NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs.

HON. RAMON G. CODILLA, JR., Presiding Judge, RTC of Cebu, Br. 19,
BANGPAI SHIPPING COMPANY, and WALLEM SHIPPING,
INCORPORATED, Respondents.
G.R. No. 170491; April 4, 2007
Facts:
M/V Dibena Win, a vessel of foreign registry owned and operated by private
respondent Bangpai Shipping, Co., allegedly bumped and damaged
petitioners Power Barge 209 which was then moored at the Cebu
International Port. Thus, petitioner filed before the Cebu RTC a complaint for
damages against private respondent Bangpai Shipping Co., for the alleged
damages caused on petitioners power barges.
Petitioner, after adducing evidence during the trial of the case, filed a formal
offer of evidence before the lower court. Consequently, private respondents
Bangpai Shipping Co. and Wallem Shipping, Inc. filed their respective
objections to petitioners formal offer of evidence.
Public respondent judge later issued the assailed order denying the
admission and excluding from the records petitioners Exhibits and its submarkings. The Court finds merit in the objections raised and the motion to
strike out filed respectively by the defendants. The record shows that the
plaintiff has been given every opportunity to present the originals of the
Xerox or photocopies of the documents it offered. It never produced the
originals. The plaintiff attempted to justify the admission of the photocopies
by contending that the photocopies offered are equivalent to the original of
the document on the basis of the Electronic Evidence. The information in
those Xerox or photocopies was not received, recorded, retrieved or
produced electronically. Moreover, such electronic evidence must be
authenticated, which the plaintiff failed to do. Finally, the required Affidavit to
prove the admissibility and evidentiary weight of the alleged electronic
evidence was not executed, much less presented in evidence. The Xerox or
photocopies offered should, therefore, be stricken off the record. Aside from
their being not properly identified by any competent witness, the loss of the
principals thereof was not established by any competent proof.

The focal point of this entire controversy is petitioners obstinate contention

that the photocopies it offered as formal evidence before the trial court are
the functional equivalent of their original based on its inimitable
interpretation of the Rules on Electronic Evidence.
Petitioner insists that, contrary to the rulings of both the trial court and the
appellate court, the photocopies it presented as documentary evidence
actually constitute electronic evidence based on its own premise that an
electronic document as defined under Section 1(h), Rule 2 of the Rules on
Electronic Evidence is not limited to information that is received, recorded,
retrieved or produced electronically. Rather, petitioner maintains that an
electronic document can also refer to other modes of written expression
that is produced electronically, such as photocopies, as included in the
sections catch-all proviso: any print-out or output, readable by sight or
other means.
Issue:
Whether or not the photocopies are indeed electronic documents as
contemplated in Republic Act No. 8792 or the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of the Electronic Commerce Act, as well as the Rules on
Electronic Evidence?
Held:
No. A perusal of the information contained in the photocopies submitted by
petitioner will reveal that not all of the contents therein, such as the
signatures of the persons who purportedly signed the documents, may be
recorded or produced electronically. By no stretch of the imagination can a
persons signature affixed manually be considered as information
electronically received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or
produced. Hence, the argument of petitioner that since these paper printouts
were produced through an electronic process, then these photocopies are
electronic documents as defined in the Rules on Electronic Evidence is
obviously an erroneous, if not preposterous, interpretation of the law. Having
thus declared that the offered photocopies are not tantamount to electronic
documents, it is consequential that the same may not be considered as the
functional equivalent of their original as decreed in the law.

G.R. No. 168071

December 18, 2006

LUCIANO TAN, petitioner,

vs.
RODIL ENTERPRISES, respondent.

FACTS:
Rodil Enterprises is a lessee of the Ides ORacca Building since 1959
which is owned by the Republic of the Philippines. Rodil and the Republic
entered into a Renewal of a Conttract of Lease through the DENR. A
subsequent Supplementary Contract was similarly entered into extending the
lease agreement until September 1, 1997. The Court upheld the validity of
the May 18 and 25, 1992 contracts when it was placed in several actions
involving Rodil, Ides ORacca Building Tenants Association, Inc., however,
prior to that the office of the President rendered a decision declaring the
Renewal of Contract of Lease and the Supplementary Contract of no force
and effect. Rodil appealed the saem to the CA and SC and was dismissed by
both courts. Rodil filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the CA on the
Order of Execution in which case the CA annulled the Order and enjoined the
Office of the President to abide by the decision in the consolidated cases
which upholds the validity of the Renewal of the Contract of Lease and the
Supplemental Contract. A subsequent Contract of Lease was drawn between
Rodil and the Republic , the same to be effective retroactively from Sept 1,
1997 to August 21, 2012 at a monthly rental of P65, 206.67, subject to the
adjustment upon the approval of the new appraisal covering the building.
Rodil subleased various units to members of the Tenants Association among
them is Tan who rented a space known as Botica Divisoria. Rodil filed a
compliant for Unlawful Detainer against Tan for not paying the monthly
rentals despite repeated oral and written demands. A payment of rentals in
arrears was similarly sought plus the attorneys fees and litigation costs
including the monthly rentals. Tan on the other hand alleged that he is a
legitimate tenant of the government as owner of the building and not Rodil,
and as such he has the right to lease the said premises pending the
disposition and sale of the building. He based his claim from the fact that the
Office of the President had declared the Renewal Contract of Lease and
Supplemental Contract between Rodil and Republic to be without force and

effect. Accordingly thee DENR was directed to award the lease contract on
favor of the Association of which Tan is a member. Thus he prayed for the
dismissal of the complaint.

MeTC issued an order recognizing the an agreement entered into in open

court by Tan and Rodil. Tan also filed a Motion to Allow Defendant to Deposit
Rentals, averring that he had agreed to pay all the rentals due on the
subsequent monthly rentals as they fall due; the rental arrears and that he
would like to deposit the amount to the City Treasurer of Manila. However,
the MeTC denied such deposit and rendered a decision in favor of Rodil and
held that Tan did not contest the sublease on a monthly basis and in fact
admitted the same. Tan appealed the decision to the RTC which reversed and
dismiss the complaint finding that MeTC erred in holding that the offer to
compromise by Tans counsel was akin to an admission of the fact. Rodil filed
a Petiiton for Review with the appellate court which affirmed and reinstated
the decision of the MeTC. A motion for Reconsideration was filed by Tan
however it was denied.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Luciano Tan made a judicial admission annet his liability
as a sub lessee of Rodil Enterprises?

RULING:

Petitioner posits that the aforesaid admission, made in open court, and
then, reiterated in his Motion to Allow Defendant to Deposit Rentals, cannot
be taken as an admission of his liability, citing Section 27, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court, which states, inter alia, that an offer of compromise in a civil
case is not a tacit admission of liability.

The general rule is an offer of compromise in a civil case is not an admission

of liability. It is not admissible in evidence against the offeror.
The rule, however, is not iron-clad. This much was elucidated by this Court
in Trans-Pacific Industrial Supplies, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, to wit:
To determine the admissibility or non-admissibility of an offer to
compromise, the circumstances of the case and the intent of the party
making the offer should be considered. Thus, if a party denies the
existence of a debt but offers to pay the same for the purpose of
buying peace and avoiding litigation, the offer of settlement is
inadmissible. If in the course thereof, the party making the offer admits
the existence of an indebtedness combined with a proposal to settle
the claim amicably, then, the admission is admissible to prove such
indebtedness (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 5, p. 233
[1980 ed.]); Francisco, Rules of Court, Vol. VII, p. 325 [1973 ed.] citing
McNiel v. Holbrook, 12 Pac. (US) 84, 9 L. ed., 1009). Indeed, an offer of
settlement is an effective admission of a borrowers loan balance (L.M.
Handicraft Manufacturing Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 186 SCRA 640
[1990]. x x x.
Similarly, in the case of Varadero de Manila v. Insular Lumber Co.39 the Court
applied the exception to the general rule. In Varadero there was neither an
expressed nor implied denial of liability, but during the course of the abortive
negotiations therein, the defendant expressed a willingness to pay the
plaintiff. Finding that there was no denial of liability, and considering that the
only question discussed was the amount to be paid, the Court did not apply
the rule of exclusion of compromise negotiations.
In the case at bar, the MeTC and the Court of Appeals properly appreciated
petitioners admission as an exception to the general rule of inadmissibility.
The MeTC found that petitioner did not contest the existence of the sublease,
and his counsel made frank representations anent the formers liability in the
form of rentals. This expressed admission was coupled with a proposal to
liquidate. The Motion to Allow Defendant to Deposit Rentals was deemed by
the MeTC as an explicit acknowledgment of petitioners liability on the
subleased premises. The Court of Appeals agreed with the MeTC. Indeed, the
existence of the Contract of Lease, dated 18 October 1999 was not denied by
petitioner.

Finally, we find a categorical admission on the part of petitioner, not only as

to his liability, but also, as to the amount of indebtedness in the form of
rentals due. The Order of the MeTC dated 27 June 2000 was clear that the
petitioner agreed in open court to pay the amount of P440,000.00,
representing petitioners unpaid rentals from September 1997 to June 2000;
and that petitioner will pay the monthly rentals computed at P13,750.00 on
or before the 5th day of each month after 30 June 2000. The petitioners
judicial admission in open court, as found by the MeTC, and affirmed by the
Court of Appeals finds particular significance when viewed together with his
Motion to Allow Defendant to Deposit Rentals, wherein petitioner stated that
the rentals due on the premises in question from September 1997 up to the
present amounted to P467,500.00, as of the date of filing the Motion.
Petitioner cannot now be allowed to reject the same. An admission made in
the pleading cannot be controverted by the party making such admission
and are conclusive as to him, and that all proofs submitted by him contrary
thereto or inconsistent therewith should be ignored whether objection is
interposed by a party or not.40 A judicial admission is an admission made by
a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, for purposes of
the truth of some alleged fact, which said party cannot thereafter disprove.41
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 21 October 2002
and the Resolution dated 12 May 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 67201, affirming
and reinstating the 6 October 2000 Decision of the MeTC in Civil Case No.
166584 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

G.R. No. 169016

January 31, 2007

CAPITOL WIRELESS, INC. Petitioner,

vs.
CARLOS ANTONIO BALAGOT, Respondent.
FACTS:
Capitol Wireless, Inc. (Capwire) hired Carlos Antonio Balagot (Balagot) as
collector on September 16, 1987. Carlos is required to work outside the office
and Capwire assigned to him a motorcycle as a service vehicle, for which it
shouldered expenses for gasoline and maintenance. Balagot was discovered
to have been rendering services to China Bank and that since 1992, Carlos
had been concurrently employed with Contractual Concepts, Inc. (CCI), a
local manpower company, which assigned him to render messengerial
services to China Bank in the same year. Capwire terminated his services on

the ground of grave misconduct and willful breach of trust and confidence.
Capwire contends that the time of work of Balagot to other companies
overlaps with his work at Capwire. Balagot admitted the charge but he filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal against Capwire and its President Epifanio
Marquez.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Balagot was illegally dismissed
HELD:
Verily, jurisprudence recognizes as a valid ground for dismissal of an
employees unauthorized use of company time. And from the evidence
presented, Balagot used the company vehicle in pursuing his own interests,
on company time and deviating from his authorized route without
permission. Capwire has all the right and reason to cry foul as this is a clear
case of moonlighting and using the companys time, money, and equipment
to render service to another company. The court said that there is no denying
that taking on double job per se is not illegal according to the Labor Code, as
extra income would go a long way for an ordinary worker like Balagot. The
only limitation is where one job overlaps with the other in terms of time
and/or poses a clear case of conflict of interest as to the nature of business
of complainants two employers. The contention of Balagot that he is working
for China Bank after 5:00 pm is untenable because he was sighted by the HR
director within the premises of the bank at 3:35 pm and as general
knowledge, the banking industry follows the ordinary working hours from
8:00 am to 5:00 pm and a bank has no use for an employee who can only be
of service to it after 5:00 pm.
HEIRS OF PEDRO PASAG
v.
SPOUSES LORENZO and FLORENTINA PAROCHA
FACTS:
An action for Declaration of Nullity of Documents and Title and Recovery of
Possession and Ownership was filed by petitioners against Spouses Lorenza
and Florentina Parocha. Petitioners, during trial, were given 10 days to
submit their formal offer of documentary exhibits and having failed to do so,
the trial court considered such as a waiver of their right to make a formal
offer of evidence. Court of Appeals affirmed
ISSUE:

Whether or not there was a waiver of the right to make their formal offer of
evidence.
HELD:
Emphasis must be had on the necessity of a formal offer of evidence to
enable judges to support their findings of facts and their judgment only and
strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties at the trial. Failure to submit
within a considerable period of time is a considered a waiver. There is a
considerable difference between identification of documentary evidence and
its formal offer. The former is done in the course of the pre-trial, and trial is
accompanied by the marking of the evidence as an exhibit; while the latter is
done only when the party rests its case.

G.R. No. 136388

March 14, 2006

ANICIA RAMOS-ANDAN, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

Facts:
Pablito Andan alias "Bobby" was accused of the crime of rape with
homicide. The offense was committed on February 19, 1994 in Baliuag,
Bulacan; the victim being Marianne Guevarra, 22 and a 2nd year student at
the Fatima School of Nursing.
On said day, victim left her home for her school dormitory in
Valenzuela. While on her way, appellant invited her to his house. He used
the pretext that the blood pressure of his wife's grandmother should be
taken. Marianne agreed to do so as the old woman was her distant relative.
She did not know that nobody was inside the house. Appellant then punched
her in the abdomen, brought her to the kitchen and raped her. By night time,
Marianne, who was still unconscious, was dragged by appellant to their
backyard that was adjacent to a vacant lot. Appellant was to transfer
Marianne to the vacant lot when she moved, prompting appellant to hit her
head with a piece of concrete block. No longer moving, he dragged her to

the lot and abandoned her. At 11am her body was discovered. The autopsy
revealed that she died of "traumatic injuries."
Marianne's gruesome death drew public attention and prompted
Baliuag Mayor Cornelio Trinidad to form an investigation team. The
investigation pointed to the appellant. Appellant's nearby house was
searched but he was not there. On February 24, a police team led by Mayor
Trinidad traced appellant in his parents' house. They took him and brought
him to the police headquarters where he was interrogated. Initially, he
denied any knowledge of Marianne's death. However, when the police
confronted him with evidence, appellant relented but implicated two of his
neighbours, and that he was merely a lookout. Larin and Dizon were likewise
brought there by the police. The following day a physical examination
conducted on the suspects revealed that appellant has multiple scratches on
the neck, chest and back.
By that time, people and media representatives were already at the
police headquarters awaiting the results of the investigation. Mayor Trinidad
arrived. Upon seeing the mayor, appellant approached him and whispered
that they talk privately. The mayor led him to the office of the Chief of Police
and there, he broke down and said "Mayor, patawarin mo ako! I will tell you
the truth. I am the one who killed Marianne." The mayor opened the door of
the room to let the public and media representatives witness the confession.
Since no lawyer was available he ordered the proceedings photographed and
videotaped. In the presence of the mayor, the police, representatives of the
media and appellant's own wife and son, appellant confessed his guilt. He
asked for forgiveness from Larin and Dizon whom he falsely implicated
saying he did it because of ill-feelings against them. He also said that the
devil entered his mind because of the pornographic magazines and tabloid
he read almost everyday. After his confession, appellant hugged his wife and
son and asked the mayor to help him. His confession was captured on
videotape and covered by the media nationwide.
On arraignment, however, appellant entered a plea of "not guilty." He
testified that on said date he was at his parent's house for the birthday party
of his nephew. He, his wife and son went home after 5pm, slept at 8pm, and
woke up at 6am the next day. Appellant claimed that after he was picked up
by the police on February 24, he was coerced to confess that he raped and
killed Marianne. Fearing for his life, appellant did as he was told.
The trial court convicted the appellant and sentenced him to death. He
was found guilty of the crime charged in the Information (Rape with
Homicide) and penalized accordingly. Hence, the automatic review.

Issue:
W/N the appellants confession not being assisted by a counsel is in
violation of the constitution, and is therefore inadmissible as evidence
against him.
Held:
Under these circumstances, it cannot be successfully claimed that
appellant's confession before the mayor is inadmissible. It is true that a
municipal mayor has "operational supervision and control" over the local
police and may arguably be deemed a law enforcement officer for purposes
of applying Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. However,
appellant's confession to the mayor was not made in response to any
interrogation by the latter. In fact, the mayor did not question appellant at
all. No police authority ordered appellant to talk to the mayor. It was
appellant himself who spontaneously, freely and voluntarily sought the
mayor for a private meeting. The mayor did not know that appellant was
going to confess his guilt to him. When appellant talked with the mayor as a
confidant and not as a law enforcement officer, his uncounseled confession
to him did not violate his constitutional rights. Thus, it has been held that
the constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a
spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities,
but given in an ordinary manner whereby appellant orally admitted having
committed the crime. What the Constitution bars is the compulsory
disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions. The rights under Section 12
are guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion by the state as
would lead the accused to admit something false, not to prevent him from
freely and voluntarily telling the truth. Hence we hold that appellant's
confession to the mayor was correctly admitted by the trial court.
Appellant's confessions to the media were likewise properly admitted.
The confessions were made in response to questions by news reporters, not
by the police or any other investigating officer. We have held that
statements spontaneously made by a suspect to news reporters on a
televised interview are deemed voluntary and are admissible in evidence.
The Court therefore held accused-appellant Pablito Andan guilty of the
special complex crime of rape with homicide.

Facts: On December 7, 1988, an altercation between Benigno Torzuela and

Atty. Napoleon Dulay occurred at the Big Bang Sa Alabang, Alabang Village,

Muntinlupa as a result of which Benigno Torzuela, the security guard on duty

at the said carnival, shot and killed Atty. Napoleon Dulay. Petitioner Maria
Benita A. Dulay, widow of the deceased Napoleon Dulay, in her own behalf
and in behalf of her minor children, filed an action for damages against
Benigno Torzuela and private respondents Safeguard and/or Superguard,
alleged employers of defendant Torzuela. Respondent Superguard filed a
Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the complaint does not state a valid
cause of action. Superguard claimed that Torzuelas act of shooting Dulay
was beyond the scope of his duties, and that since the alleged act of
shooting was committed with deliberate intent (dolo), the civil liability
therefor is governed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code. Superguard
further alleged that a complaint for damages based on negligence under
Article 2176 of the New Civil Code, such as the one filed by petitioners,
cannot lie, since the civil liability under Article 2176 applies only to quasioffenses under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. In addition, the
respondent argued that petitioners filing of the complaint is premature
considering that the conviction of Torzuela in a criminal case is a
condition sine qua non for the employers subsidiary liability. Respondent
Safeguard also filed a motion praying that it be excluded as defendant on the
ground that defendant Torzuela is not one of its employees. Petitioners
opposed both motions, stating that their cause of action against the private
respondents is based on their liability under Article 2180 of the New Civil
Code. Respondent judge declared that the complaint was one for damages
founded on crimes punishable under Articles 100 and 103 of the Revised
Penal Code as distinguished from those arising from, quasi-delict.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not Torzuela s act of shooting Napoleon Dulay constitutes a
quasi-delict actionable under Article 2176 of the New Civil Code;
(2) Whether or not Article 33 of the New Civil Code applies only to injuries
intentionally committed; and
(3) Whether or not the liability or respondents is subsidiary under the
Revised Penal Code.
Held:
(1) Yes. Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides that whoever by act or
omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no
pre-existing contractual relation between the parties is called a quasi-delict
and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. Contrary to the theory of
private respondents, there is no justification for limiting the scope of Article

2176 of the Civil Code to acts or omissions resulting from negligence. Wellentrenched is the doctrine that article 2176 covers not only acts committed
with negligence, but also acts which are voluntary and intentional.
(2) No. The term physical injuries in Article 33 has already been construed
to include bodily injuries causing death. It is not the crime of physical injuries
defined in the Revised Penal Code. It includes not only physical injuries but
also consummated, frustrated, and attempted homicide. Although in the
Marcia case, it was held that no independent civil action may be filed under
Article 33 where the crime is the result of criminal negligence, it must be
noted, however, that Torzuela, the accused in the case at bar, is charged
with homicide, not with reckless imprudence, whereas the defendant
in Marcia was charged with reckless imprudence. Therefore, in this case, a
civil action based on Article 33 lies.
(3) No. Under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, when an injury is caused by
the negligence of the employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law
that there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the
selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after
selection or both. The liability of the employer under Article 2180 is direct
and immediate; it is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the
negligent employee and a prior showing of the insolvency of such employee.
Therefore, it is incumbent upon the private respondents to prove that they
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of their employee.