Vries Benjamin Derrida Certeau

Anti-Babel: The 'Mystical Postulate' in Benjamin, de Certeau and Derrida
Author(s): Hent de Vries

Source: MLN, Vol. 107, No. 3, German Issue (Apr., 1992), pp. 441-477
Published by: The Johns Hopkins University Press
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Anti-Babel:
The 'MysticalPostulate'in Benjamin,
de CerteauandDerrida
HentdeVries
In May 1916, Walter Benjamin, in response to Martin Buber's

request for a contributionto the journal Der Jude,wrote that the
spiritof Jewishtraditionwas one of the most importantand persistentthemesin his thought.' Benjamin had met Buber earlier in
1914 when he had invitedhim to give a lecture for the 'FreieStuin Berlin, but his relation to him had from the very
dentenschaft'
start been marked by a certain reservationwhich became even
more evident afterthe outbreak of the war. It must have come as
no surprise,then, that his response to Buber's invitationwas negative. In a letterofJuly1916 Benjamin denounced in no uncertain
terms the political orientationof Buber's Der Jude, most importantlybecause of the enthusiasmof so manyof itscontributorsfor
the Erlebnisof the war and, more indirectly,because of its interpretationof Zionism.2 Moreover, the lettermarks the end of his
earlier interest and engagement in the movement of Gustav
Wyneken,and it inauguratesthe unmistakableskepticismwithre1
W. Benjamin,Briefe,Hg. und mitAnmerkungenversehenvon G. Scholem und
Th. W. Adorno (Frankfurt/M:Suhrkamp, 1966, 1978),-125.
2 Cf. G. Scholem, WalterBenjamin-Die Geschichte
einerFreundschaft
(Frankfurt/M:
Suhrkamp, 1975), 41.
MLN, 107, (1992): 441-477 ? 1992 by The Johns Hopkins UniversityPress

HENT DE VRIES
442
gard to the mainstreamof the German social democracythatcharacterizes so many of his later texts,most notably"Zur Kritikder
Gewalt" and the final theses "Uber den Begriffder Geschichte."
In the earlyletterto Buber, Benjamin formulatedhis critiquein
termsthatindicate the main preoccupationand major premisesof
his firstindependent views on language and contain in nuce his
viewson the relationshipbetween thisconceptionof language and
the question of politics.One passage standsout as the paradoxical
formulationof the intricateconnectionor even unitythat would
existbetweenword and effectiveaction.And itis preciselywiththis
paradoxical formulationthat Benjamin-by postulatingan immediate, magical,secretand yetsalutarypower of the mute,'mystical'
foundationof language-seeks to explain whythe word cannot be
reduced to a mere instrumentalmeans of action:
Mein Begriffsachlichenund zugleich hochpolitischenStils und
Schreibensist:hinzufihrenauf das dem Wortversagte;nurwo diese
kann
reinerMachtsicherschliesst,
in unsagbarer
Spharedes Wortlosen
der magischeFunkenzwischenWortund bewegenderTat uberspringen (...).
Nur die intensiveRichtungder Worte in den Kern des in-
hineingelangtzur wahrenWirkung.3
nerstenVerstummens
and at thesametimehighlypoliticalstyle
[Myconceptofan appropriate
is to lead up to theineffable:
of writing
onlytherewherethiswordless
realmdisclosesitselfin [its]inexpressible
pure force[power,violence]
can themagicflashbetweenwordand movingactionleap across[from
of thewords
destination
one side to theother](.. .) Onlytheintensive
achievesthetrue
oftheheartofthemostinnersilencing
inthedirection
effect.]
Buber did not respond to the letterand no furthercooperation
developed. In retrospect,however,these sentencescan be read as
the programmaticstatementof a lifelongconcentrationon the 'essence' of language, an essence in whichknowledge,right(as well as
of the facultiesof
morality)and art,followinga Kantian tripartition
human reason, are 'founded' in a curious way. This program,
whichbegan, as Benjamin explained in a letterto Ernst Schoen in
December 1917, as a desperate inquiryinto the linguisticcondiuberdie
Nachdenken
tionsof the categoricalimperative("verzweifeltes
des
distinguishes
Imperativs"4),
kategorischen
Grundlagen
sprachlichen
3 Benjamin, Briefe,127.
4 Ibid, 165.

M L N
443
itselfby its peculiar 'linguisticturn,' not only from the modern

criticalproject but also from any objective or absolute idealism.
Hamann showsthewayhere,not Kant let alone Hegel or Schelling.
Moreover, Benjamin's early reflectionsbetray a fascinationwith
language in which the early German Romanticwritings,the modern French lyric,and more indirectly(i.e., mediated through the
studiesof Gershom Scholem), the traditionof Jewishmysticismor
Cabbala, enter into a singular configuration.In this article,I will
focus on just one aspect of thisconfigurationthatin a remarkable
way seems to determineor found all others:the so-called 'mystical'
element. It has often been noted that this 'mystical'moment in
Benjamin's writingreveals a religious or theological desire to restore a lost or broken totalityand identity.5In what is to follow,I
will ask what remains of this critique in light of other possible
readingsof thisquasi-theologicalfigure.For thatpurpose, itwillbe
necessaryto make a long detour throughsome of the more recent
discussionsof the so-called 'mysticalpostulate,'mostnotablyin the
worksof Michel de Certeau and Jacques Derrida.
the reading of the earlywork
In Derrida's mostrecentwritings,6
of Walter Benjamin plays an increasinglyimportantrole, or so it
seems. In a text entitled"Des tours de Babel" (1985) as well as in
several scatteredremarksthroughoutthe conversationsin L'oreille
de l'autre(1982), Derrida engages in a detailed discussionof Benjamin's conceptions of language as formulated in "Uber die
Sprache uberhaupt und fiberdie Sprache des Menschen" (1916),
as well as in "Die Aufgabe des Ubersetzers" (1923). And in the
lecture "Force de loi: la 'fondation mystiquede l'autorite,'" the
same line of investigationis furtherpursued in a reading of Benjamin's thoughtsin the essay "Zur Kritikder Gewalt" (1921).
However, it is clear from the outset that these analyses are not
only undertaken to explore a remarkableresemblanceor even affinitybetween Benjamin's earliest 'program' and the 'task' of deconstruction.For in these readings, Derrida also gives voice to a
5 Cf. B.
zu
als Kritiker.Untersuchungen
Witte, WalterBenjamin-Der Intellektuelle
seinemFriihwerk
(Stuttgart:J. B. MetzlerischeVerlagsbuchhandlung,1976), 123 and
W. Fuld, WalterBenjamin,Zwischenden Stuhlen,Eine Biographie(Munchen, Wien:
Carl Hanser Verlag, 1979), 75: "die Rickerkenntnisdes Ursprungs,die erneute
verinnerlichteVersenkung in den Kern der Identitat,dcasist,was Benjamin unter
'Philosophie' verstand."
6 I will not comment here on the remarkson Benjamin in "+ R (par dessus le
marche)," published in La veriteen peinture.J. Derrida, La veriteen peinture(Paris:
Flammarion, 1978), 200ff.

444
HENT DE VRIES
profounduneasiness that,in the itinerarythatis followedfromthe

firstto the second major reading (from"Des toursde Babel," that
is, to "Force de loi"), is expressed in increasinglycandid terms.The
reasons for this ambivalence vis-a-visBenjamin's early textsseems
clear enough. For, in spite of certain strikingsimilaritieswithrespect to the problem of linguisticrepresentationin general and of
juridico-political representation in particular, there is, at first
glance, an equally notable differencebetween the two authors.
Benjamin's 'metaphysical'assumption of a 'divine' pure origin of
language beforeits'fall'as well as his appeal to an ultimate-quasieschatological-overcoming of language's ambiguitiesby a 'divine
violence' are the main reasons which cause Derrida to distance
himselffromthisthoughtand the politicsit would seem to imply.
For Benjamin's critiqueof a 'bourgeois' conceptionof language as
representationas well as of the parliamentarism-of the democracy as representation-characteristicof the Weimar Republic,
would, unfortunately,not only be 'revolutionary'in the sense of
being at once 'Marxist'and 'messianic.'The desire fora past origin,
for immediate formsof a non-communicative,i.e., no longer methat would mark the
diated, 'communication' (or Verstindigung)
formsof cooperation prefiguredby the 'general proletarianstrike,'
to thisambivawould be 'reactionary'as well. In contradistinction
lence, Derrida's deconstructionof the axioms of Benjamin's essays
could thus be expected to prepare a different,more differentiated
account of the functioningof the 'mysor, rather,more differential
ticalpostulate'at the intersectionof language and politics.And yet,
thingsare more complicatedhere. For the riskthatworriesDerrida
in Benjamin's textscontinues to haunt the deconstructivereading
as well. The differencebetween the two textsis thereforea difference within the limits of a certain-inevitable, necessaryrepetition;i.e., withina certaindisplacementof an ineluctablerelation to an 'abyss' that'is' the conditionof all language, of politics
and the law; a 'mysticalabyss,' moreover,in which 'God' or, the
'divine force'and 'the worst'are neverfaraway (fromthe reader or
'actor,' that is, and fromeach other).
Before discussingDerrida's reading of Benjamin, I willmake two
briefdetours. I will begin by retracingsome of the steps taken by
Michel de Certeau in order to approach and circumscribethe elusive subjectof 'mysticism.'
Secondly,I willbrieflypause at Derrida's
quasi-transcendentalanalysisof de Certeau's discussionof the socalled 'mysticalpostulate.' Both detours shed some light on the

M L N
445
premisesof Derrida's approach, as well as, more indirectly,on the

implicationsof Benjamin's early reflectionson language, politics
and the law.
I. The Originary Affirmationof Mysticism
"Mysticism,"Michel de Certeau writes,"is the anti-Babel. It is the
search fora common language, afterlanguage has been shattered.
It is the inventionof a 'language of the angels' because thatof man
has been disseminated."7Withthese words,de Certeau, in La fable
(an interdisciplinary
studyof some of the major charactermystique
isticsof the mysticismof the 16thand 17thcenturies,of whichonly
the firstvolume was completed and published in 1982), describes
mysticaldiscourse as a "historicaltrope" fora "loss,"8as a response
to the disintegrationof a culturein whichobjects of meaning and
even God himselfseemed to have vanishedcompletely.And yet,de
Certeau continues,mysticismdoes not respond to thisloss by substitutingfor it new doctrinesor institutions.Instead, it discoversa
new mode of treatingthe disintegratedtraditionof theological,
scripturaland patristicknowledge; that is, it uses or experiences
De Certeau relates that procedure to
the same language otherwise.
thatof negativetheology:"it is as thoughthe functionof mysticism
to a closure and erase itselfat the
were to bringa religiousepisteme
same time."9The interplayof thisclosure and erasure can be easily
explained. For in the fragmentedand virtuallyeclipsed language
of tradition,the common ground or the verypreliminariesof the
communicationof its contentswhich had-so far-been taken for
and reestablished
permanently:
granted firstneed to be established
to
has
itself
discourse
produce the conditionsof its func"mystical
tioning"10as well as of itscontinuationor conservation.Mysticism,
then,de Certeau claims,would begin witha singularoriginal and
a singular'act,'an "I will,"a volo,in whichreiteratedaffirmation,
or through which-time and again an empty 'space' is created,
inventedor instituted,a 'space,' thatis, hospitableto the new modus
7 M. de
Discourse on the Other, transl. by B. Massumi
Certeau, Heterologies,
(Minneapolis: Universityof Minnesota Press, 1986), 88, cf. M. de Certeau, La fable
1, XVIe-XVIIe siecle, (Paris: Gallimard, 1982), 216. Cf. L. Giard, "Biobibmystique,
liographie", in: "Michel de Certeau", Cahierspourun temps(Paris 1987), 245 ff.
80.
de Certeau, Heterologies,
9
Ibid., 37.
10de
225-226.
Certeau, La fablemystique,

HENT DE VRIES
446
loquendior, which amounts to the same thing,a new modusagendi.

It is thisvolothat,in the mystictext,functionsas the linguisticand
practicala priorithatwas formerlyconstitutedby the abstractcorThe
pus of theologicallearningand itsinstitutionalinfrastructure.
volo would be that without which no-new-speech is possible.
Mysticismin thissense should thusno longerbe explained in terms
of an apologeticsthatseeks to bringitsaddressees to reorienttheir
will and to accept certain assertionsor predicates with respect to
the divine being, the literaland figuralmeaning of the Scriptures,
etc. Instead of being its mere effect,the mysticvolowould, rather,
be in the silent ground of any such discourse, its secret point of
departure, the force which would make it functionat all.
At the same time, however,de Certeau makes it clear that this
'mysticalground' presupposed by all utterancewould also make
all-new--discourse impossible.For not onlydoes it haunt the very
rupture that initiateswithan ethical demand that no language or
practicecan ever hope to satisfy;"1itsforce-(the 'act' of) itsinvention-is also betrayed from the very moment it is pronounced,
reflectedor narratedin the futileattempttojustify,to preserveor
to renew it.
Up to a certainextent,de Certeau stresses,the mysticdiscourse
of the sixteenthand seventeenthcenturies,byintroducingthe volo,
anticipatesthe pragmaticmodalityof what,sinceAustin'sHow toDo
speech
ThingswithWords,has come to be known as the performative
act. Instead of reaffirminga historicallytransmitteddoctrinalcorpus of constativespertainingto the existenceand the essentialattributesof a divine reality,the mysticauthors would have expressed a new way of experiencinglanguage in general. More specifically, mystic speech, instead of postulating a reality or
knowledge thatwould precede the utterance,would resemblethat
Its priperformativeclassifiedby speech act theoryas a promise.12
And
de
would
be
an
one.
Certeau
function
illocutionary
yet,
mary
leaves no doubt thatthe volois not a performative-or promise-in
the well-definedsense most speech act theoristshave in mind. To
be sure, the mysticvolois not a constative,but it preciselylacks the
social or conventionalcontextswhichare commonlyconsidered to
render the performativespeech act 'successful'or not. On the contrary,the volo presupposes and entails the eliminationor destruc1 Ibid., 229, 230.
Ibid., 237.
12

M L N
447
tion of all such circumstancesand it therebyreveals the limitof all

performatives.And it is forthatveryreason thatthe mysticvolono
longer allows, let alone guarantees the translation-or "metamorphosis"-of the linguisticutterancein a social contract.13The volo
is less a "vouloirdire,"to recitethe well-knownformulafromDerrida's La voixetlephenomene
thatde Certeau reiteratesat thispoint,
but "a willingfromwhich a sayingis born or can be born."14The
volowould thus be ab-solute in the veryetymologicalsense of the
word, i.e., it would absolve itselffromall objects and ends. However, this circumstancewould by no means entitleus to associate
the volowitha purelynegative'act.' Rather,the volo'is' an irreducWith an obible and infinitegesture of unconditionalaffirmation.
est
lique reference to Spinoza's famous phrase omnisdeterminatio
negatio,de Certeau explains whythismustbe so: whereas "knowledge de-limitsits contentsaccording to a procedure which is essentiallythat of the 'no,' i.e., the labor of distinction('this is not
that'), the mysticalpostulate poses the illimitable[gesture] of a
'yes.' "15 And it is such a 'yes' that has to be presupposed-and
thereby'postulated'-in everydistinct'yes' and 'no,' by theiroppositionas much as by the dialecticalsublationof theirposited positivityand negativity.This pre-positional'yes,'de Certeau suggests,
thereforemanifestsitselfonly in the modalityof the futureperfect. The 'yes' has, in a way, always already taken place. It has
alwaysalready been given,althoughit never gives 'itself,''as such,'
thatis to say,'in all purity.'We could never hope to grasp it in and
foritself,because everyconstativeutterancethatwe would want to
use in order to circumscribeits nature would already presuppose
or engage its purported 'object' or 'subject,'and thisbefore even a
word had been spoken. Moreover,the 'yes'would be irreducibleto
an occurrenceor phrase thata definitearticle('the') mightstabilize
in a certain unityor number: 'yes' would be everywhereand nowhere, one and multiple.Consequently,no transcendentalor linwould ever be able to distance itselffrom it,
guisticmeta-discourse
turnitsback on it,returnto it,let alone reflectand speculate on its
of
intentor meaning.16For, since the volowould be the affirmation
a beginningor opening ratherthan of anythingdeterminate,the
The volowould
mystic'speech' would implya certain"non-vouloir."
13
14
15
16
Ibid., 238.
Ibid., 240.
Ibid., 239.
Cf. J. Derrida, Psyche.Inventionsde l'autre(Paris: Galilee, 1987), 640.

HENT DE VRIES
448
pertain to everythingand nothing, to everyone and nobody. It

would 'construct'the 'space' in whichwhatis positivelygivenor that
whichis negativecould be experienced and said at all (i.e., posited,
negated or even denegated).
In de Certeau's analysis,then,the volowould be no longer thinkable as the fulfillableintentionof a subjectconstitutedand identifiable prior to the volo.The volowould no longer be the willingor
sayingof somethingdeterminate.In itsveryab-soluteness,itwould
precisely be a nihil volo, emptied out to the point of becoming
almostinterchangeablewithHeidegger's interpretationof the nonas a releasementor 'lettingvouloirof Meister Eckart's Geldzenheit
be.'17 Not unlike Wittgenstein's TractatusLogico-Philosophicus,
where it is said that it is preciselynot "howthingsare in the world
that is mystical,but thatit exists" ("Nicht wie die Welt ist, ist das
Mystische,sondern dasssie ist."),the mysticwritingswould "display
a passion for what is" ratherthan for whatit is that 'is.'
Mysticismthen,in de Certeau's sense, would entail an originary
opening up of all language. But, at the same time,it would imply
its "circoncision."18Like the infinitedetours of negativetheology,
it would-paradoxically-only signifythroughthe fact that it removes (and withdrawsitselffrom)language's verysignifyingness.19
Mysticspeech would thus disappear in what it discloses: accordingly,it would only say by unsaying,writeby 'unwriting.'And the
alteritythat it, in so doing, reveals and conceals, would have no
identityor name independent of this movement.In de Certeau's
words:
textis notthe(t)exterior
The otherthatorganizesthe[mystic]
[unhorsfromthemovement
It is notan (imaginary)
texte].
objectdistinguishable
bywhichit(Es) is traced.To setitapart,in isolationfromthetextsthat
it
in theeffortto sayit,wouldbe to (...) identify
exhaustthemselves
of
ofalreadyconstituted
withtheresidueofalterity
systems rationality,
or to equate the questionasked underthe figureof the limitwitha
to pos(.. .) It wouldbe tantamount
religiousrepresentation
particular
of
an
the
a
the
behind
what-ever,
documents, presence
ineffability
iting,
thatcouldbe twistedto anyend.... 20
17
18
de Certeau, La fablemystique,
228, 229, 232 and 27.
Ibid., 185 ff.
19
Ibid., 189.
20 de Certeau,
27.
81-82, cf. La fablemystique,
Heterologies,

M L N
449
Instead of attemptingto define its purported 'object,' to understand mysticismwould thereforemean: to formalizethe different
aspects of its writing,of its 'style'or 'tracing,'of an infinitelyreiterated (i.e., repeated, altered and even annihilated) invisiblestep
(or pas).21And it is onlyaround thisessentialindeterminacythatall
mysticspeech would be centered and receive its peculiarforce:a
force, de Certeau claims, that is nothing else than the echo in
language of the divineanger and violencethatJacob Bohme and
others postulate at the origin of everythingthatexists,at the very
beginningof history.22
This connection brings me to the second detour. For it is preciselythe mutual implicationof an originaryviolenceand the functioningof language (as well as of law and politics)thatwillinterest
Derrida in his analysisof the 'mysticalpostulate'in de Certeau, as
well as in Benjamin.
Derrida triesto
In his reading of de Certeau's La fablemystique,
that
de
Certeau's
'reconstrucestablishthe peculiar logic
governs
in
the
tion' of the originaryaffirmation (and of)
mystictext and
it
to
Such an
as
what
seeks
exclude.
asks whatit presupposes as well
could
be
termed
"quasi-transcendental"
analysis,Derrida advances,
or "quasi-ontological,"23
formulationsthatdo not signal any lack of
rigorbut, on the contrary,expose the narrative,fictionalor, more
precisely,fabulousfeaturesof the 'mysticalpostulate' and thereby
attemptto subtractit fromthe metaphysicsof the-modern, subjective-will thatwould stillhaunt de Certeau's analysis,notablyin
withan 'I' thatwould
the identificationof the originaryaffirmation
have already enough 'determination'to say of itself,in the first
person singular: "I will" (i.e., volo).24
For, as is suggested by de Certeau's own descriptions,the silent
presupposition of all utterance,the affirmationof mysticspeech
whichengages even the mostnegativepredication,is strictly
speaking neitheran 'act' of'speech'nor,to be sure,an 'act,'pronounceable
in the present by a conscious 'I' that would have enough selfpresence to express,to put into words,whatit intends.Rather,the
general directionde Certeau's analyses take would seem to imply
what could at best be called an "absothat the voloonly "resembles"
21de Certeau, La
28.
fable mystique,
22
Ibid., 231, cf. Derrida, Psyche,205.
23
Derrida, Psyche,641.
24
Ibid., 645.

HENT DE VRIES
450
The voloresemblesan absolute performative

lute performative."25
because it 'is' neither'performative'nor 'absolute' in any generally
accepted or intelligiblesense of these terms.More precisely,one
would have to admit that the originaryaffirmation'is' not at all.
For, although it opens the 'happening' of any event (and in that
sense, perhaps, even precedes the veryEreignisof Being), it 'is' 'as
such'-in 'itself--neither an event nor any other determinable
presence (or coming into presence). No fundamentalontology,no
transcendentalinquiryinto the subjective,theoreticaland practical
conditions of this affirmation,let alone any ontic, empirical discourse, could ever adequately describeitssingularoccurrence.And
since the 'yes' can never become a themeor subjectof any possible
(hypo)thesis,the very introductionof this figure can therefore,
strictlyspeaking, never have the epistemicqualities of a so-called
'postulate.' The modalityof its manifestationas well as its philoits'logos' is
sophical articulationcould onlybe thatof a "quasiment":
that of a "fable."26
It is in the contextof thisanalysis,whichwas publishedunder the

title"Nombre de Oui" ("A Number of Yes") in 1987, four years
before the discussion of the 'mysticalpostulate'in "Zur Kritikder
Gewalt," that Derrida reminds us of a revealing passage in a text
that de Certeau does not mention and that is by now generally
regarded as one of the importantsources of some of Benjamin's
earlythoughts:27Franz Rosenzweig'sDer SternderErlisung(1921).
Derrida gives the followingquote fromits firstbook:
Das Ja istder Anfang.Das Nein kannnichtder Anfangsein;dennes
konntenurein Neindes Nichtssein.(. . .) Und weildies Nichtnichts
ja
nichtselbstandig
die Bejahungdes Nichtgegebenist-so umschreibt
allesdessen,wasnichtNichts
nichtsals innereGrenzedie Unendlichkeit
ist.Es wirdein Unendlichesbejaht:GottesunendlichesWesen,seine
seinePhysis.Das istdie KraftdesJa,dasses
unendlicheTatsachlichkeit,
uiberall
dassunbegrenzte
vonWirklichkeit
in ihm
haftet,
Moglichkeiten
liegen.Es istdas UrwortderSprache,einsvondenen,durchdie-nicht
etwa Satze, sondernerst einmaluberhauptsatzbildendeWorte,die
25
Ibid., 647.
Ibid., 648.
27 Cf. S.
Moses, "Walter Benjamin and Franz Rosenzweig", in: DeutscheViertelund Geistesgeschichte,
1982, Heft 4, 622-640, U.
jahrschrift
fur Literaturwissenschaft
Hortian, "Zeit und Geschichtebei Franz Rosenzweigund WalterBenjamin", in: W.
Schmied-Kowarzik, ed., Der Philosoph Franz Rosenzweig(1886-1929), Bd. II
(Freiburg,Munchen: Alber, 1988), 815-827.
26

M L N
451
Worte als Satzteile, moglich werden. Ja ist kein Satzteil,aber ebensoSigel eines Satzes, obwohl es als solches verwenig das kurzschriftliche
wendet werden kann, sondern es ist der stilleBegleiter aller Satzteile,
die Bestatigung,das 'Sic,' das 'Amen' hinterjedem Wort. Es gibtjedem
Wort im Satz sein Recht auf Dasein, es stelltihm den Sitz hin, auf dem
es sich niederlassenmag, es 'setzt.'Das ersteJa in Gottbegriindetin alle
Unendlichkeitdas gottlicheWesen. Und dies ersteJa ist"im Anfang."28
[Yea is the beginning.Nay cannot be the beginning;foritcould onlybe
a Nay of the Nought. ( . .) This non-Noughtis, however,not independentlygiven, for nothingat all is given except for the Nought. Thereforethe affirmationof the non-Noughtcircumscribesas inner limitthe
infinityof all thatis not Nought. An infinityis affirmed:God's infinite
essence, his infiniteactuality,his Physics.Such is the power of Yea that
it adheres everywhere... It is the archi-wordof language, one of those
which firstmakes possible, not sentences,but any kind of sentenceformingwords at all, words as parts of the sentence.Yea is not part of
a sentence,but neitheris it a shorthandsymbolfora sentence,although
itcan be employed as such. Ratheritis the silentaccompanistof all parts
of a sentence,the confirmation,the 'sic!',the 'Amen' behind everyword.
It giveseveryword in the sentencethe rightto exist,it supplies the seat
on whichit may take itsplace, it 'posits.'The firstYea in God establishes
the divine essence for all infinity.And the firstYea is 'in the beginning.'29]
Derrida comments only on those elements of this passage that are
illustrative of de Certeau's remarks on the 'mystical postulate': the
fact that, according to Rosenzweig, the originary 'yes' is both a
word and something apparently beyond or, rather, before every
determinate language, before even the pronunciation of any particular 'yes.' As the inaudible companion of all speech (as well as of
all writing, for that matter), the 'yes' would thus have a transcendental status similar to that of the 'I think' (Ich denke) that, as Kant
posited, accompanies (begleitet)all our representations (Vorstellungen). As the hidden ground or source of all language, the 'yes'
would both belong and not belong to what it makes possible or calls
28
II (The Hague: MarF. Rosenzweig,Der SternderErlosung,Gesammelte
Schriften
tinus NijhoffPublishers, 1976), 28-29, cf. Derrida, Psyche,643-644 and the reference to the 'originaryword' (Urwort)in Rosenzweig,inJ. Derrida, Ulyssegramophone.
Deux motspourJoyce(Paris: Galilee, 1987), 122n.
29 F. Rosenzweig, The Star of Redemption,
trans. W. W. Hallo (New York: Holt,
Rinehartand Winston,1971), 26-27, cited in "A Number of Yes," trans.B. Holmes,
Qui parle,vol. 2, no. 2 (Fall 1988), 120-33, 125.

452
HENT DE VRIES
into being.30It would be to thissingularpostulationthat the quotationfromRosenzweig'sDer SternderErlosungwould point in an

oblique manner.
However, Derrida goes on to furtherrefinethisanalysisthathas
been prepared by the distinctionsmade in de Certeau's La fable
mystique.For the 'yes,' he continues, is not only a quasitranscendentalor quasi-ontologicalnotion in the sense described
notion: thatis, itcannotbe reduced
above, itis also a quasi-analytical
to one, simple element,structureor event. It is marked in advance
by the "fatality"of a doubling or repetitionthatimplies the inevitable-necessary-possibility of its betrayal and perversion. Not
only is the 'yes' strictlyspeaking never first-as if it were just anor principium-italso calls foranother'yes.'
otherprimum
intelligibele
For, as a promise, no affirmationcan stand alone: it envelops at
least one more 'yes' that has to come in order to remember and
reconfirmit. And it is preciselythisreiterationwhichbringswithit
an inescapable menace or risk.As a consequence, the fabulous 'yes'
is contaminateda prioriby the possibilityof a forgettingthatcould
also be signaled by its mere mechanical repetitionor parody.31
There is nothing-no good conscience,no sincereengagement,no
effectivepoliticalstrategy-thatcould ever claim to be able to prevent thisfromhappening. And it is due to thisdisturbingcircumstance that no originaryaffirmationallows a distinctionbetween a
'space,' in which the 'yes, yes' would echo a divinevoice or force,
and a Nietzschean
one, in whichthis'yes' would be parodied.32 For
30Cf. Derrida, Psyche,644.
31 Derrida,
Psychg,649.
32 But is that
reallywhatde Certeau implieswhen he asks (withoutanswering)the
240, cf.Derrida,
question: "Cet espace est-ildivinou nietzscheen?"(Lafablemystique,
Psyche,642)? In the same contextde Certeau insistson the factthatall mysticspeech
has, for essential reasons, to remain a celebrationof 'madness': "une pratique spirituelledu 'diabolique'" (La fablemystique,
242). Not unlike Derrida, in his analysis
of the concept (and the conditionof the possibility)of 'prayer',in "Commentne pas
parler?Denegations," in Psyche,de Certeau makes itclear thatthe volo,even though
it inaugurates an 'ethical' moment and opposes language's insincerity,can (and
must) not once and for all undo its capacityto lie. On the contrary:"le volo n'instaure pas, a la maniere du cogitocartesien,un champ pour des propositionsclaires
et distinctes(.. .) Bien loin de constituerun 'propre', il entraineune metaphorisation generale du language au nom de quelque chose qui n'en releve pas et qui va s'y
et qu'a le depisteret le
tracer.Au lieu de supposer qu'il y a quelquepartdu mensonge
deloger on peut restaurerune verite(et une innocence?) du language, le prealable
A
mystiquepose un acte qui conduit a utiliserle languagetoutentiercommementeur.
partirdu volo,tout enonce 'ment' par rapporta ce qui se dit dans le dire." (La fable
241).
mystique,

MLN
453
thesamereason,one mightwonder,Derridaasks,whetherRosenJew
zweig"stillspeaksas aJew,or as thealreadyover-Christianized
he has been accusedof being,whenhe callsupon us to heed the
yesin certaintextswhosestatusremainsbynatureunceroriginary
tain,textswhichwaver-likeeverything
saying(the)yes-thetheoor ontological)and the
the
(transcendental
philosophical
logical,
or
the
And
this
of
indecision
is,perhaps,less
hymn."33
song praise
than a
an accidental-i.e., biographicalor psychological-trait
for
For
in
order
alliance
or
structural
any
uncertainty.
engagement
or faithto become whatit is, it is necessaryfor the 'first'proin a 'second'
nouncedor ineffable
'yes'to be erasedand reiterated
or
effect
more
than
a
that
is
mere
natural,
'yes'
logical programmed
and betrayalare "the condition
of the 'first.'This forgetfulness
foronlythanksto this"danger,"34
the 'second'
itselfof fidelity,"
the
'first'and
to
have
made
a
claim
can
beyond
genuinestep
'yes'
thereby,in its turn,be a new,unique and, in thatsense,'first'
affirmation.
Could the readingof thissingular'logicof affirmation'
which,
is also a 'logicof iterability,'
be of anyhelp in unsimultaneously,
derstandingsome of Benjamin'smostenigmaticphrases,forexpassage,to be discussedbelow (cf. II) in
ample, the intriguing
as boththe'origin'and the'addressee'of
which'God' is identified
theessenceof humanlanguageas it revealsitselfin thename?Is
thiswhatBenjamin'intended'or 'had inmind'?Or is this,perhaps,
how we should read him in order to 'make sense' of his often
everbe
Can thesetwoquestionsthemselves
puzzlingformulations?
inseparated?Could,in short,thequasi-transcendental
rigorously
of de Certeau35(and Rosenzweig,for thatmatter)
terpretation
shed lighton thedilemmathatfromtheverybeginninghas paralyzed the receptionof Benjamin'swork,to wit: the question
of histhoughtshouldbe regardedas an
whetherthedevelopment
of tradiexercisein Jewishphilosophy-asthe reinterpretation
modernexperitionalreligiousnotionsin lightof a distinctively
evolutiontowarda hisas a progressive
ence-or, on thecontrary,
33
Derrida, "A Number of Yes", 124-125, Psyche,643.

Derrida, Psychi,649.
35 At one point de Certeau mentionsBenjamin and refers,in the contextof an
excursion on angels, to the short text entitled "Agesilaus Santander" (writtenin
315, but the parallel here remains to be articulatedin
1933), cf. La fable mystique,
detail.
34

454
HENT DE VRIES
torical materialismin which the messianicmotifswould be transfiguredinto mere tropes of a disruptivemoment?36That the very
pertinenceof the distinctionbetweena 'serious' adoption of a theological vocabulary,oh the one hand, and its 'mere citation'or 'allegorization'on the other, would be hardly sustainable,has, perhaps, not found sufficientattentionin this perennial debate in
Benjamin scholarship.And it is here thatDerrida's analysisof the
36 Theodor W. Adorno, one of the firstand mostperceptivereaders of Benjamin,
would have denied the parallel between Benjamin's notion of 'theology'and the
'Urja' in Rosenzweig. In an unpublished letterof March 8, 1955 to Dr. Achim von
Borries (at that time a studentin Ziirich),Adorno, asked to support a reeditionof
Der SternderErlosungand provoked to commenton the possibleresonancesbetween
Trauerspiels
responded as
Rosenzweig's work and Benjamin's Ursprungdesdeutschen
follows(I cite the crucial passage fromthe letterthatDr. A. von Borrieswas so kind
to send me in 1986): "R. geh6rtauf die andere Seite und hat sein ganzes Leben lang
etwas vom jiidischen Konsistorialratbehalten. Zwischendem Klima seines Buches
und dem Benjamins liegt eben doch der Abgrund, der den Konformismusvon
einem wirklichradikalen Denken trennt,und das ist keineswegseine Sache der
blossen politischenGesinnung, sondern bezieht sich auf das Innerste der Metaphysikselber." With thislapidarycharacterizationpresentedin a familiarapodictic
manner, Adorno, far from denying the obvious metaphysicaland 'theological'or
Jewishmomentsin Benjamin's work,confidentlyrestoredthe line of demarcation
betweenwhatwould seem to be twodistinct'uses' of tradition:itsappropriationand
prolongationin conformityto preexistingcodes of interpretationversus its radical
rethinking,reversalor inversion-i.e. profanisation-in lightof new, incommensurable constellationsof modern experience. Benjamin's work, Adorno notes elsewhere,would only save theologythroughits radical secularization("Sdkularisierung
der Theologieum ihrerRettungwillen",Th. W. Adorno, iber WalterBenjamin,Hrsg.
und mit Anmerkungen versehen von R. Tiedemann (Frankfurt/M:Surhkamp,
would primarilyserve a criticalobjective:"Sein
1970), 41). And thistransformation
Essayismusistdie Behandlung profanerTexte, als waren es heilige. Keineswegshat
er an theologischeReliktesich geklammertoder, wie die religidsenSozialisten,die
Profanitatauf einen religiosen Sinn bezogen. Vielmehr erwarteer einzig von der
radikalen, schutzlosen Profanisierungdie Chance furs theologische Erbe, das in
jener sich verschwendet."(ibid., 19). Benjamin's would thus place the theological
figuresin a new configurationin which theirsemanticintentor contentwould be
suspended or bracketted.In that same vein, Scholem associated Benjamin's (later)
Theorie der Offenbarung(. . .), deren Gegenstand
workwith"eine materialistische
in der Theorie selbst nicht mehr vorkommt."(Scholem,Judaica II [Frankfurt/M:
Suhrkamp] 222).
Adorno's claim implies that Rosenzweig's 'new thought'(Das neueDenkenis the
titleof one of Rosenzweig's most importantessays),would in factbe nothingbut a
'clerical'attemptto reconcilean ideal-supposedly ahistorical-paradigm (Judaism)
withits imperfect,empiricalrealization(in the historyof the missionaryChristian
church). And yet,a more carefulreading of the Sternthatcannot be attemptedhere
would find that thingsare more complicated. For Rosenzweigconsidered his book
less a Jewishor religiousbook than a "systemof philosophy"thatshould be distinguished fromwhat was understood under the term"philosophyof religion"("ReFor the most detailed account of these questions to date, cf. S.
ligionsphilosophie").
de Franz RosenzweigPreface d'Emmanuel
etRevelation.La philosophie
Moses, Systeme
Levinas (Paris: Seuil, 1982).

M L N
455
'mysticalpostulate' in de Certeau as well as his demonstrationof

of establishinga rigorousdistinctionbetween'the
the impossibility
'the
and
non-(or a-)theological'mightenable us to find
theological'
a way out of this last, and most persistent,binaryopposition. In
order to furtherexplore this possibility,I will now turn to two
mystic'fables' thatDerrida discussesin order to exemplifythe sinof the 'postulate'of originaryaffirmationin
gular 'performativity'
his reading of Benjamin's earlythoughtson language, in "Des tours
de Babel," (cf. II) as well as of Benjamin's critiqueof 'violence' in
" (cf. III). In these
FoundationofAuthority'
"ForceofLaw: the'Mystical
textsthe basic assumptionof the said dilemma and of the debate it
has provoked show themselvesto be highlyquestionable.
II. 'In the Beginning-No Beginning': The Originary
Catastrophe and the Giftof Language
In the essay "Uber Sprache iiberhaupt und uiberdie Sprache des
Menschen," writtenin 1916 (two years before Rosenzweig's Stern)
in response to discussions with Scholem, Benjamin develops his
ideas with the help of an exegesis of some of the most important
Beziehung
categoriesof the firstchaptersof Genesis("in immanenter
auf das Judentumund mitBeziehungauf die erstenKapitelder Genesis.")37It is here, Benjamin suggests,thatwe can best learn how to
speak of the essence of language, of the divineword and itshuman
reflex in the (proper) name; and it is here that one a littlelater
finds the paradigm of the 'fall' of this originarylanguage into a
conventionalmeans for'communication,'as is narratedbythe story
about the original sin and the expulsion from paradise which is
reaffirmedand amplified by the episode of the failed project of
buildingthe towerof Babel as well as the confusionof tonguesthat
ensued (in Paradise, of course, there was only one language (GS
II.1, 152)). To be sure, the reading thatBenjamin proposes here is
less a contributionto Bible scholarshipin any linguisticor historicist sense than the attemptto formulatethe prolegomena to any
future'metaphysics'that would aspire to capture the 'essence' of
language. And Benjamin leaves no doubt thatsuch a 'metaphysics'
could only be established in close cooperation (or connection,in37 Benjamin, Briefe,128.

456
HENT DE VRIES
nigsteVerbindung)with the inquiries commonlyattributedto the

philosophyof religion (Religionsphilosophie).38
Benjamin's reading focuses on a second strain in the biblical
storyof the creation (Genesis,2:19-20) where all attentionis not so
much centered around the creation-ex nihilo-of all things
through the divine Word (as in Genesis1), but where, instead, all
emphasis is put on the origin of human historyin a paradisaical
situation.It is in this context that it is related that all livingcreatures were made from the material of the earth and that it was
preciselythe gift(Gabe, GS II.1, 148) of language which elevated
man over the rest of (a mute) nature. And it is here that the adamiticgivingof names is thoughtas the process in whichthe divine
creation completes (vollendet,
GS, II.1, 144)-supplements and redeems-itself.39 This passage of Genesis,Benjamin infers,would
demonstratethat at the beginningof everygenuine 'metaphysics'
of language it has to be postulated(vorausgesetzt)
that language is
a
an
and
mysticalreality; reality,thatis, that
ultimately inexplicable
cannot be seen or described in and for itself but only in (or
through)the detours of itsunfolding("eineletztenurin ihrerEntfalunerkldrliche
und mystische
Wirklichkeit"
(GS II.1,
tungzu betrachtende,
147). For, it is in the givingof the names, in the necessarytranslation of one language into the other(s) (GS II.1, 151), that language comes into its own. The essence of language has no human
addressee, no object and no means. In it,in the name, the spiritual
essence of man addresses itselfto God himself,therebydividing
and diffusingitselfand itsindeterminatereferent,God ("imNamen
teiltdas geistigeWesendesMenschensichGottmit"GS II.1, 144).
In Benjamin's essay this'metaphysics'is set apart fromtwo conBenfusing alternativetheories of language. Most interestingly,
jamin is quick to criticizea naive "mystic"(GS II.1, 150) theoryof
language according to which the word would be simplyidentical
withthe essence of the thing.For, originally,the thinghas neither
word nor name. Its mute, nameless language is at best a "resid38 W.
Benjamin, Gesammelte
Schriften,
Werkausgabe (Frankfurt/M:Suhrkamp,
1980) vol. II.1, 146. All furtherreferenceswillbe given by volume and page number in the body of the text.
39
Cf. GS 1I.1, 155: "Sprachlosigkeit:das ist das grosse Leid der Natur (und um
ihrer Erlosung willen ist Leben und Sprache des Menschen in der Natur." It is no
accident then that the "Erkenntniskritische
Vorrede" to the Ursprungdes deutschen
Trauerspiels,
published in 1928, calls Adam, not Plato, the fatherof philosophy(GS
1.1, 217).

M L N
457
uum" (Residuum,GS II.1, 157) of the divineword throughwhichit

has been created. It has to waitforthe "higher"human language to
be named and redeemed, not in one "spontaneous" act, but in an
differentiatedprocess of translationand elevationwhose
infinitely
movementfindsits ultimatedestinationas well as its "unity"(Einheit,ibid.) and 'objectiveguarantee' (cf.GS II.1, 151), again, in God
himself.And yet,Benjamin indirectlyconcedes thatthistranslation
is hardlya process that takes place in a homogeneous and continuous space. For, if, as he notes, the things of nature "have no
proper names, except in God" (GS II.1, 155) whereas,by contrast,
GS II.1,
theyremain overdeterminedor 'overnamed' (iiberbenannt,
155) in the language of man, it is difficultto see how a genuine
'restitution'of the relationshipbetweenword, name and thingcan
be more than a regulativeidea. And thisultimateessentialdiscrepancy between the divine word and human language is already
grounded at the very beginning where the latter is said to be a
or mulreflex(Reflex,GS II.1, 149) of the first.The diversification
tiplicationof human language would be characterizedby an 'infinity'which,in comparison to the absolute and creativeforceof the
divine word, remains always "limited"and divisibleor "analytic"
(ibid.). And at the pointwhere it,as itsmostprofoundimage (tiefste
Abbild),participates most intenselyin the infinityof the divine
word-to wit: in the (human) proper name-it does in fact not
allow any knowledge.
Although the discrepancybetween the divine and the human
word is thus given, in a sense, with the event of-appellativelanguage as such, Benjamin seeks to illustratethis differenceby
relatingit to a postulated,fictiveor fabulous turningpoint in the
genesis of all things:to the momentof originarysin, thatis, which
he identifieswiththe veryemergence and fallof the human word
GS II.1,
desmenschlichen
istdieGeburtsstunde
Wortes,"
("Der Siindenfall
in
which
153), i.e., witha seeminglyirreversibleprocess
language
becomes a mere means (Mittel)and in which the word and the
name thus degenerate into mere mediatorysigns (Zeichen).It is
here, in the original catastropheof language, thatwe discover the
roots of the second-"bourgeois"-theory of language that Benjamin condemns explicitly:the theory,namely,which holds that
language 'communicates'a semanticcontentthatwould be separaof language
ble or even distinguishablefromthe 'communicability'
as such. It is in this decisive event then that, together with all
also the mythicaloriginof law
conceptual 'abstraction'(Abstraktion),

458
HENT DE VRIES
and right-and that means: of all judgment (Urteil)-should be

located (GS II.1, 153-154). And fromhere, Benjamin infers,it will
be just one more step (nur nochein Schritt,GS II.1, 154) to the
pluralityof tongues. As the linguisticand collectiverepetitionof
the first,moral and individual fall that inaugurated an originary
and universal debt, the episode of Babel-the postlapsarianlapse
into the pluralityof tongues-further amplifies the ruin of the
adamiticlanguage thatmarksthe fallintohistory(ratherthan any
catastrophein history).40
This fall (of human language) into historyis a departure from
the "pure" and "immanent""magic" (GS II.1, 153) of the name: in
other words, it is the emergence of a general use of language in
which the name can no longer live without being 'affected' or
'hurt.'And thisoccurs at the momentwhere language commences
to 'communicate'something(etwas)outside of itself.And it is this
momentthatis prefiguredby the storyof Adam's fall.Interestingly
enough, the original dispersion within(as well as between) language(s) thus touches upon a moral paradox. For, Benjamin
stresses,it is preciselythe knowledgeof good and evil promisedby
the snake which is "withouta name" (namenlos)and therebynull
and void (nichtig,GS II.1, 152). In a sense, this knowledge, Benjamin continues,is the only evil that existed in paradise. Not the
illegitimateusurpation of a divine prerogative-the knowledge of
good and evil-causes Adam's fall, but, rather,the quest(ion) of
this knowledge itself.For, unlike the purityand adequacy of the
immanent'magic' that,in essence, defines the language of names
in paradise, the knowledge attributedto the tree of life is external;
it is not the creativeprolongationof creationthatcharacterizedthe
GS II. 1,
pure givingof names, but the mere mimesis(Nachahmung,
GS II.1, 149) of the divine word.
153) of the "actuality"(Aktualitit,
The language of names thus loses itselfin a necessaryrepetitionand translation-of a divine force,in whichit findsitsoriginand to
which it aspires.41
40 S. Moses argues that the idea of a mythicfall of language does not have a
parallel in Rosenzweig'sStern.Unlike Benjamin, Rosenzweigwould not identifythe
withthe originarylanguage before itsperversion
notion of revelation(Offenbarung)
into a means of communication.On the contrary,for Rosenzweig communication
and dialogue would be the actual formitselfof the revelation,i.e. the opening up
of the pagan self (cf. Moses, "Benjamin und Rosenzweig,"629, 634).
41 In "Die Aufgabe des Jbersetzers"(1923) Benjamin will start out from the

M L N
459
More thanbeing the mere backgroundand contrastof the promised "pure speech" (Zephaniah 3:9) (or the "giftof tongues" (Acts
2:4), for thatmatter)and more than being a mere diabolic parody
of the temple which, situated on a hill (Jerusalem),touches the
heavens,42 the story of the tower of Babel narrated in Genesis
11:1-9 would in this reading exemplifythe structural,internal
limitsof all translation.By relatinghow the Shem-literally: the
'names'-attempted to give (or make) themselves a name, one
name, how they tried to impose themselveson others by universalizing their idiom and how, finally, this endeavor was obstructed-or 'deconstructed'-by God himself,the fable of 'Babel'
For the
would be "an epigraph forall discussionsof translation."43
how
God
narrates
opposes his-untranslatable-proper
story
name to that of the Shem and therebyenforces upon them the
irrevocable multiplicityof languages. God being here both a
proper name and the index-the name-for the untranslatability
of every proper name. With the confusion of tongues (and 'confusion' is the significationthat resonatesin the name of the tower
chosen by God, 'Babel,' a word that,as Voltaire recalls in the Diccited by Derrida, also means: 'father' ('Ba')
tionnairephilosophique
and 'God' ('Bel')), God 'destines'the Shem, the names, to masteran
irredeemable "destinerrance,""clandestination"or "deschematization,"44neologisms that evoke the erring as well as the relative
illegitimacyof theirintended address and-in the case of "deschematization"-not only this disseminationbut also a 'deschematizapremises of this early 'metaphysics'of language. There he stressesthat language's
invisibleunityor ground can only be restituteddue to the factthateach language
intendsa pure essence whichnone of themis capable of expressingall by itself(that
"in ihrerjeder als ganzerjeweils eines und zwar dasselbe gemeintist,dass dennoch
keiner einzelnen von ihnen, sondern nur der Alheit ihrer einander erganzenden
Intentionen erreichbarist: die reine Sprache" (GS, IV.I, 13)). Paradoxically,this
translationdemanded by and aspiringto the 'pure language' can, in so far as it is a
process of redemptiveintegrationand 'return'to the origin,onlybe a movementof
self-effacement
("In dieser reinen Sprache, die nichtsmehr meintund nichtsmehr
ausdriickt, sondern als ausdruckloses und schopferisches Wort das in allen
Sprachen Gemeinte ist,trifftendlich alle Mitteilung,aller Sinn und alle Intention
auf eine Schicht,in der sie zu erlischen bestimmtsind." (GS IV.1, 19, cf. 15-16)).
42 Cf. N. Frye,The GreatCode,The Bible and Literature(San Diego, New York,
London: Harcourt Brace JovanovichPublisher, 1983), 158, 230.
43
ed. by Chr.
Derrida, TheEar oftheOther:Otobiography,
Translation,
Transference,
V. McDonald (Lincoln: Universityof Nebraska Press, 1982), 100.
44 Cf.
Rosenzweig,Der SternderErlisung,328: "Dass die Welt unerlostist,nichts
lehrtes deutlicherals die Vielzahl der Sprachen."

460
HENT DE VRIES
tion,' 'de-Shemitizing' and 'derouting' from the path (chemin)

taken.45
The Babelian multiplicitywithin language, the differencebetween differentlanguages or dialects, is preceded and predetermined by a division and 'migration'of language withinone language and even withinone single word, for example, a proper
name or a poetic inscription.46Thus, when God is said to declare
war on the 'names,' the verypronunciationof the proper name par
excellence('God,' 'I am who I am'), is fromits veryfirstrevelation
part of-and partitionedby-an economyof violence.God himself
is divided by the division,the double bind, the deconstructionand
disseminationthat his name orders.47In order to make thisclear,
Derrida refershere and elsewhere-in La cartepostale,L'oreillede
'autre and UlysseGramophone-to a Babelian motif that runs
throughJoyce'sFinnegan'sWake,the greatestchallenge to all problems of translation:the idiomaticexpression"And he war" which,
due to the factthat it condenses an irreduciblelinguisticduplicity
of the English and German connotationsof the word "war" evokes
not only the polemosbut also the irrecuperable'past.'
Like the originaryaffirmationdiscussed above, the figure,myth
or allegoryof Babel as examined by Derrida in "Des tours de Babel" is doubled or, rather,pluralized up to the point of no return.
The storyof Babel is read as the parable of the deconstructionof
edifices; a
many,or all, linguistic,conceptual or historico-political
deconstructionthat,as the verytitle("Des tours .. .") suggests,can
only be narrated in-and gives way to-endless 'detours.' But the
name 'Babel' would notjust stand forthe deconstructionof a given
structure.It would also indicate the modalityof the giving-of
language, of 'being'-as such: "There is," Derrida writes,"Babel
everywhere";48there is-es gibt-Babel at any given moment, at
any momentthat gives rise to somethingdeterminatelike a structure,an edificeor also its deconstruction.The taskof the workof
Cf. Derrida, Psyche,137 and the translator'snote in TheEar oftheOther,103.
Cf. J. Derrida, Schibboleth.
Pour Paul Celan (Paris: Galilee, 1986), 52, 54.
47 Derrida,
Psyche,137.
48
Derrida, The Ear oftheOther,149. Although Benjamin's "lber Sprache iiberhaupt und uber die Sprache des Menschen" explicitlyspeaks of Babel as well as of
the gift of language that it entails, it is on the "Aufgabe des lbersetzers" that
Derrida focuses in order to explore this motifof the 'there is' (il y a, es gibt)of
language as it pervades Benjamin's understandingof the impossibletask (Aufgabe)
and the "double postulation"of translation.Cf. J. Derrida, D'un tonapocalyptique
(Paris: Galilee, 1983), 10, cf. 71.
adoptsnaguereen philosophie
45
46

M L N
461
'reconciliation'and 'restitution'of the essence of language would

thusrespond to a debt that,Derrida notes,can neverbe acquitted49
and imposes the double bind of a law that both commands and
interdictstranslationand that therefore,for essentialreasons, remains unfulfillable.50It is preciselythis structuralinadequation
between differentgenres of discourse, or even withinone discourse as such, thatexplains whyfigures,mythsand metaphorsare
necessary.'Babel,' in a sense, would be the mythof the myth,the
metaphor of the metaphor.51
What 'Babel' thus stands foris nothingless than the paradoxical
of the incessantmovementof repetitionand
'logics' of 'iterability,'
alterationthat marks all linguisticutterance:in shortof the "genof all language and experience. With refereralized singularity"52
Derrida recalls the
ence to MatthewArnold's Cultureand Anarchy,
that
of
an
ab-solute 'perforas
primal-"Babelian"-scene
being
mative' gesture,a 'GetGeist,'i.e., as the most characteristictraitof
the spirit that, because of the 'fact' that it 'is' irreducible to any
constative and unforeseen by any history,remains without a
proper beginningand marks itselfat most by an invisible,incomparable 'step': "In the beginning-no [or: a step of a] beginning"
And this would be
de commencement"53).
("Au commencement-pas
of
what
Benjamin's metaphysics language, in spite of its
precisely
undeniable 'anti-Babelian'stance, gives us to think:language's essence would consist,in the 'communicationof communication,'in
the givingof the sign,ratherthan in any functionof 'signification.'
It is this feature of language, as well as the task of translationit
determinesor prescribes,which"opens," in Derrida's view,the way
to the "performativedimension of utterances,"54before any explicitdiscussion of the so-called 'speech acts.'
It would be hard to deny thatthereis also an anti-Babelianstance
to be found in Derrida's text. Not only does the notion of a "re49 Derrida, Psyche,211.
50 Ibid. 210.
51Cf.
Derrida, Psyche,203.
52
Derrida, TheEar oftheOther,104.
53J. Derrida, De l'esprit.Heideggeret la question(Paris: Galilee, 1987), 116n.
54
Derrida, Psychg,215. On this singular displacementof the notion of the 'perand 'afformative'in:
formative',cf.W. Hamacher's remarkson the 'imperformative'
"Afformativ,Streik.Entsetzungder Reprasentationin Benjamin's 'Zur Kritikder
Gewalt' ", in: Chr. Hart-Nibbrig,Hg. Was heisstDarstellen?(Frankfurt/M:Suhrkamp, 1991).

462
HENT DE VRIES
vealing catastrophe"whichwould be the unthinkable"conditionof

everything"-an originarybeing "lost" that is the consequence of
an "initialdisaster,""close to the beginning,"55-playan important
role in La cartepostale,The lettersthatcompose the firstpartof this
text,entitled'Envois,'set the scene for the 'Babelization'56of the
postal serviceand also testifyto an ineradicabledesireof the author
of the sendings to finallyovercome the distancebetweenaddressor
and addressee and thus "to erase all the traitsof language, coming
back to the most simple."57And it is only between these two limits
that a quasi-apocalypticdisplacementof the structureof linguistic
'communication' is advanced: "we are not angels, my angel, I
means messengersof whatever,but more and more angelic."58
But the way in which this 'fall' and this 'desire' are 'thematized'
reveal some strikingdifferenceswith Benjamin's 'metaphysics'of
language. First of all, the original language of which Derrida
speaks here was, in a more explicitsense than Benjamin suggests,
never there,it never existed in its purportedpurity,not even as an
idea, not even, perhaps, as a 'postulate.' For Derrida leaves no
doubt thatthere cannot be one unique, secretor sacred-divinename or language of names. If therewere a single,singularname,
exempted from the differentialrealm of language and of all experience, then this name would name nothing and nobody, it
would not be a name, properly speaking, but an "absolute vocative,"59i.e., 'a pure performative,'which,preciselybecause of its
puritywould perform'nothing.'
In a more radical sense stillthan by Benjamin, the translation
thatfollowsin the wake of 'Babel' is thus not secondaryor derived
with respect to any purported originarylanguage: in Derrida's
view,itstaskis withoutany identifiablebeginning,end or 'exit.'60If
a concise definitionof deconstructionwere possible at all, it would
thereforecontain at least this: the affirmationthat there is always
already "plus d'une langue-more than one language, no more of
55J. Derrida, La cartepostale.De Socratea Freud et au-deld (Paris: Flammarion,
1980), 16 and 23. Cf. for the motifof 'Babel', ibid., 13, 154, 155, 179.
56J. Derrida, Ulyssegramophone,
62, cf. 66-67, 77-78.
57 Derrida, The Postcard:FromSocratesto Freud and
Beyond,Translated with an
Introductionby A. Bass (Chicago: Universityof Chicago Press, 1987), 114.
58 Derrida, The Postcard,43.
59 Cf. G.
Bennington,"Derridabase," in: G. Bennington and J. Derrida, Derrida
(Paris: Seuil, 1991), 102.
60
Derrida, D'un tonapocalyptique,
9-10, 18.

M L N
463
one language,"61not even the language of names; the affirmation,

thatis, thatthe pure essence of language (Benjamin's reineSprache)
is in itself-in its veryidea-in advance, multiple("more than one
language, no more of one language").
III. "In the Beginning There Will Have Been Force": The
Mystical Postulate, Justice and the Law
Derrida's analysisof Benjamin's "Zur Kritikder Gewalt" in "Force
of Law: The 'MysticalFoundation of Authority,'"can be said to
politicizethe earlier readings by inscribing,by translating,theirreflectionon language in a more specificinquiryinto the naturei.e., the foundation,conservationas well as 'destruction'-of the
realm. This mostrecentdiscussionis framedin a
historico-juridical
lecture which was firstdelivered at a colloquium on "Deconstruction and the PossibilityofJustice"thattook place in October 1989,
and then reiterated at a colloquium on "Nazism and the 'Final
Solution': Probing the Limits of Representation,"in April 1990.
These outer circumstancesneed to be emphasized; theyare essential for the internalstructureof the proposed Benjamin interpretation'itself.'The latterremainsincomprehensibleif one does not
take into account thatDerrida's explicitlystatedinterestis here the
factthatBenjamin "is considered and considered himselfto be, in
a certainfashion,Jewish."62It is nothingless than the "enigma" of
this"signature"thatDerrida in "Force of Law" setsout to decipher,
especially in the second part of the lecture. And yet,much more
than the by now familiaranalysisof the paradoxes of the proper
name is at stake here.63 More specifically,the proper name-of
61 Cf.
Paul deMan, Trans. C. Lindsay,J.Culler, E. Cadava

J. Derrida, Memoiresfor
(New York: Columbia UP 1986), 14-15, cited in A Derrida Reader, Between the
Blinds, Edited, withan Introductionand Notes,by P. Kamuf (New York: Columbia
UP 1991), 241.
62 J.
Derrida, "Force of Law: The 'MysticalFoundation of Authority,'"in: Cardozo
Law Review,Vol. 11:919 (1990) 921-1045, 973n.
63 It would be
interesting,but beyond the scope of the present article,to investigate the problematicof the secret-proper-name that haunts both Benjamin's
writingand that of Derrida, most explicitlyin his recent "Circonfession"(in: Benningtonand Derrida,Derrida).For itis thisproblematicofthe name thatgivesaccess
to the question of the (in)voluntaryallegiance to, forexample, theJewishtradition.
In Schibboleth,
Derrida speaks of an affirmationof Judaism that would obey the
formal scheme that can be discovered in the temporalityof the date. The said

464
HENT DE VRIES
God and indirectly,Derrida suggests,of Benjamin himself-is related in thistextto the general problemof the law in itsrelationto
the state,to parliamentaryliberal democracyas well as to the general proletarianstrike.In exploringthese themes,Benjamin's "Zur
Kritikder Gewalt" would be "inscribed,"Derrida writes,"in a Judaic perspective that opposes just, divine (Jewish)violence that
would destroythe law to mythicalviolence (of the Greek tradition)
that would installand conserve the law."64And it is this veryoppositionbetween a forcethatfounds a juridico-politicalorder and
the one that preservesit, but also the demarcationbetween these
twoand the one thatfinallywould suspend themboth,whichDerrida willput into question. More precisely,he argues, these conceptual dichotomies,like the ones set up by early essayson language,
can be said to be ruined by Benjamin's own text. The least one
could say, therefore,is that Benjamin's critiqueof the violence of
the law is highlyambiguous: "at once" 'mystical,'in the overdetermined sense that interestsDerrida here, and "hypercritical."65
However, based on a philosophy of the fall of historyinto language-into the law-this textwould be marked in the finalanalysis by an "archeo-teleological,indeed archeo-eschatologicalperspectivethatdeciphers the historyof droitas a decay (Verfall)since
its origin."66And yet, in its very critique of this derailment (or
GS II.1, 192), "Zur Kritikder Gewalt" would blur
Verfallsprozess
most of the familiardistinctionstherebyno longer allowing the
reader to decide whetherthe text"grafts"a Jewishmysticismonto
a "post-Sorelian neo-Marxism" or vice versa; whether its radical
critiquejust mentionsor also intentionallyuses the vocabularythat
affirmationwould be an engagementthatis neitherthe awareness or acceptance of
a matterof fact (let alone a mere fact of life) nor, conversely,a purely arbitrary
decision taken in vacuum, outside of any context.To affirmwould be to assume a
thathas alwaysalready preceded the 'I' who says'yes' (or who
singularresponsibility
repeats the supposed original 'yes' by reiterating'yes, yes'). Strictlyspeaking, the
imGebirg,
nature of being Jewish,as discussed in Celan's shortprose piece Gesprdch
would be to have preciselyno natureor essence. The proper name of theJewwould,
like the s(ch)ibboleth,be a name that,in a given constellation,only can turnout to
be unpronounceable. ThePostcardspeaks of thisdifficult-and, in a sense, deadly(non)allegiance of Celan (and Benjamin) to theJewishtraditionwiththe extremely
lurid figure of a "rojudeo-suicide" (The Postcard,197). Cf. on Benjamin's understandingof the affirmation(the Bejahung)of the Jewishidentity,the letterof October 1912, published in GS 11.3, 837.
64
Derrida, "Force of Law," 973n.
65
Ibid., 979.
66
Ibid., 1015.

M L N
465
recallsthe idiom of the so-calledconservativerevolutioncommonly

associated withthe name of Carl Schmittand others. Moreover,it
would seem as if Benjamin's fascination with a-pure, nonviolent-force also echoes or, rather,anticipatesthe preoccupation
witha Being that-as such-would remain irreducibleto (and, in
essence, incorruptibleby) the realm of empirical or ontic beings;
that is, as if the proletarian and divine 'violence' cannot prevent
itselffrom resemblingor prefiguringthat other-and politically
more fatal or lethal-'destruction' that Derrida from his earliest
writingson has problematizedin Heidegger's thoughtof Being, in
Sein und Zeitand elsewhere. For although,Derrida acknowledges,
cannotbe confusedwiththeconceptof DeHeideggerianDestruktion
one maywell
thatwasalsoat thecenterofBenjamin'sthought,
struction
and whatitis preparaskwhatsuchan obsessivethematic
mightsignify
betweenthetwowars,all themoreso inthat,inevery
ingor anticipating
also soughtto be the conditionof an authentic
case, thisdestruction
to an originary
and ofthereference
and memory,
tradition
language.67
What is certain, however, is the fact that Benjamin's singular
configurationof heterogenousmystic,messianicand theologicalas
well as Marxistand reactionarytropes seems to announce "a new
historicalepoch," more precisely,"the beginningof a true history
that has been rid of myth."68And it is only thispurported end of
history(at least as we know it) that, followingthis same line of
thought,would allow the returnto the language of 'names' and of
'appellation' that, Benjamin postulates,would have preceded the
fall. Like the translationthat aspires to reconstitutethe pure lanof the vioguage (the reineSprache),the destruction(Vernichtung)
lence of historyin general and the statein particularis identifiedas
For the taskof the cria singular-paradoxical-task or Aufgabe.69
of
law
well
as
of
the historyit presupthe
as
of
violence
the
tique
67
Derrida, "Force of Law," 977 note. In this text Derrida only hintsat the disturbinganalogy between the sovereigntyof the 'divine violence' and Heidegger's
understandingof the Waltenand Gewalt.The possible analogy is crucial given the
final words of Benjamin's essay which read: "Die gottlicheGewalt (...) mag die
waltende heissen" (GS II, 1, 203). Here, however, Derrida only brieflyrefers to
Heidegger's claim that 'justice' (e.g. in Heraclitus' notion of Dike) also meant Eris,
conflict,polemosand therebyinjustice,adikia (cf. "Force of Law," 927).
68
Derrida, "Force of Law," 975.
69
Cf. GS II, 1, 194, 199. Benjamin also speaks of the "zarte Aufgabe," i.e.,
"jenseitsaller Rechtsordnungund also Gewalt" thatwould characterizethe secrecy
and delicacy of diplomacy (cf. ibid., 195).

466
HENT DE VRIES
poses or enforceswould consistin nothingless than the abandoning-the givingup-of the law and of historyas such (or at least as
we know it).70It is thisconvictionthatexplains Benjamin's "rejection of everycontemporarypolitical tendency"71from the early
remarkson Zionism in January 1913, in the correspondence with
Ludwig Strauss,72in whichpoliticsis associated withthe pursuitof
the lesser evil, up to the so-called 'Theological-PoliticalFragment'
from 1921, in which the messianic-divine-realm (the Reich
Gottes)is sharplydistinguishedfromany realizationof a profane,
historicaland political telos, and in which, followingthe major
contributionsof Ernst Bloch's Geistder Utopie,it is concluded that
can only have a religiousmeaning (cf. GS II.1, 203).
the theodicy
Derrida's whole textis centered around the analysisof the paradox or even double bind thatcharacterizesBenjamin's conception
realm of the
of theAufgabeof a destructionof the historico-political
law. On the one hand, postulatinga 'mystical'ground of authority
by suggesting,as Benjamin does, that the positingof the law is in
itself an unjustified-mythical-violence, seems to make it very
simple to propose a critique of any given law. No new law can
found itselfby appealing to existinggenerally,let alone universally
accepted laws thatprecede it. In Derrida's words: everylaw, every
systemof rights(or the lack thereof,for thatmatter)is in essence
"deconstructible,whether because it is founded, constructedon
interpretableand transformabletextualstrata(. . .), or because its
ultimatefoundation is by definitionunfounded."73And yet, this
same circumstance-which is, Derrida is quick to add, certainlya
"strokeof luck for politics,for all historicalprogress"74-explains
whyit is also verydifficultand always,in a sense, illegitimate,ifnot
unjust,to criticizea given impositionof the law. For since no social
authoritycan be deduced or criticizedand overturned for good
70 Or, as the
puts it: "Die Rettung halt sich an den
aphorism from Zentralpark
kleinen Sprung in der kontinuierlichenKatastrophe."(GS 1.2, 683).
71 Benjamin, Briefe,219.
72 Cf. GS
11.3, 842: "Im tiefstenSinne ist Politikdie Wahl des kleinstenObels.
Niemals erscheint in ihr die Idee, stets die Partei." One should, of course, not
confuse this critique of a political Zionism withBenjamin's sincere interestin the
task of a "Kultur-Zionismus"(ibid., 838, cf. 843) whichis never an end in itselfbut
ratherthe supreme bearer of the spiritualidea ("vornehmsterTrager und Reprasentant des Geistigen" (ibid., 839)). The early "Dialog fiber die Religiositatder
Gegenwart"(1913) relatesthistaskto thatof the "Literaten",the "Geknechteten"of
our epoch (GS II.1, 28).
73 Derrida, "Force of Law," 943.
74 Ibid., 943-945.

M L N
467
reasons withoutleading to infiniteregressor to the arbitraryviolence of a certain idiolect,75every successful revolutionarymoment,every'felicitous'performativeact thatfounds or destructsa
law will at the same time invent or institutea new law or right
that-in a retrospectiveprojection,aprescoup,afterits own coupde
force-seeks to legitimatethe violence withwhicha preexistingorder was overcome. Therefore, the law is always already constructed:thatis, it accompanies itselfwitha legitimating'fiction'or
'myth,'for example, as in Hegel's Grundliniender Philosophiedes
Rechts,with the claim that its authorityis preciselynothistorically
determined(or constructed)but,on the contrary,eternal,absolute
and thereforedivine.76And yet, this 'fiction'or 'fable,' Derrida
contends, does not imply any relativisticor pragmatisticunderof the law. For the verysingularity
standingof the conventionality
of thisfoundingand conserving'performance'consistspreciselyin
the factthatit precedes and constitutesall historicallyand socially
determinedconventions.
On what grounds then could anyone claim to be justified in
criticizingthis violence of the law if,by definition,the forceof its
groundingand preservationescapes not only thejurisdictionof all
given rightbut also-paradoxically-exceeds the legalitythatit by
its own righthas called into being? How could one accuse a force
that founds the realm of legitimationwhile itselfremainingwithout any objectivelegitimation?This impasse would, Derrida claims,
define the perilous momentof everypoliticalearthquake as well as
of every genuine juridical or ethico-politicaljudgment and decision:
moThese moments,
supposingthatwe can isolatethem,are terrifying
thatrarelyfailto accompany
ments.Becauseofthesufferings
them,no
and intheirvery
doubt,butjustas muchbecausetheyareinthemselves,
or indecipherable.
That is whatI am calling
violenceuninterpretable
thisfoundingor
(.. .) This momentof suspense,theepokhe,
'mystique.'
non-law.
in
an
of
Butitis
of
law
instance
moment
law,
is,
revolutionary
oflaw.This momentnevertakesplaceand never
also thewholehistory
75
Cf. J. F. Lyotard,Le differend

(Paris: Minuit, 1983), No. 203.
"Oberhaupt ... ist es schlechthinwesentlich,dass die Verfassung,obgleich in
der Zeit hervorgegangen,nichtals ein Gemachtes
angesehen werde; denn sie istvielmehr das schlechthinan und fur sich Seiende, das darum als das Gottlicheund
Beharrende, und als fiberder Sphare dessen, was gemachtwird,zu betrachtenist,"
desRechts,par. 273 Anmerkung,ed. J. Hoffmeister(HamderPhilosophie
Grundlinien
burg: Meiner, 1955), 239.
76

HENTDE VRIES
468
oflaw
takesplaceina presence.It is themomentinwhichtheformation
remainssuspendedin thevoidor overtheabyss,suspendedbythepure
act thatwouldnothave to answerto or beforeanyone.
performative
actwould(...) be beThe supposedsubjectof thispure performative
forea law notyetdetermined.77
It is at this point that Derrida recalls the uncanny and tragiccomic scene described in Kafka's parable VordemGesetz,in which
the man of the land cannotenterthe law "because itis transcendent
in the verymeasure that it is he who must found it."78The theological figureof the transcendenceof the law seems to be a figure
thatis pure in the measure thatit
for an absolute 'performativity'
or
convention
context
and, in thatsense, never
precedes any given
at having a minimal
at
never
arrives
takes
least,
or,
really
place
or
onto(theo)logical empiricalpresence:
of the law beforewhichand 'prior'to
the inaccessibletranscendence
transcendent
and thus
which'man'standsfastonly'appears'infinitely
so
it
on
near
to
the
extent
him,
him,on
that,
only
depends
theological
it: thelaw is transcendent,
act bywhichhe institutes
theperformative
becauseit dependsonlyon who is beforeitviolentand non-violent
and so priorto it-on who producesit,foundsit,authorizesit in an
whosepresencealwaysescapeshim.The law is
absoluteperformative
and so alwaysto come,alwayspromised,
and theological,
transcendent
finiteand so alreadypast.79
becauseitis immanent,
And yet, Derrida goes on to make it clear that the founding
momentis never immune to the possibilityof a certainperversion
and therefore never pure, i.e., strictlyspeaking, never foundational as such. Everyperformative,it is said in La cartepostale,is in
Simiessence, from its very inception on a "perverformative."80
larly,every retrospectiveprojectionof a 'fictive'legitimationand
subsequent conservation of the law-the very necessityto constantlyrecall and repeat the act with which it was foundedinscribesa peculiar driftingmovementintoitspurportedpure and
single origin. For when the foundingviolence, as Derrida writes,
"mustenvelop the violence of conservation(. . .) and cannot break
77Derrida, "Force of Law," 991.
78
Ibid., 993.
80
Derrida, The Postcard,136.
79 Ibid.

M L N
469
withit,"81somethingBenjamin does not seem to take into consideration,then the veryiterabilityof the law excludes in advancethe
very possibilityof the sudden emergence of "pure and great
founders, initiators,lawmakers."82Benjamin's demarcation between,on the one hand, the foundingor positingviolence at the
beginning (and, subsequently,within)the cycle of mythicalforms
and interpretationsof positiverightand, on the other hand, the
non-violent'violence' thatbringsabout the demise of,or 'de-posits,'
thisdialecticwhich marksall existingsocio-politicalhistory,would
forthe same reason be untenable.83And since the manifestationof
the violence thatBenjamin describesas 'ethical' (sittlich)
is to a certain extentan extrapolationand radicalizationof the genuine 'revolt,'of the real revolutionaryviolence of the general, proletarian
strikewhich destructsall right,one can easily see what the consequences of this 'deconstruction'are. Following the 'logic' of iterability,as explained in LimitedInc, the mere possibilityof decay and
petrification,betrayal and parody that 'endangers' every act of
preservationor commemoration,also implies that all law has the
structureof a ruineven before it is 'constructed'(or 'destructed').
And the same could be said of anyjudgment or decision. And yet,
paradoxically,it is only thisinescapable possibility-and therefore
necessity84-ofthe ruinationof the law whichcan account for the
factthatthe law can make itselffelt,feared or even loved and that,
consequently,an act can take place at all.
For Benjamin, however,the critiqueof the violentinstauration
and conservationof the law can onlybe based on the postulationof
an (at least) equally violentyetincommensurateannihilationof the
sphere of law. The human-and, Benjamin adds, mythic-writing
and rewritingof the law can only be confrontedby the-divine'unwriting,'notjust of thisor thatprescriptionbut of the law in its
verygenerality.This 'violence'above and beyond the foundingand
Ibid., 1007/1009.
83
It is against this supposition that Derrida repeats the formal structureof an
argumentthathad also governed his deconstructionof Heidegger's demarcationof
'vulgar' and 'authentic'temporalityin Sein und Zeit,in "Ousia et gramme" (in Mar(Paris: Minuit, 1972).
ges-de la philosophie
84 Derrida's "Signature,event,context"identifiesthe "risk"and the "exposure to
of all speech acts as a structuralfeaturenotjust of a speech act but as the
infelicity"
"necessarypossibility"and, in that sense, as the "law" of any mark. (cf.J. Derrida,
LimitedInc (Evanston: NorthwesternUP, 1988), 15).
81
82

HENT DE VRIES
470
conservingviolence is associated by Benjamin withthe power and

wrathof God, with,as Derrida formulates,"a whollyother'mystical
foundationof authority.'"85 And itis onlythisnon-violentviolence
which, Benjamin thinks, would interrupt the representational
power of language-its presentstateas beingjust a technicalmeans
to an end, a vehicle forcommunicationand information-and that
therebyrecalls and restoresits originaldestinationof being a pure
of "appellation, nomination,the givingor the appeal
manifestation
of presence in the name."86
At the end of "Zur Kritikder Gewalt," the recourse to a nonviolent divine force, thus, reconfirmsthe privilegeor, rather,inof a theologicalfigurethatthe earlyessay "Ober Sprache
evitability
iiberhauptund fiberdie Sprache des Menschen" had posited as the
very origin and essence of language. There is a correspondence
and mutual implicationbetween the mysticabyss fromwhich language emerges (or to which it,in the originarysplitor dissemination, always remains exposed) and the 'destinal violence' through
which historyas violence is suspended. Derrida insistson thiscorrelationof two virtualextremesor limitsbetweenwhichthe drama
of language and historytakes place: "Who signs? It is God, the
Wholly Other, as always,it is the divine violence that always will
have preceded but also willhave giventhe firstnames."87God signs
firstand last, 'He' opens and seals the event of language.
This structuralanalogy betweenthe event thattakes place at the
veryoriginof language and thatwhichhappens in the destruction
of the law, can also be articulatedin other respects.For both violences attemptto overcome a fundamentalarbitrarinessor undeDerrida pointsout thatBenjamin escidability(Unentscheidbarkeit).
tablishesthis analogy explicitlyby comparing the impossibilityto
come to a real, let alone just decision withinthe order of rightto
the situationin which the emerginghuman language can be nothing but a means forcommunicationand, by the same token,foran
cf. GS II.1, 154). The factthat
indiscriminate'babbling' (Geschwdtz,
the mythicalfounding violence is forgottenand pervertedby the
intrusionof the conservingviolence, blurs the crucial distinctions
and corrupts the legitimacyor, rather,justice, of decisions. The
possibilityto decide would only reside in the double manifestation
85 Derrida, "Force of Law," 1021-1023.
86
87
Ibid. 973-975n.
Ibid., 1037.

M LN
471
of the divine violence thatonce opened the event of language and

that now cannot but destroythe mythologicalorder of rightthat
was the consequence of language's fall,therebyinauguratinga new
'historical'epoch, an era that is marked by a justice (Gerechtigkeit)
beyond the order of law and right,beyond theirverygeneralityor
even universality.Only the sudden, strikingforce of divine violence would guarantee-or, perhaps, simplystand for-the "irreducible singularityof each situation."88And yet,it is preciselythat
singularitywhich explains whythe divine violence can only manifestitselfin incommensurable,incomparable'effects'thatpreclude
any conceptual determination,thatwe can neitheraffirmnor deny
on rational grounds and which for that reason, again, retain a
certainundecidability.
The same paradox appears ifone realizes thatthe pure violence
of God and that of the general proletarianstrikecan never completelyescape the contaminationof the dialectic-the come-andgo, the "Aufund Ab" (GS II.1, 202)-of the mythologicalfoundation of rightand its historicalconservation.Neitherthe divine nor
the proletarianviolence can hope to situateitselfcomfortablybeyond the fundamentalundecidabilitythatit-now and then,for a
moment only-seems to interrupt.Neither of them can force a
decision or enforceajudgment without,at the same time,exposing
itselfto a reiterationand therebya (possible) perversion which
reinscribesthe non-violentviolence in the order from which it
appeared to break away.89And foranalogous reasons, Benjamin's
88
Ibid., 1023.
In a seeminglydifferentcontext,Jean-FrancoisLyotard,as if he were providing in passing just one more reading of "Zur Kritikder Gewalt," insiststhat for
essentialreasons neitherthe genre of 'myth'nor thatof 'divine right'(here: droit),
nor thatof 'deliberativeconsensus',nor thatof proletarian'communism,'could ever
hope to forgean autoreferentialnarration,an ultimateredemption,a 'freelinking'
of heterogeneous 'phrases,' let alone a 'destruction'of all so-called 'genres of disthe
course.' For all these differentnames stand forirreconcilablewaysof instituting
'litigations'for irresolvable'differends'thatare givenwiththe Ereignisof language
as such (whetherbefore or after the 'fall', whetherits phrases are silent or not,
human or not). Between all phrases-and no phrase is firstor last-an 'abyss of
Not-Being' opens up. And yet,Lyotard refuses'to granta 'mystical'profundity'to
this abyss that,to givejust one example, drives constativesand moral imperatives
apart. And if, for example, the traditioncalled Cabbala can be said to do more
the
justice to the occurence, the happening, the 'takingplace'-the Arrive-t-il?--of
Ereignisof 'Being' or, rather,of the 'Thereis's'than,say,the mythicalnarratives,this
cannot serve a sufficientreason to simplymake the 'dispersion'of whichit testifies
into a new firstprinciple.The veryidea of an originalor originarysplittingwould
always already presuppose the idea of a lost totalityand therebyrisk to diffusea
89

472
HENT DE VRIES
distinctionbetween differenttypesof strikes-the partial and the

general, the politicaland the proletarianstrike-can only point to
twolimitsituationswhichcould never take place in theirpuritybut
in there suggestiveforce reveal two permanent"temptations"90
of
all deconstruction:namelythe reformationof the existingpolitical
order into another, perhaps more just, state versus its violent (or
peaceful) total destructionin a revoltmore radical than any coup
d'etat.Neitherone of these strategiesof (piecemeal or abrupt,limited or total) transformationand anarchic rupture can, of course,
fullycapture the 'intent'let alone the importof the displacement
thatis termeddeconstructive.And yet,no such deconstructivegesture can ever immunize itselfagainst these extremepossibilities.
More than invokingthe so-called 'generalized singularity'of all
Benlinguisticutteranceand of alljuridico-politicalintervention,91
jamin's referenceto God at the end of his essaypreciselymakes one
of these temptationsexplicit.Not only is what he writesabout divine violence, as Derrida remarks,"not always incompatiblewith
the theologicalbasis of all jusnaturalisms,"92i.e., of those theories
of law that he had earlier dismissed as dogmatic. In its very "criin the name of a purported originaryor ultitique of Aufkldrung"
in
mate authenticity, itsrelianceon a theoryof the fallof language,
the texthinges on the divine signatureand seal thatbringsout its
"most redoubtable" aspects: that which is most "intolerable"even
"beyond" the undeniable and dangerous affinitywith"the worst"
of parliamentary
thatis characteristicof any critiqueof Aufkldrung,
Derrida
not
to draw the
etc.93
And
does
hesitate
representation,
ultimateconsequence fromthis disturbinganalogy: "One is terrified at the idea of an interpretationthatwould make of the Holocaust an expiation and an indecipherablesignatureof thejust and
violentanger of God."94
That thisassociationis not as far-fetchedas it would seem at first
sight,would be made clear, Derrida stresses,by the single biblical
certainnostalgia. Cf. Le differend,
Nos. 199, 221, 237, 100, 178, 160, 131, 190, 170.
The 'mysticalpostulate' would be less vulnerableto this possible objection in its
Derridean than in its Benjaminian form.
90
Derrida, "Force of Law," 995, cf. 997.
91 Cf.
Derrida, "Force of Law," 1023: "The sudden referenceto God above reason and universality,beyond a sort of Aufkldrung
of law, is nothingother than a
referenceto the irreduciblesingularityof each situation."
92
93
Ibid., 1044.
94 Ibid., 1045.

M L N
473
example Benjamin gives in order to distinguishthe divineviolence

fromthe mythologicalviolence: to witGod's 'anger' (Zorn)whichis
cited as one of the most visiblemanifestationsof a violence thatis
not a means to an end (GS II.1, 196) as wellas his severejudgement
on the followersof Korah, who rebelled against the authorityof
Moses and were struckwithoutdistinction,disappeared alive in the
abyssunder the earth,in the kingdomof death, and were annihilated withoutleaving any trace or remainder of theirdestruction
(cf. Numbers16:1-35), "withoutbloodshed," as it were. It is preciselyin this'bloodless' characterof the destruction,Benjamin contends, that it retains its expiatorycharacter. And it is here that
Derrida's reading becomes at once most outspoken and most cautious,marked by a repeated 'perhaps' while simultaneouslyraising
doubts about the ultimateresponsibilityof Benjamin's textas well
as of any reading that would all too quicklycomplywithits interpretationof the task of destruction:
and all
It is at thispointthatthistext,despiteall itspolysemic
mobility
to resembletoo closely,to
seemsto me finally
itsresourcesforreversal,
and vertigo,the verythingagainst
the pointof specularfascination
also and speak,thatwithwhichone must
whichone mustactand think,
break(perhaps,perhaps).Thistext,likemanyotherbyBenjaminis still
for
or archeo-eschatological
too Heideggerian,too messianico-marxist
me.95
The taskthenof deconstructionwould be to explore a reading that

would be "neither( . .) Heideggerian nor Benjaminian."96For although one has to admire the "heart" and "courage" of a thinking
thatdoes not ignore thatone cannot be just or responsible"except
in exposing oneself to all risks,beyond certitudeand good conscience,"97the specificformthisthinkingtakesin Benjamin should
make one extremelycautious.
In the measure in which in Benjamin's discourse an authentic
95
Ibid., 1045: "we must ... formalize,judge the possible complicitybetween this
discourse and the worst(here the finalsolution). In myview,thisdefinesa taskand
a responsibilitythe theme of which (...) I have not been able to read in either
Benjaminian 'destruction'or Heideggerian 'Destruktion.'It is the thoughtof differencebetween these destructionson the one hand and a deconstructiveaffirmation on the other thathas guided me ... in thisreading. It is thisthoughtthatthe
memoryof the final solution seems to me to dictate." (ibid.).
96 Derrida, "Force of Law," 977n.
97 Ibid., 1025.

474
HENT DE VRIES
originarityand destructionare tightlyknottedtogetherand mirror

each other, it should be confronted with another 'logic' which
would no longer be caught in this metaphysical'specularity'and
which might thereforebe more effectivein resistingthe 'worst.'
Derrida calls thisother logic-which is, like Benjamin's, the logics
of a radical otherness-a logics of the 'spectre.' Unlike the specularityof the 'performative'of the divine foundingand annihilation
of the 'mysticalpostulate,'the
thatmarksBenjamin's interpretation
and elsewhereprecludes
here
invokes
Derrida
that
'spectrallogics'
the possibilityof any ontologicalor textual'restingpoint,'even the
one presupposed by thattheorywhichclaims thatmeaning is subAnd it is preciselythisultimate
jected to a permanent 'drifting.'98
anti-Babelian stance that marks the differencebetween Benjamin
and Derrida. The 'fall' in "Uber die Sprache iiberhaupt und fiber
die Sprache des Menschen" as well as the 'destruction'in "Zur
Kritikder Gewalt" are irreconcilablewiththe 'originarycatastrophe' that haunts Derrida's deconstructions.99
IV. 'A-Dieu'
Neither in his reading of the early essays on language, nor in his
lecture on Benjamin's "Zur Kritikder Gewalt" does Derrida refer
to de Certeau's studyof the absolute 'performative'structureof the
mysticalfable. In "Force of Law" theveryformulation"the mystical
foundationof authority"is,just as the expression"in the beginning
therewillhave been force,"takenfromPascal and, indirectly,from
Montaigne (Essais, Livre III, ch. XIII) whose idea that the law
founds 'the truthof itsjustice' on 'legitimatefictions'(ibid., Livre
98
in "Speculer-sur Freud,"
Speaking of the 'athesis' of Jenseitsdes Lustprinzips,
Derrida points out thatalso the postulateof the 'drifting'of meaning would imply
"too continous a movement: or rather too undifferentiated,too homogeneous a
movementthat appears to ravel away (...) froma supposed origin" (The Postcard,
261) that would be indivisible.
99 However, we would need many more detours to carefullyarticulatein detail
the differencesand the disturbingaffinitiesbetween the ghost of the 'worst'that
Derrida detects in Benjamin's text and the motifof the 'Holocaust' in his own La
cartepostale.There, Derrida speaks, forexample, of a necessityto 'burn everything'
and to destroythe archiveof the correspondencewhichwould not be a deplorable
accident but a necessarycondition-the chance-for the "affirmationto be reborn
at everyinstant,withoutmemory"(cf. Derrida, The Postcard,23, cf. 26).

M L N
475
II, ch. XII) had also been cited in the epigraph to the reading of
Kafka's "Vor dem Gesetz," in "Prejuges-devant la loi."'00 And
also here, the analysisDerrida givesof these expressionsmoves far
beyond the common, conventionalistinterpretationof these citations which tends to reduce the (human) law to a mere facade for
dubious power interests,to a mightthat would dictate all 'right.'
Simultaneously,these passages are subtractedfrom the Christian
pessimism that inspired Pascal and that sees in the natural laws
nothingbut a sign of the corruptionthathad befallen human reason since the firstsin. Derrida would thus seem to suggest,that it
is onlyin so faras the expression'mysticalfoundationof authority'
has been strippedof itsreligiousovertones,thatit willbe of help in
establishingthe premises of an indispensable critique of juridical
ideology.
And yet, Derrida's interestin the remarkable resemblance between Pascal's notion of a divineannihilationof all our 'justice'and
Benjamin's critique of mythicalviolencel?0 points toward a 'thematics'which reaches far beyond thatof a desedimentationof the
existingorders of law and right.To be sure, whereas forPascal the
'infiniteabyss'of the human condition-the void and vanitywhich
characterizesa situationin which there is no longer any truejustice-can in principlebe filled (again) withan infiniteobject, i.e.,
God, Derrida, on the contrary,insiststhat the "measure" of our
"tragiclot" only comes in sightwhen we realize thateven such an
infiniteobject, even God himself,would be "impotent"to master
the "aleatory"dimension and the "chance" of thissituation,i.e., of
this "atrocious lottery"of all destination.'02Seen from that perspective,it seems only consequent when he, in the 'Post-scriptum'
to "Force de loi," concludes that Benjamin's textas well as its ultimate signature should be considered as "dated." For it could be
said of everysignaturethat it takes place at a given singular time
(and place) and thisis, perhaps, even more so when the signature
"slipsin among several names of God and onlysignsby pretending
to let God himselfsign."103Would this being "dated" also mean
that the divine signatorywith which Benjamin seals his text is at
00Cf. J. F. Lyotard et al., La facultedejuger (Paris: Minuit, 1985), 87.
'1' Derrida, "Force of Law," 941, cf. 1021, 1023.
102
Derrida, The Postcard,81.
103

476
HENT DE VRIES
bottoma ruined notion,an idea thathas outliveditselfand, in that

sense, is even out-of-date?
It is importantto recall here that the formulation'mysticalpostulate' is the index of a much older and, perhaps, even more fundamental problem that had been 'thematized'in Derrida's earlier
writingslong before its being addressed and analyzed in quasitheologicalterms.Thus, in the earlyremarksmade in response to
Foucault's reading of the firstof Descartes' Meditations,where
Derrida hints at the 'silence' as well as the "coup de force"-the
of a "non-sens"l04-thatwould 'found' the relationship
"sans-fond"
between the ego and madness; in the radicalizationof Freud's noin termsof a trace "a partirde rien,"105
tion of the Urverdrdngung
and, of course, in the rethinkingof the originary affirmation
which,in the later workof Heidegger, unsettlesthe so-called questioning attitude:'06 in all these examples most, if not all, of the
characteristicfeaturesof the 'mysticalpostulate'already seem to be
indicated.
And yet, the explicit formulationof this problematicin quasitheologicaltermsadds somethingdecisiveto these earlieranalyses.
For not only does the adjective 'mystical'remind us of a certain
ethico-politicaloverdeterminationof these 'groundless grounds,'
which is an (inevitable)risk as well. The expression 'mysticalposof any affirtulate' also underscores the singular 'performativity'
or
mation of these 'grounds' therebycorrecting counterbalancing
the classical transcendentaland ontologicalfixationon the conditionsof the possibilityof any thingin general. And yet,it is forthis
very same reason that the formulation under considerationespeciallyits second part: the 'mysticalpostulate'-remainsa highly
problematicaland at best provisionalexpression,caught up in the
very'performativecontradiction'it seeks to describe. For whereas
a 'postulate,' after Kant, is generallyconsidered to be a theoretical
axiom or proposition whose referentcan, indeed, not be established by any procedure throughwhichknowledgeis acquired, the
'postulate' discussed above is preciselythe silentand violent'act' of
any such postulation:a gesture,thatis, which-like the addressing,
'04 J. Derrida, L'ecritureet la difference
(Paris: Seuil, 1967), 84, 88 n. 1.
105
Ibid. 339.
106
In the essay on de Certeau, Derrida reiteratesthe analysisof the Zusage (cf.
Psyche,645-646) that had played such an importantrole in De l'esprit.

M L N
477
signingand sealing of a text-manifestsitselffirstand foremostin

manner. It comes as no surprisethen,when Derrida
a non-constative
concludes his reading by notingthatthe finalwords of Benjamin's
text,its"ultimateaddress," resound like "theshopharat nightor on
the brinkof a prayerone no longer hears or does not yethear."'07
It is this essential uncertaintywhich marks every text with an ineffaceablea-dieu.
ofChicago
LoyolaUniversity
107
Derrida, "Force of Law," 1037. In a letterto Scholem fromApril 1931 Benjamin described his perilous situationas that of someone who is shipwreckedand
who in order to save himselftriesto send a signal by climbingthe remainingbut
extremelyfragilemast ("Ein Schiffbrichiger,der auf einem Wrack treibt,indem er
auf die Spitze des Mastbaums klettert,der schon zermiirbtist. Aber er hat die
Chance, von dort zu seiner Rettungein Signal zu geben." (Benjamin, Briefe,532).


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Anti-Babel: The 'Mystical Postulate' in Benjamin, de Certeau and Derrida

Author(s): Hent de Vries

This content downloaded from 148.206.53.9 on Mon, 24 Jun 2013 19:25:58 PM

In May 1916, Walter Benjamin, in response to Martin Buber's

MLN, 107, (1992): 441-477 ? 1992 by The Johns Hopkins UniversityPress

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Nur die intensiveRichtungder Worte in den Kern des in-

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itselfby its peculiar 'linguisticturn,' not only from the modern

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profounduneasiness that,in the itinerarythatis followedfromthe

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premisesof Derrida's approach, as well as, more indirectly,on the

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loquendior, which amounts to the same thing,a new modusagendi.

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tion of all such circumstancesand it therebyreveals the limitof all

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pertain to everythingand nothing, to everyone and nobody. It

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The voloresemblesan absolute performative

It is in the contextof thisanalysis,whichwas publishedunder the

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into being.30It would be to thissingularpostulationthat the quotationfromRosenzweig'sDer SternderErlosungwould point in an

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Derrida, "A Number of Yes", 124-125, Psyche,643.

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'mysticalpostulate' in de Certeau as well as his demonstrationof

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nigsteVerbindung)with the inquiries commonlyattributedto the

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uum" (Residuum,GS II.1, 157) of the divineword throughwhichit

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and right-and that means: of all judgment (Urteil)-should be

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tion,' 'de-Shemitizing' and 'derouting' from the path (chemin)

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'reconciliation'and 'restitution'of the essence of language would

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vealing catastrophe"whichwould be the unthinkable"conditionof

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one language,"61not even the language of names; the affirmation,

Paul deMan, Trans. C. Lindsay,J.Culler, E. Cadava

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recallsthe idiom of the so-calledconservativerevolutioncommonly

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Cf. J. F. Lyotard,Le differend

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Derrida, The Postcard,136.

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conservingviolence is associated by Benjamin withthe power and

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of the divine violence thatonce opened the event of language and

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distinctionbetween differenttypesof strikes-the partial and the

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example Benjamin gives in order to distinguishthe divineviolence