A European Invasion: The effect of Infopaq on the labour, skill and

judgement criterion of originality within UK copyright law

Alex Lyon

This essay will consider the development and continued relevance of the
labour, skill and judgement criteria of originality. After a historical overview
of originality, the approaches of other jurisdictions such as France and
Germany will be assessed. This will highlight that although the differences
between the jurisdictions are not as pronounced as they first appear; the UK
approach remains less sophisticated. We will then focus on the European
Union standard as developed in Infopaq and applied by the UK Court of
Appeal in Meltwater. It will be concluded that this European Union standard
signals the beginning of the end for the labour, skill and judgement criteria.
The criteria are not without merit, having reflected the UKs focus on
protecting works from misappropriation. But the European Court of Justice
(ECJ) is clearly moving towards a harmonised standard of originality and it is
widely believed this standard demands a higher threshold than the labour,
skill and judgement criteria can offer.

1) The Development of the labour, skill and knowledge

criterion
i) Early development through authorship
Originality within English Law is by no means a modern concept. Under the
Copyright Act 1842 there was no express requirement of originality. An early
formulation of the concept can be found in Lewis v. Fullarton: an intention to
take for the purpose of saving himself labour[1]. This was further developed
in Jarrod v Houlston where copyright could be conveyed if the individual
originates a work of his own by his own labour and industry bestowed upon
it[2]. These two cases are important as they represent the embryonic form
of originality- the UK saw labour as decisive and believed it contrary to
policy that one mans labour be misappropriated by another.

Walter v Lane[3] has been described as the case where the essential
elements of originality were expounded[4]. Although it was concerned
primarily with authorship (as originality was yet to enter the statute) it is still
regarded as undeniably good law[5]. The court dismissed the view that a
work must be an original composition of value and interest[6], stating this
was neither expressly or impliedly present in the statute. It did not matter
that the words came from someone else, provided the author displayed
labour, skill and capital in producing their work. If this was found the court
would not allow another to misappropriate it.[7]
Walter v Lane received a mixed reaction at the time- Strahan interoperated
it as a simple and natural construction on the words of the Copyright Act
1842[8], whilst Mofatt disagreed, believing the court to have come to a
startling conclusion[9]. However both were in agreement that the Copyright
Act 1842 was not fit for purpose.
ii) The Inception of Originality
The Copyright Act 1911 saw the inception of originality on statuary footinghowever no definition was given. The court addressed this in University of
London Press v London Tutorial[10]. Firstly the case clarified that originality
had nothing to do with original or inventive thought- this is consistent with
the principle established in Hollinrake v Truswell[11], that copyright is
concerned with expression. Further originality did not require work to be
expressed in a novel form, but that the work must not be copied from
another work - that it should originate from the author[12]. This is a very
low threshold which is further solidified by Peterson Js comment that what
is worth copying is prima facie worth protecting[13].
Football League Ltd v Littlewoods[14], amongst other cases, solidified the
labour, skill and judgement criterion. Claims that the implementation of
original into the statute required a higher standard than Walter v
Lane never came to fruition[15]. Ladbroke v William Hill is a more modern
example of how the law currently operates- this case related to table and
compilations as literary works. The case reiterated the requirement of

labour, skill and judgement and that originality required only that the work
originated from the author. It also displays that such a low threshold is
required to balance two competing policy objectives. Firstly it allows
individuals to protect the fruits of their labour whilst also ensuring
protection given... is in no sense a monopoly, it is open to a rival to produce
the same result if he chooses to evolve it by his own labours[16]. This case
also showed the court would consider the pre-expressive stage of the work.
Thus labour, skill and judgement in accumulating the information would be
considered. Therefore even though the arrangement of the work was not
enough to convey originality, its contents were. This is a logical extension of
a UK court looking to protect economic rights, but (as will be discussed later)
it is expressly at odds with the EU standard.

2) General Criticisms of the UK criterion

Although many more criticisms will come apparent when comparing the UKs
interpretation of originality with other jurisdictions, and that of the ECJ, it is
important to highlight some fundamental and persistent criticisms received
by the labour, skill and judgement doctrine.
i) The threshold is too low
Firstly, many argue the threshold is too low. According to Justice Laddie you
can have too much of a good thing and we have too much copyright. He
believes a major reason for this is the current interpretation of
originality[17]. The case law does seem guilty of this. For example in British
Northrop[18] drawings of bolts and screws were considered sufficient to
convey originality. This has led to industrial articles being given proxy
protection through the copyright placed on their drawings. Drassinower
believes this is because UK courts are primarily concerned with the injustice
of an individual reaping where another has sown, rather than protecting and
encouraging creative effort[19].
However cases such as Merchandising Corporation v Harpbond[20] and
Francis Day[21] display that if the labour (or the result) is trivial or

insignificant copyright will not be found. This is a significant de minus test,

without which any work could be considered original.
The historical case of Dick v Yates suggested originality should be something
which has grown up in his mind, the product of something which if it were
applied to the patent rights would be called invention[22]. This is a
significantly higher test and is not the law followed today. But Justice Laddie
questions whether if the court had its time again would it offer protection to
the trite, the commonplace and the valueless?, or choose a different
course[23]. In theory this is agreeable but the unfortunate strength of the
labour, skill and judgement criteria is that copyright is currently filling gaps
in equity- therefore without statutory reform elsewhere, a higher threshold
would leave those who deserve some measure of protection, gaining none.
Although, as we shall see, other jurisdictions seem able to make this
balance.
ii) Uncertainty
Another criticism is that the law remains uncertain. The phrase labour, skill
and judgement has been used fluidly by the courts. Indeed in Ladbroke v
William Hill the requirements were often substituted with lexis such as work,
capital and effort. As well as this and would often be replaced with or. It
could be argued that in substance this is not an issue, we know the court are
referring to sweat of brow works. But it does support Ricketsons argument
that the dividing between...original works and unoriginal...works, remains
an uncertain and shifting one[24].

Another source of uncertainty is the amount of labour, skill and judgement

required. According to G.A Cramp & Sons Ltd v F Smythson Ltd originality is
aquestion of fact and degree[25]. But this can be problematic, as displayed
by the case itself. The applicant requested copyright for the selection of
tables within a diary. They were refused at first instance, but the Court of
Appeal overturned this decision claiming the case was near the line, but the

work was original. The House of Lords disagreed with this judgement stating
there was no element of skill or originality in the order in which the tables
were arranged. This displays the minimal margins that can determine
whether originality is found and that more concrete guidance must be given
to ensure certainty in the law.

However this uncertainty is not denied by the courts: In Macmillan v

Cooper[26] Lord Atkinson stated that a precise term could not be given and
that each case will largely be determined upon its facts. Some have argued
that the inclusion of the pre-expressive effort could help remedy
uncertainty as it allows a greater appreciation of the degree of labour, skill
and judgement used by the author.[27]

3) Originality on the Continent

As we will see the UKs approach to originality differs in comparison with the
approach taken on the continent. The primary reason for this is that they
mirror different approaches to life and culture. This is reflected in the generic
differences between copyright and the continent equivalent of droit
dauteur. In order to assess whether the labour, skill and judgement
remains useful, the alternative approaches taken throughout Europe must be
assessed.

i) Copyright and droit dauteur

The UK has tended to protect copyright on the basis it has economic value.
This is logical- potential right holders are unlikely to invest their time in
creating work if they are unable to gain remuneration. Consequently the
UKs attitude to moral rights is somewhat restrictive when compared to other
jurisdictions- whom grant their authors more extensive protection of non-

economic rights[28]. This contrast with other jurisdictions is crucial, as it

explains why the UK uses the lower threshold of skill, labour and
judgement- sweat of brow works may well require economic investment
from which a return is warranted and thus should be protected. Meanwhile
jurisdictions that utilise droit dauteur are likely to demand the author
deserves protection through displaying intellectual creation.
ii) France
In theory the standard of originality on the continent is higher. For example
in the French case Cour de Cassation[29] it was held a work must show the
imprint of their authors personality to gain protection. This requirement has
the potential to remedy the broad nature of the British Law- it allows a low
threshold for creative works, whilst making it more difficult for functional
works. Therefore it is likely cases such as British Northcorp would be decided
differently under French Law. However this standard has been criticised as
arbitrary by Waisman whom stated: how is it possible to determine what
expressions reflect their authors personality and what expressions do
not?[30]
In response to this France has adapted its traditional approach. This is
displayed by the courts granting protection to compilations, such as
specialised TV directories[31]. However it has remained consistent that
labour on its own remains insufficient. Therefore tasks such as sorting data,
no matter how mundane, will not be protected[32]. In another case the
court advised the choices and intellectual operations required to create tend
to give the resulting work a certain degree of originality, even when dealing
with a technical type of work.[33] Thus as one academic put it the French
realised that what distinguishes one work from another are creative
choices.[34] Prior to this slight relaxation in French law it could have been
successfully argued that whilst the British originality criterion may be broad
its outcomes is more certain. However the creative choices doctrine is a
much more objectively determinable process than the previous test and
seems stronger than the UK approach.

iii) Germany
In Germany the Authors Rights Act 1965 Article 2 (2) states that for a work
to be protected; it must be of the authors personal intellectual creation.
This higher threshold protects copyrights purpose of encouraging and
protecting the result of intellectual creativity[35], whilst also protecting, in a
proportionate manner, those works that do not meet the higher threshold of
originality.
A good case for displaying the potential differences between Germany and
the UK is Sawkins v Hyperion[36]. Here the UK protected a derivative work
as Sawkins had displayed labour, skill and judgement in adding information
to produce playable editions of Lalandes music. This would be unlikely to
meet the German threshold. However Article 70 of the Authors Rights Act
grants a neighbouring right for works that represent the result of scientific
analysis and differ in a significant manner from previously known editions of
the works or texts, these can be protected for 25 years. It is also possible
that Sawkins could have gained protection under the Law Against Unfair
Competition, particularly section 4 (9) which concerns the exploitation of
anothers reputation or the misappropriation of anothers work.
In Hyperion v Sawkins it was held that others could still copy Lalande's
music, all that was restricted was the use of Sawkins work as a short cut to
doing this. There seems no reason why the German courts could not utilise
their statutes to come to a solution that was just as agreeable. Indeed it
could be argued the UK should consider this approach for more accurate and
relevant outcomes, rather than using copyright as a catch-all category.
iv) Are the approaches really that different?
It is argued that in reality the approaches are not as distinct as their labels
suggest. Waisman argued that it is widely accepted that a very small
amount of whatever the chosen standard requires is enough to consider that
a work is original; that is, a minimum of skill and judgment, a minimum of
creativity or a minimum of personality[37]. Thus as only a small amount is

needed, the distinction is blurred and most works will be granted protection
regardless of the standard used.
The strength of this argument can be seen in Sawkin v Hyperion Record- this
is a controversial case yet originality was granted by both the English and
the French courts[38]. The French court held that the intellectual and
personal contribution required was satisfied by the personal and arbitrary
artistic choices made by Sawkins[39]. Whilst the English claimed the work
had not been slavishly copied, but that Sawkins had exercised considerable
skill and judgement. It is important to note that the UK courts accepted that
double creation is a possibility- whilst the French court would not allow an
exact reconstruction of the work to be granted copyright. Therefore Waisman
perhaps goes too far in dismissing the labels as meaningless. Valles more
reserved opinion is more persuasive- he states that it would be inexact to
conclude the differences... have disappeared but the process of convergence
promoted by both sides should not be ignored[40]. Therefore it could be
argued there is little point in adopting the French doctrine as the outcome of
cases would remain the same.
v) Berne Convention
When comparing the international policies on originality, the Berne
Convention must be mentioned as it represents the internationally agreed
principles of copyright. Gervais believes that the UK standard is incompatible
with the Berne Convention. A reason for this is that Article 2(5) states
collections...which, by reason of the selection and arrangement of their
contents, constitute intellectual creations shall be protected[41]. Further a
WIPO expert committee stated that although Article 2 (1) does not explicitly
define originality it indicates that only those productions are considered
works which are intellectual creations[42]. Therefore the argument is that
originality requires intellectual creation by definition. As stated in The
General Report of the Berne Convention Revision conference: we are already
using a term which means we are talking about personal creation.[43]

However this interpretation may not be as persuasive as it first seems, as

Ricketson and Gingsperg claim Article 2 (5) does not indicate how
substantial the quantum of creativity should be[44]. Thus it is permissible
for Union counties to adopt differing interpretations of the minimum of
intellectual creation required[45]. Therefore the UK may be in conformity
with the Berne Convention- but the interpretation of other European
countries seems closer to the ideal.

4)The European Union Standard

The European Union standard has the potential to be determinative on

whether the labour, skill and judgement remains applicable. Its use has
already been restricted by the Database Directive and the Computer
Programs Directive. The Database Directive led to the UK expressly
amending the Copyright Design and Patents Act 1988 (CDPA) 3A (2)
meaning originality would only be granted to a database by reason of the
selection or arrangement of the contents of the database and the database
constitutes the authors own intellectual creation. InFootball Dataco[46] the
Court of Appeal produced a series of questions for the ECJ to help clarify
what this meant and how it differed from the UKs usual approach.

The first question was whether the intellectual effort and skill of creating
data should be excluded. The ECJ responded that only the structure of the
database and not its contents would be considered. Therefore the UK courts
could no longer assess the pre-expressive efforts of the author. Further, the
ECJ seemed to suggest that authors own intellectual creation represented a
higher standard of originality. This is because the court claimed labour and
skill was not enough to constitute originality in isolation but that the
arrangement of the data must amount to an original expression of the
creative freedom of the author. However it is up to the UK courts to

determine whether this has been done, therefore there is a measure of

discretion.[47]

That said, the court also confirmed that a national legislature is precluded
from granting copyright protection under conditions which vary from that of
Article 3 (1). This is significant: when writing extra judicially Justice Laddie
stated that this European standard is not just a raising of the threshold. It
imposes a requirement which is fundamentally different in kind. He added
that there is now a significant qualitative factor on the test...there must be
some subjective contribution, sweat of brow will not do.[48]

David Cran agreed, writing directly in response to the ECJs judgement he

stated what is clear is that the standard is high[49]. Thus in respect of
databases it would seem the labour, skill and judgement doctrine has been
subsumed. However it would be premature to state that this definitively
signals the end of the UK criterion. This is because the directive was dealing
with databases specifically. Further, as Minero points out, works which are
similar to databases are still protectable under Section 3 (1) (a)[50].

i)The Potential impact of Infopaq

The Infopaq v Danske Dagblades Forening[51], case could well be the

extension that signals the end of the labour, skill and judgement criteria.
The case concerned whether copyright could subsist in the eleven words
belonging to authors of newspaper articles, utilised by the defendants in
their data capture process. The ECJ held that it could. In doing so it stated
that a work needs to be original in the sense that it is the authors own
intellectual creation. It is through the choice, sequence and combination of

words that the author may express his creativity in an original manner and
achieve a result which is an intellectual creation of a literary work[52].

Vousden criticised this decision claiming the ECJ was making law rather than
interpreting it. He claimed that the court used a number of legal fictions to
support its judgement and that this would make the law more uncertain[53].
This seems agreeable, as Rosati points out, the court derived support from
the fact that intellectual creation subsisted in other directives (such as the
Software Directive and Database Directive)- however these directives were
harmonised to take account of the special features or the special technical
nature of the category of work.[54] Thus Vousdan may be correct in arguing
that this decision is not a logical application of any pre-existing law.

However others disagreed with this- Derclaye believed that the judgement
was generally beneficial both for authors and legal certainty. Further she
described it as dropping a bomb in the UK copyright landscape[55]. The
point about this higher level of criterion being beneficial for authors is
interesting. Both Derclaye and Vousdan believe cases such as Francis
Day could be decided differently under Infopaq. This is because the ECJ
clearly wants the national courts to consider qualitative aspects of the work,
rather than quantitative - therefore a minimum of two words could convey
originality if they demonstrated the authors own intellectual creation
through the choice, sequence and combination of words.

Derclaye stated the ECJ were implementing creativity as the criterion of

originality, meaning skill, labour and judgement had been subsumed and all
the cases that developed it, such as Ladbroke v William Hill, had been
overruled. However, it is important to note that this opinion was voiced
before any national court had followed Infopaq.

ii) Infopaq on the Continent

Many believed Infopaq followed the approach already adopted by the

continent[56], so it would be useful to consider how it has been received in
another jurisdiction. In Holland academics were aware of the change.
According to Visser in practise, [Infopaq] will make absolutely no
difference- however he did state that a court who wants to do it completely
right should adopt the formulation of the Infopaq test[57].

However some argue the Dutch court has not followed this advice. In the
case ofDMO Marketing BV the judge did mention the authors own
intellectual creation- however there was no real substance behind this. For
example the judge failed to mention which paragraphs of Infopaq informed
his decision[58]. Vousdan claimed any reference to Infopaq was simply
judicial vanity and it was clear only national precedent had been
considered. He believed if other jurisdictions took a similar approach there
would be no hope of harmonisation. Such scepticism from Europe may offer
hope to advocates of the labour, skill and judgement doctrine

iii) Impact in the UK: Meltwater

In Meltwater[59] the Court of Appeal (COA) had the opportunity to apply

Infopaq and did so; however the impact was not as profound as Derclaye
might have expected. The facts of Meltwater were similar
to Infopaq- Meltwater provided an online media monitoring service for
commercial customers. Each news item conveyed to a customer contained a

text extract of not more than 256 characters comprising the headline from
the article, the first few words after the headline and the context in which
the keyword was found. The question for the court was whether copyright
could subsist in these texts- a key factor being whether they could be
considered original under Infopaq and the consequent effect on previous
case law advocating the labour, skill and judgement docterine.

The relevant sections of Infopaq were stated by the judge. Firstly, Paragraph
48, this displays that originality will be found when an extract expresses the
authors own intellectual creation, which is for the national court to decide.
Secondly, paragraphs 38-39 were described as having particular
importance. According to these sections a part of the work is to be treated
no differently from the whole of the work- provided that they contain
elements which are the expression of the intellectual creation of the author
originality will be found. The judge concluded that copyright could subsist in
the headlines.

The court in Meltwater went on to state the test of quality has been restated but for present purposes not significantly altered by the Infopaq case.
From this we can infer that the court will still consider previous judgements
under the labour, skill and judgement criteria. Indeed in Meltwater there
was clear evidence that this criteria had been considered; it is not the
completed work as published but the process of creation and the
identification of the skill and labour that has gone into it which falls to be
assessed. It is difficult to assert previous case law has been overruled when
the judgement makes such as express reference to the principles developed
in Ladbroke v William Hill.

However the COAs view here is not without qualification or merit. After
stating the continued relevance of previous case law the judge recognised

many questions remain unanswered by the Court of Justice and the full
implications of the decision have not yet been worked out. If we couple this
with the courts comments that the EU standard must be followed and that
the authors own creation is the only real test, then it would seem the court
is leaving the door open to change if EU decisions demands it. However due
to the ambiguous nature of the standard set out in Infopaq it remains
consistent to apply previous case law.

Hoppner agrees with this position, he argues that although the UK courts
may be relying on an overly expansive interpretation of Infopaq, they are
not wrong to do so[60]. In support of this he cited similar approaches in
other jurisdictions, such as the Belgian decision of Coipresse SCRL V
Google[61]. Further, according to Hoppner, the European court does not
have jurisdiction to harmonise member states in this areatherefore Infopaq should only be seen as clarifying the meaning of
reproduction in the context of the InfoSoc directive- which is merely the
infringement of a work protected by national copyright. Therefore it is up to
the member state to decide what is protectable and own intellectual
creation should be seen as nothing more than a minimum threshold.

This view seems premature; Meltwater is the first time a UK court has had
the opportunity to apply Infopaq and is awaiting appeal to the Supreme
Court, therefore the effect of Infopaq should not be discounted just yet.
Indeed Rosati believes that, despite Meltwater, the impact of Infopaq will be
deep and certainly affect low-creativity and technical subject matter[62].
This would be consistent with the persuasive argument offered by Derclaye
above, indeed Hobson stated that the court went astray in their application
of Infopaq[63]. Thus it is possible that as the case law develops the authors
own intellectual creation will subsume the labour skill and judgement
criteria in the UK.

Hoppners argument of the court instilling a minimum standard is also

questionable. As discussed above it is widely agreed that the EU standard is
raising the threshold in comparison with the UK criteria- so surely applying it
as a minimum standard would render labour, skill and judgement
insufficient. However this does offer an interesting perspective on the
argument made in the previous paragraph that cases such as Francis
Day may be reversed: if the authors own intellectual creation is only a
minimum threshold then national courts could claim that parts of a
sentence may not convey originality, thereby protecting news aggregators
such as Meltwater.

The EU Standard is not without its critics. Stanganelli highlighted a potential

conflict with freedom of speech: restricting peoples access to the news is
surely contrary to public policy[64]. Bentley agrees, commenting that the
court in Meltwater failed to consider the difficult issues. They did not make
a qualitative judgement on the precise words used[65]. This is an interesting
point if the court do not make a qualitative judgement they are opening
everything to copyright protection, potentially creating a lower threshold
than labour, skill and judgement. It is clear the EU standard is in its infancy.
As the case law develops and more clarity is offered by both the ECJ and
national courts, the true impact of the EU standard will become clear. It
certainly seems the beginning of the end for the labour, skill and judgement
doctrine.

Conclusion

In conclusion the European Union standard, although still very much in its
infancy, signals the beginning of the end for the labour, skill and judgement
criteria. Although some argue the EU standard has made little difference in

practicality, it should be remembered that the decision inInfopaq was rather

sudden and as the Court of Appeal said themselves the full implications of
the decision have not yet been worked out. But it seems that the standard
will be higher and the effect on the UK law will be significant. This should be
welcomed: the previous criteria reflected a focus on the law of
misappropriation, rather than utilising copyright for its true purpose of
encouraging and protecting creative effort. This has led to too much
copyright and is stifling economic growth and innovation as a result[66]. A
harmonised standard will remedy this, but the ECJ must clarify the authors
own intellectual creation standard- so national courts can successfully apply
it. In the interim period the labour, skill and judgement criteria may have
some use.

Lewis.v.Fullarton 48 E.R. 1080;(1839) 2 Beav. 6

[1]
[2]

Jarrod v Houlston 69 E.R. 1294; (1857) 3 Kay & J.para.708

[3]

Walter v Lane [1900] A.C. 539

[4]

Sawkins v Hyperion Records Ltd [2005] EWCA.Civ.565.para.33

[5]

Express Newspapers v News (UK) Ltd [1990]1.W.L.R.1320.para.1326

[6]

Walter v Lane [1899] 2.Ch.749.(COA)

[7]

Ibid 554

Strahan, The Reporter and the Law of Copyright 26 Law Magazine and Review: A
Quarterly Review of Jurisprudence (5th series (1900/1901)) 35
[8]

[9]

Moffatt, What is an Author? (1900) 12 Juridical Review 217

[10]

University of London Press v University Tutorial Press [1916] 2 Ch. 601

[11]

Hollinrake v Truswell [1894]3.Ch.420.para.427

[12]

Supra.10.608

[13]

Ibid.610

[14]

Football League Ltd v.Littlewoods.[1959] Ch. 637

[15]

Cross J in Robertson v Lewis.[1976] R.P.C.169.para.175.

[16]

Ladbroke v William Hill [1964] 1.W.L.R.273.para.291

Justice Laddie, Copyright: over-strengh, over-regulated, overrated?E.I.P.R.1996,18(5),253-260

[17]

[18]

British Nothrop.v.Texteam.Blackburn [1974] RPC.57,68

Abraham Drassinower, Sweat of the Brow, Creativity, and Authorship: On Originality

in Canadian Copyright Law (2003-2004) 1 University of Ottawa Law & Technology
Journal 105
[19]

[20]

Merchandising Corportation v Harpbound [1983].FSR.32

[21]

Francis Day v Twentieth Century Fox.[1940] AC.112

[22]

Dick.v.Yates (1881)18.Ch.D.90

[23]

Supra.17

Ricketson, The Concept of Originality in Anglo-Australian Copyright Law (1991) 9

(2) Copyright Reporter
[24]

[25]

G.A Cramp.&.Sons.Ltd.v.F.Smythson.Ltd.[1944]A.C.329

[26]

Macmillan.v.Cooper.(1924).50.TLR.1.86

[27]

Supra.24

Adeney, The Moral Rights of Authors and Performers: An International and

Comparative Analysis (2006)
[28]

[29]

7/11/2006

[30]

Augistine Waisman, Revisiting Originality E.I.P.R. 2009, 31(7), 370-376

[31]

CA Parios 1ech May 22nd 1990: Legipresse

[32] Cass le civ.May 2,.1989:.JCP.G.1990,.11,.21392,.note A. Lucas;RIDA.1/1990,

at.309.("Coprosa" case)
[33]

CA Paris, 4e ch., Mar. 21, 1989: 142 RIDA 333, 338-39 ("Harrap's" case)

[34]

Daniel Gervais Feist Goes Global.49.J.Copyright Soc'y U.S.A. (2002).949

[35] Gervais, The compatibility of the skill and labour originality standard with the Berne Convention
and the TRIPs Agreement E.I.P.R. 2004, 26(2), 75-80
[36]

Supra 4

[37]

Waisman Revisiting Originality.E.I.P.R.2009,31(7),370-376

Ramon Casas Valles, The Requirement of Originality, Chapter 5, Research

Handbook on the Future of EU Copyright, Derclaye, Edward Elgar Publishing 2009
[38]

[39]

TGI Nanterre, 19 January 2005

[40]

Supra.38

[41]Supra.35
[42] Draft.Model.provisions.for.Legislation.in.the.Field.of.Copyright.CE/MPC/I/2-II of Oct.20,1988,10.
[43] Reproduced in 1886-1986: Berne Convention Centenary (1986) at 179.

Ricketson and Ginsberg, International Copyright and Neighbouring

Rights, 2nd Edition, OUP, 2006 405
[44]

[45]

Ibid

[46] Football Dataco Ltd and others v Stan James (Abingdon).Ltd.[2010].EWHC.841

[47] Football Dataco Ltd and others v Stan James (Abingdon).Ltd,.ECJ.C-604/10

Laddie and Prescott and Vitoria, The Modern Law on

Copyright,.3rd.Edition, Butterworths Law.para.30.27
[48]

Cran.Football.Dataco:.Fixture.lists.not.protected.by.Database.copyright Ent.L.R.2
012.23(5), 149-151
[49]

Minero,Did.the.Database.Directive.actually.harmonize.the.Database.Copyright?E.I.
P.R. 2012, 34(10),728-732
[50]

[51]Infopaq
[52]

Ibid.45

v Danske Dagblades Forening ECJ.C-5/08

Vousden,Infopaq.and.the.Europeanisation.of.Copyright.Law.W.I.P.O.J..2010,1(2),1
97-210
[53]

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