De Gruyter

The Scope of Non-Contradiction: A Note on Aristotle's 'Elenctic' Proof in "Metaphysics" 4

Author(s): M.V. Wedin
Source: Apeiron: A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science, Vol. 32, No. 3 (September
1999), pp. 231-242
Published by: De Gruyter
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A
TheScopeofNon-Contradiction:
'Elenctic'
NoteonAristotle's
Proofin
F4
Metaphysics
M.V. Wedin

T 4 oftheprinciple
ofnon-contradiction
Aristotle's
proofinMetaphysics
(PNC) is a notoriouscrux.Not leastoftheworriesis theveryfactthat
a proofin thefirst
offers
Aristotle
place,especiallygivenhis summary
oftheprinciple.
dismissalofthosewhowoulddemanda demonstration
in
under-trained
Aristotle
is
he
avers,
are,
analyticmethodology.
They
forhepromisesonlythatPNC canbe demonstrated
awareoftheworry,
'inthemannerofa refutation'.
Thisdemonstration,
theso-called'elenctic
T
4.
the
first
half
of
The
proofitselfis besetby
proof,occupiesroughly
a numberofproblems,
what
Aristotle
understands
including
bythevery
In thisnote,however,I shallfocusjuston
notionofan elencticproof.1
wherePNC finally
thefinalstageoftheelencticproof,at 1006b28-34,
I am interested
makesan explicitappearancein theproof.2
Specifically,
in themannerof theprinciple'sappearance,forAristotleappearsto
arguein thisfinalstageonlythatPNC holdsforessentialpredications
Thishas lead a numberofcommentators
aboutsubstances.
to suppose
thatAristotle
backs away froma fullygeneralversionof PNC. This

1 Forsomediscussionofthese,see Wedin'SomeLogicalProblemsin Metaphysics

and forsomeoftheliterature
on thetopicsee theBibliogGamma',forthcoming;
raphicalAppendix.
2 I actuallytaketheelenctic
willdo no
prooftoextendto1007bl8,buttheshortening
harmhere.On thissee Wedin,'SomeLogicalProblems'.

APEIRONa journalforancientphilosophy
and science
231-242$6.00Academic
& Publishing
0003-6390/99/3203
Printing

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232 M.V.Wedin
I suggesta waytoextend
wouldnotbe a welcomeresult.Inwhatfollows,
theresultoftheelencticprooftoa fullygeneralversionofPNC.3
Hereis thepassagein question:
Itisaccordingly
tosaythatitisa
(a) ifitistrueofanything
necessary,
animal
that
was
what
"man"
man,thatitbea two-footed
(for
signified);
itisnotpossible
thatthesamething
and()ifthatisnecessary,
should
a two-footed
animal... Consequently,
it
notbe,atthattime,
(y) isnot
it
to
that
the
that
should
be
true
same
simultaneously say
thing
possible
isa manandisnota man.(1006b28-34)4
Theargument
proceedsbyexamplebutis meanttobe generalineffect.
whatisprovedandthisrequires
how
Just generalwilldependonexactly
a carefullook at theargument'sform.Aristotle
beginsin (a) witha
in
taken
two
commentators.
that
has
been
waysby
Depending
premise
is givenwide ornarrowscope,we have
on whether
necessity
or

T - '3(x)(Mx- > Tx),

la. 'M' signifies
T -> (x)(Mx-> DTx).
la'. 'M' signifies

different
versionsofthearguChoiceof(la) or (la') willyieldslightly
continues:
ment.With(la) theargument
a -Tx),
lb. D(x)(Mx -> Tx)-> -nO(3x)(Mx
a -Mx),
lc. -(3x)(Mxa -Tx) -> -nO(3x)(Mx
T,we mayconclude
and,thus,giventhat'M' signifies
a -Mx),
Id. -iO(Bx)(Mx
we appear
versionofPNC. So here,finally,
whichis justtheontological
tohaveourproof.Becauseitgiveswidescopetothenecessity
operator,
I shallrefer
to (la) - (Id) as the'wide-scope'versionoftheproof.

ontheRangeofthePrinciple
3 Anearlierdiscussionis availableinWedin,'Aristotle
etAnalyse
ofNon-Contradiction/
97,1982,87-92.
Logique
Books
Aristotle's
4 Kirwantranslation,
T,,H (Oxford).
Metaphysics:

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TheScopeofNon-Contradiction
233

versionoftheproof,so-calledbecauseitbegins
The 'narrow-scope'
in(la') witha narrow-scope
continues
readingofthenecessity
operator,
inparallelwiththefirst
version:
lb'. (x)(Mx-* '3Tx) -> -1(3x)(Mxa 0-tfx).
to (lc), itrequirestwoaddiButin orderto getthecrucialcounterpart
tionalassumptions:
-> -i(3z)(Mxa 0-tMx),
lb". -,(3x)(Mxa 0-nTx)
and
lb"'. -,(5x)(Mx a O^Mx) - -J>(Bx)(Mxa -Mx).

we get,paralleltothefirst
Withthesetwoassumptions
version,
a -nMx),
lc'. -,(3x)(M*a 0-iTx)-* -nO(3x)(Mx
that'M' signifies
T,we concludeas before
and,againon theassumption
Id'. -,0(3x)(Mxa -nMx).
makeuse ofa notionofsignificaNow bothversionsoftheargument
tion,in (la) and (la'), and itis clearlythenotionthatis at workin the
Aristotle
showsa
firststageoftheelencticproof.There,at 1006a31-4,
in effect
fora modallyladen notionof signification,
clearpreference
for
optingregistered
2a. 'M' signifies
one thing,T = (x)(xis M - > T is whatitis tobe x).
rather
thantheweakerformulation
2b. 'M' signifies
onething,T = (x)(xis M - > x is T).
in (la) /(la') mustsupport
We now see why:thenotionofsignification
forthispurpose.
an explicitmodal claimand (2a) seemstailor-made
Moreover,thesecondstageoftheelencticproofalso getsa rolein the
that'not-M'signifies
thesecondstage,
On theassumption
not-T,
story.5
showsthatonecouldnotholdthatan x thatis M couldalso
1006bl3-28,

and secondstagesfunction
intheoverallargument,
5 Formoreon howthefirst
see
Wedin(forthcoming).

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234 M.V.Wedin
Thisfigures
as something
likea deepassumption
be T andnot-T.
behind,
remarkin
forexample,(lb). Thus,we mayfairly
paraphraseAristotle's
itis notpossiblethatthesamethingshould
(): '. .. ifthatis necessary,
animal(otherwise,
"man"and "notnotbe, at thattime,a two-footed
man"wouldhavethesamesignification,
whichtheycannot)/
thattheelenctic
Iftheseconsiderations
confirm
is governed
argument
it
confirmation
at
a
a
unified
is
cost.
For
as
the
notionof
just
strategy,
by
in
final
is
suited
for
essential
so
the
predication,
proof
signification (2a)
Ifso, theelenctic
appearsto hold for'Mx' as an essentialpredication.
proofas a wholemayproveatmostthatPNC holdsforthingsand their
Thisis troubling
becausea chiefeffect
oftheelenctic
essential
properties.
the
of
PNC
albeit
'elenctiis
to
confirm
firmness
by supporting,
proof
in
F
that
3's
Prooftoprove
Indubitability
cally',theprinciple was used
and thismustbe an unrestricted
versionof PNC
its own firmness,
becauseitmustbe a principlethatis immunetoallerror.
Kirwan's
We can getcleareron whatis at issuehereby considering
version
(1971) view of Stage 3 of the argument.The narrow-scope
and
This
additional
Aristotle's
(lb")
(lb"')premises,
plus
requires
wordingin(a) ofthetext,citedabove,favorthewide-scopereading.But
Kirwanhas a more seriousobjectionto the narrow-scopeversion,
arrowin (lb') is read
namely,that'Mx' canimply'D7Y, onlyifthefirst
if
'Mx'
is
an
essential
as strict
hence,
and,
only
implication
predication.
and so also for
In short,(lb') is satisfiedonlyby essentialpredications
the conclusion,(Id'). Accordingto Kirwan,however,(lb) is not so
holdsouthope
and so thewide-scopeversionoftheargument
restricted
of
PNC.
version
forprovingan unrestricted
Butevenifits'- ' is notreadas strict
implication,
surely(lb)'s modal
essentialprediformula,
D(x)(Mx- Tx),is satisfied
onlybyAristotelian
of theformulais governedby (2a), which
cations.For interpretation
the
requiresthatT be theessenceofx. Thisis clearfrominstantiating
T. So farfrombeingevencontingently
withnon-essential
formula
true,
itis plainlyfalsethatifCalliasis whitethathe is a color,whileitis true,
animal.So the
and necessarily
so,thatifhe is a man,he is a two-footed
'Mx' as a schema
also dependson construing
truthof(lb)'s antecedent
foressentialpredication.
wouldprovePNC fora
In eitherversion,then,theelencticargument
Lukasiewicz(1910a,1910b)and Anclass of predications.
restricted
aboutsubstances.6
scombe(1963)reducetheseto essentialpredications
of
the
universal
of
values
for
the
thus
quantifiers
construing range
By
and
to
be
substance
individuals,
(lb')
(lb)
theyprecludeanyinterpretationrelatingStage3 to a generaldefenseofPNC. Butnoticethateven

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TheScopeofNon-Contradiction
235

were Lukasiewicz,Anscombe,and theirfollowers,

correctabout the
forceoftheelenctic
affirms
PNC
proof,itwouldnotfollowthatAristotle
as a restricted
Lukasiewicz
is
to
do
this
when
he
principle.7
tempted
declares(1910b,502)thatPNC isnota generalontological
lawbutrather
a metaphysical
oneholdingprimarily
forsubstances
butnot,atleastnot
for
as
well.
there
However,
obviously, appearances
simplyis no evidence thatAristotlewould entertainsuch a restriction.
Indeed, On
features
as standardconInterpretation
justsuchpredicatesin offering,
'Socratesis white'and 'Socratesisnotwhite.'Moreassertions,
tradictory
over,a good deal of the argumentof F 5 aims to establishthatthe
domaindoes notfalloutsidethescopeofPNC.
perceptible
Eventakingtheelenctic
proofas itstands,thereisno reasontorestrict
substance
itsconclusion
individuals
only.Allowingaccidentindividuals
tocountas valuesdoesnotvitiatetheargument
and,moreimportantly,
a
the
to
PNC.
opens way
fullygeneral
Thattheargument's
validityis unaffected
by allowing'D(x)(Mx -
to
over
non-substantial
individualsis clearfromexample.Let
Tx)' range
'oc'be thenameofa colorindividual.Thenitis a necessarytruththatif
a is whitethena is a color.Likewise,forthenarrow-scope
formula,
a color.Moreover,
(x)(Mx- DTx). If a is white,thena is necessarily
becauseitis a colorindividual,
a is essentially
whiteandso theconstraint
on essentialpredication
is satisfied
on bothversionsoftheargument.8

6 Theyappeartobe followed
ofNon-ConbyFurth('A NoteonAristotle's
Principle
CanadianJournalof Philosophy
16 [1986] 371-82),Hutchison('L'
tradiction',
du Principede Contradiction
chez Aristote',
Revuede Philosophie
Epistemologie
Ancienne
6 [1988]213-227),and Cresswell('Non-Contradiction
and Substantial
Predication',
forthcoming).
7 Weretheargument
toestablish
PNC forsubstances
seekto
only,onewouldrather
ina waythatrelatedittoAristotle's
inMetaphysics
explainthisrestriction
program
F. Thus,Cresswell,'Non-Contradiction',
focuson
suggeststhattheargument's
substances
reflects
thefactthatF installsthemat thecenterofthescienceofbeing
reasonnottotakeAristotle
tohaveheld,
quabeing.Butthisjustgivesan additional
ingeneral,
thatPNC is a restricted
principle.
8 Comparethisparagraph
withFurth,
a moresanguineopinionof
'Note',whooffers
Anscombe's
viewas 'an interesting
and ... too-little-attended
caseforthethesisthat
theargument
thatthe"onething"be theessenceofa substantial
kind.'No
requires
suchrequirement
isathand.Although
itisnotclearthatherecognizes
thefact,
Lear
andLogicalTheory
to
(Aristotle
1980],108-9)also appearscommitted
[Cambridge
theprooftoessentialpredications
aboutsubstances.
Forthisis a conserestricting

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236 M.V.Wedin
How does thisenable us to extendthe rangeof PNC? Beginby
on theconclusionwithsubscript
therestriction
'E':
registering
explicitly
a -MxE).Herewe mayread'M' as standing
foranystandard
-iO(3x)(MxE
anysuchpredicateis essentially
predipredicatebecause,forAristotle,
Thetrick
nowis tousethisfacttoextendtheelenctic
catedofsomething.9
proofofPNC toaccidentalpredications.
forexample,'SocConsider,then,a standardaccidentalpredication,
thetruthconditions
forsucha predication
ratesis white'.ForAristotle
arenotjustthatSocratesexistandbe white.Theremustalso obtainwhat
of the followingsort:
I shall call a fineontologicalconfiguration
a
a
a
x=Socrates
is
substance
yis a colorindividual
particular
(3x)(3y)(x
a y is in x a WyE).Thatis,in additionto Socratesthereexistsa second
individual,a colorindividual,thatis presentin Socratesand thatis
white.10
Supposenowwe considerwhatsortoffineconfiguessentially
rationwouldhavetoobtainwereitpossiblethatSocratesbe simultaneI suggest,requiresthatthefolouslywhiteand notwhite.Aristotle,
a x=Socratesa y is a
is
a
substance
hold:
(3x)(3y)(x
particular
lowing
colorindividuala y is in x a WyEa -iWyE).But sincetherestricted
a -iMxe),holdsforany
conclusionoftheelencticargument,
-iO(3x)(MxE
that
there
a y suchthatWyEa
it
be
is
predicateswhatever, impossible
that
the
Therefore, ontologicalconfiguration would have to ob-iWyE.
tainwere it possiblethatSocratesbe whiteand not whiteis, by the
elencticproof,an impossibleontological
configuration.
The roughprinciple,
then,thatextendstheelencticproofto a fully
generalPNC is this:

of (2a): It is the notionof

quence of his explanationof the modal-ladenness
between
tomakethedistinction
whichenablesAristotle
notsignifying,
substance,
Butthissimplyassumesthat
aboutonething/
onethingand signifying
signifying
thegeneralrelation
cannotservetoexemplify
thepair,'man'andtwo-footed
animal,
betweena thinganditsessence.
fromany
thatis,a predicate
I meana categorial
9 Bya standardpredicate
predicate,
Archiv
ofAristotle's
FormoreonthisseeWedin,'TheStrategy
Categories',
category.
derPhilosophie79 [1997] 1-26,and Aristotle'sTheoryofSubstance:The
fr Geschichte
Zeta (Oxford,forthcoming).
and Metaphysics
Categories

in theCategories
as presentin,butnotsaid of,a
10 Theseare theitemsdemarcated
see Wedin
particulars,
subject.On the claimthatsuch itemsare nonrecurrent
Phronesis
38 [1993]137-165).
Individuals',
('Nonsubstantial

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TheScopeofNon-Contradiction
237
3. 0(3x)(Fx a -iFx) -> 0(3x)(3y)(y=xv ye x a FyEa -Fi/e),
where 'e ' is read as the Categories'in but not as a part'. But given the
elencticargument'sprohibitionagainstjointpredicationofany essential
predicateand itsnegate,we may conclude
4. -.0(3x)(3y)(y=xv ye x a FyEa -nFyE),

and so

5. -,0(3x)(Fxa^Fx).
In (5) we are freeto read Fx as a generalpredicativeschema accommodating accidental as well as essential predication. Thus, if Aristotle
implicitlysupposes somethinglike (3), restrictionof the conclusion of
Stage 3 of the elencticproof does not show him to regard PNC as a
restricted
principle.Indeed, itis partofprovingthefullygeneralversion
registeredin (5).
This proposal, firstsuggested in Wedin (1982), has been resistedby
Cresswell (forthcoming)on the grounds that 'it seems to depend on
analyzing Socrates' not being white as his having in him something
whichis nota whiteness.ButSocratescan have manysuch thingsin him
and stillbe white.' Such reluctancewould be well placed and it does
appear to be invitedby (3). But (3) is only a rough principle.Once we
thegroundsforCresswell'sreluctance
explainhow itis tobe interpreted,
are removed.
I say that(3) is a roughprinciplebecause, whereye x,what can serve
as thevalue of y depends on the predicate,F. Thus, where F is white,y
will be a color individual;where F is sweet,y will be a tasteindividual.
So understood,(3) demands, at most, thatSocrates has in him a color
individualthatis not a whiteness.
The existenceof a colorindividual that
is not white is incompatiblewith Socrates' being white.So the account
does not welcome, as values of y, itemsthatfailto exhibitthe required
withSocrates'swhiteness}1
incompatibility

11 Somewhat
morefully,
theideabehind(3) is that,wherex=y,ywillbe a substance
individualandF willbe a speciesorgenusthatholdsofitessentially;
and,where
individualofa certain
kind,saya bitofwhite,and
yex,ywillbe a nonsubstantial
F willbe a universal
suchas white
orcolorthatholdsofitessentially.
So ywillalways
be an individualfroma determinate
range,in thecase at hand,a colorindividual.
Caseswherex is a nonindividual
withF holdingofitessentially
couldbe handled
totheCategories
relation.
byaddinga provisocorresponding
said-of

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238 M.V.Wedin
A secondobjectionto extending
theresultoftheelencticproofto a
fullygeneralPNC is thatthepossibilityof Socrates'simultaneously
beingwhiteand notwhitecouldas wellbe explainedbythepossibility
whitecolorindividualexistandnotexist.Ratherthan
thatan essentially
(3) we wouldhave
v yex a FyE)a
3a. 0(3x)(Fxa -JFx)-> 0((3x)(3y)(y=x
-<3x)(3y)(y=xv yex a FyJ).
Whiletheconsequentof(3a) is false,and so would imply-iO(3x)(Fxa
is due to straightforward
ofPNC. Hereit
-.Fx),itsfalsity
infringement
can
be
to
bear
on a general
is notobvioushowtheelenctic
proof
brought
versionofPNC.
wouldbe tosimplyinsistthatwe
Now,oneresponsetothissituation
thatextendstheresultoftheelenctic
dohavean interpretation
proofand,
hence,we neednotfollowLukasiewiczand othersinsaddlingAristotle
- evenif
withthethesisthatPNC holdsonlyforessentialpredications
But we want something
the conclusionof Stage 3 is so restricted.
thatreflects
Aristotle's
settledviewthatPNC must
something
stronger,
be
so
restricted.
not
thatstarts
Supposewe beginwithan instanceofthegeneralformula
thatSocrates
iswhite
andnotwhite.
(3a),say,theproposition
Representing
subjectand predicatein thestandardway,we replace(3a), whichis
shorthand
formulation,
anyway,withthemorefine-grained
3a'. 0(Faa -Fa) - 0((3x)(3y)(xis a substanceindividuala x=a a y
is a colorindividuala yex a FyE)a -i(3x)(3y)(xis a substance
individuala x-a a y is a colorindividuala yex a FyE)).
truth
conditions
for'Fa' and '-Fa'. So
(3a') justcombinestheAristotelian
tochallengeiton thisbasis.Whatis atissueis
itwouldbe unreasonable
conditions
for'-Fa', whenthisis paired
thetruth
thewaytounderstand
in thesecondmainconjunct
Contained
withitscontradictory
opposite.
of the consequentof (3a'), thesetruthconditionscan be expanded
is notwhiteis thecase,if(i) thereexistsno
further.
Thus,thatSocrates
withSocrates,
orif(ii)thereexistsnocolor
individualidentical
substance
orif(iii)bothexistbutthecolorindividualis notinSocrates,
individual,
or if (iv) bothexistand thecolorindividualis in Socratesbut is not
thesedisjunctive
alternawhite.Forconvenience,
represent
essentially
tivesas follows:
3b. (i) -i(3x)(xis a substanceindividuala x=a);
(ii) -i(3y)(yis a colorindividual);

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TheScopeofNon-Contradiction
239

(iii)(3x)(3y)(xis a substanceindividuala x-a a y is a colorindividuala yx);

(iv) (3x)(3y)(xis a substanceindividuala x=a a y is a colorindividuala yex a -iFyE).
whichoftheseconditions
is relevantto
Thetasknowis todetermine
can contribute
to a
thecase at hand.Thatis,whichofthefourdisjuncts
it
that
would
have
to
be
like
were
of
what
the
world
possible
description
to bear in mindthat
Socratesbe whiteand notwhite.It is important
hold foroneandthesame
thatthispossibility
Aristotle
requires,fairly,
that
there
could existsomething,
of
PNC
denies
his
version
For
thing.
and not white.This
that
was
white
and
the
same
some one
thing,
to
For
excludesthefirst
disjunct. according (3b[i]),therewillbe no one
and the same thingthatis the putativesubjectof the contradictory
Fa and -Fa. The secondand thirddisjunctsarenow seento
assertions,
be hardlymoreplausible.For thisone and the same thing,whose
willbe thesubjectofcontradictory
assertions
either
isrequired,
existence
becausethereexistno colorindividualsat all,as in (3b[ii]),orbecause
colorindividualsexist,butnotin thesubjectin question,as in (3b[iii]).
can hardlyaccept,forthey
However,theseareproposalsthatAristotle
therelationbetweenbasic
runafoulof a favoredprinciplegoverning
and
their
accidents.
subjects
like
ofpropositions
is a generalization
Theprinciple
a yex),
a yis a colorindividual
individual
3c. (x)(3y)(xis a substance
touse thecase at hand.(3c) saysthatanysubstanceindividualmustin
ithavesomecolorindividualorother.Thiswas justthepointmadefive
toCresswell.Moreglobally,analogues
back,inresponding
paragraphs
of(3c)holdforitemsfromtheaccidentalcategories
Thus,any
generally.
substanceindividualmustbe at some place or other,of some size or
other,inrelationtosomethingorother,etc.Indeed,thisgeneralization
substancedeveloped
arguablyliesat theheartofthetheoryofprimary
intheCategories.12
So thesecondand thirddisjuncts,
(3b[ii])and (3b[iii]),
arenotplausible.

12 See Wedin, /rThe

Strategyof Aristotle'sCategories'and Moravcsik,'Aristotle'sTheory of Categories', in Aristotle:A Collectionof CriticalEssays (Notre Dame 1967).

On thissee Wedin,'Some
(3c) turnsoutto call forsomemodification.
Actually,
LogicalRemarks'.

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240 M.V.Wedin
We are,thus,leftwiththefourth
alternative,
(3b[iv]).Thisalonecould
whattheworldwould have tobe likewereit
playa rolein specifying
possiblethatSocratesbe whiteandnotwhite.Sucha worldwouldhave
tosatisfy
3a". 0(Faa -Fa) - 0(3x)(3y)(xis a substanceindividuala x=a a y
is a colorindividuala yex a FyEa -iFyE);
butthisway oftheworldis preciselywhattheelencticproofdeclares
ofan essentialpredicate
whenitproscribes
jointascription
impossible,
and itsnegate.So we are,afterall,able to extendthisresultto a fully
themannerprescribed
byourprinciple(3). Of
generalPNC inprecisely
introducesadditional,
course,(3c), and its underlying
generalization,
neutralwithrespectto
buttheseareentirely
considerations,
non-logical,
schemethatis
theimmediate
question.For(3c) is partofan ontological
in
PNC
and
of
worriesabout
an
interest
of
independently
proposedquite
At theveryleast,theprincipleenhancesthe
therangeoftheprinciple.
of(3a").13
credentials
Aristotelian
ofPhilosophy
Department
ofCalifornia
University
Davis,CA 95616
mvwedin@ucdavis.edu

theprooftobetheestablishing
takesthepointofrestricting
13 Cresswell
(forthcoming)
thanas a logicallaw.Butsurelyour(5)
rather
ofPNC as a metaphysical
principle,
and itis completely
canbe readas a metaphysical
general.Likewise,we
principle
run
also
oftherestricted
nowsee,for(3). Proponents
up againsta textual
reading
as Cresswellis aware,thecanonical
consideration.
andan interpretative
Textually,
showsnohintofrestriction;
ofPNC at 1005bl8-20
formulation
and,whenAristotle
On the
hisformulation
theelenctic
finishes
againappearstobe fullygeneral.
proof,
4
F
aims
to
that
bears
and
so
it
often
unnoticed,
side,
repeating,
goes
interpretive
- F 3's
itentersas a premiseintheproofofitsownfirmness
PNC because
establish
thatwas immunetoallerror,
a principle
Proof.Sincethisconcerned
Indubitability
of-.(/?a -.p)
instances
toadmitthatcertain
itwouldbe odd,indeed,wereAristotle
do notenjoysuchimmunity.

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TheScopeofNon-Contradiction
241

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