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OST WP-41-02

G. Rebender
16 April 2002

Agenda OST 02-2

ICAO ANNEX 6 PART 1 AMENDMENT 27 SECURITY NPA

INTRODUCTION:
The Chief Executive requires the OPS Director to issue at the earliest opportunity
an NPA OPS covering the Annex 6 Part 1 security amendment 27.
Whilst recognising the urgency of the matter, the OPS Director, before sending
the NPA, discussed with the OPS DIV Security Consultant (ex. CAA Chief
Inspector) the process to be followed.
The OPS Director decided, in front of the questions raised by this amendment, to
go through the regular OST NPA process.
In order to be able to deliver an NPA for the October JAAC meeting, the following
process, focusing on the areas of discussion is proposed.
The OST members are invited to prepare their proposals / comments for the
Berlin meeting, so as the OST is able to elaborate a mature NPA to meet the
October deadline.

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PROCESS:
ICAO Annex 6 Amendment 27
CHAPTER 13.
13.1.

13.12

Process

SECURITY*
Recommendation.
International Standards and
Recommended Practices
set forth in this Chapter
should be applied by all
Contracting States also in
case of domestic
commercial operations (air
services)

This recommendation is covered by the


JAR OPS concept

Security of the flight crew


compartment

13.12.1 In all aeroplanes which are


equipped with a flight crew compartment
door, this door shall be capable of being
locked, It shall be lockable from within the
compartment only. and means shall be
provided by which cabin crew can
discreetly notify the flight crew in the event
of suspicious activity or security breaches
in the cabin.

13.2.2 From 1 November 2003, all


passenger-carrying aeroplanes of a
maximum certificated take-off mass in
excess of 45 500 kg or with a passenger
seating capacity greater than 60 shall be
equipped with an approved flight crew
compartment door that is designed to
resist penetration by small arms fire and
grenade shrapnel, and to resist forcible
intrusions by unauthorized persons. This
door shall be capable of being locked and
unlocked from either pilots station.

First point is covered by JAR


OPS 1 1255.
Discussion on appropriate
communication procedures
Discussion on discreet meansapproval by NAA and expansion
into Section 2.
Regulation Director suggests
JAR 26 will cover 13.2.2.
Paragraph concept to be
confirmed by OST.
Clarification on seating
capacity in requested.

13.2.3 In all aeroplanes which are Difference with the JAA policy which
equipped with a flight crew compartment requires the internal door to be closed
door in accordance with paragraph 13.2.2:

from start of take-off.

a) this door shall be closed


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16 April 2002
and locked from the time all
external doors are closed
following embarkation until
any such door is opened for
disembarkation,
except
when necessary to permit
access and egress by
authorized persons; and
b) means shall be provided for
monitoring from either pilots
station the entire door area
outside the flight crew
compartment to identify
persons requesting entry
and to detect suspicious
behaviour
or
potential
threat.

Discussion on means and


operational use including Human
Factor issues.

13.2.4 Recommendation.
All
passenger-carrying aeroplanes should be
equipped with an approved flight crew
compartment door, where practicable, that
is designed to resist penetration by small
arms fire and grenade shrapnel, and to
resist forcible intrusions by unauthorized
persons. This door should be capable of
being locked and unlocked from either
pilots station.
13.2.5 Recommendation. In all
aeroplanes which are equipped with a
flight
crew
compartment
door
in
accordance with paragraph 13.2.4:
a) the door should be closed
and locked from the time all
external doors are closed
following embarkation until
any such door is opened for
disembarkation,
except
when necessary to permit
access and egress by
authorized persons; and
b) means should be provided
for monitoring from either
pilots station the entire door
area outside the flight crew
compartment to identify

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persons requesting entry
and to detect suspicious
behaviour
or
potential
threat.
13.23

Aeroplane search procedure


checklist

An operator shall ensure that there is on


board a checklist of the procedures to be
followed in searching for a bomb in case of
suspected sabotage and for inspecting
aeroplanes for concealed weapons,
explosives or other dangerous devices
when a well-founded suspicion exists that
the aeroplane may be the object of an act
of unlawful interference. The checklist
shall be supported by guidance on the
appropriate course of action to be taken
should a bomb or suspicious object be
found and information on the least-risk
bomb location specific to the aeroplane.
13.34

Training programmes

13.34.1
An operator shall establish
and maintain an approved security training
programme which enables ensures crew
members to act in the most appropriate
manner to minimize the consequences of
acts of unlawful interference. As a
minimum, this programme shall include the
following elements:

Principle decision to be addressed:


-

1): b, g, h, belong to classical


OPS training pattern.

2): c, d, f, scope is physical


assault preparation.

3): d, e, scope is mental


preparation in face of an
aggression.

1) belongs to classical training


process, 2) and 3) raise a
process discussion

a) determination of the
seriousness of any occurrence;
b)
coordination;

crew communication and

c)

appropriate self-defense

d)

use of non-lethal protective


devices assigned to crew
members whose use is
authorized by the State of
the Operator;

responses;

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Covered by principly by OPS


1250. Confirmation needed.

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e)

understanding of behaviour
of terrorists so as to
facilitate the ability of crew
members to cope with
hijacker behaviour and
passenger responses;

f) live situational training


exercises regarding various threat
conditions;
g) flight deck procedures to
protect the aeroplane; and
h)
aeroplane search
procedures and guidance on least-risk
bomb locations where practicable.

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