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AristotleonRationalAction
ALEXANDER
BROADIE
reasoning3.
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moral sense false and the premisses are in the non-moral sense true.
But a valid inferencecannot have true premissesand a false conclusion.
Consequently, the terms "true"and "false"will be used hereinafterin
a non-moralway.
The inability of an action to take a truth value does not however
force us to an immediate rejection of Aristotle's claim that in a
practical syllogism an action can be the conclusion of a set of premisses.
One conspicuous development that has taken place in logic in recent
years has been the construction of systems of logic employing values
other than truth-values in their account of validity. This development
has been particularly marked in the field of imperative logic. There
is a good deal yet to be learned about imperatives and their logic,
but there is at least a wide-spread belief among logicians that systems
of imperative logic can be constructed even though imperatives
do not take a truth-value8, but instead take an obedience-value9
or a satisfaction-value'0 or a satisfactoriness-valuell. That logicians
are not agreed about the precise kind of semantic value imperatives
take does not alter the fact that the concept of valid inference employed by formal logicians is no longer just the narrow concept
defined in terms of the conclusion being true if the premisses are
true, and a premiss being false if the conclusion is false. Consequently
the fact that the conclusion of a practical syllogism cannot take a
truth-value does not imply that such a syllogism cannot be valid,
and cannot even be well-formed. But if the relationship between
premisses and conclusion in the Aristotelian practical syllogism is not
truth functional, what is it?
A view that has some plausibility is that it is one of psychological
causation. This view has been defended by R. D. Milo in Aristotle
on Practical Knowledge and Weakness of Will (The Hague, 1966).
His position, which I have considered elsewhere19,is that an agent
who accepts the premisses of a practical syllogism is "psychologically
constrained" (ibid. p. 51) to embody those premisses in action. My
argument against Milo was that psychological constraint is a form of
8 See J. J0rgensen "Imperatives and Logic" Erkenntnis 1939; A. Ross "Impera-
tives and Logic" Phil. of Sc. 1944; A. Kenny "Practical Inference" Analysis
xxvi (1965-6) 65-75; A. Broadie "Imperatives" Mind lxxxi (1972).
' M. Fisher "A System of Deontic-Alethic Modal Logic" Mind lxxi (1962) 231-6.
10 Ross ibid.
"I Kenny ibid.
12 A. Broadie "The Practical Syllogism" Analysis xxix (1968-9) 26-28.
73
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conclusion of a practical
syllogism (701 a 20)" (p 182). This would give us some ground for
saying that Aristotle's claim that the conclusionof a practical syllogism
is an action can be interpreted as meaning that such a conclusion
merely states what is to be done, but for the fact that Aristotle does
1" Nicomachean
15 Ibid. p. 391.
17
75
a 29-b 14.
76
know its cause, when we know the agent's motives and intentions
and beliefs about his situation. Such knowledge not only affords
us insight into the action but even gives us warrant for regarding
the action as an action at all, that is, as an expression of human
agency rather than merely a set of physical movements. This knowledge provides us with the form of the action, the matter being the
physical movements structured by that form.
The final cause of the action, which is also expressed in the premisses, is the end envisaged by the agent, for the sake of which the
action was performed. But there is a problem as to whether also the
efficient cause of the action is expressed in the premisses. It might
seem that if we act as a result of a piece of deliberation, the deliberation is the efficient cause of action. Yet Aristotle is explicit on the
matter: "The origin (&pxz)of action - its efficient, not its final
cause - is choice, and that of choice is desire and reasoning with a
view to an end" (EN 1139 a 32ff). Choice itself is not, seemingly,
part of the practical syllogism, and consequently the efficient cause
of action does not figure in the practical syllogism.
Aristotle's position is not entirely free of difficulty, for the sentence
just quoted implies that all actions are chosen, though we know that
elsewhere he denies this. We learn in EN 1111 b 5/f that the actions
of children and animals, though voluntary, are not chosen. It is
clear why Aristotle wants to restrict the field of chosen action in this
is rational desire or desiderative reason.
way. Choice, tpo EpeaLq,
Hence those incapable of reasoning are incapable of choosing. Animals
and children (or at least infants) cannot choose because they cannot
reason. However, in telling us that the efficient cause of action is
choice, Aristotle can reasonably be taken to be saying that in the case
of actions that are chosen (not 'actions simpliciter') their efficient
cause is choice.
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