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side towards the French side). Personnel from the UK FLOR entered the running tunnel and verified that
the club car and locomotive did not contain any additional trapped victims. They then proceeded towards
the rear of the train to evaluate the conditions.
Meanwhile, the victims who were being treated in the service tunnel were transported by ambulance
vehicles through the service tunnel to the French terminal.
Additional fire-fighting resources from the French side arrived, and a French command officer assumed
command of the incident and declared it a bi-national emergency. (Per the pre-established bi-national plans
for the Tunnel, any incident which occurred within a country's territory would be commanded by that
country's personnel. This incident was well within the French boundary.)
Through an oversight, the UK second line of response (SLOR) was not notified of the fire until 10:02 p.m.
At approximately 10:19 p.m., the UK SLOR was responding via the service tunnel. The SLOR for both
countries is comprised of fire fighting resources that respond from stations located outside of the respective
terminals. The command officer who served as the UK liaison with the French incident commander
responded as part of the SLOR.
A consultation was held between the French and United Kingdom command officers, and it was decided
that the French would attack the fire from cross passage 4163 and that the UK FLOR would attack the fire
from cross passage 4201. This strategy would allow the French FLOR to attack the fire from "upstream"
and the UK FLOR to attack the fire from the middle. It was felt that if the fire was attacked from only
upstream, they would not be able to gain effective fire control within an acceptable period of time. This
was based on the fact that few crews could actually be placed within the tunnel because of space
limitations.
UK personnel were positioned at the cross passage door at 4201, which was then manually opened. The air
pressure in the service tunnel was being maintained at a higher level than the air pressure in the running
tunnel, which resulted in a very high airflow through the open cross passage door into the running tunnel.
This airflow was so strong that it was necessary for personnel to brace themselves as the door was opened
and to ensure that they did not have any loose equipment, which would have been blown into the tunnel as
the door was opened.
In addition to the airflow in the service tunnel, the ventilation system in the running tunnel had been
increased and was blowing from the UK side to towards the French side (west to east). The airflow in the
running tunnel, coupled with the airflow coming out of the cross passage, created a "bubble" that measured
approximately 1 meter (3.2 feet) out of the cross passage into the running tunnel. Within this bubble it was
possible to stand in relative comfort and safety. However, once personnel passed beyond this boundary,
there was intense heat and smoke which required that all personnel wear full protective equipment.
Hose lines were connected into the service tunnel's wall hydrant and advanced into the running tunnel.
Initial fire-fighting efforts focused on extinguishing the fire directly in front of this cross passage door.
Once this was achieved, personnel then turned to the east and began advancing hoselines towards the rear
of the train. Attempts were made to advance lines down the walkway on the north side of the train, through
the train itself, and on a smaller maintenance walkway on the south side of the train. Due to the extreme
heat, crews were able to work for only about 8 minutes before having to retreat and be replaced by fresh
crews.
It was extremely difficult to advance the lines. Large amounts of concrete were spalling off explosively
from the tunnel lining due to its exposure to the fire. This resulted in very fine concrete rubble collecting on
the access walkway, which had the consistency of large grains of sand and made the footing very difficult.
In addition, this concrete rubble was hot, and a number of fire fighters reported that the soles of their feet
were becoming hot while standing on this rubble. Furthermore, the fire fighters were being regularly
bombarded on their helmets by the debris as it fell off of the tunnel lining.
The debris was also collecting on the roof of the HGV transporters, which ultimately collapsed in a "V"
shape due to the weight of the material.
Two lines were being advanced from the UK position, while five or six lines were being advanced from the
French position. It was reported that there was insufficient water pressure and volume to maintain an
aggressive attack until Eurotunnel engineers reconfigured the water supply approximately 6 hours into the
incident.
Fire control was reported at 5:00 a.m. on the following day, and the fire was reported to have been
extinguished at 11:15 a.m.
A total of eight HGV transporters and their contents were completely destroyed, as well as a loader and the
rear locomotive. Significant damage occurred to the tunnel lining for approximately 200 meters (656 feet),
with serious damage to an additional 200 meters (656 feet).
According to reports from the Kent Fire Brigade, approximately 406 millimeters (16 inches) of concrete
was destroyed in some areas, leaving only 51 millimeters (2 inches) of concrete remaining.
No injuries to fire fighters from either country were reported.
The fire resulted in passenger service interruption for 15 days. Freight trains started running through the
undamaged tunnel again on November 21, 1996. Eurostar (passenger trains that operated between London
and Paris) service was allowed to resume on December 4, 1996. Tourist shuttles (cars only) between
Folkestone and Coquelles were allowed to begin service on a limited basis on December 10, 1996. Tourist
shuttles carrying coaches started running again on January 6, 1997.