Documentos de Académico
Documentos de Profesional
Documentos de Cultura
Abstract
Many studies have been written on Irenaeus Christology, but almost all
focus upon soteriological problems rather than Christology proper.
A. Houssiau attempted to rectify this imbalance, providing the best study
of Irenaeus Christology to date, but even he missed the fundamental logic
that Irenaeus utilizes to explain the christological union. In this article I
contend that Irenaeus uses Stoic mixture theory to conceptualize the
christological union, including the relationship between the human and
divine in the experiences and activities of Christ. In so saying, I challenge
H. A. Wolfsons position that Irenaeus use of mixture language accords
with Aristotelian mixture theory, and I stand against those, including
Wolfson and A. Grillmeier, who maintain that Irenaeus conception of
the person of Christ is devoid of philosophical reasoning.
517
518
ANTHONY BRIGGMAN
3
R. Sorabji, Matter, Space and Motion: Theories in Antiquity and their
Sequel (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988), p. 83; Diogenes
Laertius, Lives 7.1346.
4
Mixt. 3, 21417; unless otherwise noted, the text and translation of Mixt.
comes from R. B. Todd, Alexander of Aphrodisias on Stoic Physics (SMAP 28;
Leiden: Brill, 1976).
5
Mixt. 11, 226.303; the parenthetical remark would seem to reflect
Alexanders understanding, but if so, his understanding agrees with Stoic
thought. Cf. Sorabji, Matter, Space and Motion, pp. 938.
6
E.g. Cicero, Acad. 1.39.
7
Alex. Aphrod., Mixt. 3, 216.14217.2; 4, 217.2636; Arius Did., fr. 28,
ap. Stob. Eclogae 1.17.4.
8
Sorabji, Matter, Space and Motion, p. 37.
519
520
ANTHONY BRIGGMAN
16
521
22
522
ANTHONY BRIGGMAN
IN
EARLY
25
H. A. Wolfson, The Philosophy of the Church Fathers, vol. 1: Faith, Trinity,
Incarnation (2nd edn; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1964), p. 396.
26
Ibid., p. 385.
27
Wolfson prefers some diVerent titles, identifying unions involving juxtaposition as composition and unions involving fusion as confusion (Philosophy
of the Church Fathers, vol. 1, pp. 3856).
28
Ibid., p. 382.
29
Ibid., pp. 3757, 3845. For an extended discussion of Aristotelian mixture theory, see Sorabji, Matter, Space and Motion, pp. 36772.
30
Wolfson, Philosophy of the Fathers, vol. 1, p. 386.
523
31
524
ANTHONY BRIGGMAN
35
525
40
An important point, since Wolfson notes this very passage (DL, Lives
7.151) concerning Chrysippus to support his own reading (Philosophy of the
Church Fathers, vol. 1, p. 382, n. 76).
41
Aristotle (GC 1.10, 328a15; 1517) and then Alex. Aphrodisias (Mixt. 8,
221.25222.26) attack the notion that mixture could be due to infinite division.
In the course of Alexanders argument he states that if the Stoics understand
mixture to occur by an infinite division of ingredients, then they would not be
speaking of a mixture but of a mere juxtaposition (221.2534). Sorabji highlights the conditional nature of Alexanders argument (if the Stoics understand
mixture to occur by division), and proceeds to call into question the very
notion that Stoic mixture theory involved division. Thus, Stoic thought
would seem to diVer from that of Anaxagoras, who may well have envisaged
ingredients as infinitely divided (Sorabji, Matter, Space and Motion, p. 102; see
p. 64 for more on Anaxagoras).
42
Alex. Aphrod., Mixt. 4, 217.279.
43
R. E. Heine, The Christology of Callistus, JTS, NS 49 (1998), pp.
5691.
526
ANTHONY BRIGGMAN
For I will not, he says, speak of two Gods, Father and Son, but of
one. For the Father who was in him (John 14:10) assumed the flesh
and made it God by uniting it with himself, and made it one, so that
Father and Son are designated one God, and this unity, being a
person, cannot be two, and so the Father suVered with (sumpeponqe#nai)
the Son.48
527
III. MIXTURE
IN
IRENAEUS
528
ANTHONY BRIGGMAN
56
AH 2.33.1, 4.
See e.g. A. Grillmeier, Christ in Christian Tradition, vol. 1: From the
Apostolic Age to Chalcedon, trans. J. Bowden (Atlanta, GA: John Knox
Press, 1965; 2nd edn. 1975), pp. 1034, and esp. Houssiau, Christologie
dIrenee, pp. 163235.
57
529
the aeons. Gnostic logic fails, he argues, because Gnostics maintain at one and the same time that a unity of substance exists
between the aeons and their Author or Father (Propator), and
that the aeons are susceptible to passion while the Author or
Father is not. In the course of his argument he contrasts
things that are completely separated with those that are
mixed or united:
(2.17.2) It shall be asked, then, how were the rest of the aeons
emitted? Did they remain united (uniti) to the one who emitted
them, as the rays to the sun, or (were they emitted) as distinct and
separated (eYcabiliter et partiliter), so that each of them [exists] separately and has its own form (separatim et suam figurationem), as a
human being [comes] from another human being and an animal
from another animal? . . . And [are they] simple and uniform, and in
every way equal and similar among themselves, as spirit and light are
emitted, or [are they] composite and diVerent, dissimilar in their
members? (2.17.3) But, if each of them was indeed emitted distinctly
and according to its own generation (eYcabiliter et secundum suam
genesim), after the likeness of human beings, then either those generated by the Father will be of the same substance with him and similar to the one who generated them, or if they appear dissimilar, then
it is necessary to confess them to be of some other substance . . .
Furthermore, according to this reasoning each of them will be understood (to exist) separately, divided from one another (separatim divisus
ab altero), just as human beings, not mixed with nor united the one to
the other (non admixtus neque unitus alter altero), but in a distinct
form and with a defined area, each one of them has been delineated
by a magnitude of size[all of] which are characteristic of a body,
and not of a spirit. Let them, therefore, no longer speak of the
Pleroma as spiritual . . .58
530
ANTHONY BRIGGMAN
59
Irenaeus use of the analogy of a ray from the sun to illustrate a course of
production in which the product remains united with that which produced it
seems to stand against his previous understanding of this analogy. In AH
2.13.2 he identifies the analogy as a Gnostic illustration for the production
of aeons, in particular the production of Intelligence by the Father. In 2.13.5
the analogy is used as an example of, or at least in the context of discussing, a
course of production that results in the separation of a product from its
sourcenamely, the intelligence of God. Rather than challenging the suitability
of the analogy as an illustration for this type of production, Irenaeus contends
it is not suitable because it implies a medium that exists prior to the intelligence of God. As a result, it seems that Irenaeus understands the analogy to
illustrate contrary courses of production in 2.13.5 and 2.17.2. The simplest
explanation for this dissonance is that his understanding of the analogy in
2.13.5 reflects his polemic against Gnostic thought, while his use of the analogy in 2.17.2 reflects his own constructive thought. The emission of a ray
from the sun as an example of a type of production in which the product
remains united to its source does have a history prior to Irenaeus that seems
to be distinct from its Gnostic usage. Several passages in Philo utilize an
analogy of the sun and its rays (On Giants 1.3, On the Special Laws 1.7.40,
and On Dreams 1.14.77), but the analogy is not as close to Irenaeus as that
found in Justins Dial 128.3. Justin is critical of the analogy, though for different reasons from Irenaeus in 2.13.5.
them, as rays are united to the sun.59 On the other hand, there
are those produced as distinct and separated so that they exist
separately from that which produced them. Building upon this
distinction, Irenaeus states that if aeons are produced after the
manner of men then they must be regarded as existing separately, divided from one another, just as human beings, not mixed
with nor united the one to the other.
Those things that are united (unio) with that which produced
them in 2.17.2 correspond to those things that are mixed or
united (admisceo/unio) in 2.17.3. The logic of AH 2.17.23
reveals Irenaeus understanding of mixture. He sets that which
is mixed in opposition to that which exists separately, divided
from one another, while also placing that which is mixed in the
same category as or identifying it with that which is united the
one to the other. As a result, it is clear that Irenaeus conceives
of mixture as producing a unified resultant.
The production of a unified resultant by means of mixture fits
the Stoic theory of blending, but Irenaeus discussion also fits
Aristotelian mixture theory. He never specifies whether the constituent ingredients persist in the resultant in actuality or in
potentiality, or whether the resultant diVers from the ingredients
in kind (i.e. whether it is a tertium quid), positions that distinguish the two systems. This ambiguity does not characterize his
531
532
ANTHONY BRIGGMAN
For the body is not more powerful than the soul, since indeed from
that one is (given to the body) breath, and life, and increase, and
cohesion, but the soul possesses and rules over the body. It is certainly retarded in its speed, to the degree in which the body
62
Alexander of Aphrodisias: the soul . . . pervades (di0kein) the whole of the
body while preserving its own substantiality (o2s0an) in the mixture (tI m0xei)
with it (for there is nothing in the body possessing the soul that does not
partake (4moiron) of the soul) (Mixt. 4, 217.326); and Arius Didymus: the
souls within us . . . are mutually spread out (2ntiparekte0nousin) along with our
bodies through and through (5di4 7lwn) (fr. 28, Dox. Gr. 463.278; trans.
Sorabji, Matter, Space and Motion, p. 82).
533
participates in its motion; but it does not lose its own knowledge. For
the body is like an instrument, whereas the soul stands in the place of
the reason of the artist. As, therefore, the artist quickly conceives of
the work in himself, but carries it out slowly by means of an instrument because of the immobility of what is being acted on, so too the
speed of the mind having been mixed with the slowness of the instrument results in a temperate operation. So also the soul by participating (participans) with its body is hindered to a certain degree, its
speed being mixed (admixta) with the slowness of the body. Yet it
does not lose altogether its own powers (suas virtutes): indeed as it is
sharing (participans) life with the body, it does not itself cease to live.
Thus, too, when it is communicating other things to the body, it loses
neither the knowledge of them, nor the memory of the things which
have been considered.
534
ANTHONY BRIGGMAN
to resistance suggests the corporeality of the soul, since resistance is typically construed as belonging to the interaction of
material things.64 Other passages, however, more clearly indicate
that Irenaeus thinks of the soul as being corporeal.
The first two passages I would like to highlight occur in the
latter half of Against Heresies 2. In AH 2.19.6 we read:
Massuet remarked long ago that we may infer from this passage
that Irenaeus believed souls to be corporeal, insofar as they possess a circumscribed figure.65 The same inference may be drawn
from another passage that occurs towards the end of the book. In
AH 2.34.1 Irenaeus argues that the rich man is able to recognize
Lazarus and Abraham for several reasons, one of which is that
after death the soul preserves the figure of the body to which it
had once been adapted.66 This logic follows closely upon that
which we saw in AH 2.19.6 and the same inference may be
drawn: the ascription of a circumscribed figure to the soul suggests Irenaeus believed the soul to be corporeal.
Understanding Irenaeus attribution of figure to the soul as
presupposing the corporeality of the soul garners significant
64
Sorabji, Matter, Space and Motion, p. 99. Sorabji points out that the
resistance that would occur in blending as one body pervades another would
be a function of the diVerent densities belonging to the two bodies.
65
Sancti Irenaei episcopi Lugdunensis et martyris Detectionis et eversionis falso
cognominatae agnitionis, ed. R. Massuet (Paris, 1710; repr. PG 7; Paris, 1857),
col. 774, n. 34.
66
AH 2.34.1: souls not only continue to exist . . . but retain the same form
(characterem) of the body to which they are adapted (adaptantur), and souls
continue to exist . . . and have the figure (figuram) of a human being, so that
they may still be recognized. Grabe directs the reader to Tertullians argument for the corporeality of the soul in On the Soul (de Anima) 7 (Sancti
Irenaei episcopi Lugdunensis Contra omnes haereses libri quinque, ed. J. E. Grabe
[Oxford: E. Theatro Sheldoniano, 1702], p. 192, n. 2). Interestingly, given his
reading of AH 2.19.6, Massuet argues that Irenaeus does not express an opinion like Tertullian, contending that character refers to individual spiritual
properties (PG 7, cols. 8334, n. 93). This interpretation is unconvincing because the passage is speaking of the physical recognition of Lazarus and
Abraham by the rich man.
For he (the aeon Saviour) will not have the likeness and appearance
(speciem) of angels, but of those souls in whom also he is formed
(formatur)just as water when it is poured into a vessel takes the
form (formam) of that vessel, and if at some point it should freeze
in it, it will have the shape (speciem) of the vessel in which it has
frozensince souls themselves possess the figure (figuram) of the body
(in which they dwell), for they themselves have been adapted (adaptatae sunt) to the vessel, as I have said before.
535
The characteristics ascribed to that which is createdbeing corruptible, earthly, compound, circumscribedindicate that by
created Irenaeus means material. Included among the characteristics that he ascribes to created, material things is figuratio,
having a figure or shape. The possession of figure is proper to
that which is material, in contrast to that which is spiritual. That
being the case, Irenaeus ascription of figure (figura) to the soul
in AH 2.19.6 and 2.34.1 presupposes the materiality or corporeality of the soul.
The final text that bears on this discussion manifests a striking
similarity to Nemesius Nat. 81.61068 insofar as it speaks of the
soul as corporeal while also defining death as the departure or
separation of the soul from the body. In AH 5.7.1 Irenaeus
writes:
What, then, are mortal bodies? Could they be souls? On the contrary,
souls are incorporeal (incorporales) when put in comparison (quantum
ad comparationem) to mortal bodies (mortalium corporum): for God
breathed into the face of man the breath of life, and man became
a living soul (Gen 2:7). Now the breath of life is incorporeal (incorporalis). But neither can they call it mortal, since it is the breath of
life. And for this reason David says, My soul also shall live to Him
(Ps 21:30, LXX), as much as its substance is immortal. Neither,
though, can they say that the mortal body is spirit. What, then, is
there left to call the mortal body, except that which was formed,
that is, the flesh, of which it is also said that God will vivify it? For
this it is which dies and is decomposed (moritur et solvitur), but not
the soul nor the spirit. For to die is to lose vital capacity, and then to
become breathless, and inanimate, and devoid of motion, and to dissolve (deperire) into those [elements] from which one has derived the
beginning of [ones] substance. But this happens neither to the soul,
67
Following Rousseaus suggestion that eVusa et locupletia appears to be a
doublet (SC 293, p. 224).
68
Quoted in the first section.
536
ANTHONY BRIGGMAN
69
Scholars have disagreed over whether Irenaeus holds a trichotomous or
dichotomous anthropology. I have argued elsewhere that Irenaeus holds a dichotomous anthropology, according to which the human being is composed of
body and soul. The reference to the Spirit in AH 5.7.1 refers to the reception
of the Holy Spirit by the perfect human being. See Briggman, Irenaeus and the
Holy Spirit, pp. 149, 1656, 17381.
70
Strictly speaking, animation or temporal life is not proper to the soul.
The soul possesses life because it has pleased God to bestow life upon the
soul (AH 2.34.4; cf. Briggman, Irenaeus and the Holy Spirit, pp. 16773).
537
71
AH 5.12.2.
D. Minns is correct when he writes: In Irenaeus view, only material things are
made up of bits and pieces. I do not believe, however, that his next sentence represents the thought of Irenaeus: Souls are immaterial and therefore simple: they
have no parts to come unstuck and therefore they are incorruptiblethey have no
innate capacity for corruption as bodies do (Irenaeus: An Introduction [Washington,
DC: Georgetown University Press, 1994; London and New York: T & T Clark,
2010 ], p. 95). Not only is it incorrect to think of the soul as immaterial and simple, as
I have shown above, but it is also wrong to assert that souls do not have an innate
capacity for corruption, such that they are incorruptible. Incorruptibility, or immortality, does not belong to the soul by nature, but comes to human beings who
receive power or grace from the Holy Spirit (e.g. AH 5.8.12). This is true of Adam
and Eve prior to the Fall, who depend upon the power/grace of the Spirit to sustain
eternal life, as well as postlapsarian human beings, who depend upon the power/
grace of the Spirit to restore eternal life (Briggman, Irenaeus and the Holy Spirit, esp.
pp. 16673, 7980).
73
This reading of Irenaeus also has a basis in Stoic thought, which recognized some things to be more material than others. See Sorabji, Matter, Space
and Motion, p. 116; Sorabji refers to Calcidius, in Tim. ch. 289.
74
As we have seen, e.g. in AH 5.7.1, which quotes Gen. 2:7.
75
E.g. AH 3.21.10.
72
538
ANTHONY BRIGGMAN
539
potentially, and one can be dominant, as the divine nature was supposed to be, without obliterating the other.79
they wander from the truth, because their thought departs from him who is
truly God, being ignorant that his only-begotten Word, who is always
present with the human race, united to and interspersed in his own formation (unitus et consparsus suo plasmati), according to the pleasure of the
Father, and was made flesh, is himself Jesus Christ our Lord . . .
540
ANTHONY BRIGGMAN
82
part, classed this phrase among others that reveal the rich language Irenaeus uses about the union of God and man in the
incarnation.82 Though I agree with Houssiau that the placement
of the phrase between references to a more general presence of
the Word to human beings and references to his peculiar presence in the incarnation could bring into question whether the
phrase refers to the incarnation, the broader argument of the
passage concerning the unity of Jesus person strongly indicates
that it has to do with the union of the Word and humanity in the
incarnation. The decisiveness of Robinson and Grillmeier are
instructive.
As for the term that lies behind consparsus, no consensus has
emerged. Suggestions have included pefurme#no",83 sumfuraqe1",84
and sunesparme#no".85 The first two belong to the same word
family and would be translated along the lines of mixed or
mingled with and kneaded or blended together. The third
would be translated along the lines of interspersed with and
its presence would likely entail an allusion to Stoic concept of
l0go" spermatik0". This concept, however, is foreign to Irenaeus
thought,86 rendering the originality of sunesparme#no" highly
improbable.
Unless we recover the original Greek, no final determination
will be possible. At the same time it is worth pointing out that
the meanings of each of these terms are compatible with the
Stoic theory of blending, with which Irenaeus is familiar at
this point in his writing. When read in the light of the theory
of blending, unitus et consparsus suo plasmati would refer to the
union that results when the Word pervades or extends throughout (conspargere) the created human substance (plasma). Such a
reading would support Houssiaus insistence that when speaking
541
But, again, those who assert that he is just a mere man who was
begotten by Joseph remain in the bondage of the old disobedience,
and are dying, having not yet been blended (nondum commixti) with
the Word of God the Father, nor receiving liberty through the Son . . .
For it was for this reason that the Word of God [was made] man, and
he who is the Son of God was made the Son of man, that man,
having been blended (commixtus) with the Word of God, and receiving the adoption, might become the son of God.
Irenaeus twice uses commiscere with reference to the union between human beings and the Word of God. In the first instance
those who have not yet been blended (nondum commixti) with the
Word remain in a state of death, while in the second instance
those who have been blended (commixtus) with the Word become
children of God.88
87
542
ANTHONY BRIGGMAN
89
Theodoret of Cyrus, Eranistes, 1, Flor. 1, ed. G. H. Ettlinger (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1975), p. 98, line 20.
90
S. Irenaei, ed. Grabe, p. 249, n. 6. Feuardent seems to have been the first
to notice the contrast between Theodorets Greek and the Latin text of
Irenaeus (as quoted by Stieren in S. Irenaei, vol. 2, p. 903). Grabes explanation for the contrast builds upon Feuardents earlier note.
91
Of particular interest to this study is the fact that Massuet never connects
his observations with regard to Theodorets understanding of kra' si" to the
Stoic theory of blending.
92
S. Irenaei, ed. Massuet, cols. 93940, n. 55. Grabe, too, admits the possibility that Theodoret was working from memory but quickly turns to his
suggestion of Theodorets polemical alteration of the text behind commixtus
(S. Irenaei, p. 249, n. 6).
93
The debate continued over a century later in Harvey (S. Irenaei, vol. 2, p.
102, n. 5), Hitchcock (Irenaeus of Lugdunum, p. 136, n. 1), P. Nautin (Le
Dossier dHippolyte et de Meliton dans les florile`ges dogmatiques et chez les his ditions du Cerf, 1953], pp. 2931),
toriens modernes [Patristica, 1; Paris: Les E
and Houssiau (Christologie dIrenee, p. 192, n. 3).
94
S. Irenaei, ed. Massuet, col. 939, n. 55.
95
S. Irenaei, ed. Stieren, vol. 1, p. 525, n. 2.
96
Robinson, Notes of Hort on Irenaeus, p. 162. Horts suggestion is
printed beside commixti Verbo.
97
Hitchcock, Irenaeus of Lugdunum, p. 136, n. 1.
98
Rousseau, SC 210, p. 343.
543
99
word family as does kra' si", the technical term for the Stoic
theory of blending.100
Irenaeus discussion of the union between God and human
beings continues at the end of AH 3.19.1, where he bases the
benefits of the salvific union upon the attainments of the christological union. He writes:
The union (adunare) to which Irenaeus refers here is the blending (commiscere) of the Word and human beings of which he
spoke in the first part of AH 3.19.1. We have cause, then, to
utilize Stoic mixture theory as an interpretative lens when considering this discussion of the salvific union. Two features of
Stoic thought are relevant to the interpretation of this text.
First, as I have mentioned, the constituent ingredients in a
blend preserve the substances and qualities proper to them.101
The union, then, between human beings and the divine Word
does not jeopardize their distinction; they remain diVerent in
kind, and, therefore, always distinguishable even when
united.102 Second, blending is designed to explain how the
active principle (God/Pneuma/Logos) and the passive principle
relate to each other.103 The absorption of the corruptibility and
mortality of post-lapsarian human beings by the incorruptibility
and immortality of the divine Word should be recognized as the
action of the divine Word upon the passive human being with
whom it is blended.
99
Harvey is the sole exception (S. Irenaei, vol. 2, p. 102, n. 5), preferring
the Greek given by Theodoret, but his reasoning seems to be driven by his
theological predetermination that commixtus is inadmissable.
100
This would also hold for the term behind the earlier use of commiscere in
this passage, since the second usage builds on the first.
101
E.g. Alex. Aphrod., Mixt. 3, 21417.
102
Irenaeus is ever concerned to maintain a distinction between the uncreated God and created beings. In AH 4.38.1, 3 believers, as created beings,
grow increasingly perfect, ever closer to the nature of God, but never arriving,
always limited to an approximation of God, the uncreated One, the perfect
One (Briggman, Irenaeus and the Holy Spirit, pp. 1789).
103
Alex. Aphrod., Mixt. 3, 216.1417; Diogenes Laertius, Lives 7.1346.
544
ANTHONY BRIGGMAN
545
106
Rousseau provides a succinct explanation of the first line of this text in
SC 210, p. 344.
107
This discussion is an aspect of Irenaeus argument for identifying Jesus
as the Godman, an argument that occupies all of AH 3.19.
108
Loofs follows Theodorets text; see n. 105.
109
Loofs, Theophilus von Antiochien, p. 91.
110
Irenee de Lyon: Contre les Heresies, ed. F. Sagnard (Sources Chretiennes
ditions du Cerf, 1952), p. 337, n. 1. The simple distinction
34; Paris: Les E
between a personal and natural union does not fit Irenaeus thought.
Hitchcock was correct long ago to say: Irenaeus does not represent the
Word or Son of God as taking a second Personality, but a second Nature to
Himself. His manhood had no personality of its own (Irenaeus of Lugdunum,
pp. 1545). This taking of human substance by the Word/Son involves a union
of the divine and human natures or substances.
111
Houssiau and Rousseau follow the Latin text; see n. 105.
112
Rousseau, SC 210, pp. 3445; Houssiau, Christologie dIrenee, pp. 1915.
Houssiau goes so far as to suggest that Irenaeus is not here concerned with
the union between the Word and his humanity, but just two momentsglorious and ingloriousin the life of Christ (p. 195, n. 2).
546
ANTHONY BRIGGMAN
113
Some texts, including the 1526 editio princeps of Erasmus, have absorpto
(see S. Irenaei, ed. Grabe, p. 250, n. a).
114
Wolfson points out that katap0nw plays an important role in later monophysite logic, as represented in Theodorets Dialogues, for the monophysites
held that Jesus humanity was absorbed by his divinity in the christological
union (Philosophy of the Church Fathers, vol. 1, pp. 4456). While Irenaeus also
uses katap0nw, his logic is not monophysite. Unlike the monophysites, Irenaeus
is not speaking of a constant or absolute absorption which results in the existence of only one nature. Rather, he is speaking of a dynamic by which the
divine nature recedes or advances in accordance with the particular activity or
experience in which Jesus is engaged. This dynamic does not threaten or
jeopardize the existence of the human nature but in fact guarantees it, for
the human nature is always required, even if only for Jesus to be seen and
heard by earthly, material creatures (e.g. AH 5.1.1).
115
I believe this reading will bear out Horts position that the sense [of this
passage] seems to be that the Word was in active harmony with the Man in
these acts or triumphs, while not abandoning both the Greek and Latin texts
as Hort believes it is necessary to do (Robinson, Notes of Hort on Irenaeus,
p. 162). Houssiau is mistaken when he says this text furnishes . . . a well equilibrated antithesis in which the Word and his humanity are respectively subjects (Christologie dIrenee, p. 193).
547
116
For Irenaeus goal of safeguarding the unity of Christ, see Houssiau,
Christologie dIrenee, pp. 1945.
117
The relational dynamic between the humanity and divinity of Christ in
this passage reminds Grillmeier of Athanasius, about whom he writes, unlike
Irenaeus, we must in his case take Stoic ideas of the work of the Logos into
account (Christ in Tradition, vol. 1, p. 104, n. 231). Grillmeier provides no
explanation for why such Stoic ideas should not be taken into account for
Irenaeus.
118
Reading this passage in terms of the Stoic theory of blending is also
encouraged by its context, for instance Irenaeus appropriation of the theory of
blending earlier in this argument, in AH 3.19.1.
119
Alex. Aphrod., Mixt. 3, 216.1417; Diogenes Laertius, Lives 7.1346.
548
ANTHONY BRIGGMAN
120
Presumably Irenaeus does not mean to suggest that the movement to the
fore of one nature necessarily excludes the involvement of the other nature,
but that in certain instances the emphasis of one nature over the other is a
question of causality or primacy. He is not, however, as clear on this point as
one would like.
121
Sorabji, Matter, Space and Motion, p. 83.
122
Alex. Aphrod., Mixt. 4, 217.36; Sorabji, Matter, Space and Motion, p. 83.
123
Sorabji, Matter, Space and Motion, p. 83.
124
Alex. Aphrod., Mixt. 3, 216.1417.
125
Alex. Aphrod., Mixt. 4, 217.279.
549
126
Now this is his Word, our Lord Jesus Christ, who in the last times
was made a man among men, so that (6na/ut) he might join the end to
126
550
ANTHONY BRIGGMAN
Rousseau does not comment upon this topic, but his translation suggests
he reads the text in this way (SC 100, p. 635).
130
Robinson, Demonstration, pp. 645.
131
For my reading of complexus homo Spiritum Dei as referring to the
salvific union, see my Irenaeus and the Holy Spirit, pp. 18890.
the beginning, that is, man to God. And on account of this, the
prophets, receiving the prophetic gift from the same Word, proclaimed his advent according to the flesh, by which the blending
and communion (commixtio et communio) of God and man took
place (factus est) according to the good pleasure of the Father, the
Word of God foretelling from the beginning that God would be seen
by men, and would dwell with them on the earth, and would talk
[with them], and would be present with his own workmanship, saving
it, and becoming capable of being perceived by it, and freeing us
from the hands of all who hate us (Luke 1:71), that is from the
whole spirit of transgression, and causing us to serve Him in holiness
and righteousness all our days (Luke 1:745), in order that (uti) man,
entwined (complexus) with the Spirit of God, might pass into the
glory of the Father.
551
132
Commixtio et communio are also read as referring to the christological
union by Grabe, who connects commixtio in this text with consparsus in AH
3.16.6, seemingly reading both as referring to Christ (S. Irenaei, p. 331, n. 5);
Robinson, Demonstration, pp. 645, 149, n. 2); N. Bonwetsch, who notes the
text with reference to the coming of the Word in visible form (Theologie des
Irenaus [Gutersloh: C. Bertelsmann, 1925], p. 64, n. 2); Wolfson, Philosophy of
the Church Fathers, vol. 1, p. 396; and A. Orbe, Gloria Dei vivens homo
(Analisis de Ireneo, adv. haer. IV, 20, 17), Gregorianum 73/2 (1992), pp.
20568, at 231.
552
ANTHONY BRIGGMAN
Rousseau suggests this term in his Greek retroversion (SC 100, p. 635);
see also his note on commixtus in AH 3.19.1 in SC 210, p. 343.
134
Irenaeus description of the christological union in AH 3.16.6 does not
identify the union as a blend (kra' si"), but rather uses language compatible
with the Stoic theory of blending.
553
135
554
ANTHONY BRIGGMAN
IV. CONCLUSIONS
139
According to Wolfson, Tertullian is the first among the Fathers whose
discussion of the unity of the person in Jesus betrays the influence of the
philosophic discussion of physical union (Philosophy of the Church Fathers,
vol. 1, p. 387). Grillmeier declares: Non-Christian elements find no place in
[Irenaeus] understanding of Christ (cf. Adv. Haer. I, 10, 13). He is not a
philosopher as his master Justin was, but above all a biblical theologian, the
first deliberately biblical theologian of the Christian church, and an interpreter of the traditional creed (Christ in Christian Tradition, vol. 1, p. 100).
555
140
140
This characterization seems to have its origins in G. Bardys determination:
[Irenaeus] ne combat pas la sagesse profane; il se contente de la dedaigner
(Litterature grecque chretienne [Paris: Bloud & Gay, 1928], p. 36). W. R. Schoedels
early thinking illustrates the portrayals of which I speak: In summary, then, it
would appear that Irenaeus had some acquaintance with rhetoric and less with the
higher discipline of philosophy. His acquaintance with the latter was confined largely to doxographical material which gave him no real understanding of the subject.
And this for the most part was employed in a sceptical fashion for the sole purpose of
refuting the Gnostics. A Peripatetic source critical of Plato may also have been
known to him. But beyond that there seems to have been little or no direct philosophical influence upon him. In any event Irenaeus was himself conscious of little
interest in philosophy (Philosophy and Rhetoric in the Adversus Haereses of
Irenaeus, p. 32).
141
This is not the first article to argue for the influence of philosophy upon
Irenaeus thought. In a later work Schoedel revised his earlier conclusions, contending that the depth of Irenaeus indebtedness to Empiric method and Scepticism
exceeds a mere exploitation of a doxographical source (Theological Method in
Irenaeus, JTS, NS 35 [1984], pp. 3149). Barnes has argued that Stoicism is the
basis for Irenaeus understanding of God as Spirit (Irenaeuss Trinitarian
Theology, esp. pp. 70, 7681.). For a brief consideration of the status quaestionis
and a discussion of the influence of Middle Platonism on Irenaeus, see my
Revisiting Irenaeus Philosophical Acumen, VC 65 (2011), pp. 11524.
142
Heine, Christology of Callistus, pp. 778, 89. H. Chadwick has also
noted that Origen illustrates the christological union by appropriating one of
the three Stoic examples of blending, for he says the unity of the human and
divine in Christ is similar to the union of fire with iron that has been placed
in a furnace (Origen, Celsus, and the Stoa, JTS, OS 48 [1947], pp. 3449, at
3940). Chadwick maintains that this use of Stoic thought is incidental, with
Stoic thought on providence, alone, having a large influence upon Origen.
concepts. To the contrary, philosophical thought had a considerable influence upon Irenaeus.141
Finally, recognizing the importance of Stoic thought to
Irenaeus Christology enhances our understanding of the early
stages of christological development. Namely, we are able to
appreciate the fundamental importance of the Stoic theory of
blending to widely divergent christological accounts. The theory
of blending oVers the logic by which Irenaeus establishes the unity
and diversity of the person of Christ, and by which he explains
how the two realities of the incarnate Word function as one
realitythe earliest known attempt at such an explanation. The
theory of blending also oVers the logic by which the Roman
monarchians sought to avoid patripassianism.142 It is possible that
the theory of blending had a particular currency in the Roman
church of the second century, for Irenaeus too stayed in Rome for
a time and his interest in the theory could have developed there.
Whatever the case, it is clear that Stoic thought was essential to
prominent christological accounts of the late second and early
third centuries.