. Nos.
116259-60.
From the mosaic of the foregoing events and the incidents interjected
therein, the following pattern of contentious issues has emerged:
In G.R. Nos. 116259-60, the validity of the informations filed in Criminal
Cases Nos. 18027-28 is being contested on three grounds, viz.: (1) the
respondent court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case on the ground
that an inordinate delay of six (6) years between the conduct of the
preliminary investigation and the subsequent filing of the informations
against petitioner constitutes a violation of his constitutional rights to a
speedy disposition of the case and due process of law pursuant to
the Tatad doctrine; (2) the facts charged do not constitute an offense; and
(3) since the acts charged in the complaints filed before the Tanodbayan
are different from the charges contained in the informations, another
preliminary investigation should have been conducted, in the absence of
which there is a denial of due process.
In G.R. Nos. 118896-97, petitioner questions the validity of the
suspension order in that: (1) he may not be suspended while the issue on
the validity of the informations filed against him is still pending review
before the Supreme Court; and (2) Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019,
which forms the basis of the order of suspension, is unconstitutional on
the ground that it constitutes an undue delegation of the authority to

suspend which is essentially an executive power. Petitioner contends that

the jurisprudential doctrines relied upon by respondent court in
upholding the constitutionality of Section 13 are not applicable to the
cases at bar which involve an issue not yet passed upon by this Court. In
addition, petitioner again attacks the legality of the subject informations
for having been filed in violation of the due process and equal protection
clauses by reason of the non-inclusion therein, as co-principals, of the
members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan who approved the purchase of
the vessel, as well as the board of directors of ERA Technology and
Resource Corporation which entered into a contract with the Province of
Palawan.
I. G.R. Nos. 116259-60
1. In asserting that there was a violation of his right to a speedy trial by
reason of the unreasonable delay of six (6) years between the conduct of
the preliminary investigation and the filing of the informations, petitioner
invokes the doctrine laid down in the leading case of Tatad
vs. Sandiganbayan, et al. 10 In said case, all the affidavits and counteraffidavits had already been filed with the Tanodbayan for final disposition
as of October 25, 1982 but it was only on June 12, 1985, or three (3) years
thereafter, that the informations accusing Tatad of a violation of Republic
Act No. 3019 were filed before the Sandiganbayan. The Court held there
that an inordinate delay of three (3) years in the conduct and termination
of the preliminary investigation is violative of the constitutional rights of
the accused to due process and speedy disposition of his case, by reason
of which the informations filed against the accused therein were ordered
dismissed. It must be emphasized, however, that in the Tatad case, no
explanation or ratiocination was advanced by the prosecution therein as
to the cause of the delay.
In the present case, as distinguished from the factual milieu obtaining
in Tatad, respondent court found that the six-year delay in the
termination of the preliminary investigation was caused by petitioner's
own acts. Thus:
In the cases at bar, the record shows that delay in the filing of the
Informations in these cases was caused, not by inaction of the
prosecution, but by the following actuations of the accused:
(1) Sometime after the complaint of private complainant was filed with
the Office of the City Fiscal of the City of Puerto Princesa, preliminary
investigation was held in abeyance on account of the motion of accused
Salvador P. Socrates, entitled "Motion to Suspend Preliminary
Investigation" Suspension was prayed for until an Ombudsman, as
provided in Executive Order No. 243, shall have been appointed;
(2) Preliminary investigation was interrupted when private complainant,
then Governor Victoriano J. Rodriguez, filed on April 24, 1989, a lettermanifestation correcting the complaint;
(3) Only on September 22, 1989 did the accused in these cases file with
the Office of the Ombudsman a reply to complainant's manifestation;
(4) In view of the foregoing actuations of the parties, preliminary
investigation of these cases was started in earnest only on June 25, 1990.
Respondents then, including the accused herein, were required to submit
counter-affidavits;
(5) Interrupting preliminary proceedings again, accused Governor
Salvador P. Socrates, on August 13, 1990, filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint upon the following grounds:
(a) That the Honorable Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over the person
of respondent; and

(b) That the complaint does not conform substantially to the prescribed
form.
The private complainant was, as a matter of right, granted a period of
time within which to oppose the motion. The prosecution necessarily had
to ponder on the motion after protracted deliberations;
(6) On April 1, 1991, counsel for the accused filed an "Appearance and
Motion for Extension of Time to File Appropriate Pleading." Counsel
prayed that "respondents be granted an extension of twenty (20) days
within which to comply with the order of March 11, 1991";
(7) The accused Governor Salvador P. Socrates, through counsel, filed a
motion to quash/dismiss on December 17, 1991. This pleading was
received by the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman only on January 13,
1992. It took some time for the prosecution to resolve the motion and
there never was any intimation on the part of the accused that the
accused was invoking his right to a speedy disposition of the complaint
against him. The motion to quash/dismiss was in fact denied by the
prosecution in an order dated January 20, 1990;
(8) A motion for reconsideration having been filed thereafter, the
Informations in these cases were after all filed on September 16, 1992,
but only after the ruling of the prosecution on the motion to
quash/dismiss. 11
Petitioner, in a futile attempt to refute the foregoing factual findings of
respondent court, could only raise the defense that the motion to suspend
the preliminary investigation did not affect the proceedings therein; that
the preliminary investigation really started on February 18, 1987 when
the Tanodbayan issued subpoenas to the respondents; that the motion to
dismiss/ quash the complaints was purposely for the early termination of
the preliminary investigation; that the filing of the complaint was
politically motivated, as may be gleaned from the affidavit of complainant
Rodriguez; and that pursuant to Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court,
the case should have been resolved within ten (10) days from the time
the investigation was concluded.
Clearly, the facts of the case at bar are diametrically opposed to the
factual situation in Tatad because the obviously delaying tactics resorted
to by herein petitioner were not present in the latter case. Furthermore,
the allegation that the filing of the complaint was politically motivated
does not serve to justify the nullification of the informations where the
existence of such motive has not been sufficiently established nor
substantial evidence presented in support thereof. The situation
in Tatad was quite to the contrary since the accused therein successfully
proved that the charges were filed against him only after it became
widely known that he actually had a falling out with the late President
Marcos.
That scenario impelled the Court to make the admonition therein that
"prosecutors should not allow, and should avoid, giving the impression
that their noble office is being used or prostituted, wittingly or
unwittingly, for political ends or other purposes alien to, or subversive of,
the basic and fundamental objective of serving the interest of justice
evenhandedly, without fear or favor to any and all litigants alike, whether
rich or poor, weak or strong, powerless or mighty." Such an exigency
apparently does not obtain in the case at bar. There is nothing in the
records from which it can be conclusively inferred, expressly or impliedly,
that the investigating prosecutors were politically motivated or even
coerced into filing these criminal charges against petitioner.
We likewise do not adhere to petitioner's asseveration that the orders
issued by Branches 51 and 52 of the Regional Trial Court of Puerto
Princesa City quashing the informations for technical malversation filed
against herein petitioner, on the ground that the inordinate delay in the
termination of the preliminary investigation constitutes a violation of

petitioner's right to due process and speedy disposition of his case which
thereby ousted said courts of jurisdiction thereover, have become final
and conclusive by reason of the prosecution's' failure to file an appeal
therefrom. We have carefully scrutinized the orders adverted to and we
find and so hold that the same cannot effectively deter the prosecution
herein from proceeding with the trial before the Sandiganbayan.
First, the criminal cases for technical malversation filed before said
Regional Trial Court are different from the charges for violation of
Republic Act No. 3019 filed with the Sandiganbayan. The former is
covered by a general law while the latter involves a special law, with
variant elements of the offenses being required, hence double jeopardy
cannot set in. Second, and more importantly, it will be noted that the trial
court in the malversation case hastily concluded that there was an
inordinate delay of six (6) years in the termination of the preliminary
investigation through the mere expedient of counting the number of
years that had elapsed from the institution of the complaint with the
Ombudsman until the filing of the informations in court, without
bothering to inquire into the pertinent factual considerations and
procedural technicalities involved.
In arriving at such a self-serving conclusion, the trial court confined itself
strictly to a mathematical reckoning of the time involved, instead of
undertaking a more substantive appreciation of the circumstances and
particulars which could have possibly caused the delay. On the contrary,
herein respondent court has convincingly shown that the preliminary
investigation dragged on for several years owing, ironically, to
petitioner's evident propensity to resort to dilatory tactics. In the cases
now before us, it cannot be successfully and validly contended that
petitioner's right to speedy trial has been violated.
We have only to reiterate the declaration made in Tatad to the effect that
in the application of the constitutional guaranty of the right to speedy
disposition of cases, particular regard must also be taken of the facts and
circumstances peculiar to each case. It is palpably clear that the
application of the Tatad doctrine should not be made to rely solely on the
length of time that has passed but equal concern should likewise be
accorded to the factual ambiance and considerations. It can easily be
deduced from a complete reading of the adjudicatory discourse
in Tatad that the three-year delay was specifically considered vis-a-vis all
the facts and circumstances which obtained therein. Perforce, even on
this ground alone, the instant petition for certiorari should be dismissed.
A speedy trial is one conducted according to the law of criminal
procedure and the rules and regulations, free from vexatious, capricious
and oppressive delays. The primordial purpose of this constitutional right
is to prevent the oppression of an accused by delaying criminal
prosecution for an indefinite period of time. 12 In the cases at bar, while
there may have been some delay, it was petitioner himself who brought
about the situation of which he now complains.
2. Petitioner then questions the sufficiency of the allegations in the
informations in that the same do not constitute an offense supposedly
because (a) in Criminal Case No. 18027, there is no statement that herein
petitioner actually intervened and participated, as a board member of
ERA Technology and Resources Corporation, in the latter's contract with
the Province of Palawan, which is allegedly an element necessary to
constitute a violation of Section 3(h) of Republic Act No. 3019; and (b) in
Criminal Case No. 18028, the information failed to show a causal relation
between the act done by the accused and the undue injury caused to the
provincial government of Palawan.
With respect to the alleged defects in the information filed in Criminal
Case No. 18027 for violation of Section 3(h) of the anti-graft law,
petitioner invokes the ruling in the case of Trieste,
Sr. vs. Sandiganbayan 13 where it was held that "what is contemplated in
Section 3(h) of the anti-graft law is the actual intervention in the

transaction in which one has financial or pecuniary interest in order that

liability may attach." In the cited case, however, the Court found that the
petitioner therein did not, in any way, intervene in making the awards
and payment of the purchases in question since he signed the voucher
only after all the purchases had already been made, delivered and paid
for by the municipal treasurer.
The purchases involved therein were previously ordered by the
municipal treasurer without the knowledge and consent of the accused
municipal mayor, were subsequently delivered by the supplier, and were
thereafter paid by the treasurer again without the knowledge and
consent of the mayor. The only participation of the accused mayor in the
transaction involved the mechanical act of signing the disbursement
vouchers for record purposes only. Thus, the Court did not consider the
act therein of the accused mayor to be covered by the prohibition under
Section 3(h) of the law.
Contrariwise, in the present cases, petitioner Socrates stands charged
with a violation of Section 3(h) for intervening in his official capacity as
Governor of Palawan in reviewing and approving the disbursement
voucher dated August 2, 1982 for payment in favor of ERA Technology
Resources Corporation where he was one of the incorporators and
members of the board of directors. Such allegation clearly indicates the
nature and extent of petitioner's participation in the questioned
transaction. Without petitioner's approval, payment could not possibly
have been effected.
We likewise do not find any flaw in the information filed in Criminal Case
No. 18028, for violation of Section 3(e), which would warrant the
dismissal thereof. Evidentiary facts need not be alleged in the information
because these are matters of defense. Informations need only state the
ultimate facts; the reasons therefor could be proved during the
trial. 14 Hence, there is no need to state facts in the information which
would prove the causal relation between the act done by the accused and
the undue injury caused to the Province of Palawan. Antipodal to
petitioner's contention, a reading of the information in Criminal Case No.
18028 will readily disclose that the essential elements of the offense
charged have been sufficiently alleged therein. It is not proper, therefore,
to resolve the charges right at the outset without the benefit of a fullblown trial. The issues require a fuller ventilation and examination. Given
all the circumstances of this case, we feel it would be unwarranted to cut
off the prosecutory process at this stage of the proceedings and to dismiss
the information. 15
3. It is likewise asserted by petitioner that the elements of the offenses
charged in the complaints are different from those stated in the
informations which were filed before the Sandiganbayan, and that since
there was no preliminary investigation conducted with respect to the
latter, such informations should be declared null and void for lack of due
process.
The first complaint for violation of Section 3(b) became the basis for the
filing of an information in Criminal Case No. 18027 for a violation of
Section 3(h). In both, petitioner is accused of intervening in his official
capacity as Provincial Governor in the contracts for the installation and
construction of waterwork projects, with the ERA Technology and
Resources Corporation, where he was an incorporator and a member of
the board of directors, thereby directly or indirectly benefiting from said
transactions. In Criminal Case No. 18028, petitioner was charged with a
violation of Section 3(e) as a result of the complaint filed against him and
several others for a violation of Section 3(a) and (g). In both instances,
petitioner is charged with the disbursement of public funds for the
purchase of a motor launch which was grossly and manifestly
disadvantageous to the provincial government of Palawan because the
same broke down only after its maiden voyage.

It is thus clearly apparent that the complaints and the informations are
based on substantially the same factual settings, except that the
respective designations are different. Axiomatic is the rule that what
controls is not the designation of the offense but its description in the
complaint or information. 16 The real nature of the criminal charge is
determined not from the caption or preamble of the information nor from
the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated,
they being conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of facts in the
complaint or information. It is not the technical name given by the fiscal
appearing in the title of the information that determines the character of
the crime but the facts alleged in the body of the information. 17
This Court has repeatedly held that when the facts, acts and
circumstances are set forth in the body of an information with sufficient
certainty to constitute an offense and to apprise the defendant of the
nature of the charge against him, a misnomer or innocuous designation of
a crime in the caption or other parts of the information will not vitiate it.
In such a case, the facts set forth in the charge controls the erroneous
designation of the offense and the accused stands indicted for the offense
charged in the statement of facts. The erroneous designation may be
disregarded as surplusage. 18
Furthermore, it will be observed that it is the same section of the law
which is involved in the present case, that is, Section 3 of Republic Act No.
3019, albeit it defines several modes of committing the same offense. It is
an old and well-settled rule in the appreciation of indictments that where
an offense may be committed in any of several different modes, and the
offense, in any particular instance, is alleged to have been committed in
two or more of the modes specified, it is sufficient to prove the offense
committed through any one of them, provided that it be such as to
constitute the substantive offense. Thereafter, a judgment of conviction
must be sustained if it appears from the evidence in the record that the
accused was guilty as charged of any one of these modes of the offense.19
Neither will the absence of a preliminary investigation, assuming that it is
necessary to conduct a new one, affect the validity of the informations
filed against petitioner. It has been consistently held that the absence of a
preliminary investigation does not impair the validity of the criminal
information or render it defective. Dismissal of the case is not the
remedy. 20 It is not a ground for the quashal of a complaint or information.
The proper course of action that should be taken is for the Sandiganbayan
to hold in abeyance the proceedings upon such information and to
remand the case to the office of the Ombudsman for him or the Special
Prosecutor to conduct a preliminary investigation 21 if the accused
actually makes out a case justifying such relief.
On the bases of the foregoing disquisitions, therefore, we rule and so hold
that the informations filed against petitioner are valid and legal.
II. G.R. Nos. 118896-97
The main issue submitted herein for resolution is the legality of the
petitioner's preventive suspension, which is premised on several grounds.
1. Initially, petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan committed a grave
abuse of discretion in ordering his suspension despite the fact that the
validity of the informations filed against him is still pending review
before the Supreme Court. In support thereof, he invokes the rule laid
down in Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corporation vs. Court of appeals,
et al. 22 that even if no temporary restraining order was issued by the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals could have refrained from taking
any action while the petition for certiorari was pending with the Supreme
Court. Petitioner insists that this is what respondent court should have
done. Under this particular issue, petitioner is in effect seeking a review
of the order issued by the Sandiganbayan, dated February 9, 1994,
denying his amended and consolidated motion to quash the information.

We have but to reiterate the fundamental rule that an order denying a

motion to quash is interlocutory and therefore not appealable, nor can it
be the subject of a petition for certiorari. Such order may only be
reviewed in the ordinary course of law by an appeal from the judgment
after trial. 23 In other words, it cannot be the subject of appeal until the
judgment or a final order is rendered. The ordinary procedure to be
followed in that event is to enter a plea, go to trial and if the decision is
adverse, reiterate the issue on appeal from the final judgment. 24Although
the special civil action for certiorari may be availed of in case there is a
grave abuse of discretion or lack of jurisdiction, that vitiating error is not
attendant in the present case.
Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 provides that:
Sec. 13. Suspension and Loss of Benefits. Any incumbent public officer
against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under
this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any
offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property
whether as a simple or as complex offense and in whatever stage of
execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be
suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall
lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is
acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and
benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the
meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against him. 25
This Court has ruled that under Section 13 of the anti-graft law, the
suspension of a public officer is mandatory after the validity of the
information has been upheld in a pre-suspension hearing conducted for
that purpose. This pre-suspension hearing is conducted to determine
basically the validity of the information, from which the court can have a
basis to either suspend the accused and proceed with the trial on the
merits of the case, or correct any part of the proceeding which impairs its
validity. The hearing may be treated in the same -manner as a challenge
to the validity of the information by way of a motion to quash. 26
In the leading case of Luciano, et al. vs. Mariano, et al. 27 we have set out
the guidelines to be followed by the lower courts in the exercise of the
power of suspension under Section 13 of the law, to wit:
(c) By way of broad guidelines for the lower courts in the exercise of the
power of suspension from office of public officers charged under a valid
information under the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 or under the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery, pursuant to Section 13
of said Act, it may be briefly stated that upon the filing of such
information, the trial court should issue an order with proper notice
requiring the accused officer to show cause at a specific date of hearing
why he should not be ordered suspended from office pursuant to the
cited mandatory provisions of the Act. Where either the prosecution
seasonably files a motion for an order of suspension or the accused in
turn files a motion to quash the information or challenges the validity
thereof, such show-cause order of the trial court would no longer be
necessary. What is indispensable is that the trial court duly hear the
parties at a hearing held for determining the validity of the information,
and thereafter hand down its ruling, issuing the corresponding order or
suspension should it uphold the validity of the information or withhold
such suspension in the contrary case.
(d) No specific rules need be laid down for such pre-suspension hearing.
Suffice it to state that the accused should be given a fair and adequate
opportunity to challenge the validity of the criminal proceedings against
him, e.g., that he has not been afforded the right of due preliminary
investigation; that the acts for which he stands charged do not constitute
a violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 or of the bribery
provisions of the Revised Penal Code which would warrant his
mandatory suspension from office under Section 13 of the Act; or he may
present a motion to quash the information on any of the grounds

provided in Rule 117 of the Rules of Court. The mandatory suspension

decreed by the Act upon determination of the pendency in court of a
criminal prosecution for violation of the Anti-Graft Act or for bribery
under a valid information requires at the same time that the hearing be
expeditious, and not unduly protracted such as to thwart the prompt
suspension envisioned by the Act. Hence, if the trial court, say, finds the
ground alleged in the quashal motion not to be indubitable, then it shall
be called upon to issue the suspension order upon its upholding the
validity of the information and setting the same for trial on the merits.
With the aforequoted jurisprudential authority as the basis, it is evident
that upon a proper determination of the validity of the information, it
becomes mandatory for the court to immediately issue the suspension
order. The rule on the matter is specific and categorical. It leaves no room
for interpretation. It is not within the court's discretion to hold in
abeyance the suspension of the accused officer on the pretext that the
order denying the motion to quash is pending review before the appellate
courts. Its discretion lies only during the pre-suspension hearing where it
is required to ascertain whether or not (1) the accused had been afforded
due preliminary investigation prior to the filing of the information against
him, (2) the acts for which he was charged constitute a violation of the
provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 or of the provisions of Title 7, Book II
of the Revised Penal Code, or (3) the informations against him can be
quashed, under any of the grounds provided in Section 2, Rule 117 of the
Rules of Court. 28
Once the information is found to be sufficient in form and substance, then
the court must issue the order of suspension as a matter of course. There
are no ifs and buts about it. This is because a preventive suspension is not
a penalty. It is not imposed as a result of judicial proceedings. In fact, if
acquitted, the official concerned shall be entitled to reinstatement and to
the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension. In
view of this latter provision, the accused elective public officer does not
stand to be prejudiced by the immediate enforcement of the suspension
order in the event that the information is subsequently declared null and
void on appeal and the case dismissed as against him. Taking into
consideration the public policy involved in preventively suspending a
public officer charged under a valid information, the protection of public
interest will definitely have to prevail over the private interest of the
accused. 29
To further emphasize the ministerial duty of the court under Section 13 of
Republic Act No. 3019, it is said that the court trying a case has neither
discretion nor duty to determine whether or not a preventive suspension
is required to prevent the accused from using his office to intimidate
witnesses or frustrate his prosecution or continue committing
malfeasance in office. The presumption is that unless the accused is
suspended, he may frustrate his prosecution or commit further acts of
malfeasance or do both, in the same way that upon a finding that there is
probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed and that the
accused is probably guilty thereof, the law requires the judge to issue a
warrant for the arrest of the accused. The law does not require the court
to determine whether the accused is likely to escape or evade the
jurisdiction of the court. 30
Applying now the procedure outlined in Luciano, the records of the
instant case do not show that the proceedings leading to the filing of the
informations against petitioner were tainted with any irregularity so as to
invalidate the same. Likewise, the informations show that the allegations
contained therein meet the essential elements of the offense as defined by
the substantive law. The record is also bereft of undisputed facts to
warrant the quashal of the informations under any of the grounds
provided in Section 2, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court. 31 Finally, a cursory
reading of the order dated February 9, 1994 issued by respondent court
will show that petitioner was given the opportunity to be heard on his
motion to quash. Veritably, the Sandiganbayan did not commit a grave

abuse of discretion in denying the motion to quash and ordering the

preventive suspension of herein petitioner.
2. Additionally, petitioner avers that the informations filed against him on
which the order of suspension was based, are null and void in view of the
non-inclusion of his co-principals which thus constitutes a violation of
petitioner's right to due process and equal protection of the law and,
therefore, ousted respondent court of its jurisdiction over the case.
Petitioner alleges that in Criminal Case No. 18027, the board of directors
of ERA Technology Corporation should have been included as principals
by indispensable cooperation because without them he could not possibly
have committed the offense.
Also, he claims that in Criminal Case No. 18028, the members of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan who issued the resolutions authorizing the
purchase and repair of the motor launch should likewise have been
included as principals by inducement or indispensable cooperation,
considering that petitioner was allegedly merely implementing their
resolutions. Hence, according to him, since the informations are null and
void, the suspension order which is based thereon should necessarily also
be declared null and void. We find no merit in petitioner's arguments.
First, the rule under Section 1, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, as
reformulated in Section 2, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, is that all criminal actions must be commenced either by
complaint or information in the name of the People of the Philippines
"against all persons who appear to be responsible for the offense
involved." The law makes it a legal duty for prosecuting officers to file the
charges against whomsoever the evidence may show to be responsible
for an offense. This does not mean, however, that they shall have no
discretion at all; their discretion lies in determining whether the evidence
submitted justify a reasonable belief that a person has committed an
offense. What the rule demands is that all persons who appear
responsible shall be charged in the information, which conversely implies
that those against whom no sufficient evidence of guilt exists are not
required to be included.32
This notwithstanding, it has equally been ruled that the failure of the
fiscal to include the other public officials who appear to be responsible
for the offense charged as co-accused in the information filed against the
accused does not in any way vitiate the validity of the information under
the Rules.33
Second, a failure to include other persons who appear to be responsible
for the crime charged is not one of the grounds provided under Section 3,
Rule 117 for which a motion to quash the information against the accused
may be filed, most especially in the case at bar where there is prima
facie proof that petitioner is probably guilty of the offense charged, aside
from the fact that there is no allegation of conspiracy in the informations.
Besides, such an infirmity would neither have the effect of extinguishing
or mitigating petitioner's liability if he is subsequently found guilty of the
offense charged. No one would contend that if for lack of knowledge of
the facts, by mistake or for any other reason the prosecuting officer fails
to include the names of one or more persons in an information filed by
him, who were in fact guilty participants in the commission of the crime
charged therein, such persons will be relieved of criminal liability; or that
those accused who have been charged with the offense, brought to trial,
and found guilty will be permitted to escape punishment merely because
it develops in the course of the trial, or after the trial, that there were
other guilty participants in the crime.34
Granting arguendo that this plaint of petitioner may be invoked as a
ground for the quashal of the informations, the motion to quash must still
be denied for having been filed only after petitioner had been arraigned.
Section 8, Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides
that "(t)he failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to
quash before he pleads to the complaint or information, either because he

did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion,
shall be deemed a waiver of the grounds of a motion to quash, except the
grounds of no offense charged, lack of jurisdiction over the offense
charged, extinction of the offense or penalty and jeopardy." The failure to
include a co-accused is not covered by the exception; hence, the same is
deemed waived.
Third, where the government prosecutor unreasonably refuses to file an
information or to include a person as an accused therein despite the fact
that the evidence clearly warrants such action, the offended party has the
following remedies: (1) in case of grave abuse of discretion, he may file an
action for mandamus to compel the prosecutor to file such information; (2)
he may lodge a new complaint against the offenders before the
Ombudsman and have a new examination conducted as required by law;
(3) he may institute administrative charges against the erring prosecutor,
or a criminal complaint under Article 208 of the Revised Penal Code, or a
civil action for damages under Article 27 of the Civil Code; (4) he may
secure the appointment of another prosecutor; or (5) he may institute
another criminal action if no double jeopardy is involved.
Fourth, it is significant and demonstrative of petitioner's strategy that
from the inception of the criminal complaint before the Ombudsman and
during the conduct of the preliminary investigation, until the filing of the
informations before the Sandiganbayan and up to the denial of his
amended and consolidated motion to quash, herein petitioner has not
been heard to complain about the alleged non-inclusion of the other
supposed offenders. Indeed, it is now much too late for petitioner to
invoke and exploit this particular unfounded issue.
Prescinding from the averments raised in the complaint and information,
from the facts and evidence of record, we do not deem it necessary to
include the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan and
the board members of the ERA Technology and Resources Corporation as
co-accused in the informations filed against herein petitioner. Insofar as
the board members of said corporation are concerned, they may be
prosecuted only under Section 4(b) of Republic Act No. 3019 which
provides that "(i)t shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to induce
or cause any public official to commit any of the offenses defined in
Section 3 thereof." In the information filed in Criminal Case No. 18027,
petitioner stands charged with a violation of Section 3(h). It does not
contain any allegation to the effect that the board members knowingly
induced or caused herein petitioner to commit the offense defined
therein, which is an essential element of the crime in Section 4(b).
Indubitably, therefore, the board members cannot be included as coprincipals in Criminal Case No. 18027.
On the other hand, the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan cannot
likewise be included in the information for violation of Section 3(e) filed
in Criminal Case No. 18028, for the simple reason that it is not the validity
of their resolution which is in issue here. While it is true that
said sanggunian passed a resolution authorizing the allocation of funds
for the purchase of a motor launch, and that petitioner merely acted on
the strength thereof, it is not the fact of such authorization which is the
subject of the charges against petitioner but rather the manner by which
that resolution was implemented by the latter. There is nothing in the
averments in the information from which it could be inferentially
deduced that the members of the sanggunian participated, directly or
indirectly, in the purchase of the vessel, and which fact could be the basis
for their indictment.
3. Lastly, petitioner questions the legality of his suspension on the ground
that Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019, which is the basis thereof, is
unconstitutional for being an undue delegation of executive power to the
Sandiganbayan. He postulates that the power of suspension, which is an
incident of the power of removal, is basically administrative and
executive in nature. He further submits that the power of removal vested
in the court under Section 9 of Republic Act No. 3019 is an incident of

conviction, that is, it can only be exercised after a conviction has been
handed down. Hence, according to petitioner, since the power to suspend
is merely incidental to the power of removal, the former can only be
exercised as an incident to conviction. Also, considering that Section 13
authorizes the court to exercise the power of suspension even prior to
conviction of the accused, it cannot be considered as an exercise of
judicial power because it is not within the ambit of the court's power of
removal. In addition, petitioner avers that Section 13 is arbitrary and
discriminatory because it serves no purpose at all, in that it does not
require a proceeding to determine if there is sufficient ground to suspend,
except for the fact that it is required by law.
Although presented differently, the issue on the court's power of
suspension under Section 13 has been squarely and directly raised and
adjudicated in the case of Luciano vs. Provincial Governor, et al.,35 the
pronouncements wherein we quote in extenso:
3. Proceeding from our holding that suspension is not automatic, who
should exercise the mandatory act of suspension under Section 13 of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act?
Three theories have been advanced. One is that the power of suspension
where a criminal case has already been filed in court still is with the
Provincial Governor, relying on Section 2188 of the Revised
Administrative Code. Another is that, following the ruling in Sarcos vs.
Castillo . . ., because the main respondents are elective municipal officials,
that power of suspension must be held to repose in the Provincial Board,
under Section 5 of the Decentralization Act of 1967 (Republic Act 5185).
The third is that, by Section 13 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
solely the court in which the criminal case has been filed shall wield the
power of suspension.
We opt for the third. Common sense and the scheme of the law so dictate.
It is true that nothing in Section 13 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act grants with specificity upon the Court of First Instance the power to
suspend an official charged with a violation thereof. It would seem to us
though that suspensions by virtue of criminal proceedings are separate
and distinct from suspensions in administrative cases. An accurate
reading of Section 13 yields two methods of investigation, one separate
from the other: one criminal before the courts of justice, and the other
administrative. This is the plain import of the last sentence of Section 13,
which says that if acquitted, defendant in an Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices case "shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and
benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the
meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against him." Our
interpretation but preserves, as it should, the substantial symmetry
between the first part of Section 13 and the last part thereof just quoted.
And so, there is in this legal provision a recognition that once a case is
filed in court, all other acts connected with the discharge of court
functions which here include suspension should be left to the Court of
First Instance.
Not that this view finds no statutory support. By Section 9 of the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act, the court is empowered to punish any
public official committing any of the unlawful acts or omissions
enumerated in Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the law, amongst others, to
"perpetual disqualification from public office." Here, the Makati elective
officials heretofore named have been charged with and found guilty of a
violation of Section 3(8) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and
were sentenced by the court below, amongst others, to be "perpetually
disqualified to hold office." Article 30 of the Revised Penal Code declares
that the penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification entails "(t)he
deprivation of the public offices and employments which the offender
may have held, even if conferred by popular election." No stretch of the
imagination is necessary to show that perpetual absolute disqualification

which, in effect, is encompassed in the punishment set forth in Section 9

of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act covers that. of removal from
the office which each of the respondent municipal official holds.
Since removal from office then is within the power of the court, no
amount of judicial legerdemain would deprive the court of the power to
suspend. Reason for this is that suspension necessarily is included in the
greater power of removal. It is without doubt that Congress has power to
authorize courts to suspend public officers pending court proceedings for
removal and that the congressional grant is not violative of the separation
of powers. For, our Constitution being silent, we are not to say that from
Congress is withheld the power to decide the mode or procedure of
suspension and removal of public officers.
A look into the legislative intent, along with the legislative scheme,
convinces us the more that the power of suspension should be lodged
with the court. While the law may not be a model of precise verbal
structure, the intent is there. Section 13 requires as a pre-condition of the
power to suspend that there be a valid information. Validity of
information, of course, is determined by the Court of First Instance where
the criminal case is pending. That is essentially a judicial function.
Suspension is a sequel to that finding, an incident to the criminal
proceedings before the court. Indeed, who can suspend except one who
knows the facts upon which suspension is based? We draw support
from Lacson vs. Roque, supra, at page 469: "We are certain that no
authority or good reason can be found in support of a proposition that the
Chief Executive can suspend an officer facing criminal charges for the sole
purpose of aiding the court in the administration of justice. Independent
of the other branches of the Government, the courts can well take care of
their own administration of the law.
The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, an important legislation, should
not be artificially construed so as to exclude the courts from the power to
suspend a prime tool designed by Congress to prevent the power which
an official wields from frustrating the purity and certainty of the
administration of justice. Surely, we should not be pedantically exacting
in reading its provisions. We should rather say that if the court's power of
suspension incident to the court proceedings is to be withheld of
narrowed by construction, Congress should have spelled it out in no
uncertain terms. . . .
The Court then hastened to clarify that such a view may not be taken as
an encroachment upon the power of suspension given other officials,
reiterating in the process that a line should be drawn between
administrative proceedings and criminal actions in court, that one is
apart from the other. Elucidating further on the possible danger which
may arise if the power of suspension, in consequence of a criminal action
under Republic Act No. 3019 is vested in any authority other than the
court, it declared that:
There is reasonable ground to believe that Congress did really apprehend
danger should the power of suspension in consequence of a criminal case
under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act be lodged in any authority
other than the court. Quite apart from the fact that the court has a better
grasp of the situation, there is one other factor, and that is, the rights of
the person accused. The court could very well serve as a lever to balance
in one equation the public interests involved and the interests of the
defendant. And then, there is the danger that partisan politics may creep
in. The hand of political oppression cannot just be ignored especially if
the majority members of the Provincial Board and the defendant public
local elective officer are on opposite sides of the political fence. Power
may be abused. Conversely, if both are of the same political persuasion,
the suspending authority will display reluctance in exercising the power
of suspension. It is thus that the statute should catch up with the realities
of political life. There is indeed the dispiriting lesson that in a clash
between political considerations and conscience it is the latter that quite
often gets dented. . . .

xxx

xxx

xxx

Therefore, since suspension is incident to removal and should proceed

from one who should logically do so, and considering that in the
operation of a given statute fairness must have been in the mind of the
legislators, we brush aside needless refinements, and rule that under
Section 13 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, once a valid
information upon the provisions thereof is lodged with the Court of First
Instance, that court has the inescapable duty to suspend the public official
indicted thereunder.
These cases have long been on the line, unduly stretched beyond their
logical parameters and the permissible time frame. Indeed, it is high time,
ironically in fairness to petitioner himself, that the same be now calcined
in the judicial crucible into their ultimate configuration.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 116259-60
and 118896-97 are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit, with costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-33628 December 29, 1987
BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE, SANTIAGO EISMA, MIRUFO CELERIAN, JOSE
SAYSON, CESAR TABILIRAN, and MAXIMO ADLAWAN, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUDGE MELQUIADES B. SUCALDITO, RUFINO LABANG,
MENELEO MESINA, ARTURO GUILLERMO, IN THEIR RESPECTIVE
CAPACITIES AS JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
ZAMBOANGA DEL SUR, CITY FISCAL OF PAGADIAN CITY AND STATE
PROSECUTOR, and ANTI-GRAFT LEAGUE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
INC., respondents.
No. L-34162 December 29, 1987
BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUDGE ASAALI S. ISNANI, RUFINO LABANG, ALBERTO S. LIM, JR.,
JESUS ACEBES, IN THEIR RESPECTIVE CAPACITIES AS JUDGE OF THE
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF ZAMBOANGA DEL SUR, CITY FISCAL
OF PAGADIAN CITY AND STATE PROSECUTORS, ANTI-GRAFT
LEAGUE OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., and ARTEMIO
ROMANILLOS, respondents.

On June 16, 1971 and October 8, 1971, respectively, we issued temporary

restraining orders directing the respondents (in both petitions) to desist
from further proceedings in the cases in question until further orders
from the Court. At the same time, we gave due course to the petitions and
accordingly, required the respondents to answer.
The petitions raise pure question of law. The facts are hence, undisputed.
On September 26, 1970, the private respondent Anti-Graft League of the
Philippines, Inc., filed a complaint with the respondent City Fiscal,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 1-70 thereof, for violation of the provisions
of the Anti-Graft Law as well as Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, as
follows:
xxx xxx xxx
SPECIFICATION NO. I
That on or about October 10, 1969, above-named respondents, conspiring
and confabulating together, allegedly conducted a bidding for the supply
of gravel and sand for the Province of Zamboanga del Sur: that it was
made to appear that Tabiliran Trucking Company won the bidding; that,
thereafter, the award and contract pursuant to the said simulated bidding
were effected and executed in favor of Tabiliran Trucking Company; that,
in truth and in fact, the said bidding was really simulated and the papers
on the same were falsified to favor Tabiliran Trucking Company,
represented by the private secretary of respondent Bienvenido Ebarle,
formerly confidential secretary of the latter; that said awardee was given
wholly unwarranted advantage and preference by means of manifest
partiality; that respondent officials are hereby also charged with interest
for personal gain for approving said award which was manifestly
irregular and grossly unlawful because the same was facilitated and
committed by means of falsification of official documents.
SPECIFICATION NO. II
That after the aforecited award and contract, Tabiliran Trucking
Company, represented by respondent Cesar Tabiliran, attempted to
collect advances under his trucking contract in the under his trucking
contract in the amount of P4,823.95 under PTA No. 3654; that the same
was not passed in audit by the Provincial Auditor in view of the then
subsisting contract with Tecson Trucking Company; which was to expire
on November 2, 1969; that nevertheless the said amount was paid and it
was made to appear that it was collected by Tecson Trucking Company,
although there was nothing due from tile latter and the voucher was
never indorsed or signed by the operator of Tecson Trucking; and that in
facilitating and consummating the aforecited collection, respondent
officials, hereinabove cited, conspired and connived to the great prejudice
and damage of the Provincial Government of Zamboanga del Sur. 1
xxx xxx xxx

SARMIENTO, J.:
The petitioner, then provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Sur and a
candidate for reelection in the local elections of 1971, seeks injunctive
relief in two separate petitions, to enjoin further proceedings in Criminal
Cases Nos. CCC XVI-4-ZDS, CCC XVI-6-ZDS, and CCC XVI-8-ZDS of the then
Circuit Criminal Court sitting in Pagadian City, as well as I.S. Nos. 1-70, 271, 4-71, 5-71, 6-71, and 7-71 of the respondent Fiscal's office of the said
city, all in the nature of prosecutions for violation of certain provisions of
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019) and
various provisions of the Revised Penal Code, commenced by the
respondent Anti-Graft League of the Philippines, Inc.

On the same date, the private respondent commenced Criminal Case No.
2-71 of the respondent City Fiscal, another proceeding for violation of
Republic Act No. 3019 as well as Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code.
The complaint reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
That on or about April 8, 1970, a bidding was held for the construction of
the right wing portion of the Capitol Building of the Province of
Zamboanga del Sur, by the Bidding Committee composed of respondents
cited hereinabove; that the said building was maliciously manipulated so
as to give wholly unwarranted advantage and preference in favor of the,
supposed winning bidder, Codeniera Construction, allegedly owned and
managed by Wenceslao Codeniera, brother-in-law of the wife of
respondent Bienvenido Ebarle; that respondent official is interested for

personal gain because he is responsible for the approval of the manifestly

irregular and unlawful award and contract aforecited; and that,
furthermore, respondent, being a Member of the Bidding Committee, also
violated Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, by making it appear in the
very abstract of bids that another interested bidder, was not interested in
the bidding, when in truth and in fact, it was not so. 2

Melquiades Sucaldito presiding, on prohibition and mandamus (Special

Case No. 1000) praying at the same time, for a writ of preliminary
injunction to enjoin further proceedings therein. The court granted
preliminary injunctive relief (restraining order) for which the Anti-Graft
League filed a motion to have the restraining order lifted and to have the
petition itself dismissed.

xxx xxx xxx

On May 14, 1971, the respondent, Judge Sucaldito, handed down the first
of the two challenged orders, granting Anti-Graft League's motion and
dismissing Special Case No. 1000.

On January 26, 1971, the private respondent instituted I.S. No. 4-71 of the
respondent Fiscal, a prosecution for violation of Articles 182, 183, and
318 of the Revised Penal Code, as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
That on or about April 4, 1967, in Pagadian City, said respondent testified
falsely under oath in Cadastral Case No. N-17, LRC CAD REC. NO. N-468,
for registration of title to Lot No. 2545 in particular;
That respondent BIENVENIDO EBARLE testified falsely under oath during
the hearing and reception of evidence that he acquired said lot by
purchase from a certain Brigido Sanchez and that he is the owner, when
in truth and in fact Lot 2545 had been previously acquired and is owned
by the provincial Government of Zamboanga del Sur, where the provincial
jail building is now located.
2. That aforesaid deceit, false testimony and untruthful statement of
respondent in said Cadastral case were made knowingly to the great
damage and prejudice of the Provincial Government of Zamboanga del
Sur in violation of aforecited provisions of the Revised Penal Code. 3
On February 10, 1971, finally, the private respondent filed a complaint,
docketed as I.S. No. 5-71 of the respondent Fiscal, an action for violation
of Republic Act No. 3019 and Articles 171 and 213 of the Revised Penal
Code, as follows:

On June 11, 1971, the petitioner came to this Court on certiorari with
prayer for a temporary restraining order (G.R. No. 33628). As we said, we
issued a temporary restraining order on June 16, 1971.
Meanwhile, and in what would begin yet another series of criminal
prosecutions, the private respondent, on April 26, 1971, filed three
complaints, subsequently docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. CCC XVI-4-ZDS,
CCC XVI-6-ZDS, and CCC XVI-8-ZDS of the Circuit Criminal Court of
Pagadian City for violation of various provisions of the Anti-Graft Law as
well as Article 171(4) of the Revised Penal Code, as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
That on or about December 18, 1969, in Pagadian City, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE, Provincial
Governor of Zamboanga del Sur, did then and there unlawfully and
feloniously extended and gave ELIZABETH EBARLE MONTESCLAROS,
daughter of his brother, his relative by consanguinity within the third
degree, and appointment as Private Secretary in the Office of the
Provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Sur, although he well know that
the latter is related with him within the third degree by consanguinity.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 5
xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx
We hereby respectfully charge the above-named respondents for
violation of Sec. 3, R.A. No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Articles 171 and 213, Revised Penal Code and the
rules and regulations of public bidding, committed as follows:
1. That on June 16, 1970, without publication, respondents conducted the
so-called "bidding" for the supply of gravel and sand for the province of
Zamboanga del Sur; that said respondents, without any valid or legal
ground, did not include or even open the bid of one Jesus Teoson that was
seasonably submitted, despite the fact that he is a registered duly
qualified operator of "Teoson Trucking Service," and notwithstanding his
compliance with all the rules and requirements on public bidding; that,
instead, aforecited respondents illegally and irregularly awarded said
contract to Cesar Tabiliran, an associate of respondent Governor
Bienvenido Ebarle; and

That on or about December 18, 1969, in Pagadian City, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE, then and
there unlawfully and feloniously made untruthful statements in a
narration of facts by accomplishing and issuing a certificate, to wit: ,
c. That the provisions of law and rules on promotion, seniority and
nepotism have been observed.
required by law in such cases, in support of the appointment he extended
to ELIZABETH EBARLE-MONTESCLAROS as Private Secretary in the
Office of the Provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Sur, although he well
know that the latter is related with him within the third degree of
consanguinity.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 6

2. That in truth and in fact, aforesaid "bidding" was really simulated and
papers were falsified or otherwise "doctored" to favor respondent Cesar
Tabiliran thereby giving him wholly unwarranted advantage, preference
and benefits by means of manifest partiality; and that there is a statutory
presumption of interest for personal gain because the transaction and
award were manifestly irregular and contrary to applicable law, rules and
regulations. 4
xxx xxx xxx
The petitioner initially moved to dismiss the aforesaid preliminary
investigations, but the same having been denied, he went to the
respondent Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Sur, the Honorable

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx
That on or about December 18, 1969, in Pagadian City, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE, then and
there unlawfully and feloniously made untruthful statements in a
narration of facts by accomplishing and issuing a certificate, to wit:
c. That the provisions of law and rules on promotion, seniority and
nepotism have been observed.

required by law in such cases, in support of the appointment he extended

to TERESITO MONTESCLAROS, husband of his niece Elizabeth Ebarle, as
Motor Pool Dispatcher, Office of the Provincial Engineer of Zamboanga
del Sur, although he well knew that the latter is related with him within
the third degree affinity.

Engineer of Zamboanga del Sur, although he wen knew then that the
latter was not qualified to such appointment as it was in violation of the
Civil Service Law, thereby knowingly granting and giving unwarranted
advantage and preference in the discharge of his administrative function
through manifest partiality.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 7

II. SPECIFICATION FOR VIOLATION OF SECTION 4 (b), R.A. 3019

xxx xxx xxx

That on August 19, 1967, respondent BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE, Governor

of Zamboanga del Sur, taking advantage of his position caused, persuaded,
induced, or influence the Presiding Judge to perform irregular and
felonious act in violation of applicable law or constituting an offense into
awarding and decreeing Lot 2645 of the Pagadian Public Lands
subdivision to him who, according to the records of the case, failed to
establish his rights of ownership pursuant to the provisions of the Land
Registration law and the Public Land Act, it appearing that the Provincial
Government of Zamboanga del Sur as and is a claimant and in adverse
possession of Lot 2545 whereon the Provincial Jail Building thereon still
stands.

Subsequently, on August 23, 1971, the private respondent brought I.S. No.
6-71 of the respondent Pagadian City Fiscal against the petitioner, still
another proceeding for violation of Republic Act No. 3019 and Article 171
(4) of the Revised Penal Code, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
First Count.
That on or about December 1, 1969, in Pagadian City, BIENVENIDO A.
EBARLE, Provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Sur, did then and there
unlawfully and feloniously extended and gave MARIO EBARLE, son of his
brother, his relative by consanguinity within the third degree, an
appointment as SECURITY GUARD in the Office of the Provincial Engineer
of Zamboanga del Sur although he well knew that the latter is related
with him in the third degree by consanguinity and is not qualified under
the Civil Service Law.
Second Count.
That in January, 1970, at Pagadian City, Gov. BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE
replaced JOHNNY ABABONwho was then the incumbent Motor Pool
Dispatcher in the Office of the Provincial Engineer of Zamboanga del Sur
with his nephew-in-law TERESITO MONTESCLAROS relative by affinity
within the third Civil degree, in violation of the Civil Service Law, this
knowingly causing undue injury in the discharge of his administrative
function through manifest partiality against said complaining employee.
Third Count:

III. SPECIFICATION FOR VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 171 (4), REVISED

PENAL CODE
First Count.
That on or about December 18, 1969, in Pagadian City, BIENVENIDO A.
EBARLE, then and there unlawfully and feloniously made untruthful
statement in a narration of facts by accomplishing and issuing a
certificate, to wit:
c. That the provisions of law and rules on promotion, seniority and
nepotism have been observed.
required by law in such cases, in support of the appointment he extended
to TERESITO MONTESCLAROS, husband of his niece ELIZABETH EBARLE,
as Motor Pool Dispatcher, Office of the Provincial Engineer of Zamboanga
del Sur, although he wen knew that the latter is related with him within
the third degree of affinity and is in violation of the Civil Service Law.
Second Count.

That on or about December 18, 1969, in Pagadian City, BIENVENIDO A.

EBARLE, Provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Sur, did then and there
unlawfully and feloniously extended and gave ELIZABETH EBARLE
MONTESCLAROS, daughter of his brother, his relative by consanguinity
within the third degree, an appointment as Private Secretary in the Office
of the Provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Sur, although he well know
that the latter is related with him within the third degree of consanguinity,
and said appointment is in violation of the Civil Service Law.
Fourth Count.
That on or about January 22, 1970, in Pagadian City, BIENVENIDO A.
EBARLE, Provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Sur, did then and there
unlawfully and feloniously extended and gave ZACARIAS UGSOD, JR., son
of the younger sister of Governor Ebarle, his relative by consanguinity
within the third degree, an appointment as Architectural Draftsman in the
Office of the Provincial Engineer of Zamboanga del Sur although he well
know that the latter is related with him in the third degree of
consanguinity.

That on or about December 18, 1969, in Pagadian City, BIENVENIDO A.

EBARLE, then and there unlawfully and feloniously made untruthful
statements a certificate, to wit:
c. That the provisions of the law and rules on promotion, seniority and
nepotism have been observed.
required by law in such cases, in support of the appointment he extended
to ELIZABETH EBARLE-MONTESCLAROS as Private Secretary in the
Office of the Provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Sur, although he well
knew that the latter is related with him within the third degree of
consanguinity, and is in violation of the Civil Service Law. CONTRARY to
aforecited laws. 8
xxx xxx xxx
On September 21, 1971, the private respondent instituted I.S. No. 7-71 of
the said City Fiscal, again charging the petitioner with further violations
of Republic Act No. 3019 thus:

Fifth Count.
xxx xxx xxx
That on February 5, 1970, at Pagadian City, BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE,
Provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Sur, did then and there unlawfully
and feloniously extended and gave TERESITO MONTESCLAROS, husband
of his niece ELIZABETH EBARLE, his relative by affinity within the third
degree, an appointment as Motor Pool Dispatcher, Office of the Provincial

First Count.
That on or about December 2, 1969, in Pagadian City, BIENVENIDO
EBARLE, Provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Sur, did then and there
unlawfully and feloniously extend and give unwarranted benefits and

privileges BONINDA EBARLE, wife of his brother Bertuldo Ebarle, the

former being his relative by affinity within the second civil degree, an
appointment as LABORATORY TECHNICIAN in Pagadian City, although he
well knew that the latter is related to him in the second degree by affinity
and is not qualified under the Civil Service Law.

He likewise submits that the prosecutions in question are politically

motivated, initiated by his rivals, he being, as we said, a candidate for
reelection as Governor of Zamboanga del Sur.

Second Count.

The petitioner's reliance upon the provisions of Executive Order No. 264
has no merit. We reproduce the Order in toto:

That on or about January 1, 1970, at Pagadian City, BIENVENIDO EBARLE,

Provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Sur, did then and there unlawfully
and feloniously extend and give unwarranted benefits and privileges
JESUS EBARLE, nephew of said respondent, an appointment as DRIVER of
the Provincial Engineer's Office, Pagadian City, although he well knew
that Jesus Ebarle is related to him within the third civil degree by
consanguinity and is not qualified under the Civil Service Law.
Third Count.
That on or about November 1, 1969, at Pagadian City, BIENVENIDO
EBARLE, Provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Sur, did then and there
unlawfully and feloniously extend and give unwarranted benefits and
privileges PHENINA CODINERA, sister-in-law of said respondent, an
appointment as CONFIDENTIAL ASSISTANT in the Office of the Provincial
Governor, Pagadian City, although he well knew that Phenina Codinera is
related to him in the second civil degree of consanguinity and is not
qualified under the Civil Service Law.
ALL CONTRARY TO AFORECITED LAW.
Please give due course to the above complaint and please set the case for
immediate preliminary investigation pursuant to the First Indorsement
dated August 27, 1971 of the Secretary of Justice, and in the paramount
interest of good government. 9
xxx xxx xxx
The petitioner thereafter went to the respondent Court of First Instance
of Zamboanga del Sur, the Honorable Asaali Isnani presiding, on a special
civil action (Special Civil Case No. 1048) for prohibition
and certiorari with preliminary injunction. The respondent Court issued a
restraining order. The respondent Anti-Graft League moved to have the
same lifted and the case itself dismissed.
On September 27, 1971, Judge Isnani issued an order, dismissing the case.
On October 6, 1971, the petitioner instituted G.R. No. 34162 of this Court,
a special civil action for certiorari with preliminary injunction. As earlier
noted, we on October 8, 1971, stayed the implementation of dismissal
order.
Subsequently, we consolidated both petitions and considered the same
submitted for decision.
Principally, the petitioner relies (in both petitions) on the failure of the
respondents City Fiscal and the Anti-Graft League to comply with the
provisions of Executive Order No. 264, "OUTLINING THE PROCEDUE BY
WHICH COMPLAINANTS CHARGING GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND
EMPLOYEES WITH COMMISSION OF IRREGULARITIES SHOULD BE
GUIDED," 10 preliminary to their criminal recourses. At the same time, he
assails the standing of the respondent Anti-Graft League to commence the
series of prosecutions below (G.R. No. 33628). He likewise contends that
the respondent Fiscal (in G.R. No. 34162), in giving due course to the
complaints notwithstanding the restraining order we had issued (in G.R.
No. 33628), which he claims applies as well thereto, committed a grave
abuse of discretion.

We dismiss these petitions.

MALACAANG
RESIDENCE OF THE PRESIDENT
OF THE PHILIPPINES
MANILA
BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 264
OUTLINING THE PROCEDURE BY WHICH COMPLAINANTS CHARGING
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES WITH COMMISSION OF
IRREGULARITIES SHOULD BE GUIDED.
WHEREAS, it is necessary that the general public be duly informed or
reminded of the procedure provided by law and regulations by which
complaints against public officials and employees should be presented
and prosecuted.
WHEREAS, actions on complaints are at times delayed because of the
failure to observe the form.91 requisites therefor, to indicate with
sufficient clearness and particularity the charges or offenses being aired
or denounced, and to file the complaint with the proper office or
authority;
WHEREAS, without in any way curtailing the constitutional guarantee of
freedom of expression, the Administration believes that many complaints
or grievances could be resolved at the lower levels of government if only
the provisions of law and regulations on the matter are duly observed by
the parties concerned; and
WHEREAS, while all sorts of officials misconduct should be eliminated
and punished, it is equally compelling that public officials and employees
be given opportunity afforded them by the constitution and law to defend
themselves in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law and
regulations;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the
Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do hereby order:
1. Complaints against public officials and employees shall be in writing,
subscribed and sworn to by the complainants, describing in sufficient
detail and particularity the acts or conduct complained of, instead of
generalizations.
2. Complaints against presidential appointees shag be filed with the Office
of the President or the Department Head having direct supervision or
control over the official involved.
3. Those against subordinate officials and employees shall be lodged with
the proper department or agency head.
4. Those against elective local officials shall be filed with the Office of the
President in case of provincial and city officials, with the provincial
governor or board secretary in case of municipal officials, and with the
municipal or city mayor or secretary in case of barrio officials.

5. Those against members of police forces shall be filed with the

corresponding local board of investigators headed by the city or
municipal treasurer, except in the case of those appointed by the
President which should be filed with the Office of the President.
6. Complaints against public officials and employees shall be promptly
acted upon and disposed of by the officials or authorities concerned in
accordance with pertinent laws and regulations so that the erring officials
or employees can be soonest removed or otherwise disciplined and the
innocent, exonerated or vindicated in like manner, and to the end also
that other remedies, including court action, may be pursued forthwith by
the interested parties after administrative remedies shall have been
exhausted.
Done in the City of Manila, this 6th day of October, in the year of Our Lord,
nineteen hundred and seventy.
(Sgd.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS
President of the Philippines
By the President:
(Sgd.) ALEJANDRO MELCHOR
Executive Secretary 11
It is plain from the very wording of the Order that it has exclusive
application to administrative, not criminal complaints. The Order itself
shows why.
The very title speaks of "COMMISSION OF IRREGULARITIES." There is no
mention, not even by implication, of criminal "offenses," that is to say,
"crimes." While "crimes" amount to "irregularities," the Executive Order
could have very well referred to the more specific term had it intended to
make itself applicable thereto.
The first perambulatory clause states the necessity for informing the
public "of the procedure provided by law and regulations by which
complaints against public officials and employees should be presented
and prosecuted. 12 To our mind, the "procedure provided by law and
regulations" referred to pertains to existing procedural rules with respect
to the presentation of administrative charges against erring government
officials. And in fact, the aforequoted paragraphs are but restatements
thereof. That presidential appointees are subject to the disciplinary
jurisdiction of the President, for instance, is a reecho of the long-standing
doctrine that the President exercises the power of control over his
appointees. 13 Paragraph 3, on the other hand, regarding subordinate
officials, is a mere reiteration of Section 33 of Republic Act No. 2260, the
Civil Service Act (of 1959) then in force, placing jurisdiction upon "the
proper Head of Department, the chief of a bureau or office" 14 to
investigate and decide on matters involving disciplinary action.
Paragraph 4, which refers to complaints filed against elective local
officials, reiterates, on the other hand, the Decentralization Act of 1967,
providing that "charges against any elective provincial and city officials
shall be preferred before the President of the Philippines; against any
elective municipal official before the provincial governor or the secretary
of the provincial board concerned; and against any elective barrio official
before the municipal or secretary concerned. 15
Paragraph 5, meanwhile, is a reproduction of the provisions of the Police
Act of 1966, vesting upon a "Board of Investigators" 16 the jurisdiction to
try and decide complaints against members of the Philippine police.
Clearly, the Executive Order simply consolidates these existing rules and
streamlines the administrative apparatus in the matter of complaints

against public officials. Furthermore, the fact is that there is no reference

therein to judicial or prejudicial (like a preliminary investigation
conducted by the fiscal) recourse, not because it makes such a resort a
secondary measure, but because it does not intend to serve as a condition
precedent to, much less supplant, such a court resort.
To be sure, there is mention therein of "court action[s] [being] pursued
forthwith by the interested parties, " 17 but that does not, so we hold,
cover proceedings such as criminal actions, which do not require a prior
administrative course of action. It will indeed be noted that the term is
closely shadowed by the qualification, "after administrative remedies
shall have been exhausted," 18 which suggests civil suits subject to
previous administrative action.
It is moreover significant that the Executive Order in question makes
specific reference to "erring officials or employees ... removed or
otherwise vindicated. 19 If it were intended to apply to criminal
prosecutions, it would have employed such technical terms as "accused",
"convicted," or "acquitted." While this is not necessarily a controlling
parameter for all cases, it is here material in construing the intent of the
measure.
What is even more compelling is the Constitutional implications if the
petitioner's arguments were accepted. For Executive Order No. 264 was
promulgated under the 1935 Constitution in which legislative power was
vested exclusively in Congress. The regime of Presidential lawmaking was
to usher in yet some seven years later. If we were to consider the
Executive Order law, we would be forced to say that it is an amendment
to Republic Act No. 5180, the law on preliminary investigations then in
effect, a situation that would give rise to a Constitutional anomaly. We
cannot accordingly countenace such a view.
The challenge the petitioner presents against the personality of the AntiGraft League of the Philippines to bring suit is equally without merit. That
the Anti-Graft League is not an "offended party" within the meaning of
Section 2, Rule 110, of the Rules of Court (now Section 3 of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure), cannot abate the complaints in question.
A complaint for purposes of preliminary investigation by the fiscal need
not be filed by the "offended party." The rule has been that, unless the
offense subject thereof is one that cannot be prosecuted de oficio, the
same may be filed, for preliminary investigation purposes, by any
competent person. 20 The "complaint" referred to in the Rule 110
contemplates one filed in court, not with the fiscal, In that case, the
proceeding must be started by the aggrieved party himself. 21
For as a general rule, a criminal action is commenced by complaint or
information, both of which are filed in court. In case of a complaint, it
must be filed by the offended party; with respect to an information, it is
the fiscal who files it. But a "complaint" filed with the fiscal prior to a
judicial action may be filed by any person.
The next question is whether or not the temporary restraining order we
issued in G.R. No. 33628 embraced as well the complaint subject of G.R.
No. 34162.
It is noteworthy that the charges levelled against the petitioner
whether in G.R. No. 33628 or 34162 refer invariably to violations of
the Anti-Graft Law or the Revised Penal Code. That does not, however,
make such charges Identical to one another.
The complaints involved in G.R. No. 34162 are, in general, nepotism
under Sections 3(c) and (j) of Republic Act No. 3019; exerting influence
upon the presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del
Sur to award a certain parcel of land in his favor, over which the
provincial government itself lays claims, contrary to the provisions of
Section 4(b) of Republic Act No. 3019; and making untruthful statements

in the certificates of appointment of certain employees in his office. On

the other hand, the complaints subject matter of G.R. No. 33628 involve
charges of simulating bids for the supply of gravel and sand for certain
public works projects, in breach of Section 3 of the Anti-Graft statute;
manipulating bids with respect to the construction of the capitol building;
testifying falsely in connection with Cadastral Case No. N-17, LRC Cad.
Rec. N-468, in which the petitioner alleged that he was the owner of a
piece of land, in violation of Articles 182, 183, and 318 of the Revised
Penal Code; and simulating bids for the supply of gravel and sand in
connection with another public works project.
It is clear that the twin sets of complaints are characterized by major
differences. When, therefore, we restrained further proceedings in I.S.
Nos. 1-71, 2-71, and 4-71, subject of G.R. No. 33628. we did not
consequently stay the proceedings in CCC-XVI-4-ZDS, CCC XVI-6-ZDS, CCC
XVI-8-ZDS, and I.S. Nos. 6-71 and 7-71, the same proceedings we did
restrain in G.R. No. 34162.
This brings us to the last issue: whether or not the complaints in question
are tainted with a political color.
It is not our business to resolve complaints the disposition of which
belongs to another agency, in this case, the respondent Fiscal. But more
than that, and as a general rule, injunction does not lie to enjoin criminal
prosecutions. 22 The rule is subject to exceptions, to wit: (1) for the
orderly administration of justice; (2) to prevent the use of the strong arm
of the law in an oppressive and vindictive manner; (3) to avoid
multiplicity of actions; (4) to afford adequate protection to constitutional
rights; and (5) because the statute relied on is constitutionally infirm or
otherwise void. 23 We cannot perceive any of the exceptions applicable
here. The petitioner cries foul, in a manner of speaking, with respect to
the deluge of complaints commenced by the private respondent below,
but whether or not they were filed for harassment purposes is a question
we are not in a position to decide. The proper venue, we believe, for the
petitioner's complaint is precisely in the preliminary investigations he
wishes blocked here.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED. The temporary restraining
orders are LIFTED and SET ASIDE. Costs against the petitioners.
It is so ORDERED.

The criminal case was originally filed for preliminary investigation with
the 2nd Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Tubigon-Clarin, Bohol. After the
requisite preliminary investigation, Judge James Stewart E. Himalaloan
found that there was sufficient ground to hold the herein accused for trial
for the offense of Other Acts of Child Abuse defined in Sec. 10 (1), Article
VI of Republic Act No. 7610.2 The record of the case was transmitted to
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor where, after a review by Third
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, Macario I. Delusa, he failed an
Information dated October 28, 20023.
Respondent dismissed the Information in an Order dated November 21,
20024 ratiocinating, thus:
EXAMINING the Information, the two (2) copies of the same forming
parts of the Records in this case appearing in pages 28 and 30, the court
finds that the same is not subscribed and sworn to by the prosecutor.
. ..
A CAREFUL EXAMINATION on the four corners of the Information will
readily show that the information had not been subscribed by the
prosecutor and this will militate against the validity of the information
and towards nullity and total worthlessness of the same. Since the
Information is defective, the Court is left without any alternative except to
dismiss this case. Any other act by the Court will tantamount to validating
the defective information. The Court can act in this case only when a
correct information is filed, which is beyond procedure for the Court to
order.
The prosecution through Prosecutor Delusa filed a Motion for
Reconsideration and Revival5 on December 12, 2002 alleging that there
was no necessity for the Information to be under oath since he merely
concurred with the resolution of the investigating judge and that he "has
properly subscribed and signed the Information with the approval of the
Provincial Prosecutor".
On January 10, 2003, respondent issued an Order 6 granting the motion
for reconsideration, reinstating and reviving the case but at the same time
requiring the public prosecutor to file a new information "incorporating
the formalities called for under Rule 112, Section 4 and the circular of its
department implementing the pertinent laws on the matter, within ten
(10) days from notice hereof."

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
A.M. No. RTJ-04-1837

Complainant alleges that her administrative complaint arose from the

dismissal of Criminal Case No. 11627 for Other Acts of Child
Abuse1 entitled "People of the Philippines, Plaintiff vs. Fredie Cirilo Nocos
y Urot" by respondent Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Bohol, Branch
1, a Family Court.

March 23, 2004

VISITACION L. ESTODILLO, ET AL., complainants,

vs.
JUDGE TEOFILO D. BALUMA, respondent.

On January 30, 2003, the prosecution filed an ex parte motion to increase

the bail bond of the accused7 but respondent refused to act on it because
the prosecution had not yet complied with his order to file a new
information.8
On January 31, 2003, the prosecution filed a "Manifestation"9 stating that
it "will not file a new information as ordered, the same being contrary to
law and jurisprudence and is unprocedural."

RES OL UT I ON
Complainant, therefore, seeks the assistance of the Court to investigate
this impasse considering that the bond of the accused had been cancelled
earlier.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
In a verified complaint dated December 26, 2002, Jovelyn Estudillo
(Jovelyn) assisted by her mother, Visitacion L. Estodillo, charges Judge
Teofilo D. Baluma with Gross and Inexcusable Ignorance of the Law.

Complainant also alleges that previously, respondent judge had dismissed

Criminal Case No. 11514 against a certain Eduardo Vedra for Unjust
Vexation on the same ground. The prosecution, in a motion for
reconsideration, explained that what is required to be under oath is a
complaint, not an information where the Rules merely require that it be

subscribed. Respondent granted the motion and revived the case without
requiring the filing of a new information.

respondent be reprimanded with a stern warning that a repetition of the

offense will merit a more drastic action of the Court.

Complainant wonders why respondent did not require the filing of a new
information in the Vedra case, but insisted on the filing of such new
information in the present case. This, according to the complainant, is
clearly gross ignorance of the law.

Section 4, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

In his Comment, respondent avers: The complaint did not comply with
Rule 7, Section 5, Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, which required a
certification of non-forum shopping. He denies that he stood pat on his
original order because he had already issued an Order dated 27 February
2003 which found probable cause to warrant the placing of the accused,
Fredie Cirilo Nocos, under custody in order to stand trial and fixed his
bond at P60,000.00. The complainant, including Prosecutor Eric M. Ucat,
the trial prosecutor who instigated the filing of herein administrative
complaint and Atty. Esther Gertrude Biliran, who notarized and obviously
prepared the complaint, were mentally dishonest for not mentioning the
fact that before herein complaint was filed on March 8, 2003, he had
already issued the aforecited Order dated February 27, 2003. Prosecutor
Ucat and Atty. Biliran had evil motives when they instigated the filing of
the complaint against him even before he had issued the new order and
for continuing with it after he issued the Order of 27 February 2003.
Respondent maintains that he had efficiently discharged his duties as
judge although his Branch is one of the most heavily burdened branches
in the Tagbilaran City area and that to cope with this heavy load, he
works even at night and on Sundays and holidays, writing decisions and
drafting orders.
Respondent included in his Comment a "Counter-complaint" against
Prosecutor Eric M. Ucat and Atty. Esther Gertrude D. Biliran an
administrative case for disbarment or for disciplinary sanction for gross
violation of the canons under the Code of Professional conduct and for
deceit, dishonesty, failure to exercise candor, fairness, good faith, doing
falsehood or consenting to its doing and abuse of procedures.
Prosecutor Eric M. Ucat filed a "Rejoinder"10 stating that he is in quandary
why the respondent tagged him as the trial prosecutor when in fact the
record shows that Prosecutor Helen T. Cabatos was the one who handled
the subject criminal case (Criminal Case No. 11627) and Prosecutor
Macario I. Delusa was the one who filed the Information. He asserts that
the only thing he did was to administer the oath of the complainant in the
original letter-complaint subject matter of the herein administrative case.
He points out that it was in another case, Criminal Case No. 11514 for
Unjust Vexation entitled "The People of the Philippines vs. Eduardo Vedra,
a.k.a. Eddie" that he acted as the prosecutor. That case was dismissed by
respondent in an Order dated November 25, 2002 on the same ground
that the Information was not subscribed by the prosecutor. Upon a
Motion for Reconsideration with Prayer For Revival of the Case,
respondent granted it in an Order 11 dated January 2, 2003. He likewise
answered point by point all the accusations hurled by respondent in the
latter's counter-complaint.
Atty. Esther Gertrude D. Biliran also filed a "Rejoinder"12 wherein she
denied having participated in the filing of the complaint except to take the
oath of the complainant. She avers that at the time herein administrative
case was filed on March 8, 2003, complainants have not yet received the
February 27, 2003 Order issued by respondent judge which found
probable cause to warrant the placing of the accused, Fredie Cirilo Nocos
under custody in order to stand trial and fixed his bond at P60,000.00.
Likewise, she denied the accusations of the respondent judge and
proferred her defenses against it.
Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. recommends that: 1) this
case be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter; and 2)

Sec. 4. Information defined. An information is an accusation in writing

charging a person with an offense, subscribed by the prosecutor and filed
with the court.
There is no requirement that the information be sworn to. Otherwise, the
rules would have so provided as it does in a complaint which is defined as
a "sworn written statement charging a person with an offense, subscribed
by the offended party, any peace officer, or other public officer charged
with the enforcement of the law violated".13 In a case, we ruled that the
information need not be under oath, the reason therefore being
principally that the prosecuting officer filing it is charged with the special
duty in regard thereto and is acting under the special responsibility of his
oath of office.14 Clearly, respondent had confused an information from a
complaint.
A perusal of the subject Information shows that it was subscribed or
signed by Prosecutor Macario I. Delusa. It is thus clear that respondent
erred in dismissing the subject Information on the ground that it was not
under oath.
As aptly observed by the Court Administrator in the evaluation submitted
by him:
It is clear that respondent erred in dismissing the information filed by
Prosecutor Eric M. Ucat on the ground that it was not sworn to. The Rules
of Criminal Procedure clearly defines an information as "an accusation in
writing charging a person with an offense, subscribed by the prosecutor
and filed with the court" (Section 4, Rule 110). The Rules do not require
that it be under oath for otherwise, it would have provided so. On the
other hand, a complaint is defined as "a sworn statement charging a
person with an offense, subscribed by the offended party, any peace
officer, or other public officer charged with the enforcement of the law
violated" (Section 5, Rule 110).
Evidently, respondent was of the belief, albeit erroneous, that both a
complaint and an information need to be under oath. But the oath is not
required when it is a public prosecutor who files the information because
he does so under the oath he took when he qualified for his position. The
position of the public prosecutor was that the preliminary investigation
had been conducted by the municipal circuit trial judge of Tubigon-Clarin
and the latter's resolution was concurred in by the prosecutors.
It appears from the record that the respondent corrected himself by
issuing his Order of 27 February 2003 where he found that "the
complaint, the affidavit of Alberto V. Estudillo, father of the victim, the
affidavit of Jovelyn L. Estudillo, the victim executed with the assistance of
Visitacion Estudillo, her mother, the medico-legal certificate issued by
Isidro Fermites, Jr., on Jovelyn Estudillo, the certification of the facts of
birth of Jovelyn L. Estudillo, the records of the proceedings during the
preliminary examination at the First Level Court, its Order dated
September 6, 2002 and the Resolution dated September 19, 2002, this
court finds probable cause to warrant that the accused be placed in the
custody of the law to stand trial."
The error of the respondent is not a serious one. He, however, must be
reminded that as judge he must be conversant with the rules and laws
that it is his office of apply. He deserves a reprimand for his failure to
understand an elementary rule of law.15
We agree with Court Administrator Velasco.

The records disclose that respondent, in effect, apparently rectified his

error when he issued an Order dated February 27, 2003, portions of
which read as follows:
EXAMINING the complaint, the affidavit of Alberto V. Estodillo, father of
the victim, the affidavit of Juvelyn L. Estodillo, the victim executed with
the assistance of Visitacion-Estodillo her mother, the medico legal
certificate issued by Isidro Permites, Jr., M.D., on Juvelyn L. Estodillo, the
certification on the facts of birth of Juvelyn L. Estodillo, the records of the
proceedings during the preliminary examination at the First Level Court,
its Order dated September 6, 2002 and the Resolution dated September
19, 2002, this Court finds probable cause to warrant that the accused be
placed in the custody of the law to stand trial.16
However, it is noted that said Order did not have any reference at all nor
did it attempt to reconcile the previous Orders he issued on which bases
the herein administrative complaint was based, namely: the Order dated
November 21, 2002 dismissing the Information, the Order dated January
10, 2003 reinstating and reviving the case but requiring the prosecution
to file a new information, and the Order dated January 30, 2003 refusing
to act on the prosecution's ex-parte motion to increase amount of bail
until the filing of a new information, thus resulting in the grievance
submitted by complainant which could have been easily averted had
respondent been more meticulous in the performance of his duties as
presiding judge of a regional trial court.
Canon 3, Rule 3.01, Code of Judicial Conduct mandates judges to "be
faithful to the law and maintain professional competence". It is
imperative that judges must be conversant with basic legal principles 17.
Judges are called to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with
statutes and procedural laws.18 They are not common men and women,
whose errors, men and women forgive and time forgets 19. Judges sit as
the embodiment of the people's sense of justice, their last recourse where
all other institutions have failed".20
As to the counter-complaint of respondent Judge against Prosecutor Eric
M. Ucat and Atty. Esther Gertrude D. Biliran, the same should be
dismissed for failure of respondent to refute their respective "rejoinders",
dated June 11, 2003 and June 6, 2003.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Teofilo D. Baluma is found guilty of
violation of Canon 3, Rule 3.01, Code of Judicial Conduct and
REPRIMANDED with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or
similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
The counter-complaint of Judge Teofilo D. Baluma against Prosecutor Eric
M. Ucat and Atty. Esther Gertrude D. Biliran is dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.