People v.

Maceren (1977)
Doctrine:The rule-making power must be confined to details for
regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into effect the law as it has
been enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending or
expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not
covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the statute cannot be
sanctioned.
FACTS:
1. In 1969, Buenaventura et. al were caught electro fishing in the
waters of barrio San Pablo Norte, Sta. Cruz. They were charged with
having violated Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1.
2. Municipal court quashed the complaint. CFI affirmed dismissal. Case
came to SC on appeal by the prosecution under RA 5440.
3. Said law penalizes: (1) the use of obnoxious or poisonous
substance, or explosive in fishing; (2) unlawful fishing in deep-sea
fisheries; (3) unlawful taking of marine molusca, (4) illegal taking of
sponges; (5) failure of licensed fishermen to report the kind and
quantity of fish caught, and (6) other violations.
4. As a defense, they argued that the law only contemplated the use
of any obnoxious or poisonous substance in fishing, and that use
of an electric current was not punishable under it. (6) Other
violations, was construed by the SC to only be acts analogous to
the five preceding it).
a. Fisheries Law does not expressly punish electro fishing.
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Fisheries
promulgated AO 84, which expressly prohibited electro
fishing in all Philippine waters.
b. This provision was later amended by Fisheries AO 87, which
limited the regulation to fresh water fisheries. Buenaventura
et. al. now contest the validity of said orders.
ISSUE: WON the Fisheries Administrative Order 84 was within authority
of Secretary to promulgate (NO)
RATIO:
NO, the Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit electro
fishing. As electro fishing is not banned under that law, the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources cannot penalize
it. The AOs are devoid of legal basis.

The rule is that law-making bodies cannot delegate to an executive

official the power to declare what acts should constitute an offense.
It can authorize the issuance of regulations and the imposition of
the penalty provided for in the law itself, in consideration of the fact
that the legislature cannot be expected to contemplate all possible
details and scenarios.

However, these rules cannot extend the law to include something it

clearly does not contemplate. In case of discrepancy between the
basic law and a rule or regulation issued to implement said law, the
basic law prevails because said rule or regulation cannot go beyond
the terms and provisions of the basic law
In RA 5440, electric fishing was not one of the penalized acts. In
fact, an amendatory law PD 704 (promulgated 1975) would later
include electric fishing as a punishable act. This was held to
demonstrate that RA 5440 was deficient in that it failed to
contemplate that mode of fishing.
AO 84 in punishing electro fishing, does not contemplate that such
an offense falls within the category of other violations because the
penalty for electro fishing is the penalty next lower to the penalty
for fishing with the use of obnoxious or poisonous substances, and
is not the same as the penalty for other violations of the law and
regulations fixed in the Fisheries Law.
While there is no questioning the authority of the Secretary to
promulgate the orders, since this is clearly established in Sec. 4 of
the Fisheries Law, it is apparent that he exceeded his authority in
promulgating FAO 84.
UST v. Board of Tax Appeals: The rule-making power must be
confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry
into effect the law as it has been enacted. The power cannot be
extended to amending or expanding the statutory requirements or
to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Rules that subvert
the statute cannot be sanctioned.
The case of State v Miles offers a similar situation where a person
was charged with displaying game (a deer), but the law only
penalized taking game. The doctrine was that in a prosecution for a
violation of an administrative order, it must clearly appear that the
order is one which falls within the scope of the authority conferred
upon the administrative body, and the order will be scrutinized with
special care.
Since the Department Head exercise the rule-making power by
delegation of the lawmaking body, it is a requisite that he should
NOT transcend the bounds demarcated by the statute for the
exercise of such power in his own right and not as a surrogate of the
lawmaking body.

DISPOSITIVE: Case dismissed

Toledo v. CSC (1991)

Doctrine: The power vested in the rule making bodies is to implement
the law or put it into effect, not to add to it; to carry the law into effect
or execution, not to supply perceived omissions in it. The rules cannot
amend an act of Congress.
FACTS:
1. In 1986, Augusto Toledo (57) was appointed by COMELEC Chairman
Ramon Felipe as Manager of the Education and Information
Department of COMELEC.
2. No prior request for exemption from the provisions of Sec. 22 xxx
was secured.
3. He had already been reporting to work when the CSC learned of his
age, prompting them to file a resolution declaring Toledos
appointment as void.
4. The CSC posits that he was in violation of Section 22, Rule III of the
Civil Service Rules on Personnel Action and Policies (CSRPAP), which
states:
SEC. 5. No person shall be appointed, reinstated, or re-employed in
the service if he is already 57 years old, unless the President, or the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, in the case of employees in the
judiciary, determines that he possesses special qualifications
urgently needed by the hiring agency.
When Toledos Motion for Reconsideration was denied, he goes to
the SC by certiorari.
ISSUE: WON Sec. 22 Rule III of the CSRPAP was a valid exercise of the
CSCs rule-making authority. NO
5.

RATIO:
NO, Said section had no basis in law, and thus cannot stand.

There is no provision at all in the law regarding any manner with the
appointment, reinstatement or re-employment in the Government
service of any person of any particular age. The provision on 57
years of age was purely a creation of the Commission, having no
reference to any provision in the decree intended to be
implemented.

The first iteration of Sec. 22 Rule III was in the first CSRPAP (1962),
then found in Sec. 5 Rule VI. This version reads:
o SEC. 5. No person shall be appointed or reinstated in the
service if he is already 57 years old, unless the President of
the Philippines, President of the Senate, Speaker of the
House of Representatives, or the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, as the case may be, determines that he

possesses special qualifications and his services are

needed.
While the statute itself (RA 2260) contained no provisions
prohibiting appointment for reasons of age, it did allow the CSC to,
with the approval by the President, to prescribe, amend, and
enforce suitable rules and regulations for carrying into effect the
provisions of ... the Civil Service Law.
In 1975, PD 807 repealed and amended RA 2260. The assailed
CSRPAP was promulgated to implement this new law. However, PD
807 makes no mention whatsoever of age limitations in Government
service.
Respect for the legislature necessary involves the belief that thenPresident Marcos knew of the age prohibition but chose not to
include it. This demonstrates the intention not to continue the
provision in effect.
Thus, the inclusion of the provision in the CSRPAP was an act of
supererogation since the rule has no relation to or connection
with any provision of the law supposed to be carried into effect. The
section was an addition to or extension of the law, not merely a
mode of carrying it into effect.
The power vested in the CSC is to implement the law or put it into
effect, not to add to it; to carry the law into effect or execution, not
to supply perceived omissions in it. The rules cannot amend an act
of Congress.
CSRPAP was not properly promulgated and thus not binding on
Toledo.
Even assuming it were valid, the provisions therein only allows the
President and the CJ of the SC as the bodies that can allow the
hiring of those past 57. This was taken to mean that the provision
only considers those offices under the direct supervision of the
President and the SC, which naturally excludes the independent
COMELEC.

DISPOSITIVE: Petition Granted

Commission of Internal Revenue v. CA (1995)

Doctrine: A rule that restricts the scope of a law is invalid.
FACTS:
1. In 1986, EO 41 was promulgated, granting a tax amnesty on unpaid
income, estate, donors and business taxes from 1981-1985.
2. ROH Auto Products was assessed as deficient in tax payments by
the CIR, and thus availed of this amnesty, and paid the amnesty
dues.
3. When ROH made notice that it had already availed of the amnesty
and asked that the assessment be withdrawn, the CIR refused.
4. It cited Revenue Memorandum Order No. 4-87, dated 09 February
1987 (which implemented EO 41). Said order construed the
amnesty coverage to include only assessments issued by the BIR
after the promulgation of the EO on 22 August 1986 and not to
assessments theretofore made.
5. ROH protested this, and the CTA and CA ruled in ROHs favor. The
CIR now asks the SC to uphold the Memorandum Order.
ISSUE: WON the memorandum order was valid
RATIO:
NO, the memorandum order unduly restricted the scope of EO
41 to assessments made after its promulgation, since there is
no mention of this in the law proper.

Issuances of the Minister of Finance (now Secretary) must not

override, but must remain consistent and in harmony with, the law
they seek to apply and implement. Administrative rules and
regulations are intended to carry out, not to supply nor to modify,
the law.

The relevant provisions of EO 41 read as follows:

Sec. 1.Scope of Amnesty. A one-time tax amnesty covering

unpaid income taxes for the years 1981 to 1985 is hereby
declared.

The scope of the law expressly considers all unpaid income taxes
from 1981 to 1985. If, as the Commissioner argues, Executive Order
No. 41 had not been intended to include 1981-1985 tax liabilities
already assessed (administratively) prior to 22 August 1986, the law
could have simply so provided in its exclusionary clauses. It did not.
The conclusion is that the EO has been designed to be in the nature
of a general grant of tax amnesty subject only to the
cases specifically excepted by it.

Obiter: It might not be amiss to recall that the taxable periods

covered by the amnesty include the years immediately preceding
the 1986 revolution during which time there had been persistent
calls for civil disobedience, most particularly in the payment of

taxes, to the martial law regime. It should be understandable then

that those who ultimately took over the reins of government
following the successful revolution would promptly provide for a
broad, and not a confined, tax amnesty.
Disposition: Decision of CA, sustaining that of CTA, is affirmed in toto.

Land Bank of the Philippines v. CA (1995)

Doctrine: The rule-making power must be confined to details for
regulating the mode or proceedings to carry into effect the law as it has
been enacted, and it cannot be extended to amend or expand the
statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the
statute.
FACTS:
1 Petitioners DAR and LBP, filed their respective motions for
reconsideration for a decision denying their petition for review on
certiorari contending mainly that, the opening of trust accounts in
favor of the rejecting landowners is sufficient compliance with the
mandate of Republic Act 6657.
2 Private respondents are landowners whose landholdings were
acquired by the DAR and subjected to transfer schemes to qualified
beneficiaries under CARL.
3 Aggrieved by the alleged lapses of the DAR and LBP with respect to
the valuation and payment of compensation for their land, private
respondents filed petition for certiorari and mandamus with prayer
for PMI.
4 Respondents question the validity of DAR AO No. 6 s. 1992
[provides formulas for the valuation of land expropriated] and DAR
AO No. 9 s. 1990 [provides for the opening of trust accounts in the
LBP instead of depositing in an accessible bank, in cash and bonds,
the compensation for land expropriated by the DAR];
5 Ps sought to compel DAR to expedite the pending summary
administrative proceedings to finally determine the just
compensation of their properties, and LBP to deposit in cash and
bonds the amounts respectively reserved and deposited for private
respondents, and to allow them to withdraw the same.
6 In the CA, DAR maintained that
a AO No. 9 is a valid exercise of its rule-making power pursuant to
RA6657.
b "the deposit contemplated by Section 16(e) of Republic Act 6657,
absent any specific indication, may either be general or special,
regular or irregular, voluntary or involuntary (necessary) or other
forms known in law, and any thereof should be, as it is the general
rule, deemed complying."
7 CA granted the petitions for certiorari and mandamus and declared
AO No. 9 null and void; ordered LBP to immediately deposit in the
name of the landowners the just compensation
Issue 1: WON AO No. 9 is valid. NO.

Petitioners: in opting for the opening of a trust account as the

acceptable form of deposit through AO No. 9, DAR did not

commit GAD since it merely exercised its power to promulgate

rules and regulations in implementing the declared policies of
RA 6657.
SC: RA 6657 is clear and provides the details as to how it should
be enacted. Section 16(e) of RA 6657 provides that deposit
must be made only in cash or in LBP bonds.
It cannot be inferred that deposit can be made in any other
form.
The function of promulgating rules and regulations may be
legitimately exercised only for the purpose of caring the
provisions of the law into effect. The power of administrative
agencies is confined to implementing the law or putting it into
effect.
Administrative regulations cannot extend the law and amend a
legislative enactment because as a rule, administrative
regulations must be in harmony with the provisions of the law.
In case there is discrepancy between the basic law and an
implementing rule or regulation, it is the former that prevails.
DAR overstepped its limits. There is no basis in allowing the
opening of a trust account in behalf of the landowner as
compensation for his property because RA 6657 is very clear
that the deposit must be made only in cash or in LBP bonds.
Implementing regulations cannot outweigh the clear provision of
the law.

Issue 2: WON respondents are entitled to withdraw the amounts

deposited in trust in their behalf pending the final resolution of
the cases involving the final valuation of their properties. YES.

There must be full payment of JC before title to the expropriated

property be transferred.
To withhold the right of the landowners to appropriate the
amounts already deposited in their behalf as compensation for
their properties simply because they rejected the DARs
valuation, and notwithstanding that they have already been
deprived of the possession and use of their properties, is an
oppressive exercise of ED.
No need to distinguish between provisional compensation and
final compensation for purposes of exercising the landowners
right to appropriate the same.

Disposition: Petition denied.

GMCR, Inc. v. Bell Telecommunication Philippines, Inc (1997)

Doctrine: The NTCs (or any other similar agency) power is not vested
onto the chairperson.
FACTS:
1. Consolidated petitions seeking the review and reversal of the
decision of CA declaring NTC to be a collegial body under EO No.
546 and ordering the NTC to heretofore sit and act en banc i.e. with
the concurrence of at least two commissioners for valid
dispensation of its quasi-judicial functions.
2. BellTel filed with the NTC an Application for Certificate of Public
Convenience which would allow it to operate and provide
telecommunication services. A hearing was conducted. Some
telecom companies opposed.
3. Later on, it was found that Bells proposal is technically and
financially feasible, and this finding was approved by 2 Deputy
Commissioners of the NTC. The legal department of NTC prepared a
working draft of the order granting provisional authority.
4. Commissioner Kintanar set the case for hearing. During the day of
the hearing, Bell filed a motion praying for the promulgation of the
working draft of the order granting provisional authority since it was
already signed by the 2 DCs.
5. NTC denied the motion in an order solely signed by Kintanar.
6. BellTel now files a Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus, and Prohibition,
seeking the nullification of the order denying the Motion to
Promulgate.
7. CA granted the petition and orders the NTC to sit en banc to consider
the petition. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUES:
WON the NTC is a collegial body requiring a majority vote out of the
three members of the commission in order to validly decide a case or
any incident therein? (YES)
RATIO:
YES; the NTC is a collegial body and its powers is vested in the
commission and NOT on the chairperson. It requires a majority
vote out of the three members of the commission in order to
validly decide a case.

-Commissioner Kintanar is not the NTC. He alone does not speak for and
in behalf of the NTC. The NTC acts through a three-man body, and
the three members of the commission each has one vote to cast in
every deliberation concerning a case or any incident therein that is
subject to the jurisdiction of the NTC.
-This was enunciated by the Supreme Court in the case of Philippine
Consumers Foundation, Inc. versus National Telecommunications
Commission, 131 SCRA 200 when it declared that:
o The Rules of Practice and Procedure promulgated on
January 25, 1978 by the Board of Communications, the
immediate predecessor of respondent NTC govern the
rules of practice and procedure before the BOC then,
now respondent NTC.
-Hence, under its Rules of Procedure and Practice, the Respondent NTC,
as its predecessor, the BOC, had consistently been and remains a
collegial body.
-Respondents Kintanars and NTCs pose that Respondent Kintanar,
alone, is vested with authority to sign and promulgate a Decision of
the NTC is antithetical to the nature of a commission as envisaged in
Executive Order No. 546. It must be borne in mind that a
Commission is defined as:
o [a] body composed of several persons acting under
lawful authority to perform some public service.
o A Commission is also defined as a board or committee of
officials appointed and empowered to perform certain
acts or exercise certain jurisdiction of a public nature or
service. There is persuasive authority that a
commission is synonymous with board
-Indeed, as can be easily discerned from the context of Section 16 of
Executive Order No. 546, the Commission is composed of a
Commissioner and two (2) deputy commissioners not the
commissioner, alone, as pontificated by Kintanar. The conjunctive
word and is not without any legal significance. It is not, by any
chance, a surplusage in the law. It means in addition to. The word
and, whether it is used to connect words, phrases or full
sentence[s], must be accepted as binding together and as relating to
one another.
To designate the two (2) other members of the Commission does not
militate against the collegiality of the NTC. The collegiality of the NTC
cannot be disparaged by the mere nominal designation of the
membership thereof. Indeed, We are convinced that such nominal
designations are without functional implications and are designed
merely for the purpose of administrative structure or hierarchy of the
personnel of the NTC.