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Bee Thao

J. W. Caddell

History 351

22 April 2002

Use of Naval Strength in Enforcing Foreign Policies

The use of the military in projection of force and the enforcement of one government’s

policies over that of another’s is evident throughout history. The use of military enforcement

against American interests has created a need in the United States to develop a strong military,

more specifically, a powerful navy. In order to understand the factors that influence the growth

of the military-industrial complex, a working knowledge of the diplomatic missions of the

military forces of the world must be obtained. The dynamics of international diplomacy as well

as the creation of an enforceable foreign policy has helped to create a military-industrial complex

in the United States.

A multiplicity of factors influences the amalgamation of industry in building a more

powerful navy. The more important factors include diplomacy and foreign policies, as well as

international trade and the interests of the citizens of a nation. Craig L. Symonds explains the

effects of diplomacy on the naval policy debates in the United States during the nineteenth

century.1 This concept is developed further by Charles A. Beard, who finds that a military-

industrial complex can enhance a nation’s prosperity as well as provide a tool with which to

enforce one’s policies.2 Edward N. Luttwak and Robert G. Weinland provide a case studies in

the Mediterranean and Middle East conflicts, with which you can observe the use of the military

within the political constraints employed by diplomats.3

Symonds’ book, Navalists and Antinavalists: The Naval Policy Debate in the United
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States, 1785-1827, is a history of the United States Naval Policy, explaining that “the issue was

[. . .] whether a navy [. . .] should be used as a counterweight in the European balance of

power”.4 This debate concerned the use of the navy, as well as the functioning of the navy as a

part of the United States defense policy. Symonds expounds the history of the United States

Naval Policy Debate in order to show to that “the size and character of a nation’s sea force must

depend on the scope and nature of its vital interests”.5 The functions of the navy were such that

they were to serve as a permanent warning against aggressors by upholding the “image, honor,

[and] prestige” of the United States and for use as a “diplomatic counterweight in foreign

relations,” as well as being “the most economical means toward the desired end,” emphasizing

efficiency in budgeting and the effectiveness of a certain plan of action.6 This way of thinking

helped to establish the military-industrial complex through the eventual creation of a large fleet

of warships that would be used in diplomatic affairs throughout the world, as well as an integral

part of national defense. An example of naval diplomacy includes the foreign policy concerning

the Barbary Powers. During 1802-1805, “the use of naval forces [. . .] was fully desirable”

because the “circumstances in the Mediterranean more than justified the use of naval force,” so

any “augmentation of [the navy] to meet any particular emergency” was welcomed.7 This crisis

in the Mediterranean was the stimulus for increased naval appropriations and shipbuilding. The

situations that the United States faced “had become so serious as to warrant some utilization [of a

naval force to] deter further [. . .] aggressions”.8

In The Navy: Defense or Portent?, Beard further develops the concept of the military-

industrial complex with an examination of Navy League in the United States, as well as other

pro-navy entreaties. Each pro-navy entreaty uses the same rationalizations for the development

of a military-industrial complex, namely “to command the peace and be in condition to

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‘[e]nforce the terms dictated by its sense of right and justice”.9 It happens “[n]aturally, the more

building the better it is for [the ship building industry] and all the collateral enterprises dependent

upon them”.10 These collateral businesses include steel and oil companies as well as shipyards.

In Germany, Alfred von Tripitz formulated the thesis “’the navy pays,’ that sea armaments make

economic returns to industry, and that upon this hard foundation of economic cupidity must the

ideological structure of [the] navy [. . .] be built”.11 “Great Britain had long found out by

experience hat the sea power was an efficient agency with which to build empire, protect trade,

exploit backward places and peoples and smash rivals”.12 The enhancement of a country’s navy

by its industry also enhances its economy and political bargaining abilities; this form of naval

diplomacy had been evident since the foundation of the United States of America.

Luttwak and Weinland provide insight into political and diplomatic uses of military

assets against other countries in their papers, “Sea Power in the Mediterranean: Political Utility

and Military Constraints” and “Superpower Naval Diplomacy in the October 1973 Arab-Israeli

War: A Case Study”. Luttwak discusses the balance of power maintained between the United

States Sixth Fleet and the Soviet’s Russian Mediterranean Squadron in the Mediterranean area.

This balance was maintained due to political constraints as well as a “balance of perceived

interests”.13 Luttwak argues that vital interests “are defined subjectively, and their status is

subjectively accepted or subjectively denied by the other side,” thus preventing war.14 For

example, if the Soviet Navy were to intervene directly against a Sixth Fleet attack of any Soviet

satellite, the risks of nuclear war would be “unacceptable, given the nature of the value in

dispute”.15 Weinland provides further examples for this argument with his case study on the

Arab-Israeli War of October 1973. Within this war, the constraints imposed by enemy military

forces and local politics did not allow direct American or Soviet involvement in the war.
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However, the presence of their militaries helped to gain favorable conditions for the nations

under their support.16

The factors that influence the growth of the military-industrial complex, namely

increased economic stability and prosperity, protected rights and the growth of a more powerful

military, have allowed nations to enforce their policies over other nations. The dynamics of

international diplomacy as well as the creation of an enforceable foreign policy has helped to

develop the United States Navy as well as the militaries of other nations. The union of industry

and military strength is evident in the history of Great Britain, the United States, Germany, and

the Soviet Union. These nations have forged policies which have been enforced upon the world

to some extent, affecting international trade and the interests of the citizens of every nation. The

naval policies in the United States during the nineteenth century affected its diplomatic issues.1

The military-industrial complex created by the United States later enhanced its prosperity as well

as providing a tool with which to enforce its policies in the Spanish-American War and later.2

The creation of a military-industrial complex within many nations of the world was driven by

economic prosperity, the need to defend the rights, ideals, and policies of a nation, and the goal

of dictating the policies in distant areas to assist a nation’s own interests and values.
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Notes
1
Symonds, Craig L., Navalists and Antinavalists: The Naval Policy Debate of the United

States, 1785-1827. (Newark: U of Delaware P, 1980).

2
Beard, Charles A. The Navy: Defense or Portent? New York: Harper Brothers, 1932.
3
Luttwak, Edward N. “Sea Power in the Mediterranean: Political Utility and Military

Constraints.” Washington Papers 6.61 (1979): 7-54.

Weinland, Robert G. “Superpower Naval Diplomacy in the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War: A

Case Study.” Washington Papers 6.61 (1979): 55-96.

4
Symonds 11.
5
Symonds 14.
6
Symonds 12-25.
7
Symonds 93-94.
8
Symonds 135.
9
SECNAV Hilary A. Herbert qtd. in Beard 50.
10
Beard 62.
11
Beard 17-18.
12
Beard 20.
13
Luttwak 16.
14
Luttwak 19.
15
Luttwak 20.
16
Weinland 88.
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Bibliography

Beard, Charles A. The Navy: Defense or Portent? New York: Harper Brothers, 1932.

Luttwak, Edward N. “Sea Power in the Mediterranean: Political Utility and Military

Constraints.” Washington Papers 6.61 (1979): 7-54.

Symonds, Craig L. Navalists and Antinavalists: The Naval Policy Debate in the United States,

1785-1827. Newark: U of Delaware P, 1980.

Weinland, Robert G. “Superpower Naval Diplomacy in the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War: A

Case Study.” Washington Papers 6.61 (1979): 55-96.