COLLEGE OF LAW, GOVERNMENT, AND INTERNATIONAL

STUDENT (COLGIS)
SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (SOIS)

GFPP 5014 : STRATEGIC PHILOSOPHY AND THOUGHT

GROUP ASSIGNMENT:
AN ANALYSIS : THE FAILURE OF NAPOLEON AND HITLER FOR INVASION OF
RUSSIA AND PRINSIPLES EXPOUNDED BY GREAT STRATEGIC PHILOSOPHERS

PREPARED FOR:
PROF. EMERITUS DR. RANJIT SINGH A/L DARSHAN SINGH

PREPARED BY:
FETHALLAH FARES (817547)
MUHAMMAD SYUKHRI BIN SHAFEE (818981)

Introduction

In studying of strategic studies, review with comparison approach for

Hitlers and Napoleons facts are greatly similar in many field of research ,
In looking at modern history one cannot help but draw parallels between
these two conquerors. By the traditional royal families they were peasant
upstarts that elevated themselves to royal, almost superhuman status. Yet
one can only guess how contemptuously the Hapsburgs, Romanovs and
the British nobility would look at both of these common men that
descended from their serfs.

Napoleon also recalled to the colours his brother in law, Marshal

Joachim Murat, the King of Naples. In 1812 when Napoleon invades Russia,
the armies of the French Revolution characteristically outstripped their
supply services, forcing them to live off the land. Napoleon had improved
the Quartermaster General Service. He ordered that every soldier crossing
the Niemen be supplied with 60 days' rations and a sickle to cut grain.
Additional supplies were carried by the 183,000 horses with the Army.
Unfortunately, Napoleon mistakenly anticipated that he could bring the
Russian armies to battle and decisively defeat them within a relatively
short period of time. As result, napoleon failed in this one of great
campaign worldwide.

When Czar Alexander I publicly disregarded the French Continental

Blockade, Napoleon would not stand for such blatant contempt of French
authority. The Emperor decided to take military action against the
audacious Russians in order to force their obedience to the French
embargo. By raising a massive Grande Army of over 600,000 men,
Napoleon hoped to either intimidate the Russians into immediate
capitulation, or bring the czar to his knees through a massive military
engagement. Napoleon knew that the speed of travel would prove vital to
the success of his operation; as a result, he intended the campaign to last
a mere three weeks. Perhaps obviously, a foot soldier could travel much
faster than a supply wagon, and so the Grande Army was to live off the

land, taking what it needed from Russia instead of relying on lumbering

supply wagons for sustenance.1

Hitler's motivations and objectives vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, some

rational, some less conscious and more ideological, were much more
complex than Napoleon's. The conflict among this potpourri of goals and
subterranean mental constructs had a devastatingly adverse impact on
the evolution of the German military campaign in Russia at various critical
junctures.

The words Soviet Union conjured up the most hated enemies which Hitler had identified
in his disjointed autobiography, Mein Kampf, Jews, Slavs and Bolsheviks. In November 1936
Hitler told senior Nazi military and other leaders: "since the eighteenth century the world had
been rushing toward a final historical reckoning with the tradition of the French Revolution
and its bastard offspring, Bolshevism". Relations between Nazi Germany and the U.S.S.R.,
strained since 1933, were patched up temporarily after the two totalitarian states buried the
hatchet pursuant to the Nazi-Soviet Pact of August 1939.2

The drive to the East, appealed to Germany's traditional elites, which

recalled the defence of Christian civilization in medieval times against the
pagan Slavs by the Teutonic Knights and, more recently, the gains
achieved by Wilhelmine Germany in Poland, the Baltic States and the
Ukraine under the Treaty of Brest Litovsk which a weakened Russia was
forced to sign in 1918. However, Hitler and some of his Nazi ideologues
had a more sinister and more unlimited plan of conquest and enslavement
in mind for the East.

Even while the Wehrmacht was completing the destruction of the

French Army, Hitler on July 3, 1940 issued coded instructions 'Fritz' in
which the generals were told to begin making preliminary plans for
operations against the Soviet Union. Proceeding hesitantly and
indifferently with Operation Sea Lion, the plan for the cross-Channel
1 Harvey, Robert. (2006). The War of Wars: The Great European Conflict, 1793-1815. New
York : Carroll and Graf Publishers. p. 641-642.

2 Harvey, Robert. (2006). The War of Wars: The Great European Conflict, 1793-1815. New
York : Carroll and Graf Publishers. p.642.

invasion of Britain, Hitler startled his generals at a Council of War on July

31, 1940 by confiding to them that he had decided on an all out war of
annihilation against the Soviet Union in order to isolate Britain which would
be forced to make peace after Russia's defeat and to provide lebensraum,
living space, for Germany's future expansion. This surprise invasion was to
take place during the first good weather days in May 1941.3

In this paper we will embrace a contextual investigation of napoleon's invasion of Russia

in 1812 and Hitler's attack of 1941. Furthermore, examining the components of their
disappointment or failure and relate them to a percentage of the standards clarified by great
strategic philosopher, as: Sun Tzu, Kautilya and Carl von Clausewitz.

I.

Factors of Napoleons Failure in Invasion Russia in 1812

Napoleon Bonaparte was apparently powerful. Under his order, the

Grande Army had conquered the whole of Europe, and was seen by others
as a stark enemy. Despite the fact that regardless of this, Napoleon
committed a lethal error: he invades Russia in 1812 of 600.000 troops that
came to the Russian fringe only 100.000 made it out. Through the Russian
campaign the seemingly invincible man of napoleon started to disintegrate
at the base. And napoleons campaign of 1812 resulted in failure because
of the following factors:
1. Faulty Logistics
Most of historian in strategic points to logistical errors as a primary and
often overlooked reason for Napoleons Grand Failure to invade Russia in
1812. The logistical difficulties involved in supplying his Grande Army of
over 600,000 men were multiple and grave. By the time the French
retreated Russia in a devastating defeat the army had dwindled down to
only a few thousand. Napoleon's method of warfare was based on rapid
concentration of his forces at a key place to destroy his enemy.
This boiled down to moving his men as fast as possible to the place
they were needed the most. To do this Napoleon would advance his army
3 "Russian and the defaet of napoleon (1812-14)" kritika exploration in russia and
hurasian history . Lieven, D.C.B. May 8, 2006. (2) Vol. 7.

along several avenues and converging them only when necessary. The
success of Napoleon time after time in Central Europe against the
Prussians and the Austrians proved that his method of warfare worked.
However for it to work, the terrain must co-operate. There must be a good
road network for his army to advance along several axes and an
agricultural base capable of supporting the foraging soldiers.4
2. Forsaking the Refuge of Vitebsk
Initially, on July 27, 1812, Napoleon had wanted to stay put in Vitebsk
admirably getting to that the city was a decent post in which to defer the
overwhelming of Moscow until 1813. In spite of having the backing of his
armed force in this plan, he disregarded his ability to think and changed
gears. As opposed to outdoors in Vitebsk, he chose they ought to push
ahead. It was an impulsive choice spurred by his failure to stay latent. This
change in course set the route for death in the dead of winter.5
3. Poor discipline.
Napoleon was battling on two fronts. A fruitful end to the Peninsular
War would have discharged 200,000 troops. Without them, he was
compelled to swing to allies to supply him with troops. Some of them,
including Austria and Prussia, were extremely hesitant to cooperation. The
distinctive languages and gear of the different nationalities included made
discipline, communications and supply problems.
Troops needed to scavenge to survive. The more profound they went into
Russia the further they needed to go every day to find food. Commanders
lost control of their troops as many fighters just concern got to be
discovering sustenance and just vanished. These soldiers did not
necessarily die, but form an uncontrollable mass bringing up the rear.
As months passed by, units stop to exist, with the exception of in name
just. For the situation, at the crossing of the Berezina, a great many
fighters in these mobs panicked when they were assaulted by the
Russians. In their frantic endeavour to cross the bridge it broke, and no
less than 10,000 - 20,000 troopers died or were captured.6
4. Weather and the Unforgiving Winter
4 Haythornthwaite, Philip. 2012. Borodino 1812: Napoleon's great gamble. london :
Osprey Publishing, 2012. p. 19.

5 Idem

Napoleon what still stayed of his dragging and messed up armed force
after entering the about Moscow, which was situated ablaze by its own
particular Russian governor were forced to retreat just as winter was
arriving on Oct 19, 1812. Those with enough strength and resources of
nourishment, medicine and fitting apparel to bear the freezing
temperatures, had the capacity make it out alive, but most did not. Most
starved, froze or were executed by Russian Guerrilla assaults as they made
the long excursion back to France. First to die were the powerless who,
excessively unable to walk.
As the little nourishment supplies they had ran out, the solid got
weaker and they too started to die. But then the climate changed. There
was a warm spell which thawed the frozen streets easing off the walk
significantly more. At that point at the end of the day the climate got ugly
this time far colder than in the recent past. Thousands died in their
slumber overcome by depletion and presentation. When the armed force
crossed into Poland in early of December, fewer than 100,000 depleted,
battered soldiers stayed of the 600,000 pleased fighters who crossed the
Nieman five months before.7
5. Disease and Typhus Fever
Typhus was wild among the troops because of infestations of lice. The
irresistible creature that causes Typhus is called Rickettsia prowazekii. The
French warriors were put into to great degree unsanitary circumstances of
rottenness, sweat and unclean garments, as they advanced to Russia in
1812. Troopers debilitated by horrible eating routines and exhaustion are
defenceless to sickness. Also, the poor nourishment, joined with awful
water, and outdoors on destinations where several thousand bivouacked
before (and thus contaminated the water and area with faeces) made
intestinal illnesses, for example, diarrhea and dysentery common. When
Napoleon had reached Moscow, after three months, more than 200,000 of
his fighters were dead or hospitalized because of disease and exhaustion. 8
6 BENNETT, LYNCH. 2011. The Grand Failure: How Logistics of Supply Defeated
Napoleon in 1812. [http://www.indiana.edu/~psource/PDF/Archive
%20Articles/Spring2011/LynchBennettArticle.pdf] s.l. : Primary Source Volume I:
Issue I, indiana 2011.
7 idem
8 Thackeray, John E. Findling and Frank W. 1996. Events that Changed the World in the
Nineteenth Century. new york : Greenwood; annotated edition edition, 1996.

II.

Factors of Hitlers Failure in Invasion Russia in 1941

Before the war, and still more during the conquest of the West, Hitler
came to appear a gigantic figure, combining the strategy of a Napoleon
with the cunning of a Machiavelli. After his first check in Russia, his figure
began to shrink, and towards the end he was regarded as a blundering
amateur in the military field, whose crazy orders and crass ignorance had
been the Allies greatest asset. All the disasters of the German Army were
attributed to Hitler; all its successes were credited to the German General
Staff.
Major factors of defeat:
1. invasion delay:
The German invasion was late. Their plan was to capture Moscow in
the first 6 months (before winter set in). But they delayed Operation
Barbarossa for a couple of months which meant that had less time to
capture Moscow.9
2. winter:
The Germans weren't prepared for the winter that came and even
subsequent winters. Making it even more important was that Hitler
thought he had learned from Napoleon. He ordered his troops to hold their
ground (no retreat). Which meant that during the Winter War (the first
winter in Russia), the Germans weren't able to pull back to more
defensible positions.10
3. Russian forces:

The Russians were able to launch a series of counter-attacks during

that first winter. These attacks cut-off some German forces, inflicted worse

9 Winchester, Charles. 2007. Hitler's War on Russia (General Military). 1. london : Osprey
Publishing, 2007. p. 41.

10 Idem p.68.

casualties but more importantly allowed the Russians began to rebuild

their army. Stalin had purged most of the officer corps prior to the war for
political reasons.

He was left with untrained toadies. And the Russian Army showed it
with their performance in the first 4 months of the war. But come winter
(and the ability to go on limited offensives, roll out US military supplies
which were upgrades over some of their older equipment and as new
officers emerged via a deadly Darwinian process of combat), a better,
more capable, better led and equipped Soviet Red Army emerged.11

4. Distance:
Just getting to Moscow is immense. And part of the way it matters is
that your supply lines become extended. The further the Germans went,
the more fuel became a problem. And just look at a map of Russia. Look at
the distance from St. Petersburg (then Leningrad) all the way to the
Crimean (Sevastopol). How can you protect a front of that distance? So the
Germans inevitably became vulnerable to counterattacks. And during the
start of Barbarosa, the Germans relied more on horse than trucks for
transportation.12

5. Numbers:
If the Germans couldn't win an early war, by then the Russians would
start to become competent. In that sense it was like the Japanese fighting
us--they needed an early victory over the US or we'd regain our footing
and then our industrial might would assert itself (as it did). Same with
Russia.
By year two of the war, the numbers of Russian troops (which hadn't
stopped the Wehrmacht in year one) were no being better led, had more
tubes/artillery, better aircraft, better tactics and the Germans through a
11 Idem p.116.
12 Greiss, Thomas E. 2003. Second World War: Europe and the Mediterranean (West
Point Military History): Europe and the Mediterranean (West Point Military History). new
york : Square One Publishing, 2003. p. 131.

combination of distance and partisan involvement were hurting for

supplies.13

6. Arms:
The T-34 (model of tanks). The KV-1 was a nasty surprise for the
Germans but was available in limited numbers and was not very mobilize.
But the T-34 was a factor throughout the war. It was fast, handled mud
well, outgunned initially the German armour it faced and its sloped front
made it impregnable to the standard German PAK at the time of
Barbarossa.14

III.

Principles Expounded By Great Strategic Philosophers

1. Sun Tzu

The failure of Napoleon on 1812 and Hitler on 1941 regarding their plan to invade Russia,
maybe we can take some principle by one of the great scholar from East which is Sun Tzu in
his book Ping Fa (The Art of War) since year of before century (400-330 B.C). Even if
Napoleon has the biggest troops that recorded in European history on that time which is
approximately 550,000 to 600,000 men with him, he did not ably to conquer and invade
Russia.

According to Sun Tzu, there are several element that we must know in war or factor
that can be determine of winning or lose in battle. For Sun Tzu, He mention five constant
factor there are moral influence, weather, terrain, commander and doctrine. More interesting,
according to Sun Tzu, whose so ever do not master in these constant factors, definitely will
13 Hinsley, F. H. 2013. Hitler's Strategy. Reissue edition. london : Cambridge University
Press, 2013. p. 29.

14 Idem.p. 59

lose15. From these five constant factor were given by Sun Tzu as guideline for every battle,
maybe the most related with the failure of Hitler and Napoleon when they tried to conquer
Russia are moral influence, weather and terrain.

We can start discuss and analyze about terrain as the factor of failure for Napoleon and Hitler
plan to invade Russia. The size of Russia alone approximately 10,672,000 square miles or
17,075,200 square kilometer. In term of size of countries, it too wide. The territory of Russia
are include two continental which is Europe and Asia as well. At the same time, Russia have
connect with Arctic Ocean, Black Sea and North Pole. Quite large area in Russia are covered
by forest, swamps and tundra especially in South and North part of Russia16.

Because of the large and wide of territories of Russia, they can retreat and find other territory
to settlement for in case their capital city were captured by enemies. Same case happen to
Napoleon Bonaparte when they have attack and captured the capital city of Russia which is
Moscow, they retreat and stay at other territories. Moreover, they have time to plan next move
or wait until the best time to counter attack17.

Next factor were mention by Sun Tzu we can consider as important as well is weather.
According to him, weather also can be the factor that make you lose if you did not master
about it. Take Russia as case study, they can defend and avoid their countries from fall to
French (1812) and Russia (1941)18. One of the major player of factor to make it is weather.
Russian people and troops already familiar with weather in Russia because that is their place
compare to Napoleon troops and Hitler troops which are not familiar with Russia climate.
Because of this factor can determined the winner or loser for any battle, that why Japanese

15 Michaelson, G., & Michaelson, S. (2003). Sun Tzu for success: How to use the
art of war to master challenges and accomplish the important goals in your life.
Adams Media. p.3
16 Russian Geography. Diplomacy Online. Retrieved on 12th April, 2015 from
http://www.rusemb.org.uk/russiageography/
17 Grimsley, M. (2012). What If The Germans Had Captured Moscow in 1941?.
History Net. Retrieved on 12th April, 2015 from http://www.historynet.com/what-ifthe-germans-had-captured-moscow-in-1941.htm
18 Atkinson, G. D. (1973). Impact of weather on military operations: Past,
present, future. ARMY WAR COLL CARLISLE BARRACKS PA.

military learn carefully about terrain and weather other countries before they attacked after
learn Sun Tzu19.

Because of weather of Russia are hard to predict especially for non-Russian like Napoleon
troops or Hitler troops, their military operation faced many difficulties and obstruction. The
extreme weather are become number one enemy for these two troops. Take for example,
Hitler very confident and underestimated that his troops can finish conquer Russian before
winter season come with used his grand strategy named Operation Barbarossa 20. But,
unfortunately his calculation are wrong and it drag the war more long and it give
disadvantages for German troops21.

Sun Tzu at the same time mention about moral influence of the military during war. The
moral of troops are important to make sure they are not easy to give up in any battle. If the
moral of troops are falling and did not in good condition, it will give advantage to enemy even
if the enemy troop number are less. One of example we can learn is took Napoleon case when
he want to invade Russia. The Czar Alexander (leader of Russian on that time) knew if
Russian troops fight in battlefield face to face with Napoleon troops, they will lose. In fact,
their troops are out of numbers compare to Napoleon troops.

So, to make Napoleon troops demoralized during war, Czar Alexander order his troops
do not fight face to face with Napoleon troops. The Russian troops on that time used different
strategy which is retreat every time when Napoleon troops want attack them. The war or
campaign in Russia were dragged more long than what Napoleons expectation. Napoleon
troops morale decrease and lost their spirit to fight in Russia.

Russian troops not just retreat from one place to other place for long time. During
Russian troops retreat, they burn the place, jungles, food supplies and anything can assist
Napoleon troops to survive. When Napoleon troops tried chased Russian troops, the food
supply are decrease time by time. They also did not get enough food supplies to move further
19 Niou, E. M., & Ordeshook, P. C. (1994). A Game-Theoretic Interpretation of Sun
Tzu's The Art of War. Journal of Peace Research, 31(2), 161-174.
20 Frster, J. (1998). Operation Barbarossa as a war of conquest and annihilation.
Germany and the Second World War, 4, 491-513.
21 Bullock, Alan. (1962). Hitler: A Study in Tyranny. Middlesex, England: Penguin
Books Ltd. p. 651

for huge operation because bring so many troops in this expedition. This strategies called
scorched-earth and make difficult for Napoleon troops mobilize.

Even if Napoleon troops were able to capture Moscow in 1812, but that capital city are
horrible and death city compare previously. It is because the Russian troops burned all
supplies, destroyed the main building and polluted the water. Because of this tactic, the
morale of Napoleon troops were dropped and no have willing to fight 22. The situation became
worst when the winter season in Moscow and coerced Napoleon call his troops in Russia
retreat23. The morale of Napoleon troops already dropped and it give huge effect to his
military operation. We can see how huge number of Napoleon troops were defeated by
Russian troops where the number are not more then 100,000 men24.

2. Kautilya

22 Luvaas, J. (1999). Napoleon on The Art of War. New York: Touchstone. p. 112
23 Mcphee, P & Dwyer, P, G. (2002). The French Revolution and Napoleon.
London: Routledge. p. 189
24 The Russian Campaign and Napoleon's Defeat. Spark Note. Retrieved on 13th
April, 2015 from http://www.sparknotes.com/biography/napoleon/section8.rhtml

Beside Sun Tzu, the other scholar principles expounded about the failure of Napoleon
Bonaparte and Adolf Hitler was Kautilya in his great work called Arthasastra. According to
Kautilya in his book (Arthasastra), war can be categorized by three which is open war,
concealed war and silent war. According to Kautilya, Open war is fighting at the place and
time indicated, creating fright sudden assault, striking when there is error or a calamity, giving
away and striking in one place, are types of concealed warfare; that which concern secret
practices and instigations through secret agents in the mark of silent war25.

Silent war is types of fighting which is pretend in peace but at the same time silently
send secret agents and spies to kill other kingdom leaders. Also can do it by creating divisions
among key ministers and classes, spreading propaganda and disinformation. For silent
warfare, secrecy is high priority and cant be revealed to anyone, unless to very important
person26.

Napoleon and his thinker (as well as Hitler and his thinker) can used this tactic and various
way to win in battle with Russian troops. The biggest mistake were made by Napoleon and
Hitler are just declare war on Russia without planning properly like Kautilya stress in his
book. Before went to war of declare the war openly, they can used silent war and council war
(guerilla warfare). But first of all, they can used silent war as introduction in battle with
Russian.

Silent war tactic can applies by Napoleon and Hitler before going war with Russian.
For example both of them can use tactic such as acts like they are good friend with Russian
leader and make friend with them. After get trust and good relationship with Russia
government, then they can sent secret agents or spies. The role of secret agents or spies is to
assassinating the important or main leader of Russian on that time. Then, try to creating
divisions among the Russian ministers, officers, people and every classes in that country.
Make all of Russian people everywhere fighting each other and take them as alliance to fight
the Russian troops.

25 Boesche, R. (2003). Kautilya's Arthasastra on War and Diplomacy in Ancient

India. The Journal of Military History, 67(1), 9-37
26 Boesche, R. (2003). Kautilya's Arthasastra on War and Diplomacy in Ancient
India. The Journal of Military History, 67(1), 9-37

Moreover, at the same time spreading the propaganda to Russian civilians at each part
of Russia territories. Spread the bad news or misbehavior about the Russian Czar and his bad
attitude unto Russian people. These news will give huge effect especially to Russian officers
(military and government department) and civilians to fight with highest leader of Russia.
When this things happen, it will lead to civil war happen among the Russian itself.

When this situation happen, Napoleon and Hitler can consider to make concealed war
(other name called guerilla warfare) or open war. If Napoleon and Hitler choose guerilla
warfare, they can select or recruit local civilian to fight against Russian troops. They will not
lose anything because that warfare just involve Russian civilian, but maybe just a few their
soldier are involve. The guerilla warfare normally will not attack for huge scale, but in small
scale. However, the effect of guerilla or concealed warfare will give bad image and bad effect
to Russian government for short-term and create unstable situation in country.

When this situation occur, Napoleon or Hitler can declare open war with huge scale
troops and attack Russian troops. Certainly, with bad internal situation happen in Russia,
make Russian troops are instable and not full prepare to direct war with Napoleon troops
either Hitler troops. Because of that, the percentage for Russian troops to lose is high.
Advantages will gain quite easily for Napoleon or Hitler troops. The chaos and fighting each
other among the Russian people and their government will make success operation for enemy
invade their country.

3. Carl von Clausewitz

Previously we evaluate the strategy were used by Napoleon and Hitler from Eastern
perspective, now we try look for western perspective which is Carl von Clausewitz.
According to Clausewitz, before any nation want involve in battle or war, beware of pyrrhic
victories and the fallacies of hope. The plan must always updated with the situation and the
recent phenomena and have to evaluate that plan if have something unexpected happen.

For Clausewitz the key question should be given attention is what at any given
moment of a (lobby) campaign will be the probable result of all the great and small actions
put together? This question are important because it able to general for measure which are to
be taken to action? If the general take into action, will these actions really can bring their
armies to victories or maybe it will become disadvantageous for long term in their military
action?27

This evaluation are miss judged by Hitler and Napoleon before they decide to conquer Russia.
As we can see, Russia state are not like other state in Europe because that country are the
largest countries in Euro region which is covered Euro and Asia as well and at the same the
same time always faced extreme weather every years. If Napoleon and Hitler evaluated
carefully before make any decision to conquer Russia, maybe they will not decide to do it
after take into every account. The effect of the both nations military operation and expedition
after attacked Russian, gave bad effect for long term and make their strength are not anymore
strong than previously.

Hitler maybe we can say also tried to applied Clausewitz idea to conquer Russian
because for him, to conquer the whole Europe region, German need to catch Russia and put
Russia as Centre of Gravity (key of achievement) 28. But he also forgot that Center of
Gravity not only one, it can be more than one to achieved his ambition. He maybe though
that also when get capital city of Russia (Moscow), it can make his mission more smooth but
it not happen like that. Unfortunately, there are many factor can be Centre of Gravity29

27 Pars, M. (2013). Six strategy lessons from Clausewitz and Sun Tzu. Journal Of
Public Affairs (14723891), 13(3), 329-334.
28 Wedemeyer, A. C. (1983). The Strategy of Barbarossa. AIR WAR COLL
MAXWELL AFB AL.

Conclusion

Several conclusion that we can made from the failure of France troops were leaded by
Napoleon Bonaparte on 1812 and German troops were leaded by Adolf Hitler on 1941 to
conquer Russia. The first conclusion is studies thoroughly before announce war to any
countries especially to countries country like Russia. Russian are the wide and largest country
in Euro and also for world context, that mean more energies are need to force by both leader
to conquer this nation.

The war must plan properly in term of how to attack large territories like Russia for
example use of tactic were proposed by Kautilya which is started with silent war, then
continue with concealed war and finally if failed by used both that tactic, open war as last
option. The similer concept were advice by Sun Tzu long time ago which is the mention about
win the battle without fight. This concept are not analyzed by Napoleon Bonaparte and Adolf
Hitler.

Carl von Clausewitz at the same time give same advice to update any information
about the enemy, situation in war and also the condition of our own troops. The concept
Centre of Gravity of Russian militaries have to studies by both leader before launch attack
unto Russia. If both leaders can found Centre of Gravity of Russian, high probability for
success of attack will change the history of modern warfare.

The miscalculation by both leader can be good example and morale for next
generation of military studies. The same mistake may not follow by any strategic planner who
serve for their nations by take this case as reference. Moreover, Russia at now day became
one of the world super power especially for military field.

29 Falzon, L. (2006). Using Bayesian network analysis to support centre of gravity

analysis in military planning. European Journal of operational research, 170(2),
629-643.