On the Differentiation of an Implicit

and a Self-Attributed Justice Motive

Claudia Dalbert

Abstract This chapter deals with the Dissociation Model of the justice motive.
The first part of the chapter presents the theoretical background to justice motive
theory (Dalbert, 2001), namely the just world hypothesis (Lerner, 1980). The
Dissociation Model assumes an implicit justice motive that is triggered by justice-relevant cues, operates on an intuitive level outside subjective awareness, and
is particularly relevant in explaining intuitive justice-specific reactions. This
implicit justice motive can be differentiated from an explicit or self-attributed
justice motive that is part of the self-concept, is triggered by social clues, and is
better able to explain controlled reactions. The explicit justice motive is satisfied
and reinforced by social reactions and the reinforcement of the self-concept,
whereas the implicit justice motive is satisfied by justice in itself. The second part
of the chapter describes two lines of research investigating the Dissociation Model.
Overall, the results emerging from both strands of research support the Dissociation
Model. The implicit justice motive as indicated by the belief in a just world operates
independently of the self-attributed justice motive. Furthermore, the implicit justice
motive explains striving for justice as an aim in itself, as expressed in the just
allocation of resources or the just distribution of punishment for wrongdoing.

Introduction
All humans have a deep concern for justice. However, the expression of this
concern differs remarkably. Some people react to observed injustice with moral
outrage; some feel embittered when reflecting on their own life course; some fight
for the rights of disadvantaged groups and individuals; others stick to the rules and

C. Dalbert (*)
Department of Educational Psychology, Martin Luther University of Halle-Wittenberg,
Halle (Saale), Germany
e-mail: claudia.dalbert@paedagogik.uni-halle.de
E. Kals and J. Maes (eds.), Justice and Conflicts,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-19035-3_4, # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

77

78

C. Dalbert

try to behave justly; and still others justify observed injustices by blaming the
victims. According to justice motive theory (Dalbert, 2001), all of these responses
are rooted in a common striving for justice (i.e., the justice motive), and the
differences in its expression may be partly attributable to different types of justice
motives.
This chapter starts by summarizing the theoretical background to justice motive
theory (Dalbert, 2001), namely the just world hypothesis (Lerner, 1980). Justice
motive theory distinguishes two motives, the implicit justice motive and the explicit
or self-attributed justice motive. The second part of the chapter describes two lines
of research, both aiming at differentiating the two justice motives. Finally, the
theoretical implications of the findings and their practical meaning for conflict
resolution are discussed.

Justice Motive Theory

The Just World Hypothesis
Several psychological theories propose explanations for justice-driven reactions.
One of the most influential is the just world hypothesis introduced by Lerner (1965,
1980). The just world hypothesis states that people need to believe in a just world in
which everyone gets what they deserve and deserves what they get. This belief
enables them to deal with their social environment as though it were stable and
orderly and thus serves important adaptive functions. As a result, people are
motivated to defend their belief in a just world when it is threatened by injustices,
either experienced or observed. If possible, justice is restored in reality (e.g., by
compensating victims). If the injustice seems unlikely to be resolved in reality,
however, people restore justice cognitively by re-evaluating the situation in line
with their belief in a just world. This cognitive process, called the assimilation of
injustice, was first observed by Lerner and Simmons (1966).
A substantial amount of the research on belief in a just world has been experimental in nature (for a review, see Hafer & Be`gue, 2005) and focused primarily on
the maladaptive functions of belief in a just world (e.g., disdain for the victim).
Since the 1970s, however, another strand of research has examined individual
differences in the belief in a just world and found that it also serves important
adaptive functions (for a review, see Furnham, 2003). This research agenda was
triggered by the introduction of the first belief in a just world scale (Rubin & Peplau,
1973, 1975), which assessed individual differences in the belief that the world is
generally a just place. Since the 1990s, more studies have investigated the positive
as well as the negative social consequences of the belief in a just world, and the
focus of these investigations has been extended to cover its implications for
believers. Based on suggestions originating from earlier research (Furnham &
Procter, 1989; Lerner & Miller, 1978), these studies have shown that it is necessary

On the Differentiation of an Implicit and a Self-Attributed Justice Motive

79

to distinguish the belief in a personal just world, in which one personally is usually
treated fairly, from the belief in a general just world or the belief in a just world for
others, in which people in general get what they deserve (Dalbert, 1999; Lipkus,
Dalbert, & Siegler, 1996). In line with the self-serving bias in general (Taylor,
Wright, Moghaddam, & Lalonde, 1990) and fairness reasoning in particular
(Messick, Bloom, Boldizar, & Samuelson, 1985), research has evidenced that
people tend to endorse the personal belief in a just world more strongly than the
general belief in a just world and that the two constructs have different meanings.
The personal belief in a just world is a better predictor of adaptive outcomes (e.g.,
subjective well-being); the general belief in a just world is a better predictor of, for
example, harsh social attitudes (e.g., Be`gue & Muller, 2006).
The shift from the experimental to the individual differences approach to the
belief in a just world made it necessary to differentiate between a justice motive and
justice motivation. In the context of just world research and theory, scholars often
speak of the justice motive (e.g., Ross & Miller, 2002). Motives are individual
dispositions reflecting individual differences in the tendency to strive for a specific
goal. A justice motive is thus an individual disposition to strive for justice as an end
in itself. According to Lerner (1977), the individual belief in a just world can be
interpreted as an indicator of such a justice motive. The belief in a just world
indicates a personal contract; the more people want to rely on being treated justly by
others, the more obligated they should feel to behave justly themselves. Thus, the
stronger their belief in a just world, the stronger their justice motive is. Experimental just world research typically does not assess individual differences, however, but
interprets experimental reactions in the light of just world reasoning. Such research
thus addresses justice motivation, and not the justice motive as an individual
differences disposition. Motivation can be defined as a persons orientation toward
a specific goal in a specific situational state; thus, justice motivation means the
orientation toward justice in a given situation. Justice motivation is triggered by
specific situational circumstances in interaction with personal dispositions (e.g., the
justice motive or other dispositions; Lind & van den Bos, 2002; Miller, 1999).

Functions of the Belief in a Just World

In the last decade, research has shown that the belief in a just world as a personality
disposition serves at least three primarily adaptive functions.

Assimilation Function
When individuals with a strong just world belief experience an injustice that they do
not believe can be resolved in reality, they try to assimilate the experience to their
just world belief. This can be done, for example, by justifying the experienced
unfairness as being at least partly self-inflicted (e.g., Bulman & Wortman, 1977), by

80

C. Dalbert

playing down the unfairness (Lipkus & Siegler, 1993), by avoiding self-focused
rumination (Dalbert, 1997), or by forgiving (Strelan, 2007). These mechanisms
explain the positive relationships that have been observed between the belief in a
just world and justice judgments in various domains of life. Most research into the
assimilation function of the just world belief has dealt with blaming the victim and
justice judgments.
Observers of injustice may show disdain for the victims, reasoning that their fate
is a deserved punishment for a bad character (characterological attribution), or they
may blame the victims for having inflicted their fate upon themselves after all, a
self-inflicted fate is not unfair (behavioral attribution). Just world research has
shown that observers prefer to blame the victim rather than to show disdain (e.g.,
Lerner & Matthews, 1967). Indeed, blaming the victim seems to be a crucial mean
of defending the belief in a just world for observers of injustice. Similar
mechanisms can be assumed to operate for the victims themselves. Comer and
Laird (1975) showed experimentally that internal attributions seem to be a way of
reevaluating ones fate as just. The significance of causal attributions, and especially of internal attributions, has thus been a subject of much discussion in the
context of the just world hypothesis (e.g., Lerner & Miller, 1978). People with a
strong just world belief are expected to be motivated to defend their belief by
making internal attributions of negative outcomes, thus maintaining their subjective
well-being. Although some research has confirmed the hypothesized positive association between just world belief and internal attributions of the victims themselves
(e.g., Hafer & Correy, 1999; Kiecolt-Glaser & Williams, 1987), other studies have
found no association (e.g., Agrawal & Dalal, 1993; Fetchenhauer, Jacobs, &
Belschak, 2005). The overall pattern of results for the belief in a just world and
victims internal attribution is thus rather mixed.
As a consequence of the assimilation process, individuals with a strong just
world belief are expected to evaluate observed events and events in their own life as
being more just than are individuals with a weak just world belief. For example,
school students with a strong belief in a personal just world have been found to be
more likely to evaluate their school grades and their teachers, peers, and parents
behavior toward them as just (Correia & Dalbert, 2007; Dalbert & Stoeber, 2006).
Similarly, research has shown prisoners with a strong personal just world belief to
be more likely to evaluate the justice of the legal proceedings leading to their
conviction, the treatment by their prison officers, and decisions on prison affairs as
more just (Dalbert & Filke, 2007; Otto & Dalbert, 2005).

Trust Function
People with a strong belief in a just world are thought to be confident in being
treated justly by others, and this trust is hypothesized to give the just world belief
the character of a resource in everyday life. Research has confirmed the expected
positive association of just world belief with general interpersonal trust
(e.g., Be`gue, 2002; Zuckerman & Gerbasi, 1977), trust in societal institutions

On the Differentiation of an Implicit and a Self-Attributed Justice Motive

81

(Correia & Vala, 2004), and young adolescents trust in the justice of their future
workplace (Sallay, 2004). This trust in future justice has a number of implications.
The belief in a just world enables individuals to rely on their good deeds being
rewarded at some point in the future. The certitude that everyone will ultimately get
what they deserve encourages individuals to invest in their future. In contrast, those
who do not believe in a just world doubt the value of such an investment, because
the return on it is uncertain. Zuckerman (1975) was the first to observe that people
with a strong just world belief may choose to invest in their future when they feel
the need for confidence in the fairness of their own future. Hafer (2000)
corroborated these findings and demonstrated experimentally that individuals
with a particular need to believe in a bright future defended their just world belief
more strongly in the face of threat. In the same vein, questionnaire studies with
samples of students facing the school-to-work transition (Dette, Stober, & Dalbert,
2004), young male prisoners (Otto & Dalbert, 2005), and young adults living in
assisted accommodation (Sutton & Winnard, 2007) have shown that the personal
just world belief is positively associated with confidence that personal goals will be
attained.
Individuals with a strong belief in a just world show more trust in their future and
in others behavior toward them. Accordingly, they expect to be confronted with
fair tasks in achievement situations and their efforts to be justly rewarded. They can
thus be expected to feel less threatened and more challenged by the need to achieve,
to experience fewer negative emotions, and to achieve better results. Tomaka and
Blascovich (1994) conducted a laboratory study to test the basic hypotheses
outlined above, presenting participants with two rapid serial subtraction tasks.
Participants with a strong general just world belief felt more challenged and less
threatened and performed better than did those with a weak belief. Extending this
laboratory research to the school and work settings, studies have shown that the
personal just world belief is positively related to school achievement (Dalbert,
2001; Dalbert & Stoeber, 2005, 2006) and to self-rated performance at work
(Otto & Schmidt, 2007). Finally, Allen, HungNg, and Leiser (2005) have observed
that nations whose citizens have stronger just world beliefs show a faster pace of
workforce modernization and economic growth.

Motive Function
In a just world, a positive future is not the gift of a benevolent world, but a reward
for the individuals behavior and character. Consequently, the more individuals
believe in a just world, the more compelled they should feel to strive for justice
themselves. The just world belief is thus indicative of a personal contract (Lerner,
1977), the terms of which oblige the individual to behave justly. Strong just world
believers are therefore more likely to help people in need (Bierhoff, Klein, &
Kramp, 1991), at least as long as the victims are seen as innocent (DePalma,
Madey, Tillman, & Wheeler, 1999) or as member of the in-group (Correia, Vala, &
Aguiar, 2007). In addition, the belief in a just world has been shown to be one of the

82

C. Dalbert

important correlates of social responsibility (Bierhoff, 1994), commitment to just

means (Cohn & Modecki, 2007; Hafer, 2000; Sutton & Winnard, 2007), and,
inversely, rule-breaking behavior (Correia & Dalbert, 2008; Otto & Dalbert,
2005). Moreover, the obligation for reciprocity has been found to be stronger
among individuals with a strong just world belief (Edlund, Sagarin, & Johnson,
2006). Finally, a laboratory study found that only participants with a strong belief in
a just world censured their own unjust behavior by a decrease in self-esteem
(Dalbert, 1999).

The Justice Motive

The justice motive reflects the striving for justice as an aim in itself. Accordingly, it
is satisfied and reinforced by the experience of justice. In line with Lerners
reasoning (1977), the belief in a just world can be interpreted as an indicator of
the justice motive namely, the striving for justice in ones own actions and in the
world in general. As indicated above, the belief in a just word operates on an
intuitive and automatic level. Disdain for or blaming of victims is not the result of
considered reflection. The same applies to the interpersonal trust accorded by a
strong belief in a just world or to the decrease in self-esteem experienced after
committing an injustice. Overall, empirical findings suggest that the belief in a just
world is indicative of an implicit justice motive that is triggered by justice-relevant
cues and that operates on an intuitive level outside subjective awareness and that
can therefore be expected to be particularly relevant in explaining intuitive justicespecific reactions.
In line with theorizing on human motives (e.g., McClelland, Koestner, &
Weinberger, 1989; Spangler, 1992) and current debate on dual-process theories
(e.g., Epstein, 1990; Strack & Deutsch, 2004), justice motive theory posits two
distinct types of justice motive (Dalbert, 2001): the implicit justice motive or just
world justice motive, on the one hand, and the explicit or self-attributed justice
motive, on the other. The explicit justice motive is an individuals conscious selfdescription of his or her justice-related values and is part of the self-concept. It can
be assessed by self-report questionnaires tapping reactions toward justice or injustice, particularly from an observer or beneficiary perspective (e.g., Fetchenhauer &
Huang, 2004; Gollwitzer, Schmitt, Schalke, Maes, & Baer, 2005). It is expected be
triggered by social clues and to be better able to explain controlled reactions.
Further, it is thought to be satisfied and reinforced by social reactions and the
reinforcement of the self-concept, whereas the implicit justice motive is satisfied by
justice in itself.
This reasoning is summarized in the Dissociation Model of the justice motive
(see Fig. 1). The model is supported by a wealth of findings on the belief in a just
worlds association with intuitive reactions and by some evidence of its independence from justice relevant self-descriptions (Dalbert, Montada, & Schmitt, 1987).
Thus far, however, research systematically testing the Dissociation Model of the

On the Differentiation of an Implicit and a Self-Attributed Justice Motive

83

Implicit justice motive

Intuitive
reactions

Self-attributed justice motive

Controlled
reactions

Fig. 1 The dissociation model of the justice motive

justice motive is scarce. In the following, two lines of research addressing this
double dissociation are described: research on allocation decisions (Dalbert &
Umlauft, 2009) and research on unconscious decision making (Donat, 2010).

Research on Allocation Decisions

This strand of research has investigated the justice motive and its meaning for
justice-related decisions. Allocation decisions are prototypical examples of justicespecific reactions. They are widely investigated in the context of social-moral
development (Damon, 1977; Takezawa, Gummerum, & Keller, 2006) and human
altruism (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003). On the basis of justice motive theory (Dalbert,
2001), it is hypothesized that allocation decisions can be explained by two types of
justice motive: (a) the implicit or just world justice motive and (b) the justicerelated self-concept or self-attributed justice motive. These hypotheses have been
tested within the framework of experimental game theory (Guth, Schmittenberger, &
Schwarze, 1982).
In the different paradigms of experimental game theory, the task is usually to
allocate a certain amount of money. This money is generally a windfall that has not
been earned by either the recipient or the allocator. A typical view is thus that it
would be fair to distribute the money equally and egoistic for the allocator to keep
the entire windfall. The conditions under which the decision is made differ across
allocation games. Because the allocators have to decide whether or not to dispose of
the money justly, thus giving a clear indication of how much they care about justice
in the world, allocation games are of particular interest in the context of justice
research.
In one study, Dalbert and Umlauft (2009) had participants play the dictator game,
in which an allocator has to decide how much, if any, of the money to give to an

84

C. Dalbert

anonymous recipient whom s/he will never meet, and who has no say in the decision.
In other words, the allocator acts as a dictator, who may decide to keep all the money
without any negative repercussions. Interestingly, however, most players do not
make egoistic choices. Generally, three subgroups of allocation decisions can be
identified. Most allocators split the money equally, a decision that is generally seen
as striving for fairness (Konow, 2005). A significant proportion of allocators fall into
a second group, keeping all of the money for themselves (egoistic allocation).
Finally, the remaining players give a share to the recipients, but keep more than 50%
for themselves. Konow (2005) interprets this type of decision as a trade-off or
compromise between equality and the temptation of egoism.
Dalbert and Umlauft (2009) sought to provide insights into the substantial
interindividual variation observed in these allocation decisions by focusing on the
two contrasting decisions of equal and egoistic allocation. A striving for fairness in
the dictator game can be seen as reflecting a justice motivation that is triggered by
the specific situational circumstances here, the allocation task in interaction with
personal dispositions. One important personal disposition may be the justice motive.
In other words, Dalbert and Umlauft did not expect individual variation in allocation
decisions to be solely attributable to the justice motive, but they did expect the
justice motive to be one of the important sources of this individual variation. Equal
allocation in the dictator game reflects a striving for fairness (Konow, 2005) and was
thus expected to be explained by the implicit justice motive, namely the belief in a
just world. Allocators with a strong implicit justice motive were therefore expected
to choose equality. Moreover, individuals who described themselves as particularly
concerned with justice those with a strong self-attributed justice motive were
also expected to strive for justice in allocation decisions. In addition, these
individuals were expected to avoid actions that were at odds with their self-concept.
Allocators with a strong self-attributed justice motive were therefore expected to
choose equality and, in particular, to avoid egoistic allocations.
Two similar studies were conducted to test these hypotheses. In both, the dictator
had to allocate 50 between him-/herself and an anonymous recipient. The implicit
or just world justice motive was assessed with the Personal Belief in a Just World
Scale (Dalbert, 1999; seven items, Study 1: a .74; Study 2: a .82; e.g., I
believe that I usually get what I deserve). Two measures were used to estimate the
explicit or self-attributed justice motive, thus avoiding the confounding of the
assessment of the self-attributed justice motive and method variance: (1) Schmitt,
Gollwitzer, Maes, and Arbachs (2005) Justice Sensitivity Scale Beneficiary
Perspective, with seven items tapping feelings of distress over injustice that is to
ones own advantage (e.g., I feel guilty when I receive better treatment than
others; Study 1: a .86; Study 2: a .89); and (2) the extended version (Dalbert
& Umlauft, 2003) of the Dalbert et al. (1987) Justice Centrality Scale, with 13 items
gauging distress about injustice and satisfaction with ones own fairness (e.g.,
Injustice that I caused torments me for a long time, There are few things that
make me as happy as justice; Study 1: a .91; Study 2: a .91).
In both studies, latent structural equation modeling was used to examine
relations among the explicit justice motive, the just world justice motive, and

On the Differentiation of an Implicit and a Self-Attributed Justice Motive

85

allocation decisions. One model tested the choice of an equal allocation as opposed
to the other two decisions; one model tested an egoistic decision (take it all) as
opposed to the other two decisions. In line with the Dissociation Model, the implicit
justice motive was defined as being independent of the self-attributed justice motive
in both studies.
In Study 1, 119 school students played the dictator game as a paper-and-pencil
task in a classroom testing session. No real money was at stake. The dictator had to
allocate 50 in 5 steps. A majority of 57% split the sum equally; 37% allocated
between 5 and 20 to the recipient; and 6% kept the full 50 themselves. The
decision to split the sum equally was explained by both justice motives simultaneously and equally well. In contrast, egoistic allocations were negatively
explained by the self-attributed justice motive, but not by the implicit justice
motive. The stronger the self-attributed motive was, the less like the allocator
was to opt for an egoistic allocation.
Study 2 was run as a computer-based laboratory task and additionally controlled
for social desirability. Again, the dictators distributed 50. In this study, however,
real money was at stake for a random 16% of participants. Four of the 59 dictators
decided to keep all the money and three allocated just 5 to the recipients. These
two groups were collapsed into an egoistic allocation group (12%). Forty
dictators (68%) split the 50 equally; the remaining 12 (20%) fell into the tradeoff group allocating between 10 and 20 to the recipients.
At first glance, the pattern of results was very similar to that of Study 1. The
decision to split the sum equally was again simultaneously explained by both justice
motives, and egoistic allocations were negatively explained by the self-attributed
justice motive, but not by the implicit justice motive. However, it emerged that the
tendency for socially desirable responding was strongly associated with the selfattributed justice motive, but not with the implicit justice motive. Moreover, social
desirability explained the allocation decisions as well as did the self-attributed
justice motive.
In sum, the results of both studies were very much in line with the Dissociation
Model of the justice motive. (a) The implicit justice motive as indicated by the
personal belief in a just world and the self-attributed justice motive as indicated by
justice-specific self-descriptions were best described by two independent factors.
(b) Both motives explained the equal allocation of resources, which can be
interpreted as reflecting a striving for fairness. (c) Only the self-attributed justice
motive explained the avoidance of egoistic allocations. (d) Moreover, as expected,
only the self-attributed justice motive was contaminated by social desirability,
confirming that this motive is triggered and reinforced by social incentives.

Research on Unconscious Decision Making

Dijksterhuis and colleagues (e.g., Dijksterhuis, 2004; Dijksterhuis & Nordgren,
2006) have suggested that unconscious thought is often better for complex

86

C. Dalbert

decisions than conscious thought. A growing number of studies in different

contexts provide support for this hypothesis (e.g., Dijksterhuis, Bos, Nordgren, &
van Baaren, 2006; Dijksterhuis, Bos, van der Leij, & van Baaren, 2009;
Dijksterhuis & van Olden, 2006; Smith, Dijksterhuis, & Wigboldus, 2008; Strick,
Dijksterhuis, & van Baaren, 2010): People who made complex decisions after
unconscious thought consistently showed better quality decisions (e.g., chose the
most attractive object more often) than did those who consciously thought about
their decisions or those who decided immediately.
Donat (2010) applied the unconscious-thought paradigm to a complex justicespecific decision, namely the punishment to be imposed on four students who had
stolen examination papers from their school. As better decisions have been found to
result after unconscious thought, and as the implicit justice motive operates at the
unconscious level, it was expected that the quality of decisions made after unconscious thought would be positively associated with the strength of the implicit
justice motive. The self-attributed justice motive operates on a conscious level and
was thus expected if at all to improve decision making after conscious thought.
In vignettes, information on the four students and the deed committed was embedded in a large amount of irrelevant information. In terms of responsibility for the
deed, the vignettes clearly distinguished between two students, in particular: the
agitator and the watchdog. The greater the difference in the punishment imposed on
these two students by the participants, the better their decision was deemed to be.
These hypotheses were tested in two similar experiments.
In both experiments, the implicit or just world justice motive was assessed with the
General Belief in a Just World Scale (Dalbert et al., 1987; six items, Experiment 1:
a .74; Experiment 2: a .70; e.g., I am convinced that in the long run people
will be compensated for injustices). The explicit justice motive was assessed with
the same instruments as in the allocation decisions studies: the Justice Sensitivity
Scale Beneficiary Perspective (Schmitt et al., 2005), with seven items tapping
feelings of distress over injustice that is to ones own advantage (Experiment 1:
a .86; Experiment 2: a .85); and the extended version (Dalbert & Umlauft,
2003) of the Dalbert et al. (1987) Justice Centrality Scale, with 13 items gauging
distress about injustice and satisfaction with ones own fairness (Study 1: a .87;
Study 2: a .89).
On a computer screen, participants were presented four vignettes describing the
deed from each students perspective. They then had to decide on a punishment for
each student (i.e., number of hours schoolwork). The difference in hours between
agitator and watchdog served as the dependent variable. As in the unconscious
thought experiments of Dijksterhuis and colleagues (e.g., Dijksterhuis & Nordgren,
2006), three experimental conditions were compared. One group had to decide
immediately after reading the four vignettes (immediate condition); a second group
were given 3 min to deliberate before deciding (conscious thought condition), and a
third group solved anagrams for 3 min before deciding (unconscious thought
condition). In both experiments, there were 30 participants in each condition.
In Experiment 1, the difference in hours of punishment significantly correlated
with the implicit justice motive in the unconscious condition only, and with the

On the Differentiation of an Implicit and a Self-Attributed Justice Motive

87

self-attributed justice motive in the conscious condition only. Experiment 2 fully

replicated the results for the implicit justice motive, but not for the explicit justice
motive. In addition, social desirability was controlled, but did not explain any
decisions. Thus, in line with the Differentiation Model of the justice motive, the
implicit justice motive was particularly helpful in explaining complex decision
making after unconscious thought. The stronger their implicit justice motive, the
better able participants were to process the complex information, and to arrive at a
better decision, after unconscious thought. Findings for the self-attributed justice
motive were mixed.

Outlook
Overall, the results emerging from both strands of research support justice theory in
general and the Dissociation Model in particular. The implicit justice motive as
indicated by the belief in a just world operates independently of a self-attributed
justice motive. The implicit justice motive explains striving for justice as an aim in
itself, as expressed in the just allocation of resources or the just distribution of
punishment for wrongdoing. The notion that the implicit justice motive operates on
an unconscious level is further supported by the strong association between implicit
justice motive and punishment decisions observed in the unconscious condition
only. The validity of the unconscious thought condition was supported by the
finding that sympathy for the agitator or the watchdog partly explained punishment
decisions in the immediate and the conscious condition, but not in the unconscious
condition. The results thus indicate that justice-specific reactions are, to a large
extent, generated on an unconscious level and are not the result of intentional
deliberation.
The meaning and the impact of the self-attributed justice motive is less clear.
Does it depict anything more than a tendency for social desirable responding? And
how does it operate by deliberation? These questions remain unanswered. However, studies have consistently found the explicit justice motive and the implicit
justice motive to be two independent constructs.
Although findings on the implicit justice motive were consistent across studies,
one point requires further consideration. In the dictator game studies, the implicit
justice motive was indicated by the personal belief in a just world. This is in line
with early observations on the motive function of belief in a just world, which
showed that the personal but not the general belief in a just world explained the
decrease in self-esteem experienced by individuals who had committed an injustice
(Dalbert, 1999). Thus, it might seem reasonable to conclude that the personal belief
in a just world is a better indicator of a justice motive than the general belief in a just
world. However, in the agitator/watchdog experiments, the justice motive was
better indicated by the general belief in a just world (Donat, 2010). How might
this difference be explained? Under which conditions is the personal versus the
general belief in a just world a better indicator of the implicit justice motive?

88

C. Dalbert

It might be speculated that there is something specific about punishment decisions

that makes the general belief in a just world the better indicator of a justice motive
in this context. The personal belief in a just world seems to be the better indicator
of the implicit justice motive in contexts pertaining to ones own situation (confrontation with ones own behavior, allocation of ones own money). In contrast,
punishment decisions relate to others who are part of the general just world.
The belief in a general just world may therefore be a better indicator of the implicit
justice motive in this context. Future studies are needed to investigate these
aspects further.
The main message for conflict resolution is that there are great individual
differences in the striving for justice, that most these strivings take place on an
unconscious level, and that they are satisfied by the subjective experience of
increased justice. Yet the subjective experience of increased justice does not
necessarily mean that the victims situation is improved in reality. The stronger
their implicit justice motive, the more people involved in a conflict may tend to
assimilate injustices, thus playing down the conflict. Perpetrators may justify their
acts and consequently perpetuate the injustice by failing to compensating the
victim. Victims, on the other hand, may assimilate their fate by minimizing
the injustice and blaming themselves for having a part in it, thus also perpetuating
the injustice as long as the injustice is not too grave or experienced too often.
Thus, each partner in a conflict is at risk of perpetuating injustice not through
cynicism, but because of the urgent, yet unconscious, need to strive for justice.
Mediation processes may aim to make these implicit unconscious processes more
explicit and thus resolve the conflict in a way that is acceptable to all parties.
However, it is important to remember that complex justice-specific decisions are
better if made on an unconscious level. Thus, the parties should be given time to
process the information unconsciously.

References
Agrawal, M., & Dalal, A. K. (1993). Beliefs about the world and recovery from myocardial
infarction. The Journal of Social Psychology, 133, 385394.
Allen, M. W., HungNg, S., & Leiser, D. (2005). Adult economic model and values survey: Crossnational differences in economic beliefs. Journal of Economic Psychology, 26, 159185.
Be`gue, L. (2002). Beliefs in justice and faith in people: Just world, religiosity and interpersonal
trust. Personality and Individual Differences, 32, 375382.
Be`gue, L., & Muller, D. (2006). Belief in a just world as moderator of hostile attributional bias.
British Journal of Social Psychology, 45, 117126.
Bierhoff, H.-W. (1994). Verantwortung und altruistische Pers
onlichkeit [Responsibility and altruistic personality]. Zeitschrift f
ur Sozialpsychologie, 25, 217226.
Bierhoff, H.-W., Klein, R., & Kramp, P. (1991). Evidence for the altruistic personality from data
on accident research. Journal of Personality, 59, 263280.
Bulman, R. J., & Wortman, C. B. (1977). Attributions of blame and coping in the real world:
Severe accident victims react to their lot. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 35,
351363.

On the Differentiation of an Implicit and a Self-Attributed Justice Motive

89

Cohn, E. S., & Modecki, K. L. (2007). Gender differences in predicting delinquent behavior: Do
individual differences matter? Social Behavior and Personality, 35, 359374.
Comer, R., & Laird, J. D. (1975). Choosing to suffer as a consequence of expecting to suffer: Why
do people do it? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 32, 92101.
Correia, I., & Dalbert, C. (2007). Belief in a just world, justice concerns, and well-being at
Portuguese schools. European Journal of Psychology of Education, 22, 421437.
Correia, I., & Dalbert, C. (2008). School bullying: Belief in a personal just world of bullies,
victims, and defenders. European Psychologist, 13, 249254.
Correia, I., & Vala, J. (2004). Belief in a just world, subjective well-being and trust of young
adults. In C. Dalbert & H. Sallay (Eds.), The justice motive in adolescence and young
adulthood: Origins and consequences (pp. 85100). London: Routledge.
Correia, I., Vala, J., & Aguiar, O. (2007). Victims innocence, social categorization, and the threat
to the belief in a just world. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 43, 3138.
Dalbert, C. (1997). Coping with an unjust fate: The case of structural unemployment. Social
Justice Research, 10, 175189.
Dalbert, C. (1999). The world is more just for me than generally: About the personal belief in a just
world scales validity. Social Justice Research, 12, 7998.
Dalbert, C. (2001). The justice motive as a personal resource: Dealing with challenges and critical
life events. New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers.
Dalbert, C., & Filke, E. (2007). Belief in a just world, justice judgments, and their functions for
prisoners. Criminal Justice and Behavior, 34, 15161527.
Dalbert, C., Montada, L., & Schmitt, M. (1987). Glaube an eine gerechte Welt als Motiv:
Validierungskorrelate zweier Skalen [The belief in a just world as a motive: Validity correlates
of two scales]. Psychologische Beitr
age, 29, 596615.
Dalbert, C., & Stoeber, J. (2005). The belief in a just world and distress at school. Social
Psychology of Education, 8, 123135.
Dalbert, C., & Stoeber, J. (2006). The personal belief in a just world and domain-specific beliefs
about justice at school and in the family: A longitudinal study with adolescents. International
Journal of Behavioral Development, 30, 200207.
Dalbert, C., & Umlauft, S. (2003). Justice Centrality Scale. Retrieved from http://www.erzwiss.
uni-halle.de/gliederung/paed/ppsych/insteng.html
Dalbert, C., & Umlauft, S. (2009). The role of the justice motive in economic decision making.
Journal of Economic Psychology, 30, 172180.
Damon, W. (1977). The social world of the child. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.
DePalma, M., Madey, S. F., Tillman, T. C., & Wheeler, J. (1999). Perceived patient responsibility
and belief in a just world affect helping. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 21, 131137.
Dette, D., Stober, J., & Dalbert, C. (2004). Belief in a just world and adolescents vocational and
social goals. In C. Dalbert & H. Sallay (Eds.), The justice motive in adolescence and young
adulthood: Origins and consequences (pp. 1125). London: Routledge.
Dijksterhuis, A. (2004). Think different: The merits of unconscious thought in preference development and decision making. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 87, 586598.
Dijksterhuis, A., Bos, M. W., Nordgren, L. F., & van Baaren, R. B. (2006). On making the right
choice: The deliberation-without-attention effect. Science, 311, 10051007.
Dijksterhuis, A., Bos, M. W., van der Leij, A., & van Baaren, R. B. (2009). Predicting soccer
matches after unconscious and conscious thought as a function of expertise. Psychological
Science, 20, 13811387.
Dijksterhuis, A., & Nordgren, L. F. (2006). A theory of unconscious thought. Perspectives on
Psychological Science, 1, 95109.
Dijksterhuis, A., & van Olden, Z. (2006). On the benefits of thinking unconsciously: Unconscious
thought can increase post-choice satisfaction. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 42,
627631.
Donat, M. (2010). Dissoziation des Gerechtigkeitsmotivs und unbewusstes Denken bei der
Entscheidungsfindung [Dissociation of the justice motive and unconscious thought in
decision-making]. Hamburg: Verlag Dr. Kovac.

90

C. Dalbert

Edlund, J. E., Sagarin, B. J., & Johnson, B. S. (2006). Reciprocity and the belief in a just world.
Personality and Individual Differences, 43, 589596.
Epstein, S. (1990). Cognitive-experiential self-theory. In L. A. Pervin (Ed.), Handbook of personality: Theory and research (pp. 165192). New York: Guilford Press.
Fehr, E., & Fischbacher, U. (2003). The nature of human altruism. Nature, 425, 785791.
Fetchenhauer, D., & Huang, X. (2004). Justice sensitivity and distributive decisions in experimental games. Personality and Individual Differences, 36, 10151029.
Fetchenhauer, D., Jacobs, G., & Belschak, F. (2005). Belief in a just world, causal attributions, and
adjustment to sexual violence. Social Justice Research, 18, 2542.
Furnham, A. (2003). Belief in a just world: Research progress over the past decade. Personality
and Individual Differences, 34, 795817.
Furnham, A., & Procter, E. (1989). Belief in a just world: Review and critique of the individual
difference literature. British Journal of Social Psychology, 28, 365384.
Gollwitzer, M., Schmitt, M., Schalke, R., Maes, J., & Baer, A. (2005). Asymmetrical effects of justice
sensitivity perspectives on prosocial and antisocial behavior. Social Justice Research, 18, 183201.
G
uth, W., Schmittenberger, R., & Schwarze, B. (1982). An experimental analysis of ultimate
bargaining. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 3, 367388.
Hafer, C. L. (2000). Investment in long-term goals and commitment to just means drive the need to
believe in a just world. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 26, 10591073.
Hafer, C. L., & Be`gue, L. (2005). Experimental research on just-world theory: Problems, development, and future challenges. Psychological Bulletin, 131, 128167.
Hafer, C. L., & Correy, B. L. (1999). Mediators of the relation of beliefs in a just world and
emotional responses to negative outcomes. Social Justice Research, 12, 189204.
Kiecolt-Glaser, J. K., & Williams, D. A. (1987). Self-blame, compliance, and distress among burn
patients. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 53, 187193.
Konow, J. (2005). Blind spots: The effects of information and stakes on fairness bias and
dispersion. Social Justice Research, 18, 349390.
Lerner, M. J. (1965). Evaluation of performance as a function of performers reward and attractiveness. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1, 355360.
Lerner, M. J. (1977). The justice motive: Some hypotheses as to its origins and forms. Journal of
Personality, 45, 152.
Lerner, M. J. (1980). The belief in a just world: A fundamental delusion. New York: Plenum Press.
Lerner, M. J., & Matthews, J. (1967). Reactions to suffering of others under conditions of indirect
responsibility. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 5, 319325.
Lerner, M. J., & Miller, D. T. (1978). Just world research and the attribution process: Looking back
and ahead. Psychological Bulletin, 85, 10301051.
Lerner, M. J., & Simmons, C. H. (1966). The observers reaction to the innocent victim:
Compassion or rejection? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 4, 203210.
Lind, E. A., & van den Bos, K. (2002). When fairness works: Toward a general theory of
uncertainty management. Research in Organizational Behavior, 24, 181223.
Lipkus, I. M., Dalbert, C., & Siegler, I. C. (1996). The importance of distinguishing the belief in a
just world for self versus for others: Implications for psychological well-being. Personality and
Social Psychology Bulletin, 22, 666677.
Lipkus, I. M., & Siegler, I. C. (1993). The belief in a just world and perceptions of discrimination.
Journal of Psychology, 127, 465474.
McClelland, D. C., Koestner, R., & Weinberger, J. (1989). How do self-attributed and implicit
motives differ? Psychological Review, 96, 680702.
Messick, D. M., Bloom, S., Boldizar, J. P., & Samuelson, C. D. (1985). Why are we fairer than
others? Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 21, 480500.
Miller, D. T. (1999). The norm of self-interest. American Psychologist, 54, 10531060.
Otto, K., & Dalbert, C. (2005). Belief in a just world and its functions for young prisoners. Journal
of Research in Personality, 39, 559573.
Otto, K., & Schmidt, S. (2007). Dealing with stress in the workplace: Compensatory effects of
belief in a just world. European Psychologist, 12, 253260.

On the Differentiation of an Implicit and a Self-Attributed Justice Motive

91

Ross, M., & Miller, D. T. (Eds.). (2002). The justice motive in everyday life. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Rubin, Z., & Peplau, L. A. (1973). Belief in a just world and reaction to anothers lot: A study of
participants in the national draft lottery. Journal of Social Issues, 29(4), 7393.
Rubin, Z., & Peplau, L. A. (1975). Who believes in a just world? Journal of Social Issues, 31(3),
6589.
Sallay, H. (2004). Entering the job market: Belief in a just world, fairness and well-being of
graduating students. In C. Dalbert & H. Sallay (Eds.), The justice motive in adolescence and
young adulthood: Origins and consequences (pp. 215231). London: Routledge.
Schmitt, M., Gollwitzer, M., Maes, J., & Arbach, D. (2005). Justice sensitivity: Assessment and
location in the personality space. European Journal of Psychological Assessment, 21, 202211.
Smith, K. P., Dijksterhuis, A., & Wigboldus, D. H. J. (2008). Powerful people make good
decisions even when they consciously think. Psychological Science, 19, 12581259.
Spangler, W. D. (1992). Validity of questionnaire and TAT measures of need for achievement:
Two meta-analyses. Psychological Bulletin, 112, 140154.
Strack, F., & Deutsch, R. (2004). Reflective and impulsive determinants of social behaviour.
Personality and Social Psychology Review, 8, 220247.
Strelan, P. (2007). The prosocial, adaptive qualities of just world beliefs: Implications for the
relationship between justice and forgiveness. Personality and Individual Differences, 43,
881890.
Strick, M., Dijksterhuis, A., & van Baaren, R. B. (2010). Unconscious-thought effects take place
off-line, not on-line. Psychological Science, 21, 484488.
Sutton, R. M., & Winnard, E. J. (2007). Looking ahead through lenses of justice: The relevance of
just-world beliefs to intentions and confidence in the future. British Journal of Social Psychology, 46, 649666.
Takezawa, M., Gummerum, M., & Keller, M. (2006). A stage for the rational tail of the emotional
dog: Roles of moral reasoning in group decision making. Journal of Economic Psychology, 27,
117139.
Taylor, D. M., Wright, G. C., Moghaddam, F. M., & Lalonde, R. N. (1990). The personal/group
discrimination discrepancy: Perceiving my group, but not myself, to be a target for discrimination. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 16, 254262.
Tomaka, J., & Blascovich, J. (1994). Effects of justice beliefs on cognitive, psychological, and
behavioral responses to potential stress. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67,
732740.
Zuckerman, M. (1975). Belief in a just world and altruistic behavior. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 31, 972976.
Zuckerman, M., & Gerbasi, K. C. (1977). Belief in a just world and trust. Journal of Research in
Personality, 11, 306317.