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1) In what court was the case heard at first instance?

(1 mark)
The Crown Court at Middlesex Guildhall
2) Who was the judge at first instance? (1 mark)
Judge Martineau
3) What did the court of first instance decide? (3 marks)
The court decided that Hilda Gondwe Da Silva was guilty on counts 14 and 15
of assisting another person to retain the benefit of criminal conduct knowing or
suspecting that that other person was or had been engaged in criminal
conduct.
She was found not guilty on counts 1 to 10, which involved her assisting her
husband.
4) In the Court of Appeal who was the appellant, and who was the
respondent? (2 marks)
The appellant was Hilda Gondwe Da Silva and the respondent was Regina
(the crown.)
5) What were the grounds of appeal? (4 marks)
The grounds of appeal were that the judge had incorrectly direct the jury on
the elements of the offences on which she was corrected because he had
included an unfair definition of the word suspicion. He had used the
Chambers Dictionary, which included the idea of inkling. The judge had then
added the notion of fleeting thought to the idea of inkling.
6) What did the Court of Appeal decide? (4 marks)
The court decided that through no fault of a Judge Martineau there had been
a technical misdirection, as the idea of fleeting thought could confuse the
jury. The court decided that this misdirection did not affect the safety of the
conviction therefore the appeal was dismissed.
7) Which judges heard the case in the Court of Appeal? (1 mark)
Longmore LJ
Gloster J
Judge Diehl QC
8) On what date did the Court of Appeal give its judgment? (1 mark)
On 11th July 2006
9) Who were the counsel and solicitors in the Court of Appeal? (2 marks)
The Counsel for the defendant was Rossano Cifonelli. The Counsel for the
crown was Richard Milne. The solicitors were the Crown Prosecution Service.

10) What offences did counts 14 and 15 of the charges against the
defendant relate to? (4 marks)
These counts related to the defendant assisting her husband to retain the
benefit of criminal conduct knowing or suspecting that he was or had been
engaged in criminal conduct contrary to section 93 A (1 )(a) of the Criminal
Justice Act 1988
11) Were these offences summary offences or indictable offences? (1
mark)
Indictable offences
12) How did the trial judge define suspicion (3 marks)

The Judge used the Chambers Dictionary definition which states it is an act
of suspecting; the imagining of something without evidence or on slender
evidence; inkling; mistrust. He then added the notion of a fleeting thought to
the idea of inkling.
13)
a) How did the counsel for the Appellant wish to extend the ground on
which he was given leave to appeal? (2 marks)
The counsel argued that the word reasonably should be read before the word
suspecting in the statutory wording or read the statute to say suspicion on
reasonable grounds. He argued that parliament would not have meant
someone to be guilty of an offence if they were suspicious, but their
suspicions had not reasonable grounds.
b) Did the Court accept the counsels argument? (1 mark)
No, the court stated that even if it wanted to it could not read the word
reasonable into the statute.
c) Why did the court refer to section 93C of Criminal Justice Act 1988? (2
marks)
The court referred to this to explain why the word reasonable could not be
inserted into the Criminal Justice Act 1988, as where parliament wishes to use
the term reasonable in a statute it can and has done.
d) What method of statutory interpretation did the Court of Appeal use
with regard to the counsels argument? (2 marks)
The court used the literal rule to argue that parliament wrote what it intended
to, as in other provisions of the Act, it included the word reasonable, thus what
is written is what parliament intended.

e) What case authority did the Court of Appeal use to give support to its
conclusion? (1 mark)
R v Saik [2007] 1 AC 18.
f) Did the Court of Appeal agree with the counsel for the Appellant that
failing to imply a requirement for reasonable grounds for suspicion
would lead to inappropriate convictions? Give reasons for your answer
(2 marks)
No the court did not agree. This is because they thought it was unlikely that
inappropriate convictions would happen because if a defendant has no
reasonable grounds to suspect someone was involved in criminal activity, it is
unlikely that there would be a prosecution and if there was it is unlikely that a
jury would find someone guilty of having suspicions where there are no
reasonable grounds for them.
14) What definitions of the word suspect used in a criminal context did
the court draw upon? (2 marks)
The court drew upon the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 that uses the word
suspects and the words reasonable grounds for suspecting in its provisions.
15) Why was the authority of R v Gillard (1988) 87 Cr App R 189 cited? (2
marks)
The case is cited to show that judges can assist the jury with the definition of
an ordinary English word, but that in doing so they must ensure they are
correct.

16) Which court heard the case of Hussein v Chang Fook Kam [1970] AC
942? (1 mark)
The Privy Council
17) Apart from case law and statutory authority, what other secondary
sources of law were referred to by the Court of Appeal, and why? (3
marks)
The court referred to Mitchell, Taylor & Talbot on Confiscation and the
Proceeds of Crime which suggests looking at the dictionary definition of
suspicion in relation to the Drug Trafficking Act 1994. They also considered
Chambers Dictionary. It was referred to to show that the initial judge could not
be criticized for referring to the dictionary, as this is what a leading textbook
suggests.
18) Which of the following facts were material to this case? (5 marks)
b) Mrs Da Silvas arguments as to why she was unaware of her
husbands crimes were unconvincing this was material.
c) The three ghost employees of the coffee bar had worked for AMT in
the past this was material.
d) Mrs Da Silva had facilitated the payment of the proceeds of Mr Da
Silvas crimes into bank accounts she controlled this was material.
19) Explain whether each of the following statements is part of the ratio
decidendi of Regina v Da Silva [2007] 1 WLR 303. If you think a
statement is part of the ratio decidendi, explain why. If you think a
statement is not part of the ratio decidendi, explain why. (15 marks)
a) The court cannot imply the word reasonably before the word
suspecting in the wording of section 93A(1)(a) of the Criminal Justice
Act 1988 and neither can it imply the words on reasonable grounds
after the word suspecting.
This is part of the ratio decidendi as it is part of the judgement that relates to
the case, it is part of the reason for the decision. If you could read reasonable
into the statute, then the decision about the definition of suspicion and the
outcome of the appeal may have been different.

d) The Crown had a good prima facie case, partly because Mrs Da Silva
remained silent when interviewed about her joint participation in her
husbands crimes.
This is part of the ratio decidendi as it is part of the reason for the decision. It
relates to the part of the decision that the conviction was safe and why the
appeal was dismissed. If the conviction was not safe then the decision of the
court may have been different.
e) To convict a person under section 93A(1)(a) of the Criminal Justice
Act 1988 for facilitating the retention or control of the proceeds of
criminal conduct by another (A), suspecting that A is or has been
engaged in criminal conduct requires that the defendant thought that
there was a possibility, which was more than just fanciful, that A had
been engaged in or had benefited from criminal conduct.
This is part of the ratio decidendi as it relates to the decision of the judges
about the meaning of suspicion. It relates to the issue that the original judges
inclusion of a fleeting thought could have confused a jury and thus what a
jury should be directed about when considering the definition of suspicion.
20)
a) Matt worked in the Waterloo branch of Big Bank Plc. In June 2013,
Matt revealed the security codes of the main safes in the bank to a
group of bodybuilders he knew at his local gym. The next day, while Matt
was at work, the bodybuilders proceeded to rob the bank. At the time of
the robbery, Matt pretended to be an innocent victim. After the robbery
had taken place, the bodybuilders gave him 100,000 as a share of the
proceeds. In August 2013, the bodybuilders were convicted of robbery
for robbing the bank. In the newspaper and television reports of the
case it was clear that the police thought that the bodybuilders had been
assisted by an insider at the bank, but that they had no firm evidence of
this.
In October, Matt asked his sister, Rose, if she could put 50,000 of his
money into her bank account to hold it for him. He explained that he
thought her bank account would provide a better interest rate than his
bank could at the moment.

Rose agreed to his request and placed the money in her account.
In November, Matt was convicted of assisting with the robbery of Big
Bank Plc in June. Rose has subsequently been interviewed by the police
in respect of the money she deposited in her bank account on behalf of
Matt, which turns out to have been half of his share of the proceeds of
the bank robbery. She tells the police that she had always trusted Matt
due to his respectable job, although she was aware that he had been
spending time with some unsavoury characters at the gym.
Advise Rose on her potential criminal liability under section 93A(1)(a) of
the Criminal Justice Act 1988, with specific reference to the judgment in
Regina v Da Silva [2006] (15 marks)
To be found guilty of an offence under section 93A(1)(a) of the Criminal
Justice Act 1988, it must be shown that Rose had facilitated the retention or
control of the proceeds of a crime on behalf of her brother and either knew or
suspected that Matt had been engaged in criminal conduct or had benefited
from criminal conduct.
In considering whether Rose suspected her brother had been involved in
criminal conduct Regina v Da Silva [2006] helps as to what advice the judge
should give the jury about the meaning of suspicion. Paragraph 8 of the
judgement explains that you cannot put reasonable into the definition of
suspicion, as this was not parliaments intention, as they could have done this
if they wanted.
Paragraph 12 highlights that a judge can help the jury with an ordinary English
word such as suspicion, as was held in R v Gillard (1988) but that the judge
must give the correct definition.
Paragraph 19 shows that the idea of a fleeting thought cannot be given to the
jury as this may confuse the jury as to the exact level of concern necessary.
Paragraph 16 gives us an idea of what advice a judge could give a jury; it
states that for there to be suspicion, the defendant must think that there is a
possibility that is more than fanciful. Therefore this is what the prosecution
will have to show and the jury will have to be convinced of, if Rose can be
found guilty under section 93A(1)(a) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 due to
her suspicions.
Therefore if Rose is tried in relation to handling or assisting her brother Erwin
the proceeds of a crime, the jury will be asked whether Rose's knowledge that
her brother was spending time with unsavory character gave rise to her
having a suspicion that was more than merely fanciful that the money she
agreed to put in her bank account for her brother was the proceeds of a crime.
However in Regina v Da Silva [2006] at paragraph 17 of the judgment there is
a qualification that concerns directing the jury regarding that the suspicion
must be of a settled nature. For example where a defendant was suspicious
but on further thought honestly dismissed it as being contrary to other

evidence that existed or as being outweighed by other considerations. This


would apply in Roses case.
In Rose's case, her brother's respectable job and his explanation about
getting a better interest rate may have honestly dismissed or outweighed any
of Rose's suspicions. If this were the case then the suspicion would not be of
s settled nature and therefore she would not be guilty under the act as she
lacked knowledge or suspicion.

b) John was a trustee of funds held in a trust account for a charity. John
removed 10,000 from the trust account in breach of his trustee duties
in January 2013.
In February 2013, he asked his niece, Sarah, to put 10,000 of his money
into her bank account to hold it for him in case he needed it in the
future. Sarah agreed to do this for John. She was aware that John was
having serious financial difficulties at the time and that he was
desperate to resolve his problems. She also knew that he was a trustee
for a charity.
Advise Sarah on her potential civil liability for accessory liability for
breach of trust, with specific reference to the judgment in Regina v Da
Silva [2006] (10 marks)
Regina v Da Silva [2006] discusses the definition of suspicion at paragraph
15. It states that in a civil proceeding the suspicion must be clear or firmly
grounded suggesting that the suspicion must be of a certain strength. It
explains that as Manifest Shipping Co Ltd v Uni-Polaris Insurance Co Ltd
[2003] found, a vague feeling of unease is not sufficient, neither is gross
negligence. The firm grounding of suspicion therefore must be based on
facts. In Barlow Clowes International Ltd v Eurotrust International Ltd [2006]
the defendant was found guilty in relation to assisting in the misappropriation
of trust funds because they entertained a clear suspicion.
Therefore in a civil context the suspicion needs to be more firmly held than the
criminal context that suggests a possibility that is more than fanciful.
Therefore in Sarahs case knowing that her Uncle had financial problems and
that he was a trustee may not have been enough information for her to hold a
clear suspicion that the money had been wrongly taken from the trust fund.
The level of suspicion that needs to be shown is stronger than in the criminal
case.