EDWARD T. MARCELO Et al vs.

Sandiganbayan and PCGG

Gr. No. 156605
FACTS:
On February 16, 1987, the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), pursuant to
Executive Order (EO) No. 1, series of 1986, issued a writ of sequestration against Marcelo Fiberglass
Corporation (MFC), represented by its President, herein petitioner Edward T. Marcelo.
On July 27, 1987, the PCGG,

on behalf of the Republic, filed

a Complaint1with the

Sandiganbayan against Marcelo, Fabian Ver (Ver), now deceased, and Ferdinand and Imelda
Marcos for recovery of ill-gotten or unexplained wealth which they allegedly acquired in unlawful
concert with one another.
On August 15, 1997, the petitioners filed three separate Motion for Summary Judgment.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying the motion for summary judgment of Marcelo, MFC and
the other petitioner corporations.
HELD: In all then, we hold that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in denying
the petitioners separate motions for a summary judgment. To us, the petitioners were entitled to a
summary judgment owing to the interplay of the following premises:
1. The Republics complaint, as couched and presented to the Sandiganbayan
does not contain concise and direct statement of the ultimate facts on which it relies
for its claim against petitioners Marcelo and MFC. Worse still, it does not specify the act
or omission by which the other petitioners wronged the Republic. In net effect, the
complaint no less does not present genuine ill-gotten wealth issue; and
2. In view of the Republics failure to respond to MFCs interrogatories, the
Republic veritably conceded the regularity of the PN-MFC contract, that no
wrongdoing was committed vis--vis the conclusion of that contract and that the
separate personality of MFC was not used for unlawful means to activate the piercing
of corporate veil principle. The questions in the interrogatories were simple and direct
and the answers thereto would have constituted the fact/s sought to be established.
We do not see any reason why the Republic could not have answered them. They
refer to relevant matters that could clarify the important facts left out by, to borrow
from Republic v. Sandiganbayan, the roaming generalities in the complaint.
[G.R. No. 120010. October 3, 2002]
SOLIDBANK CORPORATION (a.k.a. The Consolidated Bank & Trust Corp.), petitioner, vs. HON. COURT
OF APPEALS, CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, and FAR EAST BANK & TRUST COMPANY, respondents.
FACTS: The Pacific Banking Corporation PBC was placed under receivership on 5 July 1985. A
Liquidator was designated for the liquidation process. The Central Bank invited several banks to buy
the assets and the franchise of the various offices of PBC and to assume its liabilities. The Far East
Bank and Trust Company (herafter, FEBTC) was one of the bidders, and its bid was found to be the
most advantageous. PBC and Central Bank on the one hand and FEBTC on the other,.

On 27 May 1987, the Solidbank Corporation through its Senior Vice-President/Comptroller Ms.
Corazon R. Dayao, filed its claims with the Liquidator of PBC, Mr. Renan V. Santos,
On 04 May 1989, Solidbank filed with the liquidation court a Motion for Summary Judgment in
connection with the claims aforementioned, citing the following grounds: there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact; there is no substantial controversy in the case; and, it is entitled to summary
judgment as a matter of law.
RTC granted the Motion and CA dismissed the motion.
ISSUE: whether or not summary judgment is proper in the case at bar.
HELD: We affirm the Court of Appeals and find the herein petition devoid of merit.
Summary judgment is a procedural device resorted to in order to avoid long drawn out litigations
and useless delays. When the pleadings on file show that there are no genuine issues of fact to be
tried, the Rules of Court allows a party to obtain immediate relief by way of summary judgment. That
is, when the facts are not in dispute, the court is allowed to decide the case summarily by applying
the law to the material facts.
Conversely, where the pleadings tender a genuine issue, summary judgment is not proper. A
genuine issue is such issue of fact which require the presentation of evidence as distinguished from
a sham, fictitious, contrived or false claim.Rule 34, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides two (2)
requisites for summary judgment to be proper: (1) there must be no genuine issue as to any material
fact, except for the amount of damages; and (2) the party presenting the motion for summary
judgment must be entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
In the case at bar, it cannot be said that the foregoing requisites are present. Rule 34 does not vest in
the trial court jurisdiction to summarily try the issues on depositions and affidavits when the requisites
abovementioned are not present. Upon a motion for summary judgment, the sole function of the
court is to determine whether or not there is an issue of fact to be tried. Any doubt as to the
existence of an issue of fact must be resolved against the movant. Courts must be critical of the
papers presented by the moving party and not of the papers in opposition thereto. The party who
moves for summary judgment has the burden of demonstrating clearly the absence of any genuine
issue of fact, or that the issue posed in the complaint is patently unsubstantial so as not to constitute a
genuine issue for trial.
ROLANDO C. RIVERA, Petitioner,
G.R. No. 163269
vs.
SOLIDBANK CORPORATION, Respondent.

April 19, 2006

FACTS: Petitioner had been working for Solidbank Corporation since July 1, 1977.
Deciding to devote his time and attention to his poultry business in Cavite, Rivera applied for
retirement under the Special Retirement Program (SRP).
Subsequently, Solidbank required Rivera to sign an undated Release, Waiver and Quitclaim, which
was notarized on March 1, 1995.Rivera acknowledged receipt of the net proceeds of his separation
and retirement benefits and promised that "[he] would not, at any time, in any manner whatsoever,
directly or indirectly engage in any unlawful activity prejudicial to the interest of Solidbank and will
not disclose any information concerning the business of Solidbank, its manner or operation, its plans,
processes, or data of any kind."
Aside from acknowledging that he had no cause of action against Solidbank or its affiliate
companies, Rivera agreed that the bank may bring any action to seek an award for damages
resulting from his breach of the Release, Waiver and Quitclaim, and that such award would include
the return of whatever sums paid to him by virtue of his retirement under the SRP.
On May 1, 1995, the Equitable Banking Corporation (Equitable) employed Rivera .Upon discovering
this, Solidbank wrote a letter dated May 18, 1995, informing Rivera that he had violated the
Undertaking. She likewise demanded the return of all the monetary benefits he received in

consideration of the SRP. On August 15, 1995, Solidbank filed a Verified Motion for Summary
Judgment, alleging therein that Rivera raised no genuine issue as to any material fact in his Answer
except as to the amount of damages.
RTC rendered in favor of Solidbank and CA affirmed the decision of the RTC
ISSUE: whether or not the parties raised a genuine issue in their pleadings, affidavits, and documents,
that is, whether the employment ban incorporated in the Undertaking which petitioner executed
upon his retirement is unreasonable, oppressive, hence, contrary to public policy;
HELD: The petition is meritorious.
See Sections 1 and 3, Rule 34 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure :
And For a summary judgment to be proper, the movant must establish two requisites: (a) there must
be no genuine issue as to any material fact, except for the amount of damages; and (b) the party
presenting the motion for summary judgment must be entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.Where, on the basis of the pleadings of a moving party, including documents appended thereto,
no genuine issue as to a material fact exists, the burden to produce a genuine issue shifts to the
opposing party. If the opposing party fails, the moving party is entitled to a summary judgment.
We agree with petitioners contention that the issue as to whether the post-retirement competitive
employment ban incorporated in the Undertaking is against public policy is a genuine issue of fact,
requiring the parties to present evidence to support their respective claims.
The rulings of the trial court and the appellate court are incorrect.
There is no factual basis for the trial courts ruling, for the simple reason that it rendered summary
judgment and thereby foreclosed the presentation of evidence by the parties to prove whether the
restrictive covenant is reasonable or not. Moreover, on the face of the Undertaking, the postretirement competitive employment ban is unreasonable because it has no geographical limits;
respondent is barred from accepting any kind of employment in any competitive bank within the
proscribed period. Although the period of one year may appear reasonable, the matter of whether
the restriction is reasonable or unreasonable cannot be ascertained with finality solely from the terms
and conditions of the Undertaking, or even in tandem with the Release, Waiver and Quitclaim.
DOMINGO
NEYPES,
ET
AL.
G.R. No. 141524 (September 14, 2005)

vs.

COURT

OF

APPEALS,

ET

AL.

FACTS:
Petitioners filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of land and/or reconveyance and/or
reversion with preliminary injunction before the RTC against the private respondents. Later, in an
order, the trial court dismissed petitioners complaint on the ground that the action had already
prescribed. Petitioners allegedly received a copy of the order of dismissal on March 3, 1998 and, on
the 15th day thereafter or on March 18, 1998, filed a motion for reconsideration. On July 1, 1998, the
trial court issued another order dismissing the motion for reconsideration which petitioners received
on July 22, 1998. Five days later, on July 27, 1998, petitioners filed a notice of appeal and paid the
appeal fees on August 3, 1998.
On August 4, 1998, the court a quo denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was filed eight days
late. This was received by petitioners on July 31, 1998. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration
but this too was denied in an order dated September 3, 1998. Via a petition for certiorari and
mandamus under Rule 65, petitioners assailed the dismissal of the notice of appeal before the CA. In
the appellate court, petitioners claimed that they had seasonably filed their notice of appeal. They
argued that the 15-day reglementary period to appeal started to run only on July 22, 1998 since this
was the day they received the final order of the trial court denying their motion for reconsideration.
When they filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998, only five days had elapsed and they were
well within the reglementary period for appeal. On September 16, 1999, the CA dismissed the
petition. It ruled that the 15-day period to appeal should have been reckoned from March 3, 1998 or
the day they received the February 12, 1998 order dismissing their complaint. According to the
appellate court, the order was the final order appealable under the Rules.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not receipt of a final order triggers the start of the 15-day reglmentary period to
appeal, the February 12, 1998 order dismissing the complaint or the July 1, 1998 order dismissing the
Motion for Reconsideration.
(2) Whether or not petitioners file their notice of appeal on time.
HELD:
(1) The July 1, 1998 order dismissing the motion for reconsideration should be deemed as the final
order. In the case of Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, Inc., the trial court declared petitioner non-suited
and accordingly dismissed his complaint. Upon receipt of the order of dismissal, he filed an omnibus
motion to set it aside. When the omnibus motion was filed, 12 days of the 15-day period to appeal
the order had lapsed. He later on received another order, this time dismissing his omnibus motion. He
then filed his notice of appeal. But this was likewise dismissed for having been filed out of time. The
court a quo ruled that petitioner should have appealed within 15 days after the dismissal of his
complaint since this was the final order that was appealable under the Rules. The SC reversed the
trial court and declared that it was the denial of the motion for reconsideration of an order of
dismissal of a complaint which constituted the final order as it was what ended the issues raised
there. This pronouncement was reiterated in the more recent case of Apuyan v. Haldeman et al.
where the SC again considered the order denying petitioners motion for reconsideration as the final
order which finally disposed of the issues involved in the case. Based on the aforementioned cases,
the SC sustained petitioners view that the order dated July 1, 1998 denying their motion for
reconsideration was the final order contemplated in the Rules.
(2) YES. To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair
opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days
within which to file the notice of appeal in the RTC, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a
motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration. Henceforth, this fresh period rule shall also
apply to Rule 40, Rule 42, Rule 43 and Rule 45. The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal
period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for
reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution.
The SC thus held that petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal within the fresh period of 15
days, counted from July 22, 1998 (the date of receipt of notice denying their motion for
reconsideration). This pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules which
states that the appeal shall be taken within 15 days from notice of judgment or final order appealed
from. The use of the disjunctive word or signifies disassociation and independence of one thing
from another. It should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies. Hence, the
use of or in the above provision supposes that the notice of appeal may be filed within 15 days
from the notice of judgment or within 15 days from notice of the final order, which we already
determined to refer to the July 1, 1998 order denying the motion for a new trial or reconsideration.
Neither does this new rule run counter to the spirit of Section 39 of BP 129 which shortened the appeal
period from 30 days to 15 days to hasten the disposition of cases. The original period of appeal (in this
case March 3-18, 1998) remains and the requirement for strict compliance still applies. The fresh
period of 15 days becomes significant only when a party opts to file a motion for new trial or motion
for reconsideration. In this manner, the trial court which rendered the assailed decision is given
another opportunity to review the case and, in the process, minimize and/or rectify any error of
judgment. While we aim to resolve cases with dispatch and to have judgments of courts become
final at some definite time, we likewise aspire to deliver justice fairly.
To recapitulate, a party litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt of the
RTCs decision or file it within 15 days from receipt of the order (the final order) denying his motion
for new trial or motion for reconsideration. Obviously, the new 15-day period may be availed of only if
either motion is filed; otherwise, the decision becomes final and executory after the lapse of the
original appeal period provided in Rule 41, Section 3. Petitioners here filed their notice of appeal on
July 27, 1998 or five days from receipt of the order denying their motion for reconsideration on July 22,
1998. Hence, the notice of appeal was well within the fresh appeal period of 15 days, as already
discussed.

NOTE:
The FRESH PERIOD RULE do not apply to Rule 64 (Review of Judgments and Final Orders or
Resolutions of the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit) because Rule 64 is derived
from the Constitution. It is likewise doubtful whether it will apply to criminal cases.
G.R. Nos. 141810 & 141812 February 2, 2007
VICENTE DELOS SANTOS et al
vs.
FRED ELIZALDE et al
FACTS:
On December 15, 1986, petitioners filed a Complaint for Quieting of Title, Damages and Attorneys Fees before
the Kalibo, Aklan RTC, involving four (4) adjoining lots for a total land area of 14,771 sqm, located in Boracay
Island, Malay, Aklan. The Trial Court declared intervenors Jesus delos Santos and Rosita delos Santos-Flores as
lawful owners of two-thirds (2/3) of the disputed land, and Fred and Joan Elizalde as owners of the remaining
one-third (1/3) of the land. Thus, petitioners and respondent Fred Elizalde filed their separate Notices of Appeal
dated June 6, 1996 and May 16, 1996, respectively. The cases were docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 48475 for
respondent Elizalde and CA-G.R. CV No. 54136 for petitioners. Subsequently, the CA issued the June 2, 1998
Notice to File Brief, requiring petitioners and respondent Elizalde to file their briefs within forty-five (45) days from
receipt of said notice.
On July 27, 1998, petitioners filed by registered mail a July 27, 1998 Motion for Extension of Time to File Brief for
Plaintiffs-Appellants. In their motion, petitioners admitted having received a copy of the Notice to File Brief on
June 15, 1998; thus, they had until July 30, 1998 to file their brief, and prayed for an extension of forty-five (45)
days. On September 10, 1998, petitioners filed another motion for extension, seeking another forty five (45)-day
extension, within which to file their brief. On October 27, 1998, petitioners filed an Ex-Parte Motion for Final
Extension of Period to File Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants, seeking an extension of thirty (30) days within which to file
their brief. On November 27, 1998, petitioners filed another motion for extension, asking for another thirty (30)day extension. And yet again, on December 28, 1998, petitioners filed another motion for extension, asking for
another thirty (30)-day extension to file their brief, such that the period sought to file appellants brief would be
until January 27, 1999. In sum, petitioners had a total extension of one hundred eighty (180) days from July 27,
1998, when they filed a motion for extension before the CA for the first time.
In the meantime, respondents Fred Elizalde, Jesus delos Santos, and Rosita delos Santos-Flores filed an October
6, 1998 Joint Manifestation and Motion, whereby respondent Elizalde abandoned his appeal by virtue of an
amicable settlement between the parties through the May 27, 1997 Agreement. In addition, Elizalde moved
that his appeal be considered as withdrawn and that he be excused from filing an appellants
brief.Respondents delos Santos opposed the foregoing motions for extension and moved for the dismissal of the
appeal for petitioners failure to file the required appellants brief.
However, on April 8, 1999, petitioners, through their former counsel Atty. Napoleon M. Victoriano, filed an ExParte Motion to Withdraw Appeal. Petitioners would later on claim that they did not authorize Atty. Victoriano
to withdraw their appeal.
On May 11, 1999, the CA issued the assailed Decision dismissing CA-G.R. CV No. 54136 and SP No. 48475 and
considering them withdrawn. It justified its Decision in this wise: "For failure to file their respective appellants
briefs, and in accordance with the prayer in the Joint Manifestation and Motion, and in the Ex-Parte Motion
to Withdraw Appeal, the appeal should be dismissed, and considered as withdrawn."
ISSUE: Whether or not CA erred in dismissing the appeal, considering it withdrawn as prayed for by counsel,
Atty. Victoriano and for not considering the fact that said counsel was clearly at fault and/or grossly negligent
in the performance of his duties to his clients.
RULING:
Petitioners attribute the dismissal of their appeal and their failure to file a motion for reconsideration
within the reglementary period to their former counsels negligence, Atty. Victoriano. Thus, petitioners seek the
liberal application of the rules, citing Ginete v. Court of Appeals, wherein the counsel of record did not file an
appellants brief within the prescribed period and continued with the case for fear of reprisal from respondents
who were judges. In said case, the SC ruled that the negligence of the clients counsel does not bind them. The
departure from the rule was explained, thus:
The lawyers negligence without any participatory negligence on the part of petitioners is a sufficient reason to
set aside the resolutions of the Court of Appeals. Aside from matters of life, liberty, honor or property which
would warrant the suspension of the rules of the most mandatory character and an examination and review by

the appellate court of the lower courts findings of fact, the other elements that should be considered are the
following: (1) the existence of special or compelling circumstances, (2) the merits of the case, (3) a cause not
entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (4) a lack of
any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, (5) the other party will not be unjustly
prejudiced thereby.However, the Ginete case is not a precedent to the case at bar because in said case, the
party had no participatory negligence, while in the case at bar, petitioners were negligent in not monitoring
the developments in their case. Petitioners acts are considered inexcusable negligence in line with the SCs
ruling in Bernardo v. Court of Appeals (Special Sixth Division), where they explicated the vital participation of
the parties in the effective handling of the case by their lawyers, thus:
Worth mentioning is the fact that petitioner was likewise not entirely blameless in his alleged deprivation of his
day in court. "Litigants, represented by counsel, should not expect that all they need to do is sit back, relax and
await the outcome of their case. They should give the necessary assistance to their counsel for what is at stake
is their interest in the case."
Concurrently, petitioners did not even know that Atty. Victoriano failed to file an appellants brief on their
behalf during the more than one hundred eighty (180)-day extension that he sought from the CA, aside from
their failure to learn of the Decision of the appellate court. Ordinary prudence would dictate that petitioners
must give utmost importance to the case considering that it involves their residences, presumably their most
valued material possession, and considering further that they had already lost at the trial court. Petitioners
failure to apprise themselves of the status of the case from the time that Atty. Victoriano received a copy of the
notice to file brief on June 15, 1998 up to June 2, 1999, when petitioners allegedly obtained a copy of the
assailed Decision from the CA, is unjustified. Petitioners cannot be shielded from the repercussions of their
counsels and their own negligence. Petitioners themselves are as much to blame in losing their appeal.
Petition denied.

[G.R. No. 143794. July 13, 2004]

VIKING INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and JOSE L. LUISON, JR.,
respondents.

FACTS:In 1993, petitioner extended to respondent Jose L. Luison, Jr. a loan amounting to P2,000,000.00
secured by a promissory note and a real estate mortgage. Two years thereafter, petitioner demanded from
respondent the payment of P19,102,916.39, purportedly representing the principal amount of the loan, plus
interest and penalties. Respondent disputed the accuracy of the amount. Thus, petitioner threatened to
foreclose the real estate mortgage, prompting respondent to file a petition for prohibition and declaratory relief
with the RTC.Petitioner refused to answer the petition because it was erroneously impleaded as Viking
Trading Corporation, instead of Viking Industrial Corporation. Consequently, the court, upon motion of
respondent, declared petitioner in default and allowed respondent to present his evidence ex parte.
ISSUE: W/N the motion for new trial be granted on the ground of Honest Mistake.
HELD:At any rate, even if the motion for new trial was filed on time, still, the same should not have been
granted by the RTC. Petitioner claimed that it committed an honest mistake in not filing an answer to
respondents petition for prohibition and declaratory relief because of its belief that the RTC did not acquire
jurisdiction over it.
We are not persuaded.Petitioners honest mistake hardly qualifies as a ground for a new trial. Section 1 of
Rule 37 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides:
SECTION 1, Grounds of and period for filing a motion for new trial or reconsideration. -- Within the period
for taking an appeal, the aggrieved party may move the trial court to set aside the judgment or final order and
grant a new trial for one or more of the following causes materially affecting the substantial rights of said party:
(a) Fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence which ordinary prudence could not have guarded
against and by reason of which such aggrieved party has probably been impaired in his rights; or
Definitely, petitioners reliance on honest mistake is misplaced. The mistake referred to above is one which
ordinary prudence could not have guarded against. Here, the mistake petitioner committed is a mistake of law.
Its lawyer believed that he should not file an answer because his client is erroneously impleaded. Had
petitioners counsel reviewed more closely the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, particularly Section
4, Rule 10 and Section 1, Rule 16, he would not have committed a mistake which, unfortunately, binds his
client