STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

Case Digests
DOCTRINE OF NECESSARY IMPLICATION
CHUA v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION (CSC)
GR No. 88979
FACTS:

Dec. 2, 1988 RA 6683 or the Early Retirement or Voluntary Separation Law

was approved providing benefits for early retirement and voluntary
separation from the govt service as well as for involuntary separation from
the govt. The Act covers all regular, temporary, casual and emergency
employees who have rendered at least 2 consec. years of govt service as of
date of separation.

Jan. 30, 1989 Chua filed an application with the Natl Irrigation
Administration (NIA), believing that she is qualified to receive benefits under
said Act, but application was denied.

Apr. 25, 1989 Chua filed a plea for reconsideration with the CSC, but was
also denied for the reason that contractual employees are not covered by
the Act.

Hence, the petition for a special civil action for certiorari.

ISSUE:
W/N petitioner Chua is qualified to avail the benefits of the program under RA 6683.
HELD:
Yes, petitioner is qualified. Under the doctrine of necessary implication, what is
implied in a statute is much a part thereof as that which is expressed. At times,
what is thought at the time of enactment of an all-embracing legislation may be
inadequate to provide for the unfolding events of the future.
The denial of application of contractual employees, such as the petitioner, is
unreasonable, unjustified and oppressive. If casual and emergency employees were
given the benefit of said Act, there is no justifiable reason that contractual or coterminous employees to be not given same benefit.
Further, the primary purpose of RA 6683 is to trim the bureaucracy, and the
inclusion of co-terminous personnel does not, in effect, defeat such purpose.
Thus, petition has been granted.

DOCTRINE OF NECESSARY IMPLICATION

COA v. PROVINCE OF CEBU
GR No. 141386
FACTS:

Antecedents:

The Provincial Governor of Cebu appointed teachers not included in the

DECS plantilla to handle extension classes in public schools. The teachers
salaries and personnel-related benefits as well as college scholarship
grants were charged against the provincial Special Education Fund (SEF).

COA issued Notices of Suspension to the Province of Cebu stating that said
disbursements are not chargeable to the provincial SEF.

A petition for declaratory relief was filed by the Province of Cebu and was
granted by the RTC, declaring the audits of COA as null and void. Hence,
COAs petition for review.

The SEF, created by virtue of RA 5447, shall be constituted from proceeds of

an additional 1% real property tax imposition under PD 464 or Real Property
Tax Code of the Phils., and a certain portion of taxes on Virginia-type
cigarettes and duties on imported leaf tobacco.

The salaries and benefits of teachers as well as scholarship grants are

included in said Act; however, petitioner avers that the Act has already been
repealed with the effectivity of the Local Govt Code of 1991 and that the
mentioned salaries and benefits of teachers, as well as the scholarship
grants, are not anymore included.

The Local Govt, as petitioner contends, only stated that the proceeds shall
be allocated for the operation and maintenance of public schools,
construction and repair of school buildings, facilities and equipment,
educational research, purchase of books and periodicals, and sports
development as determined and approved by the local school board (Sec.
235) and establishment and maintenance of extension classes where
necessary (Sec. 100).

Petitioner invoked the legal maxim expression unius est exclusion alterius
and alleged that since salaries, personnel-related benefits and scholarship
grants are not among those authorized as lawful expenditures of the SEF
under the Local Govt Code, they should be excluded.

Furthermore, it alleged that the maintenance and operation of public schools

pertain principally to the DECS; therefore, the establishment and

maintenance of extension classes should be construed only to the upkeep

and maintenance of public school buildings, facilities and similar expenses
other than personnel-related benefits.
ISSUE:
W/N salaries, personnel-related benefits and scholarship grants are chargeable to
the SEF.
HELD:
It is a basic precept in stat con that the intent of the legislature is the controlling
factor in the interpretation of a statute.
Under the doctrine of necessary implication, the allocation of the SEF for the
establishment and maintenance of extension classes logically implies the hiring of
teachers who should be compensated for their services. Verily, the services and the
corresponding compensation of these teachers are necessary to the establishment
and maintenance of extension classes.
The Court looked into the deliberation during the second reading of the LGC, and it
has been expressly stated therefrom that the payments of salaries, emoluments,
allowances, et cetra is covered by the transfer of the elementary school system to
LGUs under the LGC, aside from other supplemental matters.
Indeed, the maintenance and operation of public schools pertain principally to the
DECS. This is the reason why only salaries of public school teachers appointed with
the establishment and maintenance of extension classes pertain to the
supplementary budget of the local school boards. Thus, this may be charged to the
SEF.
However, the doctrine of necessary implication cannot be applied with regards to
the scholarship grants as such grants are neither necessary nor indispensable to the
operation of public schools. Such may then be charged to the General Funds of the
province. Here, the court applied casus omissus, as it should be noted that the
granting of govt scholarship to poor but deserving students in RA 5447 was
omitted in the LGC.

DOCTRINE OF NECESSARY IMPLICATION

GSIS v. CSC
GR No. 96938
FACTS:
May 1981 GSIS dismissed 6 employees as being allegedly found to be connected
with irregularities in the canvass of supplies and materials.
Five of the dismissed employees appealed to the Merit Systems Board. The Board
found the dismissal to be illegal.
GSIS then appealed to the CSC which ruled the same dismissal to be illegal.
Oct. 21, 1987 CSC promulgated a Resolution directing GSIS to reinstate the 5
dismissed employees with payment of back salaries and benefits due them not later
than 10 days from receipt of a copy of the same.
GSIS appealed to the SC.
July 4, 1988 SC Second Division promulgated a Resolution that there is no abuse of
discretion on the part of the CSC, that reinstatement of the 5 employees was proper
but w/o prejudice to the right of GSIS to pursue proper disciplinary action against
them, and that payment of back salaries shall be eliminated until the outcome of
the proceedings is known.
Jan. 8, 1990 Heirs of Namuco and Manuel filed a motion for execution of CSCs
Resolution of Oct. 1987. GSIS argued that said Resolution had already been
superseded by SCs Resolution.
June 20, 1990 CSC granted the motion for execution filed by the heirs of Namuco
and Manuel in an Order. GSIS filed a motion for reconsideration.
Nov. 22, 1990 By Order, CSC denied the motion.
GSIS again appealed to the SC to nullify CSCs Orders if June 20 and Nov. 22, 1990,
further alleging that CSC has no power to execute its judgments and final orders or
resolutions because it varied with SCs Resolution.
ISSUE:

W/N CSC has the power to execute such orders and resolutions.
HELD:
Yes, it has the power. The CSC is a constitutional commission invested by the
Constitution and relevant laws not only with authority to administer but also with
quasi-judicial powers. It has the authority to hear and decide administrative
disciplinary cases instituted directly with it or brought to it on appeal. Even if the
decision has been appealed to the SC, the same shall be executor unless the High
Court issues a restraining order or preliminary injunction (as pursuant to CSC Reso.
89-779).
It would then be absurd to deny CSC of the authority that it has been exercising for
years. Furthermore, such authority to decide cases would be rendered useless
unless accompanied by the authority to see that what has been decided on is
carried out. Hence, the grant to a tribunal or agency such as the CSC should
normally and logically be deemed to include the grant of authority to
enforce or execute the judgment it thus renders, unless the law provides
otherwise.
Hence, the petition has been dismissed.

CASUS OMMISUS
MUNICIPALITY OF NUEVA ERA v. MUN. OF MARCOS
GR No. 169435
FACTS:
June 22, 1963 RA 3753 or An Act creating the Municipality of Marcos fixed said
municipalitys boundaries, including: On the east, by the Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province
boundary Note: Mt. Province being referred to then is now the province of Apayao.
March 8, 1993 Marcos claimed that the middle portion of Nueva Era (being b/w
Marcos and the Ilocos-Apayao boundary) formed part of its territory.
However, Nueva Era alleged that Marcos was created out of the barrios of Dingras
only; hence, it should not go beyond the territory of the barrios of Dingras. The SP of
Ilocos Norte ruled in favor of Nueva Era as Marcos territorial claim would also
encroach upon a portion of Abra, as it is situated between the eastern boundary of
Nueva Era and the Province of Mt. Province.
Furthermore, the SP invoked the principle of Expressio unius est exclusio alterus
(those not mentioned are deemed excluded). Since the barrios of Nueva Era were
not mentioned in the Act creating Marcos, then those barrios must not be included
as part of Marcos territory.
When the interpretation of the statute according to the exact and literal import of its
words would also lead to absurdity, it should be construed according to spirit and
reason, disregarding the letters of the law.
On appeal, RTC affirmed the decision of the SP.
Marcos then filed a petition for review before the CA which was partially granted (re:
middle portion only) with the ff. issues:
W/N Brgy. Sto. Nino (northern portion of Nueva Era) shall be part of the
Municipality of Marcos.
W/N the site of Hercules Minerals and Oil, Inc. in Brgy. Sto. Nino (middle
portion) is part of the Mun. of Marcos.

Hence, Nueva Eras petition on certiorari.

ISSUES:
W/N the mode of appeal adopted by Marcos in bringing the case to the CA is proper
W/N the eastern boundary of Marcos extends over and covers a portion of
Nueva Era.

HELD:
Yes, it was proper. Under BP Blg. 129, the CA has the vested appellate jurisdiction
over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, etc.
No. The barangays of Nueva Era were not mentioned in the enumeration of
barangays out of which the territory of Marcos shall be set, their omission must be
held to have been done intentionally. Following the rule of casus omissus pro
omisso habendus est, a person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must
be held to have been omitted intentionally.
Hence, the petition has been granted and the decision of the CA is partly reversed.

WHERE THE LAW DOES NOT DISTINGUISH, THE COURT MUST NOT
DISTINGUISH.
PILAR v. COMELEC
GR No. 115245
FACTS:

March 22, 1992 Petitioner Juanito Pilar filed a certificate for candidacy for
the position as member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Proivince of
Isabela.

March 25, 1992 Petitioner withdrew his certificate of candidacy.

Nov. 3, 1993 | Feb. 13, 1994 COMELEC imposed upon petitioner a fine of
P10,000.00 for failure to file his statement of contributions and expenditures
as required under RA 7166 (An Act Providing for Synchronized National and
Local Electoral Reforms, Authorizing Appropriations Therefor, and for Other
Purposes)

Said Act requires every candidate to file in duplicate with the Office of the
COMELEC the full, true, and itemized contributions and expenditures in
connection with the election within 30 days after the day of election. Failure
to submit such statement will subject the candidate to pay a fine of P1,000 to
P30,000 (which shall be paid within 30 days from receipt of such failure
notice) in COMELECs discretion.

However, petitioner averred that he cannot be considered a candidate having

withdrawn his certificate of candidacy three (3) days after his filing of the
same. Hence, this petition for certiorari.

ISSUE:
W/N petitioner is liable to pay for the administrative fine imposed upon him.
HELD:
Yes, he is liable. The Court found petitioners argument unmeritorious.

RA 7166 states that every candidate has the obligation to file a statement of
contributions and expenditures. Well-recognized is the rule that where the law does
not distinguish, the courts shall not distinguish. No distinction is to be made in the
application of a law where none is indicated.
Thus, regardless of whether a candidate pursued or withdrew his candidacy or not,
he is required to submit such statement.
Furthermore, the word shall implies that the statute is mandatory. Such statute
seeks to prevent the improper use of money devoted by candidates to the
furtherance of their ambitions.
Hence, the petition has been dismissed.

WHERE THE LAW DOES NOT DISTINGUISH, THE COURT MUST NOT
DISTINGUISH.
SSS v. CITY OF BACOLOD
GR No. L-35726
FACTS:

SSS failed to pay for the taxes of its 5-storey building and the 4 parcels of
land said building occupies from 1968-1970.

April 3, 1970 the City of Bacolod forfeited said properties in its favor.

SSS sought for reconsideration of the forfeiture proceedings from respondent

thru the City Treasurer on the ground that it is exempt from payment of real
estate taxes, it being a GOCC. However, no action was instituted by
respondent.

SSS filed an action in the CFI Negros Occidental for nullification of the
forfeiture proceedings and sought issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
to restrain respondent from consolidating its ownership over forfeited
properties. Said writ was issued upon petitioners posting of a cash bond
amounting to P105,000.

After the hearing, the trial court rendered a decision declaring that SSS is not
exempt from payment of real property tax as it does not fall under the
provisions of Section 29 of the Charter of the City of Bacolod and thus,
dismissed the case.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

W/N SSS is exempt from payment of real estate taxes.

HELD:
Yes, it is exempt. The properties of SSS is included in the lands and buildings
owned by the Commonwealth of the Philippines, the City of Bacolod, the Province of
Negros Occidental exempt from taxation as stated under Section 29 of
Commonwealth Act No. 326, otherwise known as the Charter of the City of Bacolod.
The trial court erred in restricting the scope of exemption exclusively to those
GOCCs executing governmental or sovereign functions. Said section of the Act does
not qualify or make any distinction in providing for the exemption from taxes of the
aforementioned lands and buildings. The legislature intended a broad application of
such mandate, regardless of whether the property is devoted to proprietary or
governmental purposes. Where the law does not distinguish, neither shall the
courts.
Moreover, the act of collecting taxes from a property of the Government merely
translates into the transferring of money from one pocket to another, as taxes are
imposed for the sole purpose of raising revenues for the operations of the
Government as well. Therefore, such tax collection would only entail additional and
unnecessary workload, expenses and time.
Hence, the decision has been set aside and the surety bond filed by petitioner
cancelled.

EJUSDEM GENERIS
NAPOCOR v. ANGAS
GR Nos. 6025-26
FACTS:

April 13, 1974 Petitioner NAPOCOR filed two (2) complaints for eminent
domain against private respondents with CFI Lanao del Sur which sought to
expropriate certain specified lots for the development of hydroelectric power
and production of electricity.

June 15, 1979 CFI rendered a consolidated decision confirming the

mentioned lots as having been lawfully expropriated and ordered petitioner
to pay the private respondents certain sums of money as just compensation
for their expropriated lands with legal interest thereon . . . until fully paid.

May 16, 1980 One of the private respondents filed an ex-parte motion
praying that the unpaid balance due to her be paid, including the legal
interest which she computed at 6% per annum (on the basis of Civil Code
Article 2209).

Feb. 10, 1981 Another private respondent filed the same motion, however,
praying that the legal interest due to her be computed at 12% per annum
by virtue of Central Bank Circ. No. 416 pursuant to PD No. 116. Other private
respondents filed motions also praying for the same.

Petitioner moved for a motion for reconsideration, alleging that the main
decision had already become final and executor with its compliance of
depositing sums of money with legal interest at 6% per annum. However, CFI
denied the motion.

Hence, this petition for certiorari and mandamus.

ISSUE:
Whether the law applicable in the computation of legal rate of interest is Article
2209 of the Civil Code or Central Bank Circular No. 416.
HELD:
Article 2209 of the Civil Code applies.
Central Bank Circ. No. 416 prescribed the rate of interest for the loan or
forbearance of any money, goods or credits and the rate allowed in judgments.
Private respondents claimed that their case must be included in the general term
judgments alleging that such term refers to any judgment directing the payment
of legal interest. However, the court found this to be bereft of merit.
Following the principle of ejusdem generis, the term judgments should be
interpreted to mean only judgments involving loan or forbearance of any money,
goods or credits. Under this doctrine, where general terms follow the designation of
particular things or classes of persons or subjects, the general term will be
construed to comprehend those things or persons of the same class or of the same
nature as those specifically enumerated. This is justified on the ground that if the
lawmaking body intended general terms to be used in their unrestricted
sense, it would not have made an enumeration of particular subjects but
would have used only general terms.
Wherefore, petition has been granted and the decision of the lower court has been
annulled and set aside.

EJUSDEM GENERIS
CITY OF MANILA v. LYRIC MUSIC HOUSE, INC.
GR No. 42236
FACTS:

Plaintiff instituted an action for the purpose of recovering the amount of

P525.00 as license fees and penalty due the plaintiff from defendantappellant. The trial court rendered its sentence mandating the defendant to
pay aforementioned sum.

Defendant argued that the trial court erred in sentencing it to pay said sum. It
averred that it shall be exempt from the payment of taxes as its business of
musical merchandise is not included among the businesses specifically
enumerated in Municipal Ordinance No. 1925 and Act No. 3669 nor is it
included as a retailer engaged in the business of general merchandise
subject to tax.

Hence, the appeal.

ISSUE:
W/N defendants argument is correct.
HELD:
No, it is not.

The principal purpose of Act 3669, as stated in its title, is to grant authority to the
municipal board of Manila to tax and fix the amount of license fees upon certain
industries, businesses and occupations involving new (not yet used) merchandise
not yet subject to the payment of any municipal tax on the date of its enactment.
The board, then, has a right to determine which industries must be included and
considered as general merchandise.
Although musical merchandise was not specifically included in the enumerated
industries and businesses, the doctrine of ejusdem generis and Expressio unius est
exclusive alterius shall not be invoked when it is clear that the legislature intended
to go beyond the specific class mentioned. To uphold the contention of the
defendant would result to discrimination and injustice.
Furthermore, an exemption from taxation may be excused if done to aid or
encourage a struggling industry. However, the musical merchandise industry cannot
be considered as struggling when the purchase of musical instruments is prevalent
in the Philippines due to the barangays and barrios bands and orchestras.
Hence, the judgment of the trial court has been affirmed.

EJUSDEM GENERIS
ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA v. SSS
GR No. L-15045
FACTS:

Sept. 1, 1958 RC Archbishop of Manila filed a request with the SSS to be

exempt from compulsory coverage of RA 1161, but said request was denied
by SSS.
Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:
W/N Catholic charities and all religious and charitable institutions and organizations
shall be exempt from said Act.
HELD:
No. There is no express exception in the Act.
The rule of ejusdem generis applies only where there is uncertainty.

EXPRESS MENTION and IMPLIED EXCLUSION / EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST

EXCLUSIO ALTERIUS
CENTENO v. VILLALON-PORNILLOS
GR No. 113092
FACTS:

Last quarter of 1985 Officers of the Samahang Katandaan ng Nayon ng

Tikay, launched a fund drive for the renovation of the chapel of Barrio Tikay,
Malolos, Bulacan. Martin Centeno and Vicente Yco approached Judge
Adoracion Angeles, a resident of said barrio, and solicited from her a
contribution of P1,500 w/o a permit from the DSWD.

Judge Angeles then filed a complaint before MTC Malolos against

aforementioned officers together with Religio Evaristo on the ground of
violating PD 1564 otherwise known as the Solicitation Permit Law.

Petitioner moved to quash the information, alleging that PD 1564 covered

only solicitations for charitable and/or public welfare purposes while their
solicitation was made for a religious purpose. This was denied by the trial
court. Petitioner then filed for a motion for reconsideration and such was also
denied.

Dec. 29, 1992 The trial court found Centeno and Yco both guilty and
ordered them to pay a fine of P200. Both accused appealed to the RTC, but
Yco subsequently withdrew his appeal.

May 21, 1993 Respondent Judge Villalon-Pornillos affirmed the decision of

the lower court but increased the penalty to imprisonment of 6 months and a
fine of P1,000.

Hence, the appeal.

ISSUE:
W/N the phrase charitable or public purposes as enumerated in PD 1564 should
be construed in its broadest sense so as to include a religious purpose.
HELD:
No. It is an elementary rule of Stat Con that the express mention of one person,
thing, act, or consequence excludes all others (expressio unius est exclusio
alterius). The rule proceeds from the premise that the legislature would not have
made specified enumerations in a statute had the intention been not to restrict its
meaning to those expressly mentioned.
The court observed that in the Constitution and in other statutes, the terms
charitable and religious are being treated separately and independently of each
other. However, in PD 1564, the statement charitable or public purposes merely
means that the framers of the law never intended to include solicitations for
religious purposes within its coverage.
While it is true that there is no religious purpose w/c is not also a charitable
purpose, yet the opposite is not equally true for there may be a charitable purpose
w/c is not religious in its legal sense. The two terms are not interchangeable.
Furthermore, it is a well-known rule that penal laws are to be construed strictly
against the State and in favor of the accused.
Thus, the decision appealed from has been reversed and set aside, and petitioner
has been acquitted.

EXPRESS MENTION and IMPLIED EXCLUSION / EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST

EXCLUSIO ALTERIUS
MANABAT v. AQUINO
GR No. L-5558
FACTS:

Petitioners spouses Enrique and Rufina Manabat were sued on a promissory

note. However, they denied liability and alleged usury of creditors
respondents Claudio and Alejandra Roxas. They failed to appear and present
evidence at the hearing, thus, they were ordered to pay P1,261.74 plus
interest.

Sept. 7, 1951 Petitioners were notified of the decision.

Sept. 22, 1951 Petitioners sent their notice of appeal via mail together w/
the postal money order of P16 as docket fees and P30 as appeal bond,
payable to the Justice of the Peace.

Sept. 24, 1951 Peace Court of Tarlac received the papers.

Respondents Roxases submitted a motion to dismiss the appeal on the

grounds that 1) the appeal docs ad been received by the inferior court 2
days after the expiration of the prescribed time (15-day period) for

appeal and 2) the appeal was frivolous (useless) and was interposed
obviously for delay.

Petitioners asserted the use of Sec. 1 Rule 27 of the Rules of Court, which
provides that the date of the mailing of court papers shall be considered
as the date of filing in court for the timeliness of their submission of papers.
However, respondent judge refused to apply such rule, opining that such only
applied to inferior courts as it expressly provided, pursuant to Sec. 19 Rule
4.

Hence, this petition for mandamus.

ISSUE:
W/N the appeal had been perfected within 15 days as required by Sec. 2 Rule 40 of
the Rules of Court.
HELD:
Yes, it was. Sec. 1 Rule 27 of the Rules of Court shall be applied.
The maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius cannot be applied in this case, as
other circumstances indicate the enumeration was not intended to be exclusive.
If Sec. 19 Rule 4 is exclusive, as what was being posited by the respondents, then
the other provisions in the Rules of Court would likewise exclude inferior courts
(Rule 123, Rule 131, Rule 3).
Furthermore, the Court based their decision on Viola Fernando v. Aragon. In said
case, the municipal court stated that, Although Rule 17 has not been made
applicable to justice of the peace courts, such omission cannot be interpreted as a
prohibition to apply.
Hence, the writ has been issued for the respondent judge to hear and decide the
appeal.