Learning from the past

Failures during
and after construction
Both design and construction errors are identified
BY DOV KAMINETZKY
PARTNER
FELD, KAMINETZKY AND COHEN, P.C.

Large-scale structural failure is a nightmare that haunts

the construction industry. The financial devastation, the
demolished reputations and the loss of life that could re sult from a collapse have troubled the sleep of probably
e ve ry architect, engineer, contractor or owner at some
time.
This frightening quality of failures almost guarantees
that they will continue to happen. Fear, embarrassment
and the gag of interminable lawsuits have kept informa tion on failure from traveling quickly enough, what little
of it ever gets into general circulation at all.
The way to dispel a nightmare is to attack it with hard
fact, with eyes open wide and the mind alert. . . . avail ability of complete and accurate information could be the
first step towards shaking the dread of collapse.
Engineering News-Record, June 4, 1981

These timely remarks underscore some of the problems confronting our firm during more than five
decades of investigating both major and minor construction failures. A few cases are presented here in the
hope of furthering the understanding and awareness
needed to prevent such disasters.
The term failure indicates not only structural collapse
but a wide range of nonconformity with design expectations or requirementssuch as unwanted settlements, deformations, cracks, bulges and misalignments.
If one takes time to measure the shape, position, and
condition of completed stru c t u re s, many failures to
comply with good design and construction practice
could be found.
Many recent failures can be traced to:
errors in reading drawings
design errors
sloppy construction practices
poor communication between designer and contractor
inadequate construction supervision

Accordingly, failures can be reduced by more competence in design, construction, and construction supervision. The possibility of a major error in design actually
getting through the construction phase is indeed remote, considering all of the stages of checks and controls in design, estimating, detailing, field supervision,
and construction through which a job must go. In concrete construction, fortunately, there is a certain amount
of informal load testing inherent in the construction
process itself and collapses are much more common
during construction than after completion and full occupancy.
It is natural, when forms and slabs collapse during
concreting, to assume that the formwork was at fault.
This is not always true; the collapse of one 4-story concrete structure was thought at first to be caused by form
failure, but later investigation showed that some of the
exterior wall columns were not on the solid rock assumed in the design plans. A column settled, became ino p e ra t i ve, and the slabs collapsed. Other cases have
been reported in which slabs collapsed due to weakness
caused by duct openings at high-stress points. When
lower floor slabs collapse they carry upper floor forms
with them, and the situation sometimes looks like a
formwork failure until a closer study is made.

Torsional cracking in slabs

Unstiffened edge slabs of flat plate floors require top
reinforcement at exterior edges to prevent torsional
cracking at the stiff connection to the column. Columns
should be so located as to avoid reentrant corners at exterior edges of flat plates that have shallow beams or no
beams at all. The load transfer will induce high torsional stress in the slab edge or the face of the shallow spandrel and split it near the column. In a 16-story apartment
where this recommendation was disregarded, bearing
piers were later added to provide direct support at the
reentrant corners and neutralize the torsional moment.
In a 40-story apartment of similar layout, flat slabs

exhibited cracking at the columns. The use of bearing

walls as a remedy was out of the question, and structural steel brackets were bolted to the column face to provide similar support for the corner. One floor slab with

cracked area rebuilt was subjected to a load test and it

failed after 22 hours with a full load. Another load test
made after adding the brackets was quite successful.
This added support detail was provided at eight columns
on each of the upper levels (Figure 1). Self-anchoring
bolts were set into drilled holes 10 inches deep, and each
bolt was tested for pullout resistance to twice the design
requirement. The proof tests were all satisfactory.

Shear failure caused by construction error

Figure 1. Torsional shear failure at column near reentrant

slab edges. Solution shown here involved repair followed by
installation of supplementary support brackets attached to
column to resist the twisting action.

A thre e - ye a r-old concrete plaza deck, serving as the

roof of a garage, collapsed in New York without warning, crashing down on parked cars. The roof consisted
of a 16-inch-deep waffle slab with 3 feet of earth cover.
About half of a symmetrical entrance plaza, an area 45 x
50 feet, failed. The other half remained in place, apparently in sound condition. Failure was a clean punching
shear, with little effect beyond the shear cut.
In spite of the builders long experience with this type
of construction, the 12-inch-deep concrete caps that
should have extended 10 inches beyond the column
faces had been omitted at all of the columns in the failure area (Figure 2). They had also been omitted at all of
the nine columns in the symmetrical area that did not
fail. The only difference in conditions between these two
areas was a stopped-up drain in the failed area. This resulted in a frozen earth cover on the deck that failed; the
other half of the deck was well drained. The factor of
safety for three years had been 1.05.
The failed slab was reconstructed with column heads
and new columns; the other half of the deck was considerably strengthened by new girders, capitals, and column jackets.

Shear failure: design or construction error?

At first glance, the tragic failure described next resembled a formwork collapse. Howe ve r, it was determined
that it resulted from excessive punching shear in the flat

BASIC RULES FOR PREVENTING

CONSTRUCTION FAILURES
1. Gravity always worksif you dont provide permanent support, something will fall.
2. Chain reaction will make a small fall into a large failure, unless you can afford a fail-safe design, where sufficient reserve support is available when one component fails.
3. It requires only a small error or oversight, in design, in
detail, in material strength, in assembly, or in protective
measures, to cause a large failure.
4. Eternal vigilance is necessary to avoid small errors. If
there are no capable foremen on the job and in the design office, then supervision must take over the chore of
local control. Inspection service and construction management cannot be relied upon as a secure substitute.

5. Just as a ship cannot be run by two captains, a construction job must be run by one individualnot by a
committee. That individual must have full authority to
plan, direct, hire and fire; and full responsibility for production and safety.
6. Good craftsmanship is needed on the part of the designer, the vendor, and the constructor teams.
7. Some designs are unbuildable. Attempts to produce
architectural gems may stretch the limit of safe buildability even with our most sophisticated equipment
and techniques.
8. There is no foolproof design, there is no foolproof
construction methodwithout careful control.
9. The best way to generate a failure on your job is to
d i s re g a rd the lessons to be learned from failures of
others.

Figure 3. Columns remained standing following collapse of flat plate floors in this
office building. Probable failure cause was excessive punching shear in the flat plates
where reinforcement continuity was interrupted at some of the columns.
Figure 2. The roof of this parking garage in New York City
collapsed suddenly three years after construction.
Immediate cause of failure: a plugged drain in the earth
cover above. With water unable to drain from the soil, the
weight on the garage roof increased, precipitating the
collapse. Key reason for failure: the contractor failed to
construct the called-for concrete cap at the top of each
column. In looking at a plan view of the engineering
drawings, the contractor mistook the lines representing the
concrete cap for the outline of the spread footing. Had
there been better field inspection of this job, or had the
drawings been clearer, this failure might have been
prevented.

plates at the columns.

Reinforced concrete flat plate floors (no column capitals or drop panels) were 10 inches thick, supported on
square columns spaced 24 feet on centers in both directions. Columns rested on concrete-filled pipe piles driven to bedrock. Typical columns were 25 inches square
at the basement level, decreasing to 20 inches square between the second and fourth floors.
First and second floors were several weeks old at the
time of the accident, and forms and shores had been removed. The third floor concrete was at least 20 days old;
forms had been removed. The slab was reshored to the
second floor, and was carrying the formwork for the
fourth floor. Concrete had been placed in the fourth
floor forms only a short while when most of the east
wing, an area about 72 x 144 feet, dropped all the way to
the cellar. The other three wings were little damaged except where they adjoined the collapsed section.
Significantly, almost all of the columns remained
standing full height after the collapse (Figure 3). Top-story column forms remained in place and very little reinforcement projected from the free-standing columns at
any floor level. Plans indicated 10 x 14-inch duct openings in the slab along two adjacent faces of some interi-

or columns, which of course prevented slab steel from

running through the columns. The design called for a
complex reinforcement assembly around each interior
column within the slab thickness, but how these assemblies could be placed within the zone of high shear and
still permit the duct openings was not clear.

Inadequate mudsills under shoring

Workmen were placing concrete for the second floor
of a building addition when steel shoring supporting
the area collapsed and eight workmen fell 20 feet to the
basement level. The foundations for the shoring were
16-inch-wide pieces of plywood cut at random lengths.
Because of the flexibility of the wood, soil pressure under the shoring towers was approximately 5 tons per
square foot, or 5 times what the ground could adequately support.
The soil in the construction area was muddy due to
heavy rains prior to the accident. This produced differential settlement of adjacent legs of shoring towers (Fig-

Figure 4. Wet soil conditions, inadequate mudsills and shore

loads five times what the ground could adequately support
led to shoring collapse.

Figure 5. Spall
at bearing
surface on
precast beam
supporting
hollow core
slab.

Figure 7. Parapet section, weakened by cracking,

blew off in high wind.

Figure 6. Precast
parapet sections
cracked because of
restraint at welded
connections.

Figure 8. Cracking in stem of tee beam where weld to

supporting steel girder restrained movement.
ure 4). When settling occurred, it caused stress changes
in the entire framework and led to collapse, the investigation concluded.

Cracking and failures of precast

concrete elements
The first instance of cracking and distress of precast
and/or prestressed concrete structures due to end restraint appeared on the U.S. scene some 30 years ago.
The same type of failure has occurred repeatedly in
many forms and shapes, but with one consistent result:
serious damage to concrete stru c t u re s, often causing
millions in financial losses. There have also been several cases of total collapse where the seriousness of the initial distress was not recognized in time. Here, the cracking developed further and increased in such magnitude
to cause total loss of the shear resistance at the supporting ends. Why this constant recurrence and the failure to
heed repeated warnings?
Partly because of legal restrictions imposed by some
clients to bury the facts in case of embarrassing circumstances of loss of taxpayers money, but more important is the fact that insufficient publicity has been

Figure 9. Laboratory test of full-scale notched beam

resulted in failure at load much below that anticipated by
designer.
given to alert the construction industry to the serious
dangers inherent in providing end restraint to precast elements. The damage is often magnified when this restraint is coupled with the introduction of notches and
brackets. A few case histories will be presented to fill the
existing void of knowledge on this subject.

Case 1: A complex in the New York area was built in the

late 1970s of hollow-core precast prestressed slabs bearing on precast concrete walls and beams. At the typical
floors, spans at the bearing surfaces appeared as edge
loading occurred (Figure 5). At the lowe r- g a rage level
precast girders cracked as a result of restraint provided
by end welding plates. Tensile stresses developed at the
nonconfined edges. Edge spalling occurred here, too. On
the roof, precast parapet sections were welded at their
ends thereby causing restraint, limiting their movement,
and generating tensile stresses as a result of contractions
due to shrinkage and temperature. These tensile stresses exceeded the strength of the panels, which cracked at
their ends (Figure 6). One parapet unit was so weakened
that a heavy wind totally blew it off the roof (Figure 7).
Case 2: A school structure in the East was constructed
in the late 1970s of precast double tee panels supported
on a structural steel frame. The tees were supported on
either the top or bottom flanges of the steel girders. Alternate stems of the tees were welded at their ends to the
supporting girders. For economic reasons the construction stopped and the partially completed structure was
exposed to environmental effects for a great length of
time. As a result, many of the welded stems cracked, with
predominant cracking at the stems having reduced sections resulting from bottom notches or top flange blocking (Figure 8). Here again the welding at the ends restrained the panels from movement and rotation,
resulting in serious damage that had to be corrected by
p re s s u re-injected epoxy supplemented by steel shear
plates.
Case 3: A hospital structure constructed in the early
1960s of precast concrete elements had beams notched
at each end, bearing on concrete brackets cast as part of
the precast columns. Shortly after construction serious
cracks developed in both the notched beams and the
column brackets. The cracks were so severe that a fullscale notched beam was tested in a laboratory and failed
at rather a lower load than expected by the design (Figure 9). The structure was repaired by adding steel cradle
plates at a very high cost.
Case 4: Cracks developed in the stems of a precast roof
structure of a school built in the West in the late 1950s. In
1980, a section of the roof of the auditorium consisting of
approximately 18 prestressed concrete double tee joists,
(approximately 38 x 70 feet in area) fell from the center of
the roof to the floor below (Figure 10). The collapsed
portion of the roof framing consisted of factory fabricated pretensioned prestressed lightweight concrete double tee joists spanning 40 feet between prestressed concrete girders. The joists were notched to fit on girder
ledges with tops of both elements at roughly the same elevation. To meet seismic requirements for a roof diaphragm, flange shear connectors were welded, typically every 6 feet. Similar connections were provided from
tee flanges to side walls.

Figure 10. Collapse of part of a school roof structure in

which precast prestressed joists were too tightly restrained
to allow for the long-term shortening which occurs in such
members. Also shown is a typical crack observed in double
tee joists in adjacent spans.

The design also required that each stem of each double tee be welded at both ends at the steel-to-steel seat
level, and a plate in the center of each end of the flange
was welded to an insert plate in the support beams.
Thus, the double tees were tightly restrained at each end.
Hardly any supplementary reinforcement was provided
in the notched ends, and neither the amount nor location would conform to current recommendations on
connection design.
A state of California Advisory Bulletin (March 16, 1981)
describes the problem: A potentially hazardous condition may exist in certain buildings which were constructed using precast pretensioned prestressed concrete framing members. This condition may exist where
inadequate provision was made to allow for the effects of
long-term shortening which occurs in such members.
The result of this hazardous condition can be structural
failure and collapse.
Summary: After more than 30 years of misuse and
misunderstanding of the behavior of precast prestressed
concrete elements, we believe the following should now
be clear:
Brackets and notched beams could be designed and
constructed properly and eventually perform well in
s e rv i c e. These elements may be reinforced by either
post-tensioning and inducing compression in the direction of the expected tensile stresses or by placing
mild reinforcement to close tolerances at all surfaces

and reentrant corners. In any event, in order to avoid the

damage described above, the concrete elements should
be allowed to move sufficiently to reduce the possibility
of the development of tensile stresses and the resulting
cracks.
Most important, horizontal precast concrete elements
should not be welded at both ends, but rather allowed
to move and rotate, so as to avoid considerable damage
by cracking. Rigidity for lateral loads such as wind and
earthquake may be provided by reinforcing bars grouted or cast in concrete.
Elastomeric bearing pads should permit hori zo n t a l
and vertical movement and rotations and should not
be placed directly at the edges of the bearing surfaces.
To simplify the message: (1) Avoid brackets and notches where possible; (2) Do not weld both ends of precast
elements; and (3) Avoid bearing on unconfined edges.

in this article represent only the tip of a dangerous icebergone that is all too often concealed as litigation to
assign liability proceeds. Facts that would be beneficial
may be mothballed for years, while the same errors are
repeated. Although this learning process may be delayed, it must not be stopped. All members of the construction teamdesigners, builders, and materials suppliersmust become involved in learning from these
experiences.

Acknowledgement
The basic rules for preventing construction failures and the
case of shear failure due to construction error were adapted
from Dov Kaminetzkys article, Structural Failures and How
to Prevent Them, in the August 1976 issue of Civil Engineering. These basic rules were originally formulated by the
late Jacob Feld, founder of Feld, Kaminetzky & Cohen.

Conclusions
Some of the general conclusions we have reached
through many first-hand failure investigations are presented here in the basic rules. The few examples given

PUBLICATION #C810641
Copyright 1981, The Aberdeen Group
All rights reserved