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thalaminc; Hypertensive
Cardiovascular
failure; Diabetes Mellitus, type II.
Disease,
not
in
compensable.http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/april2006/G.R. No.
168821.htm#_ftn10 The appellate court also noted that respondent
failed to prove that the risk of contracting these diseases is increased by
his
working
conditions.http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/april2006/G.R. No.
168821.htm#_ftn11
As
regards
pneumoniahttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/april2006/G.R. No.
168821.htm#_ftn24 and
pulmonary
tuberculosis,http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/april2006/G.R. No.
168821.htm#_ftn25 both are listed in Annex A of the Amended Rules
on Employees Compensation as occupational diseases and are deemed
compensable. As found by the appellate court, the possible cause of
these diseases may be environmental or occupational depending on the
level of sanitation of the surroundings and the health condition of the
persons he mingles with.
Respondents work entailed that he be stationed in
the Port of Manila and the South Harbor, areas whose sanitation and
overall environmental condition are suspect.
The degree of proof required under P.D. No. 626
is merely substantial evidence, which means, such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion. What the law
requires is a reasonable work-connection and not a
direct causal relation. It is enough that the
hypothesis on which the workmen's claim is based is
probable. Medical opinion to the contrary can be
disregarded especially where there is some basis in
the facts for inferring a work-connection. Probability,
not
certainty,
is
the
touchstone.http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/april2006/G.R.
No. 168821.htm#_ftn26 While claimant must adduce substantial evidence
that the risk of contracting the illness is increased by the working
conditions to which an employee is exposed to, we cannot close our eyes
to any reasonable work-related connection of the workers ailment and
his employment. Any doubt on this matter has to be interpreted in favor of
the employee, considering that P.D. No. 626 is a social
legislation.http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/april2006/G.R.
No.
168821.htm#_ftn28
injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor to the
rights of the community or society. The Court holds that there can be 2
interpretations of Sec. 1119: 1) the Mayor of the City of Manila is vested
with unregulated discretion to grant or refuse, to grant permit for the holding
of a lawful assembly or meeting, parade, or procession in the streets and
other public places of the City of Manila; and 2) The right of the Mayor is
subject to reasonable discretion to determine or specify the streets or public
places to be used with the view to prevent confusion by overlapping, to
secure convenient use of the streets and public places by others, and to
provide adequate and proper policing to minimize the risk of disorder. The
court favored the second construction since the first construction is
tantamount to authorizing the Mayor to prohibit the use of the streets. Under
our democratic system of government no such unlimited power may be
validly granted to any officer of the government, except perhaps in cases of
national emergency. It is to be noted that the permit to be issued is for the
use of public places and not for the assembly itself. The Court holds that the
assembly is lawful and thus cannot be struck down. Fear of serious injury
cannot alone justify suppression of free speech and assembly. It is the
function of speech to free men from the bondage of irrational fears. To
justify suppression of free speech there must be reasonable ground to fear
that serious evil will result if free speech is practiced. There must be
reasonable ground to believe that the danger apprehended is imminent.
There must be reasonable ground to believe that the evil to be prevented is a
serious one . The fact that speech is likely to result in some violence or in
Allinanutshelll.wordpress.com
destruction of property is not enough to justify its suppression. There must
be the probability of serious injury to the state.
PETITION IS GRANTED.
to be an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power, police power being legislative, and not
executive, in character.
In its supplement to the petition, PASEI invokes Section 3, of Article XIII, of the Constitution,
providing for worker participation "in policy and decision-making processes affecting their
rights and benefits as may be provided by law." Department Order No. 1, it is contended, was
passed in the absence of prior consultations. It is claimed, finally, to be in violation of the
Charter's non-impairment clause, in addition to the "great and irreparable injury" that PASEI
members face should the Order be further enforced.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Department Order No. 1 in nature of the police power is valid under
the Constitution?
HELD: In the light of the foregoing, the petition must be dismissed.
As a general rule, official acts enjoy a presumed validity. In the absence of clear and convincing
evidence to the contrary, the presumption logically stands.
The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested measure should be
nullified. There is no question that Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female contract
workers," but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination between the sexes. It is wellsettled that "equality before the law" under the Constitution does not import a perfect Identity
of rights among all men and women. It admits of classifications, provided that (1) such
classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2) they are germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) they are not confined to existing conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all members of
the same class.
The Court is well aware of the unhappy plight that has befallen our female labor force abroad,
especially domestic servants, amid exploitative working conditions marked by physical and
personal abuse. As precisely the caretaker of Constitutional rights, the Court is called upon to
protect victims of exploitation. In fulfilling that duty, the Court sustains the Government's
efforts.
The same, however, cannot be said of our male workers. In the first place, there is no evidence
that, except perhaps for isolated instances, our men abroad have been afflicted with an
identical predicament. Suffice it to state, then, that insofar as classifications are concerned,
this Court is content that distinctions are borne by the evidence. Discrimination in this case is
justified.
There is likewise no doubt that such a classification is germane to the purpose behind the
measure. Unquestionably, it is the avowed objective of Department Order No. 1 to "enhance
the protection for Filipino female overseas workers" this Court has no quarrel that in the midst
of the terrible mistreatment Filipina workers have suffered abroad, a ban on deployment will be
for their own good and welfare.
The Order does not narrowly apply to existing conditions. Rather, it is intended to apply
indefinitely so long as those conditions exist. This is clear from the Order itself ("Pending
review of the administrative and legal measures, in the Philippines and in the host
countries . . ."), meaning to say that should the authorities arrive at a means impressed with a
greater degree of permanency, the ban shall be lifted.
It is incorrect to say that Department Order No. 1 prescribes a total ban on overseas
deployment. From scattered provisions of the Order, it is evident that such a total ban has not
been contemplated.
The consequence the deployment ban has on the right to travel does not impair the right. The
right to travel is subject, among other things, to the requirements of "public safety," "as may
be provided by law. Neither is there merit in the contention that Department Order No. 1
constitutes an invalid exercise of legislative power. It is true that police power is the domain of
the legislature, but it does not mean that such an authority may not be lawfully delegated. As
we have mentioned, the Labor Code itself vests the Department of Labor and Employment with
rule-making powers in the enforcement whereof.
The non-impairment clause of the Constitution, invoked by the petitioner, must yield to the
loftier purposes targeted by the Government. Freedom of contract and enterprise, like all other
freedoms, is not free from restrictions, more so in this jurisdiction, where laissez faire has
never been fully accepted as a controlling economic way of life.
This Court understands the grave implications the questioned Order has on the business of
recruitment. The concern of the Government, however, is not necessarily to maintain profits of
business firms. In the ordinary sequence of events, it is profits that suffer as a result of
Government regulation. The interest of the State is to provide a decent living to its citizens.
The Government has convinced the Court in this case that this is its intent. We do not find the
impugned Order to be tainted with a grave abuse of discretion to warrant the extraordinary
relief prayed for
the higher court. It settles the view that the LAs order of reinstatement is
immediately executory and the employer has to either re-admit them to work
under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to their dismissal, or
to reinstate them in the payroll, and that fi ling to exercise the options in
the alternative, employer must pay the employees salaries. When
reinstatement pending appeal aims to avert the continuing threat or
danger to the survival or even the life of the dismissed employee and his family, it
does not contemplate the period when the employer-corporation itself is similarly in a
Judicially monitored State of being resuscitated in order to survive.
petitioner Capitol Medical Center, Inc. (Capitol) hired Dr. Cesar Meris
(Dr.
Meris),
one
of
its
stockholders,http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/sep2005/155098.h
tm#_ftn5 as in charge of its Industrial Service Unit (ISU) at a monthly
salary of P10,270.00.
Until
the
closure
of
the
ISU
on April
30,
1992,http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/sep2005/155098.htm#_ftn
6 Dr. Meris performed dual functions of providing medical services to
Capitols more than 500 employees and health workers as well as to
employees and workers of companies having retainer contracts with
it.http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/sep2005/155098.htm#_ftn7
On March 31, 1992, Dr. Meris received from Capitols
president and chairman of the board, Dr. Thelma
Navarette-Clemente (Dr. Clemente), a notice advising him
of the managements decision to close or abolish the ISU
and the consequent termination of his services as Chief
thereof, effective April 30, 1992.
Dr. Meris, doubting the reason behind the managements decision
to close the ISU and believing that the ISU was not in fact abolished as it
continued to operate and offer services to the client companies with Dr.
Clemente as its head and the notice of closure was a mere ploy for his
ouster in view of his refusal to retire despite Dr. Clementes previous
prodding
for
him
to
do
so,http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/sep2005/155098.htm#_ftn10
sought his reinstatement but it was unheeded.
Dr. Meris thus filed on September 7, 1992 a complaint against
Capitol and Dr. Clemente for illegal dismissal and reinstatement with
claims for backwages, moral and exemplary damages, plus attorneys
fees.http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/sep2005/155098.htm#_ftn1
1
Finding for Capitol and Dr. Clemente, the Labor Arbiter held that
the abolition of the ISU was a valid and lawful exercise of management
prerogatives and there was convincing evidence to show that ISU was
being operated at a loss.
On appeal by Dr. Meris, the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) modified the Labor Arbiters decision. It held
that in the exercise of Capitols management prerogatives, it had the
right to close the ISU even if it was not suffering business losses in light
of
Article
283
of
the
Labor
Code
and
jurisprudence.http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/sep2005/155098
.htm#_ftn14
And the NLRC set aside the Labor Arbiters directive for the
payment of retirement benefits to Dr. Meris because he did not retire.
Instead, it ordered the payment of separation pay as provided under
Article 283 as he was discharged due to closure of ISU, to be charged
against
the
retirement
fund.http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/sep2005/155098.htm#_ftn
15
certiorari.http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/sep2005/155098.htm
#_ftn17
The appellate court went on to hold that the ISU was not in fact
abolished, its operation and management having merely changed hands
from Dr. Meris to Dr. Clemente; and that there was a procedural lapse
in terminating the services of Dr. Meris, no written notice to the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) of the ISU abolition
having been made, thereby violating the requirement embodied in
Article
283.http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/sep2005/155098.htm#_ftn2
0
Hence, the present petition for review assigning to the appellate court
the following errors:
I
. . . IN OVERTURNING THE FACTUAL FINDINGS AND
CONCLUSIONS OF BOTH THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION (NLRC) AND THE LABOR ARBITER.
II
. . . IN HOLDING, CONTRARY TO THE FINDINGS OF BOTH THE
LABOR ARBITER AND THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, THAT THE INDUSTRIAL UNIT (ISU) WAS NOT
INCURRING LOSSES AND THAT IT WAS NOT IN FACT
ABOLISHED.
III
. . . IN NOT UPHOLDING PETITIONERS MANAGEMENT
PREROGATIVE TO ABOLISH THE INDUSTRIAL SERVICE UNIT
(ISU).
IV
. . . IN REQUIRING PETITIONERS TO PAY RESPONDENT
BACKWAGES AS WELL AS DAMAGES AND ATTORNEYS
FEES.http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/sep2005/1550
98.htm#_ftn23
Capitol further argues that the appellate courts conclusion that the
ISU was not incurring losses is arbitrary as it was based solely on the
supposed increase in revenues of the unit from 1989-1991, without taking
into account the Analysis of Income and Expenses of ISU from July 1,
1990 to July 1, 1991 which shows that the unit operated at a loss; and the
trend resulted in losses in the operation of the ISU.
Besides, Capitol stresses, the health care needs of the hospital
employees had been taken over by other units without added expense to
it;http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/sep2005/155098.htm#_ftn32 t
he appellate courts decision is at best an undue interference with, and
curtailment of, the exercise by an employer of its management prerogatives;
at the time of the closure of the ISU, Dr. Meris was already eligible for
retirement under the Capitols retirement plan; and the appellate court
adverted to the alleged lack of notice to the DOLE regarding Dr. Meriss
dismissal but the latter never raised such issue in his appeal to the NLRC or
even in his petition for review before the Court of Appeals, hence, the latter
did
not
have
authority
to
pass
on
the
matter.http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/sep2005/155098.htm#_ft
n34
It would indeed be stretching the intent and spirit of the law if a court
were to unjustly interfere in managements prerogative to close or cease its
business operations just because said business operation or undertaking is
not
suffering
from
any
loss.http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/sep2005/155098.htm#_ftn3
7 As long as the companys exercise of the same is in good faith to advance
its interest and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the
In the case at bar, Capitol failed to sufficiently prove its good faith
in closing the ISU.
47 Dr. Meris is thus entitled to payment of separation pay at the rate of one
(1) month salary for every year of his employment, with a fraction of at least
six
(6)
months
being
considered
as
one(1)
year,http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/sep2005/155098.htm#_ftn
and full backwages from the time of his dismissal from April 30, 1992
until the expiration of his term as Chief of ISU or his mandatory retirement,
whichever comes first.
48
The
award
by
the
appellate
court
of
moral
damages,http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/sep2005/155098.htm
#_ftn49 however, cannot be sustained, solely upon the premise that the
employer fired his employee without just cause or due process.
Additional facts must be pleaded and proven to warrant the grant of
moral damages under the Civil Code, such as that the act of dismissal
was attended by bad faith or fraud, or was oppressive to labor, or done
in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy; and of
course, that social humiliation, wounded feelings, grave anxiety, etc.,
resulted
therefrom.http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/sep2005/155098.htm
#_ftn50 Such circumstances, however, do not obtain in the instant case.
More specifically on bad faith, lack of it is mirrored in Dr. Clementes
offer to Dr. Meris to be a consultant of Capitol, despite the abolition of
the ISU.
The
award
for
attorneys
fees,
however,
remains.http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/sep2005/155098.htm#_
ftn52
(NLRC) which modified the decision of the Labor Arbiter by directing the
reinstatement of private respondent
Antonio D. Estrada, the complainant, without loss of seniority rights and benefits.
FACTS
- Private respondent NAFLU, a co-complainant in the labor case, is a labor union of
which complainant is a
member.
- Complainant was first employed by Brew Master on 16 September 1991 as route
helper with the latest daily wage
of P119.00.
- From 19 April 1993 up to 19 May 1993, for a period of 1 month, complainant went
on absent without permission
(AWOP).
- On 20 May 1993, Brew master sent him a Memo: Please explain in writing within 24
hours of your receipt of this
memo why no disciplinary action should be taken against you for the following
offense: You were absent since
April 19, 1993 up to May 19, 1993.
- In answer to the aforesaid memo, complainant explained:
Sa dahilan po na ako ay hindi nakapagpaalam sainyo dahil inuwi ko ang mga anak
ko sa Samar dahil ang asawa ko
ay lumayas at walang mag-aalaga sa mga anak ko. Kaya naman hindi ako naka long
distance or telegrama dahil
wala akong pera at ibinili ko ng gamot ay puro utang pa.
- Finding said explanation unsatisfactory, the company issued a Notice of
Termination: ...we regret to inform you
that we do not consider it valid. You are aware of the company Rules and Regulations
that absence without
permission for 6 consecutive working days is considered abandonment of work...
- Complainants contend that individual complainants dismissal was done without just
cause; that it was not
sufficiently established that individual complainants absence from April 19, 1993 to
June 16, 1993 are unjustified;
that the penalty of dismissal for such violation is too severe; that in imposing such
penalty, respondent should have
taken into consideration complainants length of service and as a first offender, a
penalty less punitive will suffice
such as suspension for a definite period.
- Upon the other hand, respondent contends that individual complainant was
dismissed for cause allowed by the
company Rules and Regulations and the Labor Code; that the act of complainant in
absenting from work for 1
month without official leave is deleterious to the business of respondent; that it will
result to stoppage of production
which will not only destructive to respondents interests but also to the interest of its
employees in general; that the
dismissal of complainant from the service is legal.
- The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of merit, citing the principle of
managerial control, which
recognizes the employers prerogative to prescribe reasonable rules and regulations
to govern the conduct of his
employees. He relied on Shoemart, Inc. vs. NLRC: ...that individual complainant has
indeed abandoned his work...
therefore, under the law and jurisprudence which upholds the right of an employer to
discharge an employee who
incurs frequent, prolonged and unexplained absences as being grossly remiss in his
duties to the employer and is
therefore, dismissed for cause. An employee is deemed to have abandoned his
position or to have resigned from the
same, whenever he has been absent therefrom without previous permission of the
employer for three consecutive
days or more.
- the NLRC modified the Labor Arbiter's decision and held that complainants
dismissal was invalid for the
following reasons:
Complainant-appellants prolonged absences, although unauthorized, may not
amount to gross neglect or
abandonment of work to warrant outright termination of employment. Dismissal is
too severe a penalty...Reliance
on the ruling enunciated in the cited case of Shoemart is quite misplaced because of
the obvious dissimilarities-complainant in the Shoemart Case was an inveterate absentee who does not
deserve reinstatement compared to
herein complainant-appellant who is a first offender
ISSUE
WON the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in modifying the decision of the
Labor Arbiter
HELD
NO
Ratio a) Petitioners finding that complainant was guilty of abandonment is
misplaced. Abandonment as a just and
valid ground for dismissal requires the deliberate, unjustified refusal of the employee
to resume his employment.
Two elements must then be satisfied: (1) the failure to report for work or absence
without valid or justifiable reason;
and (2) a clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship.
b) Verily, relations between capital and labor are not merely contractual. They are
impressed with public interest
and labor contracts must, perforce, yield to the common good.
While the employer is not precluded from prescribing rules and regulations to govern
the conduct of his employees,
these rules and their implementation must be fair, just and reasonable.
Reasoning
- complainants absence was precipitated by a grave family problem as his wife
unexpectedly deserted him and
abandoned the family. Considering that he had a full-time job, there was no one to
whom he could entrust the
children and he was thus compelled to bring them to the province. He was then
under emotional, psychological,
spiritual and physical stress and strain. The reason for his absence is, under these
circumstances, justified. While
his failure to inform and seek petitioner's approval was an omission which must be
corrected and chastised, he did
not merit the severest penalty of dismissal from the service.
- the elements of abandonment are not present here. First, as held above,
complainant's absence was justified under
the circumstances. As to the second requisite, complainant immediately complied
with the memo requiring him to
explain his absence, and upon knowledge of his termination, immediately sued for
illegal dismissal. These plainly
Mabeza vs NLRC
ON SEPTEMBER 26, 2011
Abandonment is not present. Mabeza returned several times to inquire about the status of her work or her
employment status. She even asked for a leave but was not granted. Her asking for leave is a clear
indication that she has no intention to abandon her work with the hotel. Even the employer knows that his
purported reason of dismissing her due to abandonment will not fly so he amended his reply to indicate
that it is actually loss of confidence that led to Mabezas dismissal.
Loss of Confidence
It is true that loss of confidence is a valid ground to dismiss an employee. But this is ideally only applied to
workers whose positions require a certain level or degree of trust particularly those who are members of
the managerial staff. Evidently, an ordinary chambermaid who has to sign out for linen and other hotel
property from the property custodian each day and who has to account for each and every towel or
bedsheet utilized by the hotels guests at the end of her shift would not fall under any of these two classes
of employees for which loss of confidence, if ably supported by evidence, would normally apply. Further,
the suspicious filing by Peter Ng of a criminal case against Mabeza long after she initiated her labor
complaint against him hardly warrants serious consideration of loss of confidence as a ground of Mabezas
dismissal.
collective bargaining
representative of all faculty
members of the school contested
the difference in salary rates
between foreign hires and local
hires. This issues as well as the
question of including the foreign
hires in the bargaining unit caused
a deadlock between the parties.
The petitioner filed a notice of
strike. The DOLE assumed
jurisdiction over the dispute for
failure of the NCMB (National
Conciliation and Mediation Board)
to bring the parties to a
compromise. The DOLE acting
secretary Trajano issued an order
resolving the parity representation
issues in favor of the School. Then
DOLE Secretary Quisumbing denied
petitioners motion for
reconsideration. Petitioner seeks a
relief in SC.
The petitioner claims that the
point-of-hire classification
employed by the School is
discriminatory to Filipinos and that
the grant of higher salaries to
foreign-hires constitutes racial
discrimination. The acting
secretary upheld the said
classification and the principle of
equal pay for equal work is not
applicable in this case. This is
because, the existence of a system
of salaries and benefits accorded to
foreign hired personnel is
universally recognized. Also foreign
hires have limited contract as
compared to local hires who enjoy
security of tenure. Also, it was
stipulated in the 1992-1995 CBA
that both parties recognize the
difference in the status of 2 types
of employess, hence the difference
in their salaries ( that the
superintendent of the school has
the discretion to recruit and hire
expatriate teachers and that the
25% differential is reflective of the
Tirazona v PET
Facts:
Tirazona, being the Administrative Manager of Philippine EDS
Techno-Service, Inc. (PET), was a managerial employee who held a position
of trust and confidence was dismissed because of lack of confidence of the
employer.
The Labor Arbiter and NLRC favored the employer.
Issue:
Is the petitioner entitled to back pay wages?
Held:
No. Tirazona was not just gracelessly expelled or simply
terminated from the company on 22 April 2002. She was found to have
violated the trust and confidence reposed in her by her employer when she
arrogantly and unreasonably demanded from PET and its officers/directors
the exorbitant amount of P2,000,000.00 in damages, coupled with a threat of
a lawsuit if the same was not promptly paid within five days. This
unwarranted imposition on PET and its officers/directors was made after the
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Facts:
The Labor Arbiter directed the respondent to reinstate them to their former
position without loss of seniority rights and other benefits, but without back
wages .
The NLRC ordered the respondent to pay the complainants their separation
pay.
The petitioners appealed to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Is the driver entitled to separation pay instead of reinstatement?
Issue:
The award of separation pay cannot be justified solely because of the
existence of "strained relations" between the employer and the employee. It
Held:
The particular facts of this case preclude application of the "first in, last out" rule in the
retrenchment of employees. There was no discrimination against the petitioners. NASECO could not compel
the PNB to take the petitioners back to their former positions in view of its contractual right to reject any
employee of NASECO for inefficiency and other valid reasons. The PNB had already filled the vacated
positions of the petitioners during the strike, to ensure the continued operation of its business.
The constitutional policy of providing full protection to labor is not intended to oppress or destroy
management. The employer cannot be compelled to retain employees it no longer needs, to be paid for
work unreasonably refused and not actually performed. NASECO bent over backward and exerted every
effort to help the petitioners look for other work, postponed the effective date of their separation, and offered
them a generous termination pay package. The unflagging commitment of this Court to the cause of labor
will not prevent us from sustaining the employer when it is in the right, as in this case.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC are AFFIRMED.
vs.
NATIONAL
LABOR
Issue:
Whether NLRC is correct?
Held:
Yes. The failure of petitioners to report to management the aforementioned
irregularities constitute fraud or willful breach of the trust reposed in them by
their employer or duly authorized representative one of the just causes in
terminating employment as provided for by paragraph (c), Article 282 of the
Labor Code, as amended.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the National Labor Relations
Commission in is hereby AFFIRMED.
Justice policy mandates a compassionate attitude toward the working class in its relation
to management. In calling for the protection to labor, the Constitution does not condone
wrongdoing by the employee, it nevertheless urges a moderation of the sanctions that
may be applied to him in the light of the many disadvantages that weigh heavily on him
like an albatross on his neck.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari under consideration is hereby DISMISSED.
VIRGILIO CALLANTA
vs.
CARNATION PHILIPPINES, INC.,
FERNAN, J.:
Facts:
Petitioner Virgilio Callanta was employed by private respondent Carnation
Philippines, Inc. in January 1974 as a salesman in the Agusan del Sur area. Five
years later respondent Carnation filed with the Regional Office No. X of the
Ministry of Labor and Employment [MOLE], an application for clearance to
terminate the employment of Virgilio Callanta on the alleged grounds of serious
misconduct and misappropriation of company funds amounting to P12,000.00,
more or less. Callanta was terminated.
Callanta filed with the MOLE, Regional Office No. X, a complaint for
illegal dismissal. In its position paper dated October 5, 1982, respondent
Carnation put in issue the timeliness of petitioner's complaint alleging that the
same is barred by prescription for having been filed more than three [3] years
after the date of Callanta's dismissal.
Issue:
Whether or not an action for illegal dismissal prescribes in three [3] years
pursuant to Articles 291 and 292 of the Labor Code.
Held:
The action for illegal dismissal was filed by petitioners on July 5, 1982, or three
[3] years, one [1] month and five [5] days after the alleged effectivity date of his
dismissal on June 1, 1979 which is well within the four [4]-year prescriptive
period under Article 1146 of the New Civil Code.
notwithstanding the fact that the Canlubang Worker's Union (CLO) or its
members are not party to the case and were not given the opportunity to answer
and defend the charges against them or to be heard in connection therewith, the
members of said motion were likewise ordered to return to work and to desist
from exercising their right to picket.
The Court of the Industrial Relations answered, alleging that it has the
authority and jurisdiction to issue the order of February 21, 1947, by virtue of the
provisions of section 19 of the Commonwealth Act No. 103; that said jurisdiction
is merely incident to the jurisdiction acquired by the court in case No. 44-V, Bisig
ng Canlubang vs. Canlubang Sugar Estate
Issue:
Whether the NLRC has the jurisdiction to prohibit the strike.
Held:.net
The prohibition should be understood to cover only illegal picketing, that is,
picketing through the use of illegal means. Peaceful picketing cannot be
prohibited. It is part of the freedom of speech guaranteed by the Constitution.
Therefore, the order of the Court of Industrial Relations prohibiting picketing must
be understood to refer only to illegal picketing, that is, picketing through the use
of illegal means.
For all the foregoing, the petitioner is dismissed.