Documentos de Académico
Documentos de Profesional
Documentos de Cultura
On July 19, 2001, Yez, Saragoza together with complainant and Joe Linaza
(Linaza) from FEB Mitsui Marine Insurance, Co., came to see respondent in
her sala to apologize.15
In his report, the Investigating Justice of the Court of Appeals
recommended16 the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit, insufficiency of
evidence and reasonable doubt. He observed that respondents refusal to pay
the deductible franchise was not intended to violate the law. No fault can be
attributed on respondent for refusing to sign a blank form. Had respondent
grossly humiliated or berated Garao, Yez or Saragoza, they would not have
gone to her office, together with complainant and Linaza, to apologize.
The OCA adopted the Investigating Justices recommendation with
modification that complainant Duduaco be fined in the amount of P10,000.00
for filing this baseless harassment suit. The OCA opined that complainants
insistence on pursuing her unsubstantiated charges despite lack of personal
knowledge wasted the time and resources not only of respondent but also of
the Investigating Justice and this Court.
We agree with the recommendations of the OCA.
In administrative proceedings, complainants have the burden of proving by
substantial evidence the allegations in their complaints.17 Administrative
proceedings against judges are by nature, highly penal in character and are to
be governed by the rules applicable to criminal cases. The quantum of proof
required to support the administrative charges should thus be more
substantial and they must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.18
To constitute gross ignorance of the law, the acts complained of must not only
be contrary to existing law and jurisprudence but were motivated by bad faith,
fraud, dishonesty and corruption.19 On the other hand, misconduct is any
unlawful conduct on the part of a person concerned in the administration of
justice prejudicial to the rights of parties or to the right determination of the
cause. It generally means wrongful, improper or unlawful conduct motivated
by a premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose.20
Respondents refusal to pay the deductible franchise was justified. Her
insistence that the demand to pay be in writing, together with her refusal to
affix her signature in the blank form, did not amount to grave misconduct,
abuse of judicial office or gross ignorance of the law. She was only exercising
her legal right. Had respondent signed the blank form, she would be deemed
to have waived her earlier protest and would have lost the right to claim for
refund.
We agree with OCAs recommendation that complainant be sanctioned for
filing this unfounded complaint. Indeed, no person should be penalized for the
exercise of the right to litigate. This right, however, must be exercised in good
faith.21
During the formal investigation, she admitted that she was absent when the
event transpired on June 23, 2001,22 which means that she has no personal
and direct knowledge of the incident. Yet, in the verification portion of the
complaint, she claimed that all the allegations therein were true and correct of
her own knowledge and belief.23 Significantly, she also went to respondents
office and apologized.
Human nature dictates that redress for a wrong done is ordinarily sought by
the aggrieved with zeal. Yet, it appears that it was more than eight (8) months
after the incident that complainant and Toyota-Davao filed this complaint
against an alleged "erring" member of the bench. Verily, the delay militates
against the veracity of their allegations.
Moreover, complainant filed the instant administrative case after ToyotaDavao lost possession of the vehicle in favor of respondent and after she
refused to settle the replevin suit she filed against them. More specifically, the
instant complaint was filed only on March 4, 2002 or about eight (8) months
after respondent filed the replevin case and secured the writ on July 4, 2001.
As the Investigating Justice fittingly observed, "the timing couldnt be worse."24
The filing of the instant administrative complaint was not done in good faith. In
complainants letter dated January 21, 2002,25 she informed this Court about a
similar complaint filed before the Judicial and Bar Council "for the purpose of
objecting to (respondents) application for appointment as Regional Trial Court
in Midsayap, North Cotabato or elsewhere". Clearly, this administrative case
was filed not for the purpose of obtaining justice to the aggrieved persons,
however mistaken it may be, but for the sole purpose of degrading
respondents reputation and exposing her to public ridicule. This should not be
countenanced.
In Retuya v. Gorduiz,26 this Court penalized respondent-lawyer for filing a
groundless suit against a former client in order to harass and embarrass her
by suspending him from the practice of law for six (6) months.
her that he wanted to see her regarding the case, and suggested that they
meet at the lobby of the Manila Hotel at 2:00 p.m. The complainant
acquiesced, and immediately contacted her lawyer, Atty. Wilfredo Garcia at
his office in Intramuros, Manila, to inform him of the impending meeting with
the respondent Judge. The complainant narrated the succeeding events that
transpired as follows:
19. That at the scheduled place and time, I came together with my
counsel Atty. Wilfredo T. Garcia. I also instructed my Liaison Officer
Nida Diokno to proceed at the said place to bring some money for
expenses. At the Manila Hotel lobby, we met Judge Marvin Mangino,
who came ahead of us and seated at the sofa with an unidentified male
companion. He again assured us of his commitment to dismiss the case
in our favor and this will happen immediately after the prosecution had
rested their case. He further advised my counsel to file immediately a
Demurrer to Evidence which will be his legal basis for dismissing the
case. He further told us that in order not to detect his biases in our
favor, he proposed that the Demurrer to Evidence will be dismissed first,
and after that he advised us not to present our evidence or defense
anymore and let the case be submitted for early decision on the basis of
demurrer to evidence on file.
20. That with Judge Marvin Manginos personal commitment and
assurances done in the presence of my counsel, my Liaison Officer
Nida Diokno, who all saw and heard Judge Marvin Mangino of his
promises and assurances, Judge Mangino whispered to me for a "little
representation" that he needs, considering that he is on an official
business for three (3) days to attend the conference of judges at Subic
and he just beg (sic) off that day so that he could see and talk to me
personally about our case.
21. That I agreed to give him that "little representation" in the amount
of P20,000.00, which I placed inside a white envelope in P1,000.00
peso bill denomination. This matter of giving money happened at
around 3:00 p.m. after we had taken our snacks at the coffee shop of
the Manila Hotel, as witnessed by our counsel and Ms. Diokno.
22. Thereafter, the prosecution finished the presentation of their
evidence and rested their case. My counsel, Atty. Garcia, then
submitted his Demurrer to Evidence which, after submission, Judge
Marvin Mangino ordered the denial of the same on the ground of
prohibited pleadings or motions. Such order of the court is actually
the witnesses for the prosecution. While hearing was set for the accusedcomplainant to present her evidence, she failed to do so.
The respondent Judge, however, admitted that on the promulgation date of
the decision, only the prosecutor, the complainant, the private prosecutor and
the counsel for the accused appeared, and agreed among themselves that
they would just receive copies of the decision. The respondent stressed that
the accused filed an appeal, which was given due course, and the records,
thereafter, forwarded to the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac for review.
The respondent insisted that he only had the opportunity to talk with the
parties and their respective counsels at the scheduled pre-trial conference. He
claimed that the complainants allegations were false, considering that even
the latters counsel would know that the practice of making "assurances" to a
party is a breach of professional ethics and worse, a contemptuous one.2
The administrative matter was referred to Executive Judge Arsenio P.
Adriano, Regional Trial Court, Tarlac, Tarlac, for investigation, report and
recommendation.3
The Executive Judge, thereafter, submitted a Report dated February 14, 2001
and made the following findings:
With respect to the charge of gross ignorance, the judgment of conviction by
Judge Mangino was appealed to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 63,
presided by the undersigned. The undersigned rendered a decision acquitting
the spouses Felix and Yolanda Reyes. A copy of the decision is attached with
the records (Pages 122 to 125). This decision therefore contains the findings
of fact and conclusions of law of the undersigned which need not be repeated
herein.
With respect to the charge of extortion, graft and corruption, complainant
Yolanda Reyes alleged that Judge Marvin Mangino received from
her P60,000.00 in consideration of a favorable decision or acquittal.
Judge Mangino went to her house at Norzagaray, Bulacan on September 18,
1997 but since she was in Manila, they agreed to meet at the Manila Hotel, at
2:00 p.m. of the same day. Judge Mangino received the P20,000.00 while at
the Manila Hotel.
Judge Mangino also received the sum of P40,000.00 from Ruel de Castro, the
liaison officer of Atty. Wilfredo Garcia, then the lawyer of complainant.
To disprove the charge, Judge Mangino alleged that he could not be at the
Manila Hotel at 2:00 p.m. of September 18, 1997 because he solemnized two
marriages at 10:00 a.m. of that day. He could not have reached Manila Hotel
by 2:00 p.m. since he has to travel from Tarlac City to Manila after the
solemnization of the marriages. The marriage contracts were submitted as
pages 65 and 66 of the records.
The undersigned set the hearing on February 5 and 12, 2001 but only
respondent appeared. The complainant did not appear although her lawyer,
Atty. Wilfredo Garcia received the notice personally on January 18, 2001, as
shown by his signature on the face of the notice.
The undersigned also wrote letters to the contracting parties appearing in the
marriage contracts namely:
1.-Ricky Quinto
Dulce David
San Manuel, Tarlac City
2.-Vicente Lagadi, Jr.
Balete, Tarlac City
It is the intention of the undersigned to verify from them as to whether or not
their marriages were solemnized by the respondent Judge on September 18,
1997.
Since they have not appeared before the undersigned as of February 12,
2001, the undersigned personally went to see them at their residences.
The undersigned learned startling revelations. Spouses Ricky Quinto and
Dulce David affirmed before the undersigned that they were married
on September 4, 1997 solemnized by the respondent Judge and not on
September 18, 1997. They were positive that it was not on September 18,
1997 but on September 4, 1997 that was why they were wondering why when
they received the copy of the marriage contract, which was given to them
sometime after September 4, 1997. Dulce David even invited the attention of
her co-teachers on the error. She thought it was a mere typographical error.
1awphi1.nt
Vicente Lagadi, Jr. and his mother Carmen Gabriel told the undersigned that
the date of the marriage of Vicente Jr. and Eliza Bustamante is August 27,
1997 because this is the birthday of Eliza Bustamante. It is not September 18,
1997 as stated in the marriage contract. Vicente Jr. noticed the error because
they received a copy of the marriage contract sometime after the marriage. He
also thought that it was a mere typographical error. Vicente Jr. also showed
me the birth certificate of his daughter and the date of his marriage with Eliza
Bustamante as appearing therein is August 27, 1997.
The undersigned already received derogatory informations about Judge
Mangino. It is known that he solemnizes marriages even before the licenses
are issued. Probably in this case, he placed the date of the marriages as
September 18, 1997 because that was the time he went to Manila and
received the P20,000.00 from the complainant. He did this to provide him with
a ready alibi because he expected to be sued by complainant as he never
really intended to acquit her.
With these informations gathered personally by the undersigned, it is not
therefore true that Judge Mangino solemnized two marriages on September
18, 1997 because he went to Manila to meet the complainant and to receive
the P20,000.00.
Further, the presence of Judge Mangino at the Manila Hotel on September 18,
1997 was affirmed by Atty. Wilfredo Garcia and one who is a lawyer will not
easily attest to it if it is not true. The law office of Atty. Wilfredo Garcia is near
the Manila Hotel and he came there upon the request of complainant.
No transcript of the testimonies of Ricky Quinto, Dulce David and Vicente
Lagadi, Jr. was taken because they were hesitant to talk. Only after the
undersigned assured them that whatever they will tell will be treated with
utmost confidentiality that they started to talk.4
The Executive Judge then recommended that the respondent Judge be
dismissed from the service.
In a Resolution dated March 28, 2001, the Court resolved to refer the said
report to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for recommendation. The
OCA, through Deputy Court Administrator Jose P. Perez, opined that
considering the gravity of the offense charged, the Executive Judge should
have exerted earnest efforts to compel the attendance of the complainant and
the witnesses during the scheduled hearings.5 Pursuant to his
recommendation, the case was referred back to Executive Judge Adriano for
a more thorough investigation.6
In his Report filed with the OCA on September 10, 2001, the Executive Judge
made the following findings:
The undersigned set the investigation to August 20 and 27, 2001 both at
10:00 a.m., so that notice was sent to Mrs. Yolanda Reyes, Atty. Wilfredo
Garcia and Judge Marvin Mangino. On August 20, 2001, only Judge Mangino
appeared. He stated that since he already submitted a counter-affidavit, he
has nothing more to add to it. At the expense of the undersigned, the process
server of the Court was requested to serve the notice to the complainant. It
was revealed that the complainant did not receive the previous notices sent to
her because the municipal officials of Norzagaray, Bulacan are her political
opponents.
1awphi 1.nt
affidavits, those affidavits must be excluded from the proceedings for being
inadmissible and hearsay, as in this case.10
Indeed, considering that an accusation of bribery is easy to concoct and
difficult to disprove, the complainant must present a panoply of evidence in
support of such an accusation.11 Inasmuch as what is imputed against the
respondent Judge connotes a misconduct so grave that, if proven, it would
entail dismissal from the bench, the quantum of proof required should be more
than substantial.12
In this case, the complainant could have easily gathered enough extrinsic
evidence, such as testimonies of waiters, restaurant employees, or other
disinterested witnesses, to prove the alleged meeting with the respondent
Judge. She did not even present a receipt of the expenses she incurred when
she and the respondent judge took "snacks" at the coffee shop near the lobby
of the Manila Hotel to at least prove that she had been there on September
18, 1997. Moreover, if the respondent had, indeed, made corrupt overtures
and blatantly demanded money from the complainant, good sense would
dictate that the matter be immediately reported to the authorities to set up
entrapment operations against the culprit.13 The Court further notes that the
complainant even failed to present her liaison officer Nida Diokno, her
secretary Chona Guzman, or her counsels liaison officer Ruel de Castro to
testify as to the particulars of the alleged extortion incident.
As a member of the bar, the complainants counsel should know that even in
administrative cases, the Rules of Court requires that if a judge should be
disciplined for grave misconduct or any graver offense, the evidence against
him should be competent and derived from direct knowledge. The judiciary to
which the respondent belongs demands no less. Before any of its members
could be faulted, competent evidence should be presented, since the charge
is penal in character.14Thus, the ground for the removal of a judicial officer
should be established beyond reasonable doubt. Such is the rule where the
charge on which removal is sought is misconduct in office, willful neglect,
corruption, or incompetence. The general rules in regard to admissibility of
evidence in criminal trials apply.15
Anent the conviction of the complainant and her husband in Criminal Case
No. 200-97, the rule is that only judicial errors tainted with fraud, dishonesty,
gross ignorance, bad faith, or deliberate intent to do an injustice will be
administratively sanctioned.16 To hold otherwise would be to render judicial
office untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in
about 5 meters away holding an armalite rifle and firing at their direction;
Rellios also saw that Galvez had companions but did not recognize them as
well as the firearms they carried because they were approximately nine
meters away;5 Perez, also crawled and hid in the bushes about 5 meters
away; when the firing stopped, one of the attackers passed by about two
meters from where Perez was hiding and because the moon was bright, he
recognized Galvez, his cousin, who was wearing a fatigue uniform and armed
with an armalite rifle; he also saw that Galvez had three armed companions
but did not recognize them nor the firearms they were carrying because they
were about nine meters from Galvez.6
Galvez put up denial and alibi as his defenses. He testified that he was
staying at his father-in-laws house on July 27, 1991 and drank tuba at around
10:30 p.m. at a nearby store. He went home and slept with his wife soon
after.7 To corroborate his testimony, he presented SPO2 Danilo Ramillano, a
visitor at his father-in-laws house and Wilhelmina Espinosa, a sari-sari store
owner. 8 He also presented Athena Elisa Anderson, Document Examiner and
Forensic Analyst of the PNP Crime Laboratory of Region 9, Zamboanga City,
who testified that the paraffin test conducted on both his hands showed that
there was no nitrate present;9 and Police Inspector Lemuel Caser, Ballistic
Examiner, who testified that the shells found at the scene of the crime were
not fired from the firearm issued to Galvez.10
After trial, the RTC rendered its Decision dated February 27, 1995 with the
following findings:
From the foregoing facts as well as from the records of this case, this Court
finds the following facts to be undisputable, to wit:
1) That at the late night of July 27, 1991, Rosalio Enojarda, while
making copra in the coconut land of Danilo Perez at Matarling,
Lantawan, Basilan, was shot to death by one of the four (4) men. How
many gunshot wounds he suffered and what part of his body was hit by
the gunfire, the evidence is found wanting.
2) That a day before the incident and on the date of the incident which
was July 27, 1991, the accused Cesar Galvez has not fired any
firearms.
xxx
Temporal in its maximum period to death. And to indemnify the heirs of the
late Rosalio Enojarda, the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages and to
pay the Court the amount of P500.00 as judicial costs and other accessory
penalties attached to the penalty of Reclusion Temporal.
And further this accused is hereby stripped of all the military ranks he now
hold [sic] in the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
And upon the promulgation of this decision, the accused shall immediately be
committed to the Provincial Jail where the Provincial Warden is directed to
immediately transfer him to the National Penitentiary at San Ramon Penal
Colony at Zamboanga City for commitment thereat.
And the property bail bond he has posted for his provisional liberty is hereby
ordered cancelled and its pertinent papers returned, upon receipt to the
bondsman.16
Galvez appealed the case to the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 18255,
which rendered its Decision on March 30, 2001 affirming his guilt but
modifying the penalty to be imposed, thus:
WHEREFORE, with the MODIFICATION that appellant CESAR GALVEZ is
hereby sentenced to reclusion perpetua, the decision appealed from is
hereby AFFIRMED in all other respects.17
The CA held that the RTC erred in holding Galvez criminally liable based on
conspiracy when such fact was not alleged in the Information. However, it still
found Galvez guilty of Murder.18 The CA reasoned that: the negative results of
the paraffin and ballistic tests do not negate the possibility that Galvez used
another gun in shooting the victim; the eyewitnesses of the prosecution
identified Galvez as the perpetrator if not one of the perpetrators of the crime;
alibi, which was offered by Galvez, is the weakest of all defenses and cannot
prevail over positive identification; the offer of Galvez to the wife of the victim
to have the case settled is also a strong indication of Galvezs culpability; and
treachery was adequately established as the attack was sudden, unexpected
and did not accord the victim an opportunity to defend himself.19 The CA
further held that since there was no mitigating circumstance, the proper
penalty should be reclusion perpetua.20
Galvez filed a Motion for Reconsideration21 which the CA denied in its
Resolution dated August 21, 2001, stating that it was a mere rehash of the
arguments already addressed in the decision.22
The entire records of the case were forwarded to this Court pursuant to
Section 13, Rule 124 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. On April 8, 2003, the
Court issued a Resolution23 accepting the case; committing the accused to the
Davao Prison and Penal Farm; and informing the accused and the Solicitor
General that they may file additional briefs with this Court.24
In his Appellants Brief, Galvez argued that the trial court erred:
I
IN HOLDING THAT (HE) THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS LIABLE FOR
MURDER FOR THE DEATH OF ROSALIO ENOJARDA ON JULY 27, 1991
DESPITE ITS EXPRESS FINDINGS THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DID
NOT FIRE HIS RIFLE ON THAT FATAL NIGHT AND THAT THE BULLET
THAT HIT AND KILLED ROSALIO ENOJARDA COULD HAVE BEEN FIRED
FROM ANY OF THE GUNS OR RIFLES BELONGING TO ANY OF THE
THREE UNIDENTIFIED PERSONS WHO WERE NOT CHARGED NOR
INDICTED TOGETHER WITH THE ACCUSED IN THE SAME CRIMINAL
INFORMATION IN QUESTION.
II
IN HOLDING THAT DANILO PEREZ AND WILFREDO RELLIOS, WHILE
IN CRAWLING POSITION WHOSE CHESTS WERE ALMOST TOUCHING
THE GROUND AND UNDER CONDITIONS DESCRIBED BY THEM, HAD
SEEN THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT ARMED WITH M16 ARMALITE RIFLE
IN THE NIGHTIME, OF 27 JULY 1991 DESPITE DANILO PEREZ [sic]
POSITIVE ASSERTION THAT IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE OF HIS (SIC) TO
IDENTIFY THE ACCUSED WHEN ASKED TO DEMONSTRATE IN OPEN
COURT IN THE MANNER AND CIRCUMSTANCE NARRATED BY HIM.25
In his Supplemental Appellants Brief, Galvez further claims that it was
seriously erroneous:
I.
TO CONCLUDE THAT THERE WAS CONSPIRACY BETWEEN
ACCUSED-APPELLANT AND THE OTHER MALEFACTORS NOT
INCLUDED IN THE PRESENT CASE.
II.
After reviewing the entire records of the case, the Court resolves to acquit
Galvez.
Conspiracy must be alleged in the information in order that an accused may
be held liable for the acts of his co-accused. In the absence of any averment
of conspiracy in the information, an accused can only be made liable for the
acts committed by him alone and such criminal responsibility is individual and
not collective.33
As explained in People v. Tampis,34
The rule is that conspiracy must be alleged, not merely inferred, in the
information. Absence of a particular statement in the accusatory portion of the
charge sheet concerning any definitive act constituting conspiracy renders the
indictment insufficient to hold one accused liable for the individual acts of his
co-accused. Thus, each of them would be held accountable only for their
respective participation in the commission of the offense.35
The rationale for this rule has long been settled. In People v. Quitlong, the
Court explained:
Overwhelming, such as it may have been thought of by the trial court,
evidence of conspiracy is not enough for an accused to bear and respond to
all its grave legal consequences; it is equally essential that such accused has
been apprised when the charge is made conformably with prevailing
substantive and procedural requirements. Article III, Section 14, of the 1987
Constitution, in particular, mandates that no person shall be held answerable
for a criminal offense without due process of law and that in all criminal
prosecutions the accused shall first be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him. The right to be informed of any such indictment is
likewise explicit in procedural rules. x x x
xxx
x x x Quite unlike the omission of an ordinary recital of fact which, if not
excepted from or objected to during trial, may be corrected or supplied by
competent proof, an allegation, however, of conspiracy, or one that would
impute criminal liability to an accused for the act of another or others, is
indispensable in order to hold such person, regardless of the nature and
extent of his own participation, equally guilty with the other or others in the
commission of the crime. Where conspiracy exists and can rightly be
appreciated, the individual acts done to perpetrate the felony becomes of
secondary importance, the act of one being imputable to all the others. Verily,
an accused must know from the information whether he faces a criminal
responsibility not only for his acts but also for the acts of his co-accused as
well.36
Since conspiracy was not alleged in the Information in this case, it is
imperative that the prosecution prove Galvezs direct participation in the killing
of the victim. This, the prosecution failed to do.
The CA, in holding Galvez guilty of Murder, gave weight to the testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses Rellios and Perez that they saw Galvez fire an
armalite rifle in their direction on the night in question. The positive
identification of these witnesses, the CA ruled, has more weight than the
negative results of the paraffin and ballistic tests.37
We disagree.
The prosecution witnesses never actually saw Galvez shoot the victim. While
this Court does not ordinarily interfere with the findings of the lower courts on
the trustworthiness of witnesses, when there appears on the records,
however, facts and circumstances of real weight which might have been
overlooked or misapprehended, this Court cannot shirk from its duty to render
the law and apply justice.38
During his direct examination, Perez testified as follows:
Q: While you were eating your merienda at about 11:00 oclock in the evening
on July 27, 1991 what happened?
A: Suddenly we heard shots and we could not determine where it came
from and one of our companion was hit.
Q: Do you know who was that companion of yours who was hit?
A: Yes, Rosalio Enojarda.
xxx
Q: After you heard the gun fire which hit your companion Rosalio Enojarda,
what did you do?
A: I dropped and crawled, sir.
xxx
Q: And then did the gunfire stop after you hid yourself among the grasses?
A: Yes sir.
Q: What happened after the firings stopped, when you were already hiding
among the grasses?
A: I recognized the culprit sir because he passed by where I was hiding about
two meters from me.
Q: You said you recognized the culprit when he passed by where you were
hiding, who was that culprit?
A: Cesar Galvez, sir.
xxx
COURT:
After you heard the shots how long after you saw him passed by?
xxx
Q: Was it 30 minutes after?
xxx
A: In my own estimate about 20 to 25 minutes.
Q: In other words more or less you saw him (accused) passed by together
with his companions around 20 to 25 minutes after you heard the shots, is that
what you want to impress this Court?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
xxx
Q: Did you see him really shoot?
A: No, Your Honor. 39 (Emphasis supplied)
reportedly you saw him only five minutes thereafter, you only presume
Mr. Galvez to have shoot Mr. Enojarda?
A: Yes sir.42 (Emphasis supplied)
Based on the above testimonies, the following circumstances appear to have
been established: (1) at around 11 p.m., Enojarda, Rellios, Perez, and their
two companions were eating merienda near the copra kiln when they were
sprayed with gunfire; (2) Enojarda was fatally hit and fell on the ground; (3)
Rellios, Perez and their two companions ducked and crawled to seek cover;
(4) about five minutes after the first burst of gunfire, Galvez, armed with an
M16 armalite rifle, was seen firing at Rellios, Perez and their two companions
as well as in the direction of the copra kiln; and (5) about 20 to 25 minutes
after the first burst of gunfire, Galvez was again seen clad in fatigue uniform
and carrying an M16 armalite rifle along with three armed companions, after
which, their group left the scene of the crime.
However, these circumstances are not sufficient to establish the guilt of
Galvez beyond reasonable doubt.
It is well to emphasize the four basic guidelines that must be observed in
assaying the probative value of circumstantial evidence:
x x x (a) It should be acted upon with caution; (b) All the essential facts must
be consistent with the hypothesis of guilt; (c) The facts must exclude every
other theory but that of guilt of the accused; and, (d) The facts must establish
with certainty the guilt of the accused as to convince beyond reasonable doubt
that he was the perpetrator of the offense. The peculiarity of circumstantial
evidence is that the series of events pointing to the commission of a felony is
appreciated not singly but collectively. The guilt of the accused cannot be
deduced from scrutinizing just one (1) particular piece of evidence. It is more
like a puzzle which when put together reveals a convincing picture pointing to
the conclusion that the accused is the author of the crime.43
as well as the doctrines enunciated by the Court that the prosecution must
establish beyond reasonable doubt every circumstance essential to the guilt of
the accused;44 and that every circumstance or doubt favoring the innocence of
the accused must be duly taken into account.45
The "incriminating circumstances" enumerated above are mainly based on the
testimonies of prosecution witnesses Perez and Rellios. A perusal of said
The only basis of the RTC in concluding that Galvez made on offer of
compromise,67 is the March 3, 1993 Order of the RTC which reads as follows:
Considering that the accused as well as his Counsel, Atty. Bienvenido G.
Martin appeared in Court together with Rosaflor Enojarda, the wife of the
victim, and manifested that there is a possibility of understanding and
settlement between the parties, the above-entitled case is hereby reset for
new assignment.68
Galvezs supposed offer of compromise was not formally offered and admitted
as evidence during the trial. The victims widow or any prosecution witness did
not testify on any offer of compromise made by Galvez. We have held that
when the evidence on the alleged offer of compromise is amorphous, the
same shall not benefit the prosecution in its case against the accused.69
The Court also recognizes that there may be instances when an offer of
compromise will not amount to an admission of guilt. Thus, in People v.
Godoy,70 the Court pronounced that:
In criminal cases, an offer of compromise is generally admissible as
evidence against the party making it. It is a legal maxim, which assuredly
constitutes one of the bases of the right to penalize, that in the matter of public
crimes which directly affect the public interest, no compromise whatever may
be entered into as regards the penal action. It has long been held, however,
that in such cases the accused is permitted to show that the offer was
not made under a consciousness of guilt, but merely to avoid the
inconvenience of imprisonment or for some other reason which would
justify a claim by the accused that the offer to compromise was not in
truth an admission of guilt or an attempt to avoid the legal
consequences which would ordinarily ensue therefrom.71 (Emphasis
supplied).
As the alleged offer of compromise was not presented in court, it was not
shown that Galvez indeed made such an offer under the consciousness of
guilt. Galvez was not given the opportunity to explain that it was given for
some other reason that would justify a claim that it was not an admission of
guilt or an attempt to avoid its legal consequences.
In this case, the presumption of innocence of Galvez prevails over the alleged
implied admission of guilt. In Godoy, the Court, in acquitting the accused,
explained that:
(c) Galvez did not present his wife and father-in-law as witnesses to
corroborate his story that he was at their house on the night in question;
and
(d) Galvez refused three times to give a statement to the investigating
police officer.
These circumstances do not help the prosecution in the discharge of its duty
to prove the guilt of Galvez beyond reasonable doubt.
It is true that a negative finding in a paraffin test is not a conclusive proof that
one has not fired a gun, as held by this Court in People v. Pagal74 and People
v. Teehankee75 which were cited by the CA in its Decision, since it is possible
for a person to fire a gun and yet bear no traces of nitrate or gunpowder as
when the hands are bathed in perspiration or washed afterwards.76 Such
principle, however, has no bearing in the present case. In
the Pagal and Teehankee cases, the Court concluded that a negative finding
does not prove that the accused therein had not fired a gun because the
accused were positively identified by witnesses as having shot their victims,
unlike in the case at hand where Galvez is not positively identified by direct or
circumstantial evidence that he shot Enojarda. If the principle should be given
any weight at all, it should be in favor of Galvez, that is, considering that he is
not positively identified, then, the negative results of the paraffin test bolster
his claim that he did not shoot Enojarda, and not the other way around.
The argument that the negative result of the ballistic examination does not
prove that Galvez did not fire a gun during the incident as it was possible that
he used another gun, should also be struck down. It is the prosecution which
has the burden of showing that Galvez used a firearm other than the one
issued to him and that such firearm, which Galvez used, was the one that
killed the victim. It is not for Galvez to prove the opposite of the possibility
adverted to by the prosecution as it is the prosecution which must prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt and not for him to prove his innocence.
Thus, while it is true that the negative results of the paraffin and ballistic tests
do not conclusively prove that Galvez did not shoot the victim, the same
negative results cannot be used as circumstantial evidence against Galvez to
prove that he shot Enojarda. To do otherwise would violate the basic precepts
of criminal law which presumes the innocence of the accused. Every
circumstance favoring an accuseds innocence must be duly taken into
account, the proof against him must survive the test of reason, and the
strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment.77
That Galvez was a police officer who could have justified his presence at the
scene of the crime with a lawful purpose, yet he put up an alibi which is
inherently weak; and that Galvez did not present his wife and father-in-law as
witnesses to corroborate his story that he was at their house on the night in
question, pertain to the weakness of Galvezs alibi which may cast doubt on
his innocence. However, these circumstances do not prove beyond
reasonable doubt Galvezs guilt. Although an accused must satisfactorily
prove his alibi, the burden in criminal cases still rests on the prosecution to
prove the accuseds guilt. The prosecution evidence must stand or fall on its
own weight and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the defense.
Unless the prosecution overturns the constitutional presumption of innocence
of an accused by competent and credible evidence proving his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, the presumption remains.78 Courts must judge the guilt or
innocence of the accused based on facts and not on mere conjectures,
presumptions, or suspicions.79
That Galvez refused three times to give a statement to the investigating police
officer is a prerogative given to the accused and should not be given
evidentiary value to establish his guilt. In People v. Saavedra,80 the Court held
that an accused has the right to remain silent and his silence should not be
construed as an admission of guilt.
Even if the defense of the appellant may be weak, the same is
inconsequential if, in the first place, the prosecution failed to discharge the
onus of his identity and culpability.81 Conviction must be based on the strength
of the prosecution and not on the weakness of the defense, i.e., the obligation
is upon the shoulders of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused and
not the accused to prove his innocence.82 The prosecutions job is to prove
that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt.83 Thus, when the
evidence for the prosecution is insufficient to sustain a conviction, it must be
rejected and the accused absolved and released at once.84
Time and again, the Court has pronounced that the great goal of our criminal
law and procedure is not to send people to jail but to render justice.85 Under
our criminal justice system, the overriding consideration is not whether the
court doubts the innocence of the accused, but whether it entertains
reasonable doubt as to his guilt.86
It is indeed lamentable that because of the lapses of the Prosecution, justice
could not be rendered in this case for the untimely death of Enojarda. Justice,
however, would also not be served with the conviction of the herein accused.
It is well to quote Justice Josue N. Bellosillo:
In fine, we are not unmindful of the gravity of the crime charged; but
justice must be dispensed with an even hand. Regardless of how much
we want to punish the perpetrators of this ghastly crime and give justice
to the victim and her family, the protection provided by the Bill of
Rights is bestowed upon all individuals, without exception, regardless of
race, color, creed, gender or political persuasion whether privileged or
less privileged to be invoked without fear or favor. Hence, the accused
deserves no less than an acquittal; ergo, he is not called upon to
disprove what the prosecution has not proved.87 (Emphasis supplied)
As the prosecution in this case failed to discharge its burden of proving
Galvezs guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the Court has no choice but to acquit
him.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Isabela, Basilan,
Branch 1 in Criminal Case No. 1816 dated February 2, 1995 and the Decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 18255 dated March 30, 2001
areREVERSED and SET ASIDE. The accused-appellant Cesar Galvez is
hereby ACQUITTED on the ground that his guilt was not proven beyond
reasonable doubt. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ordered to
cause the immediate release of Cesar Galvez unless he is being lawfully held
for another crime and to inform this Court accordingly within ten (10) days
from notice.
SO ORDERED.
everybody especially against the bus driver and conductor and they
started to take and rob cash and personal belongings of all and on the
occasion of said robbery in order to instill more fear among passengers,
said accused in pursuit of their conspiracy, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously with intent to kill shot in different parts of his
body one SPO1 ARNEL FUENSALIDA Y INCINARES, PNP, who as a
consequence of the wounds died shortly thereafter to the damage and
prejudice of all passengers, bus driver, conductor and the family of
deceased SPO1 Arnel Fuensalida y Incinares.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
The police arrested appellant on 5 September 1998 and detained him on 8
September 1998 in the Caloocan City Jail for other criminal cases. The police
arrested appellant for Criminal Case Nos. 54650 and 546515 before Branch
131 of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City.6
Arraignment and Plea
Appellant pleaded not guilty on his arraignment on 24 May 1999. After
appellant had rested his case, the police arrested Colet. Colet pleaded not
guilty during his arraignment on 27 September 1999. When the trial court
rendered its decision, the other accused remained at large.
The Trial
The Version of the Prosecution
The prosecution presented six witnesses: (1) the victims wife Amalia
Fuensalida; (2) bus driver Camilo Ferrer ("Ferrer"); (3) conductor Jimmy
Ramos ("Ramos"); (4) PO3 Napoleon Andaya; (5) PO3 Celerino Susano; and
(6) Philippine National Police ("PNP") Medico Legal Officer Dr. Ma. Cristina
Freyra.
The trial court summarized the prosecutions evidence thus:
At around 7:00 p.m. of 15 October 1997 while bus driver Camilo Ferrer
(Ferrer for short) was driving his assigned passenger bus, the
"Dreamline Aircon Bus" bearing Plate No. PWZ-208 with around fifty
(50) passengers on board and heading for Tungko, San Jose del Monte,
Bulacan, accused Rolando Pineda (Accused Pineda for short) and his
five (5) companions boarded the bus along Quirino Highway near Lagro.
Thence after the bus conductor Jimmy Ramos (Ramos for short) had
collected the passengers individual fares, he posted himself at the front
door of the bus when suddenly accused Pineda who was seated behind
Ramos rose from his seat, prompting Ramos to turn his head and look
at Pineda. Forthwith the latter held driver Ferrer by the neck while
poking a gun at his nape and shouted to his companion: "TOTIE, IKUHA
MO AKO NG SAPATOS DIYAN PARA MAUMPISAHAN NA ANG
LARO," and then announced a hold-up. While Ferrer was looking at
accused Pineda through the rear-view mirror in front of the drivers seat,
Pineda warned the former, "AYUSIN MO ANG PAGMAMANEHO KUNG
AYAW MONG MAMATAY" with additional warning to maintain the same
speed as the vehicles preceding them. Thence accused Pineda
instructed his companions to close all the windows and bus curtains and
commanded the passengers to bow down their heads. Irked by Ferrers
act of stepping on the brake too often accused Pineda pressed the gun
on his nape telling him "PUTANG INA MO KUNG GUSTO MONG
MABUHAY AYUSIN MO ANG PAGMAMANEHO MO" and then followed
by another instruction to his cohorts: "SAMSAMIN NINYO LAHAT ANG
MASASAMSAM NINYO DIYAN" or words of similar import. At this
juncture, Ramos, who was at a distance of one-half (1/2) meter from
accused Pineda was ordered by the latter to surrender to him his
collections which out of fear he readily obeyed by handing over to
Pineda the days earnings of P5,700. It was at that point while Ramos
was giving the money to Pineda when he took a glance at the left side
of Pinedas face. Thence while his cohorts were divesting the
passengers of their cash and valuables accused Pineda was
continuously poking his gun at Ferrers neck and would press it harder
whenever he stepped on the brake. Thence after Ferrer was divested by
the robbers of his wallet containing his drivers license and cash in the
amount of P1,000 which incidentally he borrowed earlier from a loan
shark in EDSA and while the bus was somewhere in Malaria, Caloocan
City, a commotion ensued inside the bus when one passenger later
identified as Victim SPO1 Arnel Fuensalida grappled with one of the
hold-uppers for the possession of his clutch bag containing his service
firearm. In the course thereof the concerned malefactor shouted: "BOSS
INAGAW ANG BARIL KO" prompting accused Pineda to shout back
"TIRAHIN NA, PATAYIN NA, PAG LUMABAN, PATAYIN NA."
Immediately thereafter and while the bus was in Pangarap Village,
Caloocan City, six (6) shots rang out. Apparently fearing that the gunfire
would catch the attention of the highway patrol, accused Pineda
commanded his cohorts to check through the window if any patrol car
(7) Gunshot wound, thru and thru, point of entry, vertebral region,
measuring 0.8 x 0.7 cm, just left of the posterior midline, 122 cm
from the heel, with an abraded collar, measuring 0.2 cm inferiorly,
0.1 cm superiorly, medially and laterally, directed anteriorwards,
upwards and lateralwards, fracturing the 9th left thoracic rib,
lacerating both lobes of the left lung, making a point of exit at the
left anterior axillary region, measuring 1.5 x 1.2 cm, 14 cm from
the anterior midline, 126 cm from the heel.
(8) Gunshot wound, right shoulder, measuring 0.9 x 0.7 cm, 4 cm
from the posterior midline, 144 cm from the heel, with an abraded
collar, measuring 0.5 cm laterally, 0.2 cm superiorly, 0.1 cm
inferiorly and medially, directed anteriorwards, downwards and
lateralwards. A deformed slug recovered embedded thereat.
There is about 800 cc of blood in the abdominal cavity.
The stomach is full of partially digested food particles, negative for
alcoholic odor.
The rest of the visceral organs are grossly unremarkable.
"CONCLUSION:
Cause of death is hemorrhage secondary to multiple gunshot wounds,
head and trunk."
Elucidating on her medical findings, Dr. Freyra testified that she found
six (6) gunshot wounds in the victims body, one abrasion and one
contusion. Gunshot wounds designated in the Medico Legal report as
Nos. 1, 2, 5, 6 and 7 were fatal; that judging from the nature of the
wounds, wherein the six (6) gunshots had the same points of entries all
measuring 0.8 x 0.7 cm, the fatal weapon was possibly a .38 cal.
revolver; however, she could not form any opinion as to the number of
assailant[s]; that the contusion on the left eye was brought about by the
blood in the head owing to several fractures in the skull while the
abrasion could have been brought about by the rubbing of the affected
area with a rough surface. On the relative position of the victim with the
assailant/s it is possible that when gunshot wounds nos. 1, 2 and 6 were
inflicted, the assailant was somewhere at the extreme left of the victim
who could be in a lying or sitting position or at a lower level than the
assailant with the muzzle of the gun pointed downward. Gunshot wound
no. 5 was inflicted at close range. Gunshot wound no. 7 which was
located at victims back could have been sustained while victim was in
any of the three aforecited positions as nos. 1, 2 and 6 while the
trajectory of gunshot wound no. 8 was also going downward toward the
lateral side of the body.
Dr. Freyra went on to add that some of the gunshot wounds had points
of entries and exits while others did not have any exit wound thus this
explains her extraction of the deformed slugs (Exhs. "Q-1," "Q-2" and
"Q-3") from the victims body and the recovery of police of slugs at the
crime scene.
On the hearing of 16 July 1999 the Defense Counsel agreed to stipulate
that the private complainant incurred the total amount of P60,000
representing the funeral and other related expenses for the deceased.
Testifying on the civil aspect of the case the private complainant alleged
that as Senior Police Officer I, victim was receiving the monthly salary
of P9,277.50; that as a result of the death of her husband she suffered
mental block, wounded feelings and sleepless nights and was very sad
thinking of what would be in store for their three small children.7
The Version of the Defense
The defense presented four witnesses: (1) appellant; (2) his contractor Lillian
Tan ("Tan"); (3) his acquaintance Efren Quiton ("Quiton"); and (4) his coaccused Colet. The trial court summarized appellants bid for an acquittal in
this wise:
On that day of 15 October 1997 from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., accused
was in the house of one VICTOR "INTING" VILLENA in Gumamela St.,
Malaria, Tala, Caloocan City where he installed the electrical wiring per
contract with contractor LILLIAN TAN. He never left his said place of
work on that particular day and as a matter of fact LILLIAN TAN even
served him lunch and snacks in the morning and afternoon. After
finishing his work he was paid P500 by his contractor and at 5:00 p.m.
he went home which is only one hundred meters away or a five minutes
[sic] walk from VICTOR VILLENAS house. Upon arriving home he
rested for 5 minutes then took a bath and at around 6:00 p.m. he went
to the nearby house of his contractor LILLIAN TAN where he talked with
her and drunk [sic] some beer until 9:00 p.m. when he went home and
ate dinner then retired to bed at around 10:00 p.m.; that he does not
know anything about the shooting incident in question; that his house in
Gumamela St., Malaria, Tala, Caloocan City is about 30 to 45 minutes
ride to or from Lagro, Quezon City and a distance of around 4 to 5
kilometers to Quirino Highway, Malaria, this City where according to
prosecution witnesses CAMILO FERRER and JIMMY RAMOS the
shooting incident in question occurred; that he had no previous
encounter or quarrel with these FERRER and RAMOS and did not know
them prior to the incident; and that he saw for the first time police
investigator PO3 CELERINO SUSANO in court; that [the] instant charge
against him was fabricated as he was just implicated by his co-accused
VICTOR COLET, who is a brother of a policeman, and CELSO SISON
@ BOYET TARTARO, an asset of the police which arose from the
rivalry over a woman he had with CELSO SISON who is a good friend
of VICTOR COLET; that the duo who managed to elude arrest, were
heard to say that he would rot in jail; that CELSO SISON was also
instrumental for [sic] his arrest by SPO2 ABRAHAM FERNANDEZ and
SPO1 LEOPOLDO DAVID for alleged violation of P.D. 1866 filed with
the Municipal Trial Court of San Jose del Monte, Bulacan which was
however subsequently dismissed after he posted the required bailbond
on 5 August 1999 (Exh. "1"); that his picture shown by the Caloocan
City Police to the witnesses in the instant case must have been secured
by them from the Courts file; that he was again framed-up by the police
on 15 November 1999 when he was arrested by elements of the
Caloocan City Police Station, Sub-Station 6, Bagong Silang for allegedly
concealing a deadly weapon and assault which was referred for inquest
by Sub-Station Commander Capt. VALDEZ to Inquest Prosecutor
ACUA who however ordered his release as no evidence was
confiscated from his person, thus, he was released from detention on 18
November 1997; that his alleged involvement in the instant case which
occurred on 15 October 1997 was not even brought up by the SubStation 6 operatives during his custodial investigation before Prosecutor
ACUA; that in furtherance of the police efforts to file trump-up [sic]
charge against him the Caloocan City Police Station, Sub-Station 6,
Bagong Silang implicated him for alleged Violation of P.D. 1866 and
Robbery which allegedly happened on 5 September 1997 despite the
fact that he was detained as early as 5 August 1998 [sic] at the
Caloocan City Jail and ironically this resulted in the filing of two
Informations in Criminal Case Nos. 54650 and 54651, respectively,
against him now pending before RTC Branch 131, this City (Exhs. "2"
and "3" with submarkings "2-A" and "3-A", respectively); that while in jail
he met fellow inmate EFREN QUITON from Bulacan who expressed
While SPO4 LARENAS had mentioned to him that the incident for which
the aforenamed trio were the suspects [in the robbery with homicide
case that] happened in Caloocan City, however, no mention was made
to him with reference to its date of occurrence.
As records have it, after the defense was deemed to have rested its
case following the admission of its formal offer of evidence, a "Motion
To Reopen Trial" was filed on 17 September 1999 by Defense Counsel,
for the purpose of admitting newly discovered evidence brought about
by the arrest of accused VICTOR EMMANUEL COLET who was
committed to the BJMP Caloocan City on 10 September 1999 in
connection with another case involving Violation of Section 16, Art. III,
R.A. 6425. Aforecited Motion was given due course by this Court in its
Order of 24 September 1999 and the case was thus set anew for the
reception of Accused PINEDAs additional evidence which consists
solely of the testimony of co-accused COLET to corroborate his
(Accused PINEDAs) defense of alibi. In the course of Accused
COLETs testimony he gave his true name as VICTOR EMMANUEL
GONZALES COLET hence upon motion of the Trial Prosecutor, the
Information was accordingly amended to reflect his alleged true name.
As synthesized by the Court the following were Accused COLETs
declarations:
He, Accused VICTOR EMMANUEL GONZALES COLET, aka
"PINOCCHIO" x x x is a resident of 686 Quirino Highway, Bankers
Village II, this City which is one-half to one kilometer away from accused
PINEDAs place at Barracks II, Bukid Area, District I, this City. The first
time he saw Accused Pineda was in 1996 in Bukid Area and
subsequently he used to see him passed-by [sic] the house of the
woman he (Accused COLET) was courting in Barracks II.
On that fateful day at about 7:15 p.m. of 15 October 1997, Accused
COLET boarded subject air-conditioned bus in Lagro, Quezon City
purposely to go home and had himself seated at the bus right side, third
seat from the last. At that juncture he noted the presence of CELSO
SISON, SPENCER and TOTIE JACOB inside the bus. When the bus
was approaching Grotto, Guandanoville Subdivision, between Amparo
and Pangarap Village, this City Accused TOTIE JACOB, a neighbor of
his in Bankers Village II, who was armed with a handgun then seated
on the first seat, right side of the bus, suddenly stood up and declared a
hold-up shouting: "WALANG KIKILOS, HOLDAP ITO, HOLDAP ITO,
they could still catch up with the hold-uppers since they just alighted at
Sampaguita St., Malaria Caloocan City and SPO1 ALAS gave words
[sic] that he would take care of the matter. The latter also asked him if
he knew PINEDA who was once detained at the San Jose del Monte
Jail to which he answered in the affirmative. He assured SPO1 ALAS
that he will testify in this case once the suspects are apprehended.8
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court ruled that contrary to the offense designated in the information,
the proper charge against appellant is robbery with homicide under Article 294
of the Revised Penal Code9 and not highway robbery resulting in homicide
under P.D. No. 532. The trial court declared that the situation covered by P.D.
No. 532 contemplates acts of brigandage against any prospective victim
anywhere on the highway.10 The trial court found the testimonies of Ferrer and
Ramos "positive, spontaneous and forthright" and observed that they
"remained steadfast and convincing despite the rigid cross-examination by
defense counsel and the clarificatory questions"11 of the trial court judge. After
evaluating the evidence, the trial court convicted appellant and acquitted
Colet, as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered and the prosecution having
established beyond an iota of doubt the guilt of Accused ROLANDO
PINEDA Y MANALO of the crime of Robbery with Homicide as defined
and penalized under Art. 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code as
amended by RA 7659 and considering the presence of the aggravating
circumstance of, by a band, sans any mitigating circumstance to offset
it, which per Art. 63 of the Revised Penal Code called for the imposition
of the greater penalty, this Court hereby sentences said Accused to
suffer the extreme penalty of DEATH; to indemnify the legal heirs of the
deceased, SPO1 ARNEL FUENSALIDA, the civil indemnity of P50,000;
and to pay the private complainant AMALIA FUENSALIDA the following:
a. stipulated actual damages of P60,000;
b. moral damages of P40,000;
c. exemplary damages of P60,000;
d. compensatory damages of P167,872.50
Q Is this two seater seat where the person who poked a gun at your
nape seated located somewhere to your right?
A Yes, sir.
Q This seat and the drivers seat, are they parallel line or side by side or
abreast with the drivers seat?
A Slightly slanted from the drivers seat, sir.
Q In other words, this seat is situated somewhere to your back side?
A "Parang tagiliran po."
Q How far from your shoulder?
A (Witness pointing more than a meter.)
Q In other words, you would not see the person sitting on that
particular seat not unless you turn over your head to the right,
correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q At that time you were concentrated in driving, is it not?
A Yes, sir.
Q As a driver, its not your business to look around and check on the
passengers, its the duty of the conductor, right?
A Yes, sir.
Q And so sensing that no untoward incident that might happen, you just
continued driving peacefully until that very moment when somebody
shouted "umpisahan na ang laro," correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q And then immediately after that, someone approached you from your
behind and poked you something at your nape which you later felt to be
a gun, correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q And he told you to concentrate in your driving, if you want to live,
correct?
A Yes, sir.
xxx
Q For fear that something might happen to you if you disobey the
instruction of that person at your back, you just concentrated in
your driving not even trying to turn your head to look around,
correct?
A Yes, sir.29 (Emphasis supplied)
Ferrer insisted that he saw what was happening through the rearview mirror.
Although Ferrer felt the presence and heard the voice of the perpetrator at his
back, it is not clear if he saw the perpetrators face or only his back.
ATTY. CRISOSTOMO:
Q At the time you heard the gunshots, the person at your back was still
there pointing a gun at your nape?
A Yes, he never left, sir.
Q So you could not turn your head to check what was going on at
the back of the bus for fear that the man at your back will shoot
you?
A "Hindi po ako lumilingon pero nakikita ko sa salamin dahil
mayroon po akong rear [view] mirror sa harap."
COURT: (butts in)
Q How big is that mirror?
A (Witness demonstrating with hands for about a foot long and 8 inches
in width.)
ATTY. CRISOSTOMO:
ATTY. CRISOSTOMO:
Q Were you able to [lift your head to look at the rear view mirror] despite
the fact that the person who was at your back was poking the gun at
your nape and telling you not to make any wrong move because he will
shoot you?
A "Bago po nag-umpisa, nakita ko na iyong mukha niya dahil
napalingon ako noong nag-umpisa ang laro."34 (Emphasis supplied)
Ferrers identification of the perpetrator is inconsistent on how he saw the
perpetrator, through the rearview mirror or by looking back at him.
Ramos testified that he saw how appellant and his companions robbed the
passengers and killed Fuensalida. However, even if during trial Ramos
pointed to appellant as the perpetrator, an examination of Ramos testimony
shows that he did not actually see, much less remember, the faces of the
perpetrators. Thus:
PROSECUTOR SISON:
Q Those persons whom you saw who sat near the driver if you can see
him will you be able to identify him?
A I cannot point to him because when he said those words we were
made to vow [sic] our head [sic] down and whenever I made a moved
[sic] I was kicked.
xxx
Q You said you cannot identify the persons who sat by the driver of the
bus. How about the five other companions [of] that person if you see
them again will you be able to identify them?
A Hindi po.
Q Were you able to see the face x x x of that person who sat near the
driver [at any instance]?
A I only see [sic] the back of the head because when he turned
sidewards I was only able to see the back of his head.
Q How about the side view of his face. Were you able to see?
A Opo.
Q Now, look around the courtroom and point to anyone and look at their
[sic] side view of these persons one by one and tell us if any of them
resembles that person whom you saw?
A (Witness pointing to the person who identified his name as Rolando
Pineda).
COURT:
Q How were you able to identify?
A Iyong haba ng konti ng buhok, side view.
Q Was he sporting the same kind of hair?
A Medyo maigsi po.35 (Emphasis supplied)
A well-known authority36 in eyewitness identification made a list of 12 danger
signals that exist independently of the identification procedures investigators
use. These signals give warning that the identification may be erroneous even
though the method used is proper. The list is not exhaustive. The facts of a
particular case may contain a warning not in the list. The list is as follows:
(1) the witness originally stated that he could not identify anyone;
(2) the identifying witness knew the accused before the crime, but made
no accusation against him when questioned by the police;
(3) a serious discrepancy exists between the identifying witness original
description and the actual description of the accused;
(4) before identifying the accused at the trial, the witness erroneously
identified some other person;
(5) other witnesses to the crime fail to identify the accused;
(6) before trial, the witness sees the accused but fails to identify him;
(7) before the commission of the crime, the witness had limited
opportunity to see the accused;
(8) the witness and the person identified are of different racial groups;
(9) during his original observation of the perpetrator of the crime, the
witness was unaware that a crime was involved;
(10) a considerable time elapsed between the witness view of the
criminal and his identification of the accused;
(11) several persons committed the crime; and
(12) the witness fails to make a positive trial identification.
Three of these danger signals apply to the prosecution witnesses
identification of appellant as the perpetrator of the crime. Ramos originally
stated that he could not identify any of the perpetrators. Ferrer had a limited
opportunity to see the perpetrators before the robbery started. When he first
saw appellant, Ferrer had no inkling that appellant would rob them.
The more important duty of the prosecution is to prove the identity of the
perpetrator and not to establish the existence of the crime. For even if the
commission of the crime is established, without proof beyond reasonable
doubt of the identity of the perpetrator, the trial court cannot convict any
one.37 Ferrer and Ramos mental conception of the incident, the resulting
inaccuracy in their narration, and the suggestiveness of the pictures presented
to them for identification cast doubt on their testimonies that appellant is one
of the perpetrators of the crime.
Denial and Alibi as a Defense
The defense of denial and alibi is futile in the face of positive identification of
the accused. Courts look with disfavor on the defense of alibi. However, we
explained in Tuason v. Court of Appeals:38
Judges seem disposed more readily to credit the veracity and reliability
of eyewitnesses than any amount of contrary evidence by or on behalf
of the accused, whether by way of alibi, insufficient identification, or
other testimony. They are unmindful that in some cases the emotional
balance of the eyewitness is disturbed by her experience that her
powers of perception become distorted and her identification frequently
most untrustworthy. Into the identification, enter other motives, not
necessarily stimulated originally by the accused personally the desire
Q How about the passengers? What did they do when they [were]
ordered to bowed-down [sic]?
A They all bowed down.
Q How about you? What did you do?
A I also bowed my head down but I was peeping clandestinely at them
because I did not expect that I would be in that situation and looking at
what they are doing.
xxx
Q What did the hold-uppers do when all the passengers were no longer
looking at them because their heads were bowed down?
A The other hold-uppers nearest to the passengers ordered the
passengers to put their things down in a black duffel bag ("parang supot
ni Hudas").42
Colet testified that appellant was not a perpetrator in the crime and absolved
him from liability.
ATTY. BAUTISTA:
Q You said that there were six hold-uppers all in all?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you said you have taken a good look at these hold-uppers?
A Yes, sir.
Q Will you kindly tell us if Rolando Pineda was one of those six holduppers that you have seen?
A Wala po, hindi po.
Q Will you kindly tell us also if Rolando Pineda was one of the
passengers of the bus, if you know?
A Hindi rin po, wala rin po.
Q Will you kindly tell us or if you likewise see [sic] Rolando Pineda at
any time of the night of October 15, 1997?
A Wala rin po.
Q You said that you know Rolando Pineda having met you and seen
him for several times. If you will see Rolando Pineda again will you be
able to recognized [sic] him?
A Yes, sir.
Q Will you kindly tell us if Rolando Pineda is inside this courtroom now?
A Yes, sir.
Q Will you kindly point to us the person of Rolando Pineda?
A (Witness correctly pointing to accused Rolando Pineda.)
xxx
PROSECUTOR SISON:
Q What was the position of the policeman who [was] shot at the bus at
the time accused Celso Sison shot him?
A The person who shot the policeman was at the policemans back.
xxx
Q When you saw Celso Sison shot [sic] the victim inside the bus were
you standing then?
A I was still stooping down and at the same time peeping.43
Colet knows the names and faces of the perpetrators of the crime, as they all
live near each other. Colet asserted that he was an eyewitness and that he
remembers the perpetrators and even the weapons used.
PROSECUTOR SISON:
Q You said you saw the person who shot [the policeman]? Who was
that person who shot [the policeman] inside the bus?
ROMERO, J.:
Death struck like the proverbial thief in the night, but was the accusedappellant the perpetrator thereof?
In the early morning of October 28, 1986, Ana Paulin was in bed at her house
in San Vicente, San Pedro, Laguna, when she was suddenly awakened by the
cries of "Inay, inay, inay." Startled, she bolted up, looked out of the window
and saw a man alighting form the jeep parked in front of her house. She yelled
at the man who looked up at her then ran away. When she opened the front
door downstairs, she found her son, Roberto Pineda, sprawled on the
doorstep. He had been repeatedly stabbed in the chest and back.
With the help of neighbors, she rushed Roberto to the Midtown General
Hospital in San Pedro but was refused admittance due to the lack of medical
facilities therein. Her son expired on the way to another hospital. At about 3:30
a.m., she reported the incident to the San Pedro police. It was only before
noon of that same day, however, when she submitted a "Salaysay" identifying
accused-appellant Ariston A. Abad as the man she had seen running away
from her house moment before she discovered her son's bloody condition.
She further stated that accused-appellant and Roberto had been enemies
ever since her daughter-in-law, Susan, left the latter for accused-appellant,
who was then married to a certain Evelyn Tagle. On the other hand, at the
time of the incident, Roberto was cohabiting with a certain Mary Grace
Pineda.
On that very day, accused-appellant was invited by their barangay captain to
shed light on the incident and was subsequently detained, as a complaint
against him had been filed.
On June 28, 1987, accused-appellant was formally charged in an information,
reading as follows:
The case was assigned to Branch 22 of the Regional Trial Court of San
Pedro, Laguna. Upon his arraignment on September 8, 1987, accusedappellant entered a plea of "not guilty." At the trial, the prosecution presented
three witnesses, namely, Dr. Jose Lopez, Jr., Mary Grace Pineda, and Ana
Paulin; the defense presented the accused-appellant and Evelyn Tagle.
Dr. Jose Lopez, Jr., the medico-legal officer who autopsied the body of the
victim, testified that the deceased suffered fifteen stab wounds and seven
multiple wounds, consequently dying of shock due to severe intra-thoracic
hemorrhage secondary to multiple stab wounds at the chest and back.
Mary Grace Pineda testified that three days before the incident, accusedappellant had an altercation with Roberto over the child of the latter with
Susan Paulin. The victim allegedly wanted to recover his child from Susan,
which accused-appellant opposed. The two even came to blows over the
matter, with mutual threats to kill each other.
On the other hand, accused-appellant denied the truth of Ana Paulin's
narrative, saying that on the evening of October 27, 1986, after selling
sampaguita flowers at Pasay City, he went home to San Pedro at around
12:00 midnight, and that, he was already sleeping at the time the alleged
stabbing incident occurred. His alibi was corroborated by his wife, Evelyn.
In its judgment rendered on November 27, 1991, the San Pedro RTC found
accused-appellant guilty of homicide. The dispositive portion of the judgment
reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of HOMICIDE as defined and
penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code and taking
into consideration the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence
law, there being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance to
offset each other, he is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment
of 8 years 1 day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 14 years 8
months and 1 day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, together
with all the accessory penalties provided by law, and to indemnify
the heirs of Roberto Pineda in the sum of P50,000.00 as
damages. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court,
hence the present recourse.
Accused-appellant assails his conviction by the lower court, maintaining that
he could not be considered guilty beyond reasonable doubt and that the
testimonial evidence of the prosecution lacked proof and facts to sustain his
conviction.
We find accused-appellant's arguments worthy of merit.
The most glaring feature of the present case is the lack of an eyewitness to
the actual killing. No one saw accused-appellant stab the victim, nor was the
murder weapon ever found. The only thing that links accused-appellant to the
crime is his presence at the scene of the incident, thus, the reliance of the trial
court on circumstantial evidence to convict accused-appellant.
For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all the
circumstances must be consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is
guilty and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is
innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt. 3 Thus,
for circumstantial evidence to suffice for conviction, the following requisites
must concur: (i) there must be more than one circumstance to convict; (ii)
facts on which the inference of guilt is based must be proved; and (iii) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
Furthermore, Ana Paulin's testimony fails to state whether the man she saw
was carrying a weapon , or whether he was bloodied or not. Indeed, there is
an absence of positive proof that accused-appellant assaulted the victim.
Likewise, Dr. Jose Lopez, Jr., the medico-legal officer who performed the
autopsy, testified:
Q. Doctor, you said that the wounds found on the
body of the victim Roberto Pineda are (sic) cause(d)
by a sharp bladed instrument?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. But it is also possible that the wounds could have
been caused by more than one sharp bladed
instrument?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. So, it is also possible that there were (sic) more
than one assailant?
of suspicion has no shore, and the court that embarks upon it is without
rudder or compass." 10
In sum, if a life is taken, justice demands that the wrong be redressed, but this
justice that calls for retribution cannot be the same one that would convict
accused-appellant at bar whose guilt has not been proven beyond reasonable
doubt. 11
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby GRANTED and the decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 12565 dated March 31, 1995, is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Ariston A. Abad is hereby ACQUITTED on
ground of reasonable doubt. Accordingly, let the accused be immediately
released from his place of confinement unless there is reason to detain him
further for any other legal or valid cause. No pronouncement as to cost.
SO ORDERED.
On July 7, 1999, the City Prosecutor of Caloocan City filed in the RTC the
information charging Villaflores with rape with homicide committed as
follows:15
That on or about the 2nd day of July, 1999 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
with lewd design and by means of force, violence and intimidation employed
upon the person of one Marita, a minor of five (5) years old, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously lie and have sexual intercourse with said
Marita, against the latters will and without her consent, and thereafter with
deliberate intent to kill beat the minor and choked her with nylon cord which
caused the latters death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Arraigned on August 19, 1999, Villaflores pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged.16
The CA summarized the evidence of the State in its decision, viz:
After pre-trial was terminated, the trial proceeded with the prosecution
presenting witnesses namely, Aldrin Bautista, Jovie Solidum, Manito, Dr. Jose
Arnel Marquez, SPO2 Protacio Magtajas, SPO2 Arsenio Nacis, PO3 Rodelio
Ortiz, PO Harold Blanco and PO Sonny Boy Tepase.
From their testimonies, it is gathered that in the afternoon of July 3, 1999, the
lifeless body of a 5-year old child, Marita (hereinafter Marita) born on October
21, 1994, (see Certificate of Live Birth marked as Exhibit K) was discovered
by her father, Manito (hereinafter Manito) beside a toilet bowl at an
unoccupied house about 5 houses away from their residence in Phase 9,
Bagong Silang, Caloocan City. The day before at about noon time his wife
called him up at his work place informing him that their daughter was missing,
prompting Jessie to hie home and search for the child. He went around
possible places, inquiring from neighbors but no one could provide any lead
until the following morning when his wife in desperation, consulted a
"manghuhula" at a nearby barangay. According to the "manghuhula" his
daughter was just at the 5th house from his house. And that was how he
tracked down his daughter in exact location. She was covered with a blue
sack with her face bloodied and her body soaked to the skin. He found a
yellow sack under her head and a white rope around her neck about 2 and a
half feet long and the diameter, about the size of his middle finger. There were
onlookers around when the NBI and policemen from Sub-station 6 arrived at
the scene. The SOCO Team took pictures of Marita. Jessie was investigated
and his statements were marked Exhibits C, D and D-1. He incurred funeral
expenses in the total amount of P52,000.00 marked as Exhibit L and submarkings. (See other expenses marked as Exhibit M and sub-markings).
Two (2) witnesses, Aldrin Bautista and Jovie Solidum, came forward and
narrated that at about 10:00 oclock in the morning of July 2, 1999, they saw
Edmundo Villaflores, known in the neighborhood by his Batman tag and a
neighbor of the [victims family], leading Marita by the hand ("umakay sa
bata"). At about noon time they were at Batmans house where they used
shabu for a while. Both Aldrin and Jovie are drug users. Aldrin sports a
"sputnik" tattoo mark on his body while Jovie belongs to the T.C.G. ("through
crusher gangster"). While in Batmans place, although he did not see Marita,
Jovie presumed that Batman was hiding the child at the back of the house.
Jovie related that about 3:00 oclock in the afternoon of the same day, he
heard cries of a child as he passed by the house of Batman ("Narinig ko pong
umiiyak ang batang babae at umuungol"). At about 7:00 oclock in the
evening, Jovie saw again Batman carrying a yellow sack towards a vacant
house. He thought that the child must have been in the sack because it
appeared heavy. It was the sack that he saw earlier in the house of Batman.
Among the first to respond to the report that the dead body of a child was
found was SPO2 PROTACIO MAGTAJAS, investigator at Sub-station 6
Bagong Silang, Caloocan City who was dispatched by Police Chief Inspector
Alfredo Corpuz. His OIC, SPO2 Arsenio Nacis called the SOCO Team and on
different vehicles they proceeded to Bagong Silang, Phase 9 arriving there at
about 2 o:clock in the afternoon of July 3, 1999. They saw the body of the
child at the back portion of an abandoned house where he himself recovered
pieces of evidence such as the nylon rope (Exhibit N) and the yellow sack
inside the comfort room. The child appeared black and blue, (kawawa yong
bata wasak ang mukha"). He saw blood stains on her lips and when he
removed the sack covering her body, he also saw blood stains in her vagina.
The yellow sack that he was referring to when brought out in court had
already a greenish and fleshy color. The sack was no longer in the same
condition when recovered, saying, when asked by the Court: "medyo buo pa,
hindi pa ho ganyang sira-sira." There was another sack, colored blue, which
was used to cover the face of the child while the yellow sack was at the back
of the victim. He forgot about the blue sack when SOCO Team arrived
because they were the ones who brought the body to the funeral parlor. He
had already interviewed some person when the SOCO Team arrived
composed of Inspector Abraham Pelotin, their team leader, and 2 other
members. He was the one who took the statement of the wife of Edmundo
Villaflores, Erlinda, and turned over the pieces of evidence to Police Officer
SPO2 Arsenio Nacis who placed a tag to mark the items. When the SOCO
Team arrived, a separate investigation was conducted by Inspector Pelotin.
PO3 RODELIO ORTIZ, assigned at Station 1, Caloocan City Police Station,
as a police investigator, took the sworn statement of Aldrin Bautista upon
instruction of his chief, SPO2 Arsenio Nacis, asked Aldrin to read his
statement after which he signed the document then gave it to investigator,
SPO2 Protacio Magtajas. During the investigation, he caused the
confrontation between Aldrin Bautista and Edmundo Villaflores. Aldrin went
closer to the detention cell from where he identified and pointed to Villaflores
as the one who abducted the child. Villaflores appeared angry.
SPO2 ARSENIO NACIS participation was to supervise the preparation of the
documents to be submitted for inquest to the fiscal. He asked the investigator
to prepare the affidavit of the victims father and the statement of the two
witnesses and also asked the investigator to prepare the referral slip and
other documents needed in the investigation. He ordered the evidence
custodian, PO3 Alex Baruga to secure all the physical evidence recovered
from the scene of the crime composed of 2 sacks. In the afternoon of July 3,
the suspect, Edmundo Villaflores was arrested by PO3 Harold Blanco, SPO1
Antonio Alfredo, NUP Antonio Chan and the members of Bantay Bayan in
Bagong Silang.
PO1 HAROLD BLANCO of the Sangandaan Police Station, Caloocan City, as
follow-up operative, was in the office at about 1:00 oclock in the afternoon of
July 3, 1999, together with PO3 Alfredo Antonio and Police Officer Martin
Interia, when Police Inspector Corpuz, as leader formed a team for them to go
to the scene of the crime. They immediately proceeded to Phase 9. Inspector
Corpuz entered the premises while he stayed with his companions and
guarded the place. SPO3 Magtajas was already investigating the case. They
were informed that the group of Aldrin could shed light on the incident. Blanco
and the other police officers returned to the crime scene and asked the people
around, who kept mum and were elusively afraid to talk. When he went with
SPO1 Antonio Chan accompanied by councilman Leda to the house of
Batman, it was already padlocked. They went to the place of SPO1 Alfredo
Antonio nearby to avoid detection and asked a child to look out for Villaflores.
Soon enough, a jeep from Phase 1 arrived and a commotion ensued as
people started blocking the way of Villaflores, who alighted from the said jeep.
The officers took him in custody and brought him to Sub-station 6 and SPO3
Nacis instructed them to fetch his wife. He was with police officer Antonio
Chan and they waited for the arrival of the wife of Villaflores from the market.
When she arrived, it was already night time. They informed her that her
husband was at Sub-station 6 being a suspect in the killing of a child. There
was no reaction on her part. She was with her 3 minor children in the house.
She went with them to the precinct. When Sgt. Nacis asked Mrs. Villaflores if
she knew anything about what happened on the night of July 2, initially, she
denied but in the course of the questioning she broke down and cried and said
that she saw her husband place some sacks under their house. He
remembered the wife saying, "noong gabing nakita niya si Villaflores, may
sako sa silong ng bahay nila, tapos pagdating ni Villaflores, inayos niya yong
sako at nilapitan niya raw, nakita niya may siko, tapos tinanong niya si
Villaflores, ano yon? Sabi niya, wala yon, wala yon." The wife was crying and
she said that her husband was also on drugs and even used it in front of their
children. She said that she was willing to give a statement against her
husband. Their house is a "kubo" the floor is made of wood and there is space
of about 2 feet between the floor and the ground. She saw the sack filled with
something but when she asked her husband, he said it was nothing. She
related that before she went outside, she again took a look at the sack and
she saw a protruding elbow inside the sack. She went inside the house and
went out again to check the sack and saw the child. It was Sgt. Nacis who
typed the statement of Erlinda Villaflores which she signed. He identified the
sworn statement marked as Exhibit X and sub-markings.
PO1 SONNY BOY TEPACE assigned at the NPD Crime Laboratory, SOCO,
Caloocan City Police Station also went to the crime scene on July 3, 1999 at
about 2:50 in the afternoon with Team Leader Abraham Pelotin, at the vacant
lot of Block 57, Lot 12, Phase 9, Caloocan City. He cordoned the area and
saw the dead child at the back of the uninhabited house. She was covered
with a blue sack and a nylon cord tied around her neck. There was another
yellow sack at the back of her head. He identified the nylon cord (Exhibit N)
and the yellow sack. He does not know where the blue sack is, but he knew
that it was in the possession of the officer on case. The blue sack appears in
the picture marked as Exhibits S, T, and R, and was marked Exhibits T-3-A,
S-1 and R-2-A. Thereafter they marked the initial report as Exhibit U and submarkings. They also prepared a rough sketch dated July 3, 1999 with SOCO
report 047-99 marked as
Exhibit V and the second sketch dated July 3, 1999 with SOCO report 047-99
marked as Exhibit W.
DR. ARNEL MARQUEZ, Medico Legal Officer of the PNP Crime Laboratory
with office at Caloocan City Police Station conducted the autopsy on the body
There are multiple deep fresh lacerations at the hymen. The vestibule is
abraded and markedly congested, while the posterior fourchette is likewise
lacerated and marked congested.
The lining mucosa of the larynx, trachea and esophagus are markedly
congested with scattered petecchial hemorrhages.
Stomach is full of partially digested food particles mostly rice.
Cause of death is asphyxia by strangulation."
There were multiple deep laceration at the hymen and the vestibule was
abraded and markedly congested while the posterior fourchette was likewise
lacerated and markedly congested, too. It could have been caused by an
insertion of blunt object like a human penis. The cause of death was asphyxia
by strangulation, in laymans term, "sinakal sa pamamagitan ng tali." The
external injuries could have been caused by contact with a blunt object like a
piece of wood. The abrasion could have also been caused by a hard and
rough surface. He prepared the Medico Legal Report No. M-250-99 of the
victim, Marita _____ marked as Exhibit H and sub-markings. He issued the
death certificate marked as Exhibit E. The anatomical sketch representing the
body of the victim was marked as Exhibit I and sub-markings. The sketch of
the head of the victim was marked Exhibit J. The injuries on the head could
have been caused by hard and blunt object while other injuries were caused
by coming in contact with a hard or rough surface. There were also punctured
wounds which could have been caused by a barbecue stick or anything
pointed. The ligature mark was congested and depressed.
On cross-examination, among others, he explained the stages of flaccidity
which is the softening of the body of a dead person. The first 3 hours after
death is the primary stage of flaccidity and after the third hour, the body will be
in rigor mortis and after the 24 hours, it is the secondary stage. The victim
could have been dead at least 9 oclock in the morning on July 2. As regards
the multiple lacerations of the hymen, it is possible that two or more persons
could have caused it.
The CA similarly summed up the evidence of Villaflores, as follows:
EDMUNDO VILLAFLORES, testifying in his behalf, denied the charge of
raping and killing the child saying he did not see the child at anytime on July
2, 1999. At around 10:00 oclock in the morning of July 2, 1999, he was at the
market place at Phase 10 to get some plywood for his Aunt Maring. His Aunt
called him at 8:30 in the morning and stayed there for about 5 hours and
arrived home at around 5:00 in the afternoon. His Aunt was residing at Phase
10 which is about a kilometer from his place. His residence is some 5 houses
away from the place of the child. He knows the child because sometimes he
was asked by the wife of Manito to fix their electrical connection. He corrected
himself by saying he does not know Marita but only her father, Manito. He
denied carrying a sack and throwing it at the vacant lot. He was arrested on
July 3, 1999 and does not know of any reason why he was charged. He has
witnesses like Maring, Sherwin, Pareng Bong and Frankie to prove that he
had no participation in the killing.
On cross-examination, among others, he admitted being called "Batman" in
their place and that Aldrin and Jovie are his friends. They go to his house at
Package 5, Phase 9, Lot 32 in Bagong Silang, Caloocan City. They are his
close friends being his neighbors and they usually went to his house where
they used shabu ("gumagamit ng bato"). At 42, he is older than Aldrin and
Jovie. He knew Marita who sometimes called him to his house to fix electrical
wiring. He also knew his wife, but does not know their children. On the night of
July 2, Aldrin and Jovie went to his house. He was arrested on July 3 in a
street near the precinct while walking with his wife. They came from Bayan.
His wife works in a sidewalk restaurant. Two of his children were in Phase 3,
the other two were in his house and two more were left with his siblings. When
he was arrested, he was carrying some food items which they brought in
Bayan. They did not tell him why he was being arrested. He saw his wife once
at Police Station 1 before he was brought to the city jail. Aldrin and Jovie
harbored ill feelings against him because the last time they went to his house
he did not allow them to use shabu. He admitted using shabu everytime his
friends went to his house. He is not legally married to his wife. She visited him
for the last time on July 19, 1999. He denied that the door of his house had a
sack covering neither was it locked by a piece of string. He has not talked with
the father or mother of the child nor did he ask his wife for help. He just waited
for his mother and she told him, they will fight it out in court, "ilalaban sa
husgado."
On re-direct he said that Aldrin and Jovie often went in and out of his house.
His bathroom is in front of his house.
SHERWIN BORCILLO, an electronic technician and neighbor of Edmundo
Villaflores told the court that the charges against Villaflores were not true, the
truth being, that on the night of July 2, 1999 he saw Aldrin and Jovie at the
back of his house holding a sack containing something which he did not know.
They were talking to Batman and offering a dog contained in the sack and
then they left the sack near the comfort room outside the door of the house of
Batman. They came back and took the yellow sack. He followed them up to
the other pathwalk and then he went home. The following day he learned that
Villaflores was being charged with the killing of Marita. At first, he just kept
quiet because he thought Villaflores should be taught a lesson for being a
drug user, but later when he had a drinking spree with his father and uncle, he
told them what he knew because he could not trust any policeman in their
place. He told them what really happened and they advised him to report the
matter to the barangay. So he went to the purok and made a statement in an
affidavit form. He executed the "Salaysay" in the presence of their Purok
secretary and barangay tanod. It was the Purok secretary who gave him the
form. He saw Aldrin and Jovie about midnight of July 2, 1999. There was also
another person with them, one Jose Pitallana, who is the eldest in the group
and considered their "Amo-amo". In his affidavit, he said: "Ako ay lumabas ng
bahay at sinundan ko siya at nakita ko si Jose na tinalian ng nylon and bata.
Tapos po ay may narinig po akong kung sino man ang titistego sa akin ay
papatayin ko, basta kayo ang saksi sa ginawa in Batman." He said he was
sure that the sack contained the child because he saw the head of the child, it
seemed like she was staring at him and asking his help. He executed the
statement after the arrest of the accused. He did not go to the police station to
narrate his story. He made his statement not in the barangay hall but only at
their purok.
On cross-examination, among others, he said that on July 2, 1999 he left the
house at about 11:00 oclock in the morning to go to school in PMI at Sta.
Cruz, Manila. He did not see Batman, nor Aldrin, or Jovie about noon time of
July 2. He arrived home at about 8:00 oclock in the evening because he
passed by the Susano Market in Novaliches to see his mother who was a
vendor there. They closed the store at about 6:30, then they bought some
food stuffs to bring home. He was not sure of the date when Batman was
arrested. He admitted that Batman is his uncle being the brother of his
mother. His uncle is a known drug addict in the area. He usually saw him
using shabu in the company of Jose Pitallana, his wife, Aldrin and Jovie. After
he was informed that his uncle was arrested, he did not do anything because
he was busy reviewing for his exam. He did not also visit him in jail. After he
made his statement, he showed it to their Purok Leader, Melencio Yambao
and Purok Secretary, Reynaldo Mapa. They read his statement and recorded
it in the logbook. It was not notarized. He had no occasion to talk with Aldrin
and Jovie. Jose Pitallana is no longer residing in their place. He did not even
know that Aldrin and Jovie testified against his uncle. He never went to the
police to tell the truth about the incident.
As earlier stated, on May 27, 2004, the RTC convicted Villaflores of rape with
homicide, holding that the circumstantial evidence led to no other conclusion
but that his guilt was shown beyond reasonable doubt.17 The RTC decreed:
Wherefore, the Court finds accused Edmundo Villaflores guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of raping and killing "Marita" and hereby sentences him to
the Supreme penalty of death, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the
sum of P75,000.00, moral damages in the sum of P30,000.00 and exemplary
damages in the sum of P20,000.00, and to pay the cost if this suit, to be paid
to the heirs if the victim.
The City Jail Warden of Caloocan City is hereby ordered to bring the accused
to the National Penitentiary upon receipt hereof after the promulgation of the
decision.
Let the records of this case be forwarded to the Supreme Court for automatic
review.
SO ORDERED.
On intermediate review, the CA affirmed the conviction,18 disposing:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the RTC Caloocan City, Branch 128 finding the
accused Edmundo Villaflores guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
rape with homicide is affirmed with modification in the sense that (a) the death
penalty imposed by the trial court is commuted to reclusion perpetua and the
judgment on the civil liability is modified by ordering the appellant to pay the
amount of P100,000.00 civil indemnity, P75,000.00 moral damages
and P52,000.00 as actual damages.
SO ORDERED.
Issues
Villaflores now reiterates that the RTC and the CA gravely erred in finding him
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape with homicide because the State did
not discharge its burden to prove beyond reasonable doubt every fact and
circumstance constituting the crime charged.
In contrast, the Office of the Solicitor General counters that the guilt of
Villaflores for rape with homicide was established beyond reasonable doubt
through circumstantial evidence.
Ruling
We sustain Villaflores conviction.
I
Nature of rape with homicide
as a composite crime, explained
The felony of rape with homicide is a composite crime. A composite crime,
also known as a special complex crime, is composed of two or more crimes
that the law treats as a single indivisible and unique offense for being the
product of a single criminal impulse. It is a specific crime with a specific
penalty provided by law, and differs from a compound or complex crime under
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, which states:
Article 48. Penalty for complex crimes. When a single act constitutes two or
more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means
for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be
imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.
There are distinctions between a composite crime, on the one hand, and a
complex or compound crime under Article 48, supra, on the other hand. In a
composite crime, the composition of the offenses is fixed by law; in a complex
or compound crime, the combination of the offenses is not specified but
generalized, that is, grave and/or less grave, or one offense being the
necessary means to commit the other. For a composite crime, the penalty for
the specified combination of crimes is specific; for a complex or compound
crime, the penalty is that corresponding to the most serious offense, to be
imposed in the maximum period. A light felony that accompanies a composite
crime is absorbed; a light felony that accompanies the commission of a
complex or compound crime may be the subject of a separate information.
Republic Act No. 8353 (Anti-Rape Law of 1997) pertinently provides:
Article 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. Rape is committed
1) By a man who have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
legislative intent on the import of the phrase on the occasion of the rape to
refer to a killing that occurs immediately before or after, or during the
commission itself of the attempted or consummated rape, where the victim of
the homicide may be a person other than the rape victim herself for as long as
the killing is linked to the rape, became evident, viz:
Senator Enrile. x x x
I would like to find out, first of all, Mr. President, what is the meaning of the
phrase appearing in line 24, "or on the occasion"?
When the rape is attempted or frustrated, and homicide is committed by
reason of the rape, I would understand that. But what is the meaning of the
phrase "on the occasion of rape"? How far in time must the commission of the
homicide be considered a homicide "on the occasion" of the rape? Will it be, if
the rapists happen to leave the place of rape, they are drunk and they killed
somebody along the way, would there be a link between that homicide and
the rape? Will it be "on the occasion" of the rape?
Senator Shahani. x x x It will have to be linked with the rape itself, and the
homicide is committed with a very short time lapse.
Senator Enrile. I would like to take the first scenario, Mr. President: If the
rapist enters a house, kills a maid, and rapes somebody inside the house, I
would probably consider that as a rape "on the occasion of". Or if the rapists
finished committing the crime of rape, and upon leaving, saw somebody, let
us say, a potential witness inside the house and kills him, that is probably
clear. But suppose the man happens to kill somebody, will there be a link
between these? What is the intent of the phrase "on the occasion of rape"? x
xx
xxx
Senator Shahani. Mr. President, the principal crime here, of course, is rape,
and homicide is a result of the circumstances surrounding the rape.
So, the instance which was brought up by the good senator from Cagayan
where, let us say, the offender is fleeing the place or is apprehended by the
police and he commits homicide, I think would be examples where the phrase
"on the occasion thereof" would apply. But the principal intent, Mr. President,
is rape.19
II
The State discharged its burden of
proving the rape with homicide
beyond reasonable doubt
As with all criminal prosecutions, the State carried the burden of proving all
the elements of rape and homicide beyond reasonable doubt in order to
warrant the conviction of Villaflores for the rape with homicide charged in the
information.20The State must thus prove the concurrence of the following facts,
namely: (a) that Villaflores had carnal knowledge of Marita; (b) that he
consummated the carnal knowledge without the consent of Marita; and (c)
that he killed Marita by reason of the rape.
Under Article 266-A, supra, rape is always committed when the accused has
carnal knowledge of a female under 12 years of age. The crime is commonly
called statutory rape, because a female of that age is deemed incapable of
giving consent to the carnal knowledge. Maritas Certificate of Live Birth
(Exhibit K) disclosed that she was born on October 29, 1994, indicating her
age to be only four years and eight months at the time of the commission of
the crime on July 2, 1999. As such, carnal knowledge of her by Villaflores
would constitute statutory rape.
We have often conceded the difficulty of proving the commission of rape when
only the victim is left to testify on the circumstances of its commission. The
difficulty heightens and complicates when the crime is rape with homicide,
because there may usually be no living witnesses if the rape victim is herself
killed. Yet, the situation is not always hopeless for the State, for the Rules of
Court also allows circumstantial evidence to establish the commission of the
crime as well as the identity of the culprit.21 Direct evidence proves a fact in
issue directly without any reasoning or inferences being drawn on the part of
the factfinder; in contrast, circumstantial evidence indirectly proves a fact in
issue, such that the factfinder must draw an inference or reason from
circumstantial evidence.22 To be clear, then, circumstantial evidence may be
resorted to when to insist on direct testimony would ultimately lead to setting a
felon free.23
The Rules of Court makes no distinction between direct evidence of a fact and
evidence of circumstances from which the existence of a fact may be inferred;
hence, no greater degree of certainty is required when the evidence is
circumstantial than when it is direct. In either case, the trier of fact must be
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused.24 Nor has
the quantity of circumstances sufficient to convict an accused been fixed as to
be reduced into some definite standard to be followed in every instance. Thus,
the Court said in People v. Modesto:25
The standard postulated by this Court in the appreciation of circumstantial
evidence is well set out in the following passage from People vs.
Ludday:26 "No general rule can be laid down as to the quantity of
circumstantial evidence which in any case will suffice. All the circumstances
proved must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that
the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis
that he is innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except that of
guilt."
Section 4, Rule 133, of the Rules of Court specifies when circumstantial
evidence is sufficient for conviction, viz:
Section 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. - Circumstantial evidence
is sufficient for conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt. (5)
In resolving to convict Villaflores, both the RTC and the CA considered
several circumstances, which when "appreciated together and not piece by
piece," according to the CA,27 were seen as "strands which create a pattern
when interwoven," and formed an unbroken chain that led to the reasonable
conclusion that Villaflores, to the exclusion of all others, was guilty of rape with
homicide.
We concur with the RTC and the CA.
The duly established circumstances we have considered are the following.
Firstly, Aldrin Bautista and Jovie Solidum saw Villaflores holding Marita by the
hand (akay-akay) at around 10:00 am on July 2, 1999,28 leading the child
through the alley going towards the direction of his house about 6 houses
away from the victims house.29 Secondly, Marita went missing after that and
remained missing until the discovery of her lifeless body on the following
day.30 Thirdly, Solidum passed by Villaflores house at about 3:00 pm of July
2, 1999 and heard the crying and moaning (umuungol) of a child coming from
inside.31 Fourthly, at about 7:00 pm of July 2, 1999 Solidum saw Villaflores
coming from his house carrying a yellow sack that appeared to be heavy and
going towards the abandoned house where the childs lifeless body was later
found.32Fifthly, Manito, the father of Marita, identified the yellow sack as the
same yellow sack that covered the head of his daughter (nakapalupot sa ulo)
at the time he discovered her body;33 Manito also mentioned that a blue sack
covered her body.34Sixthly, a hidden pathway existed between the abandoned
house where Maritas body was found and Villaflores house, because his
house had a rear exit that enabled access to the abandoned house without
having to pass any other houses.35 This indicated Villaflores familiarity and
access to the abandoned house. Seventhly, several pieces of evidence
recovered from the abandoned house, like the white rope around the victims
neck and the yellow sack, were traced to Villaflores. The white rope was the
same rope tied to the door of his house,36 and the yellow sack was a wallcovering for his toilet.37 Eighthly, the medico-legal findings showed that Marita
had died from asphyxiation by strangulation, which cause of death was
consistent with the ligature marks on her neck and the multiple injuries
including abrasions, hematomas, contusions and punctured wounds. Ninthly,
Marita sustained multiple deep fresh hymenal lacerations, and had fresh blood
from her genitalia. The vaginal and periurethral smears taken from her body
tested positive for spermatozoa.38 And, tenthly, the body of Marita was already
in the second stage of flaccidity at the time of the autopsy of her cadaver at 8
pm of July 3, 1999. The medico-legal findings indicated that such stage of
flaccidity confirmed that she had been dead for more than 24 hours, or at the
latest by 9 pm of July 2, 1999.
These circumstances were links in an unbroken chain whose totality has
brought to us a moral certainty of the guilt of Villaflores for rape with homicide.
As to the rape, Marita was found to have suffered multiple deep fresh hymenal
lacerations, injuries that Dr. Jose Arnel Marquez, the medico-legal officer who
had conducted the autopsy of her cadaver on July 3, 1999, attributed to the
insertion of a blunt object like a human penis. The fact that the vaginal and
periurethral smears taken from Marita tested positive for spermatozoa
confirmed that the blunt object was an adult human penis. As to the homicide,
her death was shown to be caused by strangulation with a rope, and the time
of death as determined by the medico-legal findings was consistent with the
recollection of Solidum of seeing Villaflores going towards the abandoned
house at around 7 pm of July 2, 1999 carrying the yellow sack that was later