In The Shadow of Hegemony Strategic Choices

Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol.
1, 2006, 195229
doi:10.1093/cjip/pol015
In the Shadow of Hegemony:

Strategic Choices
Wei Zongyou*
Criticisms of Waltzs Balance of Power Theory

In his Theory of International Politics, Waltz established the foundations
of the structural realism upon which he constructed his balance of
1
Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill Publishing

Company, 1979), pp. 1256.
* Corresponding author. Email: wzy82@yahoo.com
Reproduced from the Science of International Politics, with kind permission of the authors
and the Institute of International Studies, Tsinghua University.
Downloaded from http://cjip.oxfordjournals.org/ by guest on October 30, 2014
A problem that frequently arises for states in international politics is that

of how to deal with one particular states rapid growth in power and
subsequent hegemonic ambitions. The standard solution provided by the
realist theory of international relations (IR) is that of other states increasing their power (internally balancing) or allying with others (externally
balancing) in order to counter the rising power and ensure their own security
and survival. Kenneth Waltz, one of the founders of structural realism,
contends that in an international system characterized by anarchy where no
overarching government exists to enforce laws, balancing, not bandwagoning, is the behaviour induced by the system.1
When examining historical and current cases, however, there are many
instances where states facing the threat of a rising hegemon or global empire
do not adopt a balancing strategy. In many cases, they avoid responsibility,
do not get involved in the conflict, or bandwagon with the potential
hegemon. Why does this happen? What are the motives behind a countrys
actions? What factors play an essential role in a states decision-making
process? How do different strategic choices affect a countrys future survival
and prosperity and what are the resulting gains and losses? This essay
addresses questions such as these.
The essay is split into four parts. The first part analyzes Waltzs balance
of power theory, examines his main ideas and views, and raises logical
problems and historical inconsistencies in relation to the theory. The second
part lays out the essays hypothesis and theoretical assumptions and
reveals parameters of state conduct. In the third part, the Warring States
period of Chinese history is taken as a case-study to test this hypothesis.
The fourth and final part is a research summary that draws certain
conclusions.
196 Wei Zongyou
2
3
4
Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 8893.

Ibid., pp. 1267.
Ibid., p. 121.
Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 1, 2006, 195229
power theory. He asserts that international politics operates in an anarchical

system where there is no overarching government and where power is the
ultimate arbiter. Each country exists in a Hobbesian state of nature and
faces tremendous pressure in the competition to survive. This competitive
pressure engenders different types of state behavior: on the one hand, it
requires members of the international system to imitate the actions of the
most successful states, which leads to socialization and like units; on the
other, a rapid increase in one states power prompts others to augment
theirs in response to it and, if this is insufficient, to ally with other states in
order to contain the latent hegemon. Once a balance of power occurs,
hegemonic ambitions disappear. In this sense, the anarchical international
system resembles Adam Smiths invisible hand of the marketplace. Under
such conditions, structural constraints emerge and patterns of behavior
develop that either reward or punish different state actions. As selfinterested state actors continue to pursue selfish goals under the pressure of
this invisible hand, one unexpected by-product is a balance of power.2
Waltzs balance of power theory posits that states are more inclined to
practice balancing than bandwagoning strategies, and that the phenomenon
of states balancing against others is actually a unique aspect of the anarchical
international system. He writes [s]econdary states, if they are free to choose,
flock to the weaker side.3 He confidently asserts that [b]alance-of-power
politics prevail wherever two, and only two, requirements are met: that the
order be anarchic and that it be populated by units wishing to survive.4
Although Waltzs balance of power theory possesses certain strengths as
regards simplicity and clarity, it is sorely lacking in explanations. The theory
does explain why certain historical European powers with hegemonic
ambitions (e.g., France under Louis XIV, the Napoleonic Empire, the
Weimar Republic and Nazi Germany) ultimately failed and were destroyed,
but only on a superficial level. While, to some extent, it explains the
subsequent return to a balance of power on continental Europe, a deeper
analysis reveals that each campaign against the rising hegemonic power
involved state actions of a nonbalancing nature. Some states, for instance,
attempted to remain neutral and stay out of the conflict, while others sided
with the rising hegemon. In todays post-Cold War global environment, the
United States (US) has clearly become the dominant power and a hegemonic
force. Waltzs theory would predict other states attempting to counter US
supremacy, thereby leading to a new balance of power in international
politics. But this has not been the case; on the contrary, many states have
chosen to participate in American power and primacy. Moreover, when
reviewing the history of non-European regions, it is clear that balances of
Strategic Choices
197
5
6
7
Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), pp.
212, 2933, and 14852.
Randall L. Schweller, Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In,
International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1 (1994), pp. 878.
Randall L. Schweller, Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitlers Strategy of World
Conquest (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1998), Chapter 1.
power have not frequently occurred. Also, that the existence of hegemonic
states or empires is possible within the realm of international politics. During
Chinas Warring States (475221 BC) period the ultimate result of the seven
powers competition was not seven powers co-existence, but the creation of a
unified empire after the state of Qin had destroyed the other six.
Scholars and academics continue to question and criticize Waltzs balance
of power theory. Among them, the assessments of Stephen Walt, Randall
Schweller, and Paul Schroeder are representative examples.
Walt points out that when a state weighs its alliance options, it is riskevaluation and the level of threat rather than power that constitute the
deciding factor. If, for instance, one state regards another as a direct threat
to its survival, it will endeavor to create a balance, whether or not the state in
question possesses advantages of power and influence. If, on the other hand,
one state does not regard another as a threat to its survival in any way,
shape, or form, it will not typically adopt a balancing strategy, even if the
state in question possesses advantages of power and influence. After a
thorough analysis of the US/Soviet alliance in the Middle East during the
Cold War, and the alliance between Southeast Asia and Europe during the
1930s, Walt draws three conclusions: first, that states balance against
threats, not simply power; second, that balancing strategies heavily
outnumber those of bandwagoning in international politics; and third,
that bandwagoning is a strategy only weak states pursue, usually under
special circumstances and on a temporary basis. It is not a general strategy.5
Schweller tries to bring the concept of the revisionist state back into the
language of realism. He does not believe that the world consists of identical
states that all seek to maintain the status quo, but that there are state quo
states and revisionist states. The former are supporters of the current
international system and intent upon preserving their own status and
position within the system. They are satisfied states. The latter are losers
under the current arrangement, or sometimes outside of it, and want to
revise the existing system.6 Status quo states balance against states and
alliances they perceive as a threat to their own security and/or the security of
the system as a whole; they are security-maximizing states. Revisionist
states, on the other hand, are primarily concerned with destroying the
current order and making additional gains. Many, therefore, choose to
bandwagon with revisionist great powers bent on constructing a new
international system; they are power-maximizing states.7
198 Wei Zongyou
9
10
11
12
Randall L. Schweller, New Realist Research on Alliances: Refining, Not Refuting,

Waltzs Balancing Proposition, American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (1997),
pp. 9289.
Randall L. Schweller, Bandwagoning for Profit, pp. 89104.
Paul Schroeder, Historical Reality vs. Neo-Realist Theory, International Security, Vol. 19,
No. 1 (1994), p. 115.
Ibid., pp. 11724, 13347.
Kenneth N. Waltz, Evaluating Theories, American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4
(1997), p. 916.
Schweller points out that Walzs analyzing the situation solely from a
status quo-state perspective amounts to turning a blind eye to the bandwagoning actions of revisionist states, and as such, to the strategy of
bandwagoning itself. On a more fundamental level, Waltz neglects to make a
theoretical examination of bandwagoning.8 Schweller goes on to say that
balancing usually comes at a heavy cost, while bandwagoning can often lead
to unexpected gains. But revisionist states intent upon destroying the
current system are willing to pay the higher cost of balancing that would
allow them to act. Based on his analysis, however, Schweller concludes that
bandwagoning is actually more prevalent than balancing in international
politics.9
Historian Paul Schroeder criticizes Waltz from a historical reality
perspective, arguing that his theoretical generalizations are incompatible
with events during the past few centuries of European diplomatic history.10
Schroeder points out that balancing has not been a strategy commonly
practiced in major international conflict since 1648 AD, while bandwagoning has been widespread among small and great powers. The main reason
for states not pursuing a balancing strategy is its high cost. Most states
under most circumstances simply cannot bear the burden, and opt for a less
costly strategy. Schroeder believes that when under threat, a state has a
number of strategies from which to choose: balancing, hiding, transcending,
and bandwagoning. Balancing is actually the least common strategy
adopted, and is usually a last resort, while bandwagoning and hiding are
far more common.11
In response to his critics, Waltz points out that theory is not meant to
mirror reality. Forcing more empirical content into a theory would . . . turn
a general theory into a particular explanation. Only when moving from
international political theory to foreign-policy application one has to
consider such matters as statesmens assessments of threats, but they do
not thereby become part of the theory [Waltzs italics].12 Waltz recognizes
that in a realistic environment, states may indeed pursue a strategy of
bandwagoning, [v]ery weak states cannot make themselves secure by their
own efforts. Whatever the risks, their main chance may be to jump on a
bandwagon pulled by stronger states. In addition, [s]tates sometimes
blunder when trying to respond sensibly to both internal and external
pressures, so there may be times when the system itself breaks down.
Strategic Choices
199
Strategic Options in the Shadow of Hegemony

Logically speaking, when the international system is in a state of anarchy
with no overarching government to enforce laws, self-help becomes the
primary means by which states survive. The pressures of conflict and an
inherently unstable system make the strategy of balancing against states that
have hegemonic ambitions and rapidly growing power seem reasonably
sound. States that persistently fail to play the game according to these rules
will eventually be eliminated. However, states operating in the international
jungle arena are not isolated billiard balls that choose strategies based
solely on their own circumstances. Strategic decisions are made in an
environment of interdependence among different states, and not in a
laboratory setting where large numbers of factors and variables can be
controlled. For example, the length of time before a threat materializes,
the ability of various actors to recognize this threat, the historical
interactions between different states, and their power differentials all
influence a states strategic behavior. Moreover, as the decision-making
actors are limited by their own experience, history and knowledge, they
13
14
15
Ibid., p. 915.
See G. John Ikenberry, ed., Meiguo Wudi: Junshi de Weilai, (America Unrivaled: the Future
of the Balance of Power), trans. Han Zhaoying (Beijing: Beijing Daxue Chubanshe, 2005).
Hans Mouritzen, Kenneth Waltz: A Critical Rationalist between International Politics and
Foreign Policy, in Iver B. Neumann and Ole Waever, eds, The Future of International
Relations: Masters in the Making? (New York, NY: Routledge, 1997), pp. 789.
Waltz, however, firmly believes that if a state violates the basic rules of
international politics, it will be punished accordingly, albeit not
immediately.13
Waltzs response generated even more reviews. In their analysis of the
post-Cold War international political environment and its new settings,
William Wohlforth, G. John Ikenberry, and Thomas Risse each criticize
Waltzs theoretical viewpoints from the points of view of realism, liberalism,
and constructivism.14 Certain scholars, furthermore, are dissatisfied with
Waltzs exclusion of foreign policy from his balance of power theory.
Hans Mouritzen, for example, argues that Waltz uses examples based on the
results of international politics (such as the ongoing balance of power
between states) and the actions of individual states (such as adopting a
balancing strategy) to endorse the theory, which they do, but only from a
status quo-state point of view. Waltz neglects to take into account
the obvious influence of foreign policy on state strategy, so pushing the
fairly common strategy of bandwagoning out of the explanatory bounds
of his IR theory, into the realm of foreign policy theory, or going as far as
to classify it as an exception. In so doing, he makes his own theory
watertight.15
200 Wei Zongyou
Structural-Level Factors
At the structural level, two factors play an important role: the anarchical
nature of the international system and its polarity.
Anarchical nature of the international system
In Waltzs analysis, anarchy is a constant within IR. This fundamentally

means that the international system lacks an overarching authority structure
16
17
In this essay, a hegemonic threat is used to portray the hegemons or potential

hegemons with rapidly growing power who pose a threat to the system as a whole as well as
to the various units in it. It is not intended to depict the unitary threat one state poses
to another.
See Randall L. Schweller, Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitlers Strategy of World
Conquest, Chapter 3; Robert Powell, In the Shadow of Power: States and Strategies in
International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), p. 156; John J.
Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York, NY: W. W. Norton &
Company, 2001), Chapter 5.
cannot accurately predict what other states will do. For all these reasons,
it is extremely difficult for a states foreign policy to be completely rational
at all times, which is why it will often seek a satisfactory rather than
maximum outcome.
In amalgamating the viewpoints of the various scholars earlier discussed,
this essay argues that when facing a hegemonic threat,16 states in the system
have three strategic options from which to choose: balancing, bandwagoning, and withdrawing. In selecting the balancing strategy, a state, either on
its own or with others, opposes the hegemonic threat through warfare,
political coalitions, and military alliances. In selecting the bandwagoning
strategy, a state forms political and military alliances with the hegemon or
potential hegemon, thus joining its camp. In selecting the withdrawing
strategy, a state joins neither side, and attempts to stay out of the conflict.
There are various ways of pursuing a withdrawing strategy. They include: a
states distancing itself from the hegemon and its allies, thereby hiding
from the threat; or adopting a wait and see attitude in order to join in the
conflict at the most opportune moment; or assuming the isolationist stance
of keeping a safe distance and completely ignoring the struggle. In other
words, withdrawing encompasses the strategic options external to balancing
and bandwagoning that have been raised by various scholars.17 Taking into
account the high costs associated with balancing and the advantages of
bandwagoning or withdrawing in order to eliminate short-term threats, from
a systemic perspective, the latter two strategies are much more common than
that of balancing.
In the next section, the main research questions and theoretical viewpoints
of this essay will be laid out. Its focus will be on analyzing why states choose
to adopt certain foreign policy strategies, and the factors and variables that
influence their decision.
Strategic Choices
201
Polarity
A systems polarity is defined by the apportionment of power among its

various Member States, according to Waltz. The most common basis
of calculation is that of the proportion of great powers in any one
system.21 Different polarities have different affects on a states strategic
behavior.
18
19
20
21
Alexander Wendt, Guoji Zhengzhi de Shehui Lilun, (Social Theory of International Politics),
trans. Qin Yaqing (Shanghai, China: Shanghai Renmin Chubanshe, 2000), pp. 31383.
Regarding collective-action problems and its effects on balancing behavior, see Wei
Zongyou, Jitixingdong de Nanti yu Zhiheng Baquan (Balancing Hegemonic Threats:
Collective-Action Problems), Guoji Guancha (International Review), No. 4 (2003),
pp. 2127.
Thomas Risse makes a similar point. See Thomas Risse, Ziyou Anquan Gongtongti de
Meiguo Quanli, (US Power in a Liberal Security Community) in G. John Ikenberry, ed.,
America Unrivaled, p. 267.
Kenneth N. Waltz, The Emerging Structure of International Politics, International
Security, Vol. 18, No. 2 (1993), p. 73.
capable of enforcing laws. Alexander Wendt, however, points out that

anarchy is more of a variable than a constant. An anarchical system not only
signifies the absence of a central governing institution, but also that it is
instrumental in constructing a common structural identity or structural
culture. Different structural identities lead to different structural cultures
and the creation of different types of anarchical system. Under a
Hobbesian system, states view each other as enemies, and interaction
between them is normally characterized by warfare; under a Lockean
system, states view each other as opponents, so warfare is a possible course
of action in state-to-state relations but not the norm; under a Kantian
system, states view each other as friends, and warfare is not the method of
resolving conflict.18
These three types of anarchical system affect a states foreign-policy
strategy in the following fashion. First, within a Hobbesian system, the
prisoners dilemma is dominant because states see each other as enemies.
In the face of a hegemonic threat, constructing a balancing coalition is
not an agreeable option because treachery, whereby a hegemon divides and
conquers, is likely to occur. Second, within a Lockean system, creating a
balancing coalition against hegemonic threats is less risky because states see
each other as opponents rather than enemies. Owing, however, to differing
perceptions of what constitutes a threat there is no effective means of
enforcement. Balancing coalitions, therefore, often encounter collectiveaction problems, that result in inefficiency that could result in defeat at the
hands of a hegemon.19 Third, within a Kantian system, states do not
threaten each other because they see one another as friends, thus creating
a secure community that does not call for internal balancing behavior.20
When an external source threatens this secure community, all Member
States collectively adopt a balancing strategy to oppose it.
202 Wei Zongyou
22
23
24
For thoughts, see William C. Wohlforth, Danjishijie Zhong de Meiguo Zhanlue,

(US Strategy in a Unipolar World) in G. John Ikenberry, ed., America Unrivaled,
pp. 98118.
Kenneth N. Waltz, The Emerging Structure of International Politics, p. 73.
This relates to what Barry Posen and others argue as defense prevails. For more, see Barry
Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine (New York, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984).
In a uni-polar system, power is concentrated at the top, resulting in a

hierarchical order. In the face of such a large power differential, states do
not choose a balancing strategy lightly, as the chances of success are slim
and likely reprisals in the form of retaliation from the hegemonic power
would be at a cost too high to bear. On the other hand, pursuing a
bandwagoning strategy could bring unexpected benefits from the hegemon.22 Then again, if a state were to pursue a withdrawing strategy, it could
avoid any potential conflict with the hegemon, and put some distance
between it and them. This could well lead to an isolationist position in which
the state focuses on its own interests and needs, on the pretext of avoiding
contamination by an evil hegemonic force, thereby protecting its own
prestige while projecting an image of justness.
In a bi-polar system, the ultimate goal of two opposing super powers and
their respective foreign policies is adoption of a balancing strategy that will
prevent either from gaining hegemonic strength. Both sides rely not only on
their internal strength, but also on help from friends and allies in this
regard.23 This opens the way for other Member States of the system toward
a bandwagoning strategy. At the same time, it is in the interests of both
super powers to provide incentives that attract potential bandwagoners to
their respective camps, as the ultimate aim of both powers is to be victor in
this battle for hegemony. Middling and small powers that have no interest in
this conflict are likely follow the withdrawing strategy, so as to ensure their
own survival and independence. All three strategies, therefore, are employed
in a bi-polar system. Balancing is the default strategy of both super powers,
while other members of the system will pursue that of either bandwagoning
or withdrawing.
In a multi-polar system, the strategies of bandwagoning and withdrawing
are far more common than that of balancing. Multi-polar systems are
characterized by a relatively diffuse division of power wherein no one state
can single handedly become the hegemon. If one state starts to manifest
hegemonic ambitions, it can be easily defeated by the others, which makes
the costs of balancing significantly lower.24 This does not mean, however,
that balancing becomes the default option, as there are many factors that are
not conducive to such a strategy. Under multi-polarity, there are too many
poles to permit any of them to draw clear and fixed lines between allies and
enemies and to be certain of what is happening in the system . . . Hence, there
Strategic Choices
203
is a tendency to pass the buck.25 In a multi-polar system, balancing

strategies also face the collective-action problems mentioned earlier, where
every state acts on the incentive of a free ride in the hope that others will do
the balancing while they sit back and relax. When every state has such a
mindset, the result is that no state, or only a small number, balances against
the potential hegemon.
Polarity nonetheless has only an indirect effect on a states strategic
behavior. The polarity of a system shapes and influences it rather than
causing it to choose one strategy over another. This is why even when
systems have similar polarities, different states may pursue all three
strategies of balancing, bandwagoning and withdrawing.
Power balance
Power balance and polarity are two different concepts. Power balance
indicates the power differential between two or more states and their overall
capabilities (particularly military power), their relative sizes, and their
strengths and weaknesses. It is classified as an interactive level variable.
Polarity, on the other hand, describes how power is organized within the
system. Juxtaposed, power balance affects a states strategic behavior
more directly than polarity. This is true for the following reasons. Firstly,
there is a difference between the strategies adopted by greater and smaller
powers. From an IR perspective, although states may not differ much in
functionality, they do substantially in capabilities. This leads to extensive divergence as regards which strategic option a state chooses. When
facing a hegemonic threat, for example, great powers react differently from
small powers. As Robert Rothstein argues, the strategies of small powers
differ in many aspects from those of great powers: first, small powers are
rarely able to resolve a threatening situation alone and often require outside
help; second, because they occupy only a small secure space, smaller powers
must act with extreme caution. Sometimes, a small power has no alternative
but to adopt a strategy that will resolve its short-term needs, even if this
endangers its long-term security and stability.26 A great powers interests,
however, are not confined to the survival of its own territory, but overspill
into other regions and the security and stability of the system as a whole.
When a hegemonic threat is perceived as endangering the entire system or
other regions of importance to a great power, it will rise up in opposition
25
26
Ted Hopf, Polarity, the OffenseDefense Balance, and War, American Political Science
Review, Vol. 85, No. 2 (1991), p. 476.
Robert L. Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers (New York, NY: Columbia University
Press, 1968), pp. 246.
Interactive-Level Factors
204 Wei Zongyou
Geopolitics
Geopolitics refers to a states location and the circumstances surrounding its

survival, and is classified as an interactive-level factor. It affects a states
strategic behavior primarily through determining the effectiveness of its
power projection capabilities. Kenneth Boulding, Patrick OSullivan and
other scholars point out that in the process of transmitting power, there is a
gradual diminishment effect, where distance is inversely proportional to the
amount of power actually projected. For example, the greater the distance of
power projection, the higher the costs and the less power it actually sends to
the target; conversely, the closer the object of power projection, the lower
the costs and the more effectively projected power.27 States will hence be
particularly aware of increases in their neighbor states power, while not
27
Patrick OSullivan, Dili Zhengzhi Lun: Guoji Jian de Jingzheng yu Hezuo, (Geopolitics),
trans. Li Yiming et al. (Beijing: Guoji Wenhua Chuban Gongsi, 1991), pp. 112, 703;
Kenneth N. Boulding, Conflict and Defense: A General Theory (New York, NY: Harper
and Brothers, 1962).
and adopt a balancing strategy. Great powers will also often balance for
reasons of prestige and reputation.
For great powers, the costs of bandwagoning far outweigh the benefits
because their interests are likely to contradict or clash with those of the
potential hegemon. Bandwagoning, therefore, is not a desirable strategy. But
this is not the case if the great power is a revisionist state that is dissatisfied
with the current system. As Schweller argues, if the revisionist power does
not have the strength to destroy the current international order alone, it will
be happy to bandwagon with a stronger prospective hegemon and share in
the creation of a new global political system. Italy has historically taken this
road.
For small powers, the costs of balancing are simply too great. Just one
failure or miscalculation could mean destruction. Furthermore, small
powers have narrow, limited interests that are generally confined to their
own territory. Any overspill is minimal. As they are seldom overly
concerned about prestige, withdrawing and bandwagoning are their most
commonly adopted strategies.
Second, there are differences in the strategies adopted by the potential
hegemonic force and its opposition in relation to discrepancies in their
relative power. When other factors are similar, and the power differential
between the potential hegemon and its opposition is small, then the incentive
to adopt a balancing strategy increases significantly, and it becomes more
widespread. If, however, there is a significant power disparity between the
two sides, balancing is less likely to occur. Under these circumstances,
adopting a balancing strategy would amount to state suicide. Many states,
therefore, tend either toward treachery or free-riding, and withdrawing and
bandwagoning are also frequently adopted.
Strategic Choices
205
Unit-Level Factors
This section primarily analyses the viewpoint of state actors. All four
variables discussed earlier: the anarchical system, polarity, power balance
and geopolitics, must filter through the perception of the decision-makers
prior to their influencing a states strategic behavior. Perception, at times,
can be a correct understanding of certain events or things, but it is often a
flawed or mistaken awareness. Robert Jervis calls this misperception. He
points out that it does not matter whether a perception is correct or not,
once formed, it will have lasting impact on a states strategic behavior. Once
a person develops an image of the otherespecially a hostile image of the
otherambiguous and even discrepant information will be assimilated to
that image . . . If they think that a state is hostile, behaviour that others might
see as neutral or friendly will be ignored, distorted, or seen as attempted
duplicity.28 Jervis concludes: the roots of many important disputes about
policies lie in differing perceptions.29 In his analysis of the European
political and alliance situation from 1865 to 1940, Thomas Christensen notes
that the perception of decision-makers has a huge influence on the future
foreign policies of a state. If leaders misperceive the distribution of
capabilities, they may stand aside at crucial junctures in a conflict, overreact
to insignificant threats, or even assist the wrong side in a war. If leaders
mistake stronger states for weaker ones, they may even join the side of the
28
29
Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ:

Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 68.
Ibid., p. 31.
paying too much attention to those of more distant states. Furthermore, due
to their close proximity, neighboring states are more likely to have similar
interests and needs, which could increase the possibility of cooperation, but
could also mean a higher probability of conflict. This could then result in
what Walt describes as states balancing against powerful neighbors while
ignoring the strongest states in the system as a whole.
When other conditions are similar, geopolitics influences a states strategic
behavior in the following fashion: when a state is far from the hegemonic
conflict or possesses some form of unique geographic feature (such as vast
oceans or great mountains) that provides effective defense, then the costs
associated with power projection against it become extremely high. It is
consequently more likely to withdraw and observe the situation from afar.
For great powers facing a threat from neighboring states, the most common
strategy is balancing, while for small powers in similar circumstances, the
risks of balancing are too great. Unless they receive strong support from
outside sources, most small states will bandwagon.
206 Wei Zongyou
30
Thomas J. Christensen, Perceptions and Alliances in Europe, 18651940, International

Organization, Vol. 51, No. 1 (1997), p. 68.
mighty, thereby behaving more like bandwagoners than balancers.30 During

the Cold War, its inherent bias against Communism and fears of a domino
effect strongly influenced US foreign policy, and lead to many avoidable
conflicts and crises.
When other conditions are similar, if decision-makers perceive the
potential hegemonic force as overtly aggressive, they are likely to adopt a
balancing strategy, because making concessions to states with an insatiable
appetite will only lead to further greed and additional desires. Unless a state
opposes them, it will eventually be destroyed. On the other hand, if decisionmakers perceive the potential hegemon as benevolent or not overtly hostile,
they are likely to adopt a withdrawing or even bandwagoning strategy. The
reasons are simple: by not confronting the rising hegemon, a state can avoid
antagonizing it and stirring up subsequent conflict; it can also react to the
changing situation and possibly reap additional profits.
In the above discussion, this essays theoretical viewpoints and assumptions have been laid out. They can be summarized as follows: first, when
facing hegemonic threats, there are three general strategies that a state can
adopt: balancing, bandwagoning or withdrawing. Second, states generally
react in a finitely rational manner when confronting hegemonic threats.
After analyzing the five variables identified as influencing a states strategic
behavior, either individually or jointly, it has been determined that, contrary
to Waltzs belief, balancing does not become the default strategy. Many
states continue to pursue balancing, but bandwagoning and withdrawing are
more widespread and commonly used strategies. Third, different anarchical
systems result in different structural reasoning. In a Hobbesian system, the
prisoners dilemma makes balancing difficult to achieve, so bandwagoning
and withdrawing become the prevalent strategies; in a Lockean system,
balancing faces collective-action problems while the other two strategies of
withdrawing and bandwagoning are also commonly adopted. Whether or
not balancing against a hegemonic threat can succeed depends largely on the
ability to resolve these collective-action problems. In a Kantian system,
threats come from external rather than internal sources, and when faced
with such external threats, states band together in secure communities as a
means of balancing. Fourth, under conditions of similar polarity, states of
comparable power attempt to balance each others hegemonic ambitions,
while states of considerable power disparity, as well as weaker states that
have no strong source of external support, have more of a tendency to
bandwagon. Fifth, states possessing particular geographic features, such as
island-states protected on all four sides by vast oceans, or hidden states
protected by great mountains, or those far from the source of conflict, can
for a certain period of time adopt a withdrawing strategy. It makes no
Strategic Choices
207
difference whether or not they are great or small powers, their geographic
advantage affords them this option. Sixth, if a potential hegemon is
perceived as benevolent, the chances of other states balancing against it
decrease significantly, while bandwagoning and withdrawing are more
widespread strategies; if a potential hegemon is perceived as aggressive and
evil, then the likelihood of balancing rises astronomically.
ChinaAnnexation Wars during the Warring

States Period
In the early Western Zhou dynasty (C.1100C.771 BC), the Zhou Imperial
Court established its central authority and internal hierarchy within the
dynasty through enfeoffment and the patriarchal clan system. The Spring/
Autumn period, however, saw the rise of feudal lords with individual
. . . kingdoms becoming more powerful until the dynasty was shattered31
that rendered the Zhou imperial court powerless. The initiation of all
interactions, whether ritual or war, began to be undertaken by feudal lords
without deference to the imperial court. In the following Warring States
period (475221 BC), the Zhou imperial courts impotence reached its nadir.
The King of Zhou was little more than a figurehead, incapable of curbing
the ambitions of the various feudal lords that now barely acknowledged his
existence. In the preceding Spring/Autumn period (770476 BC), these lords
had, in the midst of wars with one another, rhetorically evinced symbolic
respect for the Zhou imperial court. Commencement of the Warring States
period, however, marked the end of even this token respect. Kingdoms
engaged in warfare as they saw fit with no liaison whatever with the Zhou
Court. Each lord and kingdom acted as an independent political entity
subject to no outside authority. Their aim was to survive, expand, and
defeat whichever kingdom got in the way. The goal was no longer that
of hegemony among lords,32 but of eliminating any opposing kingdom.
In Schwellers words, they were not status quo but revisionist powers
intent on overthrowing the existing order and establishing a new hierarchy
with themselves at the center of power. Meanwhile, the ailing Zhou imperial
court system slid into collapse. The eminent Qing dynasty scholar Gu
31
32
Liu Zehua, Zhongguo de Wangquan Zhuyi (Chinas Hegemonism) (Shanghai: Shanghai

Renmin Chubanshe, 2000), p. 3.
It should be pointed out that hegemony (ba) during the SpringAutumn and Warring
States periods is different from the concept of hegemony used today. The former means to
seek domination under the hierarchical order of the Zhou dynasty while still paying tribute
to the Zhou Imperial Court. In this sense, competition for hegemony is for the power to
regulate the internal relationships among kingdoms.
Collapse of the Zhou Hierarchy and the Seven Powers

Co-Existence Period
208 Wei Zongyou
Yanwu describes vividly the changing order as the Spring/Autumn period

gave way to that of the Warring States:
Waltzs contention is that under an anarchical order, competitive pressure

compels a state to pursue successful strategies and to emulate the behavior
of other successful states, thereby socializing itself into the system. This
contention is endorsed by events in the early days of the Warring States
succession to the SpringAutumn period, which marked the start of
hundreds of years of inter-kingdom war. A new inter-kingdom order
emerged in which seven major powers co-existed. This is what history terms
the Seven Powers of the Warring States period. Among the seven, Chu had
the biggest territory, followed by Qin, Zhao, Qi, Wei, Yan, and the smallest,
Han. The seven kingdoms persistently attacked other smaller lords in order
to expand territory and achieve hegemonic status, but also conducted
widespread political, economic and military reforms, their intention being
to . . . promote what is beneficial and abolish what is harmful, enrich their
respective kingdoms and strengthen their military power. The resultant
internal stability facilitated due preparations for future wars within the
ongoing hegemonic competition. Examples of reforms generated by the
competitive wars between the Seven include those of Li Kui in Wei, Gong
Zhonglian in Zhao, Wu Qi in Chu, Shen Buhai in Han, Zou Ji in Qi, and
of Shang Yang in Qin. These, and others reforms gained strength for each
kingdom and sustained the period of the Seven Powers co-existence. The
emergence of the seven Warring States and the downfall of the Zhou
Imperial Court indicate the existence of a multi-polar system during this
period in Chinese history.
33
Gu Yanwu, Rizhilu, Vol. 13, quoted from Yang Hua, Xianqin Liyue Wenhua (Ritual Culture
in the Pre-Qin Era) (Wuhan,: Hubei Jiaoyu Chubanshe, 1996), p. 229.
During the SpringAutumn period, ritual and trust still existed but the seven
warring states no longer cared about ritual and trust; during the Spring
Autumn period, lords still respected the Zhou Court, but the seven warring
states no longer respected the Zhou Court; during the SpringAutumn period,
lords still made sacrificial offerings, but the seven warring states no longer did
that; during the SpringAutumn period, a lords family name and family tree
were still emphasized but the seven warring states no longer cared about that;
during the SpringAutumn period, lords still sang Zhou poems which
represented the authority of the Zhou dynasty, but the seven warring states
no longer did that; during the SpringAutumn period, lords still openly
presented symbolic notice to the Zhou court but the seven warring states simply
ignored the Zhou court. State-to-state relations became unsettling and shi
[educated and policy advisors] often switched loyalties. All of this happened
within 133 years.33
Strategic Choices
209
The Rise and Fall of Wei
The Battle of Guiling
The Battle of Guiling was fought in 353 BC. At its root was the
dissatisfaction of Zhao, the kingdom that benefited least from the
expansionist wars initiated by Wei, which prompted it to gain extra profit
by attacking, Wei* Weis tributary kingdom.34 This intensified the conflict
between Zhao and Wei,35 and in 354 BC, Zhao again attacked Wei*, forcing
the tiny kingdom to pay tribute. This incensed Wei, which sent its army, lead
by the well-known military leader, Pang Jun, to attack the Zhao capital
Handan. Zhao, facing destruction, called on Qi and Chu for help.
It was obvious to the Qi and Chu kingdoms that if Wei annexed Zhao, its
greater power would enable it control of all central Chinaan intolerable
prospect. As Wei had already annexed territories belonging to Qi and Chu,
the competition between the two had become a typical zero-sum game.
The most rational move for Qi and Chu, therefore, was to assist Zhao in
order to prevent Weis further rise. As Wei, however, had previously
defeated Qi and Chu on a number of occasions, engaging in direct combat
34
35
In Chinese, the names of these two kingdoms are different but their English spelling is the
same. Henceforth, Wei refers to the kingdom referenced as one of the seven warring states
while Wei* refers to the smaller, tributary kingdom that owed allegiance to Wei.
See Zhongguo Junshi Shi, Di Er JuanBinglue, Shang (Chinese Military History,
Vol. 2Military Strategies, Part I) (Beijing, China: Jiefangjun Chubanshe, 1986),
pp. 98102.
Among the seven warring states, Wei was the first to rise and declare wang
(King) status. The Weis poor geographical location in the middle of China,
surrounded by potentially hostile neighbours and facing war from four
sides was a severe handicap to its hegemonic ambitions. Weis bold, far
reaching internal reforms, however, helped it to be the first kingdom to
emerge as a hegemonic force. Reforms, for instance, under Wei Wenhous
(Duke Wen of Wei) governance (445396 BC) included the banning of
nepotistic appointments and making those based on merit the law. Wei
Prime Minister and eminent legalist Li Kui instituted wide-ranging reforms
that lead to establishment of a centralized government that consolidated
both the economy and the military. The Wei was indeed a rising power.
Wei embarked on a series of expansionist wars with overtly hegemonic
intent. Aware of its inferior military might, Weis strategy was to ally with
the Han and Zhao kingdoms, both of whom had the same feudal lord as
Wei, rather than advance alone. But Weis rapid rise to power appeared as a
threat to the Han and the Zhao kingdoms, taking into account that of the
three, Wei persistently took the biggest share of the spoils. Zhao broke away
from its alliance with Wei, whose encroachments were also putting the three
bigger powers the Qi, Qin, and Chu kingdoms on the alert. Matters came to
a head in the two famous battles of Guiling and Maling.
210 Wei Zongyou
36
37
38
Liu Xiang, ed., Zhanguo Ce: Qi Yi (Comments on the Warring States: Qi, Part I) (Shanghai:
Shanghai Guji Chubanshe, 1985), p. 314.
Liu Xiang, ed., Zhanguo Ce: Chu Yi (Comments on the Warring States: Chu, Part I),
pp. 4834.
Mu Zhongyue and Wu Guoqing, Zhongguo Zhanzheng Shi (Chinese War History) (Beijing:
Jincheng Chubanshe, 1992), p. 276.
with it would be risky. Qi and Chu also had their respective motivations for
helping Zhao and checking Wei. Qi was well advised to help Zhao, because
Weis annexation of it would directly imperil Qi interests. It was key Qi
official, Duan Ganpeng, which raised the strategy of delaying joining in the
Wei/Zhao battle until both sides were worn out. His reasoning was that Qis
entering the war too early would enable Zhao to retain its capital but inflict
negligible damage on Wei. The duke believed the better option would be to
wait a while and then attack the southern Wei city of Xiangling. This seemed
a relatively safe alternative, because even if the Zhao capital city were to be
taken by Wei, the remaining Wei forces would be too exhausted to defend
Xiangling. Handan may be lost, but Qi would benefit from a late entering
policy by beating Wei.36 The Chu kingdom had similar motivations. On the
one hand, Chus not entering the war could bring no benefit and would be
costly if Wei were to annex Zhao, because it would then become powerful to
the extent that it no longer feared the bigger Chu kingdom. The possible
joint Wei/Qi attack on Zhao was hence not in Chus interests. Chu advisors
suggested sending reinforcements to Zhao, sufficient to strengthen Zhao
resistance and prolong the battle, as a show of support. At the point where
both Wei and Zhao troops were exhausted, Chu could then move in and
profit from the strife, and possibly annex Wei. Another possibility was that
of letting Zhao and Wei battle it out before moving in and defeating Wei as
a united Qi/Chu/Qin force.37
Qis and Chus reluctance to send reinforcement troops to Zhao resulted,
in 353 BC, in the Wei armys capture of the Zhao capital, Handan. It was at
this expedient moment that Qi entered the war. The Qi kingdom had
appointed Tian Ji as army commander, and eminent military strategist Sun
Bin as military advisor on the attack on Wei to save Zhao. Chu, meanwhile,
appointed Jingshe to lead its army in the offensive. This joint Qi/Chu
campaign, particularly the direct military threat it constituted to the Wei
capital city of Daliang, forced Wei to order a retreat. As the Wei army
marched homeward through Guiling, Qi troops ambushed and defeated it.
In the midst of battling against Qi and Chu, Wei also suffered attacks from
the Qin kingdom, which won the battle of Yuanli, and captured the Wei
territory of Shaoliang.38 The Battle of Guiling, thus seriously depleted Weis
overall strength.
Strategic Choices
211
The Battle of Maling
39
40
Liu Xiang, ed., Zhanguo Ce: Qi Wu (Comments on the Warring States: Qi, Part V), p. 442.
Liu Xiang, ed., Comments on the Warring States: Qi, Part I, p. 316.
Wei was weakened but not sufficiently so to make it relinquish its hegemonic
ambitions. In 352 BC, Wei allied with Han to defeat a Qi army, forcing Qi to
make peace. One year later, in order to concentrate its power and counter
Qin expansion, Wei returned the captured Zhao capital Handan, and made
peace with Zhao on the Zhang River, thereby halting Wei eastern military
incursions. After making peaceful settlements with Qi and Zhao, Wei
focused its power westward toward the Qin Kingdom. After recapturing its
lost territories, Wei attacked the Qin city of Dingyang, a severe blow that
forced lord Qin Xiaogong (Duke Xiao of Qin) to meet Wei Huiwang (King
Hui of Wei) at Tong in 350 BC, and pay friendly respects and, for the time
being, accept Weis hegemony. In 344 BC, Wei Huiwang (King Hui of Wei)
after officially declaring himself King, accordingly built a palace, ordered
clothes in red imperial cloth, created a nine-banner family tree, and matched
his seven-star flag with his new, self-imposed status.39 Soon after, Wei
forced lords of the small kingdoms of Song, Wei*, Zou, and Lu to
participate in the Fengze Meeting, also attended by Qin heir-apparent,
Prince Shaogong. Wei power reached its peak at this time.
In 342 BC, using the Hans refusal to attend the Fengze Meeting as an
excuse, Wei attacked its former ally. Unable to withstand, the Han kingdom
asked Qi for help. War once again broke out between Qi and Wei,
culminating in the Battle of Maling. Upon receiving the Han request for
help, the Qi adopted tactics similar to those employed during Zhaos similar
plight. It waited on the sidelines while Wei and Han troops fought it out
until both sides were exhausted, and then sent in a massive army to attack
Wei. The rationale behind this decision was that, If Han and Wei are not
weakened by the war and we participate on the Han side, Wei will weaken us
and Han will benefit. As Wei is determined to defeat Han, Han has no
choice but to come to us for help. If we were to enter the war late, we could
save Han and also avoid aggression from Wei because both armies would be
tired out; we could thus strengthen, gain profit, and win high reputation.40
This wait-and-see strategy exacerbated the huge power imbalance between
the Wei and the Han that resulted in the Hans defeated in five major battles.
In 341 BC, the Han once again asked for Qi help. By this time both the Wei
and the Han had suffered heavy casualties, so Qi took the opportunity to
gain both profit and reputation with the minimum of effort. Echoing its
earlier Zhao strategy, Qi eventually entered battle as Hans ally, again with
Tian Ji and Tian Ying as chief military commanders and Sun Bin as chief
military advisor. Sun Bins brilliant strategies won Qi a major victory at
the Battle of Maling, in which a hundred thousand elite Wei soldiers
were annihilated. This constituted a mortal blow to Weis military strength.
212 Wei Zongyou
The Rise of Qin, and the Hezong and Lianheng Movements

The rise of Qin
The Qin Kingdom was in the west, neighbor to the Shu and Di peoples, and
regarded as less civilized by those in central China than themselves. Until the
early Warring States period, Qin was relatively backward as regards its
political, economic and cultural affairs and regarded as inferior by the six
Upon Weis defeat at Maling, the Zhao and Qin allied with the Qi with the
intent of carving Wei up. Attacks from the front and the rear lost the Wei
Kingdom a large amount of territory. In 340 BC, Wei was again defeated by
Qin and its heir Yin was captured. Weis depleted might gave it no choice
but to make friendly overtures toward Qi and also cede territory to Qin in
the hopes it would desist in military aggression toward the Wei Kingdom.
From this point, Wei entered into a rapid, irreversible decline.
The strategies employed in the two main battles that caused Weis
downfall reveal the following: First, that Zhaos and Weis bigger neighbors,
the Qin, Qi, and Chu Kingdoms, opposed Weis hegemonic ambitions and in
no way considered and alliance with it. They were unanimous in their intent
to check the rise of the Wei. This demonstrates that when the power
disparity is not overwhelming, bigger powers will consider acting to contain
anothers attempt at hegemony. Second, from the Qi and Chu responses to
the Zhao and Han calls for help, it seems fair to conclude that while neither
was unwilling to stand by while Wei annexed Zhao and Han, they were also
reluctant to pay too high a price for containing Wei. The Qi and Qu both
decided to wait until the strength of Wei and Han/Zhao had begun to flag
before entering the war, thereby gaining the maximum advantage. This
demonstrates that no matter how much bigger powers may oppose and seek
to balance out a rising hegemon, they may nonetheless avoid responsibility
and delay active participation in opposing it. Third, that during the two wars
between Qi and Wei, the Qin Kingdom, most powerful state in the west, also
chose to wait-and-see until it became apparent who the winner would be,
at which point Qin entered the war to its maximum advantage. The Chu
strategy, in turn, was similar to that of Qin.
When faced with complex conflicts, and if circumstances permit, even big
players in the system will adopt a wait-and-see approach because there are
many sound reasons for doing so. Fourth, these two battles also show that
when facing a hegemonic threat, states, for a variety of reasons such as
geographic location and power status, choose from among a number of
possible strategies. In dealing with the Wei hegemonic ambitions, some
states opted for balancing, while others chose to withdraw or bandwagon.
There was no default strategy as the states concerned used all three strategies
as the circumstances dictated.
Strategic Choices
213
41
42
43
Sima Qian, ShijiQin Benji (Historical Recordthe Kingdom of Qin) (Beijing: Taihai
Chubanshe, 2002), p. 30.
Lin Jianming, Qinshi Gao (History of Qin) (Shanghai: Shanghai Renmin Chubanshe, 1981),
p. 196.
Sima Qian, ShijiShangjun Liezhuan (Historical RecordThe Story of Master Shang),
p. 632.
other powers.41 But after reforms implemented by Qin Xiangong (Duke

Xian of Qin) and Qin Xiaogong (Duke Xiao of Qin), Qin power began
to grow. When Qin Xiaogong (337311 BC) took the throne, he appointed
Shang Yang, the foremost legalist, to guide reforms. They included
cultivating farmland, establishing a county system, rewarding military
accomplishment, and implementing a strict legal code. The reforms helped
to consolidate Qin power. During the Guiling and Maling battles previously
mentioned, Qins shrewd move in belatedly intervening brought it more
territory and other benefits at Wei expense. Qin forced the weakened Wei to
cede to it western portions of the Yellow River, thereby giving Qin access to
an extremely favorable geographic position. The balance of power between
the two gradually shifted in Qins favor until Qins power, especially in the
military field, exceeded that of Wei.42
When Qin Huiwenwang (King Huiwen of Qin 337311 BC) became king,
he continued Shang Yangs reform policies, notably the solicitation and
appointment of officials based on merit rather than family connections. The
Qin government hailed and rewarded military accomplishment; families, no
matter how wealthy, that had achieved none were held in contempt. Qins
increasing power lead, in 325 BC, to its becoming the third kingdom, after
Wei and Qi, to name itself King. The Qin then focused on eastern and
central China in its bid for hegemony.
Qins hegemonic ambitions became obvious during the late years of Qin
Xiaogongs rule. In 340 BC, reformer Shang Yang told Qin Xiaogong, Qin
and Wei are natural competitors, the Wei like an illness in Qins belly.
Sooner or later, either Wei will annex Qin or Qin Wei. Shang Yangs
suggested strategy was that of Qin first weakening Wei, forcing it to move
east, thereby winning Qin the west bank of the Yellow River and the most
advantageous geographic position. Qin could then pursue an expansionist
route eastward and eventually become the new hegemon.43 Qins strategic
approach in later years was exactly that of Shang Yangs design.
Qins repeated incursions on Wei territory, and Qin Huiwenwangs
declaring himself King, exposed its hegemonic ambitions. This was a great
cause for concern among the six other kingdoms. Hence, new approaches
geared toward collectively containing Qin emerged in the form of the
hezong policy. Qin, under Prime Minister Zhang Yis guidance, responded
by actively pursuing a lianheng policy. This marked a new period of
warfare, competition, alliance, and betrayal among the Warring States.
214 Wei Zongyou
The origins of the Hezong and Lianheng movements
44
45
46
According to MengziLianghuiwang Zhangju Shang (MenciusWords of King Lianghui),

This 700 hundred li territory now belongs to Qin.
Liu Xiang, ed., Comments on the Warring States: Chu, Part I, p. 503.
Ibid., p. 503.
Qins rise posed dual challenges to the other six kingdoms. One was a geopolitical challenge. Qins rise was quite different from that of Wei because
Qin had a much larger population and territory (especially after Wei gave
Qin its seven hundred li territory west of the Yellow River44), and so was a
major power. Another point of departure from Weis rise was that of its
being surrounded with neighboring potential enemies, while the Qin
Kingdom in the relatively isolated western parts of China bordered the
three main powers Chu, Han and Wei on just one side. All of Qins other
neighbors were small kingdoms or tribes that in no way challenged it. Hence,
any move to expand eastward did not unduly expose the Qin flanks. Also,
Weis ceding of the Yellow River territories to Qin made the kingdoms to the
east vulnerable to Qin attack as they had no natural defensive barriers. Qins
eastward military expansion was thus as easy as picking fruits out of a bag.
Wei and Han, Qins two closest neighbors did not have the military strength
necessary to counter Qin, especially the Wei Kingdom, which was at its
lowest ebb at this point. In effect, the combined strength of Wei and Han
could not match Qin power, which, overall, presented a serious geo-political
challenge to the four other kingdoms.
Second, Qin encroachments posed a cultural challenge. Other than Chu in
the south, all other six kingdoms originated in the Zhou imperial court
system and shared the rituals and musical traditions associated with the
Zhou dynasty. Qin was only marginally affected by the central plains
culture, having been far more greatly influenced by the less refined traditions
of the small kingdoms and tribes that were its western neighbors.
Consequently, most central and eastern kingdoms looked down upon Qin.
The Qin rise, therefore, not only constituted a military threat but also one to
the other states cultural identity. The book, Zhanguo Ce (Comments on the
Warring States), mentions the strong aversion to the Qin kingdom on the
part of the central kingdoms, as well as of the southern kingdom of Chu,
which acted as an outsider during the SpringAutumn period, based on
differences in cultural identity. An example of this cultural disdain is that of
the famous shuoke (lobbyist), Su Qins persuading Chu to join the coalition
against Qin because: Qin is a tigerwolf (beast) state and has ambitions to
dominate the world. Qin is public enemy number one in the world, and those
wanting to win Qin favor by giving it land are only helping the enemy.45 To
Su Qin, Qin was a coarse, vulgar kingdom, uncivilized, greedy, and alien to
those whose cultures had originated in the Zhou Dynasty. The king of Chu
agreed, Qin, a tigerwolf kingdom, is not trustworthy.46 Xinling, the
Strategic Choices
215
47
48
49
50
Liu Xiang, ed., Zhanguo Ce: Wei San (Comments on the Warring States: Wei, Part III),
p. 869.
Liu Xiang, ed., Comments on the Warring States: Qin, Part I, pp. 789.
See HanfeiziWudu.
Liu Xiang, ed., Zhanguo Ce: Zhongshan Ce (Comments on the Warring States: the Kingdom
of Zhongshan), pp. 11704.
famous Wei lord, persuaded the king of Wei not to join Qin in its attack on
Han because: Qin is backward and has a greedy heart, is untrustworthy and
does not respect rituals and ethics. As long as there is benefit to be had, Qin
would not hesitate to harm its relatives and brothers, as would not a savage.
All people know this.47 These comments were obviously based on a
fundamental bias toward the Qin, and as such were greatly exaggerated.
They nonetheless indicate that many lords during the Warring States period
regarded Qin as an alien kingdom that posed a threat to the Chinese central
plains culture, regardless of the cultures inexorable decline in the other
kingdoms.
This double-headed Qin challenge gave rise to the hezong concept. Hezong
had two strands, according to historical records. One took a geographical
perspective, based on Qins being in the west, while Han, Zhao, and
Wei were at the center, Yan was in the north, Chu in the south, and Qi was
in the east. The locations of these six Warring States enabled them to form
a vertical link from north to south, also known as a hezong, in opposition to the Qin.48 The second hezong strand was that of an alliance
among the weaker powers, Han, Zhao, and Wei as well as Yan and Chu, in
order to contain the common enemy, the powerful Qin. This signified a
belief in the weaker powers uniting to attack one powerful kingdom49
strategy, one that seems consistent with that of balancing, as described
in this essay.
As Wei shared a border with Qin, it was periodically attacked by the
powerful kingdom and needed to unite with Han and Zhao in resisting Qin
expansionism and ensuring its own security and survival. With this intent,
Wei began to consolidate its relationship with Han and Zhao, pro-actively
pursuing a hezong policy. In 325 BC, Weihuiwang (King Hui of Wei) met
with Hanweihou (Duke Wei of Han) (332312 BC) and respectfully
acknowledged him as king. Later the same year, the King of Han paid a
visit to Wei and both kings brought their heirs to meet the new Duke of
Zhao (who later became the King of Zhao, named Zhaowulingwang). These
three, originally Jin vassal, lords after a half centurys worth of battles and
mutual distrust, thus once again formed a coalition. Wei also actively
pursued a closer relationship with Qi and met with Qiweiwang (King Wei of
Qi) on a number of occasions. In 323 BC, a Wei military leader named
Gongsun Yin, who had originally been a Qin military officer, established the
five-king alliance,50 which was the first to recognize the lords of Yan, Zhao
and the smaller kingdom of Zhongshan as Kings. The three kings
216 Wei Zongyou
51
52
53
54
Liu Xiang, ed., Comments on the Warring States: Qin, Part I, p. 79.
See HanfeiziWudu.
Lin Jianming, History of Qin, p. 239.
Sima Qian, ShijiZhang Yi Liezhuan (Historical Recordthe Story of Zhang Yi),
pp. 6445.
subsequently banded together in an alliance with those of Wei and Han to

counter the rising power of Qin.
Upon initiation of the hezong movement, Zhang Yi, the Qin prime
minister, launched the lianheng strategy counter to it. Although diametrically opposed to hezong, lianheng also had a two-fold geographical/
alliance perspective. Lianheng denoted coalition and coordinated actions
among Qin in the west and all kingdoms in the east, thereby forming a
horizontal or heng51 link. From an alliance perspective, lianheng was the
manner in which Qin persuaded one of the six other kingdoms to break out
of its coalition with Qin enemies; it was a policy of divide and conquer
whereby the one powerful kingdom attacks all the weaker powers.52 The
policy was one of luring one of the other six kingdoms into the Qin camp by
means of perceived shared-interests and potential rewards. The concept of
lianheng bears obvious similarities to the strategy of bandwagoning, as
described in this essay.
The purpose of Zhang Yis lianheng policy was to disrupt the hezong
movement. This would clear the way for Qin to conquer the other states, one
by one, and finally achieve hegemony. In 323 BC, Zhang Yi met with chief
officials from Qi and Chu, and tried to isolate Wei by sabotaging its
diplomatic efforts at hezong. The same year, Chu attacked Wei and occupied
eight of its cities. Qin had occupied the Wei cities of Quwo and Pingzhou in
322 BC, and had attacked Han and taken the Han city of Yan in 319 BC.
Wei bent under this persistent Qin encroachment and appointed Zhang Yi as
the new Wei new prime minister, swearing allegiance, for the time being, to
Qin.53 Zhang Yis divide and conquer policy of lianheng thus achieved its
first success.
Qins aggressive behavior and Zhang Yis strategy of forcing Wei to pay
tribute to Qin and then making others follow suit was not well received by
the other Warring States.54 In 319 BC, Weihuiwang died and Weixiangwang
(King Xiang of Wei) became king. Qi, Chu, Yan, Zhao, and Han collectively
mobilized and supported the appointment as prime minister of a hezong
advocate, Gongsun Yan, who ousted Zhang Yi and sent him back to Qin.
The next year, Gongsun Yan helped organize the first anti-Qin coalition
composed of five kingdoms (Chu, Yan, Zhao, Han, and Wei) with
Chuhuaiwang (King Huai of Chu) at its head. However, this highly
publicized event had very little actual effect. Although Chu was leader, it
sent no troops to the planned military campaigns against Qin. Yan from the
north also failed to send troops. Only the three kingdoms of Wei, Han and
Zhao actually attacked Qin. As the five powers failed to unite and cooperate
Strategic Choices
217
effectively, their forces were easily defeated by Qin troops. The following
year, Qin defeated a large Han army at Xiuyu and slaughtered eighty
thousand soldiers. Thus the much heralded five kingdom assault campaign
against the Qin ended in failure.
The struggles between Lianheng and Hezong, and the fall of Chu and Qi
55
56
57
58
59
Liu Xiang, ed., Comments on the Warring States: Qin, Part I, p. 92.
Sima Qian, Historical Recordthe Story of Zhang Yi, p. 644; also see Liu Xiang, ed.,
Zhanguo Ce: Wei Yi (Comments on the Warring States: Wei, Part I), p. 793.
Bai Shouyi, ed., Zhongguo Tongshi, Di San Juan (A History of China, Vol. 3) (Shanghai:
Shanghai Renmin Chubanshe, 1994), pp. 51920.
Chang Ju, Huayang Guozhi (History of Huayang).
Yang Kuan, History of the Warring States Period, p. 328.
The failure of the five kingdom assault campaign and Qins victory at
Xiuyu shifted the power disparity further in Qins favor. The Qin discerned
intrinsic difficulties and irresolvable problems in the hezong strategy. The
Qinhuiwang (King Hui of Qin) once said, feudal lords cannot act alone just
like a chicken cannot survive alone,55 but as Zhang Yi also pointed out, if
parents and children have disputes over financial interests, how could five
different kingdoms not? From that point of view, Su Qins hezong policy
could not succeed.56 Zhang Yis analysis bears striking resemblance to the
Hobbesian anarchical system, whereby the kingdoms pursuing the hezong
policy faced the prisoners dilemma. Even brothers have disputes over
economic interests, so it should come as no surprise that six kingdoms each
with its own needs and ambitions, find it extremely difficult to trust one
another.
The current favorable conditions strengthened the Qin resolve to expand
eastward. In 316 BC, when its southern neighbor, Bashuguo, fell into
internal turmoil, Qin quickly took the opportunity to annex it as a means of
strengthening its flanks, thereby doubling its territory.57 As Bashuguo
bordered Chu and was upstream of a major Chu river, Qin gained strategic
offensive river access to Chu. In this sense, taking Bashuguo meant Qin
could now take over Chu and then the world.58 This move further
strengthened Qin and its strategic positioning.
Faced with the increasing power of Qin and its obvious attempts to
expand eastwards, owing to self-interest, the six other kingdoms failed to
cooperate and counter Qins ambitions, preferring to engage in their own
private warfare, thereby draining one anothers military strength. In 314 BC,
when Yan fell into internal turmoil, Qi attacked it and killed the Yan king.
Athough Yan eventually drove out the Qi army, it was seriously weakened.
The kingdom of Zhongshan took this opportunity also to attack Yan and
regained some territory.59 While Qi, Yan and Zhongshan were busy fighting,
Qin pursued its plans to expand eastward. It soon occupied the Wei cities of
Jiao and Quwo and in a battle at Anmen, defeated a Han army. Worn down
218 Wei Zongyou
60
61
62
Sima Qian, ShijiWeishijia (Historical Recordthe Family of Wei), p. 534; Sima Qian,
ShijiHan shijia (Historical Recordthe Family of Han), pp. 53940.
Liu Xiang, ed., Zhanguo Ce: Qin Er (Comments on the Warring States: Qin, Part II), p. 133.
Pei Monong, Chunqiu Zhanguo Waijiao Qunxing (Leaders and Heroes of the Spring
Autumn and Warring States Periods) (Chongqing: Chongqing Chubanshe, 1998), p. 501.
by Qins unrelenting attacks, the Han and Wei had no choice but to
bandwagon with Qin. The three formed an alliance.60
Qin having annexed Bashuguo and subdued Han and Wei, of the
remaining major kingdoms only Qi in the east and Chu in the south could
match its power. Qis victory over the Yan made it powerful enough, in
alliance with Chu, to take the city of Quwo from Qin. Qinhuiwang (King
Hui of Qin) wanted to attack Qi,61 but Qi and Chus having long ago formed
an alliance62 presented an obstacle, and Qi was also geographically distant
from Qin. If the Qin sent troops to attack Qi, Chu could strike them from
the rear, putting Qin under attack from both front and back. So Qin
adopted the lianheng policy toward Chu, manipulating it in an attempt to
break the Qi-Chu alliance.
The Qin Prime Minister, Zhang Yi, used six hundred li of territory as an
incentive for Chu to break its alliance with Qi. It was a ploy that worked in
the same way as did that of Chuhuaiwang (328299 BC). Chu took the bait
and broke away from the Qi alliance, leaving itself isolated and vulnerable.
Qin subsequently attacked it, and took over 600 li of territory in the
Hanzhong area, thereby linking the old Bashuguo lands with Qins original
territory. This provided a strong material base and strategic position for
Qins eastward expansion strategy.
Chus weakened state left only Qi with sufficient strength to check Qin.
But at the time Qin attacked Chu, Qi united with Wei and Han, two
kingdoms that constantly fell under Qin assault, and initiated a war against
Chu and Qin. Armies from the three kingdoms first attacked and defeated
Chu in 301 BC and in 298296 BC attacked Qin and occupied its [capital?]
of Hanguguan, forcing Qin to negotiate a peace deal in which it returned
former Han and Wei territories. This development indicates that although
Qin was powerful, when other kingdoms united they were able to counter its
hegemonic ambitions. The problem was that other kingdoms were not
sincere in their efforts to cooperate, and often engaged in military action
based on little more than petty jealousies. Some were even willing to
bandwagon with Qin.
In order to continue its eastward expansion strategy, gradually conquering
the middle lands between Qin and Qi, and also break the new alliance
between Qi, Han and Wei, Qin began making overtures to Qi. A recent
internal power struggle, meanwhile resulted in Qi Prime Minister Meng
Chang, who had advocated containing Qin, being dismissed and replaced
Strategic Choices
219
63
64
65
66
67
Sima Qian, ShijiMengchangjun Liezhuan (Historical Recordthe Story of Master Meng

Chang), pp. 6634.
Sima Qian, ShijiQin Benji (Historical Recordthe Kingdom of Qin), p. 32.
Sima Qian, ShijiWeishijia (Historical Recordthe Family of Wei), p. 534; Sima Qian,
Historical Recordthe Family of Han, p. 540.
Sima Qian, ShijiYanzhaogong Shijia (Historical Recordthe Family of Yanzhaogong),
pp. 45960.
Gao Rui, Zhongguo Shanggu Junshishi (Ancient Military History of China) (Beijing: Junshi
Kexue Chubanshe, 1995), p. 415.
with a Qin man, Wudafu Luli.63 Qiminwang (King Min of Qi) (300284 BC)
was keen to annex the neighboring small kingdom of Song, and on this basis
responded positively to Qins approaches. In 295 BC, Qi and Qin resumed
friendly relations. After successfully breaking the Qi alliance with Han and
Wei, Qin, true to form, sent troops to attack the two weaker states of Han
and Wei. In 294 BC, Qin defeated a Han/Wei coalition army at Yinque,
slaughtering two hundred and forty thousands soldiers64another heavy
blow to these two small kingdoms. From 292 to 289 BC, Qin continued its
relentless assault on Han and Wei. In 290 BC, Wei was forced to give up 400
li of territory in the eastern river area to Qin who also exacted 200 li of
territory in Wusui from Han.65 Qins lianheng policy was once again
tremendously successful.
Qins successful application of the lianheng strategy that so devastated the
kingdoms of Han and Wei further stimulated the kingdoms lust for
hegemony in central China. A turn of events occurred in 288 BC, when
Qinzhaowang (King Zhao of Qin) (306251 BC), no longer satisfied with the
title of King, formally declared himself Emperor (di) in the city of Yiyang.
The Qin Prime Minister Weiran, meanwhile, went to Qi and respectfully
referred to Qiminwang (King Min of Qi) (300284 BC) as the eastern
Emperor (di). Thereafter, the two kingdoms of Qin and Qi jointly attacked
Zhao. This action made plain Qins hegemonic ambitions as the Qi/Qin
coalition posed a major threat to Wei, Han, Zhao as well as Yan. The policy
of hezong was once again raised. By this time, however, Han and Wei had
been so greatly weakened that they were incapable of organizing a new antiQin alliance. Yan, led by the very capable lord Yanzhaowang (King Zhao of
Yan), gradually returned to a position of power but was unable to manage
the situation alone. But at the same time, the Yan had not forgotten Qis
earlier invasion and occupation of its lands, and sought revenge.66
In Zhao, a new king named Zhaowulingwang (King Wuling of Zhao)
(325299 BC) took the throne, and began a series of bold military reforms
that strengthened the kingdom. Then Zhao took a chance during the Qin/Qi
and Han/Wei wars to annex the medium sized kingdom of Zhongshan in
the years 300296 BC. During this time, Zhao conquered large areas to its
northwest that had belonged to the Hu people, thus doubling its own
territory. The kingdom of Zhao was hence a formidable barrier to Qins
further eastward expansion during the mid-late Warring States period.67
220 Wei Zongyou
68
Liu Xiang, ed., Zhanguo Ce: Zhao Si (Comments on the Warring States: Zhao, Part IV),
p. 727.
Zhao was the most adept kingdom at implementing the hezong strategy
to counter Qin expansion. Li Dui, a capable politician from Zhao, began
communicating with Han, Wei and other kingdoms that felt threatened by
Qin. Discussions about a new anti-Qin movement proceeded.
Meanwhile, Su Qin, the eminent hezong advocate, arrived in Qi via Yan
and persuaded Qiminwang to give up the title of Emperor and cooperate
with Yan, Han, Wei, and Zhao in forming a new hezong to counter Qin
aggression. Qi, at Su Qins urging, reversed its decision to join Qin in
attacking Zhao and Qiminwang gave up the title of Emperor. The Qi also
authorized Su Qin to engage in diplomacy with the other kingdoms of Han,
Wei and Zhao with a view to forming an alliance against the Qin.
In 287 BC, a new five kingdom anti-Qin alliance was formed, comprising
the Qi, Han, Zhao, Wei and Yan. The motivation, however, for many
participants in this coalition was purely that of self-interest and had nothing
to do with the common good. For example, Qis participation was motivated
by the intent to annex the small kingdom of Song, weakening the Qin being
a lesser objective. Yans implicit goal was that of disrupting the relationship
between Qi and Qin and Han/Wei/Zhao. Yan used Song as bait for Qi,
whose aggressive moves toward it made Qi the new target of joint action.
Yan thus got revenge on Qi for its past invasion and occupation of it. The
ostensibly anti-Qin kingdom of Zhao was also pragmatic as regards the Qin
issue. There were Zhao political forces that actually advocated allying with
Qin in a joint attack on Qi. The Zhao Prime Minister, Li Dui, was also
amenable to collaborating with Qin in an attack on Wei, as this would fulfill
the Zhao desire to avenge past indignities suffered at Wei hands.68 Han and
Wei were primarily interested in countering Qin but had limited strength and
little influence. So it was that the various Warring States acted according
to their own self-interest, with no regard for common needs. There was
consequently common mistrust among the seven states. Throughout the
Warring States period, coalitions were temporary and alliances were
frequently switched; yesterdays friend could become todays enemy. Also,
each kingdom wanted to annex the rest (in this sense they could all be
considered revisionist states), which meant that mistrust and betrayal were
commonplace. These opportunistic tendencies restricted the likelihood of
successful cooperations. Every kingdom that participated in a coalition
became a prisoner, cognizant that the other members would not think twice
about using them as a free-ride or betraying them by making clandestine
deals with the enemy.
Due to the mistrust and suspicion between coalition partners, when the
combined five-kingdom army arrived at the cities of Rongyang and
Chenggao, it halted but did not engage in battle with Qin troops. Pressure
Strategic Choices
221
69
70
71
Sima Qian, ShijiTianjing Zhongwan Shijia (Historical Recordthe Family of Tianjing), p.

547.
Yang Kuan, History of the Warring States Period, pp. 3401.
Lin Jianming, History of Qin, pp. 2545.
from the five-kingdom army forced Qin to abandon the title of Emperor
and return captured territory to the Wei and Zhao. This indicates that the
five kingdoms remaining united made them capable of deflecting Qins
hegemonic ambitions and ensuring their own security.
However, two years after this anti-Qin coalition, the legitimacy and
strength Qi had acquired as a member of the alliance emboldened the
kingdom to begin its own war against Song, and soon after annex the small
kingdom. Qi was also intent on taking the Huaibei region from Chu,
expanding westward into Han, Wei, and Zhao lands, and eventually
overthrowing and becoming ruler of the symbolic Zhou court, with the
power to force all remaining feudal lords, such as those from Zou and Lu, to
profess allegiance to Qi.69 Its hegemonic ambitions engendered Qi enemies
on all sides and caused concern and anger among the other kingdoms,
particularly those in central China. There was particularly bad blood
between Yan in the north and Qi, originating in Qis past invasion and
occupation of Yan. Yan initiated talks among itself, Zhao, Wei, and Chu
with a view to their uniting to counter Qi expansionism. Qis annexation of
Song directly threatened Han, Wei, and Zhao because of their close
geographic proximity to it. The Zhao Prime Minister, Li Dui, had long been
interested in the rich Song commercial city of Dingtao, which Zhao had
previously attacked under Wei70 auspices. Zhao, along with Wei, therefore,
responded positively to Yans call for an alliance. As internal struggles
among the six other kingdoms were beneficial to the Qin strategy of divide
and conquer, Qin voluntarily led the coalition against Qi.71 Thus, the nature
and target of the hezong coalition shifted from that of five-kingdom anti-Qin
to five-kingdom anti-Qi.
In 284 BC, the five kingdoms of Qin, Han, Zhao, Wei, and Yan completed
a series of diplomatic moves toward a five-kingdom army attack on Qi
which devastated the kingdom and from which it never really recovered.
This aided Qins eastward expansion strategy and achieved an important
breakthrough as it signified that the two kingdoms with sufficient power to
block Qin, Chu, and Qi, were greatly weakened. The central kingdoms of
Han and Wei, because of their close proximity to Qin, were also
continuously under siege, their size and strength rapidly depleting. Not
only were they unable to contain Qins aggression, but also to become the
spring-board for further Qin expansionism and potential targets of invasion.
Throughout the hezong attack on Qi, Qin successfully manipulated the
internal squabbles of the other kingdoms to its own ends, and avoided
serious losses. Qin not only defeated the major power Qi, but also took the
222 Wei Zongyou
long-coveted Song city of Dingtao. After the subsequent Qi decline, Qin

re-set its expansionist sights on Han, Wei, Zhao, and Chu. Qins final war of
elimination against the six other kingdoms had begun.
The Emergence of Uni-Polarity and Qins Elimination of the

Six-States
State behavior under uni-polarity
72
Liu Xiang, ed., Zhanguo Ce: Qin Si (Comments on the Warring States: Qin, Part IV),
p. 239.
After the Qi decline, the Warring States power apportionment was

concentrated in one dominant kingdom, the Qin, which had the upper
hand over the six weaker kingdoms. In its years of expansionist wars, the
Qin accumulated a wealth of captured territory and posed a substantial
threat to all states, most particularly its neighbors, the Wei, Han, and Chu
kingdoms. It was poised to strike vulnerable areas in the other six kingdoms,
such as the rich Song city of Dingtao, between the Qi and the Han-WeiZhao that had already come under Qin control at this time. Wei and Han,
owing to prolonged Qin attacks, were much smaller and weaker; their
elimination seemed only a matter of time. The relentless Qin onslaught also
greatly weakened Chu, and what had been a balance of power between Qin
and Chu, once defined: either Qin becomes Emperor of China or Chu
becomes King of China,72 completely disintegrated. Qi was also in a state of
decline and of no real threat; Yan was a weak power from the beginning,
and although it once defeated Qi, its strength had not significantly increased.
Zhao, since Zhaowulingwangs reforms and its annexation of Zhongshan,
was now the rising power with the best capacity to check Qins eastward
expansion. But Zhao could never match up to Qins vast territory,
population and military force. In other words, at this moment in the
Warring States period, a state of uni-polarity had basically come into
existence. Under these circumstances, where the balance of power had been
shattered and one kingdom is close to supremacy, the only possible counter
to Qins hegemonic ambitions was that of cooperation between several
powers. No single kingdom was capable of checking Qin alone.
The anarchical system of the time was one in which the common motto
was every man for himself. As such, cooperation, other than on a shortterm, opportunistic basis, was well-nigh impossible. Each state had its own
mindset as to how to annex the rest, and also how to avoid its own
annexation. Co-existence, let alone cooperation, was difficult. There was a
complete absence of trust on any level among the various kingdoms; the
situation was a classic prisoners dilemma. Although, rationally speaking,
all states faced the same hegemonic threat, and the hezong policy directed at
Qin was the only means of ensuring their own security, as had previously
Strategic Choices
223
73
Sima Guang, ZizhitongjianZhouji Si (Great Historic Writings of Politicization, Zhou 4)

(Taiyuan: Beiyue Wenyi Chubanshe, 1995), p. 25.
been proved beyond doubt, the six kingdoms simply could not be trusted to
cooperate in earnest. Some kingdoms went so far as to bandwagon with Qin,
either in response to intimidation or in the expectation of gaining rewards;
while some engaged in wars against each other for immediate short-term
gains. There were some powers that, for purposes of self-preservation,
decided to pursue a path of isolationism. When a few kingdoms, usually
under heavy pressure and trying to survive, united, it was generally a
temporary alliance that stood up in the face of an outside threat, but soon
dissolved as states refocused on their own, frequent internal struggles. The
Qin attacks on the other kingdoms, on the other hand, were constant and
consistent, and the divide and conquer strategy was a great success.
After the Qi decline, Qin began an all-out assault toward the east. In 280
BC, the Qin began its onslaught on the Chu in the south that lasted for five
consecutive years. It occupied the Chu capital of Yin, which seriously
weakened the Chu military forces, and also captured a large portion of Chu
territory, forcing it to move its capital city to Chen. In the face of these
constant Qin attacks, Chu became so weak that it was no longer a threat. To
the east, Qin continued its attacks on Han-Wei-Zhao, taking over their
territory bit by bit. In 283 BC, while Yan and Zhao were fighting against Qi,
Qin sent its main armies to attack Wei, threatening the Wei capital of
Daliang. In 282281 BC, Qin attacked Zhao and took over some of its
territory. Qin then focused all its energies on Chu, and temporarily
suspended its attacks on Han-Wei-Zhao, having formed an alliance with
them. After a major defeat at the hands of the Chu, however, the Qin
reverted to its wars with Han/Wei/Zhao. As from 276 BC, Qin launched
concerted attacks on the Wei that spanned years, twice almost capturing the
Wei capital. In 273 BC, Qin defeated a united Wei/Zhao army, slaughtering
one hundred and fifty thousands soldiers. Weiwang (King of Wei) had no
choice but to give up the city of Nanyang and swear allegiance to Qin. This
was not the first time the Han had been subjugated by the Qin.73
During Qins constant attacks on Chu and Wei, two important events
occurred. They are worth analyzing because they illustrate the psychology
and strategic behavior of the six kingdoms in the face of Qins hegemonic
threat.
The first was Qins seriously weakening the Chu and forcing the Han/Wei
to capitulate. Eminent Chu scholar, Chunshen Master Huangxie happened
to be in Qin when Qinzhaowang (King Zhao of Qin) (306251 BC) spoke
with officials from Han and Wei on the matter of a joint attack on Chu.
Alarmed by Qins attempts to destroy Chu in its vulnerable state, Huangxi
dissuaded Qinzhaowang, saying that the Han and Wei, Qins neighbors,
were the two kingdoms most likely to negotiate a hezong coalition against
224 Wei Zongyou
74
75
Sima Qian, ShijiChunshenjun Liezhuan (Historical Recordthe Story of Master

Chunshen), pp. 6734.
Liu Xiang, ed., Zhanguo Ce: Wei San (Comments on the Warring States: Wei, Part III),
p. 863; also see Sima Guang, ZizhitongjianZhouji Si (Great Historic Writings of
Politicization, Zhou 4), p. 25.
Qin. The scholar reminded Qinzhaowang that the Qin and the Han/Wei had
a long history of bad blood and that the Han/Wei had lost many kings to the
Qin. As Chu was Qins ally, by attacking it he would be fighting an ally
rather than two long-term enemies. This was not only morally wrong but
also a political mistake. Also, if Qin attacked Chu, Wei might take the
opportunity to attack Song, while Qi might occupy the Si River region.
Qins aggression toward Chu could, therefore, benefit the Wei and the Qi.
To avoid this situation, Huangxie advised Qinzhaowang to work toward
improving relations with Chu. If Qin and Chu were to ally, they could easily
overpower Han, Wei and Qi, which meant that the four kingdoms of Yan,
Zhao, Chu, and Qi, would become subject to Qin.74 Qinzhaowang was
convinced by Huangxies argument and abandoned his attack on Chu,
instead forming an alliance with it. Chu thus escaped possible annihilation.
Although Chu only temporarily avoided destruction by taking Huangxies
advice, his words nonetheless reveal an important line of reasoning. When
faced with the threat of Qin, the six kingdoms did not immediately consider
forming a coalition and cooperating to counter Qin. Instead, they looked at
the situation from the perspective of their own self-interest, taking every
opportunity to distract Qin attention away from them through an act of
betrayal. Some went as far as to bandwagon with the Qin on its attacks
on other kingdoms. The consequences of this blinkered behavior was an
increased power disparity among Qin and the other kingdoms, and constant
fear, suspicion, and distrust among the powers, which ultimately led to the
destruction of all six kingdoms.
The second event occurred in 273 BC after Qin defeated the Wei/Zhao
coalition army. After Weis defeat, under Qin pressure it was prepared to
give up the city of Nanyang. But Sun Chen from Wei opposed this, saying
that such a course of action would be like pouring oil on fire, continue
pouring oil in and the fire will continue.75 Sun Chen explained that if in the
face of a hegemonic threat from Qin, kingdoms repeatedly responded by
compromising or even bandwagoning with it, the outcome could only be
subjugation. But Weiwang (King of Wei) did not follow Suns advice and
gave up Nanyang. Weis behavior demonstrates how, under the circumstances of large power disparities, kingdoms sacrifice long-term interests in
order to ensure immediate survival. It also actually suggests that the
kingdoms were actually unable to make a rational choice between immediate
survival and long-term interests. These two events also demonstrate that
under conditions of tremendous power disparity and uni-polarity, bandwagoning becomes a fairly common strategic choice.
Strategic Choices
225
The battle of Changping and Qins elimination of the six-states
76
77
78
Sima Qian, ShijiFansui Caize Liezhuan (Historical Recordthe Story of Fansui); also see
Sima Guang, ZizhitongjianZhouji Wu (Great Historic Writings of Politicization, Zhou 5),
p. 28.
Sima Guang, ZizhitongjianZhouji Wu (Great Historic Writings of Politicization, Zhou 5),
p. 29.
Sima Qian, ShijiZhaoshijia (Historical Recordthe Family of Zhao), p. 529.
In a situation where Qin was the dominant power and all other kingdoms
were weakening, the fundamental question was not whether or not Qin
could eliminate the remaining kingdoms, but how and when. Guided by the
famous policy advisor Fan Sui, the Qin decided first to attack the two
strategic kingdoms of Han and Wei to make clear its invincibility, and then
to destroy the other kingdoms. In order to formulate favorable conditions
for the takeover of Han and Wei, Qin made gestures of friendship toward Qi
in the east in order to win its support.76 This was the famous strategy known
as yuanjiao jingong (winning support from your farthest neighbour and
attacking your closest neighbors first).
In 268 BC, Qin began launching powerful military campaigns against Wei
and Han. First, Qin captured the cities of Huan and Xingqu from Wei,
forcefully subduing Wei. Qin then captured Shaoqu, Gaoping, and the key
strategic cities of Nanyang and Yewang, thereby cutting Han in half.77
Han was in peril under the ruthless Qin aggression. In 262 BC, when Qin
took over Yewang and cut Han in half, Hanhehuiwang (King Hehui of Han)
(272239 BC) ceded the Han strategic city of Shangdang in a bid for peace.
But the governor of Shangdang chose to give the city Zhao rather than to
Qin. The king thus tried to cause problems between Qin and Zhao, with the
intent of uniting with Zhao in an alliance against Qin.78
As described earlier, during the late Warring States period, Zhao was the
most powerful of the six other kingdoms. If all six had formed a coalition
around Zhao, they might have been able to resist Qin aggression. But this
was not to be. The six kingdoms simply could not accomplish a successful
alliance. Since 261 BC, Qin had constantly sent armies to attack Zhao, and it
was by far the more powerful of the two, Zhao initially lost some territory.
But later on, under the leadership of an old military general named Lianbo,
Zhao effectively checked the Qin invasion at Changping, where the two sides
battled for months until reaching a deadlock. Qin responded with the
strategy of sowing discord between Zhaos military and civilian leaders.
This enabled it finally to defeat the Zhao army, wiping it out to a man and
slaughtering nearly half a million soldiers. This was the famous Battle of
Changping. The defeat was a fatal blow to Zhao fatally and it began to
decline in power.
It is interesting to note the different attitudes of the various kingdoms
toward the Battle of Changping. Han, under the Qin assault, was already
in inexorable decline and after giving up land to Qin, was unwilling to help
226 Wei Zongyou
79
80
81
82
83
84
Liu Xiang, ed., Zhanguo Ce: Wei Si (Comments on the Warring States: Wei, Part IV),
p. 900.
Sima Guang, Great Historic Writings of Politicization, Zhou 5, p. 30.
ibid; also see Sima Qian, Historical Recordthe Family of Tianjing), p. 547.
Liu Xiang, ed., Comments on the Warring States: Wei, Part IV, p. 900.
Liu Xiang, ed., Zhanguo Ce: Qi Er (Comments on the Warring States: Qi, Part II), p. 360.
Sima Guang, ZizhitongjianQinji Yi (Great Historic Writings of Politicization, Qin 1),
pp. 356.
Zhao; Wei was interested in short-term gains, and after Qin made it some
empty promises regarding the transfer of Han lands to Wei, it also refused to
help Zhao;79 Zhaos neighbor Yan did not provide any help to Zhao during
the war; Qi and Chu only gave limited verbal support and did not send any
troops to aid Zhao. When Zhaos major military force was surrounded by
Qin armies at Changping, it asked Qi for logistical support but Qi refused.80
At this time, a policy advisor suggested to Qiwang (King of Qi) that saving
Zhao would benefit Qi since if Zhao fell, Chu and Qi were the next likely Qin
next targets.81 But Qiwang did not listen and refused to help Zhao.
Qins battles with Zhao required sending out all of its military troops.
Qins main worry was whether or not the other kingdoms would combine
their power to help Zhao, because if all the kingdoms helped Qin, Zhao
would die; if all the kingdoms helped Zhao, Qin would die.82 If Qi and Chu
sent troops to help Zhao, Qin was prepared to withdraw, but if Qi and Chu
did not send reinforcements, Qin would focus on defeating Zhao.83
Qin gained Wei support through the promise of lands, thereby nipping in
the bud any possible hezong policy. When Qin was wholly engaged in the
Battle of Changping, the other kingdoms failed to use this opportunity to
band together and carry out a full scale attack on Qin. They were all
distracted by self-interest, which the Qin capitalized on by means of threats
and rewards. The three main choices the other kingdoms had were: support
Qin and jump on its bandwagon; remain neutral and avoid intervention or
involvement; or pay some lip service to Zhao without actually sending
any troops.
After the Battle of Changping, Zhao power declined dramatically. It did
win a small battle against the Qin in Handan, but Zhao was incapable of
retaliating further. The defeat of Zhao shifted the power disparity between
Qin and the other six kingdoms still further in Qins favor. Annexing them
was now only a matter of time. Zhaos defeat further isolated Han and Wei,
leaving them with no allies. This was the time Qin picked to annex the two
central kingdoms. From 256 BC onward, Qin continued attacks on Han and
Wei and took much of their territories. In 256 BC and 249 BC, Qin also
destroyed the Western and Eastern Zhou Imperial Courts, respectively; both
were located in Han territory. Thus, the Zhou dynasty officially ended.84
Han/Wei/Zhao were hard pressed to defend their kingdoms against
Qins aggressive expansionism, particularly as at that time Han and Wei
Strategic Choices
227
85
86
87
Ibid., p. 36.
Sima Qian, ShijiQinshihuang Benji (Historical Recordthe Story of Qinshihuang), p. 34.
There are many discrepancies and contradictions among accounts in history books of
this final hezong campaign. This essays references are those of the famed historian
Yang Kuan. See Yang Kuan, History of the Warring States Period, p. 366.
controlled only tiny territories and their destruction seemed imminent.

The situation prompted the eminent Wei scholar Xinling Master Wuji, to
advocate a hezong campaign on the part of the five allied kingdoms of Han,
Zhao, Wei, Chu, and Yan, which in 247 BC, launched an all-out attack on
Qin. Despite Qins being the sole superpower, the united resolve of the five
kingdoms beat the Qin armies and drove them back to Hanguguan.85 But
this hezong campaign was insufficient to inflict serious damage Qin, and also
failed to change the balance of power between Qin and the other kingdoms.
Moreover, the eastern kingdom of Qi did not participate in the campaign; on
the contrary, it acted very humbly toward Qin in order to save itself. Most
disappointing of all is that soon after the five-kingdom army defeated Qin,
the coalition fell apart and Wei, Zhao and Yan all engaged in military
actions against each other.
Qins defeat at the hands of the five-kingdom army did not force it into
retreat, and it continued full military assaults on Han/Wei/Zhao. In 246 BC,
Qin once again conquered Hans strategic city of Shangdang, and two years
later took over another 13 Han cities. While Yan and Zhao were fighting,
Qin took the opportunity to take Suanzao and 13 other cities from Wei, thus
establishing the Qin Eastern Township.86 At this point, Qins territory
bordered Qis and it split its newly won spoils among the Chu in the south,
the Yan and Zhao in the north, and Han and Wei at the centre. Hezong was
now impossible because the Qin had successfully severed all geographical
links between the six other kingdoms.
The six kingdoms now faced destruction. In 241 BC, five kingdoms, Chu,
Han, Zhao, Wei, and Yan organized a final hezong movement of which the
southerly Chu was named leader. A new five-kingdom army, led by the
Zhao general Pang Yuan, moved to attack Qin. But the military strength of
all five kingdoms was no match for the Qin armies, and once battle began,
the five-kingdom army retreated. During their withdrawal, the Zhao army
switched targets and attacked Qi, the only kingdom not to participate in the
final hezong, and occupied part of its territory.87 The failure of the final
hezong campaign clearly indicated that the remaining kingdoms could no
longer organize any effective resistance against the powerful Qin juggernaut.
Their fates were now sealed.
At the conclusion of the final hezong campaign, Qin used its full strength
to attack Han/Wei/Zhao. Han and Wei, having no allies, were forced to
forfeit more land and bandwagon with Qin. Wei helped Qin with its attack
on Chu, and Zhao also continued to attack Yan. While Yan and Zhao were
battling, Qin attacked Zhao again and took over a large portion of its
228 Wei Zongyou
territory. Under the Qins relentless attacks, the six kingdoms continued to
shrink. It took Qin the 10 years from 230 BC, when it destroyed Yan, to
221 BC, when it annexed Qi, to complete its campaign against the six
kingdoms and unite the whole China.
Conclusion
According to Waltzs balance of power theory, as long as the international

system remains in a state of anarchy, a balance of power will always be
present and states will choose a strategy of balancing rather than
bandwagoning. However, as numerous scholars argue, and the case-study
presented here shows, a balance of power does not necessarily appear in all
situations and balancing is not the default or only strategy available to states
facing a hegemonic threat.
The analysis in this essay reveals that there are five main factors that
influence a states strategic behavior: the type of anarchy present in a system,
its polarity, the power balance, the geo-political situation and the perception
of state leaders. Taking these variables into account, the conclusions drawn
differ greatly from Waltzs balance of power theory. They are that a state
seems more interested in non-balancing strategic behavior, thereby further
destabilizing the balance of power in the system. As the case-study of China
during the Warring States period clearly demonstrates, under an anarchical
system characterized by everyone for themselves, states find it difficult to
the point of impossibility to engage in cooperation. They hence face a
serious prisoners dilemma. When the power disparity becomes enormous
(such as when uni-polarity exists), the consequences are devastating for
states trying to counter the hegemonic threat from inside their prisoners
dilemma. They usually fall to the rising hegemon one by one, as it uses a
dual approach of rewards and threats to divide and conquer. The kingdom
of Qin followed this path by manipulating the inherent weaknesses of the
hezong policy, countering with its own strategy of lianheng and ultimately
winning. When a large disparity occurs in the power balance, smaller,
weaker states, without strong allies and threatened by great powers,
typically bow down and bandwagon with the stronger states. The kingdoms
of Han and Wei during the late Warring States period are examples of such
weak powers. The geopolitical circumstances of a state and the perceptions
of its leaders are also deciding factors in the determination of a states
foreign policy. The strategies adopted by Han, Zhao and Wei throughout
the period and Qins yuanjiao jingong strategy (winning support from your
farthest neighbor and attacking your closest neighbors first) illustrate how
geo-politics affects state behavior. Differing geographical backgrounds also
gave state leaders varying viewpoints on, and cognizance of, threats, which
in turn affected their perceptions of a states most beneficial strategic
actions.
Strategic Choices
229
88
Regarding the strategic behavior of European powers during the Napoleonic Era, please
see Wei Zongyou, Zhiheng, Zhuisui, yu Bujieru: Baquan Yinying Xia de Sanzhong Guojia
Zhengce Fanying (Balancing, Bandwagoning and Withdrawing: Three State Strategies in
Response to a Hegemonic Threat), PhD dissertation, Fudan University, 2004, part 4.
Under the influence of these five factors, when faced with a hegemonic
threat, balancing was not the default state strategy; withdrawing and
bandwagoning were most common. The result was further concentration of
power in the hands of one state and the eventual creation of a Qin Empire.
In the interests of limiting the scope of this essay, it analyses state behavior
under a Hobbesian anarchical system in relation to that which existed
during the Warring States period in Chinese history. It does not engage in
extensive investigation into a states strategic behavior under a Lockean
anarchical system. As previously mentioned, in a Lockean system, counterhegemonic states do not battle to the death which means there are fewer
obstacles to cooperation. These states, however, must still deal with
collective-action problems and remain constrained by the factors discussed
earlier. For example, during the Napoleonic Wars when various European
powers faced French hegemonic ambitions, it was the geo-politics, power
differences, perceptual variations, and collective-action problems in
organizing an anti-French alliance that prompted most states to bandwagon
with France, or withdraw from the conflict rather than try to balance against
Napoleon.88 Although in the end, Napoleonic Frances hegemonic ambitions were defeated and continental Europe returned to a balance of power,
if not for the efforts of an offshore balancer, England, in resolving the
collective-action problems of an anti-French alliance, perhaps Europe
would have seen the rise of a second Roman Empire.

In The Shadow of Hegemony Strategic Choices

Cargado por

Información del documento

Descripción original:

Título original

Derechos de autor

Formatos disponibles

Compartir este documento

Compartir o incrustar documentos

Opciones para compartir

¿Le pareció útil este documento?

¿Este contenido es inapropiado?

Copyright:

Formatos disponibles

In The Shadow of Hegemony Strategic Choices

Cargado por

Copyright:

Formatos disponibles

Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol.

In the Shadow of Hegemony:

Criticisms of Waltzs Balance of Power Theory

Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill Publishing

Downloaded from http://cjip.oxfordjournals.org/ by guest on October 30, 2014

A problem that frequently arises for states in international politics is that

196 Wei Zongyou

Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 8893.

Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 1, 2006, 195229

Downloaded from http://cjip.oxfordjournals.org/ by guest on October 30, 2014

power theory. He asserts that international politics operates in an anarchical

Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 1, 2006, 195229

Downloaded from http://cjip.oxfordjournals.org/ by guest on October 30, 2014

198 Wei Zongyou

Randall L. Schweller, New Realist Research on Alliances: Refining, Not Refuting,

Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 1, 2006, 195229

Downloaded from http://cjip.oxfordjournals.org/ by guest on October 30, 2014

Strategic Options in the Shadow of Hegemony

Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 1, 2006, 195229

Downloaded from http://cjip.oxfordjournals.org/ by guest on October 30, 2014

200 Wei Zongyou

In Waltzs analysis, anarchy is a constant within IR. This fundamentally

In this essay, a hegemonic threat is used to portray the hegemons or potential

Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 1, 2006, 195229

Downloaded from http://cjip.oxfordjournals.org/ by guest on October 30, 2014

A systems polarity is defined by the apportionment of power among its

Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 1, 2006, 195229

Downloaded from http://cjip.oxfordjournals.org/ by guest on October 30, 2014

capable of enforcing laws. Alexander Wendt, however, points out that

202 Wei Zongyou

For thoughts, see William C. Wohlforth, Danjishijie Zhong de Meiguo Zhanlue,

Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 1, 2006, 195229

Downloaded from http://cjip.oxfordjournals.org/ by guest on October 30, 2014

In a uni-polar system, power is concentrated at the top, resulting in a

is a tendency to pass the buck.25 In a multi-polar system, balancing

Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 1, 2006, 195229

Downloaded from http://cjip.oxfordjournals.org/ by guest on October 30, 2014

204 Wei Zongyou

Geopolitics refers to a states location and the circumstances surrounding its

Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 1, 2006, 195229

Downloaded from http://cjip.oxfordjournals.org/ by guest on October 30, 2014

Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ:

Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 1, 2006, 195229

Downloaded from http://cjip.oxfordjournals.org/ by guest on October 30, 2014

206 Wei Zongyou

Thomas J. Christensen, Perceptions and Alliances in Europe, 18651940, International

Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 1, 2006, 195229

Downloaded from http://cjip.oxfordjournals.org/ by guest on October 30, 2014

mighty, thereby behaving more like bandwagoners than balancers.30 During

ChinaAnnexation Wars during the Warring

Liu Zehua, Zhongguo de Wangquan Zhuyi (Chinas Hegemonism) (Shanghai: Shanghai

Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 1, 2006, 195229

Downloaded from http://cjip.oxfordjournals.org/ by guest on October 30, 2014

Collapse of the Zhou Hierarchy and the Seven Powers

208 Wei Zongyou

Yanwu describes vividly the changing order as the Spring/Autumn period

Waltzs contention is that under an anarchical order, competitive pressure

Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 1, 2006, 195229

Downloaded from http://cjip.oxfordjournals.org/ by guest on October 30, 2014

The Rise and Fall of Wei

The Battle of Guiling

Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 1, 2006, 195229