The Self in the Extended Field of Consciousness

Peter Mark Adams

It is doubtful whether consciousness has the form of the I,

or whether the I is not rather a phenomenon in consciousnessi.

What is it about the idea of the field-like nature of consciousness that makes it so counterintuitive? Most people would say that it is simply not consistent with their day to day
experience. We are dealing with three basic components of experience: our awareness, the
content of our awareness what we see, hear, feel and so on and whatever events give rise
to it. In this arrangement consciousness serves as an intermediary. On the one hand it takes in
the sound and fury of raw reality and on the other, through neurological, psychological and
socio-cultural mechanisms filters, edits and orders the mix to create the navigable three
dimensional representation that we call reality. Reality is just the production of order in the
world around us with all its variability. The reality of the expert or connoisseur whether
in the fields of science, art or gastronomy is simply not the same as that experienced by the
rest of us.
Our lived experience is often likened to a stream of consciousness. Even if this has
been demonstrated to be an inaccurate neurological descriptionii, it remains an accurate, and
usable, phenomenological description. The problem with this process is that our awareness is
so close to the neurologically ordered content of our awareness that they seem to be
inseparable. But the experience of meditation makes it clear that awareness and the content of
any experience our stream of consciousness are two distinct elements. We typically
experience consciousness as in our head. But the field conception of consciousness is not, it
is out there in some indefinable space. And it is independent of our awareness to such an

extent that, theoretically, anyone can access it. What connects these two dimensions of
consciousness is, of course, our awareness.
When it comes to discussions of consciousness much confusion arises from the
different ways in which the word used. We need to be aware of the distinction between the
psychological and philosophical uses of the term. Psychologically consciousness means
being aware (as opposed to being unconscious). Philosophically consciousness refers to a
quality of being. But if consciousness is also a public or shared field then we have to reformulate this usage to say consciousness is also a transpersonal quality of being. This is a
strange conception, but it is the only one that makes sense of much otherwise anomalous
experience. We can learn to interrogate this field by learning to shift our awareness within the
broader spectrum of states that are accessible to us. In chapter one I suggested that these
states exist on a spectrum of receptiveness from intuition through empathy to non-dual
awareness. The field conception of consciousness is only improbable to the degree that we
are not capable of doing this. But if consciousness-as-a-quality-of-being has this
transpersonal dimension, rather than being restricted to the private theatre of our brains
neurochemistry, what implications does this have for our notions of selfhood?
Selfhood is the ever-present locus of all of the sensemaking and deliberations from
which our actions flow. Informed by a blend of self-interested, altruistic and ethical
judgments, our actions create new facts and new meaning. The consequences feedback into
fresh deliberations and renewed action. Our notion of selfhood acts as the anchor for this
entire chain of purposiveness. But despite its centrality to our lives, it remains difficult to
discern what, if anything, lies at its core.
Over the years we age and, hopefully, mature. Our preferences, insights and
worldview morph. As a result of our ever changing perspectives, our memories of the past are
continuously re-inscribed generating new identities for us to confront the world. And if

science is to be believed, we completely renew every single atom of our bodies every seven
years or so. What is it, then, that binds this amorphous mass of experience together?
It has been suggested that models of the self come in two basic flavoursiii. The first is the
string model wherein the self is conceived as the thread that binds the beads of experience
together. The problem with this view is that every proposal for what constitutes the string
turns out to be some variable element of experience or else an insubstantial metaphysical
entity, such as a soul. The second model is the rope model wherein the self is just a
convenient label for the overlapping and variable memories, thoughts, feelings and sensations
that make up the rope, none of which run throughout its entire length. On this view the self is
just a comforting illusion spun from the various narratives by which we define ourselves.
Either way, the ontological status of the self is precarious. And for once, many ancient
traditions appear to agree. As with all philosophical discussions, debate without the
touchstone of experience can become interminable. And reality is sufficiently complex to
throw even the most careful inquirer off the trail.
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Notes

Voegelin, Eric (1978) Anamnesis: On the Theory of History and Politics

ii

Blackmore, Susan (2002) There is no stream of consciousness Journal of Consciousness Studies, 9, 17-28

iii

Westerhoff, Jan What Are You? New Scientist, 23rd February, 2013