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Will Malson Environmental Regulatory Transparency NEG Page 1 of 19

Environmental Regulatory Transparency NEG Index

Environmental Regulatory Transparency NEG Index........................................................1


Notes (Über Important)......................................................................................................2
Topicality: FOIA (1/3) ......................................................................................................3
A. Standard................................................................................................................................3
Topicality: FOIA (2/3).......................................................................................................4
B. Interp and Violation (seriously, read all of these) ............................................................4
Topicality: FOIA (3/3).......................................................................................................5
C. Impacts .................................................................................................................................5
Topicality: FOIA Interp/Vio XTs ......................................................................................6
Topicality: FOIA Impact XTs ...........................................................................................7
Freedom of Information Act CP (1/3) ...............................................................................8
Observation 1: Inherency ........................................................................................................8
Freedom of Information Act CP (2/3) ...............................................................................9
Observation 2: CP Text............................................................................................................9
Freedom of Information Act CP (3/3) .............................................................................10
Observation 3: Net Beneficial.................................................................................................10
Judicial Tyranny DA (1/2)...............................................................................................11
A. Links/Internal Links..........................................................................................................11
Judicial Tyranny DA (2/2)...............................................................................................12
B. Impact .................................................................................................................................12
Executive > Judicial CP (1/2) ..........................................................................................13
Observation 1: CP Text .........................................................................................................13
Executive > Judicial CP (2/2) ..........................................................................................14
Observation 2: Solvency.........................................................................................................14
Executive > Judicial CP Enforcement XTs......................................................................15
Masking DA.....................................................................................................................16
Masking DA XTs.............................................................................................................17
Incorruptible Transparency CP (1/2) ...............................................................................18
Observation 1: CP Text .........................................................................................................18
Incorruptible Transparency CP (2/2)................................................................................19
B. Observation 2: Solvency of the CP ...................................................................................19
Will Malson Environmental Regulatory Transparency NEG Page 2 of 19

Notes (Über Important)

1. First off, sorry for the weird T-press (FOIA). I had to put the standard first because the interp and
violation kindof went hand-in-hand…I couldn’t really separate things from a single card. It’ll be a little
out of order. But it’s better this way – the interp/vio cards really do mix the two together, so they’re best
when they’re put together in turn.

2. If you’re going to run the Judicial Tyranny DA, you have to run the Executive > Judicial CP.

3. If you’re going to run the Masking DA, you have to run the Incorruptible Transparency CP.

4. If you’re going to run the FOIA CP, you have to run Topicality: FOIA.

5. If you’re going to run both DAs, you need to modify the Executive > Judicial CP and the
Incorruptible Transparency CP to work together. CAREFULLY.

6. Backup for the Executive > Judicial CP can be found in the Ex Parte Merryman CP.

7. That is all!

8. Stop reading the notes section

9. Move along

10. Seriously

11. Holy cow, you made me get to double-digits


Will Malson Environmental Regulatory Transparency NEG Page 3 of 19

Topicality: FOIA (1/3)


A. Standard

Let’s start off with our standard, or how we should evaluate the resolution. We believe that we should
view the resolution through the lens of environmental policy. Furthermore, we believe that the best
definition for environmental policy is one that is defined by experts. In short, our standard is Field
Contextualism.
Will Malson Environmental Regulatory Transparency NEG Page 4 of 19

Topicality: FOIA (2/3)


B. Interp and Violation (seriously, read all of these)

A. NEPA's purpose is to ensure that information on environmental impacts of Federal action is


made available. USGS 09
U.S. Geological Survey, Environmental Affairs Program, "NEPA Purpose and Implementation", January 21, 2009, http://water.usgs.gov/eap/nepa.html
(HEG)

The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) is the cornerstone of our Nation's environmental laws and was
enacted to ensure that information on the environmental impacts of any Federal, or federally funded,
action is available to public officials and citizens before decisions are made and before actions are taken.
This Act also established the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) in the Executive Office of the President to formulate and recommend national
policies which ensure that the programs of the Federal government promote improvement of the quality of the environment.

B. Notice the NEPA's purpose is not to ensure that information on environmental decisions are
made; in other words, NEPA requires that information on IMPACTS of federal actions is made
available before they are taken; NEPA's purpose is NOT to provide information on environmental
enforcement, or decisions made by, for example, the EPA. That is the Freedom of Information
Act's purpose. David Bookchin & David Farnsworth 97
"Environmental Engineers' Handbook", Page 9, Chapter 1: Environmental Laws and Regulations, David Bookchin & David Farnsworth [], © 1999 CRC
Press LLC, Publisher: Lewis Pub; 2nd edition, June 1997, ISBN-10: 0801984882, ISBN-13: 978-0801984884 (HEG)

The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (1988, 5 USC §552) was enacted in 1966 to assure public access to
certain federal agency records. The United States Supreme Court has stated that FOIA's purpose is "to
ensure an informed citizenry, vital to the functioning of a democratic society, needed to check against
corruption and to hold the governors accountable to the governed." (National Labor Relations Board v. Robbins Tire &
Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242 [1978]).

C. NEPA was a reorganization act, not our environmental policy. Our national environmental
policy is to incorporate environmental consideration into the decision-making process. Ralph
Stephenson & James Blackburn 97
Ralph L. Stephenson [Senior Principal Engineer at the MW Kellogg Co., Houston, TX] & James B. Blackburn [attorney; master's degree in environmental
science], "The industrial wastewater systems handbook", Chapter 1: Laws and Regulations, Page 3, Publisher: CRC Press; 1 edition, October 23, 1997,
ISBN-10: 1566702097, ISBN-13: 978-1566702096 (HEG)

NEPA was a governmental reorganization act. NEPA requires that every agency of the federal
government consider the environmental impact of virtually every action that they undertake. NEPA gives
every agency the responsibility to analyze the environmental impact of their action and the legal authority to make decisions, in part or in whole, on
environmental considerations. In order to implement NEPA, the agencies had to add staff that understood environmental impact analysis and that could meet
the NEPA procedures. Due
to this, substantial government reorganization occurred at the time of NEPA's
passage. Whole sections now exist within federal agencies that did not exist prior to the passage of
NEPA. NEPA stopped short of mandating absolute environmental protection, however. Congress felt that it would not be prudent to protect the
environment to the exclusion of all else; therefore, NEPA attempts to balance the environmental protection with other agency mandates. An agency may
undertake actions that harm the environment as long. as the agency fully considers the impact of those actions prior to making a decision. Our
national
environmental policy is to incorporate environmental considerations into the decision-making process
but not to mandate absolute environmental protection in all cases.
Will Malson Environmental Regulatory Transparency NEG Page 5 of 19

Topicality: FOIA (3/3)


C. Impacts

1. A priori issue.
Topicality is an issue that is evaluated before any other contention is addressed. If they aren’t topical,
you should vote negative without considering any other issue.

2. Prima facie burden.


The Affirmative team’s obligation is to present a case on its face that defends the truth of the resolution.
Regardless of whether their plan is a good or bad idea, they have failed to uphold their prima facie
burden if it does not mirror the terms of resolution.
Will Malson Environmental Regulatory Transparency NEG Page 6 of 19

Topicality: FOIA Interp/Vio XTs

NEPA requires disclosing environmental impacts of actions, not enforcement disclosure. DOE 09
U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, “National Environmental Policy Act Information”, December 18, 2009,
http://www.nv.doe.gov/emprograms/nepa.htm (HEG)

The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and its implementing procedures (10 CFR 1021)
require federal agencies to integrate environmental values into their decision-making process by
considering the environmental impacts of their proposed actions and reasonable alternatives for
implementing those actions.
Will Malson Environmental Regulatory Transparency NEG Page 7 of 19

Topicality: FOIA Impact XTs

3. Destroys debate.
If non-topical cases are allowed, the entire foundation for academic debate is destroyed. The most
important thing to consider in academic debate is the resolution. If the resolution does not matter, why
debate? If non-topical cases are the norm, people will stop debating, because what’s the point?

4. Sets a bad precedent.


Voting in favor of a blatantly non-topical case sets a precedent. It says to our league, “This practice is
okay.” As the judge, it is your job to vote against cases that set a bad precedent of non-topical cases
being okay. A negative ballot based on topicality sends a message discouraging teams from running
non-topical cases.
Will Malson Environmental Regulatory Transparency NEG Page 8 of 19

Freedom of Information Act CP (1/3)


Observation 1: Inherency

Federal Agencies only have to disclose records when requested in writing; in other words, they
don’t have to have a publicly searchable internet database, or a criteria for confidential
information, etc. U.S. Dept of Justice No Date
US Dept. of Justice, "Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)", No Date, http://www.justice.gov/oip/ (HEG)

Like all federal agencies, the Department of Justice (DOJ) generally is required under the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) to disclose records requested in writing by any person. However, agencies may withhold
information pursuant to nine exemptions and three exclusions contained in the statute. The FOIA applies only to federal agencies and does not create a right
of access to records held by Congress, the courts, or by state or local government agencies. Each state has its own public access laws that should be
consulted for access to state and local records.
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Freedom of Information Act CP (2/3)


Observation 2: CP Text

Agency & Enforcement: USFG


Mandates:
1. The USFG should amend the Freedom of Information Act to include all the Affirmative’s mandates.
Funding: General Revenue.
Timeline: Work to achieve the mandates will begin immediately.
…And the Negative team reserves the right to clarify as needed
Will Malson Environmental Regulatory Transparency NEG Page 10 of 19

Freedom of Information Act CP (3/3)


Observation 3: Net Beneficial

A. The FOIA’s original purpose was to provide people with access to government information and
records. Dept. of State No Date
Dept. of State, The Office of Electronic Information, Bureau of Public Affairs, "U.S. Department of State Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)", No Date,
http://www.state.gov/m/a/ips/ (HEG)

The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), Title 5 of the


Availability of Department of State Records and Information to the Public
United States Code, section 552, generally provides that any person has the right to request access to federal agency
records or information. All agencies of the U.S. Government are required to disclose records upon
receiving a written request, except those records that are protected from disclosure pursuant to nine exemptions and three exclusions. The FOIA
applies only to federal agencies and does not create a right of access to records held by Congress, the courts, or by state or local government agencies. Any
requests for state or local government records should be directed to the appropriate state or local government agency. 22 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR)
171 codifies the access procedures and guidelines for the availability of Department of State records and information to the public.

B. By voting Negative on the CP, you are upholding the original intent of governmental policy and
garnering the affirmative’s advantages all in one. [no card]
Will Malson Environmental Regulatory Transparency NEG Page 11 of 19

Judicial Tyranny DA (1/2)


A. Links/Internal Links

Link: Their plan text.


In their case, the affirmative says that their plan will: “…empower courts to balance the public interest
in disclosure against the private interest in secrecy.” Most importantly, they’re “empowering courts” to
balance public & private interest. But what isn’t there? There is no executive review.

Internal Link 1: An absence of independent Executive review causes Judicial supremacy. Michael
Paulsen 94
Michael Stokes Paulsen [Assoc. Prof. Of Law, Univ. Of Minn. Law School], “The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is”, 83
Geo. L.J. 217, December 1994 (HEG)
Taken seriously, then, any principle that would justify the finality-of-judgments exception inevitably swallows the coordinacy-of-the-branches rule of
Marbury and The Federalist. In principle, the choice is not between completely co-equal executive branch
interpretive authority and "partially co-equal" authority, but between co-equal authority and complete
judicial supremacy. Taken seriously, the contra-Merryman Power supremacy-of-judgments premise yields complete judicial supremacy, which
contradicts the postulate of coordinacy and the established theorem of judicial review. The indirect proof thus establishes that the
supremacy-of-judgments premise is wrong, and affirms its negation: complete interpretive coordinacy and co-
equal executive review (including the Merryman Power). Thus, if the case against completely coordinate executive review proves anything, it
proves too much: it proves that Brutus was right; it proves that we are, in principle, governed by a judicial aristocracy, with complete constitutional authority
to decree what it will. It proves that the judiciary is Jefferson's "despotic branch."

Internal Link 2: Unchecked Judicial supremacy causes judicial tyranny. Michael Paulsen 94
Michael Stokes Paulsen [Assoc. Prof. Of Law, Univ. Of Minn. Law School], “The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is”, 83
Geo. L.J. 217, December 1994 (HEG)
Nevertheless, some find it intuitively appealing to vest superiority -- and thus practical governmental supremacy -- in the branch possessing the fewest actual
powers with which to govern. Casting Marbury and coordinacy to the wind altogether, the
pure policy argument often advanced is
that it is best to vest supremacy in the "least dangerous" branch. To the extent that interpretive
supremacy is vested anywhere, however, the body granted such supremacy is the most to be feared for
its tyranny. To grant interpretive supremacy to the courts, unchecked by the other branches of
government, is to make the judiciary the most dangerous branch.

Internal Link 3: Supremacy of the Judiciary Destroys Federalism. Michael Paulsen 94


Michael Stokes Paulsen [Assoc. Prof. Of Law, Univ. Of Minn. Law School], “The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is”, 83
Geo. L.J. 217, December 1994 (HEG)
The spectre of a cadre of unelected, unaccountable judges becoming the effective lawgivers by virtue of their supreme interpretive power was a leading
argument of the Anti-Federalist writer Brutus in New York n93 -- an argument to which Hamilton was likely responding in The Federalist
No. 78. n94 Brutus made much the same argument for judicial review as Hamilton [*246] and Marshall later would make, but he did not view the prospect
with such equanimity. This is because Brutus (wrongly, as Hamilton would argue) equated judicial review with judicial supremacy. Because Article III
"vests the judicial with a power resolve all questions that may arise" under the Constitution and laws, Brutus wrote, n95 "[t]he real effect of
this system of government, will . . . be brought home to the feelings of the people, through the medium
of the judicial power." n96 The courts, "placed in a situation altogether unprecedented in a free country,"
n97 would acquire a practical omnipotence: The opinions of the supreme court . . . will have the force of
law; because there is no power provided in the constitution, that can correct their errors, or control their adjudications. From this court there is
no appeal. . . . [T]he legislature themselves, cannot set aside a judgment of this court, because they [the courts] are authorised by the constitution to
decide in the last resort. The judicial power would, because uncheckable, result in "an entire subversion of the
legislative, executive and judicial powers of the individual states." n99
Will Malson Environmental Regulatory Transparency NEG Page 12 of 19

Judicial Tyranny DA (2/2)


B. Impact

Impact: Federalism is more important to the liberty and well being of the American people than
any other part of our constitutional system. Steven Calabresi 95
Steven G. Calabresi [Associate Professor, Northwestern University School of Law. B.A. 1980, J.D. 1983, Yale. - Ed.], “Reflections on United States v.
Lopez: "A GOVERNMENT OF LIMITED AND ENUMERATED POWERS": IN DEFENSE OF UNITED STATES v. LOPEZ,” Published by the Michigan
Law Review, December, 1995, (94 Mich. L. Rev. 752) (Ethos)
“In Part I, I consider whether federalism is somehow less important than the separation of powers, the Bill of Rights, or judicial review as a structural
feature of American government. If federalism were truly less important, then it would follow that judicial enforcement of constitutional federalism
guarantees also might be a lesser priority. While Justices Kennedy and O'Connor consider and reject the proposition that federalism is an unimportant feature
of American government, n10 they do not discuss the possibility that federalism actually might be by far the most important and beneficial feature of our
constitutional scheme. I argue at some length in Part I that federalism
is much more important to the liberty and well being
of the American people than any other structural feature of our constitutional system. In so arguing, I
present what I perceive to be the best empirical and normative arguments for American federalism. This
discussion lays the groundwork for my claim that it is vital that some institution enforce our
constitutional federalism limitations.”
Will Malson Environmental Regulatory Transparency NEG Page 13 of 19

Executive > Judicial CP (1/2)


Observation 1: CP Text

Agency: Congress, The President and any other executive agencies needed.
Mandates:
1. All mandates except for mandate 3 of the affirmative plan should be passed.
2. Mandate 3 of the affirmative plan will be passed, with the following modification: instead of
empowering the courts to balance public and private interest, the executive branch of the government
will be empowered.
Enforcement: Will be from the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs as overseen by the Office
of Management and Budget, and the Justice Dept.
Funding: General Revenue.
Timeline: Work to achieve the mandates will begin immediately.
…And the Negative team reserves the right to clarify as needed
Will Malson Environmental Regulatory Transparency NEG Page 14 of 19

Executive > Judicial CP (2/2)


Observation 2: Solvency

Judgments don't execute themselves - Executive compliance solves the Affirmative case just as
well as the Plan does. Michael Paulsen 94
Michael Stokes Paulsen [Assoc. Prof. Of Law, Univ. Of Minn. Law School], “The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is”, 83
Geo. L.J. 217, December 1994 (HEG)

Judgments are rarely self-executing; they require, in a word,


But that is simply not so in many (if not most) cases.
execution. They are not meaningfully different from statutes in that regard. If court decisions constitute
"law" binding on the parties (just as statutes are "laws" of general applicability), then the branch charged with the faithful
execution of those laws is, as Hamilton recognized in The Federalist No. 78, the executive branch. n218
To the extent judgments require execution, the executive, not the judiciary, has the last interpretive
word.

Finally, please note that the counterplan is the only way to solve judicial tyranny—anything other
than completely autonomous executive review will ultimately lead back to judicial tyranny and
undermine democracy. Michael Paulsen 93
Michael Stokes Paulsen [Assoc. Prof. Of Law, Univ. Of Minn. Law School], “The Merryman Power And The Dilemma of Autonomous Executive Branch
Interpretation”, 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 81, October, 1993 (HEG)

Lincoln's words upon becoming President in his First Inaugural strike the same theme even more strongly: The candid citizen
must confess that if the policy of the government, upon vital questions, affecting the whole people, is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme
Court, ... the people will have ceased to be their own rulers, having, to that extent, practically resigned their government, into the hands of that eminent
Not only does a judicial decision not bind the executive and the legislature in making
tribunal. n18
subsequent policy, Lincoln argued, but the contrary suggestion, that the political branches must
acquiesce in Supreme Court judgments as supplying the rule governing all their actions, is inconsistent
with democratic self-government: "the people will have ceased to be their own rulers, having to that extent practically resigned their
Government" to the judiciary. Lincoln was thus a vigorous advocate of what we today would call "nonacquiescence."
Will Malson Environmental Regulatory Transparency NEG Page 15 of 19

Executive > Judicial CP Enforcement XTs

The Office of Management and Budget’s mission is to oversee administration of regulation in


Executive Branch Agencies. OMB No Date
Office of Management and Budget, "OMB's Mission", No Date, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/organization_role/ (HEG)
OMB's predominant mission is to assist the President in overseeing the preparation of the federal budget
and to supervise its administration in Executive Branch agencies. In helping to formulate the President's spending plans,
OMB evaluates the effectiveness of agency programs, policies, and procedures, assesses competing funding demands among agencies, and sets funding
OMB ensures that agency reports, rules, testimony, and proposed legislation are consistent with
priorities.
the President's Budget and with Administration policies. In addition, OMB oversees and coordinates the
Administration's procurement, financial management, information, and regulatory policies. In each of
these areas, OMB's role is to help improve administrative management, to develop better performance
measures and coordinating mechanisms, and to reduce any unnecessary burdens on the public.

Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs’s job is to oversee privacy policies. OMB No Date
Office of Management and Budget, "Information & Regulatory Affairs", No Date, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg_default/ (HEG)
The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) is located within the Office of Management and
Budget and was created by Congress with the enactment of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 (PRA). OIRA carries out several
important functions, including reducing paperwork burdens, reviewing federal regulations, and overseeing
policies relating to privacy, information quality, and statistical programs.
Will Malson Environmental Regulatory Transparency NEG Page 16 of 19

Masking DA

Link: Empirics: Regulatory "transparency" lacks real-world implementation, opening a back


door for collusion between officials and polluters. Worldwatch Institute 07
Worldwatch Institute [an independent research organization], "New Environmental Transparency Rule Opens Opportunity for Public Participation", May
3, 2007, http://www.worldwatch.org/node/5055 (HEG)

China’s current environmental laws include the concept of “open information” but specify few details on
how to implement this. Data on water and air pollution are collected but often circulated among
government agencies, opening a back door for collusion between local officials and polluters.
Meanwhile, the lack of public access to environmental information that is kept secret by local officials
and polluters has become a major obstacle for citizens involved in environmental protection and to
pursuing litigation against polluters.

Impact: Allowing back door collusion is allowing bribery. Empirical examples prove. CSM 09
Gail Chaddock [Staff writer for the Christian Science Monitor],"Healthcare's dealbreakers: Mary Landrieu likes her $300 million", CSM, November 24,
2009, http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/2009/1124/healthcares-dealbreakers-mary-landrieu-likes-her-300-million (HEG)

On Saturday, Sen. Mary Landrieu (D) of Louisiana was pressed by reporters on whether she had cast a
vote with Democratic leadership on healthcare in exchange for $100 million in federal aid to her state.
She seized the opportunity to correct the record. “It’s not $100 million, it’s $300 million, and I’m proud of it
and will keep fighting for it,” she told reporters after a floor speech announcing her support of a vote to begin debate on healthcare reform.
Will Malson Environmental Regulatory Transparency NEG Page 17 of 19

Masking DA XTs

The main problem with regulatory transparency is implementation. Implementing regulatory


transparency creates new stress and problems within the very system the affirmative is trying to
fix. Rex Smith 04
Rex Deighton-Smith [director of a consulting company that provides specialist advice on policy and regulatory issues to governments, international
organisations and the private sector. He previously worked on the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development’s program on regulatory
management and reform, where he contributed to several country reviews of regulatory processes. Rex is also a former director of the Victorian
government’s Office of Regulation Reform and has worked in policy areas in the Department of Treasury and Finance and the Department of Premier and
Cabinet. He is an authority on regulatory impact assessment and the author of a number of publications on a range of regulatory policy issues],
"Regulatory Transparency in OECD Countries: Overview, Trends and Challenges", © 2009 National Council of the Institute of Public Administration
Australia, Volume 63 Issue 1, Pages 66 - 73, April 2004, 10.1111/j.1467-8500.2004.00360.x (HEG)

the results have in many cases fallen short of expectations. As well, the
However, despite these gains,
implementation of transparency has itself led to new stresses and problems within the regulatory
process. This article considers why regulatory transparency is important and points to some of the main trends in improving regulatory transparency. It
also considers a range of problems and issues that arise and suggests means of resolving these.
Will Malson Environmental Regulatory Transparency NEG Page 18 of 19

Incorruptible Transparency CP (1/2)


Observation 1: CP Text

Agency & Enforcement: Congress, the President, and any other federal agencies needed.
Mandates:
1. All mandates except for mandate 3 of the affirmative plan should be passed.
2. Mandate 3 of the affirmative plan will be passed, with the following modification: instead of
empowering the courts to balance public and private interest, courts will be given a specific criteria
which will detail when decisions may remain undisclosed. This criterion will mirror that of the Freedom
of Information Act.
Funding: General Revenue.
Timeline: Work to achieve the mandates will begin immediately.
…And the Negative team reserves the right to clarify as needed
Will Malson Environmental Regulatory Transparency NEG Page 19 of 19

Incorruptible Transparency CP (2/2)


B. Observation 2: Solvency of the CP

A. First, the CP would solve for any potential corruption because it is no longer up to the courts
discretion what the balance is between public and private interests. They will have a specific,
clear-cut, laid out criterion with which to judge by. [no card]

B. The criterion for secrecy is as follows. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 99
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, "Freedom of Information Act Exemptions", December 1, 1999, http://www.sec.gov/foia/nfoia.htm (HEG)
[read all of this]
The Freedom of Information Act entitles the following exemptions on documents being requested by the
public:
1. Those documents properly classified as secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy;
2. Related solely to internal personnel rules and practices;
3. Specifically exempted by other statutes;
4. A trade secret or privileged or confidential commercial or financial information obtained from a
person;
5. A privileged inter-agency or intra-agency memorandum or letter;
6. A personnel, medical, or similar file the release of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy;
7. Compiled for law enforcement purposes, the release of which
a) could reasonably be expected to interfere with law enforcement proceedings,
b) would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication,
c) could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy,
d) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source,
e) would disclose techniques, procedures, or guidelines for investigations or prosecutions, or
f) could reasonably be expected to endanger an individual's life or physical safety;
8. Contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports about financial institutions that
the SEC regulates or supervises; or
9. And those documents containing exempt information about gas or oil wells.

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