3.

DefinitionandConcepts
a.Jurisdictiondistinguishedfromexerciseofjurisdiction
Jurisdiction is not the same as the exercise of jurisdiction. As distinguished from the exercise of
jurisdiction, jurisdiction is the authority to decide a cause, and not the decision rendered therein.
Wherethereisjurisdictionoverthepersonandthesubjectmatter,thedecisiononallotherquestions
arisinginthecaseisbutanexerciseofthejurisdiction.Andtheerrorswhichthecourtmaycommitin
theexerciseofjurisdictionaremerelyerrorsofjudgmentwhicharethepropersubjectofanappeal.
CASES:
AntoninovRegistryofDeeds
TheRTCalsoruledthatitdidnotacquirejurisdictionoverAntoninoscomplaintinviewofherfailure
topaythecorrectamountofdocketfees.
Further, it is important to note that in a petition for annulment of judgment based on lack of
jurisdiction,thepetitionermustshownotmerelyanabuseofjurisdictionaldiscretionbutanabsolute
lackofjurisdiction. Theconceptoflackofjurisdictionasagroundtoannulajudgmentdoesnot
embraceabuseofdiscretion.Petitioner,byclaiminggraveabuseofdiscretiononthepartofthetrial
court,actuallyconcedesandpresupposesthejurisdictionofthecourttotakecognizanceofthecase.
Sheonlyassailsthemannerinwhichthetrialcourtformulateditsjudgmentintheexerciseofits
jurisdiction.Itfollowsthatpetitionercannotuselackofjurisdictionasgroundtoannulthejudgment
byclaiminggraveabuseofdiscretion.Inthiscasewherethecourtrefusedtoexercisejurisdictiondue
toimpropervenue,neitherlackofjurisdictionnorgraveabuseofdiscretionisavailabletochallenge
theassailedorderofdismissalofthetrialcourt.
Jurisdiction is not the same as the exercise of jurisdiction. As distinguished from the exercise of
jurisdiction, jurisdiction is the authority to decide a cause, and not the decision rendered therein.
Wherethereisjurisdictionoverthepersonandthesubjectmatter,thedecisiononallotherquestions
arisinginthecaseisbutanexerciseofthejurisdiction.Andtheerrorswhichthecourtmaycommitin
theexerciseofjurisdictionaremerelyerrorsofjudgmentwhicharethepropersubjectofanappeal.
SpouseAbrenicavLawFirmofAbrenica
Lastly,theCAheldthatthefactthatthetrialcourtwasnotdesignatedasaspecialcommercialcourt
didnotmeanthatthelatterhadnojurisdictionoverthecase.Theappellatecourtstatedthat,inany
event,petitionerscouldhaveraisedthismatteronappealorthroughapetitionforcertiorariunder
Rule65,buttheydidnotdoso.
nthecaseatbar,notonlyhasthecourtaquojurisdictionoverthesubjectmatterandoverthepersons
oftheparties,whatpetitioneristrulycomplaining[of]hereisonlyapossibleerrorintheexerciseof
jurisdiction,notontheissueofjurisdictionitself.Wherethereisjurisdictionoverthepersonandthe
subjectmatter(asinthiscase),thedecisiononallotherquestionsarisinginthecaseisbutanexercise
ofthejurisdiction.Andtheerrorswhichthecourtmaycommitintheexerciseofjurisdictionaremerely
errors of judgment which are the proper subject of
anappeal

SpousesManilavSpousesManzo
OnDecember22,1998,respondentsfiledapetitionforannulmentoftheRTCdecisionintheCA.
RespondentsassailedtheRTCfororderingthemtoselltheirpropertytopetitionersarguingthatsaid
courtsappellatejurisdictioninejectmentcasesislimitedtothedeterminationofwhoisentitledtothe
physicalpossessionofrealpropertyandtheonlyjudgmentitcanrenderinfavorofthedefendantisto
recoverhiscosts,whichjudgmentisconclusiveonlyontheissueofpossessionanddoesnotaffectthe
ownershipoftheland.Theycontendedthatthesaleofrealpropertybyonepartytoanothermaybe
ordered by the RTC only in a case for specific performance falling under its original exclusive
jurisdiction,notintheexerciseofitsappellatejurisdictioninanejectmentcase. Respondentsalso
allegedthatthepetitionforannulmentistheonlyremedyavailabletothembecausetheordinary
remediesofnewtrial,appeal,petitionforrelieforotherappropriateremediesarenolongeravailable
throughnofaultontheirpart.
It must be stressed that the main action before the Metropolitan Trial Court is one for ejectment
groundedontheexpirationofthepartiescontractoflease. Andsaidcourt,findingthatpetitioners
haveavalidrighttoaskfortheejectmentofprivaterespondents,orderedthelattertovacatethe
premisesandtopaytheirrentalsinarrears.ToOurmind,whattherespondentcourtshouldhavedone
inthe exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, wasto confine itself to theissueof whether ornot
petitionershaveavalidcauseofactionforejectmentagainsttheprivaterespondents.
Unfortunately,inthedecisionhereinsoughttobeannulled,therespondentcourtwentfurtherthan
whatisrequiredofitasanappellatecourtwhenitorderedthepetitionerstoselltheirpropertiestothe
privaterespondents. Inaveryrealsense, therespondentcourtmateriallychangedthenatureof
petitionerscauseofactionbydecidingthequestionofownershipevenastheappealedcase
involvesonlytheissueofprior physicalpossessionwhich,ineveryejectmentsuit,istheonly
questiontobe resolved. Asitwere,therespondentcourtconvertedtheissuetooneforspecific
performancewhichfallsunderitsoriginal,notappellatejurisdiction.Sadtosay,thiscannotbedone
by the respondent court in anappealedejectment casebecause the essential criterion of appellate
jurisdictionisthatitrevisesandcorrectstheproceedingsinacausealreadyinstitutedanddoesnot
createthatcause(Marburyv.Madison,1Cranch(U.S.),137,172,2L.edition60,citedin15Corpus
Juris727).
ItfollowsthattherespondentRegionalTrialCourtclearlyactedwithoutjurisdictionwhenitordered
thepetitionerstoselltheirpropertiestotheprivaterespondents.Theordertosellcanbemadeonlyby
therespondentcourtinanactionforspecificperformanceunderitsexclusiveoriginaljurisdiction,and
notintheexerciseofitsappellatejurisdictioninanappealedejectmentsuit,asinthiscase.Worse,the
reliefgrantedbythesamecourtwasnotevenprayedforbytheprivaterespondentsintheirAnswer
andpositionpaperbeforetheMTC,whereattheyonlyaskedforthedismissalofthecomplaintfiled
againstthem
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR IN ANNULLING THE
JUDGMENTBYTHEREGIONALTRIALCOURTOFMAKATICITYONTHEGROUNDOFLACKOF
JURISDICTIONWHENITHASNOTBEENSHOWNTHATTHEREGIONALTRIALCOURTOFMAKATI
CITY HAD NO JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF THE RESPONDENTS OR THE SUBJECT
MATTEROFTHECLAIM
Inanyevent,thepetitionforannulmentwasbasednotonfraudulentassurancesornegligentactsof
theircounsel,butonlackofjurisdiction.

PetitionersassailtheCAinholdingthattheRTCdecisionisvoidbecauseitgrantedareliefinconsistent
withthenatureofanejectmentsuitandnotevenprayedforbytherespondentsintheiranswer. They
contendthatwhatevermaybequestionableinthedecisionisagroundforassignmentoferrorson
appealorincertaincases,asgroundforaspecialcivilactionforcertiorariunderRule65andnotas
groundforitsannulment.Ontheotherhand,respondentsassertthattheCA,beingahighercourt,has
thepowertoadopt,reverseormodifythefindingsoftheRTCinthiscase.TheypointoutthattheCA
intheexerciseofitssounddiscretionfoundtheRTCsfindingsunsupportedbytheevidenceonrecord
whichalsoindicatedthatthelossofordinaryremediesofappeal,newtrialandpetitionforreviewwas
notduetothefaultoftherespondents.
Weagreewiththepetitioners.
Lackofjurisdictionasagroundforannulmentofjudgmentreferstoeitherlackofjurisdictionoverthe
personofthedefendingpartyoroverthesubjectmatteroftheclaim.[16]Inapetitionforannulment
ofjudgmentbasedonlackofjurisdiction,petitionermustshownotmerelyanabuseofjurisdictional
discretionbutanabsolutelackofjurisdiction.Lackofjurisdictionmeansabsenceofornojurisdiction,
thatis,thecourtshouldnothavetakencognizanceofthepetitionbecausethelawdoesnotvestitwith
jurisdictionoverthesubjectmatter. Jurisdictionoverthenatureoftheactionorsubjectmatteris
conferredbylaw.[17]
ThereisnodisputethattheRTCisvestedwithappellatejurisdictionoverejectmentcasesdecidedby
theMeTC,MTCorMCTC.WenotethatpetitionersattackonthevalidityoftheRTCdecisionpertains
toarelieferroneouslygrantedonappeal,andbeyondthescopeofjudgmentprovidedinSection6
(nowSection17)ofRule70.[18] Whilethecourtinanejectmentcasemaydelveontheissueof
ownershiporpossessiondejure solelyforthepurposeofresolvingtheissueofpossessiondefacto, it
hasnojurisdictiontosettlewithfinalitytheissueofownership[19]andanypronouncementmadebyit
onthequestionofownershipisprovisionalinnature.[20]Ajudgmentinaforcibleentryordetainer
casedisposesofnootherissuethanpossessionandestablishesonlywhohastherightofpossession,but
bynomeansconstitutesabartoanactionfordeterminationofwhohastherightortitleofownership.
[21]WehaveheldthatalthoughitwasproperfortheRTC,onappealintheejectmentsuit,todelve
on the issue of ownership and receive evidence on possession de jure, it cannot adjudicate with
semblanceoffinalitytheownershipofthepropertytoeitherpartybyorderingthecancellationofthe
TCT.[22]
Inthiscase,theRTCactedinexcessofitsjurisdictionindecidingtheappealofrespondentswhen,
instead of simply dismissing the complaint and awarding any counterclaim for costs due to the
defendants(petitioners),itorderedtherespondentslessorstoexecuteadeedofabsolutesaleinfavor
ofthepetitionerslessees,onthebasisofitsowninterpretationoftheContractofLeasewhichgranted
petitioners the option to buy the leased premises within a certain period (two years from date of
execution)andforafixedprice(P150,000.00).[23]Thiscannotbedoneinanejectmentcasewhere
theonlyissueforresolutioniswhobetweenthepartiesisentitledtothephysicalpossessionofthe
property.
Sucherroneousgrantofrelieftothedefendantsonappeal,however,isbutanexerciseofjurisdiction
bytheRTC. Jurisdictionis notthesame astheexercise ofjurisdiction.Asdistinguished fromthe
exerciseofjurisdiction,jurisdictionistheauthoritytodecideacause,andnotthedecisionrendered
therein.[24] Thegroundforannulmentofthedecision isabsenceof,orno,jurisdiction;thatis,the
courtshouldnothavetakencognizanceofthepetitionbecausethelawdoesnotvestitwithjurisdiction
overthesubjectmatter.[25]
Thus,whilerespondentsassailedthecontentoftheRTCdecision,theyfailedtoshowthattheRTCdid
nothavetheauthoritytodecidethecaseonappeal.AsweheldinYbaezv.CourtofAppeals:[26]

Onthefirstissue,wefeelthatrespondentcourtactedinadvertentlywhenitsetasidetheRTCruling
relativetothevalidityofthesubstitutedserviceofsummonsoverthepersonsofthepetitionersinthe
MTClevel.Wemustnotlosesightofthefactthatwhatwasfiledbeforerespondentcourtisanaction
toannultheRTCjudgmentandnotapetitionforreview.Annulmentofjudgmentmayeitherbebased
onthegroundthatajudgmentisvoidforwantofjurisdictionorthatthejudgmentwasobtainedby
extrinsic fraud. There is nothing in the records that could cogently show that the RTC lacked
jurisdiction.Chiefly,Section22ofB.P.Blg.129,otherwiseknownastheJudiciaryReorganizationAct
of1980,vestsupontheRTCtheexerciseofanappellatejurisdictionoverallcasesdecidedbythe
MetropolitanTrialCourts,MunicipalTrialCourts,andMunicipalCircuitTrialCourtsintheirrespective
territorialjurisdictions.Clearlythen, whentheRTCtookcognizanceofpetitionersappealfrom
theadversedecisionoftheMTCintheejectmentsuit,it(RTC)wasunquestionablyexercisingits
appellatejurisdictionasmandatedbylaw. Perforce,itsdecisionmaynotbeannulledonthe
basis of lack of jurisdiction as it has, beyond cavil, jurisdiction to decide the appeal. [27]
(Emphasissupplied.)
TheCAthereforeerredinannullingtheNovember18,1994RTCdecisiononthegroundoflackof
jurisdictionassaidcourthadjurisdictiontotakecognizanceofpetitionersappeal.
b.EssenceofAdjudicatoryPowers
CASES:
HEIRSOFSPOUSESCRISPULOFERRERandENGRACIAPUHAWANvCA

Procedurally, the Court found that the petitioners, by resorting to a certiorari petition, erred in
choosingthelegalremedyagainsttheCArulings.Wenotedthattheerrorsthepetitionersraisedwere
errorsoflawratherthanerrorsofjurisdiction,since[t]hegistof[the]petitionersobjectionstotheCA
rulingwastheappellatecourtsfailuretoappreciatetheirargumentsandevidenceinsupportoftheir
claims,butthisdoesnotamounttoanerrorofjurisdiction.Acertiorariwritwillnotbeissuedtocure
errors bythelowercourt in itsappreciationof the evidence, its conclusionsanchored on the said
findings,anditsconclusionsoflaw.Aslongasthecourtactswithinitsjurisdiction,anyallegederrors
committedintheexerciseofitsdiscretionwillamounttonothingmorethanmereerrorsofjudgment,
correctiblebyanappealxxx[by]certiorarifiledunderRule45[oftheRulesofCourt]
Theprincipleoflachesapplieswithequalforcetodefeatthepetitionersclaimover72whichwas
occupiedbyNapocorwaybackin1937.Also,wefindnoreasontodisagreewiththeRTCsfindingthat
Lot72hadalreadybeenadjudicatedinfavorof,andforwhichthepropertywasinfacttitledinthe
namesof,HilariaandVictoriaPuhawan. AstheheirsofEngraciaPuhawan,thepetitionerslikewise
havenovalidclaimover72.
The essence of the Courts adjudicatory function is to apply the law to facts, as supported by the
evidenceandtherecords.Thepetitionershavealreadyexhaustedallpossiblelegalargumentsand,as
wehavediscussed,noneofwhicharecompellingenoughtorequirereconsiderationofourpastruling.
Tobesure,repetitivefilingoflegallyuselesssubmissionscannotpressurethisCourtintotakinganother
lookatanunmeritoriouscase;theycanonlyincreasethepetitionerslegalexpenses,asinthiscase,
whereweareorderingthepaymentofdoublecostsfortheactofunnecessarilyandstubbornlywasting

theCourtstime.
c.AdherencetoJurisdiction
LUCIABARRAMEDAVDA.DEBALLESTEROSVRURALBANKOFCANAMANINC

ThisresolvestheMotiontoDismissfiledbythedefendantRuralBankofCanaman,Inc.,premisedon
the ground that thiscourt has no jurisdiction over thesubject matterof the action. This issue of
jurisdictionwasraisedinviewofthepronouncementoftheSupremeCourtinOngv.C.A.253SCRA
105andinthecaseofHernandezv.RuralBankofLucena,Inc.,G.R.No.L29791dated,whereinit
washeldthattheliquidationcourtshallhavejurisdictiontoadjudicateallclaimsagainstthebank
whethertheybeagainstassetsoftheinsolventbank,forSpecificPerformance,BreachofContract,
Damagesorwhatever.
ItisinviewofthisjurisprudentialpronouncementmadebynolessthantheSupremeCourt,thatthis
caseis,asfarasdefendantRuralBankofCanamanInc.,isconcerned,herebyorderedDISMISSED
withoutprejudiceonthepartoftheplaintifftoventilatetheirclaimbeforethenow,RTCBranch59,.
Indeed,theCourtrecognizesthedoctrineonadherenceofjurisdiction.Lucia,however,mustbe
remindedthatsuchprincipleisnotwithoutexceptions.ItiswelltoquotetherulingoftheCAonthis
matter,thus:
ThisCourtisnotunmindfulnorunawareofthedoctrineontheadherenceofjurisdiction.However,
theruleonadherenceofjurisdictionisnotabsoluteandhasexceptions.Oneoftheexceptionsisthat
whenthechangeinjurisdictioniscurativeincharacter(Garciav.Martinez,90SCRA331[1979];
Calderon,Sr.v.CourtofAppeals,100SCRA459[1980]; AtlasFertilizerCorporationv.Navarro,149
SCRA432[1987];Abadv.RTCofManila,Br.Lll,154SCRA664[1987]).
AsregardsLuciascontentionthatjurisdictionalreadyattachedwhenCivilCaseNo.IR3128wasfiled
with,andjurisdictionobtainedby,theRTCIrigapriortothefilingoftheliquidationcasebeforethe
RTCMakati,herstancefailstopersuadethisCourt.
Thiscontentionisuntenable.Thetimeofthefilingofthecomplaintisimmaterial.Itistheexecution
thatwillobviouslyprejudicetheotherdepositorsandcreditors.Moreover,asstatedinthesaidMorfe
case,theeffectofthejudgmentisonlytofixtheamountofthedebt,andnottogivepriorityoverother
depositorsandcreditors.
Thus,toallowLuciascasetoproceedindependentlyoftheliquidationcase,apossibilityoffavorable
judgmentandexecutionthereofagainsttheassetsofRBCIwouldnotonlyprejudicetheothercreditors
anddepositorsbutwoulddefeattheverypurposeforwhichaliquidationcourtwasconstitutedaswell.
ThepowerandauthorityoftheMonetaryBoardtoclosebanksandliquidatethemthereafterwhen
publicinterestsorequiresisanexerciseofthepolicepoweroftheState. Policepower,however,is
subjecttojudicialinquiry.Itmaynotbeexercisedarbitrarilyorunreasonablyandcouldbesetasideif
itiseithercapricious,discriminatory,whimsical,arbitrary,unjust,oristantamounttoadenialofdue
processandequalprotectionclausesoftheConstitution.[15]
Insum,thisCourtholdsthattheconsolidationisproperconsideringthattheliquidationcourthas
jurisdictionoverLuciasaction. ItwouldbemoreinkeepingwithlawandequityifLuciascaseis

consolidatedwiththeliquidationcaseinordertoexpeditiouslydeterminewhethersheisentitledto
recoverthepropertysubjectofmortgagefromRBCIand,ifso,howmuchsheisentitledtoreceivefrom
theremainingassetsofthebank.
d.ContradistinguishedfromVenue
Indismissingthepetitionforlackofjurisdiction,theRTC,initsOrderdatedSeptember16,2011,
apparentlyreliedonSCAdministrativeOrder(A.O.)No.7definingtheterritorialareasoftheRegional
Trial Courts in Regions 1 to 12, and Administrative Circular (Admin. Circular) No. 232008, 13
designating the environmental courts "to try and decide violations of environmental laws x x x
committed within their respective territorial jurisdictions." 14 Thus, it ruled that its territorial
jurisdictionwaslimitedwithintheboundariesofSorsogonCityandtheneighboringmunicipalitiesof
Donsol,Pilar,Castilla,CasiguranandJubanandthatitwas"bereftofjurisdictiontoentertain,hearand
decide[the]case,assuchauthorityrestsbeforeanothercoequalcourt."15
Suchreasoningisplainlyerroneous.TheRTCcannotsolelyrelyonSCA.O.No.7andAdmin.Circular
No.232008andconfineitselfwithinitsfourcornersindeterminingwhetherithadjurisdictionover
theactionfiledbythepetitioners.
Noneismorewellsettledthantherulethatjurisdiction,whichisthepowerandauthorityofthecourt
tohear,tryanddecideacase,isconferredbylaw. 16Itmayeitherbeoverthenatureoftheaction,over
thesubjectmatter,overthepersonofthedefendantsorovertheissuesframedinthepleadings. 17By
virtueofBatasPambansa(B.P.)Blg.129ortheJudiciaryReorganizationActof1980,jurisdictionover
specialcivilactionsforcertiorari,prohibitionandmandamusisvestedintheRTC.Particularly,Section
21(1)thereofprovidesthattheRTCsshallexerciseoriginaljurisdiction
in the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and
injunctionwhichmaybeenforcedinanypartoftheirrespectiveregions.(Emphasisours)
TheRTCneednotberemindedthatvenuerelatesonlytotheplaceoftrialorthegeographicallocation
inwhichanactionorproceedingshouldbebroughtanddoesnotequatetothejurisdictionofthe
court.Itisintendedtoaccordconveniencetotheparties,asitrelatestotheplaceoftrial,anddoesnot
restricttheiraccesstothecourts. 22Consequently,theRTCsmotupropriodismissalofCivilCaseNo.
20118338onthegroundoflackofjurisdictionispatentlyincorrect.
Atmost,theerrorcommittedbythepetitionersinfilingthecasewiththeRTCofSorsogonwasthatof
improper venue. A.M. No. 0968SC or the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases (Rules)
specificallystatesthataspecialcivilactionforcontinuingmandamusshallbefiledwiththe"[RTC]
exercisingjurisdictionovertheterritorywheretheactionableneglectoromissionoccurredxxx." 23In
thiscase,itappearsthattheallegedactionableneglectoromissionoccurredintheMunicipalityof
Matnogandassuch,thepetitionshouldhavebeenfiledintheRTCofIrosin. 24Buteventhen,itdoes
notwarranttheoutrightdismissalofthepetitionbytheRTCasvenuemaybewaived. 25Moreover,the
action filed by the petitioners is not criminal in nature where venue is an essential element of
jurisdiction.26InGomezCastillov.CommissiononElections, 27theCourtevenexpressedthatwhatthe
RTCshouldhavedoneunderthecircumstanceswastotransferthecase(anelectionprotest)tothe
properbranch.Similarly,itwouldservethehigherinterestofjustice 28iftheCourtordersthetransfer
ofCivil CaseNo.20118338totheRTCofIrosinforproperandspeedyresolution,withtheRTC
applyingtheRulesinitsdispositionofthecase.

\
AngvSpousesAng
On November 21, 2006, the respondents moved for the dismissal of the complaint filed by the
petitioners on the grounds of improper venue and prescription. Insisting that the venue of the
petitionersactionwasimproperlylaid,therespondentsassertedthatthecomplaintagainstthemmay
onlybefiledinthecourtoftheplacewhereeithertheyorthepetitionersreside.Theyaverredthatthey
reside in Bacolod City while the petitioners reside in Los Angeles, California, USA. Thus, the
respondents maintain, the filing of the complaint against them in the RTC of Quezon City was
improper.
CARuling
Asmaybeclearlygleanedfromtheforegoing,theplaceofresidenceoftheplaintiffsattorneyinfactis
ofnomomentwhenitcomestoascertainingthevenueofcasesfiledinbehalfoftheprincipalsince
whatshouldbeconsideredistheresidenceoftherealpartiesininterest,i.e.[,]theplaintifforthe
defendant, asthecasemaybe. Residenceisthepermanent homethe place towhich, whenever
absentforbusinessorpleasure,oneintendstoreturn.Residenceisvitalwhendealingwithvenue.
Plaintiffs, herein private respondents, being residents of Los Angeles, California, U.S.A., which is
beyondtheterritorialjurisdictionofPhilippinecourts,thecaseshouldhavebeenfiledinBacolodCity
wherethedefendants,hereinpetitioners,reside.SincethecasewasfiledinQuezonCity,wherethe
representativeoftheplaintiffsresides,contrarytoSec.2ofRule4ofthe1997RulesofCourt,thetrial
courtshouldhavedismissedthecaseforimpropervenue.15
Issue: WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW
WHENITRULEDTHATTHECOMPLAINTMUSTBEDISMISSEDONTHEGROUNDTHATVENUE
WASNOTPROPERLYLAID.
SCRuling
Thepetitionisdenied.ContrarytotheCAsdisposition,thepetitionersmaintainthattheircomplaint
for collection of sum of money against the respondents may be filed in the RTC of Quezon City.
InvokingSection3,Rule3oftheRulesofCourt,theyinsistthatAtty.Aceron,beingtheirattorneyin
fact,isdeemedarealpartyininterestinthecasebelowandcanprosecutethesamebeforetheRTC.
Suchbeingthecase,thepetitionersassert,thesaidcomplaintforcollectionofsumofmoneymaybe
filedinthecourtoftheplacewhereAtty.Aceronresides,whichistheRTCofQuezonCity.
Ontheotherhand,therespondentsintheirComment18assertthatthepetitionersareproscribedfrom
filingtheircomplaintintheRTCofQuezonCity.TheyassertthattheresidenceofAtty.Aceron,being
merelyarepresentative,isimmaterialtothedeterminationofthevenueofthe
petitionerscomplaint.
ThepetitionerscomplaintshouldhavebeenfiledintheRTCofBacolodCity,thecourtoftheplace
wheretherespondentsreside,andnotinRTCofQuezonCity.
Itisalegaltruismthattherulesonthevenueofpersonalactionsarefixedfortheconvenienceofthe
plaintiffsandtheirwitnesses.Equallysettled,however,istheprinciplethatchoosingthevenueofan
action is not left to a plaintiffs caprice; the matter is regulated by the Rules of Court.19 The

petitionerscomplaintforcollectionofsumofmoneyagainsttherespondentsisapersonalactionasit
primarilyseekstheenforcementofacontract.TheRulesgivetheplaintifftheoptionofchoosingwhere
tofilehiscomplaint.Hecanfileitintheplace(1)wherehehimselforanyofthem
resides,or(2)wherethedefendantoranyofthedefendantsresidesormaybefound.Theplaintiffor
thedefendantmustberesidentsoftheplacewheretheactionhasbeeninstitutedatthetimetheaction
iscommenced.20However,iftheplaintiffdoesnotresideinthePhilippines,thecomplaintinsuchcase
mayonlybefiledinthecourtoftheplacewherethedefendantresides.InCohenandCohenv.Benguet
CommercialCo.,Ltd.,21thisCourtheldthattherecanbenoelectionastothevenueofthefilingofa
complaintwhentheplaintiffhasnoresidenceinthePhilippines.Insuchcase,thecomplaintmayonly
befiledinthecourtoftheplacewherethedefendantresides.
Comparewith:
CSCVALFONSO
Aggrieved,respondentfiledanomnibusmotionforreconsiderationofthepreventivesuspensionorder
andrequestedachangeofvenue[11]fromtheCSCCentralOfficetotheCSCNationalCapitalRegion
(CSCNCR).Inthemotion,hearguedthatitistheCSCNCRregionalofficethathasjurisdictionover
thematterpursuanttoSection6ofCSCResolutionNo. 991936,andthattoholdotherwise may
deprivehimofhisrighttoappeal.[12]Themotionwasdenied.[
ButitisnotonlyforthisreasonthatAlfonsosargumentmustfail.Equallysignificantisthefactthathe
hadalreadysubmittedhimselftothejurisdictionoftheCSCwhenhefiledhiscounteraffidavit[27]and
hismotionforreconsiderationandrequestedforachangeofvenue,notfromtheCSCtotheBORof
PUP,butfromtheCSCCentralOfficetotheCSCNCR.[28] Itwasonlywhenhismotionwasdenied
thathesuddenlyhadachangeofheartandraisedthequestionofproperjurisdiction.[29]Thiscannot
beallowedbecauseitwouldviolatethedoctrineofresjudicata,alegalprinciplethatisapplicableto
administrativecasesaswell.[30]Attheveryleast,respondentsactiveparticipationintheproceedings
by seeking affirmative relief before the CSC already bars him from impugning the Commissions
authorityundertheprincipleofestoppelbylaches.
Inthiscase,thecomplaintaffidavitswerefiledbytwoPUPemployees.Thesecomplaintswerenot
lodgedbeforethedisciplinarytribunalofPUP,butwereinsteadfiledbeforetheCSC,withaverments
detailingrespondentsallegedviolationofcivilservicelaws,rulesandregulations.Afterafactfinding
investigation,theCommissionfoundthata primafacie caseexistedagainstAlfonso,promptingthe
Commission to file a formal charge against the latter.[32] Verily, since the complaints were filed
directlywiththeCSC,andtheCSChasoptedtoassumejurisdictionoverthecomplaint,theCSCs
exerciseofjurisdictionshallbetotheexclusionofothertribunalsexercisingconcurrentjurisdiction.To
repeat,itmay,however,choosetodeputizeanydepartmentoragencyorofficialorgroupofofficials
suchastheBORofPUPtoconducttheinvestigation,ortodelegatetheinvestigationtotheproper
regionaloffice.[33]ButthesameismerelypermissiveandnotmandatoryupontheCommission.
Respondentwaschargedwithgravemisconductandconductprejudicialtothebestinterestofthe
service.Apersonchargedwithgravemisconductisputonnoticethathestandsaccusedofmisconduct
coupledwithanyoftheelementsofcorruptionorwillfulintenttoviolatethelaworestablishedrules.
[35]Meanwhile,conductprejudicialtothebestinterestoftheserviceisclassifiedasagraveoffense
withacorrespondingpenaltyofsuspensionforsix(6)monthsandone(1)daytoone(1)yearforthe
firstoffense,andthepenaltyofdismissalforthesecondoffense.[36]

In addition to the gravity of the charges against Alfonso, and equally relevant, is the opportunity
availabletohimtousehispositionasDirectoroftheHumanResourcesManagementDepartmentof
theuniversitytoexertundueinfluenceorpressureonthepotentialwitnessesthatthecomplainants
mayproduce,ortotamperwiththedocumentaryevidencethatmaybeusedagainsthim.Preventive
suspensionis,therefore,necessarysothatrespondentsdelicateyetpowerfulpositionintheuniversity
maynotbeusedtocompromisetheintegrityandimpartialityoftheentireproceedings.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the May 21, 2007 Decision[37] and August 23, 2007
Resolution[38] of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 97284 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Accordingly, Civil Service Commission Resolution Nos. 061821[39] and 061908[40] dated
October16,2006andNovember7,2006,respectively,aswellasitsOrder[41] datedDecember11,
2006placingrespondentunderpreventivesuspensionareherebyREINSTATED.TheCSCisorderedto
proceedhearingtheadministrativecaseagainstrespondentwithdispatch.
EVANGELISTAVSPEOPLE
Thatonoraboutthe30thdayofJanuary1996,attheNinoyAquinoInternationalAirport,PasayCity,
Philippines,andwithinthejurisdictionofthisHonorableCourt,theabovenamedaccused,did,then
andthere,wilfully,unlawfullyandfeloniouslyhaveinhispossession,custodyandcontrolthefollowing
items:
1.One(1)Unit9mmJerichoPistol,withSNF36283withone(1)magazine;
2.One(1)UnitMiniUzi9mmIsraelSubmachinegunwithSN931864withtwo(2)
magazines;
3.Nineteen(19)9mmbullets.
withoutthecorrespondingpermitorlicensefromcompetentauthority.

Petitionercontendsthatthetrialcourthasnojurisdictionoverthecasefiledagainsthim. Heclaims
thathisallegedpossessionofthesubjectfirearmstranspiredwhilehewasattheandhispossession
thereofhasceasedwhenheleftforthe.Heinsiststhatsinceisoutsidetheterritorialjurisdictionofthe
andhissituationisnotoneoftheexceptionsprovidedinArticle2oftheRevisedPenalCode,our
criminallawsarenotapplicable.Inshort,hehadnotcommittedacrimewithinthe.
Indeeditisfundamentalthattheplacewherethecrimewascommitteddeterminesnotonlythe
venueoftheactionbutisanessentialelementofjurisdiction.[29]Inorderforthecourtstoacquire
jurisdiction in criminal cases, the offense should have been committed or any one of its essential
ingredientsshould havetakenplacewithintheterritorialjurisdictionofthecourt. Iftheevidence
adduced during the trial shows that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court should
dismisstheactionforwantofjurisdiction.
Moreover,thejurisdictionofacourtoverthecriminalcaseisdeterminedbytheallegationsinthe
complaintorinformation.Inthiscase,theinformationspecificallyandcategoricallyallegedthatonor
aboutpetitionerwasinpossession,custodyandcontrolofthesubjectfirearmsatthe,,,certainlya
territorywithinthejurisdictionofthetrialcourt.
Incontrast,petitionerfailedtoestablishbysufficientandcompetentevidencethatthepresent

chargehappenedin.Itmaybewelltorecallthatwhilein,petitioner,eveninasituationbetweenlife
anddeath,firmlydeniedpossessionandownershipofthefirearms.Furthermore,thereisnorecordof
anycriminalcasehavingbeenfiledagainstpetitionerininconnectionwiththediscoveredfirearms.
Sincethereisnopendingcriminalcasewhenheleft,itstandstoreasonthattherewasnocrime
committedin.Theageoldbutfamiliarrulethathewhoallegesmustprovehisallegationapplies.[31]
PetitionerfinallylamentsthetrialcourtsdenialoftheMotiontoWithdrawInformationfiledby
theinvestigatingprosecutorduetothelattersfindingoflackofprobablecausetoindicthim. He
arguesthatsuchdenialeffectivelydeprivedhimofhissubstantiverighttoapreliminaryinvestigation.
Still,petitionersargumentfailstopersuade. Thereisnothingprocedurallyimproperonthe
part of the trial court in disregarding the result of the preliminary investigation it itself ordered.
Judicialactiononthemotionrestsinthesoundexerciseofjudicialdiscretion.Indenyingthemotion,
thetrialcourtjustfollowedthejurisprudentialrulelaiddowninCrespov.JudgeMogul[32]thatoncea
complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the case as to its dismissal or the
convictionoracquittaloftheaccusedrestsonthesounddiscretionofthecourt. Thecourtisnot
dutifullyboundbysuchfindingoftheinvestigatingprosecutor. In SolarTeamEntertainment,Incv.
JudgeHow[33]weheld:
Itbearsstressingthatthecourtishowevernotboundtoadopt
theresolutionoftheSecretaryofJusticesincethecourtismandatedto
independentlyevaluateorassessthemeritsofthecase,andmayeither
agreeordisagreewiththerecommendationoftheSecretaryofJustice.
ReliancealoneontheresolutionoftheSecretaryofJusticewouldbean
abdicationofthetrialcourtsdutyandjurisdictiontodetermineprima
faciecase.
Consequently,petitionerhasnovalidbasistoinsistonthetrialcourttorespecttheresultofthe
preliminaryinvestigationitorderedtobeconducted.
Infine,wefindnoreasonnottoupholdpetitionersconviction.Therecordssubstantiatethe
RTC and CAs finding that petitioner possessed, albeit constructively, the subject firearms and
ammunitionwhenhearrivedintheon.Moreover,nosignificantfactsandcircumstanceswereshown
tohavebeenoverlookedordisregardedwhichifconsideredwouldhavealteredtheoutcomeofthe
case.
Intheprosecutionforthecrimeofillegalpossessionoffirearmandammunition,theCourthas
reiteratedtheessentialelementsinPeoplev.Eling[34]towit:(1)theexistenceofsubjectfirearm;and,
(2) the fact that the accused who possessed or owned the same does not have the corresponding
licenseforit.
Intheinstantcase,theprosecutionprovedbeyondreasonabledoubttheelementsofthecrime.
Theexistenceofthesubjectfirearmsandtheammunitionwereestablishedthroughthetestimonyof
Acierto. Theirexistence was likewiseadmittedbypetitioner whenheentered intostipulation and
throughhissubsequent judicialadmission. Concerning petitioners lack ofauthority to possess the
firearms, SPO4 Bondoc, Jr. testified that upon verification, it was ascertained that the name of
petitionerdoesnotappearinthelistofregisteredfirearmholdersoraregisteredownerthereof. As
proof,hesubmittedacertificationtothateffectandidentifiedthesameincourt. Thetestimonyof
SPO4Bondoc,Jr.orthecertificationfromtheFEOwouldsufficetoprovebeyondreasonabledoubtthe
secondelement.[35]
Afinalpoint. RepublicAct(RA)No.8294[36] tookeffectonorafterthecommissionofthe
crime on . However, since it is advantageous to the petitioner, it should be given retrospective
applicationinsofarasthepenaltyisconcerned.

Section1ofPD1866,asamendedbyRA8294provides:
Section1.UnlawfulManufacture,Sale,Acquisition,DispositionorPossessionofFirearmsor
AmmunitionorInstrumentsUsedorIntendedtobeUsedintheManufactureofFirearmsorAmmunition.x
xx
ThepenaltyofprisionmayorinitsminimumperiodandafineofThirtythousandpesos
(P30,000.00)shallbeimposedifthefirearmisclassifiedashighpoweredfirearmwhichincludesthose
withboresbiggerindiameterthan.38caliberand9millimetersuchascaliber.40,.41,.44,.45and
alsolessercaliberedfirearmsbutconsideredpowerfulsuchascaliber.357andcaliber.22centerfire
magnumandotherfirearmswithfiringcapabilityoffullautomaticandbyburstoftwoorthree:
Provided,however,Thatnoothercrimewascommittedbythepersonarrested.

Prisionmayorinitsminimumperiodrangesfromsixyearsandonedaytoeightyears.Hence,
thepenaltyimposedbytheRTCasaffirmedbytheCAisproper.
WHEREFORE, thepetitionis DENIED. TheassailedDecisionoftheCourtofAppealsinCA
G.R.CRNo.21805affirmingtheJanuary23,1998DecisionoftheRegionalTrialCourtofPasayCity,
Branch109datedJanuary23,1998,convictingpetitionerTeofiloEvangelistaofviolationofSection1
ofPresidentialDecreeNo.1866,asamended,andsentencinghimtosufferthepenaltyofimprisonment
ofsixyearsandonedaytoeightyearsandtopayafineofP30,000.00isAFFIRMED

4.ClassificationofJurisdiction
a.Definition
CASES:
CUENCAVPCGG
InthisPetitionforReviewonCertiorariunderRule45,petitionersassailtheJanuary6,2003Decision 1
oftheCourtofAppeals(CA)inconsolidatedcasesCAG.R.CVNo.60338 2andCAG.R.SPNo.496863
whichupheldthejurisdictionofSandiganbayanoveradisputeinvolvingthetransferofstocksand
subscriptionrightsofrespondentUniversalHoldingsCorporation(UHC),asequesteredcompany,in
favorofpetitionersRodolfoM.CuencaandCuencaInvestmentCorporation(CIC);anditsJuly15,
2003Resolution4denyingpetitionersMotionforReconsideration. 5Theconsolidatedcasesoriginated
fromCivilCaseNo.912721entitledRodolfoM.Cuenca,etal.v.IndependentRealtyCorp.,etal.filed
beforetheMakatiCityRegionalTrialCourt(RTC),Branch61CAG.R.CVNo.60338beinganappeal
fromtheApril23,1998DecisionrenderedbytheMakatiCityRTC,andCAG.R.SPNo.49686beinga
special civil action formerly filed as a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court, but was
remandedtotheCAforareview ofthedenialofthemotionforinterventionfiledbyrespondent
PresidentialCommissiononGoodGovernment(PCGG).
TheRulingoftheRegionalTrialCourt
OnNovember29,1991,respondentsIRCandUHCfiledaJointMotiontoDismiss 7onthegroundof
lackofjurisdiction,claimingthattheexclusivejurisdictionwaslodgedintheSandiganbayanandnotin
theRTC.Meanwhile,onDecember9,1991,respondentsIRCandUHC,representedbyrespondent

PCGG,filedanotherMotiontoDismiss 8 onthegroundof litispendentia aspetitionerCuencahada

pendingcasefiledbyrespondentPCGGbeforetheSandiganbayananddocketedasCivilCaseNo.0016
entitled RepublicofthePhilippinesv.RodolfoM.Cuenca,etal.,whichinvolvedrespondentUHCand
severalothercorporationsbeneficiallyownedorcontrolledbypetitionerCuencaforandinbehalfof
theMarcoses.
TheRulingoftheCourtofAppeals
ThroughitsassailedDecision,theappellatecourtreversedtheMakatiCityRTCsDecision,grantedthe
petitionfiledby PCGG,anddismissedtheinstant caseforlackofjurisdiction. Theappellatecourt
ratiocinated that the Sandiganbayan had exclusive jurisdiction to hear the instant case involving
petitioners and the sequestered respondents corporations. It held that the recourse of parties,
petitionersintheinstantcase,whowishtochallengerespondentPCGGsactsororders,wouldbeto
theSandiganbayanpursuanttoExecutiveOrderNo.(EO)14issuedonMay,7,1986, 27whichordained
thatthisbodyalonehadtheoriginaljurisdictionoverallofrespondentPCGGscases,civilorcriminal,
citing PCGGv.Pea28 asauthority.Theappellatecourtapplied Republicv.Sandiganbayan29 onthe
issueofsequestrationbyrespondentPCGGofUHC,CIC,andCDCP(nowPNCC)againstpetitioner
Cuenca,theMarcosspouses,theirrelatives,friends,andcolleagues.
TheIssues
Petitionersraisethefollowinggroundsforourconsideration:
THECOURTOFAPPEALSCOMMITTEDREVERSIBLEERRORINDISMISSINGCIVILCASENO.
912721 BELOW ON THE GROUND THAT THE SANDIGANBAYAN HAS EXCLUSIVE
JURISDICTIONOVERTHESUBJECTMATTEROFTHECASE.
IssueofJurisdiction
Jurisdiction is defined as the power and authority of a court to hear, try, and decide a case. 33
JurisdictionoverthesubjectmatterisconferredbytheConstitutionorbylawwhilejurisdictionover
thepersonisacquiredbyhis/hervoluntarysubmissiontotheauthorityofthecourtorthroughthe
exerciseofitscoerciveprocesses.Jurisdictionovertheresisobtainedbyactualorconstructiveseizure
placingthepropertyundertheordersofthecourt.34
Weareprimarilyconcernedherewiththefirstkindofjurisdiction,thatis,jurisdictionoverthesubject
matter.
PetitionerscontendthatevenifUHCwasindeedsequestered,jurisdictionoverthesubjectmatterof
petitionersComplaintforenforcementorrescissionofcontractbetweenpetitionersandrespondents
belongedtotheRTCandnottheSandiganbayan.PetitionerscitedPhilippineAmusementandGaming
Corporationv.CourtofAppeals,35 involvingPhilippineCasinoOperatorsCorporation(PCOC)which
wassequesteredonMarch19,1986.Insaidcase,thisCourtheldthatthefactofsequestrationalone
didnotautomaticallyousttheRTCofjurisdictiontodecideuponthequestionofownershipofthe
disputed gaming and office equipment as PCGG must be a party to the suit in order that the
Sandiganbayansexclusivejurisdictionmaybecorrectlyinvoked,andasSection2 36ofEO14wasduly
appliedinPCGGv.Pea37andPCGGv.Nepomuceno,38whichineluctablyspokeofrespondentPCGGas
apartylitigant.

Likewise, petitioners cited Holiday Inn (Phils.), Inc. v. Sandiganbayan,39 which also involved a
sequesteredcompany,NewRivieraHotelandDevelopmentCo.,Inc.(NRHDCI),wherethisCourtheld
thatthereisadistinctionbetweenanactionfortherecoveryofillgottenwealth,aswellasallincidents
arisingfrom,incidentalto,orrelatedtosuchcases,andcasesfiledbythosewhowishtoquestionor
challengerespondent PCGGs actsor ordersin suchcasesvisvis ordinary civil cases that do not
pertaintotheSandiganbayan.Assuch,petitionerscontendthattheinstantordinarycivilcaseforthe
enforcementorrescissionofthe1978contractbetweenpetitionersandrespondentsUHCandIRCis
distinctfromandhasabsolutelynobearingwiththeunrelatedissueofthesequestrationofrespondents
UHCandIRC.Thus,petitionersstronglycontendthatthetrialcourtindeedhadjurisdictionoverthe
instantcase.Besides,petitionerspointoutthatPCGGwasnotimpleadedasadefendantinCivilCase
No. 912721, and that the Complaint "does not question the PCGGs alleged sequestration of
respondentUHCxxxoranyotheractororderofthePCGG."40
Sandiganbayanhasexclusivejurisdictionovertheinstantcase
ArigorousexaminationoftheantecedentfactsandexistingrecordsathandshowsthatSandiganbayan
hasexclusivejurisdictionovertheinstantcase.
Thus,thepetitionmustfailforthefollowingreasons:
First,itisafactthatthesharesofstockofUHCandCDCP,thesubjectmatterofCivilCaseNo.912721
beforetheMakatiCityRTC,werealsothesubjectmatterofanillgottenwealthcase,specificallyCivil
CaseNo.0016beforetheSandiganbayan.InCivilCaseNo.912721oftheMakatiCityRTC,petitioners
prayed for a judgment either transferring the UHC shares or restoring and reconveying the PNCC
sharestothem.IntheeventafinaljudgmentisrenderedinsaidMakatiCityRTCcaseinfavorof
petitioners,thensuchadjudicationtendstorendermootandacademicthejudgmenttoberenderedin
SandiganbayanCivilCaseNo.0016consideringthatthelegalownershipofeithertheUHCorPNCC
shareswouldnowbetransferredtopetitionersRodolfoCuencaandCIC.Suchadversejudgmentwould
runcountertotherightsofownershipofthegovernmentovertheUHCandPNCCsharesinquestion.It
mustberememberedthatonMarch21,1986,aSwornStatement 41executedbyMr.JoseY.Camposin
Vancouver, Canada, whereby Mr. Campos, a crony and close business associate of the deposed
PresidentMarcos,namedandidentifiedIRCandUHC(awhollyownedsubsidiaryofIRC)asamong
theseveralcorporationsorganized,established,andmanagedbyhimandotherbusinessassociatesfor
andinbehalfoftheformerPresidentMarcos.Subsequently,theUHCandIRCsharesweresurrendered
andturnedoverbyMr.CampostoPCGG,transferring,ineffect,theownershipofthesharestothe
Government.
Moreover,inasmuchasUHCwasimpleadedinCivilCaseNo.0016asadefendantandwaslisted
amongthecorporationsbeneficiallyownedorcontrolledbypetitionerCuenca,theissueofthelatters
righttoacquireownershipofUHCsharesisinexorablyintertwinedwiththerightoftheRepublicofthe
Philippines,throughPCGG,toretainownershipofsaidUHCshares.
ItmustbeborneinmindthattheSandiganbayanwascreatedin1978pursuanttoPresidentialDecree
No.(PD)1606.42SaidlawhasbeenamendedduringtheinterimperiodaftertheEdsaRevolutionof
1986andbeforethe1987Constitutionwasdrafted,passed,andratified.Thus,theexecutiveissuances
duringsuchperiodbeforetheratificationofthe1987Constitutionhadtheforceandeffectoflaws.
Specifically,thenPresidentCorazonC.AquinoissuedthefollowingExecutiveOrderswhichamended
PD1606insofarasthejurisdictionoftheSandiganbayanovercivilandcriminalcasesinstitutedand
prosecutedbythePCGGisconcerned,viz:
a)EO1,entitled"CreatingthePresidentialCommissiononGoodGovernment,"datedFebruary28,
1986;

b) EO 2, entitled "Regarding the Funds, Moneys, Assets, and Properties Illegally Acquired or
Misappropriated by Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos, Their
CloseRelatives,Subordinates,BusinessAssociates,Dummies,Agents,orNominees,"datedMarch12,
1986;
c) EO 14, entitled "Defining the Jurisdiction over Cases Involving the Illgotten Wealth of Former
PresidentFerdinandE.Marcos,Mrs.ImeldaR.Marcos,Members oftheirImmediateFamily,Close
Relatives, Subordinates, Close and/or Business Associates, Dummies, Agents and Nominees," dated
May7,1986;and
d)EO14A,entitled"AmendingExecutiveOrderNo.14,"datedAugust18,1986.
BearingonthejurisdictionoftheSandiganbayanovercasesofillgottenwealth,EO14,Secs.1and2
provide:
SECTION 1. Any provision of the law to the contrary notwithstanding, the Presidential
CommissiononGoodGovernment withtheassistanceoftheOfficeoftheSolicitorGeneral
and other government agencies, is hereby empowered to file and prosecute all cases
investigatedbyitunder ExecutiveOrderNo.1,datedFebruary28,1986and Executive
OrderNo.2,datedMarch12,1986,asmaybewarrantedbyitsfindings.
SECTION2.The PresidentialCommissiononGoodGovernmentshallfileallsuchcases,
whethercivilorcriminal,withtheSandiganbayan,whichshallhaveexclusiveandoriginal
jurisdictionthereof.(Emphasissupplied.)
Notably,theseamendmentshadbeendulyrecognizedandreflectedinsubsequentamendmentstoPD
1606,specificallyRepublicActNos.797543and8249.44
Inthelightoftheforegoingprovisions,itisclearthatitistheSandiganbayanandnottheMakatiCity
RTCthathasjurisdictionoverthedisputedUHCandPNCCshares,beingthealleged"illgottenwealth"
offormerPresidentFerdinandE.MarcosandpetitionerCuenca.ThefactthattheMakatiCityRTCcivil
case involved the performance of contractual obligations relative to the UHC shares is of no
importance. Thebenchmark iswhether said UHC shares arealleged to be illgotten wealth of the
Marcoses and their perceived cronies. More importantly, the interests of orderly administration of
justicedictatethatallincidentsaffectingtheUHCsharesandPCGGsrightofsupervisionorcontrol
overtheUHCmustbeaddressedtoandresolvedbytheSandiganbayan.Indeed,thelawandcourts
frownuponsplitjurisdictionandtheresultantmultiplicityofsuits,whichresultinmuchlosttime,
wastedeffort,moreexpenses,andirreparableinjurytothepublicinterest.
Second, the UHC shares in dispute were sequestered by respondent PCGG. Sequestration is a
provisionalremedyorfreezeorderissuedbythePCGGdesignedtopreventthedisposalanddissipation
ofillgottenwealth.45Thepowertosequesterpropertymeansto
placeorcausetobeplacedunder[PCGGs]possessionorcontrolsaidproperty,oranybuilding
orofficewhereinanysuchpropertyoranyrecordspertainingtheretomaybefound,including
businessenterprisesandentities,forthepurposeofpreventingthedestructionof,andotherwise
conservingandpreservingthesame,untilitcanbedetermined,throughappropriatejudicial
proceedings, whether the property was in truth illgotten. (Silverio v. PCGG, 155 SCRA 60
[1987]).46
ConsideringthattheUHCshareswerealreadysequestered,enablingthePCGGtoexercisethepowerof
supervision,possession,andcontroloversaidshares,thensuchpowerwouldcollidewiththelegal
custodyoftheMakatiCityRTCovertheUHCsharessubjectofCivilCaseNo.912721.Whateverthe
outcomeofCivilCaseNo.912721,whetherfromenforcementorrescissionofthecontract,would

directlymilitateonPCGGscontrolandmanagementofIRCandUHC,andconsequentlyhamperor
interferewithitsmandatetorecoverillgottenwealth.Asaptlypointedoutbyrespondents,petitioners
actionisinexorablyentwinedwiththeGovernmentsactionfortherecoveryofillgottenwealththe
subjectofthependingcasebeforetheSandiganbayan.Verily,thetransferofsharesofstockofUHCto
petitioners or the return of the shares of stock of CDCP (now PNCC) will wreak havoc on the
sequestrationcaseasbothUHCandCDCParesubjectofsequestrationbyPCGG.
Third,PhilippineAmusementandGamingCorporationandHolidayInn(Phils.),Inc.47arenotanalogous
tothecaseatbar.Thefirstdealtwithownershipofgamingandofficeequipment,whichisdistinct
fromandwillnotimpactonthesequestrationissueofPCOC.Theseconddealtwithanordinarycivil
caseforperformanceofacontractualobligationwhichdidnotinanywayaffectthesequestration
proceedingofNRHDCI;thus,thecomplaintininterventionofHolidayInn(Phils.),Inc.wasproperly
deniedforlackofjurisdictionoverthesubjectmatter.
In both cases cited by petitioners, there was a substantial distinction between the sequestration
proceedingsandthesubjectmatteroftheactions.Thisdoesnotprevailintheinstantcase,asthe
ownershipofthesharesofstockofthesequesteredcompanies,UHCandCDCP,isthesubjectmatterof
apendingcaseandthusaddressedtotheexclusivejurisdictionoftheSandiganbayan.
Sec.2ofEO14pertinentlyprovides:"ThePresidentialCommissiononGoodGovernmentshallfileall
suchcases,whethercivilorcriminal,withtheSandiganbayan,whichshallhaveexclusiveandoriginal
jurisdictionthereof."
The above proviso has been squarely applied in Pea,48 where this Court held that the exclusive
jurisdictionconferredontheSandiganbayanwouldevidentlyextendnotonlytotheprincipalcausesof
action,thatis,recoveryofallegedillgottenwealth,butalsotoallincidentsarisingfrom,incidentalto,
orrelatedtosuchcases,includingadisputeoverthesaleoftheshares,theproprietyoftheissuanceof
ancillarywritsofrelativeprovisionalremedies,andthesequestrationoftheshares,whichmaynotbe
made the subject of separate actions or proceedings in another forum. Indeed, the issue of the
ownership of the sequestered companies, UHC and PNCC, as well as IRCs ownership of them, is
undeniablyrelatedtotherecoveryoftheallegedillgottenwealthandcanbesquarelyaddressedvia
theexclusivejurisdictionoftheSandiganbayan.
Fourth,whileitisclearthattheexclusivejurisdictionoftheSandiganbayanonlyencompassescases
wherePCGGisimpleaded,suchrequirementissatisfiedintheinstantcase.Theappellatecourtclearly
grantedPCGGspetitionforcertiorariinCAG.R.SPNo.49686,assailingthetrialcourtsdenialofits
MotionforLeavetoIntervenewithMotiontoDismiss.Thus,thetrialcourtsApril20,1998Orderwas
reversedandsetasidebytheappellatecourtthroughitsassailedDecision.Consequently,PCGGwas
grantedtherighttointerveneandthusbecameproperlyimpleadedintheinstantcase.Withoutdoubt,
thetrialcourthasnojurisdictiontohearanddecideCivilCaseNo.912721.
a.1Jurisdictionconferredbylawnotbythepartiesnorbytheiragreementorconsent
CASES:
HeirsofSantiagoNisperasvNisperasDucusin
TheappellatecourtaffirmedtheDecision3oftheDepartmentofAgrarianReformAdjudicationBoard
(DARAB)upholdingthevalidityoftheDeedofVoluntaryLandTransferandOriginalCertificateofTitle
(OCT) No. CLOA623 issued in favor of respondent Marissa NisperosDucusin. The instant case
stemmedfromacomplaint4filedbypetitionerswiththeDARABallegingthefollowingantecedents:

The15,837squaremeterparceloflandsubjectoftheinstantcaseispartofthe58,350squaremeter
agricultural land in Pao Sur, San Fernando City, La Union acquired by Santiago Nisperos, the
predecessorofpetitioners,duringhislifetime.Hedeclaredsaidpropertyfortaxationpurposesstarting
December1947.5
WhenSantiagoandhiswifeEstefaniadied,theyweresurvivedbytheirninechildren:Tranquilino,
Felix,Olling,Maria,Lenardo,Millan,Fausto,CandidoandCipriana.TheheirsofSantiago,petitioners
herein, claim that the subject property was occupied, controlled and tilled by all nine children of
Santiago.TheypaidtaxesforitandevenhiredfarmworkersunderMariaandCiprianassupervision
forthecultivationofthesame.Fortaxationpurposes,however,itwasinitiallydeclaredonlyunderthe
nameofMaria.6Starting1988,itwasdeclaredunderthenamesofMariaandCipriana.7
During the time when Maria and Cipriana were overseeing the property, Maria took respondent
MarissaNisperosDucusin,adaughteroftheircousinPurita,asherwardandraisedherlikeherown
child. On February 12, 1988, Maria and Cipriana, acting asrepresentatives of their othersiblings,
executed a Deed of Donation Mortis Causa8 in favor of petitioners over the 58,350squaremeter
propertyandanother46,000squaremeterproperty.OnApril28,1992,aDeedofVoluntaryLand
Transfer9(VLT)overthesubjectpropertywasexecutedbetweenMariaandCiprianaaslandowners,
andrespondent,whowasthenonly17yearsold,asfarmerbeneficiary.Theinstrumentwassignedby
the three in the presence of witnesses Anita, Lucia and Marcelina Gascon and Municipal Agrarian
ReformOfficerSusimoAsuncion.ThesamewasnotarizedbyNotaryPublicAtty.RobertoE.Caoayan.
HencethispetitionbeforethisCourtraisingtheissuesofwhetherthe
appellatecourterredin:
AllegingfraudonthepartofrespondentwhichpetitionersclaimtohavediscoveredonlyinAugust
2001,petitionersfiledacomplaintonSeptember6,2001withtheMunicipalAgrarianReformOffice
(MARO) of San Fernando City, La Union. Unfortunately, no settlement between petitioners and
respondentwasreachedpromptingtheMAROtoissueaCertificatetoFileAction.1
On October 16, 2002, DARAB Regional Adjudicator Rodolfo A. Caddarao rendered a Decision17
annullingtheVLTandOCT/CLOAinrespondentsname.
heRegionalAdjudicatornotedthatthelandsupposedlyownedbyMariaandCipriana(whichincludes
the15,837squaremetersubjectproperty)hasatotalareaof58,350squaremeters.Consideringthat
therearetwoowners,heruledthattheindividualshareofeachwouldbelessthanfivehectareseach
andwellwithintheretentionlimit. TheRegionalAdjudicatoralsoheldtherewasreasontobelieve
thatMariaandCiprianasnameswerestatedinthetaxdeclarationforpurposesoftaxationonlyasno
evidencewaspresentedthattheylawfullyacquiredthepropertyfromtheirparents.Itwasalsoruled
thattheissuanceofthetitleinrespondentsnamewasnotinaccordancewithagrarianlawsbecause
shecannotbeconsideredasatenantbutmoreofanheirofthetransferors.Respondentcontestedthe
RegionalAdjudicatorsdecisionbeforetheDARABallegingthattheRegionalAdjudicatorcommitted
graveabuseofdiscretion.Respondentcontendedthatthecomplaintshouldnothavebeengivendue
course since other partiesininterest such as Maria, the Register of Deeds of La Union and duly
authorizedrepresentativesoftheDARwerenotimpleadedandprescriptionhadalreadysetininsofar
asthecontestabilityoftheCLOAisconcerned.Shelikewisearguedthatbeingafarmeroratenantis
not a primordial requisite to become an agrarian reform beneficiary. She added that the Regional
Adjudicatorwentbeyondthescopeofhisauthoritybydirectingthepartiestolitigatetheissueof
ownershipbeforethecourt.

I
xxxDECLARINGTHATTHEPARABHASNOJURISDICTIONTORULETHATTHESUBJECTPIECEOF
LANDWASNOLONGERCOVEREDBYAGRARIANLAWS.
RULING
WesetasidetheassailedDecisionandResolution.Thecomplaintshouldhavebeenlodgedwiththe
OfficeoftheDARSecretaryandnotwiththeDARAB.
Section1,RuleIIofthe1994DARABRulesofProcedure,therulein
forceatthetimeofthefilingofthecomplaintbypetitionersin2001,
provides:
SECTION1.PrimaryandExclusiveOriginalandAppellate
Jurisdiction.TheBoardshallhaveprimaryandexclusivejurisdiction,
bothoriginalandappellate,todetermineandadjudicateallagrarian
disputesinvolvingtheimplementationoftheComprehensiveAgrarian
ReformProgram(CARP)underRepublicActNo.6657,ExecutiveOrder
Nos.228,229and129A,RepublicActNo.3844asamendedbyRepublic
ActNo.6389,PresidentialDecreeNo.27andotheragrarianlawsand
theirimplementingrulesandregulations.Specifically,suchjurisdiction
shallincludebutnotbelimitedtocasesinvolvingthefollowing:
xxxx
f)Thoseinvolvingtheissuance,correctionandcancellationof
CertificatesofLandOwnershipAward(CLOAs)and
EmancipationPatents(EPs)whichareregisteredwiththeLand
RegistrationAuthority;
However,itisnotenoughthatthecontroversyinvolvesthecancellationofaCLOAregisteredwiththe
LandRegistrationAuthorityfortheDARABtohavejurisdiction.Whatisofprimordialconsiderationis
theexistenceofanagrariandisputebetweentheparties.23Section3(d)ofR.A.No.6657definesan
agrariandisputeasanycontroversyrelatingtotenurialarrangements,whetherleasehold,tenancy,
stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning
farmworkersassociationsorrepresentationofpersonsinnegotiating,fixing,maintaining,changing,or
seekingtoarrangetermsorconditionsofsuchtenurialarrangementsandincludesanycontroversy
relatingtocompensationoflandsacquiredunderthisActandothertermsandconditionsoftransferof
ownershipfromlandownerstofarmworkers,tenantsandotheragrarianreformbeneficiaries,whether
thedisputantsstandintheproximaterelationoffarmoperatorandbeneficiary,landownerandtenant,
orlessorandlessee.
Thus,inMorta,Sr.v.Occidental,24thisCourtheldthattheremustbe
atenancyrelationshipbetweenthepartiesfortheDARABtohave
jurisdictionoveracase.Itisessentialtoestablishallofthefollowing
indispensableelements,towit:(1)thatthepartiesarethelandownerandthe
tenantoragriculturallessee;(2)thatthesubjectmatteroftherelationshipisanagriculturalland;(3)
thatthereisconsentbetweenthepartiestothe
relationship;(4)thatthepurposeoftherelationshipistobringabout
agriculturalproduction;(5)thatthereispersonalcultivationonthepartof
thetenantoragriculturallessee;and(6)thattheharvestissharedbetween

thelandownerandthetenantoragriculturallessee.25
Intheinstantcase,petitioners,assupposedownersofthesubjectproperty,didnotallegeintheir
complaintthatatenancyrelationshipexistsbetweenthemandrespondent.Infact,intheircomplaint,
they described respondent as a ward of one of the coowners, Maria, who is not a bona fide
beneficiary,shebeingnotengagedinfarmingbecauseshewasstillaminoratthetimetheVLTwas
executed.26 It is axiomatic that the jurisdiction of a tribunal, including a quasi judicial officer or
governmentagency,overthenatureandsubjectmatterofapetitionorcomplaintisdeterminedbythe
material allegations therein and the character of the relief prayed for, irrespective of whether the
petitionerorcomplainantisentitledtoanyorallsuchreliefs.Jurisdictionoverthenatureandsubject
matterofanactionisconferredbytheConstitutionandthelaw,andnotbytheconsentorwaiverof
thepartieswherethecourtotherwisewouldhavenojurisdictionoverthenatureorsubjectmatterof
theaction.Norcanitbeacquiredthrough,orwaivedby,anyactoromissionoftheparties.Moreover,
estoppeldoesnotapplytoconferjurisdictiontoatribunalthathasnoneoverthecauseofaction.The
failure of the parties to challenge the jurisdiction of the DARAB does not prevent the court from
addressingtheissue,especiallywheretheDARABslackofjurisdictionisapparentonthefaceofthe
complaintorpetition.27
a.2HowJurisdictionisdetermined
CASES:
HEIRSOFCANDIDODELROSARIOVDELROSARIO
Thisinvolvesaparceloflandwithanareaof9,536squaremeterssituatedinBarangayCaingin,Bocaue,Bulacan.The
subjectlandwasformerlyownedbyPedroG.LazaroandtenantedbythespousesJoseDelRosarioandFlorentinaDe
Guzman(SpousesDelRosario).

SpousesDelRosariohadthreechildren:MonicaDelRosario(Monica),CandidoDelRosario(Candido)
andGilDelRosario(Gil).ThepetitionersclaimedthatwhenSpousesDelRosariodied,onlythey
continuedtotenantandactuallytillthesubjectland.
SometimeinFebruary1991,MonicaandGilagreedthatthelatterwouldfacilitatetheapplicationfor
anEmancipationPatentoverthesubjectlandinthenameoftheformer.Inexchange,Monicaagreed
tocedetoGilonethirdofthesaidlandaftertheEmancipationPatenthadbeenissuedtoher.
OnMay29,1998,theDepartmentofAgrarianReform(DAR)issuedtoMonicaEmancipationPatent
No.00733146overtheland.Subsequently,onOctober22,1998,theRegistryofDeedsfortheof
issuedTransferCertificateofTitle(TCT)No.EP257MinthenameofMonica.
ThepetitionersclaimedthatMonica,despiterepeateddemands,refusedtocedetoGiltheonethird
portionofthesubjectlandpursuanttotheiragreement.Thus,onApril17,2000,thepetitionersfiled
withtheOfficeoftheProvincialAgrarianReformAdjudicator(PARAD)inMalolos,Bulacana
complaintagainstMonicaforamendmentofTCTNo.EP257Mandpartitionofthesubjectland.
Forherpart,Monicaclaimedthattheirfatherentrustedtoherthecultivationofthesubjectlandafter
thelatterbecameillandincapacitatedsometimein1950.GilandCandido,inturn,wereentrusted
withthecultivationofotherparcelsoflandtenantedbySpousesDelRosario.Further,after
PresidentialDecreeNo.27(P.D.No.27)tookeffect,Monicaclaimedthatshewastheonelistedinthe
filesoftheDARasthetenantbeneficiaryofthesubjectlandandthatshewastheonewhowaspaying
theamortizationsoverthesame.
TheCAsDecision

OnJanuary21,2008,theCArenderedthehereinassaileddecisiondenyingthepetitionforreviewfiled
bythepetitioners.TheCAheldthatthePARADandtheDARABhadnojurisdictiontotakecognizance
ofthepetitionerscomplaintforamendmentoftheEmancipationPatentandpartitionofthesubject
land,therebeingnoagrariandisputeortenancyrelationsbetweentheparties.Thus:
WhileitistruethattheDARABhasprimaryandexclusivejurisdiction,bothoriginalandappellate,to
determineandadjudicateallagrariandisputesinvolvingtheimplementationoftheComprehensive
AgrarianReformProgram(CARP),whichincludethoseinvolvingtheissuance,correctionand
cancellationofCertificatesofLandOwnershipAward(CLOAs)andEmancipationPatents(EPs)which
areregisteredwiththeLandRegistrationAuthority,however,fortheDARABtohavejurisdictionovera
case,theremustexistatenancyrelationshipbetweentheparties,whichdoesnotobtaininthepetition
atbench.
Thejurisdictionofatribunalorquasijudicialbodyoverthesubjectmatterisdeterminedbythe
avermentsofthecomplaint/petitionandthelawextantatthetimeofthecommencementofthe
suit/complaint/petition.Allproceedingsbeforeatribunalorquasijudicialagencybereftofjurisdiction
overthesubjectmatteroftheactionarenullandvoid.
Simply put, the issues for this Courts resolution are the following: first, whether the PARAD and the DARAB have
jurisdictiontotakecognizanceofthepetitionerscomplaintforamendmentandpartition;andsecond,ifthePARADand
theDARABhavenojurisdictionoverthecomplaintforamendmentandpartition,whetherthepetitionersareboundby
theirrespectivedispositions.

Thepetitionispartlymeritorious.

TheCourtsRuling

FirstIssue:JurisdictionofthePARADandtheDARAB

Contrary to the CAs disposition, the petitioners insist that the PARAD and the DARAB have the
jurisdiction to take cognizance of their complaint for amendment of the Emancipation Patent and
partitionofthesubjectlandnotwithstandingtheabsenceoftenancyrelationshipbetweenthemand
Monica.Theyassertthatthecomplaintbelowessentiallyinvolvesadeterminationoftheactualtenant
andeventualrightfulbeneficiaryofthesubjectland.
Ontheotherhand,MonicaassertsthattheCAdidnoterrindeclaringthatthePARADandtheDARAB
havenojurisdictionoverthesaidcomplaintforamendmentandpartitionsincetherewassimplyno
tenancyrelationshipallegedtherein.
The jurisdiction of the PARAD and the DARAB is
limited only to all agrarian disputes and matters or
incidentsinvolvingtheimplementationoftheCARP.
IntheprocessofreorganizingtheDAR,ExecutiveOrder
(E.O.) No. 129A created the DARAB to assume the
powersandfunctionswithrespecttotheadjudicationof
agrarianreformmatters.[10]
Atthetimethecomplaintforamendmentandpartitionwasfiledbythepetitioners,theproceedings
beforethePARADandtheDARABweregovernedbytheDARABNewRulesofProcedures,whichwere
adoptedandpromulgatedonMay30,1994,andcameintoeffectonJune21,1994afterpublication
(1994DARABRules).The1994DARABRulesidentifiedthecasesoverwhichtheDARABshallhave
jurisdiction
Specifically,thePARADandtheDARABhaveprimaryandexclusivejurisdiction,bothoriginalandappellate,todetermine

and adjudicate all agrarian disputes involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
(CARP)underRepublicAct(R.A.)No.6657,asamendedbyR.A.No.9700,E.O.Nos.228,229,and129A,R.A.No.3844
asamendedbyR.A.No.6389,P.D.No.27andotheragrarianlawsandtheirImplementingRulesandRegulations. [11]

Thus,thejurisdictionofthePARADandtheDARABisonlylimitedtocasesinvolvingagrariandisputes,
includingincidentsarisingfromtheimplementationofagrarianlaws. Section3(d)ofR.A.No.6657
definesanagrariandisputeinthiswise:
(d)Agrariandisputereferstoanycontroversyrelatingtotenurialarrangements,whetherleasehold,
tenancy,stewardshiporotherwise,overlandsdevotedtoagriculture,includingdisputesconcerning
farmworkersassociationsorrepresentationofpersonsinnegotiating,fixing,maintaining,changingor
seekingtoarrangetermsorconditionsofsuchtenurialarrangements.Itincludesanycontroversy
relatingtocompensationoflandsacquiredunderR.A.6657andothertermsandconditionsoftransfer
ofownershipfromlandownerstofarmworkers,tenantsandotheragrarianreformbeneficiaries,
whetherthedisputantsstandintheproximaterelationoffarmoperatorandbeneficiary,landowner
andtenant,orlessorandlessee.