Está en la página 1de 41

Calalang vs.

Williams Facts: The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution


of 17 July 1940, resolved to recommend to the Director of Public Works and to
the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn
vehicles be prohibited from passing along Rosario Street extending from Plaza
Calderon de la Barca to Dasmarias Street, from 7:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. and
from 1:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m.; and along Rizal Avenue extending from the
railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague Street, from 7 a.m. to 11 p.m.,
from a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge
to traffic. The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission, on 18 July 1940,
recommended to the Director of Public Works the adoption of the measure
proposed in the resolution, in pursuance of the provisions of Commonwealth
Act 548, which authorizes said Director of Public Works, with the approval of
the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to promulgate rules and
regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on national roads. On
2 August 1940, the Director of Public Works, in his first indorsement to the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications, recommended to the latter
the approval of the recommendation made by the Chairman of the National
Traffic Commission, with the modification that the closing of Rizal Avenue to
traffic to animal-drawn vehicles be limited to the portion thereof extending
from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Azcarraga Street. On 10
August 1940, the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, in his
second indorsement addressed to the Director of Public Works, approved the
recommendation of the latter that Rosario Street and Rizal Avenue be closed
to traffic of animal-drawn vehicles, between the points and during the hours
as indicated, for a period of 1 year from the date of the opening of the
Colgante Bridge to traffic. The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police
of Manila have enforced and caused to be enforced the rules and regulations
thus adopted. Maximo Calalang, in his capacity as a private citizen and as a
taxpayer of Manila, brought before the Supreme court the petition for a writ
of prohibition against A. D. Williams, as Chairman of the National Traffic
Commission; Vicente Fragante, as Director of Public Works; Sergio Bayan, as
Acting Secretary of Public Works and Communications; Eulogio Rodriguez, as
Mayor of the City of Manila; and Juan Dominguez, as Acting Chief of Police of
Manila.
Issue: Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the Director of
Public Works infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion
of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the
people.
W/N there is an undue delegation of legislative power?

Held: There is no undue delegation of legislative power. Commonwealth Act


548 does not confer legislative powers to the Director of Public Works. The
authority conferred upon them and under which they promulgated the rules
and regulations now complained of is not to determine what public policy
demands but merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by the
National Assembly in said Act, to wit, to promote safe transit upon and avoid
obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national roads by acts of the
National Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the Philippines
and to close them temporarily to any or all
classes of traffic whenever the condition of the road or the traffic makes
such action necessary or advisable in the public convenience and interest.
The delegated power, if at all, therefore, is not the determination of what the
law shall be, but merely the ascertainment of the facts and circumstances
upon which the application of said law is to be predicated. To promulgate
rules and regulations on the use of national roads and to determine when and
how long a national road should be closed to traffic, in view of the condition
of the road or the traffic thereon and the requirements of public convenience
and interest, is an administrative function which cannot be directly
discharged by the National Assembly.
The promotion of social justice is to be achieved not through a mistaken
sympathy towards any given group. Social justice is "neither communism, nor
despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the humanization of laws and the
equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its
rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated.
Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the
adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic
stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of
a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members
of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally
justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers
underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principle of
salus populi est suprema lex. Social justice, therefore, must be founded on
the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers and
diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and
evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic
life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of
promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about
"the greatest good to the greatest number."

Garupa vs. ECC

Petitioner Rhoda Castor-Garupa joined the government service on 1


January
1979 as
Resident
Physician
at
the BayawanDistrict Hospital which has a fifty-bed capacity located
at Zamora Street, Bagawan City, Negros Oriental. On 1 January 1990, she
was promoted to Medical Officer III.[4]
Sometime in 1994, petitioner started to experience high blood
pressure and started to take medicines by way of self-medication with
the help of her husband, Dr. Patrocino G. Garupa.[5] In December 1998,
she started to suffer from extreme fatigue and lost her appetite causing
her to lose weight. Fearing that petitioner might be suffering from a
more severe disease, her husband brought her to Cebu City where she
was confined at the Chong Hua Hospital from 1 to 8 February
1999. Petitioner was initially diagnosed with Chronic Renal Failure
secondary to Intrinsic Renal Disease.[6] As a result, she
underwent hemodialysis twice a week.[7] She was transferred to the
National Kidney and Transplant Institute (NKTI) where she was
confined from 9 to 18 March 1999. The diagnosis was End Stage Renal
Disease secondary to Chronic Glomerulonephritis. On 11 March 1999,
she underwent a kidney transplant with her brother as donor.[8]
On 16 September 1999, petitioner filed with respondent
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) a claim for compensation
benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, otherwise
known as the Employees Compensation Act.[9]
In a letter dated 4 October 1999, respondent GSIS denied the claim
in this wise:
Please be informed that the same cannot be given due course on
the
ground
that
Chronic
Renal
Failure
and
ChronicGlomerulonephritis are not among those diseases listed
under Annex A of PD 626, as amended.
Section 1(b), Rule III of PD 626, as amended, is explicit in its
requirements for compensability, to wit:

For the sickness and the resulting disability


to be compensable, the sickness must be the result
of an occupational disease listed under Annex A
of these Rules with the conditions set therein
satisfied, otherwise, proof must be shown that the
risk of contracting the disease is increased by the
working conditions.

Petitioner filed a letter for reconsideration [11] but respondent GSIS


treated the same as an appeal and forwarded the records of the case to
respondent ECC.[12]
The appeal was docketed as ECC Case No. MG-11703800. In its decision dated 6 April 2001, respondent ECC
affirmed respondent GSISs finding of non-compensability
of petitioners disease and denied the appealed claim.
Glomerulonephritis is not an occupational disease considering her
employment as a Resident Physician. She must, therefore, prove that
her ailment was caused by her employment or that her working
conditions increased the risk of contracting her ailment.
the appellant makes no allegations of essential facts that caused her
disease and how and why her working conditions increased the risk of
contracting said disease, nor was any evidence submitted by appellant
to substantiate and support her claim for benefits under PD 626, as
amended. Specifically, she failed to allege in her claim as to how her
employment caused her to contractGlomerulonephritis.

Aggrieved, petitioner, pursuant to Rule 43 of the Revised Rules


of Court, filed her petition for review with the Court of Appeals raising
as the sole issue the compensability of chronic glomerulonephritis under
Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended.[14] In its decision[15] dated 17
December 2002, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and
affirmed in toto the decision of respondent ECC. The motion for
reconsideration[16] filed by petitioner was denied in a resolution dated 12
May 2003.[17] Hence, this instant petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioner reiterates the sole issue of whether or not her disease, End
Stage Renal Disease secondary to ChronicGlomerulonephritis, is
compensable under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended. She argues
that (1) she was afflicted with the disease during her employment with

the Bayawan District Hospital; (2) there is substantial evidence to


sustain that her employment increased the risk of contracting the
disease; and (3) the law requires merely substantial proof of the risk of
contraction and not proof of the actual or direct causation of the
disease.
In proving risk of contraction, petitioner asserts that only
substantial or reasonable proof, not actual or direct causation of the
disease between the work and the ailment, is required since probability
and not certainty is the touchstone.
The Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner failed to demonstrate
how her working conditions caused her disease and that she did not
attempt to show any evidence that would support her claim for
benefits. It added that since petitioner failed to introduce evidence that
would support her position, she cannot rely on the Increased Risk
Theory.
We find merit in the petition.
Under Section 1(b) of Rule III of the Amended Rules on
Employees Compensation, for the sickness and the resulting disability
or death to be compensable, the sickness must be the result of an
occupational disease listed under Annex A of these Rules with the
conditions set therein satisfied; otherwise, proof must be shown that the
risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working
conditions. Petitioner was diagnosed as having End Stage Renal Disease
secondary to Chronic Glomerulonephritis. Admittedly, said disease is
not one of those enumerated as an Occupational Disease under Annex
A of the ECC Rules. This fact, however, will not prevent petitioners
claim from being granted as long as she can show that the risk of
contracting said ailment was increased by her working conditions.
For the increased risk theory to apply in compensation cases, the
claimant must adduce reasonable proof between his work and the cause
of the disease, or that the risk of contracting the disease was increased
by the claimants working conditions.[23] Strict rules of evidence are not
applicable in claims for compensation.[24] The degree of proof required under

Presidential Decree No. 626 is merely substantial evidence, which means


such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion. What the law requires is a reasonable workconnection and not a direct causal relation.[25] It is sufficient that the
hypothesis on which the workmens claim is based is probable since
probability, not certainty, is the touchstone.[26]
Petitioner is a practicing doctor in a public rural hospital from 1
January 1979 until she underwent a kidney transplant on 11 March
1999. As a doctor who was in direct contact with patients, she was more
exposed to all kinds of germs and bacteria, thus increasing the risk of
contracting glomerulonephritis. Given the nature of her work, and
considering further that resident physicians work for extended hours,
the likelihood of petitioner being infected by the streptococcus
bacterium is, without a doubt, increased. We thus find that the
probability of petitioner contracting chronic glomerulonephritis in her
workstation has been substantiated.
Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, is said to have
abandoned the presumption of compensability and the theory of
aggravation prevalent under the Workmens Compensation
Act. Despite such abandonment, however, the present law has not
ceased to be an employees compensation law or a social legislation;
hence, the liberality of the law in favor of the working man and woman
still prevails, and the official agency charged by law to implement the
constitutional guarantee of social justice should adopt a liberal attitude
in favor of the employee in deciding claims for compensability,
especially in light of the compassionate policy towards labor which the
1987 Constitution vivifies and enhances.[27]
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is GRANTED. The decision of the
Court of Appeals dated 17 December 2002 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.

GSIS vs. valenciano

The [respondent], Jaime Valenciano, started his career in government


on November 8, 1977 as Clerk II of the Philippine Ports Authority
(PPA), South Harbor, Port Area, Manila. He was promoted to Clerk
B, Traffic Systems Implementation Specialist, Terminal Operations
Officer, Terminal Operations Officer A, and, finally, as Senior
Terminal Operations Officer in 1993.
A Medical Certificate from the University of Santo Tomas
Hospital (UST), Espana, Manila dated April 12, 1984 reveals that the
[respondent], a chain smoker since age twenty (20), was admitted at
the said hospital on February 27, 1984 where he was diagnosed to be
suffering from Coronary Artery Disease.
Sometime in 1986, it was discovered that the appellant was
suffering from Diabetes. His Physical and Medical Examination
Record shows that sometime in 1988, the [respondent] experienced
insomnia
and
sudden
loss
of
appetite
accompanied
by dyspnea (shortness of breathing), cough with whitish phlegm, and
chest pain. Despite medications, no improvement was noted and he
soon complained of lumbar pain, hoarseness of voice and itchiness of
throat. He was diagnosed to be suffering from Hypertension. His
blood pressure reading then was noted to be at 150/100 mmHg to
160/100 mmHg.
On March 8, 1999, the [respondent] was confined at Medical
Center Manila, Ermita, Manila due to cough, fever and hemoptysis (the
coughing out of blood) where his ailment was diagnosed as Pulmonary
Tuberculosis III.
Sometime in April, 2001, the [respondent] felt chest
pain. Immediate consultative diagnosis taken at The Doctors
Hospital, Bacolod Cityfound him to be suffering from Bronchial Asthma,
Chronic Intermittent; Infero Lateral Wall, Non ST elevation
Myocardial Infarction; Dyslipidemia. His medical records show that
starting April, 2001, he frequently went on sick leave due to his
ailments. From May to December, 2001, he was hospitalized for several
times at the Manila Doctors Hospital, United Nations Ave., Manila. His
ailment was diagnosed as Ischemic Heart Disease; Non-Insulin
Dependent Diabetes Mellitus; Dyslipidemia.
On November 28, 2001, the [respondent] was admitted at the
Manila Doctors Hospital due to cough with phlegm. His attending
physician diagnosed his ailment as Pneumonia, moderate risk
resolved; Cerebrovascular
Disease (CVD),
bleed,
left

thalaminc; Hypertensive
Cardiovascular
failure; Diabetes Mellitus, type II.

Disease,

not

in

When the [respondents] chest was subjected to x-ray on October


17, 2002 at New World Laboratory, Quezon City, it was found out that his
heart was suffering from Lateral Wall Ischemia; Left Atrial
Enlargement.http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/april20
06/G.R. No. 168821.htm#_ftn4

Respondent filed with petitioner Government Service Insurance


System (GSIS), a claim for compensation benefits under PD No.
626. However, petitioner denied the respondents claim on the ground
that the ailments, Hypertension, Cerebrovascular Accident (CVA),
Diabetes Mellitus type II are not considered occupational diseases;
neither is there any showing that his duties have increased the risk of
contracting
said
ailments.http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/april2006/G.R.
No.
168821.htm#_ftn5

Respondents appeal to the ECC was dismissed for lack of


merithttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/april2006/G.R.
No.
168821.htm#_ftn6 on
the
grounds
that
hypertension,http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/april2006/G.R. No.
168821.htm#_ftn7 pneumonia
and
pulmonary
tuberculosishttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/april2006/G.R. No.
168821.htm#_ftn8 are mere complications of his primary ailment,
diabetes mellitus, which is not an occupational disease hence, not
compensable. Even if cerebrovascular accident is an occupational
disease under Annex A of the Amended Rules on Employees
Compensation, the ECC held that its compensability requires
compliance with all the conditions set forth in the rules which
respondent
failed
to
show.http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/april2006/G.R.
No.
168821.htm#_ftn9

On petition for review, the Court of Appeals upheld the ruling of


the ECC that diseases, such as Ischemic Heart Disease, Coronary Artery
Disease, Myocardial Infarction, Bronchial Asthma, dyspnea and
dyslipidemia, are complications of diabetes mellitus, which is not workconnected
hence
not

compensable.http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/april2006/G.R. No.
168821.htm#_ftn10 The appellate court also noted that respondent
failed to prove that the risk of contracting these diseases is increased by
his
working
conditions.http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/april2006/G.R. No.
168821.htm#_ftn11

The appellate court however disagreed with the findings of the


ECC that pneumonia, pulmonary tuberculosis and hypertension are
solely caused and directly connected with respondents diabetes mellitus
and that the cerebrovascular accident (stroke) he sustained did not
sufficiently comply with the requirements of the Amended Rules on
Employees Compensation thereby justifying the dismissal of his
claim.http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/april2006/G.R.
No.
168821.htm#_ftn12 According
to
the
appellate
tribunal, pneumonia and pulmonary tuberculosis are respiratory diseases
which may be caused by the environment or occupation depending on
the
level
of
sanitation
of
the
surroundings.http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/april2006/G.R.
No. 168821.htm#_ftn13 In the course of his employment, respondent was
stationed in the Port of Manila which is located in an area where
sanitation
is
questionable.http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/april2006/G.R. No.
168821.htm#_ftn14 His work required him to mingle with people from
different
walks
of
life.http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/april2006/G.R.
No.
168821.htm#_ftn15 His job also demanded a lot of mental work thereby
making him susceptible to stress and fatigue that could weaken his
resistance and cause hypertension which in turn could trigger a
cerebrovascular
accident
or
stroke.http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/april2006/G.R.
No.
168821.htm#_ftn16

The Court of Appeals thus held that respondent is entitled to claim


compensation
benefits
because pneumonia,
pulmonary
tuberculosis and hypertension are among the occupational diseases listed in
Annex A of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation.
In the instant petition for review, petitioner insists
that hypertension is a complication of respondents diabetes mellitus

which has been found to be non-work connected; as such, respondent


could not validly claim compensation benefits under this
disease.http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/april2006/G.R.
No.
168821.htm#_ftn17 It asserts that medical science has proven that
diabetics are vulnerable to various infections and that pneumonia is
common
among
them.http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/april2006/G.R.
No.
168821.htm#_ftn18 As
regards
respondents pulmonary
tuberculosis, petitioner alleges that respondent suffered the same way
back in 1999 and that his medical records show that he is no longer
afflicted
with
the
disease.http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/april2006/G.R.
No.
168821.htm#_ftn19

Respondent, on the other hand, argues that hypertension,


pneumonia and pulmonary tuberculosis are not caused by diabetes
mellitus alone but also by other environmental and occupational
factors.http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/april2006/G.R.
No.
168821.htm#_ftn20 He alleges that his work entailed a lot of analysis,
appraisals, review, audit and research which may have caused him to
suffer cerebrovascular
accident and pneumonia.http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/april2
006/G.R. No. 168821.htm#_ftn21

The issue before us is whether respondents hypertension,


pneumonia or pulmonary tuberculosis is compensable under the
Employees Compensation Act.
We affirm the Court of Appeals ruling with modification.
Section 1 (b), Rule III of the Rules Implementing PD No. 626, as
amended, states that for the sickness and the resulting disability or
death to be compensable, the same must be the result of an occupational
disease listed under Annex A with the conditions set therein satisfied;
otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of contracting the disease
is increased by the working conditions.
We find that respondents hypertension is a complication of
his primary ailment which is diabetes mellitus, a nonoccupational disease, hence not compensable.

As
regards
pneumoniahttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/april2006/G.R. No.
168821.htm#_ftn24 and
pulmonary
tuberculosis,http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/april2006/G.R. No.
168821.htm#_ftn25 both are listed in Annex A of the Amended Rules
on Employees Compensation as occupational diseases and are deemed
compensable. As found by the appellate court, the possible cause of
these diseases may be environmental or occupational depending on the
level of sanitation of the surroundings and the health condition of the
persons he mingles with.
Respondents work entailed that he be stationed in
the Port of Manila and the South Harbor, areas whose sanitation and
overall environmental condition are suspect.
The degree of proof required under P.D. No. 626
is merely substantial evidence, which means, such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion. What the law
requires is a reasonable work-connection and not a
direct causal relation. It is enough that the
hypothesis on which the workmen's claim is based is
probable. Medical opinion to the contrary can be
disregarded especially where there is some basis in
the facts for inferring a work-connection. Probability,
not
certainty,
is
the
touchstone.http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/april2006/G.R.
No. 168821.htm#_ftn26 While claimant must adduce substantial evidence
that the risk of contracting the illness is increased by the working
conditions to which an employee is exposed to, we cannot close our eyes
to any reasonable work-related connection of the workers ailment and
his employment. Any doubt on this matter has to be interpreted in favor of
the employee, considering that P.D. No. 626 is a social
legislation.http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/april2006/G.R.
No.
168821.htm#_ftn28

P.D. No. 626, as amended, is said to have abandoned the


presumption of compensability and the theory of aggravation prevalent
under the Workmens Compensation Act.

WHEREFORE, the July 7, 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeals in


CA-G.R. SP No. 78511 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that
respondent Jaime A. Valencianos hypertension is held to be directly
connected to his primary ailment, diabetes mellitus, and therefore noncompensable. However, Jaime A. Valenciano is DECLARED entitled to
claim for benefits for his compensable diseases, namely pneumonia and
pulmonary tuberculosis. The Government Service Insurance System
isDIRECTED to pay respondents claim under the Employees
Compensation Act.

Primicias vs. Fugoso [L-18000. Jan 27, 1948]


Doctrine: Clear and Present Danger Test, Freedom of Assembly and
Expression
FACTS: This case is an action of mandamus instituted by petitioner Cipriano
Primicias, manager of the Coalesced Minority Parties, against respondent
Manila City Mayor, Valeriano Fugoso, to compel the latter to issue a permit
for the holding of a public meeting at the Plaza Miranda on Nov 16, 1947.
The petitioner requested for a permit to hold a peaceful public meeting.
However, the respondent refused to issue such permit because he found that
there is a reasonable ground to believe, basing upon previous utterances and
upon the fact that passions, specially on the part of the losing groups,
remains bitter and high, that similar speeches will be delivered tending to
undermine the faith and confidence of the people in their government, and in
the duly peace and a disruption of public order. Respondent based his
refusal to the Revised Ordinances of 1927 prohibiting as an offense against
public peace, and penalizes as a misdemeanor, "any act, in any public place,
meeting, or procession, tending to disturb the peace or excite a riot; or
collect with other persons in a body or crowd for any unlawful purpose; or
disturb or disquiet any congregation engaged in any lawful assembly."
Included herein is Sec. 1119, Free use of Public Place. ISSUE: Whether or
not the Mayor has the right to refuse to issue permit hence violating freedom
of assembly.
HELD: The answer is negative. Supreme Court states that the freedom of
speech, and to peacefully assemble and petition the government for redress
of grievances, are fundamental personal rights of the people recognized and
guaranteed by the constitution. However, these rights are not absolute. They
can be regulated under the states police power that they should not be

injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor to the
rights of the community or society. The Court holds that there can be 2
interpretations of Sec. 1119: 1) the Mayor of the City of Manila is vested
with unregulated discretion to grant or refuse, to grant permit for the holding
of a lawful assembly or meeting, parade, or procession in the streets and
other public places of the City of Manila; and 2) The right of the Mayor is
subject to reasonable discretion to determine or specify the streets or public
places to be used with the view to prevent confusion by overlapping, to
secure convenient use of the streets and public places by others, and to
provide adequate and proper policing to minimize the risk of disorder. The
court favored the second construction since the first construction is
tantamount to authorizing the Mayor to prohibit the use of the streets. Under
our democratic system of government no such unlimited power may be
validly granted to any officer of the government, except perhaps in cases of
national emergency. It is to be noted that the permit to be issued is for the
use of public places and not for the assembly itself. The Court holds that the
assembly is lawful and thus cannot be struck down. Fear of serious injury
cannot alone justify suppression of free speech and assembly. It is the
function of speech to free men from the bondage of irrational fears. To
justify suppression of free speech there must be reasonable ground to fear
that serious evil will result if free speech is practiced. There must be
reasonable ground to believe that the danger apprehended is imminent.
There must be reasonable ground to believe that the evil to be prevented is a
serious one . The fact that speech is likely to result in some violence or in
Allinanutshelll.wordpress.com
destruction of property is not enough to justify its suppression. There must
be the probability of serious injury to the state.
PETITION IS GRANTED.

PASEI vs Drilon Case Digest


PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS VS. DRILON
G.R. NO. L-81958
JUNE 30, 1988
FACTS: The Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI) challenges the
Constitutional validity of Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, of the Department of Labor
and Employment, in the character of "GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION
OF DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD WORKERS," in this petition for
certiorari and prohibition. Specifically, the measure is assailed for "discrimination against
males or females;" that it "does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers
and females with similar skills;" and that it is violative of the right to travel. It is held likewise

to be an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power, police power being legislative, and not
executive, in character.
In its supplement to the petition, PASEI invokes Section 3, of Article XIII, of the Constitution,
providing for worker participation "in policy and decision-making processes affecting their
rights and benefits as may be provided by law." Department Order No. 1, it is contended, was
passed in the absence of prior consultations. It is claimed, finally, to be in violation of the
Charter's non-impairment clause, in addition to the "great and irreparable injury" that PASEI
members face should the Order be further enforced.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Department Order No. 1 in nature of the police power is valid under
the Constitution?
HELD: In the light of the foregoing, the petition must be dismissed.
As a general rule, official acts enjoy a presumed validity. In the absence of clear and convincing
evidence to the contrary, the presumption logically stands.
The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested measure should be
nullified. There is no question that Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female contract
workers," but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination between the sexes. It is wellsettled that "equality before the law" under the Constitution does not import a perfect Identity
of rights among all men and women. It admits of classifications, provided that (1) such
classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2) they are germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) they are not confined to existing conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all members of
the same class.
The Court is well aware of the unhappy plight that has befallen our female labor force abroad,
especially domestic servants, amid exploitative working conditions marked by physical and
personal abuse. As precisely the caretaker of Constitutional rights, the Court is called upon to
protect victims of exploitation. In fulfilling that duty, the Court sustains the Government's
efforts.
The same, however, cannot be said of our male workers. In the first place, there is no evidence
that, except perhaps for isolated instances, our men abroad have been afflicted with an
identical predicament. Suffice it to state, then, that insofar as classifications are concerned,
this Court is content that distinctions are borne by the evidence. Discrimination in this case is
justified.
There is likewise no doubt that such a classification is germane to the purpose behind the
measure. Unquestionably, it is the avowed objective of Department Order No. 1 to "enhance
the protection for Filipino female overseas workers" this Court has no quarrel that in the midst
of the terrible mistreatment Filipina workers have suffered abroad, a ban on deployment will be
for their own good and welfare.
The Order does not narrowly apply to existing conditions. Rather, it is intended to apply
indefinitely so long as those conditions exist. This is clear from the Order itself ("Pending
review of the administrative and legal measures, in the Philippines and in the host
countries . . ."), meaning to say that should the authorities arrive at a means impressed with a
greater degree of permanency, the ban shall be lifted.
It is incorrect to say that Department Order No. 1 prescribes a total ban on overseas
deployment. From scattered provisions of the Order, it is evident that such a total ban has not
been contemplated.
The consequence the deployment ban has on the right to travel does not impair the right. The
right to travel is subject, among other things, to the requirements of "public safety," "as may
be provided by law. Neither is there merit in the contention that Department Order No. 1
constitutes an invalid exercise of legislative power. It is true that police power is the domain of
the legislature, but it does not mean that such an authority may not be lawfully delegated. As

we have mentioned, the Labor Code itself vests the Department of Labor and Employment with
rule-making powers in the enforcement whereof.
The non-impairment clause of the Constitution, invoked by the petitioner, must yield to the
loftier purposes targeted by the Government. Freedom of contract and enterprise, like all other
freedoms, is not free from restrictions, more so in this jurisdiction, where laissez faire has
never been fully accepted as a controlling economic way of life.
This Court understands the grave implications the questioned Order has on the business of
recruitment. The concern of the Government, however, is not necessarily to maintain profits of
business firms. In the ordinary sequence of events, it is profits that suffer as a result of
Government regulation. The interest of the State is to provide a decent living to its citizens.
The Government has convinced the Court in this case that this is its intent. We do not find the
impugned Order to be tainted with a grave abuse of discretion to warrant the extraordinary
relief prayed for

Juanito Garcia and Alberto Dumago v. Philippine Airlines (PAL)


G.R. No. 164856, January 20, 2009
Facts:
Philippine Airlines filed a case against its employees herein petitioners for allegedly
caught in the act of sniffi ng shabu when a team of company security
personnel and law enforcers raided the PAL Technical Centers Tool room
Section. After due notice, PAL dismissed petitioner for transgressing
companys Code of Discipline prompting them to file a Complaint for illegal
dismissal which the Labor Arbiter (LA) in its decision ruled on their favor ordering PAL
to immediately comply with the reinstatement aspect of the decision. Prior to the
judgment, SEC placed PAL under Interim Rehabilitation Receiver who
subsequently replaced by Permanent Rehabilitation Receiver. On appeal,
NLRC reversed said decision and dismissed petitioners complaint for lack of
merit.
Subsequently, LA issued a Writ of Execution respecting the reinstatement
aspect of his decision. Respondent filed an Urgent Petition for Injunction with the
NLRC. The NLRC affirmed the v a l i d i t y o f t h e Wr i t a n d t h e N o t i c e i s s u e d b y
L A b u t s u s p e n d e d a n d r e f e r r e d t h e a c t i o n t o t h e Rehabilitation Receiver
for appropriate action. On appeal, the appellate court partially granted the
petition and eff ectively reinstated the NLRC resolution insofar as it suspended
the proceedings. By manifestation, respondent informed the Court that SEC issued an
Order granting its request to exit from rehabilitation proceedings.
Issue:
Whether petitioner may collect their wages during the period between the
LAs Order of reinstatement pending appeal and the NLRC decision
overturning that of the LA, now that PAL has exited from rehabilitation
proceedings.
Ruling:
A dismissed employee whose case was favorably decided by the LA is
entitled to receive w a g e s p e n d i n g a p p e a l u p o n r e i n s t a t e m e n t , w h i c h
i s i m m e d i a t e l y e xe c u t o r y. U n l e s s t h e re i s a re s t r a i n i n g o r d e r , i t i s
ministe ri al upon the L A to i mplement the orde r of rei nstatement
a n d i t i s mandatory on the employer to comply therewith. The Court reaffirms the
prevailing principle that even if the order of reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter is
reversed on appeal, it is obligatory on the part of the employer to reinstate and pay
the wages of the dismissed employee during the period of appeal until reversal by

the higher court. It settles the view that the LAs order of reinstatement is
immediately executory and the employer has to either re-admit them to work
under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to their dismissal, or
to reinstate them in the payroll, and that fi ling to exercise the options in
the alternative, employer must pay the employees salaries. When
reinstatement pending appeal aims to avert the continuing threat or
danger to the survival or even the life of the dismissed employee and his family, it
does not contemplate the period when the employer-corporation itself is similarly in a
Judicially monitored State of being resuscitated in order to survive.

CMC vs. MERIS

petitioner Capitol Medical Center, Inc. (Capitol) hired Dr. Cesar Meris
(Dr.
Meris),
one
of
its
stockholders,http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/sep2005/155098.h
tm#_ftn5 as in charge of its Industrial Service Unit (ISU) at a monthly
salary of P10,270.00.
Until

the

closure

of

the

ISU

on April

30,

1992,http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/sep2005/155098.htm#_ftn
6 Dr. Meris performed dual functions of providing medical services to
Capitols more than 500 employees and health workers as well as to
employees and workers of companies having retainer contracts with
it.http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/sep2005/155098.htm#_ftn7
On March 31, 1992, Dr. Meris received from Capitols
president and chairman of the board, Dr. Thelma
Navarette-Clemente (Dr. Clemente), a notice advising him
of the managements decision to close or abolish the ISU
and the consequent termination of his services as Chief
thereof, effective April 30, 1992.
Dr. Meris, doubting the reason behind the managements decision
to close the ISU and believing that the ISU was not in fact abolished as it
continued to operate and offer services to the client companies with Dr.
Clemente as its head and the notice of closure was a mere ploy for his
ouster in view of his refusal to retire despite Dr. Clementes previous

prodding
for
him
to
do
so,http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/sep2005/155098.htm#_ftn10
sought his reinstatement but it was unheeded.
Dr. Meris thus filed on September 7, 1992 a complaint against
Capitol and Dr. Clemente for illegal dismissal and reinstatement with
claims for backwages, moral and exemplary damages, plus attorneys
fees.http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/sep2005/155098.htm#_ftn1
1

Finding for Capitol and Dr. Clemente, the Labor Arbiter held that
the abolition of the ISU was a valid and lawful exercise of management
prerogatives and there was convincing evidence to show that ISU was
being operated at a loss.
On appeal by Dr. Meris, the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) modified the Labor Arbiters decision. It held
that in the exercise of Capitols management prerogatives, it had the
right to close the ISU even if it was not suffering business losses in light
of
Article
283
of
the
Labor
Code
and
jurisprudence.http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/sep2005/155098
.htm#_ftn14

And the NLRC set aside the Labor Arbiters directive for the
payment of retirement benefits to Dr. Meris because he did not retire.
Instead, it ordered the payment of separation pay as provided under
Article 283 as he was discharged due to closure of ISU, to be charged
against
the
retirement
fund.http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/sep2005/155098.htm#_ftn
15

Undaunted, Dr. Meris elevated the case to the Court of Appeals


via
petition
for
reviewhttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/sep2005/155098.htm#_f
tn16 which, in the interest of substantial justice, was treated as one for

certiorari.http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/sep2005/155098.htm
#_ftn17

Discrediting Capitols assertion that the ISU was operating at a loss as


the evidence showed a continuous trend of increase in its revenue for three
years immediately preceding Dr. Meriss dismissal on April 30,
1992,http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/sep2005/155098.htm#_ftn
18 and finding that the ISUs Analysis of Income and Expenses which was
prepared long after Dr. Meriss dismissal, hence, not yet available, on or
before April 1992, was tainted with irregular entries, the appellate court
held that Capitols evidence failed to meet the standard of a sufficient
and adequate proof of loss necessary to justify the abolition of the
ISU.http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/sep2005/155098.htm#_ftn1
9

The appellate court went on to hold that the ISU was not in fact
abolished, its operation and management having merely changed hands
from Dr. Meris to Dr. Clemente; and that there was a procedural lapse
in terminating the services of Dr. Meris, no written notice to the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) of the ISU abolition
having been made, thereby violating the requirement embodied in
Article
283.http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/sep2005/155098.htm#_ftn2
0

The appellate court, concluding that Capitol failed to


strictly comply with both procedural and substantive due
process, a condition sine qua non for the validity of a case of
termination,http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/sep20
05/155098.htm#_ftn21 held that Dr. Meris was illegally
dismissed. It accordingly reversed the NLRC Resolution

Hence, the present petition for review assigning to the appellate court
the following errors:

I
. . . IN OVERTURNING THE FACTUAL FINDINGS AND
CONCLUSIONS OF BOTH THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION (NLRC) AND THE LABOR ARBITER.
II
. . . IN HOLDING, CONTRARY TO THE FINDINGS OF BOTH THE
LABOR ARBITER AND THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, THAT THE INDUSTRIAL UNIT (ISU) WAS NOT
INCURRING LOSSES AND THAT IT WAS NOT IN FACT
ABOLISHED.
III
. . . IN NOT UPHOLDING PETITIONERS MANAGEMENT
PREROGATIVE TO ABOLISH THE INDUSTRIAL SERVICE UNIT
(ISU).
IV
. . . IN REQUIRING PETITIONERS TO PAY RESPONDENT
BACKWAGES AS WELL AS DAMAGES AND ATTORNEYS
FEES.http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/sep2005/1550
98.htm#_ftn23

Capitol further argues that the appellate courts conclusion that the
ISU was not incurring losses is arbitrary as it was based solely on the
supposed increase in revenues of the unit from 1989-1991, without taking
into account the Analysis of Income and Expenses of ISU from July 1,
1990 to July 1, 1991 which shows that the unit operated at a loss; and the
trend resulted in losses in the operation of the ISU.
Besides, Capitol stresses, the health care needs of the hospital
employees had been taken over by other units without added expense to
it;http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/sep2005/155098.htm#_ftn32 t
he appellate courts decision is at best an undue interference with, and
curtailment of, the exercise by an employer of its management prerogatives;
at the time of the closure of the ISU, Dr. Meris was already eligible for

retirement under the Capitols retirement plan; and the appellate court
adverted to the alleged lack of notice to the DOLE regarding Dr. Meriss
dismissal but the latter never raised such issue in his appeal to the NLRC or
even in his petition for review before the Court of Appeals, hence, the latter
did

not

have

authority

to

pass

on

the

matter.http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/sep2005/155098.htm#_ft
n34

The right to close the operation of an establishment or undertaking is


explicitly recognized under the Labor Code as one of the authorized causes
in terminating employment of workers, the only limitation being that the
closure must not be for the purpose of circumventing the provisions on
termination of employment embodied in the Labor Code.
The phrase closures or cessation of operations of establishment or
undertaking includes a partial or total closure or cessation.
And the phrase closures or cessation x x x not due to serious business
losses or financial reverses recognizes the right of the employer to close or
cease his business operations or undertaking even if he is not suffering from
serious business losses or financial reverses, as long as he pays his
employees their termination pay in the amount corresponding to their length
of
service.http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/sep2005/155098.htm#_f
tn36

It would indeed be stretching the intent and spirit of the law if a court
were to unjustly interfere in managements prerogative to close or cease its
business operations just because said business operation or undertaking is
not
suffering
from
any
loss.http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/sep2005/155098.htm#_ftn3
7 As long as the companys exercise of the same is in good faith to advance
its interest and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the

rights of employees under the law or a valid agreement, such exercise


will
be
upheld.http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/sep2005/155098.htm#_f
tn38

Clearly then, the right to close an establishment or undertaking may be


justified on grounds other than business losses but it cannot be an unbridled
prerogative to suit the whims of the employer.
The ultimate test of the validity of closure or cessation of
establishment or undertaking is that it must be bona fide in
character.http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/sep2005/155098.htm#
_ftn39 And
the burden of proving such falls upon the
employer.http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/sep2005/155098.htm
#_ftn40

In the case at bar, Capitol failed to sufficiently prove its good faith
in closing the ISU.

From the letter of Dr. Clemente to Dr. Meris, it is gathered that


the abolition of the ISU was due to the almost extinct demand
for direct medical service by the private and semi-government
corporations in providing health care for their employees; and that
such extinct demand was brought about by the existing trend of
industrial companies allocating their health care requirements to Health
Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) or thru a tripartite arrangement
with medical insurance carriers and designated hospitals.
The records of the case, however, fail to impress that there was
indeed extinct demand for the medical services rendered by the ISU.
The ISUs Annual Report for the fiscal years 1986 to 1991, submitted by
Dr. Meris to Dr. Clemente, and uncontrovertedby Capitol,
The foregoing disquisition notwithstanding, as reflected above, the
existence of business losses is not required to justify the closure or cessation
of establishment or undertaking as a ground to terminate employment of
employees. Even if the ISU were not incurring losses, its abolition or closure
could be justified on other grounds like that proffered by Capitol extinct
demand. Capitol failed, however, to present sufficient and convincing
evidence to support such claim of extinct demand. In fact, the employees of
Capitol
submitted
a
petitionhttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/sep2005/155098.htm#_f
tn46 dated April 21, 1992 addressed to Dr. Clemente opposing the abolition
of the ISU.
The closure of ISU then surfaces to be contrary to the provisions of
the Labor Code on termination of employment.
The termination of the services of Dr. Meris not having been premised
on a just or authorized cause, he is entitled to either reinstatement or
separation pay if reinstatement is no longer viable, and to backwages.
Reinstatement, however, is not feasible in case of a strained
employer-employee relationship or when the work or position formerly
held by the dismissed employee no longer exists, as in the instant
case.http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/sep2005/155098.htm#_ftn

47 Dr. Meris is thus entitled to payment of separation pay at the rate of one
(1) month salary for every year of his employment, with a fraction of at least
six

(6)

months

being

considered

as

one(1)

year,http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/sep2005/155098.htm#_ftn

and full backwages from the time of his dismissal from April 30, 1992
until the expiration of his term as Chief of ISU or his mandatory retirement,
whichever comes first.
48

The
award
by
the
appellate
court
of
moral
damages,http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/sep2005/155098.htm
#_ftn49 however, cannot be sustained, solely upon the premise that the
employer fired his employee without just cause or due process.
Additional facts must be pleaded and proven to warrant the grant of
moral damages under the Civil Code, such as that the act of dismissal
was attended by bad faith or fraud, or was oppressive to labor, or done
in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy; and of
course, that social humiliation, wounded feelings, grave anxiety, etc.,
resulted
therefrom.http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/sep2005/155098.htm
#_ftn50 Such circumstances, however, do not obtain in the instant case.
More specifically on bad faith, lack of it is mirrored in Dr. Clementes
offer to Dr. Meris to be a consultant of Capitol, despite the abolition of
the ISU.
The

award

for

attorneys

fees,

however,

remains.http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/sep2005/155098.htm#_
ftn52

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated February


15, 2002 is hereby AFFIRMED withMODIFICATION.

BREW MASTER INTERNATIONAL INC. V NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR


UNIONS (NAFLU)
DAVIDE, JR; April 17, 1997
NATURE
A special civil action for certiorari seeking the reversal of the decision of the National
Labor Relations Commission

(NLRC) which modified the decision of the Labor Arbiter by directing the
reinstatement of private respondent
Antonio D. Estrada, the complainant, without loss of seniority rights and benefits.
FACTS
- Private respondent NAFLU, a co-complainant in the labor case, is a labor union of
which complainant is a
member.
- Complainant was first employed by Brew Master on 16 September 1991 as route
helper with the latest daily wage
of P119.00.
- From 19 April 1993 up to 19 May 1993, for a period of 1 month, complainant went
on absent without permission
(AWOP).
- On 20 May 1993, Brew master sent him a Memo: Please explain in writing within 24
hours of your receipt of this
memo why no disciplinary action should be taken against you for the following
offense: You were absent since
April 19, 1993 up to May 19, 1993.
- In answer to the aforesaid memo, complainant explained:
Sa dahilan po na ako ay hindi nakapagpaalam sainyo dahil inuwi ko ang mga anak
ko sa Samar dahil ang asawa ko
ay lumayas at walang mag-aalaga sa mga anak ko. Kaya naman hindi ako naka long
distance or telegrama dahil
wala akong pera at ibinili ko ng gamot ay puro utang pa.
- Finding said explanation unsatisfactory, the company issued a Notice of
Termination: ...we regret to inform you
that we do not consider it valid. You are aware of the company Rules and Regulations
that absence without
permission for 6 consecutive working days is considered abandonment of work...
- Complainants contend that individual complainants dismissal was done without just
cause; that it was not
sufficiently established that individual complainants absence from April 19, 1993 to
June 16, 1993 are unjustified;
that the penalty of dismissal for such violation is too severe; that in imposing such
penalty, respondent should have
taken into consideration complainants length of service and as a first offender, a
penalty less punitive will suffice
such as suspension for a definite period.
- Upon the other hand, respondent contends that individual complainant was
dismissed for cause allowed by the
company Rules and Regulations and the Labor Code; that the act of complainant in
absenting from work for 1
month without official leave is deleterious to the business of respondent; that it will
result to stoppage of production
which will not only destructive to respondents interests but also to the interest of its
employees in general; that the
dismissal of complainant from the service is legal.
- The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of merit, citing the principle of
managerial control, which
recognizes the employers prerogative to prescribe reasonable rules and regulations
to govern the conduct of his
employees. He relied on Shoemart, Inc. vs. NLRC: ...that individual complainant has
indeed abandoned his work...
therefore, under the law and jurisprudence which upholds the right of an employer to
discharge an employee who

incurs frequent, prolonged and unexplained absences as being grossly remiss in his
duties to the employer and is
therefore, dismissed for cause. An employee is deemed to have abandoned his
position or to have resigned from the
same, whenever he has been absent therefrom without previous permission of the
employer for three consecutive
days or more.
- the NLRC modified the Labor Arbiter's decision and held that complainants
dismissal was invalid for the
following reasons:
Complainant-appellants prolonged absences, although unauthorized, may not
amount to gross neglect or
abandonment of work to warrant outright termination of employment. Dismissal is
too severe a penalty...Reliance
on the ruling enunciated in the cited case of Shoemart is quite misplaced because of
the obvious dissimilarities-complainant in the Shoemart Case was an inveterate absentee who does not
deserve reinstatement compared to
herein complainant-appellant who is a first offender
ISSUE
WON the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in modifying the decision of the
Labor Arbiter
HELD
NO
Ratio a) Petitioners finding that complainant was guilty of abandonment is
misplaced. Abandonment as a just and
valid ground for dismissal requires the deliberate, unjustified refusal of the employee
to resume his employment.
Two elements must then be satisfied: (1) the failure to report for work or absence
without valid or justifiable reason;
and (2) a clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship.
b) Verily, relations between capital and labor are not merely contractual. They are
impressed with public interest
and labor contracts must, perforce, yield to the common good.
While the employer is not precluded from prescribing rules and regulations to govern
the conduct of his employees,
these rules and their implementation must be fair, just and reasonable.
Reasoning
- complainants absence was precipitated by a grave family problem as his wife
unexpectedly deserted him and
abandoned the family. Considering that he had a full-time job, there was no one to
whom he could entrust the
children and he was thus compelled to bring them to the province. He was then
under emotional, psychological,
spiritual and physical stress and strain. The reason for his absence is, under these
circumstances, justified. While
his failure to inform and seek petitioner's approval was an omission which must be
corrected and chastised, he did
not merit the severest penalty of dismissal from the service.
- the elements of abandonment are not present here. First, as held above,
complainant's absence was justified under
the circumstances. As to the second requisite, complainant immediately complied
with the memo requiring him to
explain his absence, and upon knowledge of his termination, immediately sued for
illegal dismissal. These plainly

refuted any claim that he was no longer interested in returning to work.


- our Constitution looks with compassion on the workingman and protects his rights
not only under a general
statement of a state policy, but under the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights,
thus placing labor contracts on
a higher plane and with greater safeguards.
- While we do not decide here the validity of petitioner's Rules and Regulations on
continuous, unauthorized
absences, what is plain is that it was wielded with undue haste resulting in a
deprivation of due process, thus not
allowing for a determination of just cause or abandonment. In this light, petitioner's
dismissal was illegal. This is
not to say that his absence should go unpunished, as impliedly noted by the NLRC in
declining to award back
wages.
Disposition petition is hereby DISMISSED and the decision of the NLRC is hereby
AFFIRMED.

Mabeza vs NLRC
ON SEPTEMBER 26, 2011

April 18, 1997


Labor Standards Abandonment of Work Loss of Confidence
Mabeza was an employee hired by Hotel Supreme in Baguio City. In 1991, an inspection was made by the
DOLE at Hotel Supreme and the DOLE inspectors discovered several violations by the hotel management.
Immediately, the owner of the hotel, Peter Ng, directed his employees to execute an affidavit which would
purport that they have no complaints whatsoever against Hotel Supreme. Mabeza signed the affidavit but
she refused to certify it with the prosecutors office. Later, when she reported to work, she was not allowed
to take her shift. She then asked for a leave but was not granted yet shes not being allowed to work. In
May 1991, she then sued Peter Ng for illegal dismissal. Peter Ng, in his defense, said that Mabeza
abandoned her work. In July 1991, Peter Ng also filed a criminal complaint against Mabeza as he alleged
that she had stolen a blanket and some other stuff from the hotel. Peter Ng went on to amend his reply in
the labor case to make it appear that the reason why he dismissed Mabeza was because of his loss of
confidence by reason of the theft allegedly committed by Mabeza. The labor arbiter who handled the case,
a certain Felipe Pati, ruled in favor of Peter Ng.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is abandonment in the case at bar. Whether or not loss of confidence as
ground for dismissal applies in the case at bar.
HELD: No. The side of Peter Ng is bereft of merit so is the decision of the Labor Arbiter which was
unfortunately affirmed by the NLRC.
Abandonment

Abandonment is not present. Mabeza returned several times to inquire about the status of her work or her
employment status. She even asked for a leave but was not granted. Her asking for leave is a clear
indication that she has no intention to abandon her work with the hotel. Even the employer knows that his
purported reason of dismissing her due to abandonment will not fly so he amended his reply to indicate
that it is actually loss of confidence that led to Mabezas dismissal.
Loss of Confidence
It is true that loss of confidence is a valid ground to dismiss an employee. But this is ideally only applied to
workers whose positions require a certain level or degree of trust particularly those who are members of
the managerial staff. Evidently, an ordinary chambermaid who has to sign out for linen and other hotel
property from the property custodian each day and who has to account for each and every towel or
bedsheet utilized by the hotels guests at the end of her shift would not fall under any of these two classes
of employees for which loss of confidence, if ably supported by evidence, would normally apply. Further,
the suspicious filing by Peter Ng of a criminal case against Mabeza long after she initiated her labor
complaint against him hardly warrants serious consideration of loss of confidence as a ground of Mabezas
dismissal.

ISAE vs. Quisumbing


Facts:
Private Respondent (International School Manila) pursuant to PD 732 is a
domestic educational institution established primarily for dependents of
foreign diplomatic personnel and other temporary residents. The school is
authorized to employ its own teaching and management personnel selected
by it either locally or abroad. The teachers are qualified in two: foreign hires
and local hires. The school employs four tests to determine whether a faculty
member should be classified as a foreign-hire or a local hire: What is ones
domicile? Where is one;s home economy? To which country does one owe
allegiance? Was the individual hired abroad to work in the school and was the
school responsible for bringing that individual to the Philippines. Should the
answers point to the Philippines, then the faculty is classified as a local hire.
Otherwise, his a foreign hire.
The foreign hires enjoy certain
benefits not accorded to local hires
such as: housing, transportation,
shipping costs, taxes and home
leave travel allowance. They are
also paid a salary rate of 25% more
than local hires. The school justifies
such benefits because of
dislocation factor and limited
tenure.
When negotiations for a new
collective bargaining agreement
were held, the petitioner, a
legitimate labor union and the

collective bargaining
representative of all faculty
members of the school contested
the difference in salary rates
between foreign hires and local
hires. This issues as well as the
question of including the foreign
hires in the bargaining unit caused
a deadlock between the parties.
The petitioner filed a notice of
strike. The DOLE assumed
jurisdiction over the dispute for
failure of the NCMB (National
Conciliation and Mediation Board)
to bring the parties to a
compromise. The DOLE acting
secretary Trajano issued an order
resolving the parity representation
issues in favor of the School. Then
DOLE Secretary Quisumbing denied
petitioners motion for
reconsideration. Petitioner seeks a
relief in SC.
The petitioner claims that the
point-of-hire classification
employed by the School is
discriminatory to Filipinos and that
the grant of higher salaries to
foreign-hires constitutes racial
discrimination. The acting
secretary upheld the said
classification and the principle of
equal pay for equal work is not
applicable in this case. This is
because, the existence of a system
of salaries and benefits accorded to
foreign hired personnel is
universally recognized. Also foreign
hires have limited contract as
compared to local hires who enjoy
security of tenure. Also, it was
stipulated in the 1992-1995 CBA
that both parties recognize the
difference in the status of 2 types
of employess, hence the difference
in their salaries ( that the
superintendent of the school has
the discretion to recruit and hire
expatriate teachers and that the
25% differential is reflective of the

agreed value of system


displacement). The union cannot
invole the equal protection clause
to justify its claim of parity because
the said distinction is based on a
reasonable classification, a
substantial distinction between
foreing hires and local hires, the
former has a limited tenure, having
no amenities to the Philippines and
must be given a good salary
packager in order for them to
attract teaching here.
Issue: W/n the school violated the
equal work for equal pay principle,
that the foreign hires receive 25%
more in the salary rate than the
local hires?
Ruling: Yes.
1. If an employer accords
employees the same
position and rank, the
presumption is that these
employees perform equal
work. If an employee
receives less than the other
employees, it is the burden
of the employer to explain
why is such the case. In the
case at bar, there is no
evidence that the foreignhires
perform 25% more
efficiently than the local
hires. Both groups have
similar functions which they
perform under similar
conditions.
2. The school cannot invoke
the need to entice foreignhires
to leave their domicile
to rationalize the distinctions
in salary without violating
the principle of equal work
for equal pay. The local hires
perform the same services
as the foreign hires and they
ought to be paid the same
salaries as the latter. For the
same reason, the dislocation
factor the foreign hires

limited tenure cannot serve


as valid bases for the
distinction in salary rates.
The dislocation factor and
limited tenure are well
compensated in terms of
housing, transporatation,
shipping costs, taxes and
home leave travel
allowances.
3. The point-of-hire
classification is invalid
classification. There is no
reasonable distinction
between the services
rendered by foreign-hires
and local hires. The practice
of paying foreing hires
higher salaries is contrary to
public policy.
4. The court agree however
that foreign hires do not
belong to the same
bargaining unit as the local
hires. A bargaining unit is
defined as a group of
employees of a given
employer, comprised of all or
less than all of the entire
body of employees,
consistent with equality to
the employer, indicate to be
the best suited to serve the
reciprocal rights and duties
of the parties under the
collective bargaining
provisions of the law. Factors
in determining the
appropriate collective
bargaining unit 1. will of the
employees 2. affinity of the
employees interest such as
substantial similarity of work
and duties 3. prior collective
bargaining history 4.
similarity of employment
status. The basic test is
whether or not is
fundamentally the
combination which will best

assure to all employees the


exercise of their collective
bargaining rights. In the
case, it does not appear that
foreign hires intend to be
grouped together with localhires
for purposes of
collective bargaining.
Petition is granted in part. The
orders of the Secretary of Labor
and Employment are reversed and
set aside insofar as they uphold the
practice of respondent school of
according foreign-hires higher
salaries than local-hires.

Tirazona v PET
Facts:
Tirazona, being the Administrative Manager of Philippine EDS
Techno-Service, Inc. (PET), was a managerial employee who held a position
of trust and confidence was dismissed because of lack of confidence of the
employer.
The Labor Arbiter and NLRC favored the employer.
Issue:
Is the petitioner entitled to back pay wages?
Held:
No. Tirazona was not just gracelessly expelled or simply
terminated from the company on 22 April 2002. She was found to have
violated the trust and confidence reposed in her by her employer when she
arrogantly and unreasonably demanded from PET and its officers/directors
the exorbitant amount of P2,000,000.00 in damages, coupled with a threat of
a lawsuit if the same was not promptly paid within five days. This
unwarranted imposition on PET and its officers/directors was made after the

company sent Tirazona a letter, finding her handling of the situation


involving a rank-and-file employee to be less than ideal, and merely
reminding her to be more circumspect when dealing with the more delicate
concerns of their employees. To aggravate the situation, Tirazona adamantly
and continually refused to cooperate with PETs investigation of her case
and to provide an adequate explanation for her actions.

RODOLFO FUENTES vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION


BELLOSILLO, J.:
Facts:
The State is bound under the Constitution to afford full protection to labor and
when conflicting interests of labor and capital are to be weighed on the scales of
social justice the heavier influence of the latter should be counterbalanced with the
sympathy and compassion the law accords the less privileged workingman. This is
only fair if the worker is to be given the opportunity and the right to assert and
defend his cause not as a subordinate but as part of management with which he can
negotiate on even plane. Thus labor is not a mere employee of capital but its active
and equal partner.[1]
Petitioners were regular employees of private respondent Agusan Plantations,
Inc., which was engaged in the operation of a palm tree plantation in Trento, Agusan
del Sur, since September 1982. Claiming that it was suffering business losses which
resulted in the decision of the head office in Singapore to undertake retrenchment
measures.
On 31 October 1990 petitioners filed with the DOLE office in Cagayan de Oro City
a complaint for illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision in favor of
petitioners ordering private respondents to pay the former separation pay equivalent
to fifteen (15) days pay for every year of service plus salary differentials and
attorney's fees.
On appeal by respondents to the National Labor Relations Commission, the
decision of the Labor Arbiter was reversed.
Petitioners elevated their plight to this Court on a special civil action for
certiorari.
Issue:
Is the dismissal or retrenchment did not comply with the requirements of Art. 283
of the Labor Code?
Held:
Under Art. 283 retrenchment may be valid only when the following requisites are
met: (a) it is to prevent losses; (b) written notices were served on the workers and
the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) at least one (1) month before the
effective date of retrenchment; and, (c) separation pay is paid to the affected
workers.

The closure of a business establishment is a ground for the termination of the


services of an employee unless the closing is for the purpose of circumventing
pertinent provisions of the Labor Code. But while business reverses can be a just
cause for terminating employees, they must be sufficiently proved by the employer. [2]

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED.

GIL CAPILI and RICARDO CAPILI


RELATIONS COMMISSION

vs. NATIONAL LABOR

BELLOSILLO, J.:
Facts:

Respondents Benigno Santos et. al. are licensed drivers of public


utility jeepneys plying the Libertad-Sta. Cruz route in Manila.
On 7 May 1991, at a time when petitioner Ricardo Capili jointly with his wife
had assumed ownership and operation of the jeepneys driven by private
respondents, the latter required by the jeepney operators to sign individually
contracts of lease of the jeepneys to formalize their lessor-lessee
relationship. However, having gathered the impression that the signing of
the contracts of lease was a condition precedent before they could continue
driving for petitioners, all the drivers stopped plying their assigned routes
beginning 7 May 1991.
A week later or on 14 May 1991 the drivers, numbering twenty-two (22), filed
a complaint for illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter praying not for
reinstatement but for separation pay.
[1]

The Labor Arbiter directed the respondent to reinstate them to their former
position without loss of seniority rights and other benefits, but without back
wages .
The NLRC ordered the respondent to pay the complainants their separation
pay.
The petitioners appealed to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Is the driver entitled to separation pay instead of reinstatement?
Issue:
The award of separation pay cannot be justified solely because of the
existence of "strained relations" between the employer and the employee. It

must be given to the employee only as an alternative to reinstatement emanating


from illegal dismissal. When there is no illegal dismissal, even if the relations are
strained, separation pay has no legal basis. Besides, the doctrine on "strained
relations" cannot be applied indiscriminately since every labor dispute almost
invariably results in "strained relations;" otherwise, reinstatement can never be
possible simply because some hostility is engendered between the parties
as a result of their disagreement. That is human nature.
[8]

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.


JOSE L. GARCIA vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
CRUZ, J.:
Facts:
National Service Corporation (NASECO), a government-owned or controlled corporation
engaged in providing manpower services to the Philippine National Bank were petitioners were its
employees who were either members union. On November 19, 1988, they were among those who staged a
strike and picketed the premises of the PNB.
On March 1, 1989, the petitioners reported for work at the NASECO office but they could not be
given assignments because the PNB had meanwhile contracted with another company to fill the positions
formerly held by the petitioners.
NASECO then sought new assignments for the petitioners with its other clients, but the
petitioners insisted on their reassignment to the PNB. On October 13, 1989, the petitioners received notice
of separation from NASECO.The reason given was the financial losses NASECO was incurring at that time
due mainly to the salaries being paid to the employees who could not be posted despite efforts to place
them. 4
The Labor Arbiter finds that the petitioners had been "fairly discharged by the NASECO in a
valid act of simple retrenchment." NLRC affirms the decision of the labor arbiter.
Issue:

Is the retrenchment of the fifty-one petitioners valid?

Held:
The particular facts of this case preclude application of the "first in, last out" rule in the
retrenchment of employees. There was no discrimination against the petitioners. NASECO could not compel
the PNB to take the petitioners back to their former positions in view of its contractual right to reject any
employee of NASECO for inefficiency and other valid reasons. The PNB had already filled the vacated
positions of the petitioners during the strike, to ensure the continued operation of its business.
The constitutional policy of providing full protection to labor is not intended to oppress or destroy
management. The employer cannot be compelled to retain employees it no longer needs, to be paid for
work unreasonably refused and not actually performed. NASECO bent over backward and exerted every
effort to help the petitioners look for other work, postponed the effective date of their separation, and offered
them a generous termination pay package. The unflagging commitment of this Court to the cause of labor
will not prevent us from sustaining the employer when it is in the right, as in this case.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC are AFFIRMED.

CORAZON JAMER petitioners,


RELATIONS COMMISSION

vs.

NATIONAL

LABOR

HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:


Facts:

This complaint arose from the dismissal of the complainants Corazon


Jamer and Cristina Amortizido both were cashier of Isetann. They were both
dismissed on the alleged ground of dishonesty for incurring a shortage
of P15,353.78.
Complainants were asked to explain and they submitted their
respective written explanations for the shortage.
Respondents placed both complainants under preventive suspension for
the alleged shortages. Thereafter, respondents conducted an administrative
investigation. Finding the explanation of the complainants to be unsatisfactory,
respondent dismissed the complainants from the service. Aggrieved,
complainant instituted this present action .
The Labor Arbiter directed the respondents to reinstate complainants to
service with full backwages and without loss of seniority rights.
Isetann and John Go appealed the aforesaid decision to the NLRC. The
NLRC found that the complainants were validy dismissed for lack of confidence.

Issue:
Whether NLRC is correct?
Held:
Yes. The failure of petitioners to report to management the aforementioned
irregularities constitute fraud or willful breach of the trust reposed in them by
their employer or duly authorized representative one of the just causes in
terminating employment as provided for by paragraph (c), Article 282 of the
Labor Code, as amended.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the National Labor Relations
Commission in is hereby AFFIRMED.

GANDARA MILL SUPPLY vs. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS


COMMISSION
PURISIMA, J.:
Facts:
Milagros Sy, owner of Gandara Mill Supply, at Binondo, Manila, was the
respondent in NLRC Case instituted by Silvestre Germano.
On February 6, 1995, the private respondent, without notifying his employer,
Milagros Sy, did not report for work until February 11, 1995. Like any expectant father,
he chose to be near his wife who was then about to deliver. The wife gave birth on
February 12, 1995.
Two (2) weeks after, private respondent returned to duty, and to his surprise, he
was met by his employer to personally tell him that someone had been hired to take his
place.
On February 27, 1995, a case of illegal dismissal was commenced by the private
respondent with the Department of Labor and Employment.
The Labor Arbiter order the respondent/s to pay complainant Silvestre Germano
the sum of P65,685.90 representing separation pay, backwages, SLIP and attorneys fee.
On May 22, 1996, the NLRC dismissed petitioners appeal for failure to post a
cash or surety bond.
Issue:
Did the public respondent act with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing
petitioners appeal and in not giving petitioner a chance to prove that the private
respondent was not illegally dismissed but was merely suspended for abandoning his job?
Held:
Granting arguendo that private respondents absence engendered undue difficulty
to the smooth operations of petitioners business, considering the predicament of
respondent Silvestre Germano, his dismissal is unwarranted. In holding the constitutional
mandate of protection to labor, the rigid rules of procedure may sometimes be dispensed
with to give room for compassion. The doctrine of compassionate justice is applicable
under the premises, private respondent being the breadwinner of his family. The Social

Justice policy mandates a compassionate attitude toward the working class in its relation
to management. In calling for the protection to labor, the Constitution does not condone
wrongdoing by the employee, it nevertheless urges a moderation of the sanctions that
may be applied to him in the light of the many disadvantages that weigh heavily on him
like an albatross on his neck.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari under consideration is hereby DISMISSED.

PREMIERE PRODUCTIONS, INC. vs.


PHILIPPINE MOVIE PICTURES WORKERS' ASSOCIATION
CONCEPCION, J.:
Facts:
On October 2, 1951, respondent filed with the Court of Industrial Relations an urgent petition
seekingauthority to layoff 44 men working in three of its departments because of financial loses which
respondent was allegedly suffering during the current year. Workers opposed the request alleging that the
claim of financial loses has no basis. Upon ocular inspection by Hon. Roldan of Court of Industrial Relation,
it allowed the layoff of workers. The Supreme Court said that the layoff should not be allowed and workers
should reinstated.
On June 5, 1953, the Philippine Movie Pictures Workers' Association, filed, with the Court of Industrial
Relations, a petition for the execution of said decision. Inasmuch, however, as the same was not, as yet,
final, owing to a motion for reconsideration filed, with this Court, by the company, no action was taken on
said petition for execution. Presiding Judge Roldan, of the Court of Industrial Relations, rendered a
"decisionordering " the reinstatement of the workers, as prayed for in the motion for execution.
Issue:
Could the Court of Industrial Relations, sitting in banc, order petitioner to reinstate the said 44 employees
with backwages, without giving petitioner an opportunity to complete the presentation of its evidence in
support of its petition for authority to layoff the said 44 employees?
Held:
This pretense cannot be sustained for the orders of the Court of Industrial Relations of November 8 and 24,
1951, authorizing the company to layoff the employees in question have been "set aside" by the decision of
this Court, dated March 25, 1953, and, as a consequence, the relation between said employees and the
company was restored to its status immediately preceding the issuance of said orders, as if the same had
never been issued.
Wherefore, resolution appealed from is hereby affirmed

VIRGILIO CALLANTA
vs.
CARNATION PHILIPPINES, INC.,

FERNAN, J.:
Facts:
Petitioner Virgilio Callanta was employed by private respondent Carnation
Philippines, Inc. in January 1974 as a salesman in the Agusan del Sur area. Five
years later respondent Carnation filed with the Regional Office No. X of the
Ministry of Labor and Employment [MOLE], an application for clearance to
terminate the employment of Virgilio Callanta on the alleged grounds of serious
misconduct and misappropriation of company funds amounting to P12,000.00,
more or less. Callanta was terminated.
Callanta filed with the MOLE, Regional Office No. X, a complaint for
illegal dismissal. In its position paper dated October 5, 1982, respondent
Carnation put in issue the timeliness of petitioner's complaint alleging that the
same is barred by prescription for having been filed more than three [3] years
after the date of Callanta's dismissal.
Issue:
Whether or not an action for illegal dismissal prescribes in three [3] years
pursuant to Articles 291 and 292 of the Labor Code.
Held:
The action for illegal dismissal was filed by petitioners on July 5, 1982, or three
[3] years, one [1] month and five [5] days after the alleged effectivity date of his
dismissal on June 1, 1979 which is well within the four [4]-year prescriptive
period under Article 1146 of the New Civil Code.

HERMOGENES MORTERA and CANLUBANG WORKERS' UNION (CLO)


vs.
THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, CANLUBANG SUGAR ESTATE
and BISIG NG CANLUBANG (NLU)
PERFECTO, J.:
Petitioners contend that this order, requiring the laborers to return to their
work, and, upon failure to do so, authorizing the Canlubang Sugar Estate to
employ new laborers to take their place, and prohibiting picketing under any
guise or form, is contrary to law and has been issued without and/or in excess of
the jurisdiction of he Court of Industrial Relations. They also complain that

notwithstanding the fact that the Canlubang Worker's Union (CLO) or its
members are not party to the case and were not given the opportunity to answer
and defend the charges against them or to be heard in connection therewith, the
members of said motion were likewise ordered to return to work and to desist
from exercising their right to picket.
The Court of the Industrial Relations answered, alleging that it has the
authority and jurisdiction to issue the order of February 21, 1947, by virtue of the
provisions of section 19 of the Commonwealth Act No. 103; that said jurisdiction
is merely incident to the jurisdiction acquired by the court in case No. 44-V, Bisig
ng Canlubang vs. Canlubang Sugar Estate
Issue:
Whether the NLRC has the jurisdiction to prohibit the strike.
Held:.net
The prohibition should be understood to cover only illegal picketing, that is,
picketing through the use of illegal means. Peaceful picketing cannot be
prohibited. It is part of the freedom of speech guaranteed by the Constitution.
Therefore, the order of the Court of Industrial Relations prohibiting picketing must
be understood to refer only to illegal picketing, that is, picketing through the use
of illegal means.
For all the foregoing, the petitioner is dismissed.

DE LEON VS. NLU


Plaintiffs sought to recover damages and an injunctive relief in the court below which was issued preliminary
upon compliance with the provisions of the rules on the matter, upon the ground that the defendants, with
the exception of the National Labor Union, Eulogio R. Lerum and Jose J. Hernandez, the latter two being the
president and secretary of the union, had been picketing the Dalisay Theater, owned by Narcisa B. de Leon
and ran and operated by her co-plaintiffs, since the time it was reopened on 10 January 1952, the purpose
of the picketing being to secure reinstatement to their respective jobs in the theater when it was run and
operated by the Filipino Theatrical Enterprises, then a lessee of the parcel of land owned by plaintiff Narcisa
B. de Leon on which the theater was erected, since 14, April 1949.
The defendants denied the allegations in paragraph 8, 9, 10 and 11 of the amended complaint and filed a
cross-claim for damages estimated at P200 daily which was denied by the plaintiffs in their reply.
After hearing the trial court dismissed the plaintiffs complaint and defendants cross-claim and dissolved the
writ of preliminary injunction theretofore issued, without pronouncement as to costs. From this judgment the
plaintiffs appealed to this Court for the reason by the appeal would raised on the questions of law. The first
amended complaint was again amended by the allegations of the second amended complaint, mistakenly
entitled "first amended complaint," is substantially the same as the previous one.

The trial court found:


The plaintiff Narcisa B. de Leon is the owner of a parcel of land in which stands the
Dalisay Theater at 617-619 Rizal Avenue, Manila; that prior to April 14, 1949, said theater
was operated jointly by the motion picture firms known as the plaintiffs LVN Pictures, Inc.,
Premier Productions and the Sampaguita Pictures, Inc., as lessees thereof; that on April
14, 1949, Narcisa B. de Leon, leased the aforesaid parcel of land to the Filipino Theatrical
Enterprises, Inc., who on that date had become the owners of the building, known as
Dalisay Theater; that the lease contract provided that the lessor of the land, Narcisa B. de
Leon would become the owner of the building, together with all the equipment and
accessories, at the expiration of the lease; that during the terms of the leased, beginning
April 14, 1949, the Filipino Theatrical Enterprises, Inc., operated the theater; that
defendants, except the National Labor Union, Eulogio Lerum and Jose Hernandez, were
all employees of the Filipino Theatrical Enterprises Inc., April 1949 to August 14, 1951,
and said employees work at the Dalisay Theater during this period by reason of such
employment; that on July 12, 1951, short before the expiration of the aforesaid leased,
Filipino Theatrical Enterprises, Inc., notified its employees of the termination of their
employment with it, effective August 14, 1951, that on August 15, 1951, after the
expiration of said lease, the full and complete possession of the theater building was
delivered the turned over to the plaintiff Narcisa B. de Leon who immediately demolished
the building and on the same site she constructed and finished, after several months of
continous work the new Dalisay Theater Building; that on August 31, 1991, plaintiff
Narciso B. de Leon executed a contract with her co-plaintiffs for the operation the new
Dalisay Theater as a joint venture among them, whereby the latter would exhibit their
picture in said theater; that on January 10,1952 plaintiffs open the new Dalisay Theater
and begun exhibiting films therein, with the new set of personnel, retaining only the
services of four old employees; that on the last-mentioned date when the plaintiffs
reopened the Dalisay Theater for business about thirty persons among whom where the
herein defendants, except the defendants, Eulogio Lerum and Jose Hernandez, all
members of the National Labor Union, picketed the plaintiffs the said theater on 617-619
Rizal Avenue, Manila, from 9:00 a.m. to 2:30 p.m., more or less, by walking to and from on
the side walk fronting the lobby of the theater and displaying placards which for the
slogans: "Do not patronize the Dalisay Theater," "Dalisay Theater is unfair to labor." "Have
mercy on the picketeers" "and sympathize with us," and others; the defendant during the
picketing tried to persuade patrons or customers of the Dalisay Theater to refrain from
buying tickets or seeing the show because the cine's managment is unfair to its
employees, and to sympathize with the picketeers; that after the defendants Jose Ramos
and Enrique Montoya had left the lobby of the theater; the iron grill door which separates
the theater lobby from the sidewalk was closed, thereby confining the picketing in the side
walk; that the picketing was done by defendants so that they might re-employed in the
Dalisay Theater; that due to the picketing in the Dalisay Theater, the box-office receipts of
said theater for January 10, 1952 amounted only to about P1,250; and that a premiere
showing of such a film like" DIMAS" would ordinarily earned a P2,500 gross receipt for the
theater.
The Court finds that the acts of the defendants complain of in this case, which consisted
only in walking slowly and is peacefully back and forth on the public sidewalk in front of
the premises of the Dalisay Theater and displaying placards publicizing the dispute
between the theater and the management and the picketeers, were not such as to disturb
the public peace at the place. There was no clear and present danger of destruction to life
of property or of other froms of breach of the peace.
In this case, it is undisputed that after defendants were dismissed or laid off from their
work at the old Dalisay Theater by the Filipino Theatrical Enterprises, Inc., the showhouse
came under a totally different management when it was reopened on January 10, 1952.
There was no existence of a relationship of employees between plaintiffs and defendants,
although defendants purpose in picketing plaintiffs was for the defendants' reinstatement
of their services in the new Dalisay Theater under the new Management.
Picketing peacefully carried out is not illegal even in the absence of employer-employee relationship1 for
peaceful picketing is a part of a freedom of speech guaranteed by the Constitution.2

The judgment appealed from is affirm without pronouncement as to costs.


Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia and
Felix, JJ., concur.

También podría gustarte