Documentos de Académico
Documentos de Profesional
Documentos de Cultura
9
Case 0:05-cv-02368-PAM-JJG Document 9 Filed 10/14/2005 Page 1 of 7
Plaintiff,
v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Defendants.
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order.
All parties were present at the hearing and therefore the Court will consider the Motion as one
for a preliminary injunction pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 65. For the reasons that follow and for
BACKGROUND
A. Plaintiff’s Business
distributes produce. It is located off East 28th Street in Minneapolis. Plaintiff receives
produce from interstate distributors and provides both an interstate regional delivery service
and local delivery service to area grocery stores and restaurants. Between receiving and
distributing, Plaintiff handles approximately 128 truckloads of produce per week. This
Dockets.Justia.com
Case 0:05-cv-02368-PAM-JJG Document 9 Filed 10/14/2005 Page 2 of 7
Plaintiff unloads shipments at its center once every eighty minutes. It receives produce
twenty-four hours a day. In turn, it distributes produce during three delivery routes: morning
delivery leaves the distribution center between 2:00 a.m. and 6:00 a.m. and returns between
6:00 a.m. and 11:00 a.m.; afternoon delivery leaves the distribution center between noon and
3:00 p.m. and returns between 3:00 p.m. and 7:00 p.m.; and evening delivery leaves the
distribution center between 5:00 p.m. and 8:00 p.m. and returns between 9:00 p.m. and 1:00
a.m. Plaintiff claims that it adheres to these schedules to most effectively meet consumer
B. City Ordinances
Defendants are the City of Minneapolis (“City”) and Anne Stahn and Julie Casey, two
City of Minneapolis employees. The City of Minneapolis has enacted noise ordinances. At
issue in this case is Minneapolis Code of Ordinances § 389.100. Specifically, this ordinance
prohibits:
The record reveals that Plaintiff has been cited six times on three occasions since
August 2005 for violating this ordinance. On August 9, 2005, City Environmental Inspector
Anne Stahn observed two trucks at Plaintiff’s business at 10:30 p.m. She reported that one
2
Case 0:05-cv-02368-PAM-JJG Document 9 Filed 10/14/2005 Page 3 of 7
truck idled for fifteen minutes, and the other truck sat idled for 25 minutes. Plaintiff was
charged $200 for violating § 389.100(7). Plaintiff was also charged $200 for violating
§ 389.100(2).
On August 10, 2005, Stahn again cited Plaintiff for violating the ordinance. She
reported that one truck pulled into Plaintiff’s business at 5:30 a.m. Plaintiff was charged $400
for this violation of § 389.100(2). She also reported that four trucks idled for thirty minutes
at 5:30 a.m., and again Plaintiff was charged $400 for violating § 389.100(7).
On September 26, 2005, Stahn cited Plaintiff a third time for violating this ordinance.
She reported that two trucks arrived at Plaintiff’s business at 11:00 p.m., and that one of the
trucks idled for twenty minutes. Plaintiff received an $800 fine for violating § 389.100(2),
Each of these citations detailed the procedure for Plaintiff to follow to contest the
citations. However, Plaintiff claims that when it contacted the City, it was referred to Stahn,
who then referred it to Defendant Julie Casey, an environmental representative with the City.
Plaintiff claims that Defendants explained that if Plaintiff challenged the citations at an
administrative hearing, then Plaintiff would be charged for every police complaint call made
about Plaintiff. Defendants allegedly told Plaintiff that they would charge Plaintiff
approximately $250 per call, and that there were about one hundred calls. Plaintiff also claims
C. Plaintiff’s Claims
Plaintiff alleges that the ordinance is: (1) preempted by the Clean Air Act;
3
Case 0:05-cv-02368-PAM-JJG Document 9 Filed 10/14/2005 Page 4 of 7
(2) unconstitutionally vague; and (3) unconstitutional because it violates the Commerce
Clause. The Complaint also alleges that the City, by enforcing and threatening to enforce this
Ordinance, deprived Plaintiff of its federal rights under § 1983. Plaintiff seeks declaratory and
injunctive relief. In this Motion, Plaintiff seeks to enjoin enforcement of the ordinance while
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
A preliminary injunction may be granted only if the moving party can demonstrate: (1)
a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) that the balance of harms favors the movant; (3) that
the public interest favors the movant; and (4) that the movant will suffer irreparable harm
absent the restraining order. Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. C L Sys., Inc., 640 F.2d 109, 113 (8th Cir.
1981). Injunctive relief is considered to be a “drastic and extraordinary remedy that is not to
be routinely granted.” Intel Corp. v. ULSI Sys. Tech., Inc., 995 F.2d 1566, 1568 (Fed. Cir.
1993).
the Clean Air Act; (2) it violates the Commerce Clause; and (3) the ordinance is vague.
Plaintiff also complaints that Defendants’ enforcement of the ordinance violates 42 U.S.C. §
1983. Plaintiff need only demonstrate a likelihood of success with respect to one of these
claims.
As the Court explained at the hearing, the Court finds at this preliminary juncture that
4
Case 0:05-cv-02368-PAM-JJG Document 9 Filed 10/14/2005 Page 5 of 7
the ordinance fails as vague. “A noncriminal statute is not unconstitutionally vague . . . where
its terms are such that the ordinary person exercising common sense can sufficient understand
and fulfill its prescriptions.” Horn v. Burns & Roe, 536 F.2d 251, 254 (8th Cir. 1976). On
this record, the Court cannot say that the term “idle” itself is vague. However, Plaintiff
challenges the lack of quantitative parameters that define the duration or length of prohibited
idling or the amount of time between when the vehicle stops and when idling becomes
prohibited. It complains that without such specifics, it is unclear what conduct actually is
prohibited under the statute. Moreover, based on this ordinance’s vagueness, it is possible that
the City may arbitrarily enforce this ordinance without justification. 1 Accordingly, the Court
C. Irreparable Harm
Plaintiff claims that it will suffer irreparable harm absent court interference. Plaintiff
complains that it will suffer loss of and harm to its goodwill absent the injunction. It also
argues that because of the ordinance’s vagueness, it cannot adequately modify its operations
to comply with its mandate. Indeed, if Plaintiff fails to modify its operations in accord with
the City’s interpretation of the statute, then Plaintiff will perpetually violate the ordinance and
modifies its operations, however, at this preliminary stage it is unclear from the plain language
of the ordinance what operations are lawful. Moreover, the viability of Plaintiff’s business
1
In addition, the Court is concerned with the possible effects that this ordinance may
have on interstate commerce.
5
Case 0:05-cv-02368-PAM-JJG Document 9 Filed 10/14/2005 Page 6 of 7
requires it to operate twenty-four hours a day, and frustrating these operations would force
Plaintiff out of business. In light of all of these factors, the Court finds that Plaintiff has
demonstrated irreparable harm and therefore this factor weighs in favor of the injunction.
D. Balance of Harms
Plaintiff has operated its business in its current location for nearly five years. It further
complies with local zoning ordinances. Within the last three months, Plaintiff has received
six citations on three different occasions for violation of this ordinance. Absent the
injunction, Plaintiff will continuously be subjected to future citations. Although the City has
an interest in managing noise levels in residential-use neighborhoods, the Court finds that
Plaintiff will be subjected to greater harm if the injunction is not granted. Accordingly, this
E. Public Interest
Although the public interest is served by the enforcement of environmental and noise
regulations, it is imperative that such regulations are constitutionally valid. Plaintiff directly
challenges the constitutionality of this ordinance. Moreover, the Court finds that permitting
free enterprise to function with minimal government interference clearly invokes the public
interest, and that this function may be frustrated absent an injunction. Thus, the Court finds that
CONCLUSION
The Court finds that the Dataphase factors weigh in favor of granting injunctive relief.
Accordingly, based on all the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY
6
Case 0:05-cv-02368-PAM-JJG Document 9 Filed 10/14/2005 Page 7 of 7
ORDERED that:
GRANTED;
3. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 65, within ten days from the date of this Order,
Plaintiff shall post a bond in the amount of $1,000 to secure this Preliminary
Injunction. In lieu of a bond, Plaintiff may post cash or its equivalent with the
Clerk of Court.