Game over: The chance for democracy

in Egypt is lost
Posted By Robert Springborg

Wednesday, February 2, 2011 - 4:23 PM

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While much of American media has termed the events unfolding in Egypt today as "clashes between
pro-government and opposition groups," this is not in fact what's happening on the street. The socalled "pro-government" forces are actually Mubarak's cleverly orchestrated goon squads dressed up
as pro-Mubarak demonstrators to attack the protesters in Midan Tahrir, with the Army appearing to be
a neutral force. The opposition, largely cognizant of the dirty game being played against it,
nevertheless has had little choice but to call for protection against the regime's thugs by the regime
itself, i.e., the military. And so Mubarak begins to show us just how clever and experienced he truly is.
The game is, thus, more or less over.

The threat to the military's control of the Egyptian political system is passing. Millions of demonstrators
in the street have not broken the chain of command over which President Mubarak presides.
Paradoxically the popular uprising has even ensured that the presidential succession will not only be
engineered by the military, but that an officer will succeed Mubarak. The only possible civilian
candidate, Gamal Mubarak, has been chased into exile, thereby clearing the path for the new vice
president, Gen. Omar Suleiman. The military high command, which under no circumstances would
submit to rule by civilians rooted in a representative system, can now breathe much more easily than a
few days ago. It can neutralize any further political pressure from below by organizing Hosni Mubarak's
exile, but that may well be unnecessary.

The president and the military, have, in sum, outsmarted the opposition and, for that matter, the
Obama administration. They skillfully retained the acceptability and even popularity of the Army, while
instilling widespread fear and anxiety in the population and an accompanying longing for a return to
normalcy. When it became clear last week that the Ministry of Interior's crowd-control forces were
adding to rather than containing the popular upsurge, they were suddenly and mysteriously removed
from the street. Simultaneously, by releasing a symbolic few prisoners from jail; by having plainclothes
Ministry of Interior thugs engage in some vandalism and looting (probably including that in the
Egyptian National Museum); and by extensively portraying on government television an alleged
widespread breakdown of law and order, the regime cleverly elicited the population's desire for
security. While some of that desire was filled by vigilante action, it remained clear that the military was
looked to as the real protector of personal security and the nation as a whole. Army units in the streets
were under clear orders to show their sympathy with the people.

In the meantime the regime used the opportunity to place the military in more direct control of the
government while projecting an image of business as usual. In addition to securing the presidential
succession to Gen. Omar Suleiman, retired general and presidential confidant Ahmed Shafiq was
sworn in as prime minister, along with a new cabinet, in all due televised pomp and ceremony. Gamal's
unpopular crony businessmen supporters were jettisoned from the cabinet, with their replacements
being political nonentities. Mubarak himself pledged that the new government would focus on providing
material security to the people.

The stage was thus set for the regime to counterattack the opposition through a combination of divideand-rule tactics, political jujitsu, and crude application of force. The pledge by Mubarak not to offer his
candidacy, the implied succession to Suleiman rather than Gamal, the commitment to revising
constitutional provisions that govern the presidential election, and the decision to suspend
parliamentary sessions until courts have ruled on contested candidacies from the November election
succeeded in convincing some opposition elements that they had gained enough to call it a victory and
go home.

As for those elements, including the coalition formed around Mohamed elBaradei, that deemed these
concessions to be insufficient sops intended to preserve the status quo, the regime offered further
provocations. Mubarak described them as opportunists and called their patriotism into question,
implying that they were stooges of the United States and that he was defending the nation's
independence and dignity. This was classic political jujitsu, for the enraged crowd now redoubled its
efforts and demands, using much more insulting language to describe Mubarak himself. This in turn
paved the way for the regime to unleash its goon squads to attack protesters.

The military will now enter into negotiations with opposition elements that it chooses. The real
opposition will initially be ignored, and then possibly rounded up. The regime will do all possible to
restore a sense of business as usual. Cell phone and Internet connections have already been reestablished, and automatic teller machines are functioning, though banks remain closed so there can
be no run on them. Businesses will be encouraged to reopen, and all possible will be done to ensure a
flow of essential supplies into Cairo, Alexandria, and Suez.

The last challenge remaining is economic. Even before demonstrations broke out a few weeks ago,
the economy was just limping along. It is now broken. Even in the best-case scenario of a rapid return
to stability, Egypt faces a cash crunch. Capital flight, loss of foreign direct investment, drying up of
tourist revenues, downgrading of sovereign debt and commensurate increase in interest, and lost
earnings from interrupted production will all hammer the revenue side of the balance sheet. The
expenditure side will be placed under yet more stress by acceleration of inflation already running at 10
percent, devaluation of the currency, and need to repair damage resulting from the clashes. Egypt will
have to turn to its "friends" if it is to avert economic disaster and if the regime that just narrowly
survived defeat is not to be challenged yet again.

The Obama administration, having already thrown its weight behind the military, if not Mubarak
personally, thereby facilitating the outcome just described, can be expected to redouble its already bad
gamble. Fearing once again that the regime might be toppled, it will lean on the Europeans, the
Saudis, and others to come to Egypt's aid. The final nail will be driven into the coffin of the failed
democratic transition in Egypt. It will be back to business as usual with a repressive, U.S.-backed
military regime, only now the opposition will be much more radical and probably yet more Islamist. The
historic opportunity to have a democratic Egypt led by those with whom the U.S., Europe, and even
Israel could do business will have been lost, maybe forever. Uncle Sam will have to eat yet more
humble pie, served up by the dictator who has just been insulting him.

Robert Springborg is a professor of national security affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School.

GAHGEER
6:58 PM ET
February 2, 2011

Ture but
It's not over yet. Friday's protest should be the last one - unless of course they shut down mosques and
churches too.

GAHGEER
6:59 PM ET
February 2, 2011

Ture but
It's not over yet. Friday's protest should be the last one - unless of course they shut down mosques and
churches too.

OUTSPEAKER
11:38 PM ET
February 2, 2011

Game over

The elephant in the room in this article is the military -- did we not witness a number of signals that they may
well be divided within themselves? That orders to fully crack down and impose order for 8 months may not
be fully implemented by the soldiers? At best, this will lead to an internal coup or realization that no other
scenario than Obama's "transition" can avoid a period of strife akin to civil war or guerilla war.
Also not mentioned is Obama's apparent willingness to leave realpolitik behind when it comes to playing a
role in a historic pro-democracy uprising. I don't doubt that he's been trying to convince Israel that continuing
to support Mubarak (or a simlilar replacement from the military) will not provide long term security. Any overt
support for Mubarak, or sign of internal meddling, would only help ensure that the inevitable new Egyptian
regime starts off with a less than sympathetic position on Israel.
The economic aspects are certainly a concern, but they point to the new reality of the region where such
issues will soon overshadow the Palestinian situation. Friedman is right in today's Times to point out to Israel
that they are best to quickly settle the Palestinian issue now, before it can come back as a contentious issue
with the new govt (and newly empowered population) of Egypt.
Last Friday was the "Day of Rage", this Friday is being planned as the "Day of Farewell", obviously tonight
the Egyptian military appears to be ready to go all Tianenmen on the protesters, but if Friday's protests are
averted, they will only serve to give birth to a civil war or guerilla war that will oust Mubarak with a lot more
disruption to the region than if he just left power on his own.

MAX IN SAN FRANCISCO

1:20 AM ET
February 3, 2011

"Game Over..."
Your analysis is very much a 'man of the state' take on events and significantly leaves out the main actors in
the Egyptian revolutionary movement -- vast numbers of predominantly young and poor, urban, working
class Egyptians. They may have more to say here. The Egyptian armed forces may go for a Tiannemen
Square type massacre in Cairo, or later some kind of a 21st century replay of a Free Officers Movement, but
the armed forces are not a socially monolithic formation. The vast majority of enlisted men come from the
same social strata as the anti-Mubarak insurgents in the streets. No army is hermetically sealed from the
larger foces at work in the society that spawns it. See, for instance, the role that GI resistance played in
sinking the US war effort in Indochina. A more appropriate comparison here might be the evolving collapse
of the armed forces of Czarist Russia at the time of the February 1917 revolution. See also Germany in Nov.
1918, and the Spanish Navy at the beginning of the Spanish Civil War. There have already been some
reports of enlisted men mixing with the rebellious crowds.
The local elite might find it expedient to opt for a democratic management strategy to perputuate the reign of
their social class, but the urban poor won't see the mass impoverishment and tremendous social inequalites
that helped propel them into revolt disappear if they get a chance to choose a revolving set of technocrats
overseeing their continued exploitation and dispossession.
History was supposed to have come to an abrupt and permanent end around 1989 or so. Class struggle was
supposed to exist solely as an ideological construct in the foreign policy of the former goverment in Russia
and not a phenomenon spontaneously generated by market society, so the re-emergence of the urban poor
as a historical actor leaves contemporary political thinkers without functioning tools to grasp the bigger

possibilites at work now. Reducing the movement in Egypt to a demand for democratic government is both
an easy way out and a desperate effort to disappear the reemerging social question down an Orwellian
memory hole.

ONEUNSTUCKINTIME
4:15 PM ET
February 4, 2011

Brilliant.
Very insightful, Max.

WINSTON_NM
10:07 AM ET
February 5, 2011

Keeping hope alive

Well written response, thank you. Trying to keep my hopes & faith alive. Fear is such a powerful force for
bad.

CK MACLEOD
2:04 AM ET
February 3, 2011

Assuming the analysis is correct...

...what's the basis for ever assuming that any other outcome was ever very likely or possible? It's been clear
for some time, and has been pointed out by numerous informed observers, that the military was the key,
especially given the lack of a coherent opposition with identified leadership, organization, and platform. It
was further pointed out that the fraternization between protesters and troops tended to reinforce not weaken
the military's primacy: The protesters virtually invited the military to constitute the state.
The protesters succeeded in gaining a commitment from HM not to run again, under a transition to a free
and fair election process. Such a scenario could only have been underwritten by the military. Three steps
forward, two steps back. No one was outsmarted: It's just that the Egyptians aren't any better at jumping
over their shadows than anyone else. Put differently, why would the writer or anyone else assume that they
or anyone else could transfer from dictatorship to full-fledged democracy overnight?

GRANDEROHO
6:12 AM ET
February 3, 2011

Foreign policy isn't

Foreign policy isn't missionary work I suppose.
I hope you are wrong Springborg.

LINDA HERRERA
11:53 AM ET
February 3, 2011

It's not over until it's over...

This article is highly problematic on two fronts. First, it offers a monolithic and overly simplistic understanding
of the military. I urge all readers of this article to take the time to read an excellent piece by Paul Amar that
details the different factions of the military and the internal power struggles that will no doubt play a part in
determining the outcome of this phenomenal movement. I provide the link here:
http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/516/why-mubarak-is-out
Second, though some might argue that academic work is "objective" and outside of questions of morality
and solidarity, I beg to differ. This article came out at the moment when the movement turned dark, when
people on the streets in Egypt were being attacked and terrorized by government hired thugs, when their
morale may have been temporarily down, and when cracks began to deepen in people's unity. An article
such as this may serve to demoralize people. And moreover, this revolution is not being played by a
rulebook, according to certain modeling and patterns of history. A new history is being made. Let us
remember, that it's not over until it's over. And this is not over by any stretch of the imagination.

DAVEINBOCA
3:30 PM ET
February 3, 2011

Max in SF & Linda are whistling past a graveyard.

The Eurocommie and cheerleader schools of thought are represented by these two posters. But Springborg
is a survivor of having taught at Santa Clara U. and has assimilated [and perhaps rejected] superficial sociopolitical nostrums and pieties in a process of intellectual growth surrounded by the loons of the anarcho-left.
Egypt reminds a historian of the old definition of Prussia "an army with a country attached to it..." or words to
that effect. Yes, the Army is not a monolith, but it appears after a few days of shaking and baking, the iron
filings are definitely lining up towards Mubarak's praetorian guard keeping control of the country. Springborg
is right, but gives the silly tyro Obama too much credit for acting one way and talking another---typical of a
sophomoric foreign policy major trying to make up his mind while events are doing that for him.
It appears that Mubarak's somewhat capable son, pushed as successor by his grasping mother, is now out
of the running and that Omar Suleiman will succeed Mubarak as president in September. That is not the end
of the world, and calling a Cairo urban mob of young idealists and frustrated workers and unemployed the

arbiters of democracy is the usual trapdoor the MSM shallow sociologists fall into during occasions like this.
Egypt has 90 million people and has an unemployment rate about the same as the US. It's economy has
also been growing over the last two decades. Maybe if Obama would stick to his knitting at home and try not
to project his idealism elsewhere, the situation will work itself out by itself. That would be better than a
Muslim Brotherhood sharia catastrophe that would go back to stoning women and cutting off hands for
burglary.

PULLER58
10:04 PM ET
February 3, 2011

As opposed to what?
I still cannot fathom how a country receiving as much foreign aid from the US and having a treaty with Israel
could possibly have a government that would likely have a strong Islamic bent. The "people" would likely
insist on ending the treaty with Israel, and insist on breaking any cooperation with the US. Then the US
would be obliged to end the foreign aid, and bad actors in the region like Syria and Iran would attempt to aid
and abet Egypt if a government displayed a hardline attitude towards the West. (For financial assistance, the
ever industrious Hugo Chavez could be counted on to try and fill the breech.) Sure, maybe a military
dictatorship wouldn't be popular, but was there ever really another option?

YACOURI
4:26 AM ET
February 4, 2011

Wait and see..

Western experts on Egyptian internal affairs seem to be materialising by the second. My advice would be to
adopt Linda's approach in continuing to observe the workings of this popular uprising and the regime's
responses to it. It is not over until its over.
It is also important to note that this popular movement is not purely restricted to the borders of Egypt. Many
other states in the region, particularly the impoverished ones, are experiencing the same sort of public
discontent. We are a long way from any concrete conclusion or the situation 'returning to normal' as one
commentator so distastefully put it.

FJET2020
10:04 AM ET
February 4, 2011

Game Over? Don't Think So

Game over? I don't think so. Remember, we still give them $1.5 billion a year, mostly for the military guys.
We could yank that from them if they step over the line.

I was in the Nile Hilton in 1979 - got kicked out to make room for Pres. Carter's peace entourage. I think the
author is overly pessimistic.
It ain't over until its over. The dark days of dictators is running out of gas in the age of the Internet.
I have more faith in Egypt's people - they want FREEDOM. The lid is off Pandora's box.

MAGPC
1:05 PM ET
February 4, 2011

As an Egyptian
I have to say that the situation in Egypt is too foggy, many are saying that we (the anti-protesters) should
stop doing so because the people don't feel safe or have food to eat as long as we are holding our position
in Tahrir square.
There are some remarks to say:
1)the protesters in tahrir are those who understand that freedom is more valuable than food and drink, while
the whole majority (the rest of the 80 millions) just want to eat, drink, marry and have sex, and live their lives
without any objection on anything.
2)A game is played now so that the anti-protesters after being beaten by police and pro-protesters whom we
know are from police and the ruling party, the protesters are being accused that they are ruining their
country by only standing peacefully in tahrir square. And sadly the state TV and those of the ruling party
succeeded in exporting this vision to the ordinary people and now people are accusing the protesters of
being traitors to their country.
there are so many to say, but a last point.
3) If the revolution failed and Mubarak stayed, I assure you that all those in Tahrir square (I mean those with
good intentions to change and..), all of those would feel that they are so depressed that they will look for any
immigration outside that country, so Egypt will lose those who are really faithful and hardworking for the free
countries in the world ( as if this matters to Mubarak).
Feel free to comment or ask about anything.

JKLAIRWIN
1:58 PM ET
February 4, 2011

An interesting take
This article is certainly interesting, but, like so much of the commenting, seems to have no real factual basis.
Significantly, no facts and no sources are cited. We all have our opinions based on what we read and some,
like the author, even have some background expertise to throw into the mix, but actual facts seem to be in
very short supply. These predictions may very well turn out to be correct, but then again....

THIRDWORLDCHARLIE

10:01 PM ET
February 4, 2011

Gen. Omar Suleiman is a torturer

WikiLeaks confirm that Omar Suleiman was personally implicated in torture. Please read:
http://213.251.145.96/cable/2005/08/05CAIRO5924.html\

SHAMS ZAMAN
8:39 AM ET
February 5, 2011

I also Think its almost over

Very rightly said. I think Egyptians have almost lost the opportunity. Once the momentum of any movement
breaks down its very difficult to put things back in motion. The change will never come until and unless
Mubarak feels the heat. What the demonstrators doing in Tahrir square is giving Mubarak enough space and
time to turn the tables back on the demonstrators. It was a miscalculation that by staying in Tahrir square
they would put enough pressure on Mubarak to step down and by bringing Egypt to a stand still. Mubarak
has nothing to loose even the complete Egypt comes to a stand still. They have few more days and if they
don't start marching towards Presidential Palace to kick Mubarak out, it is almost over for them. The routine
in Cairo and rest of Egypt would start coming to "business as usual" if the demonstrators kept on sitting in
Tahrir square. People can't keep occupying the square for endless. They will have to return to their normal
life once they run out of money and business. If Egyptian people really want to bring in a change they will
have to march and kick him out otherwise the complete drama would fizzle out. And time for the Egyptians is
running out.
Shams Zaman - Pakistan (smszmn72@yahoo.com)

MAX IN SAN FRANCISCO

3:08 PM ET
February 5, 2011

The forward momentum of the movement may have been lost...

Unfortunately Shams Zaman's observations here are probably quite accurate. I hope I'm wrong.

KHALED25JAN
1:01 PM ET
February 6, 2011

Best way to ensure stability in the region is to support democra

Robert,
There is one fundamental issue that should not be overlooked, this demonstration were initiated by face
book rallying.
The point is, this generation of <30 years old, all have their basic understanding of the world through www.
They understand and look for the freedom and democracy as they see online.
As soon as they go out to the street they are met with all the manifestation of corruption, and oppression.
This generation is liberal and they are the best barrier against fundamental Islam.
In genuine democracy, Muslim brotherhood would be 20% at best.
Only democracy can insure the stability of the region. Military crackdown will produce violent Egypt. With
millions of youth demonstrating, after military crackdown or oppressive security regime, I can imagine 5-10%
would turn to underground work, and violence. In other words, hundreds of thousands of angry Egyptian at
the footsteps of Suez Canal, the petroleum pipeline, and at the boarder of Israel.
In short, the best way to ensure stability in the region is to support democracy.

RAMADANA
6:35 PM ET
February 11, 2011

You were worng

Mr. Springborg,
You were wrong.
Best regards,
People of Egypt

PHILLIP LAREAU
6:30 AM ET
February 12, 2011

Mubarak
Two comments about some of the blogs and commentary.
1. It is triing, to say the least, to watch so called experts shill for Obama -- the Egptian people took this action
and trying to turn this into an Obama versus Bush debate simply demonstrates the parachiol nature of those
who can only see geopolitical dynamiics through a narrow peephole called American domestic politics. Bush
faced a much more brutal regime in Iraq -- the comparisons are meaningless.
2. That said, I was stunned to see the amounts of money Mubarak allegedly stole from his country. Having
lived in Egypt and reported there, I knew he was corrupt, but over the past 15 to 20 years he has apparently
been hard at work stealing more than governing -- if the estimates of his wealth are accurate.

3. Leaders who steal so much, so blatantly from their own people deserve what they get -- in this case, I
hope, a long and humiliating exile and the insistence by a new government that much of this wealth be
returned to the people it belongs to -- the people of Egypt.
Worth recalling, too, that one reason Egyptians put up with Mubarak so long is that he brought some stability
after Nasser and Sadat. But they were sick of him 20 years ago. Now comes the next phase -- how to
cobble together a government that is not simply a reprise of the previous regime..

Post-Mubarak: How the U.S. Plans to Aid

Democracy in Egypt
By MASSIMO CALABRESI Friday, Feb. 11, 2011

Antigovernment protesters in Tahrir Square in Cairo display a giant poster that reads, "The Martyrs of the Revolution," on
Feb. 10, 2011
Amr Nabil / AP

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Now that Hosni Mubarak is getting accustomed to life as an ex-dictator, Barack Obama and his foreign-policy aides have
a new task. Washington has publicly called for an Egyptian transition to democracy, which Egypt has never known. To
avoid a continuation of dictatorial rule under a new strongman or a dangerous power vacuum as weaker players try to
seize control Egypt will need to see the lightning-fast development of long-suppressed political parties. So the U.S. is

preparing a new package of assistance to Egyptian opposition groups, designed to help with constitutional reform,
democratic development and election organizing, State Department officials tell TIME. The package is still being
formulated, and the officials decline to say how much it would be worth or to which groups it would be directed.
White House officials declined to say whether any of the new money would be directed to the Muslim Brotherhood,
Egypt's most prominent Islamist party.(See TIME's complete coverage of Egypt's uprising.)
The Obama Administration cut democracy-and-governance aid to Egyptian opposition groups in its first two years in
office, from $45 million in George W. Bush's last budget to $25 million for the 2010 and 2011 fiscal years. The Obama
Administration also stopped providing aid to groups that had not registered with the Egyptian government, drawing
criticism from human-rights organizations. The Administration has had conversations with Egyptian government officials,
including the Egyptian envoy to the U.S., Ambassador Sameh Shoukry, about the provision of new aid, sources tell TIME.
The U.S. has a history of providing assistance to nascent democracy movements, with mixed results. In countries like
Serbia and Ukraine, direct and indirect U.S. aid helped youth-driven opposition movements successfully oust repressive
leaders by training them in nonviolent civil disobedience, election organization and other fundamentals of civil society.
Elsewhere, like in Belarus, the U.S. has had less success funding change through direct democracy-building aid, as
dictatorial regimes remain impervious to democratic movements.(See TIME's photo gallery "Mass Demonstrations
in Egypt.")
Not everyone thinks democracy-building aid helps. Some analysts, like Steven A. Cook of the Council on Foreign
Relations, criticized Bush-era democracy aid to Egypt as wasteful and better spent on agricultural and other projects.
But a detailed study by researchers at Vanderbilt University and others found that U.S. democracy aid was the only
statistically significant factor affecting the pace and success of democratic development in the postCold War period.
Egypt's opposition groups are not starting from scratch, but after decades of repression under Mubarak, the country does
not have much of a foundation to build on, U.S. officials have concluded. "There is a civil society in Egypt," says State
Department spokesman P.J. Crowley, "but it has suffered from decades of restrictions. They do have an opposition, but it's
not yet organized." Secretary of State Hillary Clinton first suggested the U.S. might give aid to the Egyptian opposition
groups on her way back to Washington from Munich on Feb. 6. "As the enormity of the organizational challenge is
confronted by responsible leaders of the protest and the opposition, they are saying, 'O.K., we've got work to do,' " Clinton
said. "We are going to try to work with a lot of like-minded countries around the world to offer whatever assistance we
can."

Read more: http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2048622,00.html#ixzz1fn9uhuzt

Democracy in Egypt
Why the West should welcome a political upheaval in the Middle East
After observing the administrative practices in the realm of Muhammad Ali, the Ottoman pasha of
Egypt in the early 19th century, William Edward Lane, the great Arabic lexicographer, commented:
Most of the governors of provinces and districts carry their oppression far beyond the limits to which
they are authorized to proceed by the Bsha [Muhammad Ali]; and even the sheikh of a village, in
executing the commands of his superiors, abuses his lawful power. Bribes and the ties of relationship
and marriage influence him and them, and by lessening the oppression of some, who are more able to
bear it, greatly increase that of others. But the office of a sheikh of a village is far from being a
sinecure. At the period when the taxes are demanded of him, he frequently receives a more severe
bastinadoing than any of his inferiors; for when the population of a village does not yield the sum
required, their sheikh is often beaten for their default. ... All the fellaheen [peasants] are proud of the
stripes they receive for withholding their contributions. ... Ammianus Marcellinus gives precisely the
same character to the Egyptians of his time.
The Egypt of Gamal Abdel Nasser, Anwar El-Sadat, and Hosni Mubarak made traditional Oriental
despotism vastly more modern and merciless. Lanes accounts of Muhammad AliEgypts first great
modernizer, not known for his kindnessand his senior officials occasionally casting a vengeful eye on
excessively corrupt officials and showing mercy to their victims seem quaint today given the cruel,
predatory habits of President Mubarak, his family and friends, and his security men. With the exception

of Syria, where the religiously heretical (Shiite) Alawite ruling family of Bashar al-Assad oversees a
ferocious police state, Mubaraks Egypt is the most advanced dictatorship in the Arab world. A Stasilike array of spies spans the country, but discreetly and gently watches resident foreign businessmen,
the Westernized Egyptian elite, and the American University of Cairo, a once-vibrant institution
founded in 1919 by Presbyterians, now intellectually withered, where Egyptian and Western
academics have exercised extraordinary caution in imparting disruptive ideas or criticism of the ruling
family. Mubarak and his friends discovered that an Egypt at peace with Israel could attract billions in
U.S. aid, regardless of the regimes human rights record, and billions more from tourism, whose
profitability continued even when Mubaraks police state crushed the liberal dissident and presidential
candidate Ayman Nour in 2005. Only the countrys religious extremism when it turned lethally against
Western tourists made a dent.
But the modern Egyptian fellaheenthe urban poor, the semi-educated youths from the countrys
awful state universities, and a good slice of Egypts not insignificant middle classhave finally had
enough. As is now well known thanks to the massive demonstrations in Tahrir Square, the country is a
land of stark extremes. In Cairo, multimillion-dollar riverine apartments and lushly watered exurban golf
courses built on sand look out upon an endless horizon of low-rise, nearly windowless brick apartment
buildings, which are virtually uninhabitable during Egypts summer. These homes are stuffed with
people whocan see progress. (Cairo is a vibrant mess of a modern city.) Egypts acid-tongued poor
can read. Sixty years of socialist-turned-capitalist dictatorship have given the Egyptian masses
sufficient education to dream; its given the bright among the poor and the countrys growing middle
class the means to aspire. Like much of the Middle East without oil, Egypt has been growing
economically (around 6 percent per annum for the last five years). Using the standard set by Harvards
late Samuel Huntington, Egypt economically is beyond the democratic transition zone, where a
societys complexities start to overload centralized authoritarian states and the common mans dreams
become tangible.
Other convulsive social problems add to this volcanic resentment. Imagine a deeply conservative
society where men cannot afford to marry, where male honor revolves around married life, around
having a home where each man, no matter how low in class, can find peace, a little dominion, and bit
of bliss. Envision 30-year-old jobless men who have never had sex with a woman, dream about it
constantly, prowl tourist neighborhoods to put a hand on foreign flesh, and engage alone or with other
men in sexual practices that the society officially loathes, and its astonishing that Egypt hasnt suffered
more spontaneous riots. Now combine government and social dysfunction with frustrated idealism
the Western ideas that have become common aspirations throughout the Middle East. The good side
of Western modernityits emphasis on civil rights, democracy, and the individuals right to pursue a bit
of happinesshas married up with Islams historic and often rebellious concern with justice, that
rulers, too, have obligations to abide by the rules laid down by the Almighty.
Hosni Mubarak and the other presidents-for-life, kings, and emirs of the Middle East have the bad luck
to rule when the democratic wave has finally arrived. They have the bad luck to rule in an age when
even Islamists are wrestling with the challenge and seductiveness of representative government. One
hundred and eighty years ago when William Lane was living in Egypt, the average Egyptian, even a
member of the local elite, had no conception that he had a right to participate in the government of the
Nile Valley. This right belonged to Turkish-speaking Ottoman overlords, of whom Muhammad Ali, an
Albanian, became the founder of an Egyptian dynasty. Today, a vast swath of Egyptianssecularists,
Islamists, and everyone in betweenreally do believe that they have a right to choose their leaders.

Both liberal and fundamentalist literature is full of this democratic ethos. The concepts of masuliya
that the people can be responsible for their own fateand hurriyafreedom, an ancient term
denoting a free man as opposed to a slave, which now moves ever closer to the Western
understanding of inalienable rights of the individual against the stateare shaking the Middle East
before our eyes. This may be a hard truth to swallow for American and European realists, whove
never much appreciated the power of liberal Western ideas in third-world lands. (To read the writings of
Zbigniew Brzezinski on democracy and the Middle Eastto recall the attention that the media and
Washington lavished on him during the dark days in Iraqis to realize how intellectually parochial and
morally flexible realists and Washingtons foreign-policy establishment can be.) But after Tunisia and
Egypt and the irruptions elsewhere in the Arab world, this obdurateness may, just possibly, diminish.
This doesnt mean that democracy is going to succeed in Tunisia or Egypt or anywhere else where we
are witnessing demonstrations. The power of Arab police states should never be underestimated. The
only things that function relatively well in Arab lands are the internal security services and the armies,
the great beneficiaries of modernization. But the chances of democracy progressing are better now
than ever before.
The movement has deeper intellectual roots than most in the West have thought. Arab liberals,
especially those who are abroad in the safety of the West, have done a better job than many people
have given them credit for of keeping a democratic debate alive. Arabs may not have a vibrant
democracy anywhere in the Middle East (Iraq is, slowly, painfully, getting there), but they do have a
virtual one, courtesy of the Internet and satellite Arabic television, which, even when controlled by a
Wahhabi potentate in Qatar, has developed a remarkable jousting ethos, pitting expatriate and Iraqi
liberal democrats against Islamists, and both against the mouthpieces of state power. Al-Jazeera is
many unpleasant things, but it has shown with the uprising in Egypt and Tunisia that its heart and
money are unquestionably with democrats in both countries. It may be too much to say that the Arab
Revolt wouldnt have happened without al-Jazeera, but the revolts speed owes much to al-Jazeeras
(and the Saudi-owned al-Arabiyas) round-the-clock, intrepid reporting.
By comparison with Iranwhere populist powerhouses like Mahmoud Ahmadinejad really do have a
following among the poor, and the Islamic Republics revolutionary ethos plays to an identity that isnt
completely dead among the faithfulthe Arab dictatorships and kingdoms have little going for them.
When Mubaraks recently minted vice president, Omar Suleiman, the former head of Egyptian
intelligence, went on television to explain why Egyptians should rally around him and trust President
Mubaraks plans for reform, Suleiman counted up the virtues of the current regime without ever
alluding to an ideological basis for Mubaraks government.
He couldnt. There isnt one. He can pretend that Mubarak is the father of all Egyptiansbut most
Egyptians would deny that paternity. He can talk endlessly about the economics of tourism, which the
Mubarak regime has certainly improved, at least for the Egyptians fortunate enough to work in the
better-paying jobs in this industry. He can talk, surreally, about the social peace that the Mubarak
regime supposedly bequeathed to Egypt. But he can, when it comes to an organizing principle of
government, allude only to a shameful promise of more democracy, since the Egyptian regime
cannot do without the pretense that it rules with the peoples consent. European fascists could proudly
discard self-government as the enemy of the peoples will, united and expressed through the leader.
But there isnt an Arab secular dictator who could give that speech today without his minions laughing.
From the left to the right, from the most devout to the most secular, Egyptians who want to appeal to
their countrymen cannot openly gainsay democracy.

What ought to be clearbut obviously isnt, given the considerable Western trepidation that has
greeted this rebellion, especially on the American right and in Israelis that the West should want this
revolution to continue, even if it allows the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood much greater influence.
In so many ways, Egypt, like all Arab states, is an unrelentingly immature society, where conspiracy
replaces reason, and the worst hatredsespecially anti-Semitismare accepted without the slightest
objection. Dinner parties with the Egyptian elitelet alone Muslim Brotherscan be so conspiracyafflicted as to make Noam Chomsky look nice, introspective, and analytically evenhanded. This is what
we can always expect from dictatorial societies. But there is an antidote.
Democracyunderstood as a culture of respect for legitimate authority, free media, and individual
freedom to work and to organize and assemble, not just the regular holding of electionsintroduces
competition into every corner of society. It creates an unending ethical battle between opposing sides.
Anyone who has been to the Middle East for any time or attended one of the interminable conferences
sponsored by Middle Eastern universities or state-sponsored think tanks knows that Arabs rarely
engage in much debate at these events: They rarely try to convince the opposing side. To matter,
debate must carry the possibility of practical consequences. What we call rationalitywhich Irans
astonishing pro-democracy intellectuals, whove seized the moral and spiritual high ground from those
who support theocracy, constantly seek in their own societyis the mental process that democracy
fosters. The citizenry, while neither saintly nor immune to passions, is broadly speaking rational in the
West because there is daily demand for and tangible benefit from ratiocination. This is not at all the
case in the Muslim Middle East, where most men are powerless and most of societys great concerns
are decided behind closed doors, or as the Iranians more poetically put it, pusht-e pardeh, behind the
curtains.
What we want to see happen in Arab lands and in Iran is real intellectual competitionthe starting
point for healthy evolution. In particular, we want to see devout Sunni Muslims in Egypt try to figure out
what exactly are Islamic values. We should like to see Islams classical schools of law revitalized, not
thrown in the dustbin as they so often have been by the Middle Easts secularizing dictatorships. We
want to see Malikis versus Hanafis versus Shafiis versus Hanbalis (especially the Hanbalis who are
close to the Saudi interpretation of the faith) versus the Shiite Jafaris. We want to see them argue, as
they did long ago in Sunni Islams formative legal period, that no one can represent or embody the
divine willthat, as the liberal Egyptian Islamic jurist Khaled Abou El Fadl puts it, human knowledge is
separate and apart from Divine knowledge. Mans foremost moral and legal duty is thus to guard
himself against error and ignorance, to resist the hubris that through fiqh, the study of the Holy Law,
any man can exclusively know Gods order. Modern autocracies in the Middle East have suppressed
such philosophical debates, as they have suppressed so much else.
Parliaments, once they get going, have a way of looking upon themselves as supreme. Legislatures,
not clerical schools, are likely to be the decisive forum for great ethical debates, especially among
Sunni Muslims, who have no clerical hierarchy and are already subject to a wild proliferation of
fatwas, juridical decisions, by clerics and would-be clerics who pointedly say that your fatwa is no
better than my fatwa. It is likely in any Muslim society that goes democratic that what in the past was
the domain of judges and scholars in religious schoolsinterpreting the Koran and assessing the
relevance and value of the Traditions of the Prophetwill become the domain of legislatures,
particularly in Sunni Arab lands where the organization, prestige, and soft power of the clergy is vastly
less than among Shiites. In Egypt, there will be no Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, whose awesome
charisma gutted the Iranian revolution of its liberal democratic and secular impulses. Parliamentary

interest in religious/ethical issues could fuel a healthy give-and-take between elected representatives
of the people and the faiths traditional guardiansthe type of organic growth in debate about law,
society, and religion that has been all but absent during the pan-Arab and Arab-nationalist era since
World War II.
In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood released a political platform, then withdrew it, and then unofficially
rereleased it in 2007. This was the first platform in its history, and it provoked considerable controversy
among members and supporters of the Brotherhood. It provoked even more furor in the Coptic
Christian community, because the first draft contained references to a religious oversight body that
would judge the content of legislation passed by parliament. The idea was withdrawn. Although Cairo
is the seat of the Al-Azhar religious establishment, the most prestigious in the Sunni world, the
Brotherhood does not enjoy the imprimatur of Al-Azhar. The two have often had a tense, competitive
relationship. How the Brotherhood wouldif it actually couldorganize a supervisory body for the
Egyptian legislature is as unclear now as it was before the Brotherhood first published its platform.
This shows that democracy is an acquired taste and that not all members of the Brotherhood want to
let Egyptians have full rein. A powerful strain in Islamic thought teaches that humans have many bad
impulses, especially libidinous ones, and they need to be constrained by the law.
Through the democratic process, the Egyptian Brothers, like all Arab fundamentalists, will get to
discover Islamic values. If the majority of Egyptian Muslims repeatedly votes one way, it is a good bet
that the Brother-hood, always sensitive to public opinion, will find that commendable Muslim values
overlap rather well with Egyptian voting patterns. The Sunni clergys historically conservative ethos has
usually bent to authority but also, and especially, to popular consensus. The medieval clergy strongly
disliked Sufism, for instance, but reluctantly accepted it when it became too popular to condemn and
once the great theologian Al-Ghazali successfully blended it into orthodoxy. Sufism in its many
medieval manifestations was often wildly heterodox, pushing the envelope of recognizable Islamic
practice and belief.
Incorporating democracy into traditional Islamic dogma, the type worshipped by many Muslim
Brothers, will likely be easier than the slow acceptance of Sufism, which still causes many clerics to
recoil. If Arab Muslims want to vote for their leadersand the evidence in the highly Westernized and
urbanized countries (Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, and Iraq) is that they dothe clerical
establishment and the Muslim Brothers are unlikely to fight a rearguard action against it. Its possible
that Egyptian Muslims will vote en masse for the Brotherhood because they like the organizations
profound cultural conservatism, but if this is so, its most likely that Egyptians, like the once-devout
Iranian revolutionaries who now back reform, will prove highly variable in their loyalty.
The Brotherhood will have to survive constant competition from Egypts liberals and secular
nationalists, who have an older history in the country than the Islamists. They will have to survive the
competition of devout Muslims who bristle at the Brotherhoods heavy-handedness. We should not
assume that devout Muslims will be less subject to faction than their secular brethren. Its possible that
the Muslim Brotherhood could pull off a military coup, but it seems unlikely. Their paramilitary forces
are pathetic compared with the Egyptian Army, which has so far not shown itself, even in the lower
ranks, to be blindly enamored of the Brotherhood. The organization would likely confront an enormous
social, and quite possibly a military, backlash if it attempted to abort free elections once they got
going.

The key here is elections soonSeptember is way too late. Periodic elections are what most
powerfully builds democratic institutions and culture. As the French scholar Olivier Roy has written, If
we had to wait for everyone to become a democrat before creating democracy, France would still be a
monarchy. Its now plain that Mubaraks regime has no intention of transferring power beyond his
inner circle. Its becoming increasingly clear that the senior ranks of the military are siding with
Mubarak in his ever more violent attempts to squash the protests. For better or worse, whats
happening in Egypt will continue to reverberate throughout the region. If Washington and Jerusalem
are dreading an empowered Muslim Brotherhood, a vicious clampdown on the democratic rebellion will
surely make the next irruption much more radical and violent.
A democratizing Egypt could change the face of the Middle East. Political evolution could start. No
doubt the American and Israeli embrace of Mubaraks detested dictatorship will carry a price, perhaps
a stiff price, in a democratic Egypt. It is the cost of our having sought to build stability on an
authoritarian illusion. But for Mubaraks regime, or a military successor, to hold on would be a
catastrophe for the United States. All of the cancers of the regionespecially Islamic militancywould
get worse.
President Obama has only one trump to playthe American subventions to the Egyptian armed
forces. If the violence continues, we need to tell the Egyptian military that we will immediately cut off all
military aid. We can say this in private, but if (when) the army ignores Washington, we should say it in
public, giving Cairo 24 hours. By so doing, President Obama would not be choosing the next Egyptian
leader, but he would be -saying unequivocally that U.S.-Egyptian relations henceforth are based on
democratic values. Realists may object. But the realists have been egregiously wrong for decades.
The promise of democracy for Muslims offers something historically unparalleled. For the first time
since the early caliphs, it holds out the possibility of an organic, reciprocal relationship between leaders
and their communities. It could begin to undermine Islams long history of rebellious religious violence.
It could give the Middle Easts Muslims some of the elemental, nonthreatening, unflappable pride and
self-confidence that Americans, the oldest modern democrats, have in spades. In an age of
proliferating nuclear weapons, that would be a very good thing for believers and nonbelievers alike. It
could also give back to Egypt what William Lane, and so many others, found to be the Egyptians most
sterling qualitytheir cheerfulness.