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  • Reynolds, David - One World Divisible (Capítulos 2, 3, 4, 7 y 8)

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    Reynolds, David - One World Divisible (Capítulos 2, 3, 4, 7 y 8)

    Cargado por

    Damián López
    reynolds varios caps

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    © All Rights Reserved
    Descargue como PDF o lea en línea desde Scribd
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    Copyright © 9000 by Dovid Reynolds Allights esened Printed inthe United States of Ameren int Eaton For nfrmation about permlson to reprodce selections from this book. write to Persson, \W.W Norton & Company, Ine, 00 Fh Aven, NewYork NY 10L10 ‘The text ofthis book iscompzsed in New Caledonia ‘vith the pay stn Teri ‘Compostion Ly te Allentown Digtal Services Dvsion af BR, Donnelley & Sone Capany Manulictrng bythe Haddon Cafe, Tne ‘Book dexgn by Antunins Kee Library of Congress Cataloging n-Publeaton Data eypolde Dei 2962- ‘One work disble: x global Mean since 1945 / Davi eyo [pcm {Tho gl enters) Tce bllogeapbel references and ade ISBN 0.993-01521-7 1, History, Modery—=t945- 1, Til UH. Sere, iasi.ns7” 2000 900.825 dent 9.33000, cP \W.W.Norton & Company, Ine, 500 AB Avenae New York NY, 10170 WC WE Norton & Company Led 1 Cope Sret London WOIA LPO 1234567800 For my students ‘To TEACH 18 10 LEARN 36 | ONE WORLD DIVISIBLE ‘pearance,® but fo many around the world in the 1940s and 1950s the Soviet Union offered a model for the future. The cold war was a struggle of ideals as wel as interest Above all, however, it was about power. The Eniwetok test had inaugurated the thermonuclear age. By splitting a miclens (fission) and generating enough ‘energy to fuse hydrogen into helium, physicists had created a weapon one thousand times more powerful than the bomb dropped on Hiroshima, Pri vately leading U.S. scientists including J. Robert Oppenheimer, “father” of the atomic bornb, wamed that this was “a weapon af genocide” whose power 1vas too vast to be targeted on specific military installations. “Its use there- fore carries much further than the atomic bomb itself the poligy of extermi- nation of eiviian populations ”® Winston Churchill sai that the H-bomb was as far from the A-bomb as the “atomic bomb itself from the bow and arco" ‘The question now was, What to do with it? And even if one superpower de- cided to do nothing, relying on nuclear weapons as a form of deterrence, could it be sure thatthe othor would adopt the same policy? ‘The Iron Curtain under the Mushroom Cloud. Since 1945, international relations had moved from a concert of powers to a balance of power, con- structed around a Furope divided between America and Russia. By 1949 both superpowers had atomic capability; within another five years they had tested hydrogen bombs, Stalin, the immediate cause of the cold war, was dead, But che Stalinist sytem, endowed with vast new destructive power, had «life of ts ov. And the confrontation became more intense and extensive because the United States had emerged from the war with a enlarged defi- nition of its security, interests, and mission. The accelerating nuclear arms race showed how fragile the now balance of power really was: each super- power defined security as superiority. And outside Europe, the aftershocks of war and decolonization allowed the superpower vivalry to sipplo across the world, ‘Seven weak after Stalin's death the Blith sient journal Neture published a paper by James Watson and Francis Crick tht sot et tho deubleelit model of DNA and extublshed is importince asthe chomical of Mf." The genetic rewouton was to pass by the Senet Usion almost completly, CHAPTER 2 ‘On October 1, 1949, eight days after President Truman had announced the Soviet atomic test, a small man ina plain, high-collared jacket reviewed the assembled thousands from a balcony on the Gate of Heavenly Peace, ‘ian An Men, in Beijing (Plate 5). Mao Zedong wan shui! they shouted. “May Mao ‘Zedong live for ten thousand years!” Suddenly, there was silence as the new national fag climbed up the immense flagpole in the center of the square. At the top it cracked open in the chill wind—thirty fect broad, blood red, with five yellow stars in the top left comer—to inaugurate the People’s Re- public of China, The symbolism was carefully nuanced. The red flag was, of ‘course, a banner of revolution, and the largest ofthe five stars represented the dominant position of the Communist party in China's “New Democ- ragy.” Yet five was a number beloved of China's philosophers—the five virtues, the five rules—and red was the historic color of the Han people of ‘Chins, This revolution was both communist and nationalist. "The fact that the worlds most populous country had “fallen” to commt- nism was momentous enough. But the Chinese revolution of 1949 takes on its full significance only against the backdrop of the war, Consider two other translers of power earlier in the decade. On the evening of February 15, 1g42, Goneral Arthur Percival, the British commander of Singepore, marched out tothe Japanese lines to surrender. One hundred thirty thousand 37 38 | OWE WORLD DIVISIBLE Communist Revouurions, Astaw Stu | 38 British and empire forees succambed to an attacking force half their nam- ber, with barely a fight. Winston Churchill later called it “the worst disaster and largest capitulation in British history”! Percival’s motives were honor- able: tho Jepanese controlled the island’s water supply, and a prolonged siege ‘would result in the deaths of thousands of soldiers and civihans. But the mage that wont around the world was of Percival and his officers, i their long baggy shorts, walking out with Union Jack and white flag to make their surrender, The British Empire had not only been defeated: far worse, it had been rendered ridiculous, Percival speot the rest of the war in a Japanese prison camp. But at g:00 ‘ant on September 2, 1945, he was a guest of honor on the American bat- eship Missourt in Tokyo Bay when the Japanese surrendered. He stood next to the American commander, General Douglas MacArthur, and after the signing ceremony, MacArthur handed one of the fountain pens he bad used to Percival. Now it was tho turn of the Japanese to feel the anguish of defeat (Plate 4). Allied officers watched in savage satisfaction as Foreign Minister Shigemitsu Mamoru, burdened with a wooden leg, struggled to mount the steep steps. His secretary. Toshikam Kase, had never realized be- fore that “the glance of glaring eyes could hurt so much,” like “a million shafts of a ratling storm of arrows barbed with fre.” Yet he was then de- lighted by the magnanimiy of MacArthur's words. Instead of preaching “dis- trust, malice or hatred,” the American victor expressed the hope that “a better world shall emerge” characterized by “freedom, tolerance and jus- tice."® ‘By 1945 the tables had been tured on the Japanese. Surrender brought to an abrupt end their empire in China, Korea, and southeast Asia, and the “white” colonial powers were able to recover the possessions they had lostin 3941-1942. In 1945-2046 the British returned to Malaya and Flong Kong, the Dutch to the East Indies, and the French to Indochina, Yet the memory of those earlier humiliations could not be wiped out. Japan’s dramatic suc- cesses had fatally undermined the prestige ofthe white man, especially the Europeans, across east and southeast Asia. Over the ensuing decade, the Dutch and the French would discovor that the ompires they ad rogained ‘were now untenable, while the British hung om only at considerable eost in Malaya, The vacuums created by the contraction of Japanese and European, imperialism had been filed, in varying degrees and forms, by a complex blend of nationalism and communism—of which the most important exem- pplar was China. Communist success there in unifying and modernizing a vast agrarian society seemed the harbinger of revolution all over Asia. Only ‘the United States, propelled into Asia by the Pacific War, had the potential to contain thet expansion, ‘The cold war gave it the will and reason to do so, particularly in Korea and Vietnam, And a remarkable new alliance with Japan, crafted by MacArthur, was to prove America’ main bulwark of con- fainment in Asia Japan under U.S. Occupation Tn 1940 Japan had s population of seventy-three million. Unique among the countries of Asia it had become a major industrial power, com- parable at this stage to France, and had also developed a system of parlia- ‘mentary democracy on the British model, with adult male suffrage since 1995, Yet capitalism and democracy both rested on shaky foundations. The country was poorly endowed with raw materials, its main asset was cheap labor, and population growth prossod on the limited arable land available in a langely motintainous country. Over 40 percent of the work force was stillin agriculture, and they were devastated by the aggos depression. Asin Weimar (Gormany, factional paty politicians were ill equipped to cape with economic crisis. In the 1930s the Japanese military gained effective control of politics and pushed the country into colonial wars as an answer tots economic prob- Jems. The bid to build a “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere” in China, Korea, and Southeast Asia ended in disaster, because Japan lacked the eco- nomic resources to sustain 2 full-scale war against the United States. From ‘August 1045 the Japanose experienced what they, unlike much of Asia, had hitherto escaped—Western oceupation. Officially, eleven powers participated in the occupation government, but 90 percent of the forces in Japan were American and the occupation was dominated by the United States. MacArthur, as Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP), was endowed with almost absolute powers, which he exercised in a proconsular manner, The surrender document made clear that “the authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government will be subject tothe Supreme Commander.” Here, then, is one important contrast swith Germany, the other main defeated power: Japan was not divided among, the Allies, but administered largely by the United States. Yet, second, MacArthur chose to govern indirectly through the Japanese government and bureaucracy, rather than setting up direct military government as in Ger- many, Both of these features of the occupation had considerable signifi- ance. Ti 1p45-21947. MacArthur oversaw a dramatic series of reforms. Most im- portant was the new constitution of May 1947, which set out unequivocally the principles of responsible democratic government under the lew. SCAP ‘grafted American features onto the existing parliamentary system, notably 40 | ONE WORLD DIVISIBLE Gowstentsr Revouurions, Asiay Site | 41 popular sovereignty, judicial review, and guaranteed civil rights, The cabinet now enjoyed executive authority and was responsible to the legislature, or Diet. The constitutional principle of local government autonomy was re- flected in new logal codes aud in the abolition ofthe autocratic Fiome Min Istry, which had controled local government and police. And Article g of the constitution renounced war “as a sovereign right of the nation” and forbade the maintenance of “land, sea and air forces.”’This “peace clause” was one of the most controversial articles of the canstitation Another far-reaching change was land reform, implemented through two new laws in 2945-1946. Japan’s rural population consisted largely of poor ‘peasants, The new laws addressed the serious problems of poverty and ab- seatee landlordismn In consequence, the proportion of farm households that ‘were owner-cultivators rose ftom 37 percent in 1947 to 62 percent in 2950, bby which time go peroent of the total arable land was cultivated by its ovm- ers. SCAP also pushed through three new labor laws in 1945-1947, legaliz- ing for the fst time both unionization and collective bargaining. By 1949, nearly half the urban work Force was unionized. Education was reformed on ‘American lines, ane women were given the vote. The constitution even guar- ‘anteod them equal rights in public life and marviage—provisions in advance of much of Westera Europe and certainly of the United States (where the Equal Rights Amendment of 1972 was never ratified by suffcioat states). ® ‘The U.S. occupation of Japan has been described by ane historian, with lit tle exaggeration, as “perhaps the single most exhaustively planned operation of massive and externally directed political change in world history."® ‘The new constitution, for instance, was 2 SCAP invention, drafted in a week ia February 1946 after the Japanese had failed to come up with something MacArthur deemed adequate. In such matters of high policy the general vwas closely involved, personally writing the basis ofthe “peace clause.” for iu- stance, But on lesser issues, vast authority devolved on relatively junior ssembers ofthe SCAP bureaucracy. The second and third labor laws, for n= stance, were largely the work of twenty-ight-year-old Tod Coben from New ‘York. The equal rights provisions were prepared by Beate Sirota, age twenty. two, after research in a few Tokyo libraries to check out constitutional prac tice elsewhere, Yet the indirect character ofthe occupation must not be forgotten: SCAP ‘worked through the Japanese government, whose politicians and bureau- rats exercised considerable influence on the reforms. SCAPs purges of war criminals and ultranationalists in 1945~1947 removed aver two hundred thousand of Japan’ fortner leaders. The frst postwar elections, in April 1946, produced a Diet 80 percent of whose members had never served before. “New" politicians, and those from the 1920s who were now rehabilitated, represented reformist traditions that had been suppressed under mulitary tale Secs who ed a caliton goverment ia sot 8 ee particu: larly supportive of MacArehur vision ofa demilitarized Japan. An even more impottan Japanese contbution cane froma the professional esl service, largely untouched by the purges, whose anthority was enhanced during the ‘occupation years. In some cases, they presented draft reforms to procmpt ‘American initiatives, as with the election law, but land reform was itself a Tong-standing goal of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. Most pieces of legislation represented a dialogue botween Americans and Japanese. But certain essential reforms were American Iunpositions (notably the purges and te Constitution) and “not one of the basie reforms carried out under the ‘Occupation could have been achieved without the best efforts of SCAR” Forirstance, almost no developing capitalist country (except for Taiwan) has carried out a smooth program of land reform. This would have been impos- sible in Japan “without the force exerted by the Occupation.”* ‘By ag48, however, American priorities were changing. The occupation rover intended to remake Japan, only to democratize and demiltarize the country 30 it would never again threaten international peace, Most of ‘MacArthur's reforms were intended to do this, by iberalizing polities and so- ety and dismantling “feudal” concentrations of power in land and industry. Although he was still tying to break up the big industrial holding companies, the zetbateu, by 1948 much of his initial agenda had been accomplished. At the same time, Washington was taking a greater interest in Japan as the deepening cold war forced it to develop a global perspective, Policy makers ‘begat to sce Japan asthe Asian analogue to Germany in Europe—a country ‘of great economic and military potential whose loss to commnmnistn would im- ‘peria) America’s influence over a whole continent. State Department plan- ners observed in September 1947: “Idea of eliminating Japan as a military power forall time is changing, Now, because of Russia's conduct, tendency {s to develop Hirobito’ islands as a buffer state.”* Guided particularly by George Kennan, Washington increasingly sought the economic recovery of Japan and even its Iimited rearmament. But both of these strategies would “upset relations with the countries of East and Southeast Asia, Japan needed this fo0d, raw materials, and markets for its industrial recovery. And any in- crease in Jepanese military power would reawaken memories of past impe- rialisin. In early 1950 Thailand’ chief trade negotiator told an American official: “apparently itis United States policy to secure through political pres- sure what the Japanese Army failed to secute in Asia."” America’s policy sbift on Fapan was therefore partial and confused—viti- ated not only by feuding among MacArthur, the Pentagon, and the State Depastment but also by the difficulty of drawing the rest of Asin into a new framework of containment. Meanwhile, conditions in Japan deteriorated. From 1946 wholesale prices doubled annually and in 1949-1950 inflation 42 | ONE WORLD DIVISIBLE ‘was curbed only by a Washington-Imposed austerity program that led to re- cession, bankruptcies, and increased unemployment. Labor militancy be~ ee 30 acute ‘that bearer gradually restricted the right to strike. ;conomie enss increased politcal polarization. The 1 i. ‘mated the socialists, boosted the rightwing Liberals Culeauee a the Diet, and gave the Japanese Communist party (JCP) its fist significant representation, with 7.§ percent of the seats, The CIA warned that the po- litical conter was being wiped out. In January 2950, the one hundred thousand -strong JCP, under pressure from Moscow, abandoned its policy of peaceful revolution and mounted a campaign of strikes, demonstrations, and even industrial sabotage. The Joint Chiofs of Staff told Truman that, if Japan fell under communist influence, “Russia would gain, thereby, an additional ‘war-making potential equal to 25% of her capacity." At the back of their mninds was the question, Might Japan go the way of China? China and the Endgame of Civil War Tn 1945 China was the world’s most populous country, with nearly five hundred million people—triple the umber in the United Sutes petite posed on a map of North America, it would extend from Adlantio to Pacific and from Hudson Bay to Puerto Rico. It was also a civilization of great an- tiquity, which had pioneered the technologies of paper and print long before Enrope, and it had resisted or absorbed foreign incursions for centuries, Yet in the half-century following defeat by Jspan in 1895, China seemed in ter- ina deetine—the are of ta whose fate would likely emulate that Ottoman empire, tho “sick man of Europe" in the decades before it Be nal epi during Ward War eee ee ince the collapse of the Qing dynasty in 1922, the country hat / aged by civil war. Consolidation of one y the esse lemon (GMD) ba eG frustrated first by their former allies, the Chinese communists, and then by war with Japan from 1937. With the Japanese con- trolling much of the northeast and eat from Mantria down ‘pone the. cormimunists, now led by Mao Zedong, held on in the north from their capi. tal at Yan‘an while Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jeisht) and the GMD tried to eon- trol south and central China from Chongging, In the winter of 1945-1946, after the sudden Japanese surrender, the Americans pressed both sides to reach a negotiated settlement, But the GMD would not share politcal power, and the CCP would not redaceits military power without a lest a coalition government. "Never in my experience with human beings,” observed U.S. Gonnoyisr Revotvtioys, Asiay Srruz | 43 ambassador John Leighton Stuart, “have I encountered anything lke the suspicion on both sides, especially among the communist." Hostilities re~ summed in July 1948, with Chiang determined to destroy the communist guer- rilla strongholds. As U.S. military analysts predicted, he lacked the means to do 50, But they also had ite donb that “the Communists cannot win either in attack or defense in a toe-to-toe slugging match with National Gov{em~ ‘menlt forces." A bloody stalemate seemed likely. Even Zhou Enlai, Mao's principal diplomatist, reckoned in 1946 that ultimate CCP success would take up to twenty years of war. ‘And yet, by the end of 1949, the communists were in full control of the country, except for the island of Taiwan, to which Chisng and the Guomnin- dang had retreated (Map 5). Their astounding defeat was largely self- inflicted. For all its professions of democracy and reform, the GMD had degenerated into a corrupt, faction-ridden oligarchy whose demands for con- scripts and resources had alienated peasants throughout its rural base areas. In the spring of 1944, for instance, fifty thousand GMD soldiers retreating beforo the Japanese Ichigo offensive were killed by resentful local farm- ‘ers--somo soldiers even being buried alive. Inthe cities, home to a tenth of China's population, the biggest solvent of GMD support was rampant infla- tion. Chiang paid for the war by printing banknotes, with the result that av- erage prices rose aver two thousand times in 1997-1946, Postwar attempts at wage and price controls or rationing were half hearted and ineffectual: in the year from mid-1947, for instance, the eost-of living index in Shanghai ‘went up fiflyfold. Peasants hoarded their grain, consumers bought up scarce goods —in both eases accelerating the inflationary spiral. “Like leukaemic blood,” writes the historian Lloyd Eastman, “the deprociated currency of the National Government flowed through the body politic, enfeebling the entire organism—the army, government, economy, and society generally.” ‘Of course, the CCP was hardly a bonevolent taskmaster, and most peasants ‘would doubtless have preferred to be left in peace by both sides. But the communists, despite their antecedents as displaced urban revolutionaries, did a much better job of mobilizing rural support, Indeed, that was the basis oftheir stratexy—"setting the mastos in motion’ through a locally ran pro- {gram of land redistribution at the expense of “landlords” and rich peasants ‘These methods were pioneered before and during the Sino-Japanese war in CP base areas, which Mao graphically called “the buttocks of the revolu- tion,” supporting the whole body. Alter 1945 they were applied with great success in the northesst, in Manchuria—the decisive battleground of the civil war. Whereas the GMD “civilian bureaucracy and armies were grafted tonto Northeast China,” with ltele effort to secure local support, the CP's restructuring of rural Manchuria enabled it “to tap the sources of manpower and supplies which they needed to wage corventional war against the Na- 44 | ONE WORLD DIVISIBLE Conmunisr Revovorions, Asran Srvu | 45 tionalst armies.” Yet conventional war was not the same as the guerrilla op- erations (‘sparrow warfare”) that the CCP had waged previously and which Mao still preferred. Gradually they developed the tactics and logistics to take the offensive against an enemiy that sill had superior firepower and ‘commanded the main cities and railtoads. After weathering the CMD ad- vances of 1946-1947, including the loss of Yenan, the commanders of the People’ Liberation Anuy (PLA) refined their techniques of “mobile warfare” using light infantry in rapid, suxprise attacks. This distinctive blend of peasant struggle and conventional warfare was the basis of the smashing victories won by the PLA in 1948-2949, a8 Lin Biao, its leading general, drove south through Manchuria to take the port of Tian. Jin and then Beijing itselfn January 1949. The value of rural bases was dra matically shown in the Xuzhou campaign in central China in the last two months of 1948, In regular troops the two sides were evenly matched, about half million each, but the CCP could draw on the logistic support of up to ‘wo million peasants in four surrounding provinees, coordinated by the young. Deng Xisoping. These victories transformed the military situation. The GMD opened peace negotiations in janvary but, following their breakdown sn April, the PLA’ reorganized armies moved across the Yangtze River and swept south and west to consolidate their hold with a speed unparalleled since the Manchu conquests three centuries before.!? Both superpowers had been wrong footed by the events of 1948-1949. Al- though the CCP was a member of Comintern, Stalin was always suspicious of communist leaders who took an independent line. Tn any ease he doubted Mao's chances of vanquishing the Cuomindang. In August 2945 he con- cluded a “treaty of friendship and alliance” with Chiang, along lines prefig- ‘ured at Yalta. The Chinese acknowledged Soviet control of Outer Mongolia and accepted its claims, dating back to tsarst times, to port and railroad in- terosts in Manchuria, Ia return, the Russians recognized the GMD as the na- tonal government of China and plodged it their exclusive support and aid. In 1945-2946, Stalin urged Mao to enter a coalition with the GMD. Stalin’ ‘China policy was typical of his thinking immediately after the war: secure So- Vet interests in buffer regions, but avoid conflict with the Western allies and restrain local communist pressures for revolution, Altbough the Red Army cecupied Manchuria rapidly in August 1945, allowing large quantities of Japanese arms to fall into CCP hands, the Russians did not intervene overtly in the civil war, Having looted Manchuria of most enemy industrial equip- ‘ment—again emulating their practice in urmpe- they withe ther ‘roops completely from the region inthe spring of 1948. Throughout the en- suing struggle, Stalin kept his distance from Mao. In early 1949 he advised the CCP leaders not to cross the Yangtze, for fear of triggering a clash with the United States into which the Soviet Union would be drawn: the Soviet ambassador ws, ironically, the lastto leave Chiang, Little wonder Mao later insisted that “the Chinese revolution achieved its victory against the will of ott vith Sov mae, the Americas were perpetual meddlers ia the allais of China—though with no greater success by 1949, During the ‘as American aid had foved to Cag and Roost ha bl hin wp a ‘the four Allied “policemen” who would maintain world peace. In an efit Sees ine and democratic” China, General George C. Marshall spent much of 1946 trying to promote an agreement between ‘Chiong and Mao, But whea he filed, American policy makers tefused to be ‘drawn into the civil war. They had no illusions by now about the corruption and ineptitute of the CMD. U S. aid to Chiang, totaling $3. billion by 1949, seemed like money poured down a drain. In February 1948, Marshall iby then secretary of state} told congressmen that to eliminate Chinese com- son wou equ dhe United Stats" be prepare veal t the over the Chinese government and administer its economic, military, an eel affairs.”® The Truman administration already had its hands fll ‘with Europe, finding it hard enough to extract money from Congress for the Marshall Plan, An open-ended commitment to help Chiang destroy the CCP was inconceivable. But the administration, like the Soviets, realized only yery late in the day that Mao would actually bo able to destroy the Guo- rmindang regine. hn bth superpowers had to redefine their China policies hurriedly in 1949-1950. Stalin shifted allegiance to the new communist govemment, signing a treaty of friendship and alliance with Mao in Moscow ia February 1950. Mao aflirmed the territorial concessions agreed to by Chiang in 1945 and éecured a pledge of economic aid and a routual military coumaitment if either country was attacked by another. Soviet help in these areas was es- sential for Mao, to rebuild the country and to help deter American aggres- sion, He regarded the latter as a real possiblity in 1949—paralleling ‘npérialist intervention against the Bolsheviks in 1938-1921. In June 1949, hho wade clear that “help from the international revolutionary forces” was es- sential: “in order to win the victory and consolidate it we must lean to one side, Yet the recent checkered history of relations with Stalin had not been {orgotten or forgiven. Mao had no intention of losing China’ hard-won unity and independence to Moscow, and his larger object was to restore China's ao in word fas asthe Cental Kiaglon,” The xy word leaning ims ied a temporary posture. As Zhou Enlai, the new foreign minister, feonee reoniaves, “We shall have to ean to one side, but how far we lean depends on you." vitlced Chae 1949 Truman's National Security Council undertook a ‘major review of U.S. poliey i Asia. Itealled the CP's vietory“a grievous po- dross 46 | ONE WORLD DIvISIBLE Goumomise Rrvousrrans, Asian Sevue | 47 litical defeat for us” which the USSR, already “an Asiatic power -nagnitude,” would try to exploit. But ree dyn ay el ian Amer {can interests, noting China's immense social and economic problems, which ‘had “contributed to the downfall of every Chinese regime in recent history.” ‘The NSC aso thought it “quite possble that serious frictions would dovelop between the Chinese communist regime and Moscow if Stalin tried to exert control, In deference to Pentagon pressure, it advised a continued attempt by diplomacy and “modest” economic aid to deny Taiwan to the communists bout ruled out “overt military action” to save Chiang. In line with this wait- gpet-ee pole, minimizing Sno- American frtion while hoping fora Sto vets Tron stated publely on January 52950, tbat te United States ‘would “not provide military ad or advice” to Chiang’ forces on Taiwan, Nor did it have “any intention of utilizing its armed foces to interfere in the pre~ Sent situation” A woek ater Sceretary of State Dean Acheson dectared that te Asa Ameres defensive perimeter runs from the Ryuks tp th Philip pine Islands centeringon Japan. Acheson dd not wnt off the Asan main land, adding that in the event of aggression outside the perimettir "the intial reliance must be on the people attacked to esis and Phen upem «the United Nations, which 2 fa has not proved a weak reed But what was in Moscow and Beljing was what he had omitted. K ai ly outed Arnrcasguarantood Asan dafene Ines Sn TN Korea: The Cold War Turns Hot On the evening of Saturday June 24, 1950, President Hany Truman \was enjoying a rare weekend with his wife and daughter at their home in In- dependence, Missouri. At g:20 Px, just as they had finished a lelsurely din- ner, the telephone rang. It was Dean Acheson from Washington. “Mr President, Thave very serious news,” said the Sectetary of State.“The North Koen have tae South Koren Ino this nal county 1 sian of Minnesota or the United Kingdom—-ns tough thes or the United King hore the cald By 1900, the Korean peninsula hed ected asa single polity for a millen nium (arguably as far back asthe late seventh cent Bite puncte by Asie’ three major powers, Having always been under the cultural influ- feof Ching ts man northern ego, the tm ofthis centny Korea fel vt tothe expansionary ambitions of Russa end Jpans ater the asso Jpaese war of 904-005 fll completly under Japanese cota the 19306, Japan set about tho economic development of Korea (and peighboring Manchuria). The result was a nascent industrial state with avige forous bureaucracy. At the end of the Pacific War, Korea, a country smaller than most Chinese provinces, bad go percent of Chinaé total railroad mileage sind carried half as many passengers. Equally important was the effect of the forced mobilization of Korean soldiers and workers for the Japanese war ef- fort at home and abroad, By 1944, perhaps 20 percent of Koreans were ei- ther abroad or in provinces other than those in which they had been born—a powerful soWent of traditional attitudes. Yet this was “abortive, fractured Movelopment’ "partial in its effect on peasant society and aborted by the sudden Japanese surrender in August 1945. Into the chaos stepped the ‘new superpowers ‘Korea was partitioned because the Amoricans were determined to prevent total Soviet control of the peninsula, The Truman administration wanted “American forces to take the Japanese surrender in the south, and in the early frou of August 13, 1945, 680 days ater the second atomic bomb had been USS. planners were told at short notice to find a dividing line as far north as was malitarily feasible. With only a swall wall map of the Far East lt their dicposal, the planners, among them Dean Rusk of the State Depart- ‘ment, latched on to the thirty-cighth parallel, which passed north of the cap- ifal, Seoul, and divided the peninsula almost equally (Map g). Stalin accepted this plan without debate, and adhered to steven though Soviet forces oce- pied the north almost immediately and U.S. forces did not arsive from tho is- land of Okinawa until September 8, Evidence from Soviet archives strengthens earlier suppositions that Stalin was not bothered about total con: trol of the whole peninsula. His approach “was in keeping with the general ‘aim of Russia's pre-1gos stratogy, to maintain a balance of power in Korea."™ ‘The tacit spheres-of influence arrangement struck with the Amoricans mir rored similar deals in Europe, and the 8th parallel was in fact the line ‘around which Russia and Japan had negotiated at the turn of the century But, asin Europe, Stalin understood “his” sphere to be Soviet property: the Russians promptly souled off the zone and exploited its resources. They also helped local commanists organize Soviet-style structures in the north but frained from similar activities in the south. There, in a cauldron of social ‘and political ferment, the U.S. military worked to create a right-center coali- ‘ion against communism. ‘in principle, both the United States and the Soviet Union were commit. ted to establishing a provisional, democratic government forthe whole coun- tay, but, as cold war animosttes intensified, neither was willing to move in thet direction for fear of Korca’s falling under the influence of the other side, Infact, the division suited both superpowers, preoceupied with Euro- pear crises in 1947-1948. Following dubious elections in south nd north in {he summer of 1948, Soviet troops were withdrawn at the end of the year and 2.UN. Inchon Lanting, 7 ‘Sept: 15,1 Communisr Ruvowrios, Asian Srrue | 49 “American troops by the following Jime. Each side hoped that continued mil- itary aid would maintain its client rogime—in the north the leR-communist .ce under Kim Tl Sung, a former communist guerrilla against the Japan- ‘ese; in the unstable south a government led by the veteran conservative na tionalist Syagman Rhee, who had returned in 1945 from lengthy exile im the United States, But although the superpowers might have viewed this as sat {sfactory solution, division at the g8th parallel made no economic sense. It loft the north with most ofthe country’s minerals and heavy industry, while the bulk ofthe agricultural land lay inthe south, together with two-thirds of the twenty-four million population. In any case, Rhee and Kirn were ardent rationalists, each determined to unify the country under his contxcl. Neither accepted partition as permanent. It has been estimated that about one bun~ ‘dred thousand people were killed in politcal disturbances, guervilla war, and border clashes before the formal outbreak of email war in June 1950." ‘Despite concern about the political and economic weakness of Rhoe's regime, however, the State Department remained confident that he cond ‘survive. To quote the historian James Matray, they assumed that “local Com- ounist partes, rather than organized military forces, acted as the primary vehicles of Soviet expansion” and that, in any case, South Korea “would be able to defend itself without extensive American aid or advico."# Both of ‘these assumptions lay behind Acheson's speech of January 12; both proved inisteken, In April 1950 Kim visited Stalin in Moscow and wore down his doubts about all-out military attack, arguing that it would not provoke the ‘United Statos. Kim was reassured by Acheson's defensive perimeter speech, but in any ease, he insisted this would be a surprise attack, coordinated with major communist uprising in the south, and that victory would be won in three days—before the Americans had time to intervene, Once Stalin hed ap- proved, the Soviets provided substantial support in the form of arms, atn- aunition, and advisers. Soviet military planners oven drafted the “Preemptive Strike Operations Plan.” On bis way home from Moscow, Kim visited Beijing and obtained Chinese acquiescence, The failure of the Ames {cans to intervene in China and the speeches by Truman and Acheson left Mao, like Stalin, complacent about U.S. reaction, Communisin had been contained in Europe, but in Asia it seemed to be on the move. For Truman, however, this was the great test of the cold war, Before the tend of June he had ordered American air, naval, aud ground forces into the ‘Korean battle and had moved the U.S. Seventh Fleet into the Taiwan Straits, ‘effectively blocking a PRC invasion. These major shifts in America’s Asian policy reflected global rather than regional considerations. Truman and bis falvicers had no doubt that Kim was acting et Stalin behest, “The attack on Korea,” declared the president on June 27, “makes it plain beyond all doubt that Communism has passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer inde- 50 | ONE WORLD DIVISIBLE Communist Revouuriens, Astax Stite | 51 pendent nations and will now use armed invasion and war." A “dorning mentality also prevailed in Washington, If Korea fell, Truman claimed, the Soviets would “keep right on going and swallow up one piece of Asia ater an- ther... we were to let Asia go, the Near East would collapso and no telling what would happen in Europe."* Truman, a history bulf, was also keen (o draw lessons from the past. Communism, he reflected, “was acting in Korea just as Hitler, Mussolini, and the Japanese had acted ten, Aiteen, and twenty years earlier... . IF this was allowed to go unchallenged it would ‘mean a third world war” The Americans also seeured United Nations sup- port. This was the fist time that the UN had used force to defend a mem- bor state under attack Since 1945 the organization had been frozen by the cold war. Of the fifty-one founder states, twenty-two came from the Ameri- «as and another fifteen from Fuzope, giving the Americans a substantial ma Jonty in the Assembly: In retaliation, the Soviets repeatedly used their veto in the Security Council, Only the Soviet boyeott of the Council in 1950, in protest against the PRC being denied China’ seat, allowed the Korean war to be a UN operation, Eventually sixteen nations contributed troops to the UN command in ‘Korea, but 4o percent were South Korean and about 50 percent American. Jtwas under the domineering U.S, command of General Douglas MacArthur that the war was ran, By the end of July North Korean troops hed occupied ‘most ofthe peninsula. Ia response, MacArthur planned an amphibious land- ing behind enemy lines at the western port of Inchon, near Seoul, Most of his staff opposed the risky assault, but Macarthur grandly assured them that its very npracticality ensured complete surprise. He was right. The landings on September 15, 1950, were virtually unopposed. Within two weeks Seoul was in UN hands, and a jubilant Truman administration authorized MacArthur to cross the 98th parallel into North Korea, Unification was UN policy, but the Americans saw it in the contest of the eold war. To quote one State Department official, “the resultant defeat to the Soviet Union and to the Communist world will be of momentous significance.“ Macarthur was told to draw backif there was any danger of Soviet or Chi- nese intervention but, confident that this would not occur, he pushed north toward the Yalu siver, Korea’ northem border with China. MacArthur was correct about Stalin. As soon as the Americans committed themselves in Korea, the Soviet leader distanced himself from the conflict, rejecting all Kim’ pleas for Russian intervention, He had never intended a Sonirontation with the United States. Many of China's Politburo also wanted to stay out, in- cluding Zhou Bnlat and Lin Biao, But Mao feared that China would be next ‘on America’ list and, in any case, UN successes had emboldened the CCP ‘opponents at home—counterrevolution threatened from within, ifnot from without. Like Truman, Mao saw Korea in an international context. Stalin sed the PRC air cover if they did intervene, but the Chinese have a ee eae tied to wriggle out bis promise nearly October Wate he did or ot, when Chinese “volunteers started crossing the Yawn Oto, er 29, Mao must ave fe dngeoslyesponed. Cty be was wel var ofthe limits of the Sino-Soviet alliance * ae Fortunately for Mao, the inal Chinese incursions were dismissed ss n> sigaificant by American commanders. Some three bundred thousan nese tops wer in North Korea by November 25, when they bogan 2 falta offensive. Most weve hardened veterans of the fll was, who aqucly routed the USS. Eighth Army, One Ameria ofcer termed it “s fight hat has’ ben son for undies of years: the men of whale Unite States Army Neng fora bate abandoning tel: wounded, unsing for their ives By January 195, Seoul had allen and most of North Korea cra in cominanist hands again a a panicky Washington, there was alk of total evacuation or of vsing the atomic bomb—alaring European ale suc a the British. Noto March did the Amorcas rea he iat, ‘After the bloody failure of China’ spring offensives, the fighting sted into a var ofr, Itook two more yeast achieves form armistice, even tual siged a Pannnonjom a Jul 1958. The new demon trond theiryeighth panel, where thewae had started Onl he beligronts the effects wer profound—especil fo he reans, Thanks to romans restrain of Machu, they were spared the use of tome weaposs, but the alteratve—nown as “ited wa” —was tle snore agecebo. Dead and wounded are estimated at. milion in the south tnd 1g main i the nowth-—roughy a tenth of Kone population®” De- veloping thie acts of Wow WaT, the Americans prefaced evry as with nfense ar and artillery bombardment Seoul, for instance, changed hands fon tnes in nine ronths. By the time twas “berated” by the UN in Mare 951 only the Capital an the rtheay station stood amid the b> Bie oth mjorbulding: Even MacArthsno ranger tease at “the war in Korea has almost destroyed that nation ao ae rch dowsation Alter {ooked at hat wreckage and those thousands of women and children and everything, I vomited. i ‘Nor had the confit schioved its orginal am of unifying the country. On the contort confirmed Kores’ partition fr the freseabe four nthe south, Rhee cig ono power unto, vigng elections and soering the tim, but tho economy wasn mins and recoven, was mininal n he sees. Inthe north, Kim eliminated his rivals with ratbless Brutality and about Stalnizing his country, Agroutare was collocvized and Sx-year an promoted the development of heat indus: Whereas South Kort how dependent onthe United States, Soviet influence inthe north bd been sweater by Stalin's failure to assist the war effort. Although needing Chi- 52 | ONE WORLD DIVISIBLE Commonrsr Revoturions, Astaw Sree | 53 nese help, Kim tried to keep a balance between his two great communist neighbors—enunciating the concept of self-reliance, juche, as a model for ‘Third World communism. American losses were small by comparison—only thirty-three thousand dead—but they were evidence that the cold war had become a hot war in ‘Asia and might do so in Europe as well. The Korean War also inflamed an- lileftst feeling n a country that had no experience of left-of-center polities on European models. Senator Joseph McCarthy had started his notorious ac. cusations abot communists in high places in February 2950, but what be- came Imovm as MeCarthyism was part of a general assault by right-wing Republicans, mainly frora middle Amezica, on the Truman administration, especially Acheson, for being “soft” on communism, which prospered with the shambles in Korea in 1950-1951, Although McCarthy’ power waned after the end of the war, hs legacy was a lasting elimate of fear in which all public exticism of rigid anticommunism was suspect. Tn diplomacy, the main casualty of this mood was America’s policy toward China. There was now a powerfill pro-Chiang lobby in Congress. Its leader, Senator William Knowland, considered war with the “Chinese Reds” almost inevitable: “If we don't fight them in China and Formosa, we will be ght. ‘ng them in San Francisco.” Truman had interposed the U.S. Navy to prevent communist invasion of Taiwan; his Republican suocessor, Dwight D. Eisen- hhower; indicated in February 959 that he would do nothing to stop a Na Lionalist reconquest of the mainland as China’ legitimate government, The Republicans intensified their blockade of the PRC and committed them- selves in December 1954 to defending Taiwan and the other Guomindang offshore islands from communist attack. Secretary of State John Foster Dalles was loolong fora Sino-Soviet split. But he argued that “the way to get that is to make the going tough, not easy” by koeping the PRC “under pres- sures which would, i turn, keep the Commmmnists pressuring Russia for more than Russia would give."® NATO allies feared that such intransigence in Asia would distract the United States from European security. The British, ‘with major interests in Hong Kong, had recognized the PRC in January 1950 and advocated a more conciliatory line to woo Beijing away from Moscow, Neithor Washington nor London shifted ground, but the disagreement was symptomatic of grawing concem in Europe that the Americans were now ‘aking the cold war too seriously. ‘The Korean War had a profound effect on Japan. Exports soared go per- cent in the frst two years of war, and GNP grew at an annual rate of 10 per- cent. Much of the benefit steramed from some $g billion that the Americans spent in Japan in 1950-1954 on war or war-related orders. The governor of the Bank of Japan called these procurement orders “divine aid’; they wero “Toyotas salvation,” according to the president of that company, which had een on the verge of bankruptcy in 1949. As well as aiding Japan's exonomic reanehy the Coca Wat sss usbored in «now seca relationship ih ‘America, In August 1950, the Pentagon dropped its objections to a peace treaty with Japan, as long as U.S. beses remained. At the same time, MacArjhur éracked down oa Japanese communists and started ‘einng 2 paramilitary police reserve of seventy-five thousand. Tough negosbions £9 Towed with the Liberal premier, Yoshida Shigemuru, ebont the form of the new Aznerican-Japanese relationship. Inthe peace treaty of September 3952, Japan regained fll sovereign but simultaneous signed a seo peta septng the continued presence of US. troops and promising no © offer Ines to any ober power. On renmament howoves, Yoshida drgge foc, acopting only a secet paper commitment oa fity-thowsand strong nbay; and abil erating “Self-Defense Forces” was not approved by the Diet until March 1954. To seiooth ratification of the secarity treaty by US. Sate, Yoshsta eta agreed to sign a peace teat normale Intions with the Guosindangon Tavan, He so tated that pan had nn tenon ofconeaing ten vith “the Communist regine of China,” whieh, Se sat was probably “backing the pan Commit Paya program of seeking violently to overthrow the constitational system and the presen Sovernment of Japan." Ocean Wr eed, threfore oft renin ans forthe oo. nomic and military recovery of Japan within a new American alliance, but apart prospects dd not ook impressive in the mid-gos- Although Yost and the Liberals controlled the coehitions of 46-2954, plies romaine facto as soils parties revved nthe ery nag and the oes conser ‘ative party the Democrat, was ent yfeuting, Yoshida accepted the atest temporary, fran American alince, bute didnot share the go> tral Democrat ens forzearmarent, while the oes condesne both the security tenty a emilitariaton. nay case the inequality of tho relationship with America was widely resented: the 1952 security treaty n= clade no Japanese right to abrogate nor any formal Amesean commitment to defend Japan (bese the Japanese eis fo rear suggested they were not wilingto help thomselves)® he unequl secur pact a the enforced enw Tawa re, fr any Japanese, huang mba ofan int independence under U.S. hegemony."® “goes com covery ened pei: Renewed inion ws only checked in ag5q by tighter monetary controle and another recess Earrings from procurement errs encouraged increased ipo’, pushing she wkedefito 81. ilon in 1954, whe eps ed selunders its prowar level. To most Westera observers at this time, Japan remained an SPIED) chad coun, Inaggats GNP sa oneftonathof Aer ica’s amd only half that of West Germany's. Nearly 4o percent of its work 54 | ONE WORLD DIVISIBLE force was still engaged in agriculture, and the count jculture, and the country was the second largest Borrower rom the Weld Bae Noles an author tan Bn O. Fee chauer, the eminent American Japanologist, wrote in 2957: “The economic Staton ia Japan may be so fendanenally unsound that no pele, 20 ‘matter how wise, ean save her from slow economic starvation and al the con- comitant political and social ills that situation would produce."# Consolidating Unity and Revolution in China Tnternationlly, the biggest beneficiary ofthe Korean War: ples Republic of China, After a century of defeats by the fdas Japan, the Chinese had held their own against the world’s leading super- Dover. Ther solders were celebrated as heroes in Chines films and books American imperialists were likewise excoriated. In fact, the conflict was not refered toa the Korean Wr but a kang yuh Rast i Korea") and both ofthese words became popular names Geentareraties cease eer reey ga ctt Ty Yet the price had been appalling, The "1 appalling. The Chinese bad suffered nine hun thousand easats in tho ar one of Mason, Anying wus arg the dead The war confirmed Sino-American enmity until the 1970s: it also forced Mao completely into the Soviet camp, even though Stalin had proved to be an unreliable ally Because of the American embargo, rade with the ‘USSR soarod from 8 percent of China total commerce in 1949 to.70 per- cent 1952 Leaning to one side had become, t eto the moment, vie tal dependence, China'sintenatina postion ater r9go alo hhad a marked effect on it internal revolution, In 1949 Meo proposed continuance of the Zunted foot” pois that a proved so sites inthe cl wa, The oP ss oniyon ofthe arn tno Str lg, ale te huge he other stars represented peasants, workers, talists, and national oe and Mao's "New Democracy” was tailored to the realities of a semicolonial country in which the working class was weak and disorganized, Fe stated in Jane 1049: Our present poly isto regu capitals, nt destroy" Course fatended induc couse establish ral soeliststte—the ned front was means notte ond, Butte pio and xten of China cialst transformation” inthe early 19505 cit asin ‘early 19505 oved much to the crisis caused by ‘In 1949 the Communist party amounted to nist party amounted to 4.5 milion members—Iess than » percent of China's popution For two decades its bine had been Communist Revouorions, Astan Srvue | 55 y rural now it had to take control of the cities and mobilize their in- habitants, The Korean War justified and accelerated that process. A series of mess campaigns were orchestrated by the party, identifying particular ene- ‘nies of the community and exposing them through public indictment. They lWese backed by police investigation, intimidation, and violence. The first ‘campaign succeeded in driving out almost all foreigners by the end of 1950. ‘Their businesses were forced to sell up, their Chinese associates scared off, ‘and the Christian churches brought under firm state oversight. War fever en- couraged a second campaiga from February 1951 against “counter rovolutionaries,” characterized by particular violence as old seores were settled na Hurry of arrests, trials, and summary executions. Not only sus- pected GMD members, but anyone with alleged tes to “foreign cultural ag- gressors” became targets in this two-year Terror. In Guangdong province ‘lone, according to Zhou Enlai, 8,332 people were executed; he deplored the fact that too many countersevolutionaies had escaped. Less bloody, but equally important, were the “Three Ants” campaign of 151~2952, to crack down on corruption in party and government, and its successor, the “Five “Antic” to break business lenders, the so-called national bourgeoisie. Using the ‘well-tried techniques of group mobilization, class antagonism, and enforced Selcoufession, CCP personnel obliged businesstien to admit corruption, pay massive fines, and submit to state cootrol. By the end of the Korean War, the cities were cowed and political pluralism in China almast extin- guished. ‘But the decisive battleground of the Chinese revolution was the country side, where about 85 percent of the population lived. Rural lie hed been dominated by an elite of landlords and rich peasants, who owned much ofthe land, managed moneylending, and dominated village government and reli- gious charities. Resentment against their rule was constrained by traditional ties of kinship and village solidarity. Goods were sold, loans contracted, and ‘marriages arranged within these networks. The challenge facing the CCP was ‘50 to arouse horizontal, class antagonisms that they would sever these cus- tomary vertical ties that held togethier rural society, The CP's methods had been pioneered in the old bases around Yan‘an during the evil war. A “work team of tained communists would move into a village and gradually clas- sify the status ofits households, often aided by “Poor Peasants’ Association” that they set up. The team’s classifications would then be posted at the con- tral meeting place, whereupon the “struggle phase” would begin. Vietims of those identified as landlords or rich peasants were urged to denounce their ‘oppressors in special “speak bitterness” meetings. Thoy were often reluctant to do $0, as the rural elite played om traditional ties, while the communists tried to arouse class hostility among people who had never been politicized before, Weeks of meetings and agitation might be required before poorer 56 [ONE WORLD DIVISIBLE peasants were willing to speak out. Once sufficient numbers had done so and the nocused bad been coerced into confessing, the way was open to take away his property and redistribute it to poor or landless peasants. For a glimpso of what this moant in practi¢e, take the case of Chang- huang, a former Japanese-occupied village in Shanxi province, some four Ihundred miles southwest of Peking, where land reform took hold in 1946 in the wake of the chaotic Anti-Traitor movement to identify collaborators. The richest man in this village of some two hundred households hed been Sheng, Ching-ho, « landlord whose long fingeruails and long gown proclalined that he was above manual work, He owned the largest landholding and also liquor distillery, loaning out part of his profs at interest rates of up to 50 per- centa month to desperate peasants whose defaults then served to onlange his property. Sheng Ching-ho also managed the affairs of the local Buddhist and, ‘Confucian religious charities, which enabled him to cream off healthy com- ‘missions from regular offerings, spirit talking, the annul fair, and so on. As village head under the provincial governor, he also took a substantial cut from local taxes. When the peasants were mobilized in 1946, Sheng Ching- ho found that half the village families bed scores to settle. Once one dared to accuse him, the floodgates opened. Old women who had never spoken in public before rose to denounce him. Li Mao’ wife shook her fist under his nose and shouted: “Once I went to glean whest on your land. But you cursed ime and drove me away.” A total of 180 accusations were made. Sheng Ching- ho stood with head bowed. When asked, he admitted them all and was judged to owe four hundred bags of milled grain. Having found less than that 1m his store, they beat him up and kept on doing so until he confessed, one by one, the locations of his various hoards of silver coin—the equivalent of $500, That night, villagers sated themselves on the New Year’ feast he had prepared, while Ching-ho and his wife escaped and were never heard of again. As a result ofthe campaign to “settle accounts” with landlords, about half the people of Changchuang were the beneficiaries of land and property redistribution * ‘During the civil war period land reform in the north was particularly rad ical and bloody. In the newer liberated areas to the south the pace was more measured. In ag49 only about a fifth of China’ villages had been touched. ‘When the program resumed with the Agrarian Reform Law of June 1950, its tempo and tone were affected by the tense atmosphere of the Korean War thas been estimated that in the process “between 400,000 and 800,000 people were killed offically after 1949” and pethaps as many again unofli- ally Yet the governments target had been deliberately narrow, focusing Inainly on “landlords” to maximize support among the ticher and most pro- uctive peasants, whose output was vital to satisy food needs. Wide differ- ences of wealth and landownership still existed. For the CCP the point of the Conuunist Revourtions, Asian Styut | 57 ‘campaign had never been land redistribution itstf, though this was the batt tort the persnty, bt to break the tradition power structure of roa China and mobilize support for the party by fomenting class conflict. As ‘Mao put it back in in 1927: “A revolution is not a dinner party... ts nec- essary to create terror for a while in every rural area.”® "The Korean War reforms in city and countryside gave the government both the foundation and the confidence to proceed with more radieal so- cialization. The government’ first fve-year plan for 1953-1957 borrowed heavily from Soviet precedents, concentrating on the development of heavy industry under tight central controls. By the time it was approved in July 1955, Mao was more worried about lagging production and continued class

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