and

Verum-factum

Wisdom

Practical

Early

in

Writings

the

of

Giambattista Vico

Robert C. Miner

As several contemporarywriters have noted, GiambattistaVico defends

the idea of practicalknowledge, a type of knowledge that cannot be fully expressedby propositionsanddefies reductionsto method.'The defense of practical knowledge, againstDescartesand the rise of objectifyingscience, is most
clearly articulatedin a group of Vico's early writings: the oration De nostri
temporis studiorum ratione (1709), the metaphysicalbook De antiquissima
Italorumsapientia ex linguae latinae originibus eruenda (1710), and two rejoinders (Prima and Seconda risposte) to critics of the De antiquissima.In
these texts Vico criticizesCartesianmethodin termsthatremindus of Aristotle,
or at least the Aristotleof the NicomacheanEthics andPolitics. "Ifyou were to
importthe geometricalmethod into practicallife, you would do no more than
exhaust yourself in becoming a rational lunatic" (A 7.5).2
This comment and many others like it seem to suggest that Vico is an
"Aristotelian,"but any simple classificationis problematic.In the same text in
which Vico defends the Aristoteliantopos he also announcesthat"thetrueand
the madeareconvertible"(verumetfactum convertuntur).The emphasison the
' See, e.g., Hans-GeorgGadamer,Truthand Method,tr. Joel Weinsheimerand Donald G.
Marshall(New York, 19892), 19-24; Joseph Dunne, Back to the Rough Ground: "Phronesis"
and "Techne"in Modem Philosophy and in Aristotle (Notre Dame, 1993), 464; and Alasdair
Maclntyre,After Virtue(Notre Dame, 19842),277.
2 References to Vico's texts are
parenthetical,by section and subsection. SR=De nostri
temporisstudiorumratione. A=De antiquissimaItalorumsapientia. Citations to the Vitarefer
to the page numberin Autobiographyof GiambattistaVico, tr. M. H. Fisch and T. G. Bergin
(Ithaca, 1944). Vico's early works are cited from Operefilosofiche, ed. Paolo Cristofolini
(Florence, 1971), with Italian translationson facing pages.

53
Copyright1998 by Journalof the Historyof Ideas, Inc.

Robert C. Miner

54

role of "making"in truth seems incompatible with the Aristotelian idea of

phronesis, whose knowledge is associated with praxis and cannot be reduced
to techne. It would be simplerif Vico distinguishedbetween a realm in which
the verum-factumprincipleappliedand one in whichprudentiawas supreme.
However,Vico not only situatesmathematicsand experimentalscience within
the metaphysicalframeworkgovernedby verum-factum,butalso impliesstrong
connectionsbetween makingandethics. The prominenceVico assigns to making in all areasof humanendeavorgives him a distinctlymodem appearancein
the fashion of Bacon, Galileo, and Hobbes.
This gives rise to both hermeneuticaland philosophicalproblems.Is Vico
simply hesitating between the old and new? Does he coherently balance an
Aristotelianperspectivewith the "moder" emphasison artifice?3PerhapsVico
is caughtin the middle of the querelledes anciens et modernes,somewhatlike
JohnDunn's version of Locke, a "tragicfigure"who cannotreconcile his epistemological discoveries with a noninstrumentalistview of practicalreason.4
The purposeof this essay is to provide a sympatheticinterpretationof Vico's
early writingson prudentiaand its links to both verum-factumand rhetoric.
Vico contra Rule-basedEthics
The denial that ethics is well understoodas a matterof following or justifying general rules has become a commonplace among contemporaryAristotelians and Wittgensteinians.5Against the Enlightenmentambitionto constructa universallyvalid moralscience, recentvirtueethics has emphasizedthe
irreduciblycontingentaspects of humanlife, aspects which resist the clutches
of "method."Although Descartes wrote little about moralsdirectly,his influence can be detectedin the ethicalwritingsof Hobbes,Kant,Mill, andSidgwick.
These examplesof moder moralphilosophypresupposethe correctnessof the
Cartesiandiagnosisof ancientandmedieval writingon virtue.In the Discourse
on Method Descartes compares previous moral teaching to "the most proud
and magnificentpalaces built on nothingbut sandor mud."6Descarteshimself
did not provide a rationaljustificationof ethics, but he has had no shortageof
successors who have triedto complete his foundationalproject.Jusnaturalism,
Kantiandeontology, and utilitarianism,as different as they are from one another,sharethe desire to groundethics in principlesas universaland certainas
3 Cf. John Milbank, The Religious Dimension in the Thoughtof GiambattistaVico 16681744: Part 1, The Early Metaphysics(Lewiston, N.Y., 1991), 316.
4 John Dunn, Locke (Cambridge,1984), vii.
5
See (e.g.) AlasdairMacIntyre,After Virtue,150; John McDowell, "Virtueand Reason,"
Monist, 62 (1979), 336.
6 Descartes, Discours de la methode,ed. CharlesAdam and Paul Tannery(11 vols.; Paris,
1964), VI, 8; Discourse on Method, tr. D. A. Cress (Indianapolis,1980), 4-5.

GiambattistaVico

55

those of mathematics.Each of these variantsof post-Cartesianethics claim to

have discovered and justified such a principle or set of principles. Maxims
deduced from the principle, if not the principle itself, will arguablyenable
moral agents to discover the right course of action in a particularsituation.
Vico did not live to witness the most articulateexpressions of a Cartesian
approachto ethics, but he did apprehendthe shift in focus from prudenceto
method. In the De nostri temporis studiorumratione, an orationdelivered at
the Universityof Naples in 1708 and publishedthe following year,Vico criticizes approachesthat locate the essence of moralityin rules.
InvokinganAristoteliantopos, Vico declaresthat"thedeeds of men cannot
be assessed by a straightand unbendingrule of the mind;they must be viewed
accordingto the supple Lesbic rule, which does not conform bodies to it, but
altersitself accordingto them"(SR 7).7 Moralrules are characteristicallygeneral. In particularsituations, their generality often renders them useless. No
matterhow comprehensiveour ethical manuals,practicallife will always include situationswhere no rules are at hand,where there is a single rule whose
particularapplicationis unclear,where thereare many conflicting rules which
mightapply,or wherethe rulethatusuallyappliesdemandsan exception.There
is no methodthat can reliablybridge the gap between universaland particular
in the ethical life. Systematizedroutines,which are embodied in the artes that
Vico admiresand associates with the "modems,"are no substitutefor the virtues, betterunderstoodby the ancients. "Forin those things regulatedby practical wisdom, it makes no difference whetheryou have many artes or only a
few"(SR 10). Prudentia"takesits deliberationsfromthe circumstancesof things,
which are infinite; hence any comprehensionof them, however wide, is never
sufficient"(SR 10). At best, rules will give us access to the generalfeaturesof
a situation,but in practicalaffairswisdom is a matterof insight into particulars.
The distinctionbetween universalandparticularinformsVico's entirecase
in the De ratione, but it does not receive adequateelaborationuntil the De
antiquissimaItalorumsapientia, in which Vico will-perhaps bizarrely-criticize Aristotle on the ground that his metaphysics promotes the tendency to
ignoreethical particularsin favor of abstractuniversals.In the De rationeVico
relies upon a distinction between necessity and contingency. "Eternaltruths
standabove nature;in nature,no truthsare containedbut those which are variable and inconstant"(SR 7). Even Bacon, whom Vico much admires,forgets
this and"proveshimself more worthyof a new world ratherthanourown" (SR
1). Vico combinesa genuineappreciationof the meritsof BaconianandGalilean
science with a warningagainsthubris,ancientor moder. "Unlikethe ancients,
we should study physics as philosophers... in orderto quell humanarrogance,
if we indeed seek the truthin these things, which we desire so much.And if we
7 On the history of this topos from Aquinas throughthe humaniststo Vico, see Giuseppe
Giarrizzo,Vico, la storia e la politica (Naples, 1981), 146-74.

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RobertC. Miner

do not find it, the desire for the truthwill itself take us by the handand lead us
to God, who alone is the way and the truth"(SR 4).'8
If natureitself is too slippery to be conquered,then a fortiori we cannot
hope to capturethe demandsof the ethical life in lawlike propositions."With
respectto prudencein civil life, we should rememberthatoccasion andchoice
are the mistresses of humanaffairs, and are most uncertain,governedfor the
most partby simulationand dissimulation,things which are exceptionallydeceitful" (SR 7). Only prudentia and its ally sensus communis, which arises
from probabilities,are sound guides in the active life. Those who ignore this,
perhapsspending too much time in the classroom, "accustomthemselves to
clinging to generalprecepts:in actualitywe find thatnothingis more useless"
(SR 10).
An ethics centeredaroundmaxims is practicallyfutile. Vico paintsa portraitof the imprudentsavant(doctus imprudentis)who approachesethics as if
it were a manualof propositionsto be memorized.Vico contraststhe type of
the expert with three other types: the fool (stultus), the astute ignoramus
(illiteratusastutus), and the wise man (sapiens). The fool lacks knowledge of
either the general or the particular.Theory and practiceescape him alike; he
"constantlypays the penalty for his rashness"(SR 7). The astute ignoramus
knows how to succeed in temporalaffairs.But his ignoranceof the most importantthings,evidencedby his consistentpreferenceforthe utileoverthehonestum,
ensuresfailure.In Aristoteliantermshe does not possess phronesisbut only its
counterfeit,deinotes. Only the sapiens possesses both practicalandtheoretical
wisdom, knowing how to rise from lowly occasions and chance opportunities
to the highest good. "Wisepeople [sapientes], who throughall the obliquities
and uncertaintiesof human actions, aim for eternal truth,follow roundabout
ways, becausethey cannottakestraightones; andexecuteplans [consilia]which
in the long runare for the best, as far as the natureof things allows" (SR 7). A
parallelpassage in the Vitadescribes the sapiens as the embodimentof both
Platonic "esotericwisdom" and Tacitean "common wisdom." "And as Plato
with his universalknowledgeexplores the partsof nobilitywhich constitutethe
man of intellectualwisdom, so Tacitusdescends into all the counsels of utility
whereby,among the infinite irregularchances of malice and fortune,the man
of practicalwisdom brings good things to issue" (Vita 138).
By contrast,the distinguishingmarksof the imprudentsavantareslowness
in decision, arrogancein behavior,and incapacityfor persuasivespeech. Because he lacks experiencein situationswhereplausibleargumentscan be made
in utramquepartem,his choices come slowly, often too slowly. Vico scornsthe
8 Angela-MariaJacobelli-Isoldi,G. B. Vico:La vita e le opere (Bologna, 1960), 175, finds
in Vico's entire oeuvre "due motivi, quello della esaltazione e quello della mortificazione
della naturaumana,"motives which may illuminatethe natureof the referenceto Pascal in the
Vita.

GiambattistaVico

57

critics who, "whensomethingdoubtfulis presentedto them, say: 'Let me think

about it' " (SR 3). The practicalconsequences are baneful. Vico does not disguise his distaste for the physicians of his time who would suspend action,
waiting for the disease to progressinto somethingmore treatable.Because his
educationfocuses on the analyticalfacultyandneglects the memoryandimagination,the imprudentsavantwill not develop his synthetic capacities.He will
be unlikely to discover new or hidden things, to notice the small but telling
detail that can alter one's perceptionentirely.As a result, his judgment will
often rely on incomplete and misleadingdescriptionsof a situation.This deficiency in apprehension,nourishedby the substitutionof preceptsforprudentia
andsensus communis,leads him to "eruptin actions both astonishingand arrogant"(SR 3).
Vico identifiessensus communisas the ruler(regula) of bothprudentiaand
eloquentia. Disregardfor either producesthe ineloquent blusterof one-sided
rationalists."Led to judge before properlyapprehending,"they "become arid
and dry in expression and without ever doing anything set themselves up in
judgment over all things"(Vita 124). The decline of eloquence and prudence
are strictly parallel.Even when the "unscripted,anxious stutterers"produced
by anti-rhetoricalideals are able to apprehendandjudge rightly,they will not
have acquiredthe habitof persuasivespeech.9This is the thirdpracticalfailing
of the imprudentsavant.Vico is not referringto an inability to dress humble
languagewith ornament.He meansthatpersonswithouteloquence,in the wide
sense of the term, will be unable to communicate their wisdom, to make a
practicaldifference.Nor is Descartesan exception:his success in craftingworks
of philosophicalpersuasionowes much to his educationin humanisticstudies,
as Vico implies at the end of the Seconda Risposta.
Insofaras he approximatesthe caricatureof the imprudentsavant,the moral
agentwill fail to realizethe good in particularsituations.Deprivedofprudentia,
he will rely on his methods and manuals. These pretend to take him "in a
straightline from generalto particulartruths,"so as to "burstthroughthe tortuous curves of life" (SR 7). Sometimes he may succeed-the very contingency
of life ensures that his demise is not guaranteed-but the usual outcome is
failure."Frustratedin theirown plans,deceived by those of others,they usually
give up" (SR 7).
An ethics of maxims is self-deludingand self-frustrating.One might suppose thatVico is denying any point at all to moral rules. He consistentlyassociates preceptualapproacheswith the Stoics and ridicules their identification
of reasonwith the regula veri. Because the Stoics devalue probabilityanddeny
that the wise man has any opinions, Vico considers them the pompous ancestors of Descartes and Amauld (SR 3). Their rationalismis inimical to sound
9 The phrase belongs to AlasdairMacIntyre,After Virtue,216.

RobertC. Miner

58

pedagogy, and their individualismneglects the social natureof humanity.But

Vico also speaks with a voice thatpraises the Stoics, insofaras they "seriously
and authoritativelyteach about the steadfastness [constantia] of the wise"
(OrazioneIII). The ideal of rigor,embodied in an outlook thatemphasizesthe
moral law, has a genuine role to play in characterformation."The rigor of
humanactions, meant to ensure that a person is constantto himself in all his
doings and throughall things, was best taughtby the Stoics, to whom it seems
the more recent sects of philosopherscorrespond"(SR 8). Vico does not exclude the possibility that some rules have the power to bind and admit of no
exceptions, but even inviolable maxims are not unproblematicallyinterpreted
and applied.The life of the sapiens displays constantiabut cannotbe reduced
to scrupulousrule-following. The primaryfunction of rules is pedagogical.
They serve as "animage of the divine cross-roads[deorumcompitalia]"which
"only indicate how and where one is to go, i.e. via philosophy to the contemplation of the best natureitself " (SR 10).
In his early writings,then, Vico offers a critiqueof Cartesianaspirationsto
make ethics into a moral science, complete with its own unshakablerules and
procedures.It mightbe objectedthatVico's criticismis merelynegative,unless
supplementedby an alternativemodel of practicalknowledge.Vico would take
this objection seriously.Negative critique, "thoughintriguingto the imagination, is repugnantto the understanding,since by it the human mind is not
enlarged"(Vita 193). For philosophy to be useful, it must unite theory and
practice.It mustdescribein moredetail the ascentof the sapiens fromcommon
wisdom to esoteric wisdom. Taken on the widest possible scale, this is precisely the projectof the Scienza nuova, but Vico first pursuesthe question in
the individualcase, throughcategories inheritedfrom the traditionof rhetoric.
The ars topica
Classical Frenchmethod,as embodiedin the Discourse on Methodand the
Port-RoyalLogic, violently repressesthe idea of a type of knowledge that exceeds rationalproof. Vico links this repressionto Arauld's scorn for the Roman ars topica, itself a development of the mode of reasoning described in
Aristotle'sTopoi."Whois to be believed?"Vico asks. "Arauld, who denies it,
or Cicero, who affirms and professes that he was made eloquent from topics
above all? Let othersbe the judge" (SR 3).
The ars topica is the "artof finding in anythingall that is in it." It enables
one to summonthe full rangeof considerationsthatare relevantin a particular
case and to discover the "middle term" (medium)of a persuasiveargument.
Even though particulartopics, the "commonplaces"or "seats"of argument,10
1' Loci communes and sedes argumentorumare assimilated in Cicero (Topica, 1.5), but
the metaphors are not identical. See Joan Marie Lechner, Renaissance Concepts of the

GiambattistaVico

59

can be organizedin a catalogue,the ars topica itself is not a methodthatcan be

acquiredfrom a textbook, or learnedand memorizedin a classroom. It is akin
to a disposition, wherebyone has persuasiveanalogies and argumentsat one's
command.The oratoruses the ars topica to ensure thathe does not overlook a
single considerationthat can assist in the work of producingconviction. For
the doctor the ars topica provides readyaccess to the stock of medical precedents that have historicallyenabled successful diagnosis and treatment.
Many commentatorsfocus on the rhetoricaland legal context of the ars
topica. But Vico does not consider the ars topica as a tool just for oratorsand
Its
lawyers. His accountof the necessity of the ars topica is perfectlygeneral."1
cultivationis requiredfor creativediscoveryand quick actionin all disciplines,
from mathematicsand physics to medicine and law. His lament that the ars
topica is neglected by Cartesiancurriculais not rightly interpretedas only a
protest against a natural-scientificmethodologicalimperialismthat threatens
to encroachupon the territoryof nonscientifichumanism.12
In orderto flourish,
any discipline-whether "scientific"or "humanistic"-requiresexcellence in
the syntheticreasoningthat Vico associates with the ars topica.
Vico holds that ethics is a matterof prudentia, not ars. But his constant
insistence on the parallelsbetween eloquence andprudencesuggests an ethical
role for the ars topica. The exercise ofprudentia demandsattentionto circumstances. It requiresthat the agent describe particularscorrectly and base her
descriptionson a comprehensive"reading"of the situationthatoverlooks none
of the detailsthatarerelevantforjudgingandactingrightly.In defendingCicero
againstArauld, topics againstmethod,Vico reiteratesin rhetoricalfashionthe
Aristotelianconcernfor comprehensivedescriptionof a situation.
The analogy between prudenceand eloquence is embeddedin Vico's conception of the sensus communis, which is described as the criterionof both
prudenceandeloquence. No less strikingly,Vico connects the rise of Cartesian
pedagogies that devalue the ars topica with the abandonmentof an ethics and
politics based on virtue. In forging a link between prudentia,eloquentia, and
sapientia, Vico invites us to recall the parallelsbetween eloquence and practical wisdom. Both concern themselves with particularsituations,aspire to persuade, considerthe full rangeof circumstances,addressthe passions, employ a
stock of precedents,andrequireingenuityand sharpperception.Quidsit agendum?is the questionthat frames theirinquiries.Situatedin the contingentand
Commonplaces(New York, 1962), 131 and 147-52; Quentin Skinner,Reason and Rhetoric in
the Philosophy of Hobbes (Cambridge, 1996), 111-20.
" Thus in Seconda Risposta, 4, Vico commends Herbertof Cherbury'sDe veritate on the
groundsthatit is "veramentealtronon e che unatopicatrasportataagli usi de' fisici sperimental."
12 This is the Vico familiarto us from Berlin and
Gadamer,among others. But, according
to John Milbank (The Religious Dimension, I, 158), such interpreterstend to overlook Vico's
avowals, in texts early and late, that his writings are composed on a geometric paradigm.

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Robert C. Miner

the probable,where considerationscan be adducedin utramquepartem, each

aims for truthwhile refusingto assume thatits discovery dependson apodictic
argument.The ars topica perfects the habit of attentionto circumstances,no
matterhow trivialseeming, thatis vital for the exercise of prudence."Scientific
knowledge [scientia]differs thus from practicalwisdom [prudentia]:in scientific knowledge, those who excel seek one cause, from which many things in
natureareproduced;butin practicalwisdom, those who shine arethe ones who
seek as manycauses as possible of one deed [factum],so as to conjecturewhich
is true"(SR 7).
The ars topica is importantfor the operation of prudentia. It facilitates
both comprehensionand celerity. Uniting these distinct imperativesis crucial
in practical matters,which often require a swift response given ex tempore
without the benefit of protractedanalysis. As the good doctor cannot waste
time, so the effective orator must give immediate assistance to the accused.
Analogously, a distinctive characteristicof the phronimosis the capacity for
making the right decision without the luxury of long deliberation.Ethics requires the ars topica, no less than oratoryor medicine.
Comprehensionand quickness, however, are not sufficient to guarantee
truth.The ars topica seems to generate only facility and plenitude.This is a
problemfor Vico, who does not reduce truthto pragmaticadequacyin either
scientia orprudentia."As for the end of all pursuits,todayonly one is contemplated, one is cultivated,one is celebratedby all: truth"(SR 1). Although the
end is posteriorto the instrumentaand adiumenta,studentsmustkeep thefinis
in view throughouttheirlabors.The ars topica, on its own, seems more likely
to produceskeptics than seekers of truth.
One might rejectthe Cartesiannotion thatpreservationof truthagainstthe
skepticrequiresone to treatprobableknowledge as if it were false. Vico identifies precisely this assumptionas the basis for the moder rejectionof the ars
topica. Nonetheless, Vico's strategy is not simply to expose the assumption
andthen dismiss it. He takes seriously the concern thatthe ars topica will lead
to a dangerousskepticism.Vico observes, echoing Cicero and Quintilian,that
Carneadeswas a masterof topical plenitude."Hewould arguefor both contraries, holding on one day, thatjustice exists, on another,thatit does not, bringing
forthequallydecisive arguments,with incredibleforce. This was bornfrom the
fact that truthis one, probabilities many, and falsehoods endless" (SR 3). A
genuinelyphilosophicalrhetoricmustperceivethe limitationsof the ars topica.
It must situate copia as means to end. The ability to summon all potentially
relevantconsiderationsdoes not guaranteetruth,even if it is an importantprerequisite.
In the De ratione,Vico is reluctantto resolve the issue in favorof eitherthe
ars topica or ars critica. He defends the ars topica against those who would
expel it from the curriculum."As the inventionof argumentsis by natureprior

GiambattistaVico

61

to the judgmentof theirtruth,so topica must come before critica in teaching"

(SR 3). The priorityaccordedin this passage to the ars topica is strictlypedagogical. In the orderof learning,artsthatrequirephantasia and memoriamust
precededisciplines thatdevelop the aptitudefor criticism.Only afterthe study
of painting,poetry,and rhetoricshould learnersstudy logic, algebra,and synthetic geometry.Those who learncriticism aftertopics will be in a betterposition "to judge anew, using their own discriminationon what they have been
taught"(SR 3). These pedagogical considerationsdo not, however, license an
ideal priorityof topica to critica, inventio to iudicio. The ars critica, no less
thanthe ars topica, is requiredfor truth.The amplitudeof one mustbe checked
by the precision of the other.Those who are fluent in topics but neglect criticism fall short,because they "oftenlatch on to falsehoods;the reverseerroris
committedby those who "do not also consort with probabilities"(SR 3). Interpreterswho takeVico to proposea "topicalphilosophy"thatexcludes or subordinates the role of criticismtend to ignore the multiplepassages in which Vico
ascribes the attainmentof truthto critica or iudicio. In the De ratione, Vico
proposesa model thatseriallyjoins the ars topica andthe ars critica. He leaves
the essential identityof each unchanged,while stressingthe need for both approaches.13

Vico continueshis explicationof practicalreasonby turningto the connection between rhetoricand the transformationof humandesire.The work of the
ars topica and the ars critica, apprehensionandjudgment,is fruitlessif it does
not issue in a concrete work of persuasion.Milbanksuggests thatVico tacitly
assigns this function to elocutio (the stage that traditionallyfollows inventio
and dispositio or iudicio), and he takes Vico to propose the replacementof
Cartesianmethod with a notion of elocutio whose function is to unite topica
and critica.'4 Elocutio is not just "the most purely aesthetic, emotional and
linguistic moment of rhetoric"but becomes the "key rationaland ethical moment, implying that "the most vital point of invention and judgment is postponed to the very instanceof utteranceitself."'5Vico does not speakdirectlyof
elocutio in the De ratione,but he advertsto the role of eloquentiain the section
devoted to virtue.This device indicatesVico's desire to press the parallelbetween rhetoricand prudenceas far as possible, withoutcompletely identifying
them.
13 Jacobelli-Isoldi, finds analogies between the desired unions of topica and critica, of
sapientia, prudentia, eloquentia, and the universal and particular(G. B. Vico: La vita e le
opere, 180). But the "essential integration"of topica and critica that she speaks of is not
achieved in the De ratione, as Botturi clearly realizes. See Francesco Botturi, La sapienza
della storia: GiambattistaVico e la filosofica pratica (Milan, 1991), 43-47, 68-69.
14Milbank, The Religious Dimension, I, 302-3. On the increased interest in elocutio in
Italianculturejust before Vico, see BrianVickers,"On the Practicalitiesof RenaissanceRhetoric," in Rhetoric Revalued (Binghamton,N.Y., 1982), 136-41, with references.
'5 Milbank, The Religious Dimension, I, 296-97.

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Robert C. Miner

"Two things only are capable of turningto good use the disordersof the
soul [animiperturbationes],all the evils of the interiorman which originate
from desire [ab appetitu],as it were from one source:one is philosophy,which
tempersthem in wise men, so thatvirtuesarise. The otheris eloquence, which
in the common man sets them on fire, so thatthey performthe duties of virtue"
(SR 7). Both philosophia and eloquentiaare endowed with the capacity to induce virtue. Exercise of this capacity comprises their common telos. Action
thatarises from the virtueof prudencewill involve the mediationof eloquence
or philosophy.Practicalreasonwithoutpersuasion,Vico suggests, is not practical reason at all.
Vico first addresses the ordinarycondition, in which desire is not fully
rational.Here eloquence is the necessary complementof invention (the function of the ars topica) and judgment (the function of the ars critica). "The
mind [mens] may indeed be ensnaredby those delicate nets of truth,but the
soul [animus]cannot be turnedand conqueredexcept by more bodily means"
(SR 7). The necessity for artifice cannot be eliminated,unless the desires are
alreadyrational.The soul of the vulgus "mustbe drawnby corporealimages in
orderto love; for once it loves, it is easily taughtto believe; once it believes and
loves, it must be inflamed in orderto will, against its ordinarylack of power"
(SR 7). Vico illustratesby direct referenceto the oratoricalcase: "Unless the
oratordoes these three things, he has not at all crafteda work of persuasion"
(SR 7). The parallelis obvious in the ethical case, wherepracticaldiscernment
must culminate in a work of self-persuasion.The conclusion of a practical
syllogism is an action.As inventionandjudgment are useless withoutpersuasion, so deliberationand choice are fruitlesswithoutaction.The structuralisomorphismserves to link eloquence and prudence;both are normativeactivities
concernedwith achieving ends. It also implies the presenceof a rhetoricaldimension in moraldiscourse.An ethics that seems truein the abstractbut lacks
the capacityto persuade,to effect the transformationof desire,is a self-discrediting ethics. It is the kind of philosophythatVico consistentlyrejectsas useless
and thereforeharmful.
The ars topica is a crucial startingpoint for Vico's response to the Cartesian and Arnauldianchallenge to practicalreason in the De ratione. Although
the text does not explicitly statethe convertibilityof the trueand the made, it is
simply unintelligible without the assumptionof a substantialconnection between constructionand truth.In the ethical case we have seen the prominence
Vico accordsto the constructionsof rhetoric.What makes these constructions
or any othersimages of truth?The seventh inauguralorationdoes not directly
addressthe question. It is in the De antiquissimaItalorumsapientia that Vico
takes himself to have realized the main theme of the De ratione "a little more
distinctly" (Vita 156). There Vico will explicate the link between truth and
construction,develop the critiqueof rule-basedethics initiated in the De ratione, and supply a new model of the relationbetween topica and critica.

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GiambattistaVico
Verum-factum

The De antiquissima Italorum sapientia begins with the announcement

that"forthe Latins 'true'and 'made' arereciprocal,or in the commonlanguage
of the Schools, convertible"(A 1.1). Vico presents the verum-factumaxiom
first as an etymological thesis, and proceeds to assert original identities between terms.Intelligere (to understand)is the same as perfecte legere (to read
completely) andaperte cognoscere (to know clearly).In vernacularItalian,the
identity is reproduced by the synonymy of pensare (to think) and andar
raccogliendo (to collect), both of which are embracedby the Latins'cogitare.
Finally,ratio originallydenotesthe "collectionof arithmeticelements"(A 1.1).
The effect is to suggest a primal homology between knowing and making,
tracesof which remainin our currentlanguage-despite the accretionof other
paradigms,e.g., introspection,observation.
is not only a thesis about the originalmeaningof words. Its
Verum-factum
sense is also conditionedby the traditionsof Christiantheology, as the reference to the "schools"suggests. Thus Vico attributesto the Latins the conception of the humanbeings as a rationisparticeps but understandsthis in a way
thatrecallsbothAquinasandRenaissancetranslationsof the De Interpretatione.
"As words are symbols and signs of ideas, so ideas are symbols and signs of
things"(A 1.1). There is no direct passage from word to thing;humanscannot
escape the necessity of conceptualmediation.But Vico is not a pessimistabout
humanknowledge. Words,ideas, and things are connectedin reality,even if a
literal and exhaustive grasp of the connections is not available to the finite
creature.Vico understandshumanjudgmentby analogyto the process of reading. The readergathers the alphabeticelements out of which words are constructed.In the absence of readerlycollection, the elementawill be an incoherent jumble, lacking significance. Textual meaning is simply impossible without the active contributionof the reader.However,one should attendto Vico's
use of the passive voice: the reader collects the elements ex quibus verba
componuntur(A 1.1). The individualdoes not arbitrarilydeterminethe combinationsof elements thatconstitutewords. Linguisticprecedentsets constraints
on literarysynthesis. Constructionsthat do not make contact with the way in
which the languageis used publicly and has been used historicallyare unintelligible.
In the case of humanjudgment,the knowercollects the elementaof a thing
(res), out of which ideas are constructed.The more thoroughthe composition
of real elements, the more perfect the idea. Vico defines intelligere, understanding, as the process of "collecting [colligere] all the elements of a thing
[elementarei], from which its most complete idea may be expressed"(A 1.1).
Again the use of the passive is important.Withoutthe active constructionof
humanbeings, thereare no ideas, or at least none thatare accessible to us. But
the perfectionof the idea expressed depends on the collection of the elementa

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Robert C. Miner

rei, which are more than humanproductions.The ontological independenceof

the elementaplaces constraintson the humanexpression of ideas, just as the
public and historicalcharacterof alphabeticelements makes the intelligibility
of languagemore than a matterof personalfiat.
Vico combines the emphasis on construction(verumesse ipsumfactum)
with the conviction that "man is neither nothing, nor everything"(A 1.1, 2).
Neither the analogies nor the disanalogies between human making and the
divine art can be ignored. Vico claims "not to proposehuman scientia as the
rule for divine scientia, but divine scientia as the rule for humanscientia" (A
conclusion). Any satisfactoryreadingof the texts, then, must consider Vico's
understandingof the divine case. God, as the primus Factor, composes the
elementato producethe primumverum.The elementaare in no sense external
to God. Vico does not hesitate to describe divine generationby analogy to the
processes of human "composition"but makes clear that generationis not an
arrangementof preexistingmaterial.In generatingthe Son, the Fatherbegets a
modification of his own substance, his own elements that are contained entirely within himself. The primus Factor, the comprehensioof the elementa,
and the Verbumgeneratedby the collectio of the elementaare at root identical.
With perfectconsistency Vico associates the elementsboth with the Father,as
primus Factor, and with the Son, who containsthe divine ideas. In composing
his own elements God knows and begets himself, as the Verbum.
Because the elementa are entirelycontainedin, and thereforewholly commandedby, theprimus Factor, theprimumverumgeneratedby the divine artis
"infiniteand exact" (A 1.1). Human making, by contrast,is derivative of the
firsttrue,because it attainsonly a partialgraspof the elementarei. The "human
mind, which is bounded and externalto those things thatare not itself, is confined to the outside edges of thingsonly and nevercollects all the elements"(A
1.1).Vico repeatsthe phraseparticepsrationisanddeploysan image (similitudo),
lest his readerfail to see that he does not intend to posit a univocal identity
between divine and human making. "Divine truthis a solid image of things,
like a statue;human truthis a monogramor plane image, like a painting"(A
1.1).
To understandmore precisely how Vico considersthe humanappropriation
of the elementa rei as incomplete yet fruitful, we must shift our focus to the
hierarchyof scientiae that he proposes.Of the scientiae consideredabsolutely,
"revealedtheology" is the most certain,since complete truthuniquelyinheres
in its object. Humanscientiae, by contrast,do not know the elementaby revelation. Instead,it creates its own images of elementarei through"dissection."
All humanscientia, according to Vico, is a "type of anatomyof the works of
nature"(A 1.2). Before humanscientia can know truthby composingelements,

GiambattistaVico

65

it must gain access to the elements themselves. This is achieved by dissections

of reality (dissicere, dividere,minuere).16
The metaphorof dissection testifies againstsecularizinginterpretationsof
Vico thatendow humanswith the power to createautonomouselements.Without an ontologically priorunum,nothing can be dissected into parts.Thus the
humanscientiae cannotsimply createtheirown elements.On the contraryVico
suggests that human dissection aspires to know the very elements contained
within the divine comprehensio:"Godknows everything,because he contains
within himself the elements, from which he composes all things; man, however, seeks to know them by dividing" (A 1.2). The distinctionis not between
two sets of elements but between two modes of graspingthe elementarei. One
mode is properto the infinite God, who possesses the elements in se, and the
otherto finite humanbeings who graspthem from the outside, throughthe use
of dissections.
This seems to clash with Vico's understandingof mathematics,the scientia
that seems to create its own elements. The humanmathematician"createsthe
point, the line, the surfacefollowing the model of God, without any substrate
and as though from nothing [tamquamex nihilo]-as if they were things"(A
1.2). We seem to have at least one case in which humansare creatorsof autonomous elementa.The metaphorof dissection seems not to apply,in the absence
of a priorwhole. In responseit must be said thateven in the mathematicalcase
humans do not literally create elements out of nothing (note the qualifying
Figura,treated
tamquam).Vico speaksof bothunumandfiguraas "abstractions."
by geometry,is abstractedfrom corpus, which itself is a dissection of homo.
The other division of homo is animus, which is carved into intellectus and
voluntas. From all of these dissections, "fromthese things and from all other
things,"ens and unumare abstracted.There is no space in Vico's thoughtfor
the mathematicianto create elementa that enjoy real existence independently
of the divinely createdelementa rei. We may speak of the mathematicsas the
humanscientia that createsits own elementa but only if we take this as shorthandfor elements thathave no reality in themselves. Insofaras the elements of
mathematicspossess any ontological weight, they do so only as participations
in "metaphysicalpoints."(The natureof this relationis elusive; the point here
is simply that the mathematicalelementa are not autonomous,but ultimately
depend on metaphysics,which Vico identifies as the "fountof all truthfrom
which everythingin the otherscientiae are derived"[A 4.2]).
Even if Vico did attributeto humanbeings the powerof genuinecreationex
nihilo in the mathematicalcase, it would still be difficult to contend that its
16

The idea of "dissection,"as presentedin De antiquissima1.2, may have inspiredGeorges

Sorel's conception of "diremption."

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Robert C. Miner

elements have real existence apartfrom the divine elementa. The reason is
simply that, in themselves, the mathematicalelements do not possess real existence at all. Vico describesthe arithmeticalunumand geometricalpunctusas
nominal"fictions.""Forthe point, if you drawit, is no longer a point;the unit,
if you multiply it, is not entirely a unit" (A 1.2). Their fictive status does not
make them any less useful.17The unumandpunctus enable the mathematician
to fabricate "a certain world of shapes and numberswhich he can embrace
entirelywithin himself" (A 1.2). Both the elements and the constructionsthat
proceed from them are within the full control of the mathematicalscientiae.
Following most closely the model of divine scientiae, human mathematicians
"makethe truthsthey teach"and operate"with their abstractionsjust as God
operateswith reality"(Prima riposta 2).
What makes mathematicsthe paradigmaticcase of human scientia is the
proceduralanalogy to divine knowing. Mathematicsis the scientia operatrix
that conforms most closely to verum-factum.Because it proves from causes,
because it most thoroughly constructs its elements, it is most certain. "The
most certainthings are those which, redressingthe defects of their origin, resemble divine knowledge in their operation,inasmuch as in them the true is
convertiblewith what is made"(A 1.2). As God possesses the elements andthe
generatedVerbumentirely within himself, so the mathematicianpossesses the
elements of his scientia and its constructionsintra se. This position is not
abandonedafterthe De antiquissima.Vico reaffirmsit in section 15 of the Vici
vindiciae, writtenafter the first version of the Scienza nuova. "Justas he who
occupies himself with geometryis, in his world of figures, a god (so to speak),
so GodAlmightyis, in his worldof spiritsandbodies,a geometer(so to speak)."
Because it contains its elements within itself, and can manipulatethem
withoutexternalconstraints,Vico places mathematicsfirst on the hierarchyof
human scientiae. The other scientiae, in descending order of certainty,are
mechanics,physics, medicine, logic, and ethics. These also exemplify verumfactum, but less perfectly. Knowledge is still a matterof construction,of collecting the elements. But in deriving the elements themselves, the non-mathematical scientiae do not rely solely on their own proceduresand so lack the
formal certaintyof geometry and arithmetic.Like the other humanscientiae,
mechanicsandphysicsderivetheirelements(imagesof the elementarei)through
dissection. Here "dissection"not only refers to the postulationof abstractions
but also embracesthe notion of "experiment."The partly"external"character
of theirelements rendersthe scientiae of mechanicsand physics less amenable
to humancontrol, and thereforeless predictablethan mathematics.Nonetheless, the relative conformityto the verum-factumprincipleconfers a degree of
17 Certainly Vico's positioning of mathematicsat the pinnacle of the human scientiae is
an anti-Cartesianirony, because what mathematicsgains in certainty and clarity, it loses in
ontological significance.

GiambattistaVico

67

assurance about their results. "Thoughtsabout naturalthings are considered

most illuminatingand are accepted with the fullest consent of everyone, if we
are able to apply experimentsto them, in which we make somethingsimilarto
nature"(A 1.2).
Vico's hierarchyarrangesthe scientiae in descendingorderof humancertainty,but certaintyis not itself the orderingprinciple.The hierarchydepends
on a distinctionbetweenscientia andconscientia.Mathematicsis purescientia
because the grasp of its elements is entirely internal.("Internal"is not a synonym for "intuited"or "introspected."The termis meantto recallthe ability of
the human mind to create the mathematicalficta independentlyof external
constraints.)The otherscientiae involve varyingdegreesof interactionwith the
external world. Their knowledge is not pure scientia but conscientia, knowledge thatdependsin some measureon elements graspedfromthe outside. The
physicist may hypothesizeany set of elements he likes, but the extent to which
his postulationsare true, i.e., genuine images of the elementarei, depends on
confirmationfrom without.His scientia is con-scientia; it requiresa cooperation with nature,never completely within humancontrol.
The otherscientiae in the hierarchy-chemistry, medicine,logic, and ethics-involve an increasingproportionof interactionwith the external world.
Ethics is least amenableto formal procedures,relying on prudentia.Since its
elements are not graspedby dissective methods,it is almostentirelya matterof
conscientia. The primaryelementa of ethics are the humanperson(homo) and
the end (finis). Vico identifiesethics as the scientia thattakesthefinis as its first
cause (A 3). In connectionwith thefinis, it treatsthe motions of spirits(motus
animorum). Of all human phenomena these are the "most deeply hidden"
(penitissimi)and arise from "desire [libido] that is infinite"(A 1.2). Vico does
not just mean that it is difficult to employ experimentin morals, as Verene
suggests.'8He intendsthe strongerclaim that any dissective procedurewhose
mode of operationis to resolve wholes into parts(whetherspecifically experimentalist, as in physics, or non-experimentalist,as in mathematics)is unable
to comprehendthe integralrealities treatedby ethics (especially homo andfinis).
To situateethics at the bottom of the scientia-conscientiahierarchymight
seem puzzling. Is not desire the most interiorof human realities?What prevents us from graspingit internally?Like Augustine,Vico uses the rhetoricof
depth to evoke the opacity of desire, its seeming resistanceto scrutiny,its tendency to escape humancontrol.The "interiority"of desire, however,does not
imply that it is "internal"in the relevant sense. The root of desire, its first
cause, is thefinis, identicalto the infiniteprimumverum.No humanconstruction, finite and partialsince confined to the outside edges of the elementa rei,
18But see Donald Phillip Verene, Vico'sScience of Imagination(Ithaca, 1981), 40.

RobertC. Miner

68

can exhaustit, or penetrateto its infinite essence. The ultimateexplanationfor

the obscurityof libido andthe motusanimorum(of which libido is the efficient
cause) is teleological. Vico identifies thefinis as both the first andfinal cause of
desire. Libido is infinite because thefinis it longs for is infinite. Since the end
is neveravailableto transparentunderstanding,the humanyearningfor the end
is mysterious.The elusiveness of desire is neithera brutefact nor a phenomenon to be explainedby depth metaphors.It is an anthropologicalreality,situated by Vico within a negative theology that is also a teleology.
The resistanceof the elementaof ethics to dissective proceduremight seem
to alienateethics from the verum-factumaxiom. Certainlyif the principlewere
only a thesis about the human derivationof elements, its relevance to ethics
would be minimal. Verum-factum,
however,embracesnot only the origination
of elements, but also-and more directly-their arrangementor composition.
Moral philosophy, despite its lack of formal certainty,does not constitute an
exception to the general principle "to know is to compose [componere]the
elements of things"(A 1.1).19The knowledge properto ethical praxis will assume the form of a collection of elements. It can thereforebe describedwithout
violence as a type of "construction"even thoughits elementaare not humanly
produced.Given the emphasis on the inexhaustibilityof desire and the resistance of thefinis to humanremaking,an ethics of technicalcontrolis not possible for Vico, as it is for Hobbes. There is a role for "maker'sknowledge"in
practicalreason,but the makingis "poetic"ratherthan"technological."It adds
contentto our initial glimpse of the bonum,which Vico identifies as a criterion
by whichtruemakingsaredistinguishedfromothers,withoutsupplyinga recipe
for attainingan end whose essence is knownpriorto construction,or an airtight
system of rules or principlesthat constitutethe naturallaw. As we have seen,
Vico specifically rejects "moder" attemptsto replace an ethics of prudentia
with an ethics of "method."
Ingeniumandprudentia
Vico associates ingeniumandprudentiafirstby adducingetymologies that
locate them in neighboringpartsof the body. "Forthe Latinscommonly spoke
of prudentiaas lodged in the heart,or of plansand worriesas turnedover in the
heart,and of acuity of invention [inveniendiacumen] as lodged in the breast"
(A 5.3). Vico identifies inveniendiacumen and the Plautineexpression e pectoreacetumwith ingenium.The implicationis thatwithoutingenium,the exercise of prudenceis impossible. Practicalreasonrequiresboth cors andpector.
la politica dei moderni (Bari, 1995), 63, concludes that
verum-factumis not reducible to an epistemological criterion, Baconian or otherwise, but is
"un principio etico-politico, non solamente gnoseologico."
19 Marcello Montanari, Vico e

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69

Before discussing the faculty of ingeniumin particular,Vico connects the

generalnotionoffacultas tofacilitas, "areadyandproductiveaptitude[solertia]
for making"(A 7.1).2? Afacultas is "thatby which power [virtus]is led to act"
(A 7.1). This states what ingenium has in common with the other faculties of
sensus, memoria, andfantasia. What is properto ingeniumis its capacity to
"connectdisparateanddiverse things"(A 7.4).21The best exercises of ingenium
are "acute,"while many are "obtuse."Obtuse wits are unsynthetic,and leave
diverse things far apart.They are unableto constructconnections,or construct
them with painful slowness. Vico finds an "aesthetic"dimensionto ingenium.
It is the humanability to "see the proportionof things [commensurerum]and
recognize what is apt, fitting, beautiful and ugly" (A 7.4). Vico wants to preserve the conceptualconnection to both artand geometry:"Is it becausejust as
naturegives birthto physical things, so humaningeniumgeneratesmechanics
and, as God is nature'sartificer,so man is the god of artifacts?"(A 7.4). The
spirit of geometry and finesse are at root one: "humanknowledge [scientia]
itself is nothingbut making things correspondto themselves in beautifulproportion, which only those who excel in ingenium can do" (A 7.4). The De
antiquissima echoes the conviction of the De ratione that good geometers,
physicists, and oratorsarise from the same source. All possess the faculty of
ingenium.

To probemorefully the operationof ingeniumin the practicallife, we must

recall Vico's emphasis on the infinite characterof the circumstancesthat confrontus. Practicalrationalityrequiresthatwe select some of themfor consideration and ignore others. Not everythingcan be considered,but nothing can be
omittedarbitrarily.To make sense of a situation,the agent must cut it down to
size, withoutreductivelyfalsifying it. This implies thatthe exercise of practical
reasonwill involve, in its own fashion, a dissection of reality.The humanbeing
does not originate the elementa in ethics, but she "remakes"them in accordance with the requirementsof thefinis. This process requiresthe possession
of the metaphysicalgenera. In the Vita,Vico specifically connects his ability,
developedby the "long studyof metaphysics,"to "movefreely in the infiniteof
genera"with his readingof orators,historians,and poets thatenabledhis intellect to take "increasingdelight in observingbetween the remotestmattersties
that bound them together in some common relation"(Vita 123). The genera
enable the sapiens, whose mind is "madeuniversalby metaphysics,"to grasp
the universal throughacute judgment involving particulars.And this is precisely the work of ingenium,the faculty "by which man is capableof contemplating and constructing[contemplandiacfacendi] likenesses"(A 7.5).
20 Botturi,La
sapienza della storia, 113, note 169, suggests thatthe promotionof solertia
from a habitus to afacultas is an artifactof humanismbut leaves the details obscure.
21 This
conceptionof ingeniumsuggests affinitieswith Baroquewriters,especially Tesauro.
On the Baroque aspect of Vico generally, see Botturi, La sapienza della storia, 106-10, with
references.

Robert C. Miner

70

Both topica and critica are requiredfor ingenium.The ars topica provides
comprehension,and the ars critica supplies focus. "Topics discovers things
and piles them up. Criticismdivides the pile and removes some of it: and thus
the topical wits are more fertile, but less true;the criticalones are truer,but are
sterile"(Seconda riposta4). This seems merely to echo the De ratione, which
defends the ars topica of Cicero but acknowledgesthatAmauldiancritica is a
necessary supplement.In the De antiquissima Vico goes beyond the earlier
work and constructsa new model of the relation of topics and criticism. He
now faults both the ancientsand the modems, attributingto the formeran artificial separationof discovery andjudgment."Neitherinvention withoutjudgment,norjudgmentwithoutinventioncan be certain"(A7.5). Topicaandcritica
are ideally one: "topicsitself will become criticism"(A 7.5).
The exercise of ingeniumandprudentiarequiresthe agent to constructan
adequate description of her situation. Descriptions must be constructed,for
they are never simply given or read off from general principles.Relevantfeatures must be isolated, pertinentcircumstancesmust be considered,appropriate categories must be consulted.All this is the work of inventio,regulatedby
the ars topica. Withouttopics one might miss something, and risk acting in a
way that is incompatiblewith the demandsofprudentia. But the integrationof
topica and critica suggests that the work of constructive apprehensionwill
include the momentof criticaldiscrimination.Inventioand iudicio are distinct
stages in the manualsof rhetoric,but interactin the actualprocessof reasoning.
Any appropriationof the topics is already"normative,"guided by standardsof
what is desirableand what is not. The topics, moreover,receive their original
identityas summariesof criticaljudgments,themselves productsof ingenium.
As precedents in the etymological sense, they embody the contingentjudgments made on particularoccasions. This enables us to make sense of Vico's
ambivalence toward moral rules. Viewed as timeless propositionsthat automaticallydictatethe rightcourse of action in abstractionfrom the processes of
inventioand iudicio, moralrules repressingenium.But takenas condensations
of experientialjudgments, as "abridgments"of tradition,22they can be useful-provided that the fixed form they typically assume is not confused with
the authenticuniversalityof the genera."No matterhow hardanothermay try,
he cannot speak or act more appropriately-which is why the memorablesayings and doings of wise men are so much commended"(Prima riposta 2).
No "value-neutral"appropriationof topics is possible. Criticaljudgment,
linked to the transcendentalbonum which Vico identifies as the criterionof
truth,always guides the descriptionof situations.Bad orators,unconsciousof
the critical imperative,will tend to roamthroughthe topics randomly,unaware
that a disorderedamassing of possible aspects and considerationswill only
22

Cf. Michael Oakeshott,Rationalismin Politics (New York, 1962), 91-92.

GiambattistaVico

71

confuse the issue. Neither sententiaenor exemplacan be used unreflectively;

both requirethe discretionthatis a productof criticaljudgmentandprudentia.
(It is relevantthatVico associatesprudentiawith both topica andcritica.) Thus
Vico contraststhe bad oratorwith the one who "rangesthroughall the topical
commonplaces with a critical torch"(A 7.5). Anothermode of topical abuse,
more characteristicof the "modem"rationalist,is to scrutinizethe topics too
carefully,tryingto find in them what is not there. "Aristotle'sCategories and
Topicsare completely useless if one wantsto find somethingnew in them. One
becomes a Lull or Kircher,or someone similar,who indeed knows the letters
but cannot bring them together [colligit] to read the great book of nature"(A
7.5). The analogy of knowing and readingdirectlyrecalls verum-factum.Topics must be used as a startingpoint for construction,not as its substitute.Their
practicalfunction is to supply a readingof a particularsituationthat enables
prudentaction.Attemptingto find solutionsin the topics themselves is as foolish as tryingto uncover the meaningof a book by examining its index.
Ingenium,then, is both the origin and the result of the exercise of the ars
inveniendi.The appropriationof the traditionalcategory and the critique of
Cartesianrationalismare simultaneous.When Vico says that the geometrical
methodcannotbe appliedto practicallife, unless we pretendthat"desire,rashness, occasion, and fortunedo not rule in humanthings,so thatyou could draw
a straightline throughthe curves of life" (A 7.5), he is underscoringthe contrastbetween "method"and ingenium.The constructivefacultas of ingenium,
as opposed to the artificiallamplightof method, provides a clear and distinct
view of a situation,by demandinga thorough-and thoroughlycritical-examinationof all the relevant questions at hand. This is precisely the requirement of Aristotelianphronesis,the virtueappropriateto contingentthings.Vico
defendsAristotleagainstDescartesby pointingto the topical utility of his Categories and by creditinghim with the habit of never defining a thing until he
has looked to see what is in it, eitherinside or outside (Secondariposta4).23 He
also reaffirmsthe Aristotelianjudgment that the aspirationfor mathematical
exactitudein morals is a markof stupidity.The Stoics, whom Vico considers
the ancientequivalentof modem Cartesians,"aimedto disruptthe established
orderand to replacemathematicswith theirpompousmaxim:Sapientiemnihil
opinarF' (Seconda riposta 4). Far from being useful to the community,the
Stoics merelyasserteddoubtfulpropositionsas true,andthus preparedthe way
for skepticism.In Vico's eyes the quest for certaintyis boundto end in despair.
It is a cause of skepticism,and not merely its effect. In the Scienza nuova,Vico
will speakof the destructionwroughtby the "barbarismof reflection,"perhaps

23 Cf. Gadamer,Truthand Method, 317: "Aristotle's

ability to describe phenomenafrom
every aspect constitutes his real genius."

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Robert C. Miner

remindingsome contemporaryreadersof BernardWilliams'sdictum that"reflection can destroyknowledge."24

For Vico, knowledge of the humangood in particularsituationsis a matter
of both contemplationand construction.For human beings constructionassumes a naturalprioritybut does not remove the possibility of contemplation.
It has been emphasizedthatmoralknowledge is a type of construction,despite
the fact thatwe do not wholly constructthe ethical order,the orderof the real.
More than most commentatorsappreciate,Vico fuses the categoriesof practical and constructiveknowledge. Prudentiais not scientia but conscientia, and
so it involves an elementof maker'sknowledge.The activitywhich involves no
makingandis thereforeless certainthaneitherscientia or conscientiais "analysis," which Vico considers the ars divanandi(SR 5). If Vico excluded verumfactum from moralphilosophy,he would be reducingit to the statusof divination; and Vico clearly does not wish to do this. Even as he emphasizes the
difference between practicaland geometricalreasoningagainst Descartes, he
attendsto theircontinuity.All knowledge is an instanceof the convertibilityof
the verum and the factum. Vico both defends prudentia against Cartesianism
and makes a partialbreak with the "ancients"who neglect artes in practical
life, leaving it solely to prudentia.
Thus Vico does not devalue the role of the artificiumin ethics, but he creates a space for the poetic.25Practicalreasonaims at the end to be achievedand
contemplated,but the content of the end is known throughthe constructionof
culturalmodels. R. G. Collingwood, himself influencedby Vico, capturesthis
aspect of verum-factumin his contrastbetween "technique"and "expression."
In the latterthereis "a directedprocess; an effort, that is, directedupon a certain end; but the end is not something foreseen and preconceived, to which
appropriatemeans can be thoughtout in the light of our knowledge of its special character.Expressionis an activity of which therecan be no technique."26
The link between constructionand knowledge of the good, the presence of a
But it
"poetic teleology," lends Vico a distinctively "moder" appearance.27

24 Bernard

Williams, Ethics and the Limitsof Philosophy (Cambridge,Mass., 1985), 148.

Montanari,Vico e la politica dei moderni, 61, emphasizes that "making"for Vico is
something more than technical operation. It is an "attivita creativo-poietica"that does not
intendto "contraporrela poesia e le scienze moralialle scienze naturali,la retoricaalla logica."
Rather,it subsumesthe usual dualitiesin a conception of philosophythatembraces"la volonta
di combatterequelle filosofie che vogliono ridurrela 'potenza creativa'(la fantasia,la prassi)
ad un agire meccanico."
26 R. G. Collingwood, Principles of Art (Oxford, 1938), 111. Quoted in Dunne, Back to
the Rough Ground,63.
27
Compare Milbank, The Religious Dimension, I, 90, which speaks of an "immanent
teleology of art."This is similar to the "expressivism"described in Collingwood, and more
recently in CharlesTaylor, The Ethics of Authenticity(Cambridge,Mass., 1991), 61ff.
25

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73

doesnotassimilatehimto theanti-teleological
stanceof Grotius,Hobbes,and
The
of
"Aristotelian"
prudentiaagainstDescarteswill
Spinoza. appropriation
find parallelexpressionin Vico's critiqueof rationalistethics andjurisprudence, initiatedin the Diritto Universaleand completedin the ScienzaNuova.

Universityof NotreDame.