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CITY SHERIFF, ILIGAN CITY and SPOUSES ANGEL L.

BAUTISTA and ANGELICA


M. BAUTISTA, petitioners,
vs.
ALFARO FORTUNADO, EDITHA FORTUNADO, & NESTOR FORTUNADO,
respondents.
MARTINEZ J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to nullify the Order 1 dated January 24,
1986 of the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Norte, Branch V, in Civil Case No. 262,
which reversed its earlier Decision2 dated July 31, 1985 dismissing the complaint filed
by respondents.
The facts are not disputed:
Respondents Alfaro, Editha and Nestor, all surnamed Fortunado, are the registered
owners of two parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificates of Title No. 7-3041 and
T-1929, both registered with the Register of Deeds of Iligan City. Said properties were
mortgaged by Arsenio Lopez, Jr. on July 24, 1968 to the Traders Commercial Bank
(now Traders Royal Bank) to secure a loan obligation in the amount of P370,000.00.
On January 6, 1971, respondents instituted an action before the then Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Branch XVIII, against Arsenio Lopez, Jr. and Traders Royal Bank,
among others, for annulment of mortgage. In said complaint, Traders Royal Bank
interposed a counterclaim for foreclosure of the mortgage.
On August 24, 1973, the trial court rendered a decision3, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court renders judgment:
I. As Regards the Plaintiff's Complaint:
1. Ordering the defendant Mariano Pascual to pay to the plaintiffs the amount of
P24,550.00 plus legal interest from the filing of the complaint until fully paid and
attorney's fees in the amount of P2,000.00 and to pay the costs.
2. Ordering the deed of real estate mortgage which is attached as Annex "B" of the
complaint to be declared null and void and, ordering the Register of Deeds of Iligan
City to cancel the said mortgage at the back of TCT No. T-1929, Book I, Page 8 and
TCT No. T-3040, Book I, Page 96 of said Register of Deeds.
II. With Respect to the Cross-Claim and the Third-Party Complaint of Defendant
Traders Commercial Bank:
1. Ordering the spouses Arsenio Lopez, Jr. and Ofelia Lopez to pay the Traders
Commercial Bank jointly and severally the amount of P578,025.23, inclusive of
interest and other bank charges as of April 30, 1971, and, thereafter, plus all interest
and bank charges until full payment is made and, to pay to the bank the amount of
P20,000.00 as attorney's fees and the costs.
The bank 's counterclaim against the plaintiffs is hereby dismissed.
Likewise, the counterclaim of Mariano Pascual against the plaintiffs is also dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the trial court's decision, in this manner:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby modified by eliminating

paragraph 2 of the dispositive portion of the decision of the lower court declaring the
real estate mortgage in favor of the Traders Commercial Bank null and void. The
decision is affirmed in all other respects.4
On December 28, 1983, Traders Royal Bank assigned 5 its rights to the mortgage to
petitioner Angel L. Bautista. By virtue of the said assignment, petitioner on March 19,
1984 wrote the City Sheriff of Iligan City requesting that the mortgaged properties be
foreclosed for non-payment of the loan obligation. To thwart the pending foreclosure,
respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Norte, Branch V, a
complaint for cancellation of lien with preliminary injunction against petitioner, which
was docketed as Civil Case No. 262.
After petitioner filed his answer, respondents moved for a summary judgment which
was granted by the court. Consequently, on July 31, 1985, the trial court rendered
judgment dismissing the complaint. In its decision, the trial court delved on the issue
of prescription of a mortgage action.
Respondents moved for reconsideration arguing that since the principal loan has
already been paid, the mortgage, which is an accessory contract, should likewise be
extinguished.
On January 24, 1986, the trial court modified its earlier decision disposing thus:
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration, as amended, of the summary
judgment of July 31, 1985 is hereby reconsidered and modified to read:
Premises considered, the Court finds that the plaintiffs have made out a
preponderating case against the defendants.
And as prayed for in the complaint, the temporary restraining order of the Court in the
case on April 23, 1984 is hereby converted into a preliminary injunction and by these
presents made permanent. The City Sheriff of Iligan City, Mr. Angel L. Bautista and
Mrs. Angelica M. Bautista are hereby permanently restrained from conducting a public
auction sale of the property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-3041 (a.f.).
The Register of Deeds of Iligan City is hereby further ordered to cancel Entry No. 451
on Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-3041 (a.f.) on file with his office. No
pronouncement as to damages or attorney's fees.
With costs against the defendants.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which rendered a Resolution6 on August
28,1987, forwarding the case to this Court for resolution reading thus:
Considering that opposing counsel left the resolution of Atty. Ramon Gonzales' motion
to the sound discretion of this Court and considering the unrefuted allegation of the
said motion that there were no documentary or testimonial evidence which were the
basis of the questioned decision but mere admissions of the parties, the questions
raised on appeal become mere questions of law, over which the Supreme Court has
exclusive original jurisdiction.
On December 29, 1987, petitioner filed this present petition for review contending that
the trial court erred in modifying its earlier decision; in declaring that he has no right to
foreclose the mortgaged property; in declaring the temporary restraining order into a
permanent preliminary injunction and in ordering the Register of Deeds of Iligan City
to cancel entry No. 451 on TCT No. 3041.

We gave due course to the petition and required the contending parties to submit their
respective Memoranda on August 31, 1988.

inform the trial court of the death of petitioner, a duty mandated by Section 16, Rule 3
of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides in part, to wit:

On January 30, 1995, respondents, through counsel Ramon A. Gonzales, filed a


verified Manifestation informing the Court that the subject real estate mortgage has
already been released by the Traders Royal Bank on December 23, 1983 as shown in
the certified true copy of the Release of Real Estate Mortgage,7 and that the petitioner
was killed in a robbery in his house.8 Respondents therefore pray for the dismissal of
the petition.

Sec. 16. Death of party; duty of counsel. Whenever a party to a pending action
dies, and the claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty of his counsel to
inform the court within thirty (30) days after such death of the fact thereof, and to give
the name and address of his legal representative or representatives. Failure of the
counsel to comply with this duty shall be a ground for disciplinary action.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Hence, the proper substitution of the deceased in accordance with the aforequoted
provisions of Rule 3 could not be effected.

On February 20, 1995, this Court required petitioner's counsel Atty. Emilio Abrogena
to comment on the said Manifestation. However, the copy of the resolution of the
Court addressed to Atty. Abrogena was returned unclaimed after three notices,9 with
the postmaster's remark "moved." In view of this development, the Court considered
the resolution as served. 10
Acting on the Manifestation of the respondents, we resolve to dismiss the petition for
having been rendered moot and academic.
The resolution of the basic issue of whether or not the petitioner has the right to extrajudicially foreclose the mortgage is no longer necessary in view of the release of the
mortgage as shown in the certified true copy thereof. No useful purpose would be
served by passing on the merits of the petition. Any ruling in this case could hardly be
of any practical or useful purpose in the premises. It is a well-settled rule that courts
will not determine a moot question or abstract proposition nor express an opinion in a
case in which no practical relief can be granted. 11
However, we take notice of the failure of petitioner's lawyer, Atty. Emilio Abrogena, to
ADELINO H. LEDESMA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RAFAEL C. CLIMACO, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental, Branch I, Silay City, respondent.
Adelino H. Ledesma in his own behalf.
Hon. Rafael C. Climaco in his own behalf.
FERNANDO, J.:p
What is assailed in this certiorari proceeding is an order of respondent Judge denying
a motion filed by petitioner to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio. 1 One of the
grounds for such a motion was his allegation that with his appointment as Election
Registrar by the Commission on Elections, he was not in a position to devote full time
to the defense of the two accused. The denial by respondent Judge of such a plea,
notwithstanding the conformity of the defendants, was due "its principal effect [being]
to delay this case." 2 It was likewise noted that the prosecution had already rested and
that petitioner was previously counsel de parte, his designation in the former category
being precisely to protect him in his new position without prejudicing the accused. It
cannot be plausibly asserted that such failure to allow withdrawal of de oficio counsel
could ordinarily be characterized as a grave abuse of discretion correctible by
certiorari. There is, however, the overriding concern for the right to counsel of the
accused that must be taken seriously into consideration. In appropriate cases, it
should tilt the balance. This is not one of them. What is easily discernible was the
obvious reluctance of petitioner to comply with the responsibilities incumbent on the

We likewise note Atty. Abrogena's failure to inform this Court of his change of address
which accounts for his failure to comment on the manifestation of respondents
relative to the death of petitioner and the release of the subject real estate mortgage.
Atty. Abrogena should bear in mind that a lawyer is, first and foremost, an officer of
the court. His duties to the court are more significant than those which he owes to his
client. His first duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice; to that end,
his client's success is wholly subordinate; and his conduct ought to and must always
be scrupulously observant of the law and ethics of the profession. 12
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for being moot and academic. Atty.
Emilio Abrogena, counsel for petitioner, is hereby REPRIMANDED for his failure to
inform this Court of the death of petitioner and to perform his duty under Section 16,
Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court. He is further warned that a repetition of such
omission in the future will be dealt with severely.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Melo, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
counsel de oficio. Then, too, even on the assumption that he continues in his position,
his volume of work is likely to be very much less at present. There is not now the
slightest pretext for him to shirk an obligation a member of the bar, who expects to
remain in good standing, should fulfill. The petition is clearly without merit.
According to the undisputed facts, petitioner, on October 13, 1964, was appointed
Election Registrar for the Municipality of Cadiz, Province of Negros Occidental. Then
and there, he commenced to discharge its duties. As he was counsel de parte for one
of the accused in a case pending in the sala of respondent Judge, he filed a motion to
withdraw as such. Not only did respondent Judge deny such motion, but he also
appointed him counsel de oficio for the two defendants. Subsequently, on November
3, 1964, petitioner filed an urgent motion to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de
oficio, premised on the policy of the Commission on Elections to require full time
service as well as on the volume or pressure of work of petitioner, which could
prevent him from handling adequately the defense. Respondent Judge, in the
challenged order of November 6, 1964, denied said motion. A motion for
reconsideration having proved futile, he instituted this certiorari proceeding. 3
As noted at the outset, the petition must fail.
1. The assailed order of November 6, 1964 denying the urgent motion of petitioner to
withdraw as counsel de oficio speaks for itself. It began with a reminder that a crime
was allegedly committed on February 17, 1962, with the proceedings having started
in the municipal court of Cadiz on July 11, 1962. Then respondent Judge spoke of his

order of October 16, 1964 which reads thus: "In view of the objection of the
prosecution to the motion for postponement of October 15, 1964 (alleging that
counsel for the accused cannot continue appearing in this case without the express
authority of the Commission on Elections); and since according to the prosecution
there are two witnesses who are ready to take the stand, after which the government
would rest, the motion for postponement is denied. When counsel for the accused
assumed office as Election Registrar on October 13, 1964, he knew since October 2,
1964 that the trial would be resumed today. Nevertheless, in order not to prejudice the
civil service status of counsel for the accused, he is hereby designated counsel de
oficio for the accused. The defense obtained postponements on May 17, 1963, June
13, 1963, June 14, 1963, October 28, 1963, November 27, 1963, February 11, 1964,
March 9, 1964, June 8, 1964 July 26, 1964, and September 7, 1964." 4 Reference
was then made to another order of February 11, 1964: "Upon petition of Atty. Adelino
H. Ledesma, alleging indisposition, the continuation of the trial of this case is hereby
transferred to March 9, 1964 at 8:30 in the morning. The defense is reminded that at
its instance, this case has been postponed at least eight (8) times, and that the
government witnesses have to come all the way from Manapala." 5 After which, it was
noted in such order that there was no incompatibility between the duty of petitioner to
the accused and to the court and the performance of his task as an election registrar
of the Commission on Elections and that the ends of justice "would be served by
allowing and requiring Mr. Ledesma to continue as counsel de oficio, since the
prosecution has already rested its case." 6
2. What is readily apparent therefore, is that petitioner was less than duly mindful of
his obligation as counsel de oficio. He ought to have known that membership in the
bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. It could be that for some lawyers,
especially the neophytes in the profession, being appointed counsel de oficio is an
irksome chore. For those holding such belief, it may come as a surprise that counsel
of repute and of eminence welcome such an opportunity. It makes even more
manifest that law is indeed a profession dedicated to the ideal of service and not a
mere trade. It is understandable then why a high degree of fidelity to duty is required
of one so designated. A recent statement of the doctrine is found in People v. Daban: 7
"There is need anew in this disciplinary proceeding to lay stress on the fundamental
postulate that membership in the bar carries with it a responsibility to live up to its
exacting standard. The law is a profession, not a trade or a craft. Those enrolled in its
ranks are called upon to aid in the performance of one of the basic purposes of the
State, the administration of justice. To avoid any frustration thereof, especially in the
case of an indigent defendant, a lawyer may be required to act as counsel de oficio.
The fact that his services are rendered without remuneration should not occasion a
diminution in his zeal. Rather the contrary. This is not, of course, to ignore that other
pressing matters do compete for his attention. After all, he has his practice to attend
to. That circumstance possesses a high degree of relevance since a lawyer has to
live; certainly he cannot afford either to neglect his paying cases. Nonetheless, what
is incumbent upon him as counsel de oficio must be fulfilled." 8
So it has been from the 1905 decision of In re Robles Lahesa, 9 where respondent
was de oficio counsel, the opinion penned by Justice Carson making clear: "This
Court should exact from its officers and subordinates the most scrupulous
performance of their official duties, especially when negligence in the performance of
those duties necessarily results in delays in the prosecution of criminal cases ...." 10
Justice Sanchez in People v. Estebia 11 reiterated such a view in these words: "It is
true that he is a court-appointed counsel. But we do say that as such counsel de

oficio, he has as high a duty to the accused as one employed and paid by defendant
himself. Because, as in the case of the latter, he must exercise his best efforts and
professional ability in behalf of the person assigned to his care. He is to render
effective assistance. The accused-defendant expects of him due diligence, not mere
perfunctory representation. For, indeed a lawyer who is a vanguard in the bastion of
justice is expected to have a bigger dose of social conscience and a little less of selfinterest." 12
The weakness of the petition is thus quite evident.
3. If respondent Judge were required to answer the petition, it was only due to the
apprehension that considering the frame of mind of a counsel loath and reluctant to
fulfill his obligation, the welfare of the accused could be prejudiced. His right to
counsel could in effect be rendered nugatory. Its importance was rightfully stressed by
Chief Justice Moran in People v. Holgado in these words: "In criminal cases there can
be no fair hearing unless the accused be given an opportunity to be heard by counsel.
The right to be heard would be of little avail if it does not include the right to be heard
by counsel. Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the
science of law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and; without counsel, he may be
convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his
innocence. And this can happen more easily to persons who are ignorant or
uneducated. It is for this reason that the right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so
important that it has become a constitutional right and it is so implemented that under
rules of procedure it is not enough for the Court to apprise an accused of his right to
have an attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an
attorney, but it is essential that the court should assign one de oficio for him if he so
desires and he is poor or grant him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his
own." 13 So it was under the previous Organic Acts. 14 The present Constitution is even
more emphatic. For, in addition to reiterating that the accused "shall enjoy the right to
be heard by himself and counsel," 15 there is this new provision: "Any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and
to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or
any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any confession
obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence." 16
Thus is made manifest the indispensable role of a member of the Bar in the defense
of an accused. Such a consideration could have sufficed for petitioner not being
allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio. For he did betray by his moves his lack of
enthusiasm for the task entrusted to him, to put matters mildly. He did point though to
his responsibility as an election registrar. Assuming his good faith, no such excuse
could be availed now. There is not likely at present, and in the immediate future, an
exorbitant demand on his time. It may likewise be assumed, considering what has
been set forth above, that petitioner would exert himself sufficiently to perform his task
as defense counsel with competence, if not with zeal, if only to erase doubts as to his
fitness to remain a member of the profession in good standing. The admonition is
ever timely for those enrolled in the ranks of legal practitioners that there are times,
and this is one of them, when duty to court and to client takes precedence over the
promptings of self-interest.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is dismissed. Costs against petitioner.
Zaldivar (Chairman), Antonio, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur.
Barredo, J., took no part.

GERVACIO L. LIWAG, complainant,


vs.
ATTY. GILBERTO NERI, respondent.
Assistant Solicitor General Esmeraldo Umali and Solicitor Antonio M. Consing for the
complainant.Gilberto Neri in his own behalf.
PARAS, C. J.:
The complainant, Gervacio L. Liwag, seeks to disbar the respondent, Atty. Gilberto
Neri.
Prior to October 21, 1952, the spouses Enrique and Ursula Pineda requested the
complainant to act as counter-indemnitor with the Manila Surety & Fidelity Company
in a bond posted for said spouses in favor of the National Rice and Corn Corporation
(NARIC). When the Pinedas had failed to liquidate their obligation, the NARIC
enforced the bond against the Manila Surety and Fidelity Company and the latter in
turn collected from the complainant the sum of P2,951.35. Having failed to recover
extra-judicially said amount from the Pinedas, the complainant engaged the services
of the respondent who agreed to handle the matter on a contingent fee of forty per
cent.
As they were his neighbors, the respondent, acting slowly, tried to talk to the Pinedas,
who admitted their indebtedness and pleaded for time to pay the same. On or about
DOMINGO C. GAMALINDA, complainant,
vs.
AYTYS. FERNANDO ALCANTARA and JOSELITO LIM, respondents.
NARVASA, C.J.:
In his verified letter-complaint dated June 19, 1991, 1 complainant Domingo
Gamalinda charges retired Judge Fernando Alcantara and Atty. Joselito Lim with
grave abuse of their profession ("labis nilang pag-abuso sa kanilang propesyon"),
deception, threats, dishonoring and injuring the reputation of said complainant and
bringing about the loss of his land.
The Court finds the charges to be without basis and accordingly dismisses them.
The administrative complaint against retired Judge Fernando Alcantara is a futile
attempt to resurrect the charges filed against him in Adm. Matter No. MTJ-90-494,
which were dismissed by this Court in its resolution of September 8, 1988 for having
become moot and academic. Adm. Matter No. MTJ-90-494 was filed only on July 22,
1987, or five (5) months after the respondent judge's retirement from the service on
February 3, 1987. No motion for reconsideration having been seasonably filed by
complainant, that resolution has become final and executory. It serves as a bar to a
relitigation of the same charges against respondent judge. 2 That those charges are
now being brought against respondent judge in his capacity as an attorney does not
help the cause of complainant, for the change in the form of action or remedy pursued
does not bar the application of the rule of res judicata. 3
On the other hand, the record establishes that Atty. Lim was merely performing his

July 17, 1956, when no payment had been made, the respondent wrote a letter of
demand, threatening to take judicial action if the Pinedas would still not meet their
obligation. On the same date, the complainant delivered to the respondent the
amount of P30.00 as the filing fee for the necessary complaint. The respondent did
not actually file any complaint, for the alleged reason that debtor spouses had given
assurances to pay, although he informed the complainant that he had already done
so. It did not take long before the truth was discovered and before the complainant
was provoked into commencing this administrative case.
It is an established fact that the respondent had received from the complainant
P30.00 as filing fee. The respondent argues that his services were not engaged solely
"for the purpose of filing the corresponding collection complaint", but to collect from
the Pinedas the amount owed; or in other words, that the respondent was given full
discretion as to the means for accomplishing the assignment. Assuming that this was
so, the respondent has committed a breach of professional ethics when, contrary to
the fact, he made the complainant believe that the Pineda spouses had already been
sued in court and did not return the amount intended for the filing fee.
Considering however, that the respondent has not yet received anything for his
services and that the complainant has subsequently been paid, disbarment or even
suspension of the respondent from the practice of his profession would be too harsh
and unkind. We only here reprimand him for the offense, with the warning that a
repetition of similar misconduct or, for that matter, any violation of his oath will be
dealt with more drastically.
So ordered.
duty as counsel for the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3827 when he did what is now
complained of. 4
In Civil Case No. 3827 of the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac, Branch LXIII, Salud Balot
and Felicidad Balot had sued the heirs of Apolinario Gamalinda 5 for reconveyance,
with damages, of the eastern half of Lot No. 3217 of the cadastral survey of Victoria,
Tarlac, which was allegedly inadvertently included in the original certificate of title of
Apolinario Gamalinda. In the course of the trial, plaintiffs were able to secure a writ of
preliminary injunction against the "defendants, their agents, representatives or other
persons acting in their behalf, ordering them to desist from threshing and carting
away the palay harvest on Lot No. 3217 of the Cadastral Survey of Victoria, . . . until
further order of this Court. . . ." 6 This injunction was made permanent in the decision
of the lower court rendered on July 26, 1977 in favor of the plaintiffs.
Pending appeal to the Court of Appeals, complainant herein entered a portion of the
area in dispute, in the belief that the whole of Lot No. 3217 belonged to him by virtue
of a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with Quitclaim 7 executed in his favor by the
heirs of Apolinario Gamalinda on May 6, 1985. It must be noted that at that time title
to Lot No. 3217 was still in the name of Apolinario Gamalinda. Thus, when Maximiano
Tiburcio, Protacio Cabatino and Maximo Mateo, tenants of Salud Balot, entered the
portion being cultivated by complainant, the latter reported the incident to the police.
From Salud Balot's viewpoint, it was complainant who intruded into her land. Relying
therefore on the injunction issued by the lower court, she filed through counsel, Atty.
Lim, a motion to declare complainant Gamalinda in contempt of court.
Complainant interposed the defense that the area in dispute in Civil Case No. 3827

was different from the area occupied by him. To resolve the issue, the lower court with
his agreement, ordered a resurvey of Lot No. 3217. The result of the resurvey
showed that contrary to complainant's claim, the lot occupied by him was the very
same land involved in Civil Case No. 3827. Accordingly, the lower court declared
complainant in contempt in an order dated July 24, 1986 which was affirmed on
appeal by the Court of Appeals in a decision rendered on March 21, 1998. 8
Considering that Tiburcio, Cabatino and Mateo are tenants of Salud Balot and
complainant is the successor-in-interest of the heirs of Apolinario Gamalinda, the
defendants in Civil Case No. 3827, it is clearly erroneous for complainant to claim that
neither he nor Tiburcio, Cabatino and Mateo had anything to do with said civil case.
Being privies to the parties, they are necessarily bound by the orders rendered in said
case.
On October 12, 1987, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision, affirming in toto the
judgment of the lower court in Civil Case No. 3827. 9 After the appellate court's
decision had become final, Atty. Lim moved for the execution of the affirmed
judgment, 10 and when the writ of execution was returned unsatisfied, filed an "Urgent
Motion to Require Domingo Gamalinda to Surrender TCT 186299 to the Clerk of
Court and to Authorize the Latter to Execute Reconveyance of Lot 3217-A in Favor of
Plaintiffs." 11 That motion was granted by the lower court, but complainant refused to
surrender the Owner's Copy of TCT No. 186299, prompting Atty. Lim to file the
questioned "Motion to Declare Owner's Copy of TCT 186299 Null and Void," 12 which
the lower court granted on July 31, 1989.
It is clear from the foregoing that the questioned acts of Atty. Lim were all done in line
with his duty to prosecute his clients' cause in Civil Case No. 3827. The first motion

was filed to protect his clients' possessory rights over the property in dispute while the
second motion was made to procure execution of the decision in Civil Case No. 3827.
A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and must be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him. 13 He shall serve his client with competence and diligence,
14
and his duty of entire devotion to his client's cause not only requires, but entitles
him to employ every honorable means to secure for the client what is justly due him
or to present every defense provided by law to enable the latter's cause to succeed. 15
An attorney's duty to safeguard the client's interests commences from his retainer
until the effective release from the case 16 or the final disposition of the whole subject
matter of the litigation. 17 During that period, he is expected to take such reasonable
steps and such ordinary care as his client's interests may require.
This is precisely what Atty. Lim was doing when he filed the motions complained of.
He should be commended, not condemned, for diligently and competently performing
his duties as an attorney;
With respect to the complainant's contention that the Deed of Sale of Unregistered
Land relied upon by the lower and appellate courts in Civil Case No. 3827 is a forged
or fake instrument, suffice it to say that this is a matter that should have been litigated
in said case instead of being raised for the first time in these proceedings. In any
case, there being no showing that Atty. Lim was aware of any defect in that deed, the
charge of deception against him will not lie. Absent, too, is any showing that Atty. Lim
had anything to do with the preparation of the criminal information, and for the same
reason he cannot be called to account for it.
ACCORDINGLY, the administrative charges against retired Judge Fernando Alcantara
and Atty. Joselito Lim are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

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