THE WHITE DEATH:

THE BATTLE FOR SUOMUSSALMI

7 DEC 1939 TO 8 JAN 1940
MICHAEL R. EVANS
23 MAY 1997
Please send comments to the author at Tbolt6@aol.com .
Reproduce this article only with author's permission.
ORDER OF BATTLE
OPPOSING FORCES:
FINN
Northern Group of Forces (P-SRE)
MG W.E. Tuompo
22nd Field Replenishment (Replacement Depot) Division (22.KT-D)
TASK FORCE SUSI
LTC Paavo Susitaival
16th Separate Infantry Battalion, (ErP16), MAJ I. Pallari, succeeded by LTC Paavo
Susitaival, succeeded by CPT Salske
15th Separate Infantry Battalion, (ErP 15), CPT Matti Harola
6th Bicycle Battalion, (PPP6), MAJ Jaervinen
Two Civic Guard battalions, MAJ Kaarle Kari
One Border Police company, LT Elo
9TH DIVISION (formed on 21 Dec)
COL Hjalmar Siilasvuo, commanding
CPT Maekinen, G2
CPT Alpo Marttinen, G3
27th Infantry Regiment, (JR27), COL Hjalmar Siilasvuo, succeeded by
COL Johann Makiniemi
(1/27, CPT Eino Lassila)
(2/27, MAJ Sihvonen)
(3/27, CPT Airimo)
64th Infantry Regiment, (JR64), LTC Frans Fagernaes
(1/64, CPT Maenkonen)
(2/64, CPT L. Raesaenen)
(3/64 CPT P. Simelius)
65th Infantry Regiment, (JR65), LTC Karl Mandelin)
(1/65 MAJ Y. Hakanen)
(2/65 CPT Hyppoelae)
(3/65, CPT M. Flink)

1st Ranger Battalion, (SissiP1), CPT Sulo Haekkinen

22nd Reconnaissance Bn, (Kev.Os22), CPT Ahti Paavola
22nd Pioneer Bn, (PionP22), LT Sorasalmi
9th Divisional Artillery, (KTR9), CPT Ahlholm
Elements of 4th Field Artillery Regt, (KTR4)
4th Replacement Battalion, LT Karhunen
SOVIET
9TH ARMY
Army Commander Chuikov
45th Corps
Corps Commander Dashitsev
44th Rifle Division
("Shorsi" or "Blue" Division)
Division Commander Vinogradov
25th Rifle Regiment
305th Rifle Regiment
146th Rifle Regiment
4th Recon Battalion
44th Pioneer Battalion
312th Tank Battalion
58th Antitank Battalion
3rd Ski Regiment
48th Truck Battalion
122nd Artillery Regiment
179th Artillery Regiment
44th Medical Battalion
84th Mobile Field Hospital
Horse Field Clinic
AAA Machine-gun Company
Signal Battalion
Divisional Air Support Unit
Various members of Kuusinen's "Peoples' Democratic Army of Finland"
163rd Rifle Division
Division Commander Selendsov
759th Rifle Regiment
662nd Rifle Regiment
81st Rifle Regiment
1st Bn/82nd Rifle Regiment
163rd Recon Battalion
230th Pioneer Battalion
246th Pioneer Battalion
13th Road Construction Battalion
222nd Tank Battalion
203rd Antitank Battalion

304th Antitank Company

148th Truck Battalion
147th Transportation Regiment
86th Artillery Regiment
365th Artillery Regiment
163rd Medical Battalion
225th Field Hospital
175th Hospital
248th Signal Battalion
147th Chemical Company (Decon)
204th Chemical Battalion
274th Field Bakery
About 100 members of Kuusinen's "Peoples' Democratic Army of Finland"
SYNOPSIS: On 30 Nov 1939, the USSR invaded Finland. The Soviet 9th Army attacked to
seize the rail center at Oulu to cut Finland in two at the narrow waist and cut off rail
communication with Sweden. The two divisions attacked successively, first the 163rd along a
northeast to southwest axis on the northern flank, and then the 44th along a southeast to
northwest axis on the southern flank. The initial task was to seize the road junction of
Suomussalmi and to destroy any Finn forces in that area to allow the 9th Army to control the
Suomussalmi-Oulu axis of advance. Finn forces rushed to the area quickly built up from
constant harassment attacks, which greatly limited Soviet movement, to vicious local road
cutting and blocking attacks which created isolated pockets of Soviet forces (which the Finns
termed "mottis," from the Finn word for a cord of firewood, cut and left in measured piles to
be collected later). The 44th Division stalled on the road six miles south of Suomussalmi, still
in a 20 mile long march formation. They were opposed by a two-company roadblock. The
163rd Division, meanwhile, was hacked to pieces, ceasing to exist on or about 29 Dec 1939.
The Finns then turned their attention to the 44th Division, which suffered a similar fate,
resistance ceasing on the morning of 8 Jan 1940.
This is an example of what a small number of well-trained, well-led, motivated soldiers can
do when faced with seemingly overwhelming odds in numbers and materiel. The Soviets,
however, learned a number of valuable lessons from this battle and the others like it during
this war, and applied these lessons in total or in part by the time of the German invasion of
the USSR in the spring of 1941. As a result, the Red Army faced by the Wehrmacht was
greatly improved and would continue to improve every day from the one which had seemed
so inept to German military observers in the icy Finn forests.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Khrushchev, Nikita; Khrushchev Remembers; ed by Strobe Talbott; Little, Brown, & Co;
NY; 1960
2. US Government Printing Office; Finland: A Country Study; Federal Research Division;
Library of Congress; Washington, DC; 1990
3. Zaloga, Stephen and Grandsen, James; Soviet Tanks and Combat Vehicles of WW II; Arms
& Armour Press; London; 1984
4. Poirer, Robert and Conner, Albert; The Red Army Order of Battle in the Great Patriotic
War; Presidio Press; Novato; 1985
5. Upton, Anthony; Finland, 1939-1940; University of Delaware Press; Newark; 1974

6. Engle, Eloise and Paananen, Lauri; The Winter War; Stackpole Books; Harrisburg; 1973
7. Trotter, William; A Frozen Hell; Algonquin Books; Chapel Hill; 1991
8. Dupuy, RE and TN; The Encyclopedia of Military History; Harper Collins; 1993
9. Goff, James; The Winter War; (reprinted from Strategy and Tactics Magazine); ST 17-1824; Combined Arms Warfare, Late-Modern; USA Armor Center; Fort Knox; 1988
10. Garder, Michel; A History of The Soviet Army; Frederick A. Praeger; 1966
11. Liddell-Hart, Basil (ed); The Red Army; Harcourt, Brace, & Co; 1956
12. Mackintosh, Malcolm; Juggernaut: A History of the Soviet Armed Forces; Macmillan Co;
1967
13. O'Ballance, Edgar; The Red Army; Frederick A. Praeger; 1964
14. Interview (via Email) by the author with Tuomas Erik Seijavuori, 2LT, Finn Army, 24-27
Nov 1996
15. Chew, Dr. Allen F.; The Destruction of the Soviet 44th Motorized Rifle Division (Chapter
2 of Leavenworth Papers #5, Fighting the Russians in Winter, Three Case Studies, US Army
Command & General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1981
16. Chew, Dr. Allen F.; The White Death; The Epic of the Soviet-Finnish Winter War,
Michigan State University Press, 1971.
17. Samuels, Martin; Doctrine and Dogma: German and British Infantry Tactics in the First
World War, Greenwood Press, NY, 1992

THE STRATEGIC SETTING

"And thus be it e'ere
When free men shall stand
Between their loved homes
And the wars' desolation"
Francis Scott Key
The Star Spangled Banner
1st Stanza, 4th Verse
1814
A note on Soviet ranks: The Revolution abolished the ranks of
General and Admiral, consequently commanders at Brigade-level
and higher were referred to by the size formation they led,
e.g. Division Commander Selendsov or Army Commander
Meretskov.

There is very little written in English about the Russo-Finnish Winter War of 1940,
overshadowed as it was by the opening days of WW II. When discussed at all, it has
generally been viewed as a Red Army dress rehearsal, one which benefited them by exposing
serious defects in leadership, training, organization, doctrine, and materiel; defects which, if
not entirely corrected by May 1941, were at least somewhat mitigated by that point. The
Germans took keen note of this "rehearsal", and took away with them some accurate
observations of Red Army shortcomings, but they gravely underestimated the Red Army's
potential in their myopic focus on Soviet inferiority and incompetence. This underestimation
was to be a key factor in the German predictions of swift victory over the Soviets in the
summer of 1941.
In the opening months of WW II, the international situation seemed to be going the way of
the totalitarian powers, of which the USSR had been part since concluding the MolotovRibbentrop Pact on 27 Aug 1939. While certainly not friends, the Soviets were not opposed

to reaping the fruits of Nazi aggression, joining to seize half of Poland on 17 Sep 1939. The
Soviet perspective on German performance in Poland, their own success there, and their
proxy-experience in the Spanish Civil War from 1936 to 1939 seemed to indicate the ease
with which large, mechanized formations, synchronized with large-scale air attacks, could
crush the defenders of small nations. Additionally, the Soviets hearkened back to the glory
days of the Revolution in anticipation of an uprising by a "fifth column" of communist
workers and peasants who would surely welcome the "liberating" Red Army. The Russian
Civil War (their only major combat experience to this point) along with the abortive 20-yearold Finnish Bolshevik uprising of 1918 (The Finn War of 1918), seemed to confirm this
belief. They did not take into account the effects of 20 years of freedom and democracy and
an economy so strong that it was the only nation (and still is) to repay completely its WW I
debt to the USA (Finland's debt had been assumed from the extant debt of Tsarist Russia).
Ever since the 1917 Revolution and the establishment of Finland as an independent (and
suspicious of everything communist or Russian) nation, the Soviets had been nervous about
the vulnerability of Leningrad and its access to the Baltic through the Gulf of Finland.
Friendly relations between Finland and Germany (which had provided assistance to the Finn
anti-Communist White Guard during the Finn Bolshevik uprising) did not help Soviet
paranoia, no matter what policies of neutrality Finland espoused. The presence of Carl Gustav
von Mannerheim (a former Tsarist General in WW I) as Finn Minister of Defense was a cause
of great concern. In addition, the pre-eminent role played by the ruling Social Democratic
Party (Mensheviks to the old Bolsheviks) as the majority national party only seemed to
confirm Soviet suspicions of a capitalist threat on their most vulnerable border.
On 5 Oct 1939, Soviet Foreign Minister V.M. Molotov began a series of diplomatic
discussions with the Finn Foreign Ministry over what the Soviets termed "concrete political
questions." Their demands were simple and even, to them, generous. In short, they wanted
cession of most of the Finn islands in the Gulf of Finland, rights to fortify the rest, cession of
40 miles of the Karelian isthmus, destruction of all Finn frontier fortifications, a nonaggression pact, and an agreement by Finland not to enter into any diplomatic agreements
without Soviet approval. In return, they offered territory in Soviet Karelia nearly twice as
large as the area to be ceded by Finland. However, Soviet demands touched on the most
prosperous and populous area of Finland. Additionally, Finn suspicions of Soviet intent (the
Baltic Republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania had been "neutralized" in Sep under
similar pretexts) precluded any agreement which involved the loss of frontier security. The
Finns, cautious as always, began mobilization of their largely reservist Army on 10 Oct 1939.
At about the same time, the Soviets began a partial mobilization, but did not anticipate
inevitable hostilities. As Nikita Khrushchev reminisced on meetings with Stalin, Molotov,
and Voroshilov, "All we had to do was raise our voices a little bit, and the Finns would obey.
If that didn't work, we could fire one shot and the Finns would put up their hands and
surrender. Or so we thought." In preparation for the expected easy victory, an old Finn
Bolshevik from the War of 1918, Otto Kuusinen, was detailed from the Comintern to head up
a "Karelian SSR". (Later, following hostilities, this role was expanded to "Leader of the
Peoples' Democratic Republic of Finland", reflecting the optimistic Soviet anticipation of
total victory and the communization of all of Finland.) Soviet optimism was further reflected
in their military preparations; Commissar for Defense Marshal K.E. Voroshilov planned to
use only the staff and troops of the Leningrad Military District, augmented with some units
drawn from other areas. He expected a two-month campaign. Marshal G.I. Kulik, Deputy
Commissar for Defense, instructed Chief Marshal of Artillery N.N. Voronov to plan his
ammunition consumption estimates on a twelve-day campaign. The more pessimistic
analysts, including Leningrad Military District Commander K.A. Meretskov and Chief of the

General Staff Army Commander Boris Shaposhnikov, cautioned against expected stiff Finn
resistance, but were unable to prevail against Stalin's political assumptions.
The Soviets mustered a huge force, considering the expected weakness of their opposition. A
nation of 171 million fielded 600,000 soldiers organized into four Armies, comprising 28
Rifle Divisions, one Mechanized Corps, and five Tank Brigades against a nation of 3.5
million fielding an reservist Army of three Corps, comprising eight Infantry Divisions, plus
an assortment of Border Guards and Civic Guards. Total Finn troop strength was around
300,000 after mobilization, including the Civic Guard (Suojeleskunnat) and the Womens'
Auxiliary (Lotta Svaerd, a noncombatant force which took on clerical, casualty evacuation,
food services, and transportation tasks). The Finns had 28 old WW I vintage Renault FT-17
tanks (dug in as pillboxes as part of the Mannerheim Line, behind Kirvesmaeki), ten VickersArmstrong light tanks (also employed in Karelia), and their artillery (by normal table of
organization only 24 field guns and 12 howitzers per Division) was mostly of Russo-Japanese
War (1905) vintage and, while serviceable, were critically low on ammunition. Some units
were still using Model 1887 107mm guns, manufactured before the invention of counterrecoil mechanisms.
The Soviets deployed their forces along the entire Russo-Finn border, with the bulk of their
forces concentrated opposite the Mannerheim Line, a string of Finn obstacle, bunker, and
trench system fortifications stretching for about 90 miles across the Karelian isthmus. While
frequently portrayed as heavily defended, the Mannerheim Line was actually nothing more
than a series of outposts and occasional log-bunker/trench system strongpoints without any
serious fortifications in depth. The rest of the Finn border had no fortifications at all. The
Soviet plan, as devised by Meretskov, was simple. By pressing the Finn defenses as hard as
possible along the entire length of the border, the Finns would be forced to commit their
entire force, including any scant reserves, to a desperate attempt to prevent penetration of
their borders and the piecemeal division of their homeland. Meanwhile, the Mannerheim Line
would be crushed between the anvil of the Soviet 7th Army, attacking frontally, and the
hammer of the Soviet 8th Army which would penetrate Finn defences north of Lake Ladoga
to swing south and catch the defenders from behind, enabling the 7th Army to advance into
the interior of Finnish Karelia, the economic, political, and demographic heart of Fnland. The
9th Army, under Army Commander Chuikov, comprising a Special Corps (122nd Rifle
Division), the main effort 45th Corps (163rd and 44th Rifle Divisions), Group Rebola (54th
Rifle Division) and a reserve (88th Rifle Division), would attack west toward Oulu to cut
Finland in half and to deny western support from reaching Finn forces. The Soviet 14th Army
and Group Murmansk would occupy the Arctic port of Petsamo and northern Finland
(Lapland) to secure the northern flank.
The Finns faced this threat with a sense of optimism. While the USSR was their only likely
opponent, and the Finns had no real hope of prevailing, most anticipated foreign assistance.
Accordingly, their plan was simple - hold out for as long as possible and rely on the collective
Western European conscience. Unfortunately, in the winter of 1939-1940, most of Europe
was otherwise involved. The USA had retreated behind a curtain of isolationist rhetoric,
buttressed by anti-intervention laws passed in the wake of the Spanish Civil War. Finland
faced the Red Army onslaught on its own; the only help forthcoming was to be too little, too
late.

TACTICAL SITUATION
"We tried to put our own troops on skis, too,
but it wasn't easy for ordinary, untrained Red

Army soldiers to fight on skis. We started

intensively to recruit professional sportsmen.
There aren't many around. We had to bring them
from Moscow and the Ukraine as well as
Leningrad. We gave them a splendid send off...
Poor fellows, they were ripped to shreds. I don't
know how many came back alive."
Nikita Khrushchev
Khrushchev Remembers
referring to the 3rd Ski Regt
The Area of Operations
Climate and Weather
Central Finland, in the vicinity of Suomussalmi, is characterized by vast, dense deciduous
and coniferous forests, the land carved by recent glacial activity into a patchwork of snowmelt filled swamps, bogs, ponds, and lakes. Low ridges and long, narrow valleys stretch
generally northeast to southwest. The Soviet intent to cut Finland in half in this area might
have seemed simple and inviting on a map in Leningrad, but reality was not so
accommodating. While Oulu was a critical point and a reasonable selection as an objective,
the problem lay in getting there. To cross the grain of the dominant terrain through vast,
virgin forests in the dead of winter on roads which were little more than logging and farm
trails seemed to the Finns to be so ill-advised that the Soviet attack there came as a complete
surprise.
This surprise was the only thing the Soviets would have in their favor. In this environment (it
was the coldest winter seen in Europe since the beginning of record keeping in 1828 temperatures of -30 degrees F were common) and in the face of vicious and persistent
harassment by Finns who skied over 20 foot snow drifts with ease in their white camouflage
snowsuits (fighting, in many cases, in their own backyards), the Soviets were singularly illprepared. The hapless Ukrainian, Russian, and Central Asian conscripts faced what they came
to call "Belaya Smjert" (the White Death) which could come peacefully, when an entire patrol
simply vanished in the frigid, silent forest, or violently, in the form of a bullet in the head
from an invisible Finn sniper hundreds of yards away. The night, when it came, seemed long
when compared to the nights the southern Soviet conscripts knew, with the sun setting at
1430 and not rising until 0930.
Terrain
The whole region was an obstacle to mechanized units. Cross-country mobility was
hampered by the dense forests and swamps; the Soviets were reduced to operating in long
regimental, or even division-sized columns, with little or no flank security. Patrols, when
sent, floundered ineffectually in the deep snow and forests, or they simply vanished without a
trace. Avenues of approach were the Juntusranta-Kiannanniemi road, running E-W in the
north; the Raate-Suomossalmi road running E-W in the south; and the SuomussalmiPalovaara road running N-S between the two. This is where the bulk of the fighting occurred.
Frozen lakes and bogs offered inviting opportunities for movement, but only served the Finns
as such. (When employed by the ungainly Soviets, they became only fields of fire or, when
incompletely frozen or subjected to artillery fire, deathtraps for the unwary.) Roads were
generally poor, even the Juntusranta-Raate road was only a two-lane gravel track. The Finns
compensated by constructing "ice roads" parallel to the main roads, but Soviet attempts at the
same were interdicted by aggressive Finn patrolling and ambushes. Key terrain was the
mobility corridors and road junctions; the Soviets needed to move to attain their operational

objectives, the Finns had to deny that movement. Ultimately, Soviet success depended on
seizure of the Hyrynsalmi and Puolanka road junctions for access to the Finn interior. The
Finns, freed from a dependence on terrain by superior mobility, ignored the roads which were
so necessary to Soviet success and focused on the enemy force and its ability to fight.
Observation was frequently limited to only a few hundred yards or simply the next bend in
the road. Cover and concealment favored the defender; if the defender fought from the
forests. If anchored to the roads, snaking through the low areas and shallow ravines as were
the Soviet formations, an attacker would have an easy time creeping up on an unsuspecting
road-bound unit with a field of fire perhaps 200 yards across, at best.
Combat Effectiveness
1. Soviet.
The two Soviet Divisions in this battle arrived at, or near, 100% strength. The 44th Rifle
Division, in particular, was considered a crack unit, composed of Ukrainians, and based in the
Military District of Moscow. The 163rd Rifle Division was not so well regarded, composed
primarily of Central Asians who were completely out of their environment in the far north.
The 44th had been issued ski manuals, but no skis, immediately prior to their departure for
Soviet Karelia. A Ski Regiment attached to the 44th was never employed as such. Soviet
tanks and other vehicles were painted olive drab, and their uniforms, while generally warm
enough, were khaki. The Soviets did not begin to camouflage their uniforms and equipment
until Jan 1940. Soviet petroleum based lubricants froze in the bitter cold, and their vehicle
engines had to be run every two hours or their batteries would die. (The Finns used glycerin
and antifreeze as a lubricant and were not dependent on vehicles for movement). The Soviets
brought their entire complement of antitank guns, their flat trajectories useless in the forest
and in the complete absence of any Finn tanks.
Soviet training had focused on large unit combined arms warfare in open terrain. Their
command structure was rigid and prescriptive, primarily a result of the political climate in the
Red Army of the late 1930s. Many of their best and brightest officers had been purged in
1937-1938; those who remained were groveling "yes-men" to their "Politruk" commissars or
were timid non-entities. Soviet tactical intelligence, in the absence of effective patrolling or
sympathetic locals, was non-existent, and their strategic intelligence (including maps) was
frequently just plain wrong. In one case, however, they were accurate: in 1937 a Red Army
pamphlet on the Finn Army noted that all Finn troops were experienced skiers trained for
combat in cold weather, and that their exercises focused on active defense in the difficult Finn
terrain. Soviet commanders seem not to have paid much attention to this warning.
2. Finn
The Finns suffered from grave materiel deficiencies, primarily a result of pre-war political
decisions based on economy and an assumption of the inviolability of neutrality. When COL
Hjalmar Siilasvuo led his 27th Infantry Regiment into battle near Sumossalmi, he had no
weapon heavier than .50 cal Maxim heavy machine-guns. Their only antitank weapons were
grenades, satchel charges, crowbars, and "Molotov Cocktails," which got their name here
when the Finn State Liquor Board starting manufacturing and distributing empty "fifth"
bottles for just this purpose. He had no artillery, and was even short of some individual
equipment, such as load-bearing equipment and uniforms. Most units lacked radios below
regimental level and field-telephones were a battalion-level asset. This was fairly typical of
the entire Finn Army. Most of their artillery, of pre-WW I vintage, lacked sufficient
ammunition. They did, however, have tents and lightweight, portable, wood-fired heaters.
These were carried, along with other heavy gear and supplies, in sleds pulled by skiers, called
akhios. This preparation for extended cold weather operations was to become a key
advantage as the battle progressed.

Finn individual weapons, however, were generally quite good. Both sides used variants of the
reliable and effective 7.92mm M1891/30 Mosin-Nagant bolt-action rifle, but the Finns also
had a significant number of 7.92mm Lahti M-26 light machine-guns (comparable to the US
BAR, although prone to jams in cold weather as a result of over-fine machining), and the
excellent, if expensively made, Suomi 9mm M-31 sub machine-gun. This last weapon had
actually been considered and rejected by the Soviets prior to the war; they considered it a
"police weapon." After the Winter War, they paid it the ultimate compliment of copying it in
simplified form as the PPSh-41 of WW II fame. These two rugged automatic weapons, plus
an increasing number of captured Soviet weapons as time went by (the Finns particularly
liked the excellent and reliable 7.92mm Degtyarev light machine-gun) gave the Finns a
significant advantage in squad to platoon level firepower. (Each Finn division was authorized
250 M-31s.) Finally, and most important, what the Finns lacked in heavy weapons they made
up for in independence, initiative, motivation, training, and leadership.
The Finn Army had been born in the Finn seizure of independence from a crumbling Tsarist
empire in 1917. Earlier, however, over 2000 young Finn nationalists had traveled covertly to
Germany where they enlisted to fight, indirectly, for Finn independence, becoming the
Prussian 27th Royal Jaeger Battalion. (The Jaeger Battalions in the German Imperial Army
were elite light infantry formations which employed maximum flexibility, dispersion, and
small unit initiative in reconnaissance, screening, and infiltration roles. They functioned as
reconnaissance and security forces for German Corps.) The 27th Jaegers had served on the
Eastern Front in the massive campaigns of maneuver around Tannenburg and the Silurian
Lakes, the victories of which led to the fall of the Tsarist Monarchy and the Treaty of BrestLitovsk.
The 27th Jaeger alumni returned home schooled in the ideas of the German Imperial Army
which reformed itself in five bloody years of warfare. Ideas such as Schwerpunkt (decisive or
critical point), Aufrollen (rolling up enemy forces from their flanks), Flachen und
Lukentaktik (surfaces/areas and gaps or zone defense), Die Leere des Gefechtsfeldes (the
empty battlefield or counter- reconnaissance/security zone), Schlagfertigkeit (quick response
or immediate counter action), and Fuhring nach Direktiv (mission-based orders), as well as
the doctrines of individual initiative and battle tactics focused on recon-pull and the enemy's
vulnerability permeated their thinking. A professional elite, nearly every Finn battalion or
higher commander was an alumnus of the 27th Jaegers, or had been trained by one. (COL
Siilasvuo and his three Regimental commanders, COL Makiniemi, LTC Fagernas, and LTC
Mandelin, were all alumni of the 27th Jaegers.) These officers, and others like them, had
trained their subordinates in the same doctrines.
The Finns were also fighting on their own home ground. With a childhood spent in
orienteering, cross-country skiing, and hunting, the Finn tactics were a mixture of WW I
German Stosstrupp and plain old home-grown woodland savvy. Considering their
performance, even after mobilization put captains in charge of battalions, and majors in
charge of regiments, the soundness of their training and leadership is evident. Add to this the
motivation of free men fighting for their homes against Soviet conscripts, some of whom
were so ignorant they didn't even know the name of the country they were invading. The
Finns were further aided by excellent signal intelligence and by the capture of Soviet tactical
codes in early December, which enabled them to predict Soviet movements and intent. (Finn
commanders generally had decoded and translated enemy signal traffic within five hours,
sometimes as little as two.)

THE BATTLE
"Pursue one great, decisive aim with force and

determination."
Karl von Clausewitz
On War
With the commencement of hostilities on 30 Nov 1939, Soviet 9th Army Commander
Chuikov committed his two lead divisions, the 163rd and 44th Rifle Divisions, to a twopronged attack aimed at the road junction of Suomussalmi. The 163rd, under Division
Commander Selendsov, was committed first as the 9th Army main effort, attacking to seize
the Suomussalmi road junction to allow the 9th Army to attack toward both Peranka and
Hyrynsalmi. The 163rd Div supporting effort, the 759th Rifle Regiment and the 163rd Recon
Battalion, advanced up the Raate road from the south, while the main effort, comprising the
remainder of the Division, took the northern Juntusranta- Palovaara road. Chuikov's intent
was for the 163rd to push the northern Finn defenders past Suomussalmi, south out of his
zone of operations. The 9th Army supporting effort, the 44th Rifle Division (following the
759th Rifle Regiment by about 48 hours) would squeeze the retreating Finns from the south.
Eventually the Finns would be pushed out onto the ice-covered lakes and eliminated. With
Finn resistance crushed, the 9th Army would then be free to advance via Hyrynsalmi and
Puolanka to Oulu, cutting Finland in half and severing the main rail connection to Sweden.
Selendsov's higher commander's guidance included instructions to avoid occupying
Suomussalmi itself, because of the potential for any unit doing so to be trapped between the
lakes on either side of the town.
The Finns did not expect an attack in the vicinity of Juntusranta. The roads in this area were
so spectacularly bad that they hadn't even been considered as an avenue of advance and so the
Finns had shifted the covering force of two battalions of Civic Guards, under MAJ Kaarle
Kari, south towards Raate. When Selendsov crossed the border with the 662nd and 81st Rifle
Regiments and the 163rd Division Troops, the Finns were able to offer only token resistance
from the sole remaining 50-man border police company under LT Elo. Nevertheless, the
Soviets found it extremely slow going. Lead elements only reached Palovaara late on 5 Dec.
At Palovaara, Selendsov ordered the 662nd Regiment, minus one battalion (Division reserve),
to move north to seize Peranka by nightfall on 6 Dec, to protect the Division northern flank .
The 81st continued south to the town, with the remainder of the 163rd, to link up with the
759th Regiment advancing on Suomussalmi from the south. It was at this time that MG W.E.
Tuompo, commanding the Finn Northern Group of Forces (P-SRE), decided that this was the
Soviet main effort in this area, and dispatched his reserve, the 16th Separate Infantry
Battalion (ErP16) under MAJ I. Pallari, from Kuusamo via Peranka to reinforce MAJ Kari's
two Civic Guard battalions which had already moved back to this area. This force arrived in
the vicinity of Lake Piispajaervi at approximately 0100 on 6 Dec and, by noon, occupied
defensive positions to block the Kuusamo road to deny further movement north by the 163rd.
Making contact here late on 6 Dec, the 662nd stopped and began to probe.
Early on 7 Dec, the Finns evacuated and burned the town of Suomussalmi. The demolition
was incomplete, however, and a substantial number of buildings remained intact. Lead
elements of the 81st Rifle Regiment and the 163rd Division Troops arrived later that day,
joined by the end of the day by the 759th Regiment and the 163rd Recon Bn, from the Raate
Road to the south. Pausing, Selendsov issued orders for the 759th Regiment to attack to seize
Puolanka via Hyrynsalmi, and for the 662nd to attack to seize Puolanka via Peranka to allow
the Division to continue its movement west. The 662nd started first. Faced with the bitter
cold and a shortage of tents, meanwhile, Selendsov was unable to resist the temptation to
occupy the town and the surrounding areas from Kylaenmaeki to Lake Kuomasjaervi. The
662nd Regiment, however, was unable to make any headway against ErP16 toward Peranka.
On 8 Dec, MAJ Pallari of ErP16 was wounded, and was replaced by LTC Paavo Susitaival,

on leave from his duties as a member of the Finnish Parliament. With LTC Susitaival given
command of all units north and east of Palovaara (designated TF [Rhymae]) Susi), command
of ErP16 devolved on CPT Salske.
Meanwhile on 7 Dec, Field Marshal von Mannerheim made the decision to commit one of his
few strategic reserves, the 27th Infantry Regiment (JR27) under COL Hjalmar Siilasvuo,
from its assembly area in Kemi. With attachment of TF Susi, the entire force was designated
Task Force (Rhymae) Siilasvuo, under the operational control of P-SRE (although ErP16
remained under direct P-SRE control for the time being). Siilasvuo's mission was to destroy
the 163rd Rifle Division to protect central Finland and its centers of transportation, a tall
order for a light infantry formation (of five battalions with the addition of MAJ Kari's Civic
Guards) one third the size of its adversary and which possessed exactly zero artillery or antitank guns. But the Finns had one advantage: they possessed complete freedom of maneuver,
as opposed to the road-bound Soviets. Additionally, Siilasvuo was able to stage his JR27 out
of the newly completed Kontiomaeki-Taivalkoski rail terminus at Hyrynsalmi (only 25 miles
from Suomussalmi) a terminus so new the Soviets were not aware of its existence. This
terminus provided unbroken Finn logistical support throughout the battle.
By 9 Dec, Siilasvuo had one battalion defending in the vicinity of Hyrynsalmi. By 10 Dec, he
had the entire 27th Regiment in place, plus MAJ Kari's two battalions of Civic Guards which
had been operating in the area since 30 Nov. That night, the Finns moved to an assembly area
in the vicinity of Lake Kuivasjaervi, just south of the Raate road. From here the force
divided. The entire JR27, plus TO 5 and 6 (TO is "TiedusteluOsasto," or recon detachment)
turned west to attack toward Suomussalmi (from the east to west), to cut the 163rd off from
the south. TF Susi was to attack south to cut the 163rd off from the north.Without heavy
weapons, however, JR27 was unable to dislodge the Soviet defenders. Siilasvuo kept the
pressure on, though, while he waited for TF Susi to cut the 163rd off in the north. By 11 Dec,
TF Susi's attacks in the north had forced the 662nd into a defense at Haapavaara, where they
faced the Finns at Ketola across the frozen surface of Lake Piispajaervi. Meanwhile, JR27
established an attack position southeast of Suomussalmi, about five miles south of the Raate
road, and began local operations while they built combat power.
On 11 Dec, Siilasvuo's small force launched the first of many road cutting operations which
would create the famed "mottis." A variant on the German Aufrollen concept, a typical attack
would go something like this: Platoon-size teams, mounted on skis and snowshoes and
wearing white snowsuits, were assembled. The teams were assigned specialized duties:
assault, support, and exploitation. They teams were as heavily armed as possible, with
grenades, sub and light machine-guns, pistols, satchel charges, and "Molotov Cocktails."
Scouts would pre-plot assembly areas, routes, attack positions, and the locations of enemy
defenses. The assault teams would then stage at the assembly areas where they would receive
last minute intelligence, leaders would give their updated orders, and the teams would
rehearse. On receipt of a pre-arranged signal, support teams would begin intense suppressive
fire from support by fire positions. On receipt of a second signal they would shift these fires
to two points about 200 yards apart, creating a "corridor" between the two beaten zones, in
which the assault teams would begin their attack. The assault teams would then cut quickly
across the stunned Soviet column with grenades, satchel charges, and automatic weapons fire.
The objective was to cross the road and reach the other side. At this point, the exploitation
force would rush out to widen, fortify, and occupy the cut, frequently using overturned or
wrecked Soviet vehicles for their roadblocks.
Finn tactical experience near Lake Ladoga had already been assimilated; three miles was the
effective limit for coordinating flank attacks in wooded areas, where the problems of
communications, logistical support, and artillery coordination all limited action. On 11 Dec,
the Finns established a two-company road block on the Raate road to deny Soviet use of this

avenue of advance, under CPT J.A. Maekinen (commanding the 1st Bn, JR64, which was
operating in the area under control of P-SRE). (This battalion was later commanded by CPT
Mankonen when CPT Maekinen was reassigned as 9th Div G2.) The road block was
positioned at the choke point between Lakes Kuomasjaervi and Kuivasjaervi, approximately
6 miles southeast of Suomussalmi. The Soviets could not flank this defense as the Finns had
occupied a low ridge at the choke point between the lakes and covered the flat, frozen surface
of the lakes with heavy machine-gun fire. In the absence of effective patrolling, the Soviets
simply had no idea of the size of the force they were opposing. This block cut the 163rd Rifle
Division off from the 44th Rifle Division, advancing from the south. At the same time, TF
Susi, minus ErP16 (which had fixed the 662nd Regiment at Haapavaara), attacked the 163rd
Division Main Supply Route (MSR) at Hulkonniemi, just northwest of Suomussalmi, to deny
the use of this avenue of advance. While they were unable to dislodge the Soviet defenders,
they were able to bring road traffic under direct harassing fires. From this point on, Selendsov
was on his own.
Finn efforts intensified when, on 13 Dec, a Finn recon aircraft spotted the Soviet 44th Rifle
Division moving past Raate. As the 44th made its slow progress west, radio intercept
indicated its commander, Division Commander A.E. Vinogradov, intended to reach
Suomussalmi by 22 Dec to destroy Finn defences and reinforce the 163rd Division to allow
the 9th Army to continue its westward advance. The Finns noted the better equipment and
state of training in the 44th. Finn attacks on the 163rd were intensified, in the hopes of
defeating it before the 44th could arrive. Siilasvuo also sent raiding teams south to harass and
delay the 44th until then, and immediately began construction of "ice roads," trails plowed
through the snow under the forest canopy and along the frozen surface of the lakes that
paralleled the Raate Road. The one alongside the Raate Road eventually extended the length
of the road, then overland 15 miles back to Moisiovaara where it intersected the established
road net which was joined to the Finn rail system. Another improvised road ran along the
Haukiperae streambed to just west of Lake Kuivasjaervi, and from there, overland to the east.
Once in place, these roads enable rapid movement from one sector to another, by covered and
concealed (under the evergreen forest canopy) routes. They also enabled flanking attacks to
extend as far as 15 miles, instead of the previous three, by providing a communications and
logistics support net. (The Soviets tried "ice roads," too. Finn patrols harassed the 163rd Rifle
Division's attempts to maintain logistics support over the surface of Lake Kiantijaervi.)
During the night of 14-15 Dec, the Soviet 662nd Regiment, still stuck at Haapavaara, staged a
series of attacks toward their objective at Peranka in an attempt to penetrate the Finn defences
to protect the northern flank and MSR of the 163rd Division. ErP16 gave some ground, but,
in a series of counterattacks, regained it by dawn. The Soviets lost 150 dead. This was their
last offensive action in this area.
On 16-17 Dec, the situation began to improve for COL Siilasvuo. On the 16th, LTC
Susitaival's TF Susi was reinforced with the 6th Bicycle Battalion (PPP6) under MAJ
Jaervinen (dispatched by Supreme Headquarters to P-SRE which attached them to
Susitaival). On the 17th, JR27 received its first artillery, a four gun battery of Russian
(Tsarist) made M1905 76.2mm field guns (2nd Battery of the 9th Artillery Regiment;
2/KTR9). With the added forces, Susitaival immediately cleared the area between Lakes
Alajaervi and Kovajaervi and firmly fixed the Soviet 662nd Regiment in place. He also found
time and resources to raid Palovaara. On 17 Dec, PPP6 attacked to
clear enemy forces in the vicinity of the secondary road connecting Yli-Naeljaenkae to allow
access to Vaaekio. By 17 Dec they had reached Vaaekio, and by 22 Dec they had also cleared
the area between Lakes Alajaervi and Kovajaervi.
On 21 Dec, Siilasvuo was reinforced again by the 64th Infantry Regiment (LTC Frans
Fagernaes), the 1st Ranger Battalion (1Sissipataljoona or SissiP1) (CPT Sulo Haekkinen), the

22nd Reconnaissance Battalion (Kev.Os22) (CPT Ahti Paavola), the 22nd Pioneer Battalion
(PionP22) (LT Sorasalmi), the 4th Replacement Battalion (LT Karhunen), the 22nd Signal
Company (22ViestiP), Recon Company 1 (TO1)( LT Larvo), Recon Company 2 (TO2)(LT
Hannila), and the 22nd Transportation Battalion (Liik.K22). These units were assigned to him
from the 22nd Field Replenishment Division (22.KT-D) by P-SRE. He also assumed
operational control of PPP6, which had since moved into his area of operations. This force,
plus the field gun battery already under his control, was designated as the Finn 9th Infantry
Division, with COL Siilasvuo commanding. COL Johann Makiniemi assumed command of
JR27. The Division's first attack order read, in part, "Orienting in the direction of the Raate
Road, attack from the west on the morning of 26 Dec 39 to destroy Soviet forces in the
vicinity of Hulkonniemi." This was later postponed by one day to allow time for movement.
Also on 21 Dec, TF Susi was reinforced with four infantry battalions (the three battalions of
JR65 under LTC Karl Mandelin, plus the 15th Separate Infantry Battalion (ErP15) under CPT
Matti Harola, attached from P-SRE). (Mandelin's men came from Oulu in a grueling 100
mile-plus open-truck movement in temperatures of -25 degrees (F) or less.) With additional
forces came new orders from P-SRE. Susitaival's mission read, in part, "Destroy Soviet
forces south of Lake Piispalanjaervi while securing the east flank, then cut Soviet lines of
communication to Suomussalmi and advance toward Juntusranta." The Soviet 662nd was
now so hard pressed by Susitaival that it had nothing to spare for the 163rd Division trains
and the 81st and 759th Rifle Regiments in Suomussalmi. On 22 Dec, while the TF Susi
attacked south from Lake Piispajaervi, ErP16 moved to Tervavaara to attack Palovaara itself.
On 25 Dec, TF Susi recaptured Haapavaara, cut off on 22 Dec by ErP16's "end-run", and on
27 Dec they also secured Palovaara. The 662nd was now rapidly disintegrating. Radio
intercepts referred repeatedly to low morale. At least one "Politruk" was killed by his own
men.
Finn priorities had already begun to shift to the south. On 21 Dec CPT Maekinen led a
reconnaissance from his roadblock on the Raate road five miles east to Lake Kokkojaervi,
and met no contact. On 23 Dec, however, the threat of the Soviet 44th Rifle Division loomed
large as it steadily pressed on Maekinen's two-company force. Leading a sally out of his
defenses in coordination with simultaneous harassing attacks by other units, Maekinen struck
at the 44th Division's advance guard, the 25th Rifle Regiment, while the other forces raided
the 44th's flanks, starting at about 2300. CPT Kontula attacked with two companies of 1/64
from the south at Haukila, and hit the 44th Division's antitank battalion, killing over 100
artillery horses. CPT Lassila's 1/27 cut the Raate road from the south at Kokkojaervi, where
they killed over 100 men, destroyed one tank and several trucks, and demolished a field
kitchen. (The Finns always designated field kitchens as high payoff targets due to the impact
the loss of hot food would have on troops in this weather.)The 1/27th lost two dead in this
action. Division Commander Vinogradov panicked and dug in. From Raate to Haukila they
"secured" the road with platoon to company size pockets located at hundred yard (or so)
intervals. Tanks patrolled the intervals. From a distance of only six miles, the men of the 44th
Rifle Division listened to the death spasms of their comrades in the 163rd. Constant probing
and harassment by Finn forces enable them to identify all major 44th Division units and unit
boundaries by 24 Dec.
On 23, 24, and 25 Dec, the remnants of the 163rd Rifle Division at Suomussalmi made
several frantic attempts to break out. They succeeded only in using up most of their
remaining ammunition. Although 2/27 was hard-pressed in their defensive positions on the
24th by an assault on both sides of the road leading south out of Suomussalmi itself, they
counterattacked and regained all lost ground by the end of the day. By the 25th Soviet attacks
to the south and to the west (from Hulkonniemi across the ice to Vulkonniemi) had largely

played out. Meanwhile, TF Susi's attacks south from Palovaara were placing increasing
pressure on the 163rd's northern perimeter.
On 26 Dec Siilasvuo issued his attack order. The Division main effort was directed at the
western end of the Soviet perimeter, at Hulkonniemi, where MAJ Kari's two Civic Guard
battalions and JR64 would attack to penetrate the 163rd defensive belt to disrupt the 163rd
Division perimeter. Kari task organized his units into two attack forces. LTC Fagernaes
would make the main effort with 1/64 and the 4th Replacement Battalion from the southern
tip of the Vuonanniemi peninsula, across the lake ice toward Hulkonniemi to seize the road to
Suomussalmi to disrupt the Soviet perimeter. CPT Matti Harola would make the supporting
effort, attacking to seize the main road with CPT Raesaenen's 2/64 and ErP15 to deny Soviet
withdrawal or reinforcement. After blocking the road to the north Harola was to attack south
to penetrate the Suomussalmi defenses to divide and destroy remaining Soviet forces. Each
task force received one antitank gun (the 9th Division only had two antitank guns at this
point) and one artillery battery (the Division only had two batteries at this point) in direct
support. The 22nd Pioneer Battalion provided general support.
At 0730 on 27 Dec (before dawn), COL Siilasvuo launched the 9th Division's supporting
attacks. MAJ Jaervinen's PPP6 attacked down the eastern side of Lake Pirttajaervi toward the
Kylaenmaeki road junction to enable the 9th Division to penetrate the Soviet perimeter, and
CPT Paavola's 22nd Recon Battalion (Kev.Os22) (minus one company, screening the north
flank) attacked from Ruottula (on the eastern shore of Lake Kiantijaervi) west across the ice
to Sopala, to link with MAJ Kari's main force, to reinforce their attack. (With the balance
shifting in Finn favor, Siilasvuo also detached the Ranger Battalion (SissiP1) to reinforce
CPT Maekinen's 1/64 at the Raate Road roadblock to continue to deny use of the road to the
44th Rifle Division.)
The Finns encountered heavy resistance as the Soviets fought with the fury of desperation.
LTC Fagernaes' main effort made little headway against strong fortifications, and didn't reach
the outskirts of Hulkonniemi until 1300, a distance of only two miles in five and a half hours.
(Although their objective, the main road, was only a half mile away, in three attempts they
were unable to reach it.) CPT Harola's supporting effort made it to the road but was thrown
back by a counterattack supported by tanks. The battle here raged all night. CPT Paavola's
three companies who, under cover of darkness, had crept across the frozen surface of Lake
Kiantajaervi right up to the Soviet eastern perimeter, ran into armored trucks on the ice and
didn't make it to the shore until noon. He was unable to link with MAJ Kari that night.
Little headway was made, except the supporting effort by MAJ Jaervinen's PPP6, which
destroyed six vehicles and advanced to Kylaenmaekki. They finally seized the town in the
darkness of early 28 Dec and then held on in the face of several violent counterattacks during
that night. At about this time, the 9th Div Operations Officer, CPT Marttinen, was urging
COL Siilasvuo to commit the Division reserve (1/27, CPT Lassila). COL Siilasvuo refused,
retaining 1/27 against the possibility of a breakthrough by the 44th Div to the south.
Suddenly, just before dawn on 28 Dec, Soviet resistance at Hulkonniemi collapsed. At about
0900, Red Army soldiers began to flee in panic toward Suomussalmi, while others scattered
into the forests or ran aimlessly onto the ice of Lake Kiantajaervi, where the waiting Finns
shot them down as if on a target range. (A week later, the Finns were still hunting ragged
groups of stragglers through the silent, icy forests.) Few, if any, survived.
At 1200 on 28 Dec COL Siilasvuo committed the Division reserve, CPT Eino Lassila's 1/27th
racing to Sopala by truck in pursuit of the fleeing Soviet remnants. LTC Fagernaes also began
pushing forces up the road toward Sopala, joined at about 2400 by CPT Harola's ErP15.
Intense local resistance was still being encountered. At 1000 on 29 Dec MAJ Jaervinen of
PPP6 requested assistance against fierce attacks by enemy forces trying to break out of the
encirclement of the town itself. COL Siilasvuo identified this as his main effort and

committed 1/27, 3/27, 1/64, and 4th Replacement Battalion under the JR27 commander, COL
Makiniemi. (2/27 was sent south to further reinforce CPT Maekinen's roadblock on the Raate
road.) The attack begins at 1500, as darkness began to fall. Movement through the dark forest
was slow, with scattered Soviet elements everywhere attempting to escape. 1/27 scattered two
companies of Soviets in the dark, while the 1/27 battalion S4, LT Miettunen, organized the
horse drivers into a platoon to counterattack a group of about 50 Russians who overran the
battalion trains (all the Russians were killed when they stopped, starving, to eat the food they
found cooking in the Finn mess area). Confused fighting continued throughout the night, the
trap finally becoming effective at dawn on 29 Dec. The last organized attempt at escape
occurred at 1000, resulting in 300 Russian dead and the capture of 8 guns, 50 trucks, and 100
horses.
By the end of 29 Dec, Suomussalmi itself fell, organized resistance ceasing at about 1200.
The Finns dug the last determined defenders out of cellars and bunkered houses with
grenades and bayonets. Survivors attempted to flee across the lake into the gathering
darkness. Late in the day, the pursuit forces caught up with about 400 Russians. That night,
Finn tracers lit the skies over Lake Kiantajaervi. The Finns had plotted likely avenues of
escape and had wired the snow drifts with barbed wire-mine systems and antitank ditches.
One large group of hapless Soviets were strafed and bombed by two Finn Air Force BristolBlenheim light bombers, the only Finn close-air-support strike of the entire campaign.
Mopping up continued through 30 Dec. When it was all over, the 9th Infantry Division
counted 5000 Soviet dead. About 500 prisoners were taken. An unknown number had
vanished into the forest. (Months later, the Finns were still finding frozen corpses as the
spring thaw revealed them.) Throughout all of this, the 44th Rifle Division remained passive.
The 44th Div advance guard, the 25th Rifle Regiment, made an attempt to cross the
Kuomasjoki River, near to Lake Kuomasjaervi, and tried again on 25 Dec, but was repelled
both times by counterattacks led by CPT Maekinen. Vinogradov had planned an assault
through to Suomussalmi at 1030 on 28 Dec, but canceled it in the face of two raids early on
the 28th and dug in out of fear of what he thought were constant attacks from superior forces.
The Finns were now shifting their main effort south. On the night of 31 Dec, CPT
Haekkinen's SissiP1 conducted a reconnaissance in force to the Haukila area. Passing Lake
Kuivasjaervi from the south, they encountered a Soviet battalion in defense east of the lake.
They had located and identified the main Soviet grouping, a 2-mile stretch of road including
the 25th Rifle Regiment, 2/146th Rifle Regiment , the 122nd and 179th Artillery Regiments
and the 312th Tank Battalion. With the 163rd Division eliminated, at this point even if the
44th Division could have broken through, they would only have changed the location of their
destruction as the balance of forces shifted into the Finns' favor. Vinogradov considered an
all-out breakout, but never put it into action. His officers begged him to attempt a retreat, but
he refused saying he would have to have authorization from his superiors; authorization
which, given the Soviet system, would never come.
At this point, the 44th Rifle Division was stretched out along a forest road in a 20-mile long
column. The column, cut into sections by Finn "mottis," resembled a giant link of sausages.
The largest "link," at the head, had been identified by CPT Haekkinen. COL Siilasvuo's intent
was to hack this, and the other large links, down to a more "manageable" size. To this end, he
organized two task forces, TF Kari under MAJ Kari (2 battalions of Civic Guards and 1/64),
and TF Fagernaes, under LTC Fagernaes (CPT Raesaenen's 2/64 and CPT Simelius' 3/64). TF
Kari assembled in Maekalae, TF Fagernas in Heikkila. The 44th had occupied the Eskola
area, on a side road about one and a half miles south of the Raate Road. Siilasvuo began by
sending the CPT Paavola's Kev.Os22 to Sanginlampi to deny the areas further use to the
enemy. The battalion easily traversed the entire 15 miles in a day, skiing along the excellent
"ice roads."

The operation began with a supporting attack by 1/27, under CPT Eino Lassila, which had
returned from its pursuit operations near Sopala. The attack was a textbook "motti" operation.
Lassila sent a company advance guard and trail-breaking party (no small task in 5-15 foot
snowdrifts) ahead by ski at 1400 on 1 Jan, the rest of the battalion moving out from their
assembly area south of Lake Kuivasjaervi at 1500 (dusk). At 1700 the battalion reached their
new assembly area at the end of a horse trail paralleling the Raate road, where they had a hot
meal before proceeding on skis through the dark and silent woods to their attack position
about three miles further. They arrived at about 2300. From a low ridge about 400 yards from
the Soviet positions they could see the Soviets huddled around their campfires.
After a leader's reconnaissance and orders brief, CPT Lassila organized his attack. His heavy
machine-gun company formed the support force, and was split into two sections of six guns
each. One section was placed on each side of the attack force, with instructions to hold their
fire until the enemy fired. Two rifle companies formed the assault force, and would advance
abreast to the road where they would split, one company east and one west, to secure about
500 yards of road. The engineer platoon would then advance to fell trees and assist in
constructing barricades at the ends of the cut. A third rifle company was held in reserve near
the battalion command post, just over the ridge. For an hour and a half the Finns rehearsed,
unknown to the Soviets only a few hundred yards away.
The Finns easily overran Soviet sentries only 60 yards from the Soviet perimeter and reached
the road with little opposition. They easily cut through the Soviet unit, an artillery battalion.
For the rest of the night the Finns extended their supply route from the horse trail to the road.
It was finished by 0700 and the first item down the trail was two 37mm AT guns, followed
shortly by hot food. At this point, Finn troops began to rotate to heated rest tents erected at
the battalion command post.
By dawn, the new roadblocks were up, segmenting this area, reinforced with the two precious
Bofors antitank guns. Also on 2 Jan, 3/27 under CPT Arne Airimo, attacked near Heikkilae,
where, although they were unable to cut the road, they succeeded in destroying a large
number of their high payoff targets, the remaining Soviet field kitchens. At 0700 on 2 Jan the
Soviets counterattacked the 1/27th in force, with tanks reinforcing the infantry. They failed,
however, to coordinate their attack won both sides of the Finn position. The Finns picked off
seven tanks with the Bofors guns which had arrived just in the nick of time, and the attack
failed. The Finns settled into their new roadblock, erecting tents out of enemy sight and
continuing to rotate troops for hot meals and warm rest. The surviving Soviets remained cold
and hungry.
Later that day, another uncoordinated attack was made on the western roadblock. This attack
also failed, when CPT Lassila counterattacked with his reserve company against the Soviet
flank. (The Soviets consistently failed to coordinate their actions. While attacks were made
on both the east and west roadblocks, they were never made at the same time.) Through the
night and into 3 Jan they wasted ammunition, firing wildly in all directions at imagined
threats or harassment. Beginning at dawn on 3 Jan they began to ration ammunition. The
pressure remained. Late on 3 Jan, 3/27 assaulted again, this time from the left flank of the
new roadblock, but was unable to cut the road in the face of stiff resistance and extensive
fortifications. That night, Siilasvuo reinforced the effort with the CPT Haekkinen's SissiP1,
who moved close to Haukila where he could support either 1/27 or 3/27 as necessary.
Haekkinen also patrolled to the east of Lassila's roadblock.
Elsewhere on 2 Jan, CPT Paavola's Kev.Os22 advanced cautiously toward Sanginlampi from
it's assembly area at Maekelae. They encountered small arms fire and entrenched defenses
where the secondary road from Kokkojaervi allowed the Soviets to extend their perimeter and
deploy more of the force. Siilasvuo committed TF Kari (4th Replacement Battalion, ErP15,
and 1/64) to clear this area.

MAJ Kari attacked with the LT Karhunen's 4th Replacement Battalion at 1600 on 3 Jan. By
dawn on 4 Jan they had seized Sanginlampi, inflicting 260 Soviet dead and taking 40
prisoners. 4th Replacement Battalion then went into TF Kari's reserve, and ErP15 became TF
Kari's main effort, assuming the mission to clear Sanginlampi to allow TF Kari to occupy
positions in the vicinity of Kokkojaervi. Simultaneously a company from SissiP1 cut the
Raate road north of Eskola late on 3 Jan, allowing ErP15 to seize Eskola from the south at
dawn on 4 Jan. TF Kari had consolidated its attack position only two miles from the
Kokkojaervi road fork.
TF Fagernaes (CPT Raesaenen's 2/64 and CPT Simelius' 3/64) spent 3 and 4 Jan
consolidating their positions and constructing ice roads from Linnalampi and Honkajaervi.
On 4 Jan COL Siilasvuo issued a new attack order and assembled a new, brigade-sized task
force. This force, TF Makiniemi, under COL Makiniemi, consisted of JR27, 1/65 under MAJ
Hakanen, and SissiP1, and was supported with six of the eight available 76.2mm M1905 field
guns. This new force was the new 9th Division main effort, and was assembled to complete
the destruction of the 44th Rifle Division. The objective was the largest Soviet concentration,
near Haukila, attacking from the south. At the same time, a smaller task force, TF Mandelin,
was assembled under COL Mandelin, consisting of 2/65, under CPT Hyppoelae, and 3/65,
under CPT Flink, plus three additional infantry companies. Their objective was the same as
TF Makiniemi, the task was a coordinated attack on Haukila, from the north, to allow TF
Makiniemi to destroy Soviet forces in and around Haukila. Simultaneously, TF Kari (4th
Replacement Bn, ErP15, and 1/64, plus the remaining two 76.2mm guns) would attack east
from Kokkojaervi to Tyynela on TF Makiniemi's right (east) flank (and drive east to link up
with TF Kari if possible); and TF Fagernas (2/64 and 3/64) would cut the road at the
Purasjoki River bridge and at Raate, the purpose being to prevent the 44th Rifle Division
from receiving any reinforcements from the east.
The attack commenced before dawn on 5 Jan. Soviet resistance was so fierce that none of the
attacks succeeded entirely. CPT Maekinen continued to hang on at the head roadblock, his
little force down to about 50% strength now, despite which he still managed some limited
attacks. The main effort, TF Makiniemi, ran into stiff resistance and made little headway;
CPT Haekkinen's SissiP1 and MAJ Sihvonen's 2/27 started at about 0600 and easily made it
to just short of the road, but were stopped cold by massed defensive fires about a half mile
short of the road itself, with all movement forward halted by evening. CPT Airimo's 3/27, on
Sihvonen's right, attacked from positions near Haukila, making it to the road by noon before
coming under intense suppressive fires from the high ground around Haukila. At 2400 that
night they were still under heavy artillery fire, and tanks patrolled the road to their front. To
Airimo's right, CPT Lassila's 1/27 attacked at 0830, reaching the road by 1300, where they
came under devastating artillery fire, followed by fierce counterattacks. Lassila quickly lost
10% of his total strength and requested permission to pull back to just short of the road,
keeping the road under direct fire. (When the 1/27 lead company commander, LT Miettunen,
was killed and both other officers wounded, the company medical sergeant volunteered to
lead the company. Shortly thereafter CPT Lassila encountered the sergeant being evacuated
with sucking chest wounds. In response to his commander's inquiry about the pain the
sergeant joked that he could breathe easier with the two holes in his chest.) COL Makiniemi
threatened to have Lassila shot if he withdrew; 1/27 held its position.
MAJ Kari had ordered CPT Mankonen's 1/64 to seize the Kokkojaervi road fork. Mankonen
attacked at 0600, but in day-long heavy fighting only made it to a quarter mile east of the
junction. Due to heavy losses, a lack of tents, and temperatures that plunged to -31 degrees
(F) that night, Kari relieved 1/64 with his reserve, the 4th Replacement Battalion. Kari's other
force, CPT Harola's ErP15 (without any heavy weapons), was similarly unable to make
headway against entrenched tank and infantry defenders.

The supporting effort by TF Fagernas, however, enjoyed some success. A reinforced

company skied through swamps and heavy snow to bring Raate under direct fire at 1200,
occupying the outer houses that night. The rest of TF Fagernaes, advancing via Honkajaervi
toward Likoharju, attacked Likoharju at 1000 without waiting for his AT guns. During
confused all-day fighting, they managed to close the road with fire and ambushed a truckborne battalion of NKVD troops from the 3rd NKVD Regiment (Border Guards, sent to
reinforce the 44th) near Mantyla for good measure. During the night, in a seesaw of attack
and counterattack, and with assistance from a company of the 65th Infantry (9th Division
reserve), they succeeded in blowing the Purasjoki bridge at about 2200 hours. As the ice over
the rivers was not strong enough to support traffic, the 44th Rifle Division was now trapped.
TF Mandelin then cleared the north side of the road of remaining Soviet patrols, taking up
positions in Kotvala and near the Puras road. The region between Kotvala and Matero was
covered by patrols.
Growing increasingly desperate, on 6 Jan the Soviets drove their remaining artillery horses
into the Finn minefields in an attempt to clear a path, but to no avail, as the Finns
methodically shot them down as they became entangled in the snow-covered barbed-wire
nets, leaving only mangled corpses freezing in the snow and wire. TF Makiniemi, meanwhile,
finally fought through to the road and began to roll up the Soviet "mottis" one by one. 3/27
cut the road and established a new roadblock west of the one held by 1/27. 2/27 also reached
the road after smashing several lines of bunkers and rolling up others from the flanks. SissiP1
also made it to the road, but the Russians doggedly held onto a few bunkers on SissiP1's left
flank, along the shore of Lake Kuivasjaervi. The battered 1/27 grimly held on to their
roadblock in the face of Soviet tank attacks.
TF Kari resumed its attack on Kokkojaervi with 4th Replacement Battalion as the main
effort. At 0300 on 6 Jan, a reinforced (with a heavy machine-gun platoon and an AT gun)
company of the 4th cut the Raate road a mile east of Kokkojaervi. Only hours later the
Soviets counterattacked in strength. Reinforced with the rest of the machine-gun company
and two infantry platoons, the roadblock held, and again against new attacks at 1400. CPT
Harola's ErP15 cut the road east of Tyynelae at 1100, after a three hour fight. Red Army
soldiers began to flee along the Puras road and in the direction of Purasjoki and the Finn
roadblocks there. COL Siilasvuo committed CPT Paavola's Kev.Os22 to the Matero area to
close the escape route. Near Likoharju the trapped Russians launched several assaults
supported by tanks and artillery against TF Fagernaes. When their AT guns malfunctioned,
the Finns fell back, but counterattacked to the Purasjoki bridge, which they held on to until
dark when COL Siilasvuo ordered MAJ Kari to reinforce Fagernaes with 1/64.
Late that afternoon, Division Commander Vinogradov issued an "every-man- for-himself"
order. By 0200 on 7 Jan the Soviets had begun to panic. Finn infiltration teams were creeping
into Soviet positions under cover of darkness and taking cover behind and under destroyed
Soviet vehicles, then opening fire on the Soviets from within their own lines. Freezing, the
Soviets would build bonfires within their positions, the Finns would ski silently out of the
darkness and toss satchel charges onto the fires, vanishing into the dark as the fires (and their
hapless builders) were blown to bits behind them. Troops, vehicles, and horses surged back
and forth, seeking escape. The Red Air Force could do nothing except circle and watch, with
the Finns safely concealed by the evergreen forest canopy. The Finns watched, fascinated by
the horror, as Soviet tanks drove over their own equipment and men in their frenzy to escape.
Soviet aircraft managed to drop six small bags of biscuit, not much help to an estimated
17,000 men who had subsisted on little more cold or frozen horsemeat in sub-zero
temperatures for more than five days. Soviet forces near Likoharju threw back a company of
3/64, before being dispersed in a Finn counterattack. Soviet artillery fire came from positions

within the USSR, in response Finn reconnaissance patrols advanced into the USSR as far as
Vasonvaara (about two miles).
It was too late. All Soviet resistance ceased by 0800 on 8 Jan 1940.

THE AFTERMATH AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE

"There is no teacher but the enemy. No one but the enemy will ever tell you what
the enemy is going to do.
No one but the enemy will ever teach you how to
destroy and conquer. Only the enemy shows you where
you are weak. Only the enemy tells you where he is
strong. And the only rules of the game are what you
can do to him and what you can stop him from doing."
Orson Scott Card
Ender's Game, 1977
When the Finns took count after 8 Jan 1940, they found incredible booty. They had captured,
intact, 65 tanks, 437 trucks, 10 motorcycles, 1,620 horses, 92 field guns, 78 anti-tank guns,
13 anti-aircraft guns, 6,000 rifles, 290 machine-guns, and a large quantity of precious
communications equipment. From Piispajaervi in the north, to Raate in the south, they
counted 27,500 Soviet dead, 43 destroyed tanks, and 270 other destroyed vehicles. Finn
losses were 900 dead and 1,770 wounded. James Aldridge of the United Press reported in the
New York Times stepping over Russian corpses, "a kaleidoscope of bodies.....four miles
long." Division Commander Selendsov disappeared. The best guess is he was one of the
anonymous many who vanished in the forest, their frozen or decaying corpses turning up
weeks, months, or even years later. Division Commander Vinogradov managed to flee the
destruction of his command in a tank, and escaped back to the USSR. There he was courtmartialed and shot, along with three other surviving officers of the 44th Rifle Division. The
charge was losing 55 field kitchens to the enemy.
The battle was significant in three ways. First, in the context of the Winter War, it eliminated
the Soviet threat to northern Finland and freed those Finn forces, now lavishly equipped with
captured Soviet gear, to move south to reinforce the endgame being played out in the
Karelian isthmus. Reports of this amazing success also gave new hope to the beleaguered
Karelian defenders. (Unfortunately, this backfired to some extent: the glowing reports of Finn
victories created a feeling of complacency in the western powers to whom Finland was
appealing for aid. The emergency seemed less immediate to British and French statesmen
reading newspaper accounts of crushing Soviet defeats. By the time the seriousness of the
situation had sunk in, any aid sent was too little, too late.)
Second, the battle's (and the war's) significance was greatest in its effect on the Germans and
Soviets who studied it carefully in anticipation of their coming conflict. Although the
Germans were unwilling to send overt support, given their own needs and diplomatic
relations with the Soviets in this time frame, they had enjoyed a fairly close relationship with
the Finns since WW I, and their military observers carefully studied the dichotomy of Finn
effectiveness against the Soviet colossus. From these studies, they made the reasonable
assumption that, if the small, poorly-equipped, but well-trained and led Finns could do so
well against the bumbling Soviet giant, then the Wehrmacht, employing essentially the same
doctrine, would easily be able to defeat them with their similarly high-quality, but much
larger and better-equipped forces. Unfortunately for the Germans, this lesson was not entirely
valid. Consider, for example, that the Finns only captured 1,600 POWs at and around

Suomussalmi. The rest died. The Germans did not take into account the Red Army's capacity
to absorb damage and keep fighting.
Finally, the Germans were not the only ones studying and learning from the Winter War. The
Soviets began in January 1940, with the war still on, by replacing commanders and
reorganizing their forces on the Mannerheim Line, their main effort. With reinforcements,
large numbers of tanks, and massive artillery barrages from heavy 122mm and 152mm guns,
the Soviets stormed and broke the Mannerheim Line at last. (Although the artillery barrages
did not cause excessive casualties among the well-dug in Finns, it did sever their supply lines.
Water, in particular became very short as even the snow was blown away leaving only
blackened, frozen ground.) On 11 Mar 1940, the Soviets reached the outskirts of Viipuri
(Vyborg). On 12 Mar, the Finns sued for peace. On 13 Mar, the cease-fire went into effect.
Soviet reforms continued after the war. On 7 May 1940, Marshal S. Timoshenko was
appointed as People's Commissar for Defense, replacing Stalin's old crony Voroshilov.
Timoshenko brought with him a new breed of Red Army officers, including, as chief of staff,
a young Division Commander named Zhukov, fresh from his stunning victory over the
vaunted Imperial Japanese Army at Khalkin Gol. Timoshenko had a mandate from Stalin:
destroy the "Cult of the Past." The effects were rapid.
The ranks of General and Admiral were re-established, and commissars returned to their
purely political role. The disciplinary was re-written, with a new emphasis on obedience.
Commanders were now told to shoot soldiers who did not obey, a far cry from the old
democratic Red Army of the Revolution. Tank divisions, abolished after a brief heyday in the
1930s, were re-created and more tank battalions were added to the Rifle Division tables of
organization (from a single battalion to a regiment). Heavier tanks with bigger guns and
wider tracks were built, the T-34 was typed as standard, rather than the T-26 (a license-built
copy of the British Vickers-Armstrong light tank), T-28, and BT-5 tanks employed in Finland.
Formerly purged officers, even including some former Tsarist officers, were "rehabilitated"
and brought back as instructors and staff officers in an attempt to improve the quality of
professional instruction.
Soviet tactical doctrine was returned to their earlier revolutionary experiments in maneuver
and combined arms warfare. (Soviet paratroop doctrine, however, continued to languish on
the periphery. During the Winter War, drops of small teams had been initially successful in
the seizure of bridges and crossroads, until the Finns wiped them out when their road-bound
relief columns failed to arrive on schedule. The Soviets mistakenly concluded that airborne
formations were suitable only for small scale raids.) Fast, coordinated action by combined
infantry, tank, and artillery teams replaced the mass waves of "tank pure" or "infantry pure"
formations which had dashed themselves against the Mannerheim Line.
While the Soviets had only just begun these reforms by May 1941, the results were
noticeable. As an example, when faced with encirclement by the more mobile German forces,
the Soviets would now withdraw to escape, dumping their heavy equipment if necessary.
They had learned to run when prudent, to fight another day. The Finns themselves remarked
on the difference in quality between the Soviets in the Winter War and the Soviet formations
they encountered a year later when they joined the Germans in their attack on the USSR in
what the Finns called the Continuation War.
From a tactical-operational standpoint, the lesson is one of maneuver-oriented warfare. The
similarity to the Battle of the Tannenburg Wald during WW I is noticeable. A small, mobile,
well-led, and coordinated force defeated two large formations in detail. Each of these
formations was too cumbersome (given TO&E in that environment) to react appropriately,
and each was encumbered with a command structure too rigid to permit the kind of initiativebased tactics which were necessary in order to seize and retain the initiative in a battle which

was restricted by terrain to innumerable small unit actions. By retaining freedom of

maneuver, by avoiding the temptation to get bogged down in head-on assaults, by allowing
subordinate leaders the initiative to exploit local opportunities, and by coordinating their
actions around a decisive point (which in this battle was the extreme vulnerability of strungout and essentially immobile enemy formations) the Finns seized and retained the tactical
initiative and defeated the Soviets, bit-by-bit, until there were no bits left.
The Finns observed the situation, oriented upon it, decided on a course of action, and acted
faster than their Soviet counterparts. When they did act, their actions were focused on a
single, decisive point, and all assets were massed toward achieving that end. Finn initiative
and intent-based command philosophy allowed this focus to re-orient on the decision of local
commanders when the situation changed. The Soviets, on the other hand, were attempting to
synchronize the movements of large units in an environment where their situational
awareness was effectively nil. Their command philosophy emphasized prescriptive, detailed
orders which could not be deviated from even in the face of irrelevance. Caught in a negative
feedback loop of constant, centralized reaction to incessant, disorienting attacks from every
direction, they fell further and further behind the Finn decision making process until their
actions became so inappropriate they lapsed into a passive huddle. Put simply, they
completely lost track of what was going on as their actions became less and less appropriate
to the situation, and finally gave up.
The Soviets' very materiel superiority was a handicap; they were so heavily equipped, in
terms of vehicles, equipment, etc, they couldn't operate according to the rules the Finns were
forcing them to play by. Tanks were a handicap, the way they were using them linked to the
speed of their infantry and bound securely to a narrow, twisting road. Artillery was a
handicap, limited to direct fires over open sights with no forward observation. Air defense
and antitank weapons, as well as bridging equipment (for frozen rivers?) and chemical
defense equipment, were so much dead weight. Aircraft were useless without targets. Their
intelligence was non-existent and their logistical support was easily cut by the fast and
flexible Finns. The Soviets had failed to tailor their force to the environment and the
situation.
Unfortunately for the Finns, the war was not so victorious. No one could deny, however, that
they had fought the better fight. In the complete absence of foreign assistance, they had, in a
way, won for, of all the Baltic countries who negotiated with the USSR in 1939-40, only
Finland remained free.

"Then, out spake brave Horatius, the Captain of the gate,

To every man upon this earth, death cometh, soon or late.
And how can man die better, than facing fearful odds,
For the ashes of his fathers, and the temples of his gods? "
Thomas Babington Macauley
Horatius at the Bridge

"Sankareita? Ne ainoot sankarit makaa siellae vielaekin."

"The heroes, they're all still there."
Tuomas Oskari Seijavuori
PFC (Korpraali), 5PPP
(5th Sep Inf Bn), Finn Army
1939-40