14-51311 - EEOC Amicus Brief in Support of Plaintiff-Appellant

Case: 14-51311
Document: 00513015639
Page: 1
Date Filed: 04/22/2015
Case No. 14-51311

____________________________
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
____________________________
LORETTA I. EURE,
Plaintiff-Appellant
v.
THE SAGE CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellee
__________________________________________________
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
No. 5:12-CV-1119, Hon. David A. Ezra, Presiding
__________________________________________________
BRIEF OF U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
AS AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT LORETTA EURE AND REVERSAL
__________________________________________________
P. DAVID LOPEZ
General Counsel
CAROLYN L. WHEELER
Acting Associate General Counsel
LORRAINE C. DAVIS
Assistant General Counsel
ANNE W. KING
Attorney
U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT

OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Office of General Counsel
131 M St. NE, Fifth Floor
Washington, D.C. 20507
(202) 663-4699
anne.king@eeoc.gov
Attorneys for amicus curiae
U.S. Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission
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SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT OF INTERESTED PARTIES

Loretta Eure v. The Sage Corporation,
Case No. 14-51311, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,
Case No. 5:12-CV-1119, U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas
The undersigned counsel of record certifies that the following listed persons
and entities as described in the fourth sentence of 5th Cir. R. 28.2.1 have an
interest in the outcome of this case. These representations are made in order that
the judges of this court may evaluate possible disqualification or recusal.
1.
U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

Amicus Curiae
2.
P. David Lopez
Carolyn L. Wheeler
Lorraine C. Davis
Anne W. King
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission
s/ Anne W. King___________
Attorney of record for the
Equal Employment
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT OF INTERESTED PARTIES ........................... i
TABLE OF CONTENTS .......................................................................................... ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................... iii
STATEMENT OF INTEREST ..................................................................................1
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE .................................................................................1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ..................................................................................2
I. Statement of Facts ............................................................................................2
II. District Court Decision .....................................................................................8
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ......................................................................10
ARGUMENT ...........................................................................................................11
I. Discrimination against transgender persons is cognizable as discrimination
because of sex under Title VII. .............................................................................11
II. Plaintiffs asserting transgender discrimination need not provide specific
evidence of gender stereotyping. ..........................................................................16
III. A jury could conclude that Sage discriminated against Eure because
of his sex ...............................................................................................................23
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................28
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
ECF CERTIFICATE
ii
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Alvarado v. Tex. Rangers,
492 F.3d 605 (5th Cir. 2007)26, 27
Barnes v. City of Cincinnati,
401 F.3d 729 (6th Cir. 2005) ..13
Chavez v. Credit Nation Auto Sales,
49 F. Supp. 3d 1163 (N.D. Ga. 2014) .15
Corley v. La. ex rel. Div. of Admin.,
498 F. Appx 448 (5th Cir. 2012) ...24
Doe v. Dekalb Cnty. Sch. Dist.,
145 F.3d 1441 (11th Cir. 1998) ..24
Doe v. United Consumer Fin. Servs., No. 1:01 CV 1112,
2001 WL 34350174 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 9, 2001)...15
EEOC v. Boh Bros. Constr. Co., L.L.C.,
731 F.3d 444 (5th Cir. 2013) ..8, 5, 18, 22, 23
Etienne v. Spanish Lake Truck & Casino Plaza, L.L.C.,
778 F.3d 473 (5th Cir. 2015) ..25
Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth.,
502 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2007) 13, 21
Finkle v. Howard Cnty.,
12 F. Supp. 3d 780 (D. Md. 2014) ..14
Glenn v. Brumby,
663 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2011) 12, 15, 16, 23
Hart v. Lew,
973 F. Supp. 2d 561 (D. Md. 2013) 15
iii
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Hinson v. Clinch Cnty., Ga. Bd. of Educ.,

231 F.3d 821 (5th Cir. 2000) ..24
Jones v. Robinson Prop. Grp., L.P.,
427 F.3d 987 (5th Cir. 2005) ..25
Kastl v. Maricopa Cnty. Cmty. Coll. Dist.,
325 F. Appx 492 (9th Cir. 2009) ...13
Lopez v. River Oaks Imaging & Diagnostic Grp., Inc.,
542 F. Supp. 2d 653 (S.D. Tex. 2008) 14
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792 (1973) ...26
Mitchell v. Axcan Scandipharm, Inc., No. Civ.A. 05-243,
2006 WL 456173 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 17, 2006) ...15
Myers v. Cuyahoga Cnty.,
182 F. Appx 510 (6th Cir. 2006) ...13
Nichols v. Azteca Restaurant Enters., Inc.,
256 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2001) 22, 23
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Oil Servs., Inc.,
523 U.S. 75 (1998) .....18
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,
490 U.S. 228 (1989) 8, 11-12, 18
Rosa v. Park W. Bank & Trust Co.,
214 F.3d 213 (1st Cir. 2000) ...13
Schroer v. Billington,
525 F. Supp. 2d 58 (D.D.C. 2007) ..19
Schroer v. Billington,
577 F. Supp. 2d 293 (D.D.C. 2008) 14, 19-20, 21, 22
iv
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Schwenk v. Hartford,
204 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2000) 13, 17, 20
Smith v. City of Salem,
378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004) ..15, 16, 18
Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc.,
667 F.2d 748 (8th Cir. 1982) ..17
Thompson v. City of Waco,
764 F.3d 500 (5th Cir. 2014) ..24
Tronetti v. TLC HealthNet Lakeshore Hosp., No. 03-cv-375E(SC),
2003 WL 22757935 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2003) 15
Ulane v. E. Airlines,
742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984) 17
Willis v. Cleco Corp.,
749 F.3d 314 (5th Cir. 2014) 26, 27
Young v. City of Houston,
906 F.2d 177 (5th Cir. 1990) ..25
Statutes
42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq.....1
42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1) ..11
Administrative Materials
Lusardi v. McHugh, Appeal No. 0120133395
(EEOC Apr. 1, 2015) ..........16
Macy v. Holder, Appeal No. 0120120812,
2012 WL 1435995 (EEOC Apr. 20, 2012) .........16, 17, 23
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STATEMENT OF INTEREST
The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC or
Commission) is the primary agency charged by Congress with administering,
interpreting, and enforcing Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
2000e et seq. This appeal raises the issue of whether disparate treatment of an
employee because he is transgender is discrimination because of sex under
Title VII. The district court concluded that individuals alleging discrimination
based on transgender status must provide additional evidence of gender
stereotyping, which conflicts with the Commissions view of Title VII. This appeal
also raises further questions relating to the merits of Appellants Title VII claim.
Because these issues are important to the effective enforcement of Title VII, the
Commission respectfully offers its views to the Court. See Fed R. App. P. 29(a).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Whether a reasonable jury could determine that Appellee Sage Corporation
discriminated against Appellant Lorenzo (Loretta) Eure because he is transgender.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I.
Statement of Facts1
Appellant Lorenzo Eure, formerly known as Loretta Eure, was an instructor
at Appellee Sage Corporations (Sage) San Antonio, Texas truck driving school,
beginning around December 2010. ROA.326; ROA.664 (RE.T5) (Eure Dep.
43:11-19; Eure Decl. 2). He was paid on an hourly basis, and his responsibilities
included conducting classroom training and providing on-the-road training in truck
driving. ROA.326 (Eure Dep. 43:16-25). Eure worked part time, about 26 to 28
hours a week, but he was told he would soon receive additional hours when the
San Antonio school launched expanded services for Sanjel, Inc., a long-time client
of Sage. ROA.239; ROA.326-27 (Campanian Aff. 6; Eure Dep. 43:20-44:11).
Eure is transgender: his gender identity (male) is different from the sex
assigned to him at birth (female). ROA.665 (RE.T5) (Eure Decl. 4). When Eure
worked at Sage, he presented as a male and he had taken steps towards
transitioning from female to male (including a hysterectomy, mastectomy, and
testosterone therapy) before starting at Sage. ROA.309-10; ROA.355; ROA.392;
ROA.665 (RE.T5) (Eure Dep. 26:3-27:9; 72:13-24; Eure Dep. Ex. 1; Eure Decl.
Except for the record citations, the Statement of Facts is nearly identical to the
Statement of Facts in the EEOCs amicus brief in Brandon v. The Sage
Corporation, No. 14-51320 (5th Cir.).
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4). Eure was known as Loretta Eure when he worked at Sage and later changed
his name to Lorenzo Eure. ROA.288-89 (Eure Dep. 5:8-6:2).
Margie Brandon, Eures supervisor, was School Director for Sages San
Antonio school, beginning in May 2010. ROA.670 (RE.T7) (Brandon Decl. 1).
Brandon interviewed Eure for the instructor position and recommended hiring him.
ROA.460-62; ROA.568 (Brandon Dep. 42:16-44:9; 150:11-20). Sages Safety
Manager approved Eures hire based on a background check and a Department of
Transportation assessment. ROA.569; ROA.671 (RE.T7) (Brandon Dep. 151:1-25;
Brandon Decl. 3).
In March 2011, Sages Carmella Campanian visited the San Antonio school
in conjunction with Sages expansion of driver training services for the Sanjel
company. ROA.239 (Campanian Aff. 6). Campanian introduced herself to the
San Antonio school staff as Sages co-founder and Vice President. ROA.496;
ROA.667 (RE.T6); ROA.670 (RE.T7) (Brandon Dep. 78:10-15; Solis Decl. 4;
Brandon Decl. 2). Campanian, who is located in Montana, served as the National
Project Director in charge of the Sanjel driver training program. ROA.238-39
(Campanian Aff. 2, 6). Sage has provided driver training services to Sanjel since
1994, and in June 2010 Sage entered into an expanded contract with Sanjel, which
included launching driver training for Sanjel at the San Antonio school. ROA.239
(Campanian Aff. 6-7) (describing multi-million dollar expansion). Before
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Campanians visit, Brandon spoke to Campanian by phone on one occasion, and

found her pushy and abrasive to a degree that made Brandon uncomfortable.
ROA.487-93 (Brandon Dep. 69:22-75:1). Brandon reported her impression of
Campanian to her own supervisor, Barbara Blake. ROA.488 (Brandon Dep. 70:814). Blake acknowledged that Campanian is very difficult to work with, but
warned Brandon, Youre on your own on that one. ROA.488 (Brandon Dep.
70:8-14).
Brandon testified that Campanian expressed animosity towards Eure soon
after her arrival at the San Antonio school, on March 29. ROA.494-96; ROA.671
(RE.T7) (Brandon Dep. 76:5-78:9; Brandon Decl. 3). Campanian was looking
outside the Sage office when she exclaimed, What the hell is that? What the hell
is that out there? ROA.494; ROA.671 (RE.T7) (Brandon Dep. 76:5-19; Brandon
Decl. 3). Brandon realized that Campanian was referring to Eure, who was
working with a student on a truck. ROA.494-95; ROA.671 (RE.T7) (Brandon Dep.
76:20-77:1; Brandon Decl. 3). Brandon responded that it was Loretta Eure, a
Sage instructor. ROA.494-95 (Brandon Dep. 76:20-77:1). Campanian declared,
We dont hire cross-genders in this company, and asked who made the decision
to employ Eure, inquiring, [W]ho the hell hired that? and querying whether
Brandon herself hired Eure. ROA.495; ROA.671 (RE.T7) (Brandon Dep. 77:2-18;
Brandon Decl. 3). Brandon responded that Eure was qualified for the instructor
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position and explained that Sages safety department approved the hire. ROA.495;
ROA.671 (RE.T7) (Brandon Dep. 77:5-8; Brandon Decl. 3).
Campanian indicated that Brandon would face consequences for employing
Eure, asserting, [W]e will deal with you seriously for hiring that. ROA.495;
ROA.671 (RE.T7) (Brandon Dep. 77:2-10; Brandon Decl. 3). Maria Solis,
Brandons administrative assistant, witnessed this exchange and confirmed
Brandons account. ROA.667-68 (RE.T6) (Solis Decl. 5, 7, 9). Afterwards,
Brandon called Blake, her supervisor, to report Campanians comments about
Eure. ROA.499-500 (Brandon Dep. 81:20-82:8).
On March 30, Campanian continued berating Brandon, repeating the
admonishment that, [W]ere going to deal with you seriously for hiring Eure,
and emphasizing that, I told you yesterday we dont hire cross-genders.
ROA.507-08 (Brandon Dep. 89:17-90:4). Brandon asked how Campanian planned
to deal with her, and Campanian responded, I havent made the decision yet. I
have to talk to [Sage President Gregg] Aversa. Hes still traveling, and I cant get a
hold [of] him. ROA.508 (Brandon Dep. 90:5-10).
After this conversation, Campanian made some phone calls; Brandon
assumed that she spoke with Aversa, and Campanian acknowledged speaking to
Aversa that day. ROA.247; ROA.508 (Campanian Aff. 26; Brandon Dep. 90:1112). Then, Campanian called Solis, Brandons administrative assistant, into
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Brandons office and told Brandon and Solis to sit down. ROA.508; ROA.668
(RE.T6); ROA.671-72 (RE.T7) (Brandon Dep. 90:11-14; Solis Decl. 13;
Brandon Decl. 5). Campanian asked Brandon her salary, and Brandonshocked
that Campanian had raised a highly personal question in front of Solisdid not
immediately respond. ROA.508; ROA.668 (RE.T6); ROA.671-72 (RE.T7)
(Brandon Dep. 90:15-21; Solis Decl. 13; Brandon Decl. 5). Campanian then
announced, [O]ur decision to deal with you seriously is to cut your pay in half.
ROA.508; ROA.668 (RE.T6); ROA.671-72 (RE.T7) (Brandon Dep. 90:23-25;
Solis Decl. 13; Brandon Decl. 5). Brandon protested that cutting her pay would
be illegal. ROA.509; ROA.668 (RE.T6); ROA.671-72 (RE.T7) (Brandon Dep.
91:1-6; Solis Decl. 13; Brandon Decl. 5).
Also on March 30, Campanian created a schedule for the San Antonio
school instructors that incorporated the Sanjel students. ROA.512-13; ROA.672
(RE.T7) (Brandon Dep. 94:22-95:22; Brandon Decl. 6). Brandon reviewed this
schedule and told Campanian there was a mistake: Campanian failed to include
Eure on the schedule. ROA.513; ROA.672 (RE.T7) (Brandon Dep. 95:3-10;
Brandon Decl. 6). Campanian retorted, Are you stupid? Im not putting her
on the schedule. Those Sanjel people, theyll eat her up alive. ROA.513 (Brandon
Dep. 95:11-14). Brandon asked Campanian if she was firing Eure. ROA.513
(Brandon Dep. 95:15). Campanian said no, but clarified, Were just not going to
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give her any hours. Just wont put her on the schedule. ROA.513 (Brandon Dep.
95:15-18). Then, Campanian asked Brandon whether she understood the
consequences she faced for hiring Eure. ROA.672 (RE.T7) (Brandon Decl. 2).
When Eure saw the schedule, he asked Brandon why he was excluded from the
schedule and whether he had been fired. ROA.513-14 (Brandon Dep. 95:23-96:5).
Documentary evidence corroborates Brandons account that Campanian
reduced Eures hours. One version of the instructor schedule for April 4 through
April 10 reflects that Eure was scheduled to work six shifts, while a second version
of that weeks schedule omits all of Eures shifts. Compare ROA.414 with
ROA.415. Also, one version of the instructor schedule for March 28 through April
3 reflects possible shifts for Eure on March 31 and April 3, while a second version
of that weeks schedule allots those shifts to another instructor. Compare ROA.412
with ROA.413.
Sage acknowledged that Campanian created an instructor schedule and
reduced Eures hours but provided a different explanation of Eures exclusion from
the schedule. Campanian claimed that, on March 31, she scheduled a meeting for
the next morning (April 1) to determine instructors availability for the following
week. ROA.249-50 (Campanian Aff. 29). According to Campanian, Eure had
called Campanian earlier on March 31 to report that he had the stomach flu.
ROA.249 (Campanian Aff. 28). Campanian claimed that she tried to contact Eure
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at home the afternoon of March 31 to apprise him of the instructors meeting, but
could not reach him. ROA.249-50 (Campanian Aff. 29). Campanian asserted that
she posted the schedule for the following week late on April 1, and that she
excluded Eure from the schedule because she could not confirm his availability.
ROA.249-50 (Campanian Aff. 29).
Both Brandon and Eure resigned as a result of Campanians conduct.
Brandon did not return to work on March 31 and submitted a formal resignation to
Sage President Aversa, while Eure resigned on April 4. ROA.343-44; ROA.520-22
(Eure Dep. 60:22-61:1; Brandon Dep. 102:19-104:20).
II.
District Court Decision

The district court granted summary judgment to Sage on Eures sex
discrimination claim on the rationale that Eure could not show that Sage
discriminated against him because of sex. The parties summary judgment
briefing had not even raised this issue, see ROA.844 n.7 (RE.T4), but the district
court found it dispositive.
The district court acknowledged that, under Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,
490 U.S. 228 (1989), [i]t is well established that a plaintiff can satisfy Title VIIs
because-of-sex requirement with evidence of a plaintiffs perceived failure to
conform to traditional gender stereotypes. ROA.840 (RE.T4) (quoting EEOC v.
Boh Bros. Constr. Co., L.L.C., 731 F.3d 444, 454 (5th Cir. 2013) (en banc)). The
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district court further recognized that transgender plaintiffs have successfully relied
on Price Waterhouse to bring sex discrimination claims under Title VII. ROA.842
(RE.T4).
However, the district court concluded that Eure was required to provide
additional evidence of gender stereotyping to bring a Title VII claim. ROA.842
(RE.T4). The district court asserted that courts applying Price Waterhouse have
generally required evidence of gendered statements or acts that target a plaintiffs
conformance with traditional conceptions of masculinity or femininity. ROA.841
(RE.T4). Along the same lines, the district court stated that courts have been
reluctant to extend the sex stereotyping theory to cover circumstances where the
plaintiff is discriminated against because [of] the plaintiffs status as a transgender
man or woman, without any additional evidence related to gender stereotype nonconformity. ROA.842 (RE.T4).
In this case, the district court asserted, [a]ll of the testimony that Eure has
presented related to Campanians animus couches Campanians alleged
discrimination in terms specifically related to Eures status as a transgender person,
not in terms related to [Eures] conformance with gender stereotypes. ROA.844
(RE.T4). The district court viewed Eures evidence as consisting of two items: 1)
Brandons testimony that Campanian asked What is that and who hired that?
when she saw Eure; and 2) Brandons testimony that Campanian asked whether
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she (Brandon) understood the consequences for hiring a cross-gender. ROA.844

(RE.T4). The district court held that, [b]ecause Eure has failed to present evidence
showing that the discrimination was motivated by her [Eures] failure to act as a
stereotypical woman would, Eure has not presented a cognizable gender
stereotyping claim and cannot succeed in showing that the discrimination claim
that she [Eure] presents is because of sex as Title VII requires. ROA.845
(RE.T4).
Having resolved Eures sex discrimination claim on that basis, the district
court did not reach the merits of his claim. However, the district court determined
that Campanians reduction of Eures hoursand Eures corresponding reduction
in incomecould be a materially adverse action for Eures retaliation claim
(which is not at issue in this appeal). ROA.850-52 (RE.T4).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
In granting summary judgment to Sage on Eures disparate treatment claim,
the district court incorrectly interpreted the scope of Title VIIs protections against
discrimination because of sex. In the Commissions view, Title VII
encompasses discrimination against transgender persons because the statute
provides that gender must not play a role in employment decisions. The district
court erred in holding that no reasonable jury could find that Sage discriminated
against Eure based on his non-conformance with gender stereotypes. The district
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court also erred in determining that transgender plaintiffs must present additional
evidence of gender stereotyping in order to establish a cognizable Title VII claim.
Gender stereotypes inherently drive discrimination against transgender persons, so
it is not necessary to identify specific evidence of stereotyping.
Here, the record presents genuine issues of fact as to whether Sage
discriminated against Eure because of sex. A jury could reasonably infer that
Campanian reduced Eures work hours because he is transgenderor crossgender in Campanians words. Or, a jury could determine that Campanian
reduced Eures hours because she believed he failed to conform with his assigned
sex, and preferred that he look and act female rather than present as male.
ARGUMENT
I.
Discrimination against transgender persons is cognizable as

discrimination because of sex under Title VII.2
Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of

employment, because of such individuals race, color, sex, or national origin. 42
U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1). The Supreme Court has clarified that the phrase because
of sex means that gender must be irrelevant to employment decisions. Price
The EEOC understands the term transgender to refer broadly to a person whose
gender identity or expression is different from the sex assigned to him or her at
birth.
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Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 240. The plaintiff in Price Waterhouse was a female
senior manager who was being considered for partnership in an accounting firm.
Id. at 231-32. There was evidence that she was denied partnership because she was
considered not feminine enough in dress and behavior. Id. at 235. Her evaluators
suggested that she could improve her chances for partnership if she were less
macho and learned to walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more
femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry. Id. The Court
held that the evaluation amounted to prohibited sex stereotyping, explaining that
[i]n forbidding employers to discriminate against individuals because of their sex,
Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men
and women resulting from sex stereotypes. Id. at 251 (citations omitted). The
court held that Title VII barred not just discrimination because the plaintiff was a
woman, but also discrimination based on the employers belief that she was not
acting like a woman. Id. at 250-51.
After Price Waterhouse, the courts of appeals have recognized that a
transgender plaintiff may state a claim for discrimination because of sex if the
defendants action was motivated by the plaintiffs nonconformance with a sex
stereotype or norm. See Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1317 (11th Cir. 2011)
(stating that discrimination against a transgender individual because of her
gender-nonconformity is sex discrimination, whether its described as being on the
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basis of sex or gender); Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 572-73 (6th Cir.
2004) (holding that an adverse action taken because of transgender plaintiffs
failure to conform to sex stereotypes concerning how a man or woman should look
and behave constitutes unlawful gender discrimination); Schwenk v. Hartford, 204
F.3d 1187, 1201-02 (9th Cir. 2000) (concluding that a transsexual prisoner had
stated a viable sex discrimination claim under the Gender Motivated Violence Act
because [t]he evidence offered show[s] that [the assault was] motivated, at
least in part, by Schwenks genderin this case, by her assumption of a feminine
rather than a typically masculine appearance or demeanor and noting that its
analysis was equally applicable to claims brought under Title VII);3 but see Etsitty
v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1222-24 (10th Cir. 2007) (declining to adopt
See also Kastl v. Maricopa Cnty. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 325 F. Appx 492, 493 (9th
Cir. 2009) (concluding that, after Price Waterhouse, it is unlawful to discriminate
against a transgender (or any other) person because he or she does not behave in
accordance with an employers expectations for men or women); Myers v.
Cuyahoga Cnty., 182 F. Appx 510, 519 (6th Cir. 2006) (concluding that Title VII
protects transsexual persons from discrimination for failing to act in accordance
and/or identify with their perceived sex or gender); Barnes v. City of Cincinnati,
401 F.3d 729, 733, 736-39 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that the demotion of a
preoperative male-to-female transsexual police officer because he did not
conform to sex stereotypes concerning how a man should look and behave stated
a claim of sex discrimination under Title VII); Rosa v. Park W. Bank & Trust Co.,
214 F.3d 213, 214-15 (1st Cir. 2000) (applying Price Waterhouse to conclude,
under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, that plaintiff stated a claim for sex
discrimination because it [was] reasonable to infer that bank refused to provide a
loan application because plaintiffs traditionally feminine attire did not accord
with his male gender).
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a per se rule that transgender discrimination always amounts to sex discrimination

at this point in time and with the record and arguments before this court, but not
reaching whether Title VII protects transsexuals who act and appear as a member
of the opposite sex).
Additionally, numerous district courts, including one from within the Fifth
Circuit, have concluded that transgender discrimination is cognizable under Title
VII. See, e.g., Finkle v. Howard Cnty., 12 F. Supp. 3d 780, 788 (D. Md. 2014)
(holding that an officers claim that she was discriminated against because of her
transgender status was a cognizable claim of sex discrimination); Schroer v.
Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 305-06 (D.D.C. 2008) (While I would therefore
conclude that Schroer is entitled to judgment based on a Price Waterhouse-type
claim for sex stereotyping, I also conclude that she is entitled to judgment based on
the language of the statute itself.); Lopez v. River Oaks Imaging & Diagnostic
Grp., Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d 653, 659-61 (S.D. Tex. 2008) (Title VII and Price
Waterhouse do not make any distinction between a transgendered litigant who
fails to conform to traditional gender stereotypes and an effeminate male or
macho female who, while not necessarily believing himself or herself to be of the
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opposite gender, nonetheless is perceived by others to be in nonconformity with

traditional gender stereotypes.).4
Likewise, the Fifth Circuit, outside the transgender discrimination context,
has recognized that a plaintiff can satisfy Title VIIs because-of-sex requirement
with evidence of a plaintiffs perceived failure to conform to traditional gender
stereotypes. Boh Bros., 731 F.3d at 454 (same-sex harassment case). In reaching
its holding, the en banc court relied in part on two transgender discrimination
cases, Smith, 378 F.3d at 573, and Glenn, 663 F.3d at 1316. See Boh Bros., 731
F.3d at 454 n.4.
See also Chavez v. Credit Nation Auto Sales, 49 F. Supp. 3d 1163 (N.D. Ga.
2014) (Because Title VII protects discrimination based on gender stereotypes,
Plaintiff can assert a sex discrimination claim because Plaintiff was transitioning
from a male to a female, and Plaintiff essentially claims that the failure to conform
to male stereotypes caused Plaintiffs termination.); Mitchell v. Axcan
Scandipharm, Inc., No. Civ. A. 05-243, 2006 WL 456173, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 17,
2006) (transgender plaintiff may state a claim for sex discrimination by showing
that his failure to conform to sex stereotypes of how a man should look and behave
was the catalyst behind defendants actions); Tronetti v. TLC HealthNet
Lakeshore Hosp., No. 03-cv-375E, 2003 WL 22757935, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 26,
2003) (transsexual plaintiff may state a claim under Title VII based on [] alleged
discrimination for failing to act like a man); Doe v. United Consumer Fin.
Servs., No. 1:01-cv-1112, 2001 WL 34350174, at *2-5 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 9, 2001)
(termination based on non-conformity with gender expectations is actionable under
Title VII); cf. Hart v. Lew, 973 F. Supp. 2d 561, 579 (D. Md. 2013) (assuming
without deciding that Title VII protects transsexual individuals).
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Plaintiffs asserting transgender discrimination need not provide specific

evidence of gender stereotyping.
Plaintiffs alleging that their employers discriminated against them because
they are transgender need not provide specific evidence of gender stereotyping
because consideration of gender stereotypes will inherently be part of what drives
discrimination against a transgendered individual. Macy v. Holder, Appeal No.
0120120812, 2012 WL 1435995, at *8 (EEOC Apr. 20, 2012); see also Lusardi v.
McHugh, Appeal No. 0120133395, at *11 n.6 (EEOC Apr. 1, 2015) (explaining
that Macy [] held that discrimination on the basis of transgender status is per se
sex discrimination and found that a plaintiff need not have specific evidence of
gender stereotyping). As the Eleventh Circuit has emphasized, [a] person is
defined as transgender precisely because of the perception that his or her behavior
transgresses gender stereotypes. [T]he very acts that define transgender people as
transgender are those that contradict stereotypes of gender-appropriate appearance
and behavior. Glenn, 663 F.3d at 1316 (citations omitted) (second alteration in
original). And, as the Sixth Circuit explained, discriminating against an individual
because of his or her transgender status inherently entails sex-based considerations.
See Smith, 378 F.3d at 574-75 ([D]iscrimination against a plaintiff who is
transsexualand therefore fails to act and/or identify with his or genderis no
different from the discrimination directed against Ann Hopkins in Price
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Waterhouse, who, in sex-stereotypical terms, did not act like a woman.).

Therefore, [w]hen an employer discriminates against someone because the person
is transgender, the employer has engaged in disparate treatment related to the sex
of the victim. Macy, 2012 WL 1435995, at *7 (quoting Schwenk, 204 F.3d at
1202).
In this case, the district court erred in holding that plaintiffs who allege
transgender discrimination are required to provide specific evidence of gender
stereotyping. The district court maintained, [C]ourts have been reluctant to extend
the sex stereotyping theory to cover circumstances where the plaintiff is
discriminated against because [of] the plaintiffs status as a transgender man or
woman, without any additional evidence related to gender stereotype nonconformity. ROA.842 (RE.T4). However, in the Commissions view, evidence
of gender stereotyping is simply one means of proving sex discrimination in
transgender discrimination claims under Title VII. Macy, 2012 WL 1435995, at *8.
Moreover, the opinions on which the district court relied do not squarely illustrate
courts reluctan[ce] to apply Title VII to discrimination based on the plaintiffs
status as a transgender person.
First, the district court relied on two opinions, Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, 742
F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984), and Sommers v. Budget Marketing, Inc., 667 F.2d 748
(8th Cir. 1982), which pre-date Price Waterhouse. The Supreme Court has since
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rejected the two rationales these courts used to decline to extend protections to
transgender individualsa narrow definition of sex and a refusal to expand
protections beyond the protected groups originally considered by Congress. To
begin, as noted, Price Waterhouse makes clear that Title VII does not simply
prohibit discrimination based on biological sex, but also the entire spectrum of
disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes. 490 U.S. at
251 (citations omitted); see also Smith, 378 F.3d at 573 ([T]he approach in []
Sommers[] and Ulane has been eviscerated by Price Waterhouses holding that
Title VIIs reference to sex encompasses both the biological differences
between men and women, and gender discrimination, that is, discrimination based
on a failure to conform to stereotypical gender norms.). Moreover, in Oncale v.
Sundowner Offshore Oil Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998), in ruling that same-sex
harassment is actionable, the Supreme Court explicitly rejected the notion that
Title VII only proscribes types of discrimination specifically contemplated by
Congress. Id. at 79-80 (explaining that statutory prohibitions often go beyond the
principal evil [they were passed to combat] to cover reasonably comparable evils,
and it is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of
our legislators by which we are governed); see also Boh Bros., 731 F.3d at 454
(same).
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Second, the district court cites Schroer v. Billington, Schwenk v. Hartford,

and Etsitty v. Utah Transit Authority to support its position, but the courts reliance
on those opinions is misplaced. As described above, Schroer held that a
transgender plaintiff was entitled to judgment based on a Price Waterhouse-type
claim for sex stereotyping and based on the language of the statute itself; that is,
because discrimination predicated on an individuals transgender status is
discrimination because of sex. 577 F. Supp. 2d at 305-06. The district court
quoted the following language from Schroer:
While I agreed with the Sixth Circuit [in Smith v. Salem] that []
transsexuality is not a bar to a sex stereotyping claim, I took the position that
such a claim must actually arise from the employees appearance or conduct
and the employers stereotypical perceptions. In other words, a Price
Waterhouse claim could not be supported by facts showing that [an adverse
employment action] resulted solely from [the plaintiffs] disclosure of her
gender dysphoria.
ROA.843 (RE.T4) (quoting Schroer, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 304 (quoting Schroer v.
Billington, 525 F. Supp. 2d 58, 63 (D.D.C. 2007) (emphasis and third and fourth
alteration in original)). However, the district court neglected to explain that, in the
quoted passage, the Schroer court is describing the position it took in a prior
opinion. The Schroer court makes clear that it subsequently changed its position
based on the development of the factual record that is now before me. 577 F.
Supp. 2d at 304. Schroer goes on to conclude, Ultimately, I do not think it matters
for purposes of Title VII liability whether [the employer] withdrew its offer of
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employment because it perceived Schroer to be an insufficiently masculine man,

an insufficiently feminine woman, or an inherently gender-nonconforming
transsexual. Id. at 305. In summary, the district court failed to acknowledge that
the Schroer court revised its understanding of Title VII and determined that a
transgender plaintiff may state a claim based on the language of the statute itself.
Id. at 305-06.
Similarly, the district court quotes language from Schwenk without
acknowledging its full context, citing a passage that states, [w]hat matters, for the
purpose of this part of the Price Waterhouse analysis, is that in the mind of the
perpetrator the discrimination is related to the sex of the victim: here, for example,
the perpetrators actions stem from the fact that he believed that the victim was a
man who failed to act like one. ROA.842-43 (RE.T4) (quoting Schwenk, 204
F.3d at 1201-02). But, as explained previously, Schwenk held that a prisoner stated
a cognizable sex discrimination claim under the Gender Motivated Violence Act
by alleging that an assault was motivated, at least in part, by [her] gender, that is,
by her assumption of a feminine rather than a typically masculine appearance or
demeanor. 204 F.3d at 1202; see also id. (explaining that the same reasoning
applies under Title VII). Schwenk makes clear that discrimination based on a
plaintiffs assumption of a feminine rather than typically masculine appearance or
demeanor is equivalent to discrimination based on a belie[f] that [a plaintiff] was
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a man who failed to act like one. Therefore, Schwenk does not support the
district courts position that a transgender plaintiff must provide additional
evidence related to gender stereotype non-conformity, ROA.842 (RE.T4), to
establish a sex discrimination claim.
Moreover, Etsitty is weak support for the district courts position. While
Etsitty declined to adopt a per se rule that transgender discrimination is
discrimination because of sex, the Tenth Circuit acknowledged that other
courts had relied on Price Waterhouse to recognize a cause of action for []
transsexuals claiming protection under Title VII, although it did not reach that
question itself. 502 F.3d at 1223-24. Further, Etsitty relied on decisions rendered
before Price Waterhouse and Oncaleincluding Ulane and Sommerswhich, for
the reasons discussed above, see supra at 17-18, are no longer viable. See Etisitty,
502 F.3d at 1221.
Additionally, underpinning the Etsitty courts rejection of a broader per se
rule was its interpretation of Title VII as prohibiting discrimination against men or
women, but not against individuals who change their sex. See 502 F.3d at 1222
(emphasizing a traditional binary conception of sex and two starkly defined
categories of male and female). The courts reasoning is flawed, as the Schroer
decision highlights that discrimination against someone for changing genders is
itself evidence of sex discrimination. 577 F. Supp. 2d at 305-06. Schroer
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analogized to a religious conversion: an employer that fires an individual for

converting from Christianity to Judaism, and that harbors no bias against
Christians or Jews but only converts, has discriminated because of religion. Id. at
306. The court concluded that [n]o court would take seriously the notion that
converts are not covered by the statute. Discrimination because of religion
easily encompasses discrimination because of a change of religion. Id. (emphasis
in original). It follows that discrimination against transgender individualsthose
who have changed their gender expressionis literally discrimination because of
sex. Id. at 302.
The district court also maintained that courts have generally required
evidence of gendered statements or acts that target a plaintiffs conformance with
traditional conceptions of masculinity or femininity. ROA.841 (RE.T4). To
support its assertion, the district court relied on EEOC v. Boh Brothers and Nichols
v. Azteca Restaurant Enterprises, Inc., 256 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2001), which both
involved Title VII claims alleging male employees were harassed because they
failed to conform to the harassers gender stereotypes. See Boh Brothers, 731 F.3d
at 449; Nichols, 256 F.3d at 869. It is certainly accurate that both Boh Brothers and
Nichols involved evidence of gendered statements or acts that target[ed] [the]
[employees] conformance with traditional conceptions of masculinity. But in
those cases, such evidence was integral to demonstrating that harassment occurred
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because of sex. See Boh Bros., 731 F.3d at 457; Nichols, 256 F.3d at 874. It
does not follow from Boh Brothers and Nichols that a transgender individualwho
is defined as transgender precisely because of the perception that his or her
behavior transgresses gender stereotypes, Glenn, 663 F.3d at 1316must provide
such evidence. Again, evidence of gender stereotyping is simply one means of
proving sex discrimination in transgender and other sex discrimination claims.
Macy, 2012 WL 1435995, at *8.
III.
A jury could conclude that Sage discriminated against Eure because of

his sex.
The record evidence presents a genuine dispute of fact as to whether Sage
discriminated against Eure because of sex. A reasonable jury could infer that
Campanian correctly understood that Eure was transgender, given Campanians
disparagement of cross-genders in reference to Eure. ROA.495. Or, a reasonable
jury could inferalso based on Campanians stated animus towards crossgendersthat Campanian perceived Eure as non-conforming with his assigned
sex (female), and that Campanian expected or preferred that Eure look and act
female, rather than dressing and otherwise presenting as male. See ROA.309-10;
ROA.355; ROA.392; ROA.495; ROA.665 (RE.T5).
To begin, a jury could determine that Eure experienced an adverse
employment action. For example, as Brandon testified and Campanian
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acknowledged, Campanian entirely excluded Eure from the instructor schedule,

eliminating his work hours. ROA.249-50; ROA.414-15; ROA.512-13; ROA.672
(RE.T7). The district court also recognized that the record indicated that
Campanian reduced Eures work hours. ROA.850-52 (RE.T4). Eure was paid by
the hour, ROA.326, so the reduction in hours was an adverse employment action
that directly affected his compensation. See Thompson v. City of Waco, 764 F.3d
500, 503 (5th Cir. 2014) ([A]dverse employment actions consist of ultimate
employment decisions such as compensat[ion].); see also Hinson v. Clinch
Cnty., Ga. Bd. of Educ., 231 F.3d 821, 829 (5th Cir. 2000) (reduction in pay is
adverse) (citing Doe v. Dekalb Cnty. Sch. Dist., 145 F.3d 1441, 1448 (11th Cir.
1998)); Corley v. La. ex rel. Div. of Admin., 498 F. Appx 448, 450 (5th Cir. 2012)
(treating reduction in pay equal to a one-day suspension as an ultimate
employment decision). Eures removal from the schedule may also be
characterized as a loss of job responsibilities . . . [that is] so significant and
material that it rises to the level of an adverse employment action. Thompson, 764
F.3d at 504.5
Sage argued at summary judgment that Eures EEOC charge references only
terminationnot a reduction in hoursas an adverse employment action.
ROA.168. Eures charge states, Since on or about March 30, 2011, I was taken off
the schedule and have not been allowed to return to work. ROA.411. Eures
reduction-in-hours claim is readily inferred from that statement, and, at a
minimum, falls within the scope of the EEOC investigation which can
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Eure may rely on direct or circumstantial evidence to show that Campanian

discriminated against him by reducing his hours based on his gendernonconformity. Campanians statements maligning transgender individualsand
Eure in particularprovide direct evidence of discrimination because they were
(1) related to the plaintiffs protected characteristic; (2) proximate in time to the
challenged employment decision; (3) made by an individual with authority over the
challenged employment decision; and (4) related to the challenged employment
decision. Etienne v. Spanish Lake Truck & Casino Plaza, L.L.C., 778 F.3d 473,
476 (5th Cir. 2015). Here, Campanians admonishment to Brandon that we dont
hire cross-genders in this company is directly related to Eures protected
characteristic: his gender. ROA.495. A supposed ban on employing crossgenders prove[s], without inference or presumption, that [gender] was a basis in
employment decisions at Sage. Etienne, 778 F.3d at 476 (quoting Jones v.
Robinson Prop. Grp., L.P., 427 F.3d 987, 993 (5th Cir. 2005)). The record
indicates that Campanian expressed hostility towards Eure and his gender shortly
before reducing Eures hours. ROA.495; ROA.512-13. Campanian had authority
over the decision to reduce Eures hours; in fact, she created the schedule that
reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge. Young v. City of Houston, 906
F.2d 177, 179 (5th Cir. 1990); see id. (observing that the courts scope of inquiry
is not [] limited to the exact charge brought to the EEOC) (emphasis in original).
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omitted Eures hours. ROA.249-50; ROA.512-13. Finally, Campanians statements

are related to the reduction in Eures hours. Campanian expressed hostility to
employing transgender individuals, exclaiming, Who the hell hired that? and
telling Brandon she would deal with her seriously for hiring that. ROA.495;
ROA.671 (RE.T7). Campanians statements made at the time she reduced Eures
hours reflected this same hostility to employing transgender persons: Were just
not going to give [Eure] any hours. Just wont put [Eure] on the schedule.
ROA.513.
Alternatively, Eure may rely on circumstantial evidence under the burdenshifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04
(1973). Under McDonnell Douglas, Eure may create an initial presumption of
intentional discrimination by establishing a prima facie case. Alvarado v. Tex.
Rangers, 492 F.3d 605, 611 (5th Cir. 2007). On this record, Eure easily satisfies
the four prongs of the prima facie case. See Willis v. Cleco Corp., 749 F.3d 314,
320 (5th Cir. 2014). First, for the reasons explained above, see supra at 23, Eure is
a member of a protected group based on his gender. Willis, 749 F.3d at 320.
Second, Eure was qualified for the [instructor] positiona fact Sage does not
seriously contest. Id. Third, Eure suffered [an] adverse action: a reduction in
hours and pay. Id.Fourth, by reducing Eures hours, Sage treated [Eure] less
favorably than other similarly situated employees outside the protected group
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under nearly identical circumstances. Id. The other San Antonio school instructors
held the same position as Eure, and their hours were listed on the same schedule.
See, e.g., ROA.412-14.
Assuming Sage meets its burden of articulating a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory justification for reducing Eures hours, Eure may rebut Sages
justification in one of two ways. Alvarado, 492 F.3d at 611. First, Eure may show
that even if Sages explanation were true, discrimination also motivated Sage. Id.
Here, given Campanians insistence that Sage does not hire cross-genders, a jury
could determine that Eures gender (or non-conformance with gender stereotypes)
motivated Campanians decision to reduce his hours, regardless of any other
justification Sage provides. Second, Eure may establish that Sages reason is
pretext for discrimination. Id. For example, if Sage asserts that Campanian omitted
Eure from the schedule because Eure did not attend the alleged April 1 scheduling
meeting, Eure could call that justification into question by pointing out that
Campanian only scheduled the meeting the day before (when Eure was not
present), and emphasizing that a jury could doubt Campanians assumption that
Eure was not available to work the following week. At a minimum, Brandons and
Campanians divergent descriptions of how Campanian excluded Eure from the
schedule raise a genuine issue of material fact supporting Eures pretext argument.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the Commission respectfully urges this
Court to reverse the district courts grant of summary judgment.
Respectfully submitted,
P. DAVID LOPEZ
General Counsel
s/ Anne W. King_____
ANNE W. KING
Attorney
Washington, DC 20507
(202) 663-4699
anne.king@eeoc.gov
CAROLYN L. WHEELER
Acting Associate General Counsel
LORRAINE C. DAVIS
Assistant General Counsel
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on April 22, 2015, I electronically filed the foregoing
with the Clerk of the Court for the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit by using the CM/ECF system, which will transmit a Notice of Electronic
Filing to all participants in this case, who are all registered CM/ECF users.
s/ Anne W. King_____
ANNE W. KING
Attorney for the Equal Employment

(202) 663-4699
anne.king@eeoc.gov
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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
This brief complies with the type-volume limitations of Fed. R. App. P.
32(a)(7)(B) and Fed. R. App. P. 29(d), because this brief contains 6,282 words,
excluding the parts of the brief exempted by Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(B)(iii).
This brief complies with the typeface requirements of Fed. R. App. P.
32(a)(5) and the type style requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(6) because this
brief has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using Microsoft Word
2007 in 14-point Times New Roman font in the body and footnotes of the brief.
s/ Anne W. King___________
Dated: April 22, 2015
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Page: 37
ECF CERTIFICATE
Undersigned counsel certifies that required privacy redactions have been
made pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 25.2.13; the electronic submission is an exact copy of
the paper document pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 25.2.1; and the document has been
scanned for viruses with the most recent version of a commercial virus scanning
program and is free of viruses.
s/ Anne W. King___________
Dated: April 22, 2015
Case: 14-51311
Document: 00513023155
Page: 1
United States Court of Appeals

FIFTH CIRCUIT
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
LYLE W. CAYCE
CLERK
TEL. 504-310-7700
600 S. MAESTRI PLACE
NEW ORLEANS, LA 70130
April 28, 2015
Ms. Anne Warren King

U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
Office of General Counsel/Appellate Services
131 M Street, N.E.
No. 14-51311
Loretta Eure v. Sage Corporation

USDC No. 5:12-CV-1119
Dear Ms. King,

The following pertains to your Amicus Curiae brief
electronically filed on April 22, 2015.
You must submit the seven (7) paper copies of your brief required
by 5TH CIR. R. 31.1 within five (5) days of the date of this notice
pursuant to 5th Cir. ECF Filing Standard E.1.
Sincerely,
LYLE W. CAYCE, Clerk
By: _________________________
Nancy F. Dolly, Deputy Clerk
504-310-7683
cc:
Ms.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Demoya R. Gordon
John Thomas Hawkins
Glenn Deutsch Levy
Peter C. Renn
Joe Anthony Rivera
Kenneth Dale Upton Jr.
Larry D. Warren

14-51311 - EEOC Amicus Brief in Support of Plaintiff-Appellant

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Case: 14-51311

Date Filed: 04/22/2015

Case No. 14-51311

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT

Date Filed: 04/22/2015

SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT OF INTERESTED PARTIES

U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

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Hinson v. Clinch Cnty., Ga. Bd. of Educ.,

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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Date Filed: 04/22/2015

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Campanians visit, Brandon spoke to Campanian by phone on one occasion, and

Date Filed: 04/22/2015

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District Court Decision

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she (Brandon) understood the consequences for hiring a cross-gender. ROA.844

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Discrimination against transgender persons is cognizable as

individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of

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a per se rule that transgender discrimination always amounts to sex discrimination

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opposite gender, nonetheless is perceived by others to be in nonconformity with

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Plaintiffs asserting transgender discrimination need not provide specific

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Waterhouse, who, in sex-stereotypical terms, did not act like a woman.).

Date Filed: 04/22/2015

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Second, the district court cites Schroer v. Billington, Schwenk v. Hartford,

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employment because it perceived Schroer to be an insufficiently masculine man,

Date Filed: 04/22/2015

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analogized to a religious conversion: an employer that fires an individual for

Date Filed: 04/22/2015

A jury could conclude that Sage discriminated against Eure because of

Date Filed: 04/22/2015

acknowledged, Campanian entirely excluded Eure from the instructor schedule,

Date Filed: 04/22/2015

Eure may rely on direct or circumstantial evidence to show that Campanian

Date Filed: 04/22/2015

omitted Eures hours. ROA.249-50; ROA.512-13. Finally, Campanians statements

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U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT

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United States Court of Appeals

April 28, 2015