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Plato's LesserHippias
ROBERTG. HOERBER
I Cf. George Grote, Plato and the other Companionsof Sokrates (London 187S) I 387-8,
for references to the scholars of the previous century. Even W. Lutoslawski seems to
accept the LesserHippias, omitting it from his study merely because it is so brief and
because he feels it is of no importance in the area of logic; cf. The Origin and Growthof
Plato'sLogic(London 1905) 75, 194.
2 Metaphysica 1025a6-9:
"Hence, the argument in the Hippias that the same man is
false and true is misleading. For it takes him to be fasle who is able to speak falsely,
though he is discerning and intelligent, and takes him to be better who is consciously
false" (Richard Hope's translation).
3 Cf. Paul Shorey, WhatPlato Said (Chicago 1957) SS; F. M. Cornford, CambridgeAncient
History (Cambridge 1933) VI 3 I; Hans Raeder, Platons Philosophische Entwickelung
(Leipzig i905)
57; George Grote, op. cit. (above, note I) 1 388. Wilamowitz
assumes the date of the composition to be prior to 399 B.C.: "Aber ein unvorbereiteter
Leser musste sagen, Sokrates vertritt im Gegensatze zu Hippias die Unsittlichkeit, and
so viel sollte jeder einsehen, dass kein Sokratiker nach dem Urteil des Gerichts denjenigen so etwas sagen lassen konnte, der als Verfuhrer der Jugend verurteilt war"; cf.
Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, Platon: Sein Lebenundseine Werke(Berlin 1 959) 10 3.
12 I
373a-c.
Cf. Kathleen Freeman, The Pre-SocraticPhilosophers/Oxford I949)
343-4. R. Hackforth
is entirely too dogmatic in his statement: "... and the date of this [i.e. the Protagoras]
must be 433-432 at latest' (Plato's Phaedrus [Cambridge 1952] 8).
I 22
"Trojan Speech," "Collection," "Nomenclature of Tribes;" his knowledge of "archaeological" lore; his skill in mnemonics.'
The attainments of Hippias have resulted in his appearance in three
of Plato's compositions2 and in references to him in two other treatises.3
Xenophon4 also records a conversation between Socrates and Hippias
on the question of legislation, in which Hippias is compelled to agree
that no distinction exists between justice and law. A modern commentator attempts to link Hippias with several additional pieces from ancient
literature: the Anonymus Jamblichi; Thycydides 3.84; the Prooemium to
Theophrastus' Characters; the Dissoi Logoi; and the philosophical digression
It seems much more certain to
in Plato's Seventh Letter (342a-343d).5
ascribe to Hippias of Elis the emendations in the accentuation of Homer
which Aristotle accredits to Hippias of Thasos, no doubt by confusion.6
Cf. Plato, Protagoras 3'8d-e, 337C-338a; Lesser Hippias 368b-d; Greater Hippias
sb-286b; Kathleen Freeman, op. cit. (previous note) 38I-9 1; Eduard Zeller, Outlines
of the History of GreekPhilosophy(New York i 95) 1o2-4; J. B. Bury, CambridgeAncient
History (Cambridge
1940)V 380; Philostratus, VitaeSophistarum i. ii; Pausanias E. 2E. 4.
2 Greater Hippias, Lesser Hippias (in which he and Socrates carry on practically the
complete discussion), and Protagoras (in which Hippias plays a minor role, acting as
mediator between Socrates and Protagoras [337c-338a], and in which Protagoras gibes
at Hippias' stress of arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and music [3 i 8d-e]). The authercity of the GreaterHippias is a question not pertinent to the present discussion.
3 The Apology (I ge-20a)
contains merely a reference to Hippias, Gorgias, and Prodicus,
who claim ability to teach the youth. In the Phaedrus (267b) Hippias again is merely
mentioned, as agreeing with Prodicus on the appropriate length of a speech.
4 Memorabilia4.4 5-25. Xenophon's conversation seems to have been suggested by the
GreaterHippias. Both have a similar opening:
8Lx Xp6vou yocp &aLx6[ievoqo 'I7rtrLoc'AO'vxo,e ... (Xen.) is parallel to eg 8ta xpovou
F?Zv xarr pacqet -r& 'AO'vcxc. (Plato); also both discussions refer to the laws of Sparta
and to the imperfection of human legislation (Xenophon, Memorabilia4.4. 14-16; Plato,
Greater Hippias 283-5). Xenophon also calls attention to Hippias as Callias' teacher
in the art of mnemonics (Symposium4.62).
s Mario Untersteiner, The Sophists (New York 1954) 273-303. W. H. S. Jones, furthermore, suggests Hippias as the author of the essay De Arte in the Hippocratic collection
(Hippocrates[Loeb edition] vol. 1I); while C. E. Periphanakis assumes that Hippias is the
-ratpoq in Plato's Minos (Les Sophisteset le Droit [Athens 19531 3S). For additional recent
I
28
literature
i8i
; 5o (I956-7)
i8o.
The most
Cf. K. Freeman,
122
note 4) 383-4;
Ancilla to the
On the basis of the ancient evidence, then, and apart from recent
attempts to associate Hippias of Elis with doubtful portions of Greek
literature, the key characteristic of Hippias is that of a most versatile
polymath.' Such a polymath was a figure of ridicule to the Greeks.
The Greek reader would recall the comic personality of Margites, who
"knew many things, but knew them all badly. "z Also Heracleitus3
expresses the ridicule of excessive versatility:
voov o1: 8L8kcaxzt.
7r0XU[GC6UJ
yap
Ws, E
aoL
YEVOfLEVOL
TO 7r,Oo
&VeU
8MCXX7q 70XUYV4L0Veq
EtVXL 80'OUaLV,
CV'L
aocp7v. (Phaedrus 2 7 5a-b)
?t 8' o{h& ToUT' 9xcL, xWV8uv6v(
?t vLt
7tO?V0Lev pouav rTOLq 7XtocLV
Otocv.(Laws 8 i i b)
oU2a1105ov yap 8ELOV ou8ue
MpoappoV
&LpLE T(V 7nrVT(V 28' oLyvaTOV xXx6v,
&kX' 7ro 7trcLplaXcxL =XupXOLo 0.e-T&xoxX
&yonyig yEYVVtat 7to0XtTOU1T:V
i
,ut4cov4n,Aa. (Laws8 ga)
I25
way for the first of the perplexing propositions of the dialogue - that
the truthful individual is one and the same as the liar. For on the basis
of the admission that the essential attribute of both the true person and
the deceiver is ability (8uvmroo),it is relatively easy to "prove" to
Hippias that the same person is best able to give either a correct answer
or a false reply in matters of arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy
(366a-368a). After an interlude, reviewing Hippias' versatility in the
various crafts, literary arts, musical theory, and mnemonics, Socrates
again challenges Hippias to disprove the current conclusion; but Hippias
is so confused that he, the specialist in mnemonics, experiences a lapse
of memory, and Socrates is forced to remind him that the current argument would make Odysseus (as well as Achilles) both a liar and a truthful person (368b-369b).
The second half of the dialogue continues the confusion, leading to
another perplexing proposition - that a person who commits injustice
voluntarily is superior to one who does so unwillingly. Socrates cites
conflicting statements of Achilles which seem to indicate that Hippias'
hero was confused concerning his plans for departure from the Greek
army (37oa-37ic).' Hippias' attempt to explain the apparent confusion
of Achilles involves confused terminology; for first, in contrasting &xsW
and excov, he parallels ex?v with eK inltOuhg (by plan, plot, treachery),
and later he employs the phrase i'A ei)vo(gq (through goodwill) as if
equal to &x&w (3 7oe, 37 I e). Also Hippias' appeal to the laws might strike
a contemporary reader as odd (372a), for Hippias' preference for nature
as opposed to law was well-known; he must be confused to appeal to a
standard he professed to be secondary. But after a lengthy discourse by
Socrates (admitting erstwhile confusion) and a special appeal by Eudicus,
Hippias is willing to continue the discussion (372b-373c). The final
few pages, which propose that voluntary error is superior to involuntary
mistake, present additional confusion by making no apparent distinction
and by contrasting 8Uvoc,ut
between rexvaLand IntLrrX.a=
(37Sb8-ci)
and eta-unl
(37sd-e)2
- although
the entire
argumentation
of the
; 9.65o-s.
The citations are from the Iliad - 9.3 12-3; 9.357-63; i1.69-7
The joining of uva,l?tc with rkXvvi(376a3) is another instance of loose terminology;
for occurring in the same context in which there is a distinction between 86VOqLL4 e
7rat4aAr, this juxtaposition might give the impression that ktar+.pc and 'rXv-n are
synonymous. Previously Socrates (368bi-2) had indicated a distinction between ntrtIrr[AOt
(referring to arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy, which he just had discussed) and
'Exvo (comprising the crafts of Hippias, which Socrates is about to mention); but
Socrates' distinction in terminology apparently made no impression on Hippias, and the
two terms occur later (37sb8-ci) without any distinction being noted. Although Hippias
I
I26
treatise began from the premise that 8uvovoEand aocpot are identical
(36sd-e). And so Plato completes the full circle of confusion, with
Socrates in his final statement again admitting confusion (376b-c).
It is tempting to see a clue of confusion also in the use of the various
comparatives for &yoM6qthroughout the treatise. Hippias supports the
claim of Eudicus' father that Achilles is O'tsLvcvthan Odysseus. This
comparative both Socrates and Hippias employ consistently throughout
the first portion of the dialogue, with one exception - in referring to his
personal accomplishments in non-physical contests at Olympia Hippias
substitutes the comparative xpet'r'rv, which generally has physical
connotation (364a). This is the only time the entire composition employs
the comparative xpe'rL'cov, and it definitely appears out of place. In the
latter portion of the discussion Socrates introduces the comparative
PEXT(v (37ie), which generally has moral connotation; and in the
remainder of the discourse the two comparatives, &X.?Lev&vand PX'dE&v,
are used interchangeably as if there were no distinction in connotation.
&uLLvcWvand PXTVcv
in the latter
&4LE1vv
xptdr-rOv
370e2
PEXTI(Ov
IcLeIVG)V
PcX'rtLV
37ie8
373c7
374e3
?C)Ti6V
37sa2 (S), 375a3 (S), 37Sa4 (S), 375a8 (S), 375b2 (S), 37sb6 (S),
375b7 (H), 375cl (S), 37Sc6 (S)
37sc7 (S), 37Edi (S), 375d4 (S), 37Se3 (S)
&.EVO)v
37Se9
&4LEi)v
By distinguishing between &etvcov and Pek?ricv, a reader might suspect that one who
errs willingly may be ,Le1vcjv(i.e. superior in ability in the sciences, the crafts, and
physical skills) but not 3eX-dtwv(i.e. in the realm of ethics). Whether Plato had such a
distinction in mind would be difficult to prove. It is interesting, however, to note that
in the LesserHippias Plato employs JroLeCVand kpy&ica;Om, avoiding npi&r-rLV throughout
1 27
That Plato was challenging his readers to work out a solution to the
perplexing propositions of the LesserHippias seems to be clear from several
aspects of the treatise. Already the various elements of confused logic
and terminology, which we have noticed permeating the discourse,
would lead the reader to suspect that he must scrutinize further the
propositions of Socrates - especially since Socrates himself admits
perplexity both in the course of the discussion and at the conclusion
of the dialogue (372d-e, 376b-c). Also it was well-known that Socrates
(and Plato) consistently held to a theory directly opposed to the second
proposition of the Lesser Hippias; namely, according to Socrates and
Plato no one commits injustice voluntarily.' Another warning Plato
presents to the reader that the argumentation is not to be taken as final
is the statement of Socrates on the concluding page (3 76b):
r
7otwO), X I7VE,
xac cxaXpa xal &3LxCX
'O &pM ?x(ov 0p'prMvv
tnep T4
?atLV OUtOq, OVX XV AxAo4?LY)7 0
'O6ayo.
The phrase, etsp Tt{[ ?atV 0o'rO4, should warn the reader not to take
seriously the puzzling propositions of the treatise; for such a phrase
Plato employs in other dialogues to show his personal disagreement
with the premises being discussed.2
That the argumentation is based on fallacious reasoning, leading to
erroneous conclusions, should be evident to the reader. But does Plato
give any dramatic clue (besides the loose logic and terminology) to the
correct solution of the perplexing propositions? The principal dramatic technique of the dialogue is its construction in "doublets." Only
the treatise. One cannot help referring to the distinction among these verbs which
Plato draws in the Charmides(i62a, i63e-d) - a distinction which points to a similar
differentiation between crafts or skills and ethics.
I The theory is found already in Plato's Apology (2sd-26a) and extends to his final work,
the Laws (86od, 73Ic, 734b); cf. Meno 77b-78b, Protagoras34sd-e and 3S8c-d, Republic
s89c, Timaeus 86d-e. For the Platonic sense of voluntary (&xou'toq) as what we really
wish to have, see Proclus' commentary In Rempublicam2.3ss; that everybody really
wishes for what he presumes is good, see Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea1172b3 - 117 P.
2 The importance of the phrase must not be overlooked. Cf. Euthyphro7d:
&v;
TI gi oL 6eot, c1 ECOvpcov; oux cftscp rt&8Laypov'act, 8t oaura&
-rTa5a 8tapo0tVr
and Euthyphro8e:
'A,x' ExoaT6v ye oltxs, X EvOUpcoV, T@'V 7 pLX0rVT30
oi 0p4L5ClYnOUClV
04
'ro5vte4,
xca
MVpc7rot
LyaprO5mlv
6eo'L'
In Plato's judgment deities should not engage in quarrels; hence the phrases elTreprt
and ?tep &La,u -nroutv Oeolt.
8tM(PkpoVTaL
Also in Gorgias480e:
... t &po8L 'IrLVoXMXGq 7rOLeLV,
etT 10p6Ov etTe 6vTtvouv ...
Plato presents a clue to his disagreement with a popular premise.
1 28
(363a, 364b).
The "doublets" and professed confusion within the dialogue seem to
be dramatic clues pointing the reader to two famous propositions of
Socrates - that virtue is knowledge, and that no one does wrong voluntarily - each of which may lead to confusing conclusions if a twofold
division is not made. The Socratic dictum, virtue is knowledge, could
lead to the conclusion that ignorance is the only cause of vice, and thus
make ethics a matter of the intellect alone. In the realm of mathematics,
as Plato points out in the first portion of the LesserHippias, it is the
intellect which determines either true or false answers. But mathematics
is not ethics; in ethics the entire soul must be trained, for moral actions
involve more than merely the intellect. The other dictum, no one does
wrong voluntarily, likewise, could be interpreted as if error were never
a matter of any lower part of the soul, but involving only the rational
element. But, as the second portion of the treatise reveals, there must
be more than natural ability for success even in physical pursuits; for the
athlete may choose not to employ the full measure of his ability. The
"doublets" seem to point the reader to a realization that a distinction
must be made between two separate areas: ethics, on the one hand;
I 29
q 7rpaxXrLxOE
'TA
LXCXO7rpaYOuaL XOl POU'XOVTOCt
&cp'1q 8LXOvt
xUaLXo'
oAoroct
stp67rov xcL 7Sp'L &aiXaOc4,
xac 0Zv 7tpii)rov (q &v 'V71:c)V7oxetaO&.Tiock. oU8i y&Sp-rv
vv
v
CL Tp6lo
a&v
xv
T v
7r ter
ao
9 ewv.
uLiFV ya'p XaL' C'7LO-n'L
8OXE!T05Ve'VOCVTL'V -nOUT-CIVO9L,gEtq8 i
uvoclL,
o6, otov &OMTY; vUyteLxoq
ov 7trp'cTTrTol 'rx evotv'a,
evxv'TdTCv e'vXtvrdv
v oe46v
81XoLcXc OV'
&4
t& &ceLxOc.
TX UYLELVX
UyLMXVG)V(I
UyteLLv
PA8(4CtV, 6rxWvPotT
UC
&V
130
dtvaXLtLeTr&X4you
O nepl
p
M'&vpOpcaVM
I=Lv
&'p?,
tv
cppovqaew 8 oux
Xvyov
p
'x6vT-cv, Ocr'pou &'v eL
&X?w&gXeLvxal -n'
Xr016
iera'
&XXa
pMv
ou8'
Myou
~6vov
*
0t&V
'4
9EL,
pp6v7aq.
"vLeZoV 8' 6TL
e,
g?rt,
gpov
aXe&
8'
OuX
gotLV
(I
I
4ob20-30).
ToLoar'f4
;
The influence of the LesserHippias on Aristotle is clear from each of these
passages. From the first citation it seems that the prior portion of the
LesserHippias led Aristotle to the distinction between 9iLq versus 86v&,XLLq
86x
7rep%LT6 ?V8MX6?Levov
and A7rLarr
,un, thus solving the riddle of the first perplexing
proposition.
In the second citation Aristotle appears to have the latter portion of the
Lesse,Hippias in mind in distinguishing between voluntary error in ethics
as contrasted with error in the 'rexva.I
The dramatic technique of the Lesser Hippias, finally, is manifest from
the play on the word to?U'rpoto. The term first becomes prominent in
the discussion of the Homeric characters Odysseus and Achilles. Then,
in the sense of clever or skilful, the adjective becomes the chief characteristic of the polymath Hippias, who is depicted as most versatile
both in the arts and in the crafts. At the conclusion of the dialogue,
however, it is Socrates who is tOU'TpotoO; for he has thoroughly confused Hippias by maintaining two false theses, but he has done so voluntarily, cautioning that the preposterous propositions are not really
reliable. It is Socrates, therefore, who comes off superior also on that
score; for he is truly 7ro)X'rpo07o0,able to present false answers voluntarily
- and, according to the argument of the treatise, also able to be truthful
when he chooses. The genial humor of the composition portrays Hippias
as completely baffled; Aristotle, however, apparently saw through the
perplexities and no doubt appreciated the humor; a modern reader can
appreciate fully the treatise by following the clues of Plato's dramatic
technique.
Westminster College, Fulton, Missouri
I For another Platonic dialogue which seems to have influenced Aristotle particularly,
see my article, "Plato's Lysis"(Phronesis4 fli 9 591 x - 2 8). To observe additional examples
of the intertwining of dramatic techniques with philosophic content, compare also
my studies, "Plato's Euthyphro"(Phronesis3 [I9S8] 9S-I07) and "Plato's Meno"(Phronesis
5 [1 9601 78-10 2).
13 I