University of the Philippines Diliman

College of Social Sciences and Philosophy

Department of Philosophy

BUILDING THE FOUNDATIONS OF DEMOCRACY:

Epistemology and Suffrage

In partial fulfillment
for the requirements in
Philo 250

Submitted by:
Bernardo Cielo II

Submitted to:
Prof. Vera Cruz

Abstract
In theorizing a system operative in a democratic society, one inevitable makes
assumptions about the nature of the political actors in play. The roles, largely constituent
to the very principle of democracy itself, demand a certain level of conscientiousness
from all actors involved in order for the system to function as intended. As such we
assume all political actors as conscientious. However, the extent by which we assume the
necessary conscientiousness of said political actors often forgo the categories by which
we can and must evaluate them. One principle requirement for the exercise of democracy
is the freedom to make choices, the exercise of free will that enables one who is part of
the democratic society to choose for himself what he thinks is good. Such decisions, if
done unconscientiously, are a detriment not only to other political actors within the
system but also to the very system itself that demands it. In this paper I aim to discuss the
epistemic process involved in a democratic system, putting particular focus on suffrage,
as it is one of the primary means for mass participation. Further, I aim to evaluate the
predominant suppositions in the exercise of democracy and argue that all political actors,
in order to be effective participants in the democratic process of suffrage, need to develop
epistemic virtues.
The Democratic Society
For the most part, constituents involved within a model of democracy (at least
theoretically) rarely participate in the discourse involved in defining its parameters. We
take for granted the mechanisms by which we exercise certain freedoms, and often fail to
understand what constitutes those freedoms and to what or to whom we vest it to.
Democracy now seems to have devolved into an operational dogma, a societal
requirement that people abide to in order to pursue individualistic pursuits within the said
framework. However, it is, or rather it should be constituent to the exercise of democracy
for agents to participate in the dialogue. In this paper, I intend to escape the reductionist
construction of democracy and put into debate the model by which social epistemology is
added within the calculus of how it operates, as well as argue for the development of
virtuous epistemic agents as necessary step in developing a richer construct of
democracy.
Prior to arguing for the need of a national epistemic community, we would have to define
first what we mean by democracy and consequently adopt a model of democracy we
perceive to be best formulated to account and adequately represent the epistemic powers
observable in society. While the nature of theory building may sometimes rely on logical
reconstructions of the social order rather than in sensual evidence (to dichotomize the
ideal from lived experiences), we cannot escape the Hegelian responsibility of including
a materialist account in defining democracy.
There have been various theoretical accounts that try to explain the mechanisms by which
democracy operates; the most popular being the Condorcet Jury Theorem that attempts to
account for the value of the vote as rational mechanism in delivering the highest
probability of deciphering truth or the most conscientious course of action. The theorem

states that within a democratic framework, when voters are given two options where they
are free to vote independently of each other, where they have sole and independent
judgment of what the best possible recourse is in solving the problem and have at least an
aggregate probability of being 50% right, then as the number of voters reach infinity, the
probability that the majority vote will select the right option approaches 1 to the point
that the minority (choosing the wrong option) proves to be virtually negligible.
The popularity of this theory does not proceed unfounded. As Elizabeth Anderson stated
in The Epistemology of Democracy, The favorable results of the Condorcet
Jury Theorem have been generalized to cover plurality voting over
multiple options (List 2001), supermajority voting rules (Fey 2003), and
even some cases in which individual voters have less than 50% chance
of being right. Simply put, the logical construction of the theorem is
sound in comprising the value of the vote in the exercise of our
epistemic responsibilities in different instances of variance observable
in democracy, sometimes even surpassing the initial premises
instrumental to the theorem itself. That being said however, the
theorem proves still to be incomplete in fully accounting for the
dynamic character of democracy. While it is successful in providing us
a glimpse of the epistemic powers of the vote, it does so removed from
establishing a need for diversity and conscientiousness, both of which
are instrumental aspects of the exercise of democracy. Anderson states
that [the Condorcet Jury Theorem] works even if voters are
epistemically homogeneous, meaning to say that voters diversity is of
little consequence to deriving the right option. In contrast, democracy
thrives in diversity. Society is innately complex, both in what comprises
it and in what it tries to resolve; and there is fair room to argue that the
best possible option does not only arise from the perspectives of an
epistemically homogenous majority, but may arise from the
contentions inherent to epistemically diverse minorities. In fact, it
works contrary to the nature of democracy for one epistemically
homogenous majority to dictate the recourse that applies for the
whole. Democracy should, theoretically, provide avenues, checks and
balances, by which one is able to build an opposition to the
predominance of an epistemically homogenous majority. Further,
societal complexity in any democracy presupposes asymmetrically
distributed knowledge, knowledge that is necessary in deriving the
best option of which is not privy only to one social class, gender, age,
or religion. Thus, in voting for the right option, we cannot entirely rely
on our individual biases and should, in interest of conscientiousness,
involve in our calculus a knowledge that is available only to people of
different, if not opposing, views.
Second, the Condorcet Jury Theorem presumes (or more accurately,
suggests) that voters vote independently of one another. Anderson
discusses that while this does not rule out all influence of voters on

one another (Estlund 1994), it is unclear whether the Theorem is

robust under the actual patterns of influence characteristic of modern
democracies. Contextually, it is a normative characteristic of
democracy to involve certain institutional and agential mechanisms by
which all constituents are able to freely involve themselves in
discourse, organize themselves, and create the means to gain access
to asymmetrically distributed information. Discourse is a necessity in
democracy. The ability to freely talk prior, during, and after a vote is
instrumental to its exercise. Institutions like the free press, and
organized agential participation through public fora and even protests
provide mutual influences outside of voting which are not mere
externalities or accidental features to the political process, but are
constitutive to democracy itself. We cannot remove ourselves from
influence as it is advent to democracy, albeit unintentionally.
Removing ourselves from the structures that influence the vote
removes us as well from viable sources of knowledge necessary in the
exercise of the vote. Often, votes made in vacuity, derived solely from
personal biased or assumed and unverified conditions, lead to
misinformed and prejudiced votes. In assuming that one is separated
from influence, it assumes as well that the vote needs to be derived
away from discourse. This proposition is problematic in the sense that
the exercise of democracy (and by extension, the theory we use to
deconstruct it) requires for the instance by which both discourse and
the vote correlate with each other (rather than contradict each other)
in deriving the best option.
In order to account for a model of democracy that admits the dynamics of discourse and
the vote, we lean towards John Dewey and his experimental conception of democracy.
Dewey defines democracy as a mode of associated living, of conjoint, communicated
experience. From the definition, we could derive two distinctions which makes his
model more responsive. First is the recognition that democracy is more than just a form
of government, but a mode of associated living. Thus, it requires an understanding of
the complex social contrivances in operation in a democracy which surpasses principles
of governance. These complex social contrivances allow us to understand the social
requirement set for democracy to function is more than just for the purposes of creating a
functioning institution that regulates shared rights, but rather it responds to social and
ethical demands of shared living where responsibility resides not only in the character of
law nor in a shared national identity, but in a society built from a premise of shared
beliefs. Second, Dewey emphasizes the need for a communicated experience which
gives value to discourse as a necessary component in the exercise of democracy.
Experiences need to be communicated, there has to have an active element to it, and not
merely a consequence.
Deweys account of democracy makes use of social intelligence to address problems of
practical interest. It employs a progressive look in institutional construction and factors in
the limitations of institutions in predicting the operational concerns that may arise upon

implementation. Contextually, this progressive framework succumbs to the experimental

attitude predominantly exercised in the positivist tradition. He argues that deliberation
(contemporary to the democratic process) is a kind of thought experiment where we
review proposition within the extent of our imagination, factoring in a variance of
interests, which we later test and evaluate. The results of the process are not indicative of
the value of the social experiment in the sense that the experiment may lead to a negative
result, but not out of consequence to the process rather an unavoidable potentiality and a
essential step in deciphering the best possible option. This behavioral requirement
responds to a principle of trial and error -that to arrive to the best possible option, we
would have to accept the possibility of failure. Also, Dewey notes that this exercise is not
limited only to dominant political agents within a democratic society. In his experimental
conception of democracy, he accounts for citizens at large as agents in active discourse
with representatives and state officials. This, then, does not limit the discourse as one that
exists only within governments, nor does it relegate the role of voting merely as seeking
out representation. The active discourse between citizens and their representatives,
further accounting for non-governing institutions like the free press, civil society, and
pervasive market forces, allows for some level of accountability from all parties involved.
My inclination to Deweys conception of democracy arises from the interesting account it
has that leaves room for explaining the epistemic powers observable in democracy. It
accounts for the importance of diversity and discourse in the exercise of democracy by
focusing on the experimental nature of the democratic process as well as accounting for
the importance of discussion post testing any given solution. However, it will not go
uncontested. While undoubtedly Deweys experimental conception of democracy is
flexible enough to allow an analysis of the epistemic powers in play, one inevitably fails
to address an agents or an institutions liability to the beliefs they form. The assumption
is that as long as there are a variety of political actors within a framework of discourse,
that inevitably the most conscientious answer arises. This in itself is problematic in the
sense that if we do not find the political actors (and by extension, the political institutions
in place) in anyway epistemically accountable for the means by which they form their
beliefs, then we inevitably invite unwarranted, if not false beliefs to enter the arena. In
practice, one might argue that such cases are inevitable, and that discourse provides a
means by which this can be addressed (that the constant conflict arising from two
opposing beliefs will give rise to the best held belief). But the context by which discourse
illuminates the best possible option does so still with the interest of the majority in mind.
If that is the case, then we must ponder the possibility that within a framework of
democracy, if an unwarranted false belief becomes a matter of popular opinion, then
democracy dictates it to be a matter of legal norm. Is this then still democratic? I think
not. Democracy does not operate within a principle of absolute freedoms, or at least it
shouldnt. This is because if we build our context of democracy within a principle of
freedom that does not add within its calculus the interests of everyone in society, power
then becomes the sole primary mechanism by which one is able to exercise freedom. The
more power you have, the more free you become. A system that propagates freedom
based off ones ability to exercise power is not a democracy.

Further, if one is not accountable to the beliefs that they form, they become far more
susceptible to the influences of particularly powerful entities and institutions in their
belief formation. It goes without contention that institutions play a large role in the
democratic process. Institutions provide a necessary stream if information and
propaganda generally inaccessible to the public otherwise. The free press provides an
unadulterated stream of information relevant to day-to-day affairs. Political Parties
provide a streamlined agenda for the candidates vying for government positions. Civil
Society provides a set of consolidated demands from politically active constituents. All
these are required for the exercise of democracy. However, it remains the role of the
political actor to collect the asymmetrically distributed information and filter the
information he receives to form his belief accordingly. If we cannot hold the constituents
to be epistemologically accountable for the beliefs they form, then inevitably political
actors may opt to secure themselves to the beliefs espoused by these institutions
unconscientiously and without critique and still see it as legitimate and democratic. The
threat may not seem so apparent until we entertain the possibility where an institution
amasses enough power to manipulate various channels of information arising from the
unconscientious belief formation of political actors in support of it leading to the
marginalization of the democratic process in favor of the said institution.
Conscientiousness serves as a mechanism to regulate the accountability of various
institutions in the exercise of their power. Epistemologically conscientious agents are not
only valuable in the sense that votes must be born from reflection and discourse, but they
also serve as assessors in the epistemic responsibility of institutions.
To resolve these issues, I propose a restructuring of Deweys definition of democracy in
order to include epistemic responsibility and conscientiousness as necessary
requirements. Wed then proceed to define democracy as a mode of associated living, of
conjoint, communicated experience by epistemically conscientious agents in exercise of
their constitutive freedoms.
Social Epistemology
To proceed with establishing a theory of social epistemology within democracies, it
becomes important to analyze the various components that exist within a democracy and
investigate their epistemic powers. Contemporary with the prevalent debates in political
theory, power often ascribes to either agents or structures (institutions). Both are
prevalent entities in a democratic society and are constitutive to the democratic process.
In understanding the social epistemology concerned in a democratic society, one needs to
analyze as well the nature and flow of asymmetrically distributed information in and
between agents and structures and how these information are gathered assessed and
dispersed in the interest of developing solutions to problems of democracy.
Colin Hay defines Agency as action, in our case to political conduct; the ability or
capacity of an actor to act consciously and in doing, to attempt to realize his or her
intentions. The term agency is often associated with a range of other concepts such as
reflexivity (the ability of the actor to consciously monitor and to reflect upon the
consequences of previous action), rationality (the capacity of an actor to select modes of

action or conduct best likely to realize a given set of preferences), and motivation (the
desire or passion with which an actor approaches the attempt to realize a particular
intention or preference).
Consequently, Colin Hay defines a Structure as a context and refers to the setting within
which social, political and economic events occur and acquire meaning and that it refers
to the ordered nature of social and political relations-to the fact that political institutions,
practices, routines and conventions appear to exhibit some regularity or structure over
time. Structural factors define the context with which political events, outcome, and
effects occur outside the immediate control of the agent.
The nature of the debates that expand through theoretical dimensions of metaphysics,
ethics, political and economic theory, and epistemology is one that classically pins
agential factor in contention with structural factors in constructing the worldview.
However, recent theories account (Colin Hay, Habermas, Rawls) that the conundrum
associated with structure and agency goes beyond the debate as both are vital to the
formation of a worldview. Epistemologists submit that both structure and agency possess
a considerable level of epistemic powers, at least enough to be of consequence to the
formation of public preferences and the vote.
In recognizing the role of agents and structures in the formation of belief systems and in
the search for truth within a democratic society, it is important to note, however, that
these roles are comparatively different. Agents, as active participators in a democracy,
serve largely as sporadic initiators of belief, built from either preference or interest, or
from reason (or both). Agents often enjoy the sole liberty of being able to vote upon the
prevalent issues of the day putting in a main stake in addressing individual preferences in
addressing matters of public interest. For example, in matters involving the construction
of laws, agents are provided two main means by which they can form their beliefs and
directly espouse those beliefs in the formation of public policy. First, they are given the
sole power to select their representatives in government and can decide to do so relative
to the similarities in the positions they hold with the positions potential candidates hold in
relevant issues of the day. Second, agents are given a direct ability to influence the
creation of laws through an initiative, where loosely organized individuals may, with
enough support, push through a law with the context that it is a matter of public interest.
Comparatively, structures do not hold this power. Structural entities are not given
epistemic powers to directly involve in the vote. Despite this however, the structures
become instrumental in the epistemic process in arriving to a vote. While agents (as
highlighted in the Concordet Jury Theorem) have the advantage of being able to decipher
the best possible option brought forth by their ability to vote individually, they are poorly
equipped with amassing large quantities of asymmetrically distributed information
available within society. Structures (Institutions), like the free press and civil society, play
a vital role in making diverse perspectives and contending notions and analysis available
to the agents in order for them to make more conscientious decisions.
In this sense, it is important as well to categorically discuss separately the epistemic
responsibilities of both structural and agential factors in a democracy. Anderson discusses
that, relative to institutional epistemology, the problems we need to solve demand the

utilization of information that is highly dispersed across society as somehow the

information made available to agents in a society must be brought to bear solutions to the
problems they face. Socially dispersed information can be located in three major facets of
democracy: discourse, the vote and the market (economics). In this paper I will focus on
the vote and discourse as the market is highly fluid and the constructs by which it is
defined can be arbitrary within different types of democracy (democracy does not
particularly recommend a particular mode for the production and distribution of goods in
a society). Further, the market does not provide a means to arrive at solutions of public
interest, which is of central importance to democracy.
It must be noted that the democracy does not concern itself to solve every individual
problem but rather centers itself to answer problems of public interest. Anderson
expounds that The epistemic needs and powers of any institution should be assessed
relative to the problems it needs to solve. Contextually she defines this as problems (a)
of public interest, the efficient solution to which requires (b) joint action by citizens, (c)
through the law.
Why is it important to note that the problems of democracy are problems of public
interest? As discussed in the previous section, democracy thrives in diversity and
discourse, and much of the individual problems faced by society are in fact born from
difference and discourse. Matters of individual interest may be pervasive in a society but
equally may not hinder the exercise of democracy. Disagreement and conflicts are
inevitable to a certain extent, much as a subtext to the rich differentiation of perspectives
within a framework that allows them to discuss these issues freely. Fixing problems of
individual interests will inevitably lead to an epistemic homogeneity within the agents in
society, which we established in earlier sections of this paper to be counterproductive to
the exercise of democracy.
Public interest is a matter entirely different in the sense that it involves not only a large
section of society, but factors in the daily business needed in preserving that society. To
make this point clear, suppose we are made to discuss the national budgetary allocations
in our country. In any given year, one of the primary tasks of the Legislative Branch of
the Philippine Government is to assess the needs of the nation and align it with the
national goals and targets of the country. As discussed, the way we spend our budget as a
nation is not merely a reflection of the projected areas of national expense, but an
indication of what the current administrations priorities are (budgetary allocation is
given to projects/policies that current administrators see as issues of relevance). This is a
matter of public interest. In general, it matters to us individually as we all contribute to
the amount that the government allocates through taxation, but it applies to society as a
whole as the budgetary allocation dictates the direction by which our nation will proceed
in the year to come. If, say, the budgetary allotment for education is reduced in the
applicable year (factoring in inflation rates and comparative market prices), it is not
merely a matter of operational concern (in fact, it rarely is the case) but rather is
indicative of its priority in the national agenda put forth by the majority in office, which
is of grave importance not only to those economically dependent to the government
subsidy but to the entire nation as a whole.

In contrary, in discussing issues of establishing, say, a national religion, modern

democracies opt not to define it as a matter of public interest as principally the notion is
virtually of no political consequence to the society. While it may be important for
Christians, as private individuals or even as an institution, to put forth one faith for all
citizens of a given nation, it is not seen as an improvement of the democratic exercise of
the rest of the individuals whose appropriate religion youll arbitrarily define.
In the interest of addressing matters of public interest, one needs then to go back to
discourse and the vote for the mere fact that private interests may be held by a substantial
number of people does not automatically constitute it as a matter of public interest. It is in
utilizing discourse as a means to thresh out through the concerns and shelve matters of
private interest thus putting into light matters of public interest, and the vote is needed to
ratify and legitimate these concerns. It is then important to address not merely the
categories by which we develop a criteria of success that relies solely on the outcome of
the process, but one that constitutes the means by which the vote was made, and the
avenues needed to revise, if need be, upon and after implementation. This criteria then
does not only qualify the rationality of the arguments or its ability to proceed to an
intended outcome, but also assess the conscientiousness of a believer in the process of
forming their beliefs, and thus in voting.
The Democratic Process of Suffrage
The mechanism by which we vote in a democratic society is not merely as how
Concordet theorized. While it provides a means by which we can understand the
probability principle positively associated with the democratic process of suffrage, one
cannot entirely account for the nature and power of dissent, nor the epistemic dynamics
in play. Dewey also fell short in discussing the process, but only in leaving out the need
for epistemic responsibility for the agents and institutions in play. Democracy involves
internal and external discourse permeating through the process of suffrage. In context,
one who is presumed to be an admirable democratic participant must be able to
preoccupy himself with internal reflection and external dialogue in the process of forming
his beliefs about a particular issue of public interest. In this discourse, one is made to
question his beliefs in contention with other peoples beliefs with the interest of arriving
at the best possible option, putting within calculus the interest of the society as he sees it.
This dialogue involves all willing players in the society, guided by the information made
available through institutions, to participate and in the process deliver the best possible
options at the least cost to the society. Society, then, puts the question to a vote, putting
forth the solutions proposed and in the process arrives at the option seen most appropriate
by the majority. This, however, is not the end to the democratic process. Upon voting for
the best possible option, the minority reserves the power of dissent upon which a time
when, upon assessment usually initiated by institutions, we find that it is not responsive
to the issues we intended to resolve or may have led to undesirable externalities we prefer
not to have. In these cases, we are provided with the opportunity to revise our vote, or
revise the solutions we saw fit.

In this process flow of the democratic process of suffrage it is clear that the agent and the
institution both employ certain epistemic powers. On one end, an institution is provided
the responsibility to gathering and filtering asymmetrically distributed information that
can be sourced in variety from societal sub and superstructures and to make these
available for the general public to consume, appropriate, or reject. At the other, agents are
provided with the responsibility of taking the necessary information available to them,
both as derived from their own faculties and to the ones derived from institutions they
trust, and try to determine and vote on a course of action that will not only benefit
themselves, but the rest of society as well. In the exercise of these powers, it becomes
apparent that the requirement to adhere to a particular level of ethical culpability is not
only one ascribed to an ethereal aspiration of being perfectly rational, but rather is
constituent to an epistemic aspiration to arrive at some semblance of knowledge.
Knowledge then can be seen as a good, as something desirable, even instrumental, in a
democratic society.
Virtues and the Admirable Democratic Agent
In this sense, it then becomes a matter of importance for an admirable democratic agent
to aspire for truth, more so for knowledge. In a democracy, it comes without need of
exposition that matters of public interest are matters that we collectively care about. Then
should it not be the case that in things that we care about we are able to have knowledge
about it? Is it not the case that to effectively address matters of public interest, agents
need to acquire knowledge about it? Linda Zagzebski argues that we must care about
having true beliefs in the domains we care about, that we must arrive at a certain belief
with a concern for truth. Caring about what we believe demands conscientiousness both
in our belief forming capacities and in the beliefs we opt to hold. This is none more so
relevant than in the democratic process of suffrage. It must then be assumed that if we
care about being part of a democratic society that we must be able to form true beliefs
about it, or more appropriately, in the decisions we make in the exercise and preservation
of the democratic process. It is because we care that we stay democratic that one should
be able to be conscientious about the belief he forms and espouses.
The requirement to be conscientious applies to both the institutions and the agents in
play. Institutions are constructed by organized and collectivized agents and their beliefs.
Some institutions have no observable face, but may be reflective of a common dogma or
prejudice. Other institutions have more observable membership and can be individually
accounted in their contributions to the collective perspective espoused by the institution.
Nonetheless, the beliefs that evolved as expressed by institutions are principally made by
agents, and as such are held in the same level of accountability. It is then for the better
interest of democracy for all agents, and thus subsequently all institutions to develop
conscientiousness in their belief forming capacities.
If we are to conceptualize an admirable democratic agent as an epistemically
conscientious individual, we then must substantiate what it means to be conscientious.
Zagzebski states that conscientiousness requires self-trust. She suggests that while
conscientiousness may not guarantee truth, nor knowledge, in being conscientious one is

more capable of arriving at truth than the opposite. She expounds I can be careful, be
thorough in seeking and evaluating evidence, be open-minded, listen to those with a
contrary view, and so forth, but there are no guarantees. This, if anything, highlights the
attitude one needs to have in order to be conscientious, that we must be epistemically
cautious in the beliefs we form, that we need to seek out evidence and be thorough, that
we need to explore the possibility that we are not privy to all answers, and that we need
to be able to listen to opposing views. Further, she discusses that since we are social
individuals, our belief forming capabilities are not merely an individual function. That in
forming belief, we do so depending upon other people. This requires a different kind of
trust, but trust all the same. She states that the logic of caring requires that we live in a
community of epistemic trust. How then are we capable of forging trust? Where will it
lie in our calculus? How then can we differentiate which agents and institutions we can
trust from those that we cannot?
Zagzebski indirectly provides us with the answer. In constituting an epistemology that
requires us not merely to look at the validity of a particular proposition but equally
questions the conscientiousness of a believer, particularly the virtues he exhibits in the
process of espousing a particular belief, one is then able to develop a calculus by which
to measure trustworthiness. In Virtues of the Mind, Zagzebski states that virtue theory
focuses on virtue, not because it maintains that the concept of a virtue is more
fundamental than the concept of a right act, but because it contends that the concept of
virtue offers the most useful criterion for the Rightness of an act. This is a very
interesting notion in the sense that it must be constitutive that the calculus by which we
measure trustworthiness must not arbitrarily apply to all cases, but still must be able to
provide a general measure or criterion. In using virtues as a measure, we are able to agree
on a context by which an act is constituted relative to case-per-case conditions, but does
so with a set criterion unprejudiced by the preservation of individual interests. Thus to be
democratic is to be epistemically virtuous.
The Closing
Admirable democratic (epistemically virtuous) agents are instrumental for the
preservation and propagation of democracy. This is because admirable democratic agents
work within a framework of democracy that makes use of discourse and diversity in order
to vote on the best options available conscientiously and with collective interests in sight.
Problems of public interest require a level of moral and epistemic accountability (that
cannot be categorically dichotomized) from all political actors involved as the nature of
participation characteristic of democracy is vulnerable for abuse otherwise.
Consequently, suffrage, as a democratic process, requires the same. The ability to vote
comes with a moral demand to choose not merely out of personal preference, but in
should be in full, conscientious view of what would benefit society as a whole.