Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 81262 August 25, 1989
GLOBE MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORP., and HERBERT C. HENDRY, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and RESTITUTO M. TOBIAS, respondents.
Atencia & Arias Law Offices for petitioners.
Romulo C. Felizmena for private respondent.

CORTES, J.:
Private respondent Restituto M. Tobias was employed by petitioner Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation (GLOBE
MACKAY) in a dual capacity as a purchasing agent and administrative assistant to the engineering operations manager. In
1972, GLOBE MACKAY discovered fictitious purchases and other fraudulent transactions for which it lost several
thousands of pesos.
According to private respondent it was he who actually discovered the anomalies and reported them on November 10,
1972 to his immediate superior Eduardo T. Ferraren and to petitioner Herbert C. Hendry who was then the Executive VicePresident and General Manager of GLOBE MACKAY.
On November 11, 1972, one day after private respondent Tobias made the report, petitioner Hendry confronted him by
stating that he was the number one suspect, and ordered him to take a one week forced leave, not to communicate with
the office, to leave his table drawers open, and to leave the office keys.
On November 20, 1972, when private respondent Tobias returned to work after the forced leave, petitioner Hendry went
up to him and called him a "crook" and a "swindler." Tobias was then ordered to take a lie detector test. He was also
instructed to submit specimen of his handwriting, signature, and initials for examination by the police investigators to
determine his complicity in the anomalies.
On December 6,1972, the Manila police investigators submitted a laboratory crime report (Exh. "A") clearing private
respondent of participation in the anomalies.
Not satisfied with the police report, petitioners hired a private investigator, retired Col. Jose G. Fernandez, who on
December 10, 1972, submitted a report (Exh. "2") finding Tobias guilty. This report however expressly stated that further
investigation was still to be conducted.
Nevertheless, on December 12, 1972, petitioner Hendry issued a memorandum suspending Tobias from work preparatory
to the filing of criminal charges against him.
On December 19,1972, Lt. Dioscoro V. Tagle, Metro Manila Police Chief Document Examiner, after investigating other
documents pertaining to the alleged anomalous transactions, submitted a second laboratory crime report (Exh. "B")
reiterating his previous finding that the handwritings, signatures, and initials appearing in the checks and other documents
involved in the fraudulent transactions were not those of Tobias. The lie detector tests conducted on Tobias also yielded
negative results.

Notwithstanding the two police reports exculpating Tobias from the anomalies and the fact that the report of the private
investigator, was, by its own terms, not yet complete, petitioners filed with the City Fiscal of Manila a complaint for estafa
through falsification of commercial documents, later amended to just estafa. Subsequently five other criminal complaints
were filed against Tobias, four of which were for estafa through Falsification of commercial document while the fifth was
for of Article 290 of' the Revised Penal Code (Discovering Secrets Through Seizure of Correspondence).lwph1.t Two
of these complaints were refiled with the Judge Advocate General's Office, which however, remanded them to the fiscal's
office. All of the six criminal complaints were dismissed by the fiscal. Petitioners appealed four of the fiscal's resolutions
dismissing the criminal complaints with the Secretary of Justice, who, however, affirmed their dismissal.
In the meantime, on January 17, 1973, Tobias received a notice (Exh. "F") from petitioners that his employment has been
terminated effective December 13, 1972. Whereupon, Tobias filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. The labor arbiter
dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed the labor arbiter's
decision. However, the Secretary of Labor, acting on petitioners' appeal from the NLRC ruling, reinstated the labor
arbiter's decision. Tobias appealed the Secretary of Labor's order with the Office of the President. During the pendency of
the appeal with said office, petitioners and private respondent Tobias entered into a compromise agreement regarding the
latter's complaint for illegal dismissal.
Unemployed, Tobias sought employment with the Republic Telephone Company (RETELCO). However, petitioner Hendry,
without being asked by RETELCO, wrote a letter to the latter stating that Tobias was dismissed by GLOBE MACKAY due
to dishonesty.
Private respondent Tobias filed a civil case for damages anchored on alleged unlawful, malicious, oppressive, and abusive
acts of petitioners. Petitioner Hendry, claiming illness, did not testify during the hearings. The Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Manila, Branch IX, through Judge Manuel T. Reyes rendered judgment in favor of private respondent by ordering
petitioners to pay him eighty thousand pesos (P80,000.00) as actual damages, two hundred thousand pesos
(P200,000.00) as moral damages, twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) as exemplary damages, thirty thousand pesos
(P30,000.00) as attorney's fees, and costs. Petitioners appealed the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals. On the other
hand, Tobias appealed as to the amount of damages. However, the Court of Appeals, an a decision dated August 31,
1987 affirmed the RTC decision in toto. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration having been denied, the instant petition for
review on certiorari was filed.
The main issue in this case is whether or not petitioners are liable for damages to private respondent.
Petitioners contend that they could not be made liable for damages in the lawful exercise of their right to dismiss private
respondent.
On the other hand, private respondent contends that because of petitioners' abusive manner in dismissing him as well as
for the inhuman treatment he got from them, the Petitioners must indemnify him for the damage that he had suffered.
One of the more notable innovations of the New Civil Code is the codification of "some basic principles that are to be
observed for the rightful relationship between human beings and for the stability of the social order." [REPORT ON THE
CODE COMMISSION ON THE PROPOSED CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, p. 39]. The framers of the Code,
seeking to remedy the defect of the old Code which merely stated the effects of the law, but failed to draw out its spirit,
incorporated certain fundamental precepts which were "designed to indicate certain norms that spring from the fountain of
good conscience" and which were also meant to serve as "guides for human conduct [that] should run as golden threads
through society, to the end that law may approach its supreme ideal, which is the sway and dominance of justice" ( Id.)
Foremost among these principles is that pronounced in Article 19 which provides:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
This article, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain standards
which must be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but also in the performance of one's duties. These
standards are the following: to act with justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. The law,

therefore, recognizes a primordial limitation on all rights; that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in
Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may
nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the
norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the
wrongdoer must be held responsible. But while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the government of human
relations and for the maintenance of social order, it does not provide a remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for
damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper.
Article 20, which pertains to damage arising from a violation of law, provides that:
Art. 20. Every person who contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall
indemnify the latter for the same.
However, in the case at bar, petitioners claim that they did not violate any provision of law since they were merely
exercising their legal right to dismiss private respondent. This does not, however, leave private respondent with no relief
because Article 21 of the Civil Code provides that:
Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
This article, adopted to remedy the "countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless,
even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury" [Id.] should "vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that
untold number of moral wrongs which it is impossible for human foresight to provide for specifically in the statutes" [ Id. it p.
40; See also PNB v. CA, G.R. No. L-27155, May 18,1978, 83 SCRA 237, 247].
In determining whether or not the principle of abuse of rights may be invoked, there is no rigid test which can be applied.
While the Court has not hesitated to apply Article 19 whether the legal and factual circumstances called for its application
[See for e.g., Velayo v. Shell Co. of the Phil., Ltd., 100 Phil. 186 (1956); PNB v. CA, supra;Grand Union Supermarket, Inc.
v. Espino, Jr., G.R. No. L-48250, December 28, 1979, 94 SCRA 953; PAL v. CA, G.R. No. L-46558, July 31,1981,106
SCRA 391; United General Industries, Inc, v. Paler G.R. No. L-30205, March 15,1982,112 SCRA 404; Rubio v. CA, G.R.
No. 50911, August 21, 1987, 153 SCRA 183] the question of whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has been
violated resulting in damages under Article 20 or Article 21 or other applicable provision of law, depends on the
circumstances of each case. And in the instant case, the Court, after examining the record and considering certain
significant circumstances, finds that all petitioners have indeed abused the right that they invoke, causing damage to
private respondent and for which the latter must now be indemnified.
The trial court made a finding that notwithstanding the fact that it was private respondent Tobias who reported the possible
existence of anomalous transactions, petitioner Hendry "showed belligerence and told plaintiff (private respondent herein)
that he was the number one suspect and to take a one week vacation leave, not to communicate with the office, to leave
his table drawers open, and to leave his keys to said defendant (petitioner Hendry)" [RTC Decision, p. 2; Rollo, p. 232].
This, petitioners do not dispute. But regardless of whether or not it was private respondent Tobias who reported the
anomalies to petitioners, the latter's reaction towards the former upon uncovering the anomalies was less than civil. An
employer who harbors suspicions that an employee has committed dishonesty might be justified in taking the appropriate
action such as ordering an investigation and directing the employee to go on a leave. Firmness and the resolve to uncover
the truth would also be expected from such employer. But the high-handed treatment accorded Tobias by petitioners was
certainly uncalled for. And this reprehensible attitude of petitioners was to continue when private respondent returned to
work on November 20, 1972 after his one week forced leave. Upon reporting for work, Tobias was confronted by Hendry
who said. "Tobby, you are the crook and swindler in this company." Considering that the first report made by the police
investigators was submitted only on December 10, 1972 [See Exh. A] the statement made by petitioner Hendry was
baseless. The imputation of guilt without basis and the pattern of harassment during the investigations of Tobias
transgress the standards of human conduct set forth in Article 19 of the Civil Code. The Court has already ruled that the
right of the employer to dismiss an employee should not be confused with the manner in which the right is exercised and
the effects flowing therefrom. If the dismissal is done abusively, then the employer is liable for damages to the employee
[Quisaba v. Sta. Ines-Melale Veneer and Plywood Inc., G.R. No. L-38088, August 30, 1974, 58 SCRA 771; See

also Philippine Refining Co., Inc. v. Garcia, G.R. No. L-21871, September 27,1966, 18 SCRA 107] Under the
circumstances of the instant case, the petitioners clearly failed to exercise in a legitimate manner their right to dismiss
Tobias, giving the latter the right to recover damages under Article 19 in relation to Article 21 of the Civil Code.
But petitioners were not content with just dismissing Tobias. Several other tortious acts were committed by petitioners
against Tobias after the latter's termination from work. Towards the latter part of January, 1973, after the filing of the first of
six criminal complaints against Tobias, the latter talked to Hendry to protest the actions taken against him. In response,
Hendry cut short Tobias' protestations by telling him to just confess or else the company would file a hundred more cases
against him until he landed in jail. Hendry added that, "You Filipinos cannot be trusted." The threat unmasked petitioner's
bad faith in the various actions taken against Tobias. On the other hand, the scornful remark about Filipinos as well as
Hendry's earlier statements about Tobias being a "crook" and "swindler" are clear violations of 'Tobias' personal dignity
[See Article 26, Civil Code].
The next tortious act committed by petitioners was the writing of a letter to RETELCO sometime in October 1974, stating
that Tobias had been dismissed by GLOBE MACKAY due to dishonesty. Because of the letter, Tobias failed to gain
employment with RETELCO and as a result of which, Tobias remained unemployed for a longer period of time. For this
further damage suffered by Tobias, petitioners must likewise be held liable for damages consistent with Article 2176 of the
Civil Code. Petitioners, however, contend that they have a "moral, if not legal, duty to forewarn other employers of the kind
of employee the plaintiff (private respondent herein) was." [Petition, p. 14; Rollo, p. 15]. Petitioners further claim that "it is
the accepted moral and societal obligation of every man to advise or warn his fellowmen of any threat or danger to the
latter's life, honor or property. And this includes warning one's brethren of the possible dangers involved in dealing with, or
accepting into confidence, a man whose honesty and integrity is suspect" [Id.]. These arguments, rather than justify
petitioners' act, reveal a seeming obsession to prevent Tobias from getting a job, even after almost two years from the
time Tobias was dismissed.
Finally, there is the matter of the filing by petitioners of six criminal complaints against Tobias. Petitioners contend that
there is no case against them for malicious prosecution and that they cannot be "penalized for exercising their right and
prerogative of seeking justice by filing criminal complaints against an employee who was their principal suspect in the
commission of forgeries and in the perpetration of anomalous transactions which defrauded them of substantial sums of
money" [Petition, p. 10, Rollo, p. 11].
While sound principles of justice and public policy dictate that persons shall have free resort to the courts for redress of
wrongs and vindication of their rights [Buenaventura v. Sto. Domingo, 103 Phil. 239 (1958)], the right to institute criminal
prosecutions can not be exercised maliciously and in bad faith [Ventura v. Bernabe, G.R. No. L-26760, April 30, 1971, 38
SCRA 5871.] Hence, in Yutuk V. Manila Electric Co., G.R. No. L-13016, May 31, 1961, 2 SCRA 337, the Court held that
the right to file criminal complaints should not be used as a weapon to force an alleged debtor to pay an indebtedness. To
do so would be a clear perversion of the function of the criminal processes and of the courts of justice. And in Hawpia CA,
G.R. No. L-20047, June 30, 1967. 20 SCRA 536 the Court upheld the judgment against the petitioner for actual and moral
damages and attorney's fees after making a finding that petitioner, with persistence, filed at least six criminal complaints
against respondent, all of which were dismissed.
To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a design to vex and
humiliate a person and that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that the charges were false and
groundless [Manila Gas Corporation v. CA, G.R. No. L-44190, October 30,1980, 100 SCRA 602]. Concededly, the filing of
a suit by itself, does not render a person liable for malicious prosecution [Inhelder Corporation v. CA, G.R. No. 52358, May
301983122 SCRA 576]. The mere dismissal by the fiscal of the criminal complaint is not a ground for an award of
damages for malicious prosecution if there is no competent evidence to show that the complainant had acted in bad faith
[Sison v. David, G.R. No. L-11268, January 28,1961, 1 SCRA 60].
In the instant case, however, the trial court made a finding that petitioners acted in bad faith in filing the criminal
complaints against Tobias, observing that:
xxx

Defendants (petitioners herein) filed with the Fiscal's Office of Manila a total of six (6) criminal cases, five
(5) of which were for estafa thru falsification of commercial document and one for violation of Art. 290 of
the Revised Penal Code "discovering secrets thru seizure of correspondence," and all were dismissed for
insufficiency or lack of evidence." The dismissal of four (4) of the cases was appealed to the Ministry of
Justice, but said Ministry invariably sustained the dismissal of the cases. As above adverted to, two of
these cases were refiled with the Judge Advocate General's Office of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
to railroad plaintiffs arrest and detention in the military stockade, but this was frustrated by a presidential
decree transferring criminal cases involving civilians to the civil courts.
xxx
To be sure, when despite the two (2) police reports embodying the findings of Lt. Dioscoro Tagle, Chief
Document Examiner of the Manila Police Department, clearing plaintiff of participation or involvement in
the fraudulent transactions complained of, despite the negative results of the lie detector tests which
defendants compelled plaintiff to undergo, and although the police investigation was "still under follow-up
and a supplementary report will be submitted after all the evidence has been gathered," defendants
hastily filed six (6) criminal cases with the city Fiscal's Office of Manila, five (5) for estafa thru falsification
of commercial document and one (1) for violation of Art. 290 of the Revised Penal Code, so much so that
as was to be expected, all six (6) cases were dismissed, with one of the investigating fiscals, Asst. Fiscal
de Guia, commenting in one case that, "Indeed, the haphazard way this case was investigated is evident.
Evident likewise is the flurry and haste in the filing of this case against respondent Tobias," there can be
no mistaking that defendants would not but be motivated by malicious and unlawful intent to harass,
oppress, and cause damage to plaintiff.
xxx
[RTC Decision, pp. 5-6; Rollo, pp. 235-236].
In addition to the observations made by the trial court, the Court finds it significant that the criminal complaints were filed
during the pendency of the illegal dismissal case filed by Tobias against petitioners. This explains the haste in which the
complaints were filed, which the trial court earlier noted. But petitioners, to prove their good faith, point to the fact that only
six complaints were filed against Tobias when they could have allegedly filed one hundred cases, considering the number
of anomalous transactions committed against GLOBE MACKAY. However, petitioners' good faith is belied by the threat
made by Hendry after the filing of the first complaint that one hundred more cases would be filed against Tobias. In effect,
the possible filing of one hundred more cases was made to hang like the sword of Damocles over the head of Tobias. In
fine, considering the haste in which the criminal complaints were filed, the fact that they were filed during the pendency of
the illegal dismissal case against petitioners, the threat made by Hendry, the fact that the cases were filed notwithstanding
the two police reports exculpating Tobias from involvement in the anomalies committed against GLOBE MACKAY, coupled
by the eventual dismissal of all the cases, the Court is led into no other conclusion than that petitioners were motivated by
malicious intent in filing the six criminal complaints against Tobias.
Petitioners next contend that the award of damages was excessive. In the complaint filed against petitioners, Tobias
prayed for the following: one hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) as actual damages; fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) as exemplary damages; eight hundred thousand pesos (P800,000.00) as moral damages; fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000.00) as attorney's fees; and costs. The trial court, after making a computation of the damages incurred by
Tobias [See RTC Decision, pp. 7-8; Rollo, pp. 154-1551, awarded him the following: eighty thousand pesos (P80,000.00)
as actual damages; two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) as moral damages; twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00)
as exemplary damages; thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as attorney's fees; and, costs. It must be underscored that
petitioners have been guilty of committing several actionable tortious acts, i.e., the abusive manner in which they
dismissed Tobias from work including the baseless imputation of guilt and the harassment during the investigations; the
defamatory language heaped on Tobias as well as the scornful remark on Filipinos; the poison letter sent to RETELCO
which resulted in Tobias' loss of possible employment; and, the malicious filing of the criminal complaints. Considering the
extent of the damage wrought on Tobias, the Court finds that, contrary to petitioners' contention, the amount of damages
awarded to Tobias was reasonable under the circumstances.

Yet, petitioners still insist that the award of damages was improper, invoking the principle of damnum absque injuria. It is
argued that "[t]he only probable actual damage that plaintiff (private respondent herein) could have suffered was a direct
result of his having been dismissed from his employment, which was a valid and legal act of the defendants-appellants
(petitioners herein).lwph1.t " [Petition, p. 17; Rollo, p. 18].
According to the principle of damnum absque injuria, damage or loss which does not constitute a violation of a legal right
or amount to a legal wrong is not actionable [Escano v. CA, G.R. No. L-47207, September 25, 1980, 100 SCRA 197; See
also Gilchrist v. Cuddy 29 Phil, 542 (1915); The Board of Liquidators v. Kalaw, G.R. No. L-18805, August 14, 1967, 20
SCRA 987]. This principle finds no application in this case. It bears repeating that even granting that petitioners might
have had the right to dismiss Tobias from work, the abusive manner in which that right was exercised amounted to a legal
wrong for which petitioners must now be held liable. Moreover, the damage incurred by Tobias was not only in connection
with the abusive manner in which he was dismissed but was also the result of several other quasi-delictual acts committed
by petitioners.
Petitioners next question the award of moral damages. However, the Court has already ruled in Wassmer v. Velez, G.R.
No. L-20089, December 26, 1964, 12 SCRA 648, 653, that [p]er express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New Civil
Code, moral damages are recoverable in the cases mentioned in Article 21 of said Code." Hence, the Court of Appeals
committed no error in awarding moral damages to Tobias.
Lastly, the award of exemplary damages is impugned by petitioners. Although Article 2231 of the Civil Code provides that
"[i]n quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence," the Court,
in Zulueta v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., G.R. No. L- 28589, January 8, 1973, 49 SCRA 1, ruled that if gross
negligence warrants the award of exemplary damages, with more reason is its imposition justified when the act performed
is deliberate, malicious and tainted with bad faith. As in the Zuluetacase, the nature of the wrongful acts shown to have
been committed by petitioners against Tobias is sufficient basis for the award of exemplary damages to the latter.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 09055 is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-14628

September 30, 1960

FRANCISCO HERMOSISIMA, petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., respondents.
Regino Hermosisima for petitioner.
F.P. Gabriel, Jr. for respondents.

CONCEPCION, J.:
An appeal by certiorari, taken by petitioner Francisco Hermosisima, from a decision of Court of Appeals modifying that of
the Court of First Instance of Cebu.
On October 4, 1954, Soledad Cagigas, hereinafter referred to as complaint, filed with said of her child, Chris
Hermosisima, as natural child and moral damages for alleged breach of promise. Petitioner admitted the paternity of child
and expressed willingness to support the latter, but denied having ever promised to marry the complainant. Upon her
motion, said court ordered petitioner, on October 27, 1954, to pay, by way of alimony pendente lite, P50.00 a month,
which was, on February 16, 1955, reduced to P30.00 a month. In due course, later on, said court rendered a decision the
dispositive part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, declaring the child, Chris Hermosisima, as the natural daughter of
defendant, and confirming the order pendente lite, ordering defendant to pay to the said child, through plaintiff, the
sum of thirty pesos (P30.00), payable on or before the fifth day of every month sentencing defendant to pay to
plaintiff the sum of FOUR THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P4,500.00) for actual and compensatory
damages; the sum of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) as moral damages; and the further sum of FIVE
HUNDRED PESOS (P500.00) as attorney's fees for plaintiff, with costs against defendant.
On appeal taken by petitioner, the Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, except as to the actual and compensatory
damages and the moral damages, which were increased to P5,614.25 and P7,000.00, respectively.
The main issue before us is whether moral damages are recoverable, under our laws, for breach of promise to marry. The
pertinent facts are:
Complainant Soledad Cagigas, was born in July 1917. Since 1950, Soledad then a teacher in the Sibonga Provincial High
School in Cebu, and petitioner, who was almost ten (10) years younger than she, used to go around together and were
regarded as engaged, although he had made no promise of marriage prior thereto. In 1951, she gave up teaching and
became a life insurance underwriter in the City of Cebu, where intimacy developed among her and the petitioner, since
one evening in 1953, when after coming from the movies, they had sexual intercourse in his cabin on board M/V
"Escao," to which he was then attached as apprentice pilot. In February 1954, Soledad advised petitioner that she was in
the family way, whereupon he promised to marry her. Their child, Chris Hermosisima, was born on June 17, 1954, in a
private maternity and clinic. However, subsequently, or on July 24, 1954, defendant married one Romanita Perez. Hence,
the present action, which was commenced on or about October 4, 1954.
Referring now to the issue above referred to, it will be noted that the Civil Code of Spain permitted the recovery of
damages for breach to marry. Article 43 and 44 of said Code provides:
ART. 43. A mutual promise of marriage shall not give rise to an obligation to contract marriage. No court shall
entertain any complaint by which the enforcement of such promise is sought.
ART. 44. If the promise has been in a public or private instrument by an adult, or by a minor with the concurrence
of the person whose consent is necessary for the celebration of the marriage, or if the banns have been
published, the one who without just cause refuses to marry shall be obliged to reimburse the other for the
expenses which he or she may have incurred by reason of the promised marriage.
The action for reimbursement of expenses to which the foregoing article refers must be brought within one year,
computed from the day of the refusal to celebrate the marriage.
Inasmuch as these articles were never in force in the Philippines, this Court ruled in De Jesus vs. Syquia (58 Phil., 866),
that "the action for breach of promises to marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from the right to recover money or
property advanced . . . upon the faith of such promise". The Code Commission charged with the drafting of the Proposed
Civil Code of the Philippines deem it best, however, to change the law thereon. We quote from the report of the Code
Commission on said Proposed Civil Code:

Articles 43 and 44 the Civil Code of 1889 refer to the promise of marriage. But these articles are not enforced in
the Philippines. The subject is regulated in the Proposed Civil Code not only as to the aspect treated of in said
articles but also in other particulars. It is advisable to furnish legislative solutions to some questions that might
arise relative to betrothal. Among the provisions proposed are: That authorizing the adjudication of moral
damages, in case of breach of promise of marriage, and that creating liability for causing a marriage engagement
to be broken.1awphl.nt
Accordingly, the following provisions were inserted in said Proposed Civil Code, under Chapter I, Title III, Book I thereof:
Art. 56. A mutual promise to marry may be made expressly or impliedly.
Art. 57. An engagement to be married must be agreed directly by the future spouses.
Art. 58. A contract for a future marriage cannot, without the consent of the parent or guardian, be entered into by a
male between the ages of sixteen and twenty years or by a female between the ages of sixteen and eighteen
years. Without such consent of the parents or guardian, the engagement to marry cannot be the basis of a civil
action for damages in case of breach of the promise.
Art. 59. A promise to marry when made by a female under the age of fourteen years is not civilly actionable, even
though approved by the parent or guardian.
Art. 60. In cases referred to in the proceeding articles, the criminal and civil responsibility of a male for seduction
shall not be affected.
Art. 61. No action for specific performance of a mutual promise to marry may be brought.
Art. 62. An action for breach of promise to marry may be brought by the aggrieved party even though a minor
without the assistance of his parent or guardian. Should the minor refuse to bring suit, the parent or guardian may
institute the action.
Art. 63. Damages for breach of promise to marry shall include not only material and pecuniary losses but also
compensation for mental and moral suffering.
Art. 64. Any person, other than a rival, the parents, guardians and grandparents, of the affianced parties, who
cause a marriage engagement to be broken shall be liable for damages, both material and moral, to the engaged
person who is rejected.
Art. 65. In case of breach of promise to marry, the party breaking the engagement shall be obliged to return what
he or she has received from the other as gift on account of the promise of the marriage.
These article were, however, eliminated in Congress. The reason therefor are set forth in the report of the corresponding
Senate Committee, from which we quote:
The elimination of this Chapter is proposed. That breach of promise to marry is not actionable has been definitely decide
in the case of De Jesus vs. Syquia, 58 Phil., 866. The history of breach of promise suit in the United States and in
England has shown that no other action lends itself more readily to abuse by designing women and unscrupulous men. It
is this experience which has led to the abolition of the rights of action in the so-called Balm suit in many of the American
States.

See statutes of:

Florida 1945 pp. 1342 1344

Maryland 1945 pp. 1759 1762
Nevada 1943 p. 75
Maine 1941 pp. 140 141
New Hampshire 1941 p. 223
California 1939 p. 1245
Massachusetts 1938 p. 326
Indiana 1936 p. 1009
Michigan 1935 p. 201
New York 1935
Pennsylvania p. 450
The Commission perhaps though that it has followed the more progression trend in legislation when it provided for
breach of promise to marry suits. But it is clear that the creation of such causes of action at a time when so many
States, in consequence of years of experience are doing away with them, may well prove to be a step in the
wrong direction. (Congressional Record, Vol. IV, No. 79, Thursday, May 19, 1949, p. 2352.)
The views thus expressed were accepted by both houses of Congress. In the light of the clear and manifest intent of our
law making body not to sanction actions for breach of promise to marry, the award of moral damages made by the lower
courts is, accordingly, untenable. The Court of Appeals said award:
Moreover, it appearing that because of defendant-appellant's seduction power, plaintiff-appellee, overwhelmed by
her love for him finally yielded to his sexual desires in spite of her age and self-control, she being a woman after
all, we hold that said defendant-appellant is liable for seduction and, therefore, moral damages may be recovered
from him under the provision of Article 2219, paragraph 3, of the new Civil Code.
Apart from the fact that the general tenor of said Article 2219, particularly the paragraphs preceding and those following
the one cited by the Court of Appeals, and the language used in said paragraph strongly indicates that the "seduction"
therein contemplated is the crime punished as such in Article as such in Article 337 and 338 of the Revised Penal Code,
which admittedly does not exist in the present case, we find ourselves unable to say that petitioner is morally guilty of
seduction, not only because he is approximately ten (10) years younger than the complainant who around thirty-six
(36) years of age, and as highly enlightened as a former high school teacher and a life insurance agent are supposed to
be when she became intimate with petitioner, then a mere apprentice pilot, but, also, because, the court of first
instance found that, complainant "surrendered herself" to petitioner because, "overwhelmed by her love" for him, she
"wanted to bind" "by having a fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy."
The court of first instance sentenced petitioner to pay the following: (1) a monthly pension of P30.00 for the support of the
child: (2) P4,500, representing the income that complainant had allegedly failed to earn during her pregnancy and shortly
after the birth of the child, as actual and compensation damages; (3) P5,000, as moral damages; and (4) P500.00, as
attorney's fees. The Court of Appeals added to the second item the sum of P1,114.25 consisting of P144.20, for
hospitalization and medical attendance, in connection with the parturiation, and the balance representing expenses
incurred to support the child and increased the moral damages to P7,000.00.
With the elimination of this award for damages, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed, therefore, in all
other respects, without special pronouncement as to cost in this instance. It is so ordered.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 97336 February 19, 1993
GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MARILOU T. GONZALES, respondents.
Public Attorney's Office for petitioner.
Corleto R. Castro for private respondent.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to review and set aside the Decision 1of the
respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 24256 which affirmed in toto the 16 October 1939 Decision of Branch 38
(Lingayen) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pangasinan in Civil Case No. 16503. Presented is the issue of whether or
not damages may be recovered for a breach of promise to marry on the basis of Article 21 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines.
The antecedents of this case are not complicated:
On 27 October 1987, private respondent, without the assistance of counsel, filed with the aforesaid trial court a
complaint 2 for damages against the petitioner for the alleged violation of their agreement to get married. She alleges in
said complaint that: she is twenty-two (22) years old, single, Filipino and a pretty lass of good moral character and
reputation duly respected in her community; petitioner, on the other hand, is an Iranian citizen residing at the Lozano
Apartments, Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an exchange student taking a medical course at the Lyceum Northwestern
Colleges in Dagupan City; before 20 August 1987, the latter courted and proposed to marry her; she accepted his love on
the condition that they would get married; they therefore agreed to get married after the end of the school semester, which
was in October of that year; petitioner then visited the private respondent's parents in Baaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan to
secure their approval to the marriage; sometime in 20 August 1987, the petitioner forced her to live with him in the Lozano
Apartments; she was a virgin before she began living with him; a week before the filing of the complaint, petitioner's
attitude towards her started to change; he maltreated and threatened to kill her; as a result of such maltreatment, she
sustained injuries; during a confrontation with a representative of the barangay captain of Guilig a day before the filing of
the complaint, petitioner repudiated their marriage agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore and; the
petitioner is already married to someone living in Bacolod City. Private respondent then prayed for judgment ordering the
petitioner to pay her damages in the amount of not less than P45,000.00, reimbursement for actual expenses amounting
to P600.00, attorney's fees and costs, and granting her such other relief and remedies as may be just and equitable. The
complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 16503.
In his Answer with Counterclaim, 3 petitioner admitted only the personal circumstances of the parties as averred in the
complaint and denied the rest of the allegations either for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to
the truth thereof or because the true facts are those alleged as his Special and Affirmative Defenses. He thus claimed that

he never proposed marriage to or agreed to be married with the private respondent; he neither sought the consent and
approval of her parents nor forced her to live in his apartment; he did not maltreat her, but only told her to stop coming to
his place because he discovered that she had deceived him by stealing his money and passport; and finally, no
confrontation took place with a representative of the barangay captain. Insisting, in his Counterclaim, that the complaint is
baseless and unfounded and that as a result thereof, he was unnecessarily dragged into court and compelled to incur
expenses, and has suffered mental anxiety and a besmirched reputation, he prayed for an award of P5,000.00 for
miscellaneous expenses and P25,000.00 as moral damages.
After conducting a pre-trial on 25 January 1988, the trial court issued a Pre-Trial Order 4 embodying the stipulated facts
which the parties had agreed upon, to wit:
1. That the plaintiff is single and resident (sic) of Baaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, while the defendant is
single, Iranian citizen and resident (sic) of Lozano Apartment, Guilig, Dagupan City since September 1,
1987 up to the present;
2. That the defendant is presently studying at Lyceum Northwestern, Dagupan City, College of Medicine,
second year medicine proper;
3. That the plaintiff is (sic) an employee at Mabuhay Luncheonette , Fernandez Avenue, Dagupan City
since July, 1986 up to the present and a (sic) high school graduate;
4. That the parties happened to know each other when the manager of the Mabuhay Luncheonette,
Johhny Rabino introduced the defendant to the plaintiff on August 3, 1986.
After trial on the merits, the lower court, applying Article 21 of the Civil Code, rendered on 16 October 1989 a
decision 5 favoring the private respondent. The petitioner was thus ordered to pay the latter damages and attorney's fees;
the dispositive portion of the decision reads:
IN THE LIGHT of the foregoing consideration, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendant.
1. Condemning (sic) the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of twenty thousand (P20,000.00) pesos as
moral damages.
2. Condemning further the defendant to play the plaintiff the sum of three thousand (P3,000.00) pesos as
atty's fees and two thousand (P2,000.00) pesos at (sic) litigation expenses and to pay the costs.
3. All other claims are denied. 6
The decision is anchored on the trial court's findings and conclusions that (a) petitioner and private respondent were
lovers, (b) private respondent is not a woman of loose morals or questionable virtue who readily submits to sexual
advances, (c) petitioner, through machinations, deceit and false pretenses, promised to marry private respondent, d)
because of his persuasive promise to marry her, she allowed herself to be deflowered by him, (e) by reason of that
deceitful promise, private respondent and her parents in accordance with Filipino customs and traditions made
some preparations for the wedding that was to be held at the end of October 1987 by looking for pigs and chickens,
inviting friends and relatives and contracting sponsors, (f) petitioner did not fulfill his promise to marry her and (g) such
acts of the petitioner, who is a foreigner and who has abused Philippine hospitality, have offended our sense of morality,
good customs, culture and traditions. The trial court gave full credit to the private respondent's testimony because, inter
alia, she would not have had the temerity and courage to come to court and expose her honor and reputation to public
scrutiny and ridicule if her claim was false. 7
The above findings and conclusions were culled from the detailed summary of the evidence for the private respondent in
the foregoing decision, digested by the respondent Court as follows:

According to plaintiff, who claimed that she was a virgin at the time and that she never had a boyfriend
before, defendant started courting her just a few days after they first met. He later proposed marriage to
her several times and she accepted his love as well as his proposal of marriage on August 20, 1987, on
which same day he went with her to her hometown of Baaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, as he wanted to
meet her parents and inform them of their relationship and their intention to get married. The photographs
Exhs. "A" to "E" (and their submarkings) of defendant with members of plaintiff's family or with plaintiff,
were taken that day. Also on that occasion, defendant told plaintiffs parents and brothers and sisters that
he intended to marry her during the semestral break in October, 1987, and because plaintiff's parents
thought he was good and trusted him, they agreed to his proposal for him to marry their daughter, and
they likewise allowed him to stay in their house and sleep with plaintiff during the few days that they were
in Bugallon. When plaintiff and defendant later returned to Dagupan City, they continued to live together in
defendant's apartment. However, in the early days of October, 1987, defendant would tie plaintiff's hands
and feet while he went to school, and he even gave her medicine at 4 o'clock in the morning that made
her sleep the whole day and night until the following day. As a result of this live-in relationship, plaintiff
became pregnant, but defendant gave her some medicine to abort the fetus. Still plaintiff continued to live
with defendant and kept reminding him of his promise to marry her until he told her that he could not do
so because he was already married to a girl in Bacolod City. That was the time plaintiff left defendant,
went home to her parents, and thereafter consulted a lawyer who accompanied her to the barangay
captain in Dagupan City. Plaintiff, her lawyer, her godmother, and a barangay tanod sent by the barangay
captain went to talk to defendant to still convince him to marry plaintiff, but defendant insisted that he
could not do so because he was already married to a girl in Bacolod City, although the truth, as stipulated
by the parties at the pre-trial, is that defendant is still single.
Plaintiff's father, a tricycle driver, also claimed that after defendant had informed them of his desire to
marry Marilou, he already looked for sponsors for the wedding, started preparing for the reception by
looking for pigs and chickens, and even already invited many relatives and friends to the forthcoming
wedding. 8
Petitioner appealed the trial court's decision to the respondent Court of Appeals which docketed the case as CA-G.R. CV
No. 24256. In his Brief, 9 he contended that the trial court erred (a) in not dismissing the case for lack of factual and legal
basis and (b) in ordering him to pay moral damages, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs.
On 18 February 1991, respondent Court promulgated the challenged decision 10 affirming in toto the trial court's ruling of
16 October 1989. In sustaining the trial court's findings of fact, respondent Court made the following analysis:
First of all, plaintiff, then only 21 years old when she met defendant who was already 29 years old at the
time, does not appear to be a girl of loose morals. It is uncontradicted that she was a virgin prior to her
unfortunate experience with defendant and never had boyfriend. She is, as described by the lower court,
a barrio lass "not used and accustomed to trend of modern urban life", and certainly would ( sic) not have
allowed
"herself to be deflowered by the defendant if there was no persuasive promise made by the defendant to
marry her." In fact, we agree with the lower court that plaintiff and defendant must have been sweethearts
or so the plaintiff must have thought because of the deception of defendant, for otherwise, she would not
have allowed herself to be photographed with defendant in public in so (sic) loving and tender poses as
those depicted in the pictures Exhs. "D" and "E". We cannot believe, therefore, defendant's pretense that
plaintiff was a nobody to him except a waitress at the restaurant where he usually ate. Defendant in fact
admitted that he went to plaintiff's hometown of Baaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, at least thrice; at ( sic) the
town fiesta on February 27, 1987 (p. 54, tsn May 18, 1988), at (sic) a beach party together with the
manager and employees of the Mabuhay Luncheonette on March 3, 1987 (p. 50, tsn id.), and on April 1,
1987 when he allegedly talked to plaintiff's mother who told him to marry her daughter (pp. 55-56, tsn id.).
Would defendant have left Dagupan City where he was involved in the serious study of medicine to go to
plaintiff's hometown in Baaga, Bugallon, unless there was (sic) some kind of special relationship
between them? And this special relationship must indeed have led to defendant's insincere proposal of
marriage to plaintiff, communicated not only to her but also to her parents, and ( sic) Marites Rabino, the

owner of the restaurant where plaintiff was working and where defendant first proposed marriage to her,
also knew of this love affair and defendant's proposal of marriage to plaintiff, which she declared was the
reason why plaintiff resigned from her job at the restaurant after she had accepted defendant's proposal
(pp. 6-7, tsn March 7, 1988).
Upon the other hand, appellant does not appear to be a man of good moral character and must think so
low and have so little respect and regard for Filipino women that he openly admitted that when he studied
in Bacolod City for several years where he finished his B.S. Biology before he came to Dagupan City to
study medicine, he had a common-law wife in Bacolod City. In other words, he also lived with another
woman in Bacolod City but did not marry that woman, just like what he did to plaintiff. It is not surprising,
then, that he felt so little compunction or remorse in pretending to love and promising to marry plaintiff, a
young, innocent, trustful country girl, in order to satisfy his lust on her. 11
and then concluded:
In sum, we are strongly convinced and so hold that it was defendant-appellant's fraudulent and deceptive
protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood
to him and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and it was
likewise these (sic) fraud and deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their
daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their supposed marriage. And as these acts of appellant are
palpably and undoubtedly against morals, good customs, and public policy, and are even gravely and
deeply derogatory and insulting to our women, coming as they do from a foreigner who has been enjoying
the hospitality of our people and taking advantage of the opportunity to study in one of our institutions of
learning, defendant-appellant should indeed be made, under Art. 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, to
compensate for the moral damages and injury that he had caused plaintiff, as the lower court ordered him
to do in its decision in this case. 12
Unfazed by his second defeat, petitioner filed the instant petition on 26 March 1991; he raises therein the single issue of
whether or not Article 21 of the Civil Code applies to the case at bar. 13
It is petitioner's thesis that said Article 21 is not applicable because he had not committed any moral wrong or injury or
violated any good custom or public policy; he has not professed love or proposed marriage to the private respondent; and
he has never maltreated her. He criticizes the trial court for liberally invoking Filipino customs, traditions and culture, and
ignoring the fact that since he is a foreigner, he is not conversant with such Filipino customs, traditions and culture. As an
Iranian Moslem, he is not familiar with Catholic and Christian ways. He stresses that even if he had made a promise to
marry, the subsequent failure to fulfill the same is excusable or tolerable because of his Moslem upbringing; he then
alludes to the Muslim Code which purportedly allows a Muslim to take four (4) wives and concludes that on the basis
thereof, the trial court erred in ruling that he does not posses good moral character. Moreover, his controversial "common
law life" is now his legal wife as their marriage had been solemnized in civil ceremonies in the Iranian Embassy. As to his
unlawful cohabitation with the private respondent, petitioner claims that even if responsibility could be pinned on him for
the live-in relationship, the private respondent should also be faulted for consenting to an illicit arrangement. Finally,
petitioner asseverates that even if it was to be assumed arguendo that he had professed his love to the private
respondent and had also promised to marry her, such acts would not be actionable in view of the special circumstances of
the case. The mere breach of promise is not actionable. 14
On 26 August 1991, after the private respondent had filed her Comment to the petition and the petitioner had filed his
Reply thereto, this Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective Memoranda,
which they subsequently complied with.
As may be gleaned from the foregoing summation of the petitioner's arguments in support of his thesis, it is clear that
questions of fact, which boil down to the issue of the credibility of witnesses, are also raised. It is the rule in this
jurisdiction that appellate courts will not disturb the trial court's findings as to the credibility of witnesses, the latter court
having heard the witnesses and having had the opportunity to observe closely their deportment and manner of testifying,

unless the trial court had plainly overlooked facts of substance or value which, if considered, might affect the result of the
case. 15
Petitioner has miserably failed to convince Us that both the appellate and trial courts had overlooked any fact of
substance or values which could alter the result of the case.
Equally settled is the rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court. It is not the function of this Court to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence introduced by the
parties before the lower court. There are, however, recognized exceptions to this rule. Thus, inMedina
vs. Asistio, Jr., 16 this Court took the time, again, to enumerate these exceptions:
xxx xxx xxx
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures (Joaquin v.
Navarro, 93 Phil. 257 [1953]); (2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurb or impossible
(Luna v. Linatok, 74 Phil. 15 [1942]); (3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion (Buyco v. People, 95
Phil. 453 [1955]); (4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts (Cruz v. Sosing,
L-4875, Nov. 27, 1953); (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting (Casica v. Villaseca, L-9590 Ap. 30,
1957; unrep.) (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case
and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellate and appellee (Evangelista v. Alto Surety and
Insurance
Co.,
103
Phil.
401
[1958]);
(7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court (Garcia v. Court of Appeals,
33 SCRA 622 [1970]; Sacay v. Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593 [1986]); (8) When the findings of fact are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based (Ibid.,); (9) When the facts set
forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents
(Ibid.,); and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of
evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on record (Salazar v. Gutierrez, 33 SCRA 242 [1970]).
Petitioner has not endeavored to joint out to Us the existence of any of the above quoted exceptions in this case.
Consequently, the factual findings of the trial and appellate courts must be respected.

And now to the legal issue.

The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. 17 Congress deliberately
eliminated from the draft of the New Civil Code the provisions that would have made it so. The reason therefor is set forth
in the report of the Senate Committees on the Proposed Civil Code, from which We quote:
The elimination of this chapter is proposed. That breach of promise to marry is not actionable has been
definitely decided in the case of De Jesus vs. Syquia. 18 The history of breach of promise suits in the
United States and in England has shown that no other action lends itself more readily to abuse by
designing women and unscrupulous men. It is this experience which has led to the abolition of rights of
action in the so-called Heart Balm suits in many of the American states. . . . 19
This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article 21, which is designed to expand the concept of torts
or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is
impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books. 20
As the Code Commission itself stated in its Report:
But the Code Commission had gone farther than the sphere of wrongs defined or determined by positive
law. Fully sensible that there are countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so many victims of moral

wrongs helpless, even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury, the Commission has
deemed it necessary, in the interest of justice, to incorporate in the proposed Civil Code the following rule:
Art. 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.
An example will illustrate the purview of the foregoing norm: "A" seduces the nineteen-year old daughter
of "X". A promise of marriage either has not been made, or can not be proved. The girl becomes
pregnant. Under the present laws, there is no crime, as the girl is above nineteen years of age. Neither
can any civil action for breach of promise of marriage be filed. Therefore, though the grievous moral
wrong has been committed, and though the girl and family have suffered incalculable moral damage, she
and her parents cannot bring action for damages. But under the proposed article, she and her parents
would have such a right of action.
Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the forgoing rule is approved, would vouchsafe adequate legal
remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which it is impossible for human foresight to provide for
specifically in the statutes. 21
Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which defines a quasi-delict thus:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay
for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
is limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes the notion of willfulness or intent. Quasi-delict, known in
Spanish legal treatises as culpa aquiliana, is a civil law concept while torts is an Anglo-American or common law
concept. Torts is much broader than culpa aquiliana because it includes not only negligence, but international
criminal acts as well such as assault and battery, false imprisonment and deceit. In the general scheme of the
Philippine legal system envisioned by the Commission responsible for drafting the New Civil Code, intentional and
malicious acts, with certain exceptions, are to be governed by the Revised Penal Code while negligent acts or
omissions are to be covered by Article 2176 of the Civil Code. 22 In between these opposite spectrums are
injurious acts which, in the absence of Article 21, would have been beyond redress. Thus, Article 21 fills that
vacuum. It is even postulated that together with Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, Article 21 has greatly
broadened the scope of the law on civil wrongs; it has become much more supple and adaptable than the AngloAmerican law on torts. 23
In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are of the opinion, and so hold, that where a man's promise to
marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise
thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in
reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or
inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to
Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her
honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury should have been committed in a
manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.
In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for
and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him on the
honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and it was likewise these fraud and deception on appellant's
part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their supposed marriage." 24 In
short, the private respondent surrendered her virginity, the cherished possession of every single Filipina, not because of
lust but because of moral seduction the kind illustrated by the Code Commission in its example earlier adverted to. The
petitioner could not be held liable for criminal seduction punished under either Article 337 or Article 338 of the Revised
Penal Code because the private respondent was above eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the seduction.

Prior decisions of this Court clearly suggest that Article 21 may be applied in a breach of promise to marry where the
woman is a victim of moral seduction. Thus, in Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals, 25 this Court denied recovery of
damages to the woman because:
. . . we find ourselves unable to say that petitioner is morally guilty of seduction, not only because he is
approximately ten (10) years younger than the complainant who was around thirty-six (36) years of
age, and as highly enlightened as a former high school teacher and a life insurance agent are supposed
to be when she became intimate with petitioner, then a mere apprentice pilot, but, also, because the
court of first instance found that, complainant "surrendered herself" to petitioner because, "overwhelmed
by her love" for him, she "wanted to bind" him by having a fruit of their engagement even before they had
the benefit of clergy.
In Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals, 26 while this Court likewise hinted at possible recovery if there had been moral
seduction, recovery was eventually denied because We were not convinced that such seduction existed. The following
enlightening disquisition and conclusion were made in the said case:
The Court of Appeals seem to have overlooked that the example set forth in the Code Commission's
memorandum refers to a tort upon a minor who had been seduced. The essential feature is seduction,
that in law is more than mere sexual intercourse, or a breach of a promise of marriage; it connotes
essentially the idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of confidence on the part of the
seducer to which the woman has yielded (U.S. vs. Buenaventura, 27 Phil. 121; U.S. vs. Arlante, 9 Phil.
595).
It has been ruled in the Buenaventura case (supra) that
To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sufficient promise or
inducementand the woman must yield because of the promise or other inducement. If
she consents merely from carnal lust and the intercourse is from mutual desire, there is
no seduction (43 Cent. Dig. tit. Seduction, par. 56) She must be induced to depart from
the path of virtue by the use of some species of arts, persuasions and wiles, which are
calculated to have and do have that effect, and which result in her person to ultimately
submitting her person to the sexual embraces of her seducer (27 Phil. 123).
And in American Jurisprudence we find:
On the other hand, in an action by the woman, the enticement, persuasion or deception is
the essence of the injury; and a mere proof of intercourse is insufficient to warrant a
recovery.
Accordingly it is not seduction where the willingness arises out of sexual desire of
curiosity of the female, and the defendant merely affords her the needed opportunity for
the commission of the act. It has been emphasized that to allow a recovery in all such
cases would tend to the demoralization of the female sex, and would be a reward for
unchastity by which a class of adventuresses would be swift to profit. (47 Am. Jur. 662)
xxx xxx xxx
Over and above the partisan allegations, the fact stand out that for one whole year, from 1958 to 1959,
the plaintiff-appellee, a woman of adult age, maintain intimate sexual relations with appellant, with
repeated acts of intercourse. Such conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly there is here
voluntariness and mutual passion; for had the appellant been deceived, had she surrendered exclusively
because of the deceit, artful persuasions and wiles of the defendant, she would not have again yielded to
his embraces, much less for one year, without exacting early fulfillment of the alleged promises of
marriage, and would have cut short all sexual relations upon finding that defendant did not intend to fulfill

his defendant did not intend to fulfill his promise. Hence, we conclude that no case is made under article
21 of the Civil Code, and no other cause of action being alleged, no error was committed by the Court of
First Instance in dismissing the complaint. 27
In his annotations on the Civil Code, 28 Associate Justice Edgardo L. Paras, who recently retired from this Court, opined
that in a breach of promise to marry where there had been carnal knowledge, moral damages may be recovered:
. . . if there be criminal or moral seduction, but not if the intercourse was due to mutual lust. (Hermosisima
vs.
Court
of
Appeals,
L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960; Estopa vs. Piansay, Jr., L-14733, Sept. 30, 1960; Batarra vs. Marcos, 7 Phil. 56
(sic); Beatriz Galang vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-17248, Jan. 29, 1962). (In other words, if the CAUSE
be the promise to marry, and the EFFECT be the carnal knowledge, there is a chance that there
was criminal or moral seduction, hence recovery of moral damages will prosper. If it be the other way
around, there can be no recovery of moral damages, because here mutual lust has intervened). . . .
together with "ACTUAL damages, should there be any, such as the expenses for the wedding presentations (See
Domalagon v. Bolifer, 33 Phil. 471).
Senator Arturo M. Tolentino 29 is also of the same persuasion:
It is submitted that the rule in Batarra vs. Marcos, 30 still subsists, notwithstanding the incorporation of the
present article 31 in the Code. The example given by the Code Commission is correct, if there
was seduction, not necessarily in the legal sense, but in the vulgar sense of deception. But when the
sexual act is accomplished without any deceit or qualifying circumstance of abuse of authority or
influence, but the woman, already of age, has knowingly given herself to a man, it cannot be said that
there is an injury which can be the basis for indemnity.
But so long as there is fraud, which is characterized by willfulness (sic), the action lies. The court,
however, must weigh the degree of fraud, if it is sufficient to deceive the woman under the circumstances,
because an act which would deceive a girl sixteen years of age may not constitute deceit as to an
experienced woman thirty years of age. But so long as there is a wrongful act and a resulting injury, there
should be civil liability, even if the act is not punishable under the criminal law and there should have been
an acquittal or dismissal of the criminal case for that reason.
We are unable to agree with the petitioner's alternative proposition to the effect that granting, for argument's sake, that he
did promise to marry the private respondent, the latter is nevertheless also at fault. According to him, both parties are
in pari delicto; hence, pursuant to Article 1412(1) of the Civil Code and the doctrine laid down in Batarra vs. Marcos, 32 the
private respondent cannot recover damages from the petitioner. The latter even goes as far as stating that if the private
respondent had "sustained any injury or damage in their relationship, it is primarily because of her own doing, 33 for:
. . . She is also interested in the petitioner as the latter will become a doctor sooner or later. Take notice
that she is a plain high school graduate and a mere employee . . . (Annex "C") or a waitress (TSN, p. 51,
January 25, 1988) in a luncheonette and without doubt, is in need of a man who can give her economic
security. Her family is in dire need of financial assistance. (TSN, pp. 51-53, May 18, 1988). And this
predicament prompted her to accept a proposition that may have been offered by the petitioner. 34
These statements reveal the true character and motive of the petitioner. It is clear that he harbors a condescending, if not
sarcastic, regard for the private respondent on account of the latter's ignoble birth, inferior educational background,
poverty and, as perceived by him, dishonorable employment. Obviously then, from the very beginning, he was not at all
moved by good faith and an honest motive. Marrying with a woman so circumstances could not have even remotely
occurred to him. Thus, his profession of love and promise to marry were empty words directly intended to fool, dupe,
entice, beguile and deceive the poor woman into believing that indeed, he loved her and would want her to be his life's
partner. His was nothing but pure lust which he wanted satisfied by a Filipina who honestly believed that by accepting his
proffer of love and proposal of marriage, she would be able to enjoy a life of ease and security. Petitioner clearly violated

the Filipino's concept of morality and brazenly defied the traditional respect Filipinos have for their women. It can even be
said that the petitioner committed such deplorable acts in blatant disregard of Article 19 of the Civil Code which directs
every person to act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith in the exercise of his rights
and in the performance of his obligations.
No foreigner must be allowed to make a mockery of our laws, customs and traditions.
The pari delicto rule does not apply in this case for while indeed, the private respondent may not have been impelled by
the purest of intentions, she eventually submitted to the petitioner in sexual congress not out of lust, but because of moral
seduction. In fact, it is apparent that she had qualms of conscience about the entire episode for as soon as she found out
that the petitioner was not going to marry her after all, she left him. She is not, therefore, in pari delicto with the
petitioner. Pari delicto means "in equal fault; in a similar offense or crime; equal in guilt or in legal fault." 35 At most, it could
be conceded that she is merely in delicto.
Equity often interferes for the relief of the less guilty of the parties, where his transgression has been
brought about by the imposition of undue influence of the party on whom the burden of the original wrong
principally rests, or where his consent to the transaction was itself procured by
fraud. 36
In Mangayao vs. Lasud, 37 We declared:
Appellants likewise stress that both parties being at fault, there should be no action by one against the
other (Art. 1412, New Civil Code). This rule, however, has been interpreted as applicable only where the
fault on both sides is, more or less, equivalent. It does not apply where one party is literate or intelligent
and the other one is not. (c.f. Bough vs. Cantiveros, 40 Phil. 209).
We should stress, however, that while We find for the private respondent, let it not be said that this Court condones the
deplorable behavior of her parents in letting her and the petitioner stay together in the same room in their house after
giving approval to their marriage. It is the solemn duty of parents to protect the honor of their daughters and infuse upon
them the higher values of morality and dignity.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the challenged decision, the instant petition is hereby DENIED, with costs
against the petitioner.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-20089

December 26, 1964

BEATRIZ P. WASSMER, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
FRANCISCO X. VELEZ, defendant-appellant.
Jalandoni & Jamir for defendant-appellant.
Samson S. Alcantara for plaintiff-appellee.

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

The facts that culminated in this case started with dreams and hopes, followed by appropriate planning and serious
endeavors, but terminated in frustration and, what is worse, complete public humiliation.
Francisco X. Velez and Beatriz P. Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love, decided to get married and set
September 4, 1954 as the big day. On September 2, 1954 Velez left this note for his bride-to-be:
Dear Bet
Will have to postpone wedding My mother opposes it. Am leaving on the Convair today.
Please do not ask too many people about the reason why That would only create a scandal.
Paquing

But the next day, September 3, he sent her the following telegram:
NOTHING CHANGED REST ASSURED RETURNING VERY SOON APOLOGIZE MAMA PAPA LOVE .
PAKING
Thereafter Velez did not appear nor was he heard from again.
Sued by Beatriz for damages, Velez filed no answer and was declared in default. Plaintiff adduced evidence before the
clerk of court as commissioner, and on April 29, 1955, judgment was rendered ordering defendant to pay plaintiff
P2,000.00 as actual damages; P25,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages; P2,500.00 as attorney's fees; and the
costs.
On June 21, 1955 defendant filed a "petition for relief from orders, judgment and proceedings and motion for new trial and
reconsideration." Plaintiff moved to strike it cut. But the court, on August 2, 1955, ordered the parties and their attorneys to
appear before it on August 23, 1955 "to explore at this stage of the proceedings the possibility of arriving at an amicable

settlement." It added that should any of them fail to appear "the petition for relief and the opposition thereto will be
deemed submitted for resolution."
On August 23, 1955 defendant failed to appear before court. Instead, on the following day his counsel filed a motion to
defer for two weeks the resolution on defendants petition for relief. The counsel stated that he would confer with defendant
in Cagayan de Oro City the latter's residence on the possibility of an amicable element. The court granted two
weeks counted from August 25, 1955.
Plaintiff manifested on June 15, 1956 that the two weeks given by the court had expired on September 8, 1955 but that
defendant and his counsel had failed to appear.
Another chance for amicable settlement was given by the court in its order of July 6, 1956 calling the parties and their
attorneys to appear on July 13, 1956. This time. however, defendant's counsel informed the court that chances of settling
the case amicably were nil.
On July 20, 1956 the court issued an order denying defendant's aforesaid petition. Defendant has appealed to this Court.
In his petition of June 21, 1955 in the court a quo defendant alleged excusable negligence as ground to set aside the
judgment by default. Specifically, it was stated that defendant filed no answer in the belief that an amicable settlement was
being negotiated.
A petition for relief from judgment on grounds of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, must be duly supported
by an affidavit of merits stating facts constituting a valid defense. (Sec. 3, Rule 38, Rules of Court.) Defendant's affidavit of
merits attached to his petition of June 21, 1955 stated: "That he has a good and valid defense against plaintiff's cause of
action, his failure to marry the plaintiff as scheduled having been due to fortuitous event and/or circumstances beyond his
control." An affidavit of merits like this stating mere conclusions or opinions instead of facts is not valid. (Cortes vs. Co Bun
Kim, L-3926, Oct. 10, 1951; Vaswani vs. P. Tarrachand Bros., L-15800, December 29, 1960.)
Defendant, however, would contend that the affidavit of merits was in fact unnecessary, or a mere surplusage, because
the judgment sought to be set aside was null and void, it having been based on evidence adduced before the clerk of
court. In Province of Pangasinan vs. Palisoc, L-16519, October 30, 1962, this Court pointed out that the procedure of
designating the clerk of court as commissioner to receive evidence is sanctioned by Rule 34 (now Rule 33) of the Rules of
Court. Now as to defendant's consent to said procedure, the same did not have to be obtained for he was declared in
default and thus had no standing in court (Velez vs. Ramas, 40 Phil. 787; Alano vs. Court of First Instance, L-14557,
October 30, 1959).
In support of his "motion for new trial and reconsideration," defendant asserts that the judgment is contrary to law. The
reason given is that "there is no provision of the Civil Code authorizing" an action for breach of promise to marry. Indeed,
our ruling in Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals (L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960), as reiterated in Estopa vs. Biansay (L-14733,
Sept. 30, 1960), is that "mere breach of a promise to marry" is not an actionable wrong. We pointed out that Congress
deliberately eliminated from the draft of the new Civil Code the provisions that would have it so.
It must not be overlooked, however, that the extent to which acts not contrary to law may be perpetrated with impunity, is
not limitless for Article 21 of said Code provides that "any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner
that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage."
The record reveals that on August 23, 1954 plaintiff and defendant applied for a license to contract marriage, which was
subsequently issued (Exhs. A, A-1). Their wedding was set for September 4, 1954. Invitations were printed and distributed
to relatives, friends and acquaintances (Tsn., 5; Exh. C). The bride-to-be's trousseau, party drsrses and other apparel for
the important occasion were purchased (Tsn., 7-8). Dresses for the maid of honor and the flower girl were prepared. A
matrimonial bed, with accessories, was bought. Bridal showers were given and gifts received (Tsn., 6; Exh. E). And then,
with but two days before the wedding, defendant, who was then 28 years old,: simply left a note for plaintiff stating: "Will
have to postpone wedding My mother opposes it ... " He enplaned to his home city in Mindanao, and the next day, the
day before the wedding, he wired plaintiff: "Nothing changed rest assured returning soon." But he never returned and was
never heard from again.

Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere breach of promise to marry is not an
actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the above-described preparation and publicity, only to
walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to
good customs for which defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 aforesaid.
Defendant urges in his afore-stated petition that the damages awarded were excessive. No question is raised as to the
award of actual damages. What defendant would really assert hereunder is that the award of moral and exemplary
damages, in the amount of P25,000.00, should be totally eliminated.
Per express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable in the cases mentioned
in Article 21 of said Code. As to exemplary damages, defendant contends that the same could not be adjudged against
him because under Article 2232 of the New Civil Code the condition precedent is that "the defendant acted in a wanton,
fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner." The argument is devoid of merit as under the above-narrated
circumstances of this case defendant clearly acted in a "wanton ... , reckless [and] oppressive manner." This Court's
opinion, however, is that considering the particular circumstances of this case, P15,000.00 as moral and exemplary
damages is deemed to be a reasonable award.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, with the above-indicated modification, the lower court's judgment is hereby affirmed, with
costs.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-18630

December 17, 1966

APOLONIO TANJANCO, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ARACELI SANTOS, Respondents.
P. Carreon and G. O. Veneracion, Jr. for petitioner.
Antonio V. Bonoan for respondents.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals (in its Case No. 27210-R) revoking an order of the Court of First Instance
of Rizal (in Civil Case No. Q-4797) dismissing appellant's action for support and damages. law library
The essential allegations of the complaint are to the effect that, from December, 1957, the defendant (appellee herein),
Apolonio Tanjanco, courted the plaintiff, Araceli Santos, both being of adult age; that "defendant expressed and professed
his undying love and affection for plaintiff who also in due time reciprocated the tender feelings"; that in consideration of
defendant's promise of marriage plaintiff consented and acceded to defendant's pleas for carnal knowledge; that regularly
until December 1959, through his protestations of love and promises of marriage, defendant succeeded in having carnal
access to plaintiff, as a result of which the latter conceived a child; that due to her pregnant condition, to avoid
embarrassment and social humiliation, plaintiff had to resign her job as secretary in IBM Philippines, Inc., where she was
receiving P230.00 a month; that thereby plaintiff became unable to support herself and her baby; that due to defendant's
refusal to marry plaintiff, as promised, the latter suffered mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral

shock, and social humiliation. The prayer was for a decree compelling the defendant to recognize the unborn child that
plaintiff was bearing; to pay her not less than P430.00 a month for her support and that of her baby, plus P100,000.00 in
moral and exemplary damages, plus P10,000.00 attorney's fees. law library
Upon defendant's motion to dismiss, the court of first instance dismissed the complaint for failure to state a cause of
action. law library
Plaintiff Santos duly appealed to the Court of Appeals, and the latter ultimately decided the case, holding with the lower
court that no cause of action was shown to compel recognition of a child as yet unborn, nor for its support, but decreed
that the complaint did state a cause of action for damages, premised on Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
prescribing as follows:
ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
The Court of Appeals, therefore, entered judgment setting aside the dismissal and directing the court of origin to proceed
with the case. law library
Defendant, in turn, appealed to this Court, pleading that actions for breach of a promise to marry are not permissible in
this jurisdiction, and invoking the rulings of this Court inEstopa vs. Piansay, L-14733, September 30, 1960; Hermosisima
vs.
Court
of
Appeals,
L-14628,
January
29,
1962;
and De
Jesus
vs.
SyQuia,
58
Phil.
886.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
We find this appeal meritorious. law library
In holding that the complaint stated a cause of action for damages, under Article 21 above mentioned, the Court of
Appeals relied upon and quoted from the memorandum submitted by the Code Commission to the Legislature in 1949 to
support the original draft of the Civil Code. Referring to Article 23 of the draft (now Article 21 of the Code), the Commission
stated:

But the Code Commission has gone farther than the sphere of wrongs defined or determined by positive law. Fully
sensible that there are countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though
they have actually suffered material and moral injury, the Commission has deemed it necessary, in the interest of justice,
to incorporate in the proposed Civil Code the following rule:
"ART. 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage."
An example will illustrate the purview of the foregoing norm: "A" seduces the nineteen-year old daughter of "X". A promise
of marriage either has not been made, or cannot be proved. The girl becomes pregnant. Under the present laws, there is
no crime, as the girl is above eighteen years of age. Neither can any civil action for breach of promise of marriage be filed.
Therefore, though the grievous moral wrong has been committed, and though the girl and her family have suffered
incalculable moral damage, she and her parents cannot bring any action for damages. But under the proposed article, she
and her parents would have such a right of action.
The Court of Appeals seems to have overlooked that the example set forth in the Code Commission's memorandum
refers to a tort upon a minor who has been seduced. The essential feature is seduction, that in law is more than mere
sexual intercourse, or a breach of a promise of marriage; it connotes essentially the idea of deceit, enticement, superior
power or abuse of confidence on the part of the seducer to which the woman has yielded (U.S. vs. Buenaventura, 27 Phil.
121; U.S. vs. Arlante, 9 Phil. 595). law library

It has been ruled in the Buenaventura case (supra) that To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sufficient promise or inducement and the woman must yield
because of the promise or other inducement. If she consents merely from carnal lust and the intercourse is from mutual
desire, there is no seduction (43 Cent. Dig. tit. Seduction, par. 56). She must be induced to depart from the path of virtue
by the use of some species of arts, persuasions and wiles, which are calculated to have and do have that effect, and
which result in her ultimately submitting her person to the sexual embraces of her seducer (27 Phil. 123).
And in American Jurisprudence we find:
On the other hand, in an action by the woman, the enticement, persuasion or deception is the essence of the injury; and a
mere proof of intercourse is insufficient to warrant a recover. virtual law library
Accordingly it is not seduction where the willingness arises out of sexual desire or curiosity of the female, and the
defendant merely affords her the needed opportunity for the commission of the act. It has been emphasized that to allow a
recovery in all such cases would tend to the demoralization of the female sex, and would be a reward for unchastity by
which a class of adventuresses would be swift to profit." (47 Am. Jur. 662)
Bearing these principles in mind, let us examine the complaint. The material allegations there are as follows:
I. That the plaintiff is of legal age, single, and residing at 56 South E. Diliman, Quezon City, while defendant is also of legal
age, single and residing at 525 Padre Faura, Manila, where he may be served with summons; law library
II. That the plaintiff and the defendant became acquainted with each other sometime in December, 1957 and soon
thereafter, the defendant started visiting and courting the plaintiff; law library
III. That the defendant's visits were regular and frequent and in due time the defendant expressed and professed his
undying love and affection for the plaintiff who also in due time reciprocated the tender feelings; virtual law library
IV. That in the course of their engagement, the plaintiff and the defendant as are wont of young people in love had
frequent outings and dates, became very close and intimate to each other and sometime in July, 1958, in consideration of
the defendant's promises of marriage, the plaintiff consented and acceded to the former's earnest and repeated pleas to
have carnal knowledge with him; law library
V. That subsequent thereto and regularly until about July, 1959 except for a short period in December, 1958 when the
defendant was out of the country, the defendant through his protestations of love and promises of marriage succeeded in
having carnal knowledge with the plaintiff; law library
VI. That as a result of their intimate relationship, the plaintiff started conceiving which was confirmed by a doctor sometime
in July, 1959; virtual law library
VII. That upon being certain of her pregnant condition, the plaintiff informed the defendant and pleaded with him to make
good his promises of marriage, but instead of honoring his promises and righting his wrong, the defendant stopped and
refrained from seeing the plaintiff since about July, 1959 has not visited the plaintiff and to all intents and purposes has
broken their engagement and his promises.
Over and above the partisan allegations, the facts stand out that for one whole year, from 1958 to 1959, the plaintiffappellee, a woman of adult age, maintained intimate sexual relations with appellant, with repeated acts of intercourse.
Such conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly there is here voluntariness and mutual passion; for had
the appellant been deceived, had she surrendered exclusively because of the deceit, artful persuasions and wiles of the
defendant, she would not have again yielded to his embraces, much less for one year, without exacting early fulfillment of
the alleged promises of marriage, and would have cut chart all sexual relations upon finding that defendant did not intend

to fulfill his promises. Hence, we conclude that no case is made under Article 21 of the Civil Code, and no other cause of
action being alleged, no error was committed by the Court of First Instance in dismissing the complaint. law library
Of course, the dismissal must be understood as without prejudice to whatever actions may correspond to the child of the
plaintiff against the defendant-appellant, if any. On that point, this Court makes no pronouncement, since the child's own
rights are not here involved. library
FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and that of the Court of First
Instance is affirmed. No costs.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-19671

November 29, 1965

PASTOR B. TENCHAVEZ, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
VICENTA F. ESCAO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
I. V. Binamira & F. B. Barria for plaintiff-appellant.
Jalandoni & Jarnir for defendants-appellees.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Direct appeal, on factual and legal questions, from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, in its Civil Case
No. R-4177, denying the claim of the plaintiff-appellant, Pastor B. Tenchavez, for legal separation and one million pesos in
damages against his wife and parents-in-law, the defendants-appellees, Vicente, Mamerto and Mena, 1 all surnamed
"Escao," respectively.2
The facts, supported by the evidence of record, are the following:
Missing her late afternoon classes on 24 February 1948 in the University of San Carlos, Cebu City, where she was then
enrolled as a second year student of commerce, Vicenta Escao, 27 years of age (scion of a well-to-do and socially
prominent Filipino family of Spanish ancestry and a "sheltered colegiala"), exchanged marriage vows with Pastor
Tenchavez, 32 years of age, an engineer, ex-army officer and of undistinguished stock, without the knowledge of her
parents, before a Catholic chaplain, Lt. Moises Lavares, in the house of one Juan Alburo in the said city. The marriage
was the culmination of a previous love affair and was duly registered with the local civil register.
Vicenta's letters to Pastor, and his to her, before the marriage, indicate that the couple were deeply in love. Together with
a friend, Pacita Noel, their matchmaker and go-between, they had planned out their marital future whereby Pacita would
be the governess of their first-born; they started saving money in a piggy bank. A few weeks before their secret marriage,
their engagement was broken; Vicenta returned the engagement ring and accepted another suitor, Joseling Lao. Her love
for Pastor beckoned; she pleaded for his return, and they reconciled. This time they planned to get married and then
elope. To facilitate the elopement, Vicenta had brought some of her clothes to the room of Pacita Noel in St. Mary's Hall,
which was their usual trysting place.
Although planned for the midnight following their marriage, the elopement did not, however, materialize because when
Vicente went back to her classes after the marriage, her mother, who got wind of the intended nuptials, was already
waiting for her at the college. Vicenta was taken home where she admitted that she had already married Pastor. Mamerto
and Mena Escao were surprised, because Pastor never asked for the hand of Vicente, and were disgusted because of
the great scandal that the clandestine marriage would provoke (t.s.n., vol. III, pp. 1105-06). The following morning, the
Escao spouses sought priestly advice. Father Reynes suggested a recelebration to validate what he believed to be an
invalid marriage, from the standpoint of the Church, due to the lack of authority from the Archbishop or the parish priest for
the officiating chaplain to celebrate the marriage. The recelebration did not take place, because on 26 February 1948
Mamerto Escao was handed by a maid, whose name he claims he does not remember, a letter purportedly coming from
San Carlos college students and disclosing an amorous relationship between Pastor Tenchavez and Pacita Noel; Vicenta
translated the letter to her father, and thereafter would not agree to a new marriage. Vicenta and Pastor met that day in
the house of Mrs. Pilar Mendezona. Thereafter, Vicenta continued living with her parents while Pastor returned to his job
in Manila. Her letter of 22 March 1948 (Exh. "M"), while still solicitous of her husband's welfare, was not as endearing as
her previous letters when their love was aflame.
Vicenta was bred in Catholic ways but is of a changeable disposition, and Pastor knew it. She fondly accepted her being
called a "jellyfish." She was not prevented by her parents from communicating with Pastor (Exh. "1-Escao"), but her
letters became less frequent as the days passed. As of June, 1948 the newlyweds were already estranged (Exh. "2Escao"). Vicenta had gone to Jimenez, Misamis Occidental, to escape from the scandal that her marriage stirred in Cebu
society. There, a lawyer filed for her a petition, drafted by then Senator Emmanuel Pelaez, to annul her marriage. She did
not sign the petition (Exh. "B-5"). The case was dismissed without prejudice because of her non-appearance at the
hearing (Exh. "B-4").

On 24 June 1950, without informing her husband, she applied for a passport, indicating in her application that she was
single, that her purpose was to study, and she was domiciled in Cebu City, and that she intended to return after two years.
The application was approved, and she left for the United States. On 22 August 1950, she filed a verified complaint for
divorce against the herein plaintiff in the Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada in and for the County of
Washoe, on the ground of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character." On 21 October 1950, a decree of divorce, "final
and absolute", was issued in open court by the said tribunal.
In 1951 Mamerto and Mena Escao filed a petition with the Archbishop of Cebu to annul their daughter's marriage to
Pastor (Exh. "D"). On 10 September 1954, Vicenta sought papal dispensation of her marriage (Exh. "D"-2).
On 13 September 1954, Vicenta married an American, Russell Leo Moran, in Nevada. She now lives with him in
California, and, by him, has begotten children. She acquired American citizenship on 8 August 1958.
But on 30 July 1955, Tenchavez had initiated the proceedings at bar by a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cebu,
and amended on 31 May 1956, against Vicenta F. Escao, her parents, Mamerto and Mena Escao, whom he charged
with having dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta from joining her husband, and alienating her affections, and against the
Roman Catholic Church, for having, through its Diocesan Tribunal, decreed the annulment of the marriage, and asked for
legal separation and one million pesos in damages. Vicenta claimed a valid divorce from plaintiff and an equally valid
marriage to her present husband, Russell Leo Moran; while her parents denied that they had in any way influenced their
daughter's acts, and counterclaimed for moral damages.
The appealed judgment did not decree a legal separation, but freed the plaintiff from supporting his wife and to acquire
property to the exclusion of his wife. It allowed the counterclaim of Mamerto Escao and Mena Escao for moral and
exemplary damages and attorney's fees against the plaintiff-appellant, to the extent of P45,000.00, and plaintiff resorted
directly to this Court.
The appellant ascribes, as errors of the trial court, the following:
1. In not declaring legal separation; in not holding defendant Vicenta F. Escao liable for damages and in
dismissing the complaint;.
2. In not holding the defendant parents Mamerto Escano and the heirs of Doa Mena Escao liable for damages;.
3 In holding the plaintiff liable for and requiring him to pay the damages to the defendant parents on their
counterclaims; and.
4. In dismissing the complaint and in denying the relief sought by the plaintiff.
That on 24 February 1948 the plaintiff-appellant, Pastor Tenchavez, and the defendant-appellee, Vicenta Escao, were
validly married to each other, from the standpoint of our civil law, is clearly established by the record before us. Both
parties were then above the age of majority, and otherwise qualified; and both consented to the marriage, which was
performed by a Catholic priest (army chaplain Lavares) in the presence of competent witnesses. It is nowhere shown that
said priest was not duly authorized under civil law to solemnize marriages.
The chaplain's alleged lack of ecclesiastical authorization from the parish priest and the Ordinary, as required by Canon
law, is irrelevant in our civil law, not only because of the separation of Church and State but also because Act 3613 of the
Philippine Legislature (which was the marriage law in force at the time) expressly provided that
SEC. 1. Essential requisites. Essential requisites for marriage are the legal capacity of the contracting parties and
consent. (Emphasis supplied)
The actual authority of the solemnizing officer was thus only a formal requirement, and, therefore, not essential to give the
marriage civil effects,3 and this is emphasized by section 27 of said marriage act, which provided the following:

SEC. 27. Failure to comply with formal requirements. No marriage shall be declared invalid because of the
absence of one or several of the formal requirements of this Act if, when it was performed, the spouses or one of
them believed in good faith that the person who solemnized the marriage was actually empowered to do so, and
that the marriage was perfectly legal.
The good faith of all the parties to the marriage (and hence the validity of their marriage) will be presumed until the
contrary is positively proved (Lao vs. Dee Tim, 45 Phil. 739, 745; Francisco vs. Jason, 60 Phil. 442, 448). It is well to note
here that in the case at bar, doubts as to the authority of the solemnizing priest arose only after the marriage, when
Vicenta's parents consulted Father Reynes and the archbishop of Cebu. Moreover, the very act of Vicenta in abandoning
her original action for annulment and subsequently suing for divorce implies an admission that her marriage to plaintiff
was valid and binding.
Defendant Vicenta Escao argues that when she contracted the marriage she was under the undue influence of Pacita
Noel, whom she charges to have been in conspiracy with appellant Tenchavez. Even granting, for argument's sake, the
truth of that contention, and assuming that Vicenta's consent was vitiated by fraud and undue influence, such vices did not
render her marriage ab initio void, but merely voidable, and the marriage remained valid until annulled by a competent
civil court. This was never done, and admittedly, Vicenta's suit for annulment in the Court of First Instance of Misamis was
dismissed for non-prosecution.
It is equally clear from the record that the valid marriage between Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta Escao remained
subsisting and undissolved under Philippine law, notwithstanding the decree of absolute divorce that the wife sought and
obtained on 21 October 1950 from the Second Judicial District Court of Washoe County, State of Nevada, on grounds of
"extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character." At the time the divorce decree was issued, Vicenta Escao, like her
husband, was still a Filipino citizen. 4 She was then subject to Philippine law, and Article 15 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines (Rep. Act No. 386), already in force at the time, expressly provided:
Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon
the citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
The Civil Code of the Philippines, now in force, does not admit absolute divorce, quo ad vinculo matrimonii; and in fact
does not even use that term, to further emphasize its restrictive policy on the matter, in contrast to the preceding
legislation that admitted absolute divorce on grounds of adultery of the wife or concubinage of the husband (Act 2710).
Instead of divorce, the present Civil Code only provides for legal separation (Title IV, Book 1, Arts. 97 to 108), and, even in
that case, it expressly prescribes that "the marriage bonds shall not be severed" (Art. 106, subpar. 1).
For the Philippine courts to recognize and give recognition or effect to a foreign decree of absolute divorce betiveen
Filipino citizens could be a patent violation of the declared public policy of the state, specially in view of the third
paragraph of Article 17 of the Civil Code that prescribes the following:
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order,
policy and good customs, shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by
determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
Even more, the grant of effectivity in this jurisdiction to such foreign divorce decrees would, in effect, give rise to an
irritating and scandalous discrimination in favor of wealthy citizens, to the detriment of those members of our polity whose
means do not permit them to sojourn abroad and obtain absolute divorces outside the Philippines.
From this point of view, it is irrelevant that appellant Pastor Tenchavez should have appeared in the Nevada divorce court.
Primarily because the policy of our law cannot be nullified by acts of private parties (Civil Code,Art. 17, jam quot.); and
additionally, because the mere appearance of a non-resident consort cannot confer jurisdiction where the court originally
had none (Area vs. Javier, 95 Phil. 579).
From the preceding facts and considerations, there flows as a necessary consequence that in this jurisdiction Vicenta
Escao's divorce and second marriage are not entitled to recognition as valid; for her previous union to plaintiff Tenchavez

must be declared to be existent and undissolved. It follows, likewise, that her refusal to perform her wifely duties, and her
denial of consortium and her desertion of her husband constitute in law a wrong caused through her fault, for which the
husband is entitled to the corresponding indemnity (Civil Code, Art. 2176). Neither an unsubstantiated charge of deceit nor
an anonymous letter charging immorality against the husband constitute, contrary to her claim, adequate excuse.
Wherefore, her marriage and cohabitation with Russell Leo Moran is technically "intercourse with a person not her
husband" from the standpoint of Philippine Law, and entitles plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez to a decree of "legal separation
under our law, on the basis of adultery" (Revised Penal Code, Art. 333).
The foregoing conclusions as to the untoward effect of a marriage after an invalid divorce are in accord with the previous
doctrines and rulings of this court on the subject, particularly those that were rendered under our laws prior to the approval
of the absolute divorce act (Act 2710 of the Philippine Legislature). As a matter of legal history, our statutes did not
recognize divorces a vinculo before 1917, when Act 2710 became effective; and the present Civil Code of the Philippines,
in disregarding absolute divorces, in effect merely reverted to the policies on the subject prevailing before Act 2710. The
rulings, therefore, under the Civil Code of 1889, prior to the Act above-mentioned, are now, fully applicable. Of these, the
decision in Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855, is of particular interest. Said this Court in that case:
As the divorce granted by the French Court must be ignored, it results that the marriage of Dr. Mory and Leona
Castro, celebrated in London in 1905, could not legalize their relations; and the circumstance that they afterwards
passed for husband and wife in Switzerland until her death is wholly without legal significance. The claims of the
very children to participate in the estate of Samuel Bishop must therefore be rejected. The right to inherit is limited
to legitimate, legitimated and acknowledged natural children. The children of adulterous relations are wholly
excluded. The word "descendants" as used in Article 941 of the Civil Code cannot be interpreted to include
illegitimates born of adulterous relations. (Emphasis supplied)
Except for the fact that the successional rights of the children, begotten from Vicenta's marriage to Leo Moran after the
invalid divorce, are not involved in the case at bar, the Gmur case is authority for the proposition that such union is
adulterous in this jurisdiction, and, therefore, justifies an action for legal separation on the part of the innocent consort of
the first marriage, that stands undissolved in Philippine law. In not so declaring, the trial court committed error.
True it is that our ruling gives rise to anomalous situations where the status of a person (whether divorced or not) would
depend on the territory where the question arises. Anomalies of this kind are not new in the Philippines, and the answer to
them was given in Barretto vs. Gonzales, 58 Phil. 667:
The hardship of the existing divorce laws in the Philippine Islands are well known to the members of the
Legislature. It is the duty of the Courts to enforce the laws of divorce as written by Legislature if they are
constitutional. Courts have no right to say that such laws are too strict or too liberal. (p. 72)
The appellant's first assignment of error is, therefore, sustained.
However, the plaintiff-appellant's charge that his wife's parents, Dr. Mamerto Escao and his wife, the late Doa Mena
Escao, alienated the affections of their daughter and influenced her conduct toward her husband are not supported by
credible evidence. The testimony of Pastor Tenchavez about the Escao's animosity toward him strikes us to be merely
conjecture and exaggeration, and are belied by Pastor's own letters written before this suit was begun (Exh. "2-Escao"
and "Vicenta," Rec. on App., pp. 270-274). In these letters he expressly apologized to the defendants for "misjudging
them" and for the "great unhappiness" caused by his "impulsive blunders" and "sinful pride," "effrontery and audacity"
[sic]. Plaintiff was admitted to the Escao house to visit and court Vicenta, and the record shows nothing to prove that he
would not have been accepted to marry Vicente had he openly asked for her hand, as good manners and breeding
demanded. Even after learning of the clandestine marriage, and despite their shock at such unexpected event, the
parents of Vicenta proposed and arranged that the marriage be recelebrated in strict conformity with the canons of their
religion upon advice that the previous one was canonically defective. If no recelebration of the marriage ceremony was
had it was not due to defendants Mamerto Escao and his wife, but to the refusal of Vicenta to proceed with it. That the
spouses Escao did not seek to compel or induce their daughter to assent to the recelebration but respected her decision,
or that they abided by her resolve, does not constitute in law an alienation of affections. Neither does the fact that

Vicenta's parents sent her money while she was in the United States; for it was natural that they should not wish their
daughter to live in penury even if they did not concur in her decision to divorce Tenchavez (27 Am. Jur. 130-132).
There is no evidence that the parents of Vicenta, out of improper motives, aided and abetted her original suit for
annulment, or her subsequent divorce; she appears to have acted independently, and being of age, she was entitled to
judge what was best for her and ask that her decisions be respected. Her parents, in so doing, certainly cannot be
charged with alienation of affections in the absence of malice or unworthy motives, which have not been shown, good faith
being always presumed until the contrary is proved.
SEC. 529. Liability of Parents, Guardians or Kin. The law distinguishes between the right of a parent to interest
himself in the marital affairs of his child and the absence of rights in a stranger to intermeddle in such affairs.
However, such distinction between the liability of parents and that of strangers is only in regard to what will justify
interference. A parent isliable for alienation of affections resulting from his own malicious conduct, as where he
wrongfully entices his son or daughter to leave his or her spouse, but he is not liable unless he acts maliciously,
without justification and from unworthy motives. He is not liable where he acts and advises his child in good faith
with respect to his child's marital relations in the interest of his child as he sees it, the marriage of his child not
terminating his right and liberty to interest himself in, and be extremely solicitous for, his child's welfare and
happiness, even where his conduct and advice suggest or result in the separation of the spouses or the obtaining
of a divorce or annulment, or where he acts under mistake or misinformation, or where his advice or interference
are indiscreet or unfortunate, although it has been held that the parent is liable for consequences resulting from
recklessness. He may in good faith take his child into his home and afford him or her protection and support, so
long as he has not maliciously enticed his child away, or does not maliciously entice or cause him or her to stay
away, from his or her spouse. This rule has more frequently been applied in the case of advice given to a married
daughter, but it is equally applicable in the case of advice given to a son.
Plaintiff Tenchavez, in falsely charging Vicenta's aged parents with racial or social discrimination and with having exerted
efforts and pressured her to seek annulment and divorce, unquestionably caused them unrest and anxiety, entitling them
to recover damages. While this suit may not have been impelled by actual malice, the charges were certainly reckless in
the face of the proven facts and circumstances. Court actions are not established for parties to give vent to their
prejudices or spleen.
In the assessment of the moral damages recoverable by appellant Pastor Tenchavez from defendant Vicente Escao, it is
proper to take into account, against his patently unreasonable claim for a million pesos in damages, that (a) the marriage
was celebrated in secret, and its failure was not characterized by publicity or undue humiliation on appellant's part; (b) that
the parties never lived together; and (c) that there is evidence that appellant had originally agreed to the annulment of the
marriage, although such a promise was legally invalid, being against public policy (cf. Art. 88, Civ. Code). While appellant
is unable to remarry under our law, this fact is a consequence of the indissoluble character of the union that appellant
entered into voluntarily and with open eyes rather than of her divorce and her second marriage. All told, we are of the
opinion that appellant should recover P25,000 only by way of moral damages and attorney's fees.
With regard to the P45,000 damages awarded to the defendants, Dr. Mamerto Escao and Mena Escao, by the court
below, we opine that the same are excessive. While the filing of this unfounded suit must have wounded said defendants'
feelings and caused them anxiety, the same could in no way have seriously injured their reputation, or otherwise
prejudiced them, lawsuits having become a common occurrence in present society. What is important, and has been
correctly established in the decision of the court below, is that said defendants were not guilty of any improper conduct in
the whole deplorable affair. This Court, therefore, reduces the damages awarded to P5,000 only.
Summing up, the Court rules:
(1) That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after the effectivity of the present Civil Code (Rep.
Act 386), is not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction; and neither is the marriage contracted with another party
by the divorced consort, subsequently to the foreign decree of divorce, entitled to validity in the country;

(2) That the remarriage of divorced wife and her co-habitation with a person other than the lawful husband entitle the latter
to a decree of legal separation conformably to Philippine law;
(3) That the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one consort entitles the other to recover damages;
(4) That an action for alienation of affections against the parents of one consort does not lie in the absence of proof of
malice or unworthy motives on their part.
WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified as follows;
(1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a decree of legal separation from defendant Vicenta F.
Escao;
(2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escao to pay plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez the amount of P25,000 for
damages and attorneys' fees;
(3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee, Mamerto Escao and the estate of his wife, the deceased
Mena Escao, P5,000 by way of damages and attorneys' fees.
Neither party to recover costs.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 180832 : July 23, 2008]
JEROME CASTRO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 emanated from the complaint for grave oral defamation 2 filed by Albert P. Tan
against petitioner Jerome Castro.
The facts follow.
On November 11, 2002, Reedley International School (RIS) dismissed Tan's son, Justin Albert (then a Grade 12 student),
for violating the terms of his disciplinary probation.3Upon Tan's request, RIS reconsidered its decision but imposed "nonappealable" conditions such as excluding Justin Albert from participating in the graduation ceremonies.

Aggrieved, Tan filed a complaint in the Department of Education (Dep-Ed) for violation of the Manual of Regulation of
Private Schools, Education Act of 1982 and Article 19 of the Civil Code 4 against RIS. He alleged that the dismissal of his
son was undertaken with malice, bad faith and evident premeditation. After investigation, the Dep-Ed found that RIS' code
violation point system allowed the summary imposition of unreasonable sanctions (which had no basis in fact and in law).
The system therefore violated due process. Hence, the Dep-Ed nullified it. 5
Meanwhile, on November 20, 2002, the Dep-Ed ordered RIS to readmit Justin Albert without any condition. 6 Thus, he was
able to graduate from RIS and participate in the commencement ceremonies held on March 30, 2003.
After the graduation ceremonies, Tan met Bernice C. Ching, a fellow parent at RIS. In the course of their conversation,
Tan intimated that he was contemplating a suit against the officers of RIS in their personal capacities, including petitioner
who was the assistant headmaster.
Ching telephoned petitioner sometime the first week of April and told him that Tan was planning to sue the officers of RIS
in their personal capacities. Before they hung up, petitioner told Ching:
Okay, you too, take care and be careful talking to [Tan], that's dangerous.
Ching then called Tan and informed him that petitioner said "talking to him was dangerous."
Insulted, Tan filed a complaint for grave oral defamation in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City against
petitioner on August 21, 2003.
On November 3, 2003, petitioner was charged with grave oral defamation in the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of
Mandaluyong City, Branch 607 under the following Information:
That on or about the 13th day of March, 2003 in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named [petitioner], with deliberate intent of bringing ATTY. ALBERT P. TAN, into discredit,
dishonor, disrepute and contempt, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously speak and utter the following
words to Ms. Bernice C. Ching:
"OK, YOU TOO, YOU TAKE CARE AND BE CAREFUL TALKING TO [TAN], THAT'S DANGEROUS."

and other words of similar import of a serious and insulting nature.

CONTRARY TO LAW.
Petitioner pleaded not guilty during arraignment.
The prosecution essentially tried to establish that petitioner depicted Tan as a "dangerous person." Ching testified that
petitioner warned her that talking to Tan was dangerous. Tan, on the other hand, testified that petitioner's statement
shocked him as it portrayed him as "someone capable of committing undesirable acts." He added that petitioner probably
took offense because of the complaint he filed against RIS in the Dep-Ed.
For his defense, petitioner denied harboring ill-feelings against Tan despite the latter's complaint against RIS in the DepEd. Although he admitted conversing with Ching (whom he considered as a close acquaintance) on the telephone a few
days after RIS' 2003 commencement exercises, petitioner asserted that he never said or insinuated that Tan or talking to
Tan was dangerous. On cross-examination, however, he did not categorically deny the veracity of Ching's statement.
The MeTC found that Ching's statements in her affidavit and in open court were consistent and that she did not have any
motive to fabricate a false statement. Petitioner, on the other hand, harbored personal resentment, aversion and ill-will

against Tan since the Dep-Ed compelled RIS to readmit his son. Thus, the MeTC was convinced that petitioner told Ching
talking to Tan was dangerous and that he uttered the statement with the intention to insult Tan and tarnish his social and
professional reputation.
In a decision dated December 27, 2005, the MeTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of grave oral
defamation:8
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused, Jerome Castro GUILTYbeyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Grave Oral Defamation, sentencing him therefore, in accordance to Article 358(1) of the Revised Penal Code and
applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of 1 month and 1 day of arresto mayor as
minimum to 4 months and 1 day of arresto mayor as maximum.
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) affirmed the factual findings of the MeTC. However, in view of the animosity
between the parties, it found petitioner guilty only of slight oral defamation. But because Tan filed his complaint in the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City only on August 21, 2003 (or almost five months from discovery), the
RTC ruled that prescription had already set in; it therefore acquitted petitioner on that ground. 9
On April 19, 2007, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a petition for certiorariin the Court of Appeals (CA)
assailing the decision of the RTC.10 It contended that the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion when it downgraded
petitioner's offense to slight oral defamation. The RTC allegedly misappreciated the antecedents which provoked
petitioner to utter the allegedly defamatory statement against Tan.
The CA found that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion when it misapprehended the totality of the circumstances
and found petitioner guilty only of slight oral defamation. Thus, the CA reinstated the MeTC decision. 11
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied. 12 Hence, this recourse.
Petitioner basically contends that the CA erred in taking cognizance of the petition forcertiorari inasmuch as the OSG
raised errors of judgment (i.e., that the RTC misappreciated the evidence presented by the parties) but failed to prove that
the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion. Thus, double jeopardy attached when the RTC acquitted him.
We grant the petition.
No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. 13 This constitutional mandate is echoed in
Section 7 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court which provides:
Section 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. ' When an accused has been convicted or acquitted or the
case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction,
upon a valid complaint or in information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and
after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall
be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for
any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or
information.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Under this provision, double jeopardy occurs upon (1) a valid indictment (2) before a competent court (3) after
arraignment (4) when a valid plea has been entered and (5) when the accused was acquitted or convicted or the case
was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused. 14 Thus, an acquittal, whether ordered
by the trial or appellate court, is final and unappealable on the ground of double jeopardy.15

The only exception is when the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion or, as we held in Galman v.
Sandiganbayan,16 when there was mistrial. In such instances, the OSG can assail the said judgment in a petition
for certiorari establishing that the State was deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case. 17
The rationale behind this exception is that a judgment rendered by the trial court with grave abuse of discretion was
issued without jurisdiction. It is, for this reason, void. Consequently, there is no double jeopardy.
In this case, the OSG merely assailed the RTC's finding on the nature of petitioner's statement, that is, whether it
constituted grave or slight oral defamation. The OSG premised its allegation of grave abuse of discretion on the RTC's
"erroneous" evaluation and assessment of the evidence presented by the parties.
What the OSG therefore questioned were errors of judgment (or those involving misappreciation of evidence or errors of
law). However, a court, in a petition forcertiorari, cannot review the public respondent's evaluation of the evidence and
factual findings.18 Errors of judgment cannot be raised in a Rule 65 petition as a writ ofcertiorari can only correct errors of
jurisdiction (or those involving the commission of grave abuse of discretion). 19
Because the OSG did not raise errors of jurisdiction, the CA erred in taking cognizance of its petition and, worse, in
reviewing the factual findings of the RTC.20 We therefore reinstate the RTC decision so as not to offend the constitutional
prohibition against double jeopardy.
At most, petitioner could have been liable for damages under Article 26 of the Civil Code 21 :
Article 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other
persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action
for damages, prevention and other relief:
xxx

xxx

xxx

(3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends;

xxx

xxx

xxx

Petitioner is reminded that, as an educator, he is supposed to be a role model for the youth. As such, he should always
act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith. 22
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The August 29, 2007 decision and December 5, 2007 resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 98649 areREVERSED and SET ASIDE. The November 20, 2006 decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 212 is REINSTATED. Petitioner Jerome Castro isACQUITTED of slight
oral defamation as defined and penalized in Article 358 of the Revised Penal Code.
No pronouncement as to costs.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD dIVISION

G.R. No. L-54598 April 15, 1988

JOSE B. LEDESMA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Spouses PACIFICO DELMO and SANCHA DELMO (as private
respondents),respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Luzel D. Demasu-ay for respondent.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This petition seeks to reverse the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals which afirmed the decision of the Court of
First Instance of Iloilo, adjudging the petitioner, who was then the President of the West Visayas College liable for
damages under Article 27 of the Civil Code of the Philippines for failure to graduate a student with honors.
The facts are not disputed.
An organization named Student Leadership Club was formed by some students of the West Visayas College. They
elected the late Violets Delmo as the treasurer. In that capacity, Delmo extended loans from the funds of the club to some
of the students of the school. "the petitioner claims that the said act of extending loans was against school rules and
regulations. Thus, the petitioner, as President of the School, sent a letter to Delmo informing her that she was being
dropped from the membership of the club and that she would not be a candidate for any award or citation from the school.
Delmo asked for a reconsideration of the decision but the petitioner denied it. Delmo, thus, appealed to the Office of the
Director of the Bureau of Public Schools.
The Director after due investigation, rendered a decison on April 13, 1966 which provided:
Records of the preliminary investigation conducted by one of the legal officers of this Office disclosed the
following: That Violeta Delmo was the treasurer of the Student Leadership Club, an exclusive student
organization; that pursuant to Article IX of the of the Constitution and By-Laws of the club, it passed
Resolution No. 2, authorizing the treasurer to disburse funds of the Club to student for financial aid and
other humanitarian purposes; that in compliance with said resolution and as treasurer of the Club, Violeta
Delmo extended loans to some officers and members of the Club upon proper application duly approved
by the majority of the members of the Executive Board; and that upon receiving the report from Mr. Jesse
Dagoon, adviser of the funds of the Club, that Office conducted an investigation on the matter and having
been convinced of the guilt of Violets Delmo and the other officers and members of the Club, that Office
rendered the order or decision in question. In justifying that Office's order or decision, it is contended that
approval by that Office of the Constitution and By-Laws of the Club is necessary for its effectivity and
validity and since it was never submitted to that Office, the Club had no valid constitution and By-Laws
and that as a consequence, Resolution No. 2 which was passed based on the Constitution and By-Lawsis without any force and effect and the treasurer, Violeta Delmo, who extended loans to some officers and
members of the Club pursuant thereto are illegal (sic), hence, she and the other students involved are
deemed guilty of misappropriating the funds of the Club. On the other hand, Raclito Castaneda, Nestor
Golez and Violeta Delmo, President, Secretary and Treasurer of the Club, respectively, testified that the
Club had adopted its Constitution and By-Laws in a meeting held last October 3, 1965, and that pursuant
to Article I of said Constitution and By-Laws, the majority of the members of the Executive Board passed
Resolution No. 2, which resolution became the basis for the extension on of loans to some officers and
members of the Club, that the Club honestly believed that its Constitution and By-Laws has been
approved by the superintendent because the adviser of the Club, Mr. Jesse Dagoon, assured the

President of the Club that he will cause the approval of the Constitution and By-Laws by the
Superintendent; the officers of the Club have been inducted to office on October 9,1965 by the
Superintendent and that the Club had been likewise allowed to cosponsor the Education Week
Celebration.
After a careful study of the records, this Office sustains the action taken by the Superintendent in
penalizing the adviser of the Club as well as the officers and members thereof by dropping them from
membership therein. However, this Office is convinced that Violets M. Delmo had acted in good faith, in
her capacity as Club Treasurer, in extending loans to the officers and members of the Student partnership
Club. Resolution No. 2 authorizing the Club treasurer to discharge finds to students in need of financial
assistance and other humanitarian purposes had been approved by the Club adviser, Mr. Jesse Dagoon,
with the notation that approval was given in his capacity as adviser of the Club and extension of the
Superintendent's personality. Aside from misleading the officers and members of the Club, Mr. Dagoon,
had unsatisfactorily explained why he failed to give the Constitution and By-Laws of the Club to the
Superintendent for approval despite his assurance to the Club president that he would do so. With this
finding of negligence on the part of the Club adviser, not to mention laxity in the performance of his duties
as such, this Office considers as too severe and unwarranted that portion of the questioned order stating
that Violeta Delmo "shall not be a candidate for any award or citation from this school or any organization
in this school." Violeta Delmo, it is noted, has been a consistent full scholar of the school and she alone
has maintained her scholarship. The decision in question would, therefore, set at naught all her sacrifice
and frustrate her dreams of graduating with honors in this year's commencement exercises.
In view of all the foregoing, this Office believes and so holds and hereby directs that appellant Violeta. M.
Delmo, and for that matter all other Club members or officers involved in this case, be not deprived of any
award, citation or honor from the school, if they are otherwise entitled thereto. (Rollo, pp. 28-30)
On April 27, 1966, the petitioner received by mail the decision of the Director and all the records of the case. On the same
day, petitioner received a telegram stating the following:
"AIRMAIL RECORDS DELMO CASE MISSENT THAT OFFICE"
The Director asked for the return only of the records but the petitioner allegedly mistook the telegram as ordering him to
also send the decision back. On the same day, he returned by mail all the records plus the decision of the Director to the
Bureau of Public Schools.
The next day, the petitioner received another telegram from the Director order him to furnish Delmo with a copy of the
decision. The petitioner, in turn, sent a night letter to the Director informing the latter that he had sent the decision back
and that he had not retained a copy thereof..
On May 3, 1966, the day of the graduation, the petitioner received another telegram from the Director ordering him not to
deprive Delmo of any honors due her. As it was impossible by this time to include Delmo's name in the program as one of
the honor students, the petitioner let her graduate as a plain student instead of being awarded the Latin honor of Magna
Cum Laude.
To delay the matter further, the petitioner on May 5, 1966, wrote the Director for a reconsideration of the latters" decision
because he believed that Delmo should not be allowed to graduate with honors. The Director denied the petitioner's
request.
On July 12, 1966, the petitioner finally instructed the Registrar of the school to enter into the scholastic records of Delmo
the honor, "Magna Cum Laude."
On July 30, 1966, Delmo, then a minor, was joined by her parents in flag action for damages against the petitioner. During
the pendency of the action, however, Delmo passed away, and thus, an Amended and Supplemental Complaint was filed
by her parents as her sole and only heirs.

The trial court after hearing rendered judgment against the petitioner and in favor of the spouses Delmo. The court said:
Let us go to specific badges of the defendants (now petitioners) bad faith. Per investigation of Violeta
Delmo's appeal to Director Vitaliano Bernardino of the Bureau of Public Schools (Exhibit L it was the
defendant who inducted the officers of the Student Leadership Club on October 9, 1965. In fact the Club
was allowed to cosponsor the Education Week Celebration. (Exh. "L"). If the defendant he not approve of
the constitution and by-laws of the Club, why did he induct the officers into office and allow the Club to
sponsor the Education Week Celebration"? It was through his own act that the students were misled to do
as they did. Coupled with the defendants tacit recognition of the Club was the assurance of Mr. Jemm
Dagoon, Club Adviser, who made the students believe that he was acting as an extension of Mr.
Ledesma's personality. (Exhibit "L").
Another badge of the defendan'ts want of good faith is the fact that, although, he kaew as early as April
27,1966 that per on of r Bernardino, Exhibit "L," he was directed to give honors to Miss Delmo, he kept Id
information to . He told the Court that he knew that the letter of Director Bernardino directed him not to
deprive Miss Delmo the honors due her, but she (sic) says that he has not finished reading the letterdecision, Exhibit "L," of Director Bernardino 0, him to give honors to Miss Delmo. (Tsn, Feb. 5, 1974,
testimony of Mr. Ledesma, pp. .33-35). It could not be true that he has not finished reading the letterdecision, Exh. "L," because said letter consisted of only three pages, and the portion which directed that
Miss Delmo "be not deprived of any award, citation or honor from the school, if otherwise entitled thereto
is found at the last paragraph of the same. How did he know the last paragraph if he did not read the
letter.
Defendants actuations regarding Miss Delmo's cam had been one of bias and prejudice. When his action
would favor him, he was deliberate and aspect to the utter prejudice and detriment of Miss Delmo. Thus,
although, as early as April 27, 1966, he knew of the exoneration of Miss Delino by Director Bernardino, he
withheld the information from Miss Delmo. This is eloquently dramatized by Exh. "11" and Exh. "13" On
April 29,1966, Director Bernardino cabled him to furnish Violeta Delmo copy of the Decision, Exh. "L," but
instead of informing Miss Delmo about the decision, since he said he mailed back the decision on April
28,1966, he sent a night letter on April 29,1966, to Director Bernardino, informing the latter that he had
returned the decision (Exh. "l3"), together with the record. Why a night letter when the matter was of
utmost urgency to the parties in the case, because graduation day was only four days ahead? An
examination of the telegrams sent by the defendant shows that he had been sending ordinary telegram
and not night letters. (Exh. "5", Exhibit "7"). At least, if the defendant could not furnish a copy of the
decision, (Exh. "L"), to Miss Delmo, he should have told her about it or that Miss Delmo's honors and
citation in the commencement be announced or indicated. But Mr. Ledesma is one who cannot admit a
mistake. Very ungentlemanly this is home out by his own testimony despite his knowledge that his
decision to deprive Miss Delmo of honors due to her was overturned by Director Bernardino, he on his
wrong belief. To quote the defendant,1 believed that she did not deserve those honors(Tsn Feb. 5, 1974,
p. 43,Empasized supplied). Despite the telegram of Director Bernardino which the defendant received
hours before the commencement executory on May 3-4,1966, he did not obey Director Bernardino
because he said in his testimony that he would be embarrassment . Tan Feb 5,1974, P. 46). Evidently, he
knew only his embarrassment and not that of r Bernardino whose order was being flagrantly and wantonly
disregarded by bim And certainly, not the least of Miss Delmo's embarrassment. His acts speak
eloquently of ho bad faith and unjust of mindwarped by his delicate sensitivity for having been challenged
by Miss Delmo, a mere student.
xxx xxx xxx
Finally the defendant's behaviour relative to Miss s case smacks of contemptuous arrogance, oppression
and abuse of power. Come to think of it. He refused to obey the directive of Be o and instead, chose to
feign ignorance of it." (Reward on Appeal, p. 72-76).

The trial court awarded P20,000.00 to the estate of Violeta Delmo and P10,000.00 to her parents for moral damages;
P5,000.00 for nominal damages to Violeta's estate; exemplary damages of P10,000.00 and P2,000.00 attorney's fees.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. Hence, this petition.
The issues raised in this petition can be reduced to the sole question of whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals
erred in affirming the trial court's finding that petitioner is liable for damages under Article 27 of the New Civil Code.
We find no reason why the findings of the trial and appellate courts should be reversed. It cannot be disputed that Violeta
Delmo went through a painful ordeal which was brought about by the petitioner's neglect of duty and callousness. Thus,
moral damages are but proper. As we have affirmed in the case of (Prudenciado v. Alliance Transport System, Inc., 148
SCRA 440, 448):
There is no argument that moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury.
Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate
result of defendant's wrongly act or omission." (People v. Baylon, 129 SCRA 62 (1984).
The Solicitor-General tries to cover-up the petitioner's deliberate omission to inform Miss Delmo by stating that it was not
the duty of the petitioner to furnish her a copy of the Director's decision. Granting this to be true, it was nevertheless the
petitioner's duty to enforce the said decision. He could have done so considering that he received the decision on April 27,
1966 and even though he sent it back with the records of the case, he undoubtedly read the whole of it which consisted of
only three pages. Moreover, the petitioner should have had the decency to meet with Mr. Delmo, the girl's father, and
inform the latter, at the very least of the decision. This, the petitioner likewise failed to do, and not without the attendant
bad faith which the appellate court correctly pointed out in its decision, to wit:
Third, assuming that defendant could not furnish Miss Delmo of a copy of the decision, he could have
used his discretion and plain common sense by informing her about it or he could have directed the
inclusion of Miss Delmo's honor in the printed commencement program or announced it during the
commencement exercises.
Fourth, defendant despite receipt of the telegram of Director Benardino hours before the commencement
exercises on May 3-4, 1966, disobeyed his superior by refusing to give the honors due Miss Delmo with a
lame excuse that he would be embarrassed if he did so, to the prejudice of and in complete disregard of
Miss Delmo's rights.
Fifth, defendant did not even extend the courtesy of meeting Mr. Pacifico Delmo, father of Miss Delmo,
who tried several times to see defendant in his office thus Mr. Delmo suffered extreme disappointment
and humiliation.
xxx xxx xxx
Defendant, being a public officer should have acted with circumspection and due regard to the rights of
Miss Delmo. Inasmuch as he exceeded the scope of his authority by defiantly disobeying the lawful
directive of his superior, Director Bernardino, defendant is liable for damages in his personal capacity. . . .
(Rollo, pp- 57-58)
Based on the undisputed facts, exemplary damages are also in order. In the same case of Prudenciado v. Alliance
Transport System, Inc., supra., at p. 450, we ruled:
The rationale behind exemplary or corrective damages is, as the name implies, to provide an example or
correction for the public good (Lopez, et al. v. Pan American World Airways, 16 SCRA 431).

However, we do not deem it appropriate to award the spouses Delmo damages in the amount of
P10,000.00 in their individual capacity, separately from and in addition to what they are already entitled to
as sole heirs of the deceased Violeta Delmo. Thus, the decision is modified insofar as moral damages are
awarded to the spouses in their own behalf.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the
slight modification as stated in the preceding paragraph. This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.