Political Science:

X ? J ~7

PAULPIERSONA N D THEDASKOCPOL

1
I

Historical institutionalism in
Contemborary Political Science

Ira Katznelson and Helen V. Milner, editors

Columbia University

Like the character in Molicre's play who spoke prose all his life without
knowing it, contemporary
scientists are familiar wit11 leading examples of historical institutionalist rescarch without necessarily realizing
that they exemplify a cohcrent gcnrc-mucll as tlo works in the other two
major rcscarch apl~roacliespracticed in clnpirical political science, surveybased behavioralis~nant1 rational-clioicc modeling. tiistorical institutionalists analyzc organizational and institutional configurations where others
look at particular scttings in isolation; and they pay attention to critical
junctures and long-tcnu processes whcre others look only at slices of time
or short-term maneuvers. Researching important issues in this way, historical institutionalists make visible and understandable the overarching contexts and interacting processes that shape and reshape states, politics, and
public policymaking.
Stephen Skowronek's The Politics Presidents Make (1993), for example, reveals recurrent cycles in the nature a11c1 success of presidential leadership throughout U.S. history. Anotlicr long-tern1 study in American
politics, John Mark Hansen's Gaining Access: Congress and the Farm
Lobby, 1919-1981 (1991), dcvelops a nlodel of interest group interaction
with government and uses it to explain the emergence, persistence, and ultimate eclipse of the political influence of national farmers' associations.
Ranging across nations as well as time, Peter A. Hall's 1986 book Govem-

ing the Economy: The Politics of State intervention in Britain and France
explains how institutions and orga~lizationsintersect to shape not just the
policies of governments but also the strategies and alliances of interest
groups and public intellectuals. Painting on even grander canvases, Shap-

W. W. Norton & Company

American Political Science Association

NEWYORK( LONDON

WASHINGTON,
D.C.

ing the Political Arena: Critical lunctures, the Labor Movement, and
Regime Dynamics in Latin America by Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier (1991) and Birth of the Leviathan: Building States and Regimes in
Early Modem Europe by Thomas Ertman (1997) explain regime dynamics
and the varied formations of modern national states. In the study of international relations, Activists Beyond Borders by Margaret Keck and Kathryn

Sikkink (1998) analyzes the historical roots and contelnporary poliferation

of t r a ~ l ~ n a t i o n aad\,ocacy
l
networks, \vhile Judith Goldstein's Ideas, Interests, and American ' k d e Policy (1993) shows how the institutionalization
of policy ideas at an earlier j ~ ~ n c t ~had
~ r lasting
e
conseqoences for subsequent U.S. trade measures.
TlIese are but a few of Inany possible citations, for historical institutionalist studies have cumulated to provide wide-ranging as well as causally
precise understandings of sue11 important matters as transitio~lsto democracy,' tlic elnergcnce and derl~iseof authoritarian reginles,? the iiitersection of domestic and international politics,z the origins and development
of lvelfare states,' social identities in politics,i the ~ o l i t i c a ldvnamics of
gender rigl~ts,"the developme~ltof e e o ~ i o ~ r lregimes,'
ic
a n d the causes a n d
consequences of social illoveme~ltsand revolutions."
Obviously, studies using historical-institutionalist strategies of a~lalysis
vary in many iillporta~ltways. Some are explicitly comparative, while 0thers analyze trends within just olie macrocontcxt. Soine offer s~iggestiveinterpretations (e.g., Hart 1994). while others develop explicit ~ ~ i o t l eframed
ls
in general terms (e.g., Hansen 1991; Luong 2002). Sonic Iiistoricalillstitutionalist studies draw exte~lsivelyfrom primary sources (e.g., G a m ~ n
1999), while others synthesize findings from secondary publications (e.g.,
Skocpol 1979; Downing 1992). And sollle deploy a r g u n c ~ l t sabout strate1. See, for ex:unplc, Anderso~~
1999; Baloyra 1987; Brattoll and V:ul de MJ;~llc
1995: Diamond 1999b: Downing 1992; Gor~ld1999: Haggard and Kaufinan 1995;
R ~ e s c h e m e ~ eStephens,
r,
and Stephens 1992; and Yashar 1997. A comprehensive
review of hypothesis testing and c u n ~ ~ ~ l a ttheoretical
ive
developmel~tin this field
y
appears in M a h o ~ ~ e2002.
2. Examples include Chehahi and Linz 1998; Doyle 1986a; Ekiert 1996; Im 1987;
M a h o ~ ~ e2001;
y and S ~ ~ ? d1998.
e r For further review of the literature, see Mal~oney
2002.
3. Examples include Friedherg 2000,

tially, within any particular slice of time. Historically informed iiivestigati011 also sensitizes investigators to teinporal I~ouiidaryconditio~isor pcriod
effects, with respect to claims about causal relationships. By cxanlining a
wider range of historical settings, an analyst can consider t l ~ e~)ossibilit]\.
that supposedly universal effects in fact only llold under particular circumstances.
Historical investigations can also contribute to causal inferciice. Because thcorctically grounded assertio~~s
of causal relationships imply temporal relationships among variables (either that one precedes the other or
that both happen at esseiitially the same tinle), examining historical sequences is extremely useful for testing such assertions (Rucschemeyer and
Stephens 1997; Mahoiley 2000b). Optinlally, assertio~~s
of causality should
be borne out ilot just by a correlatioil between tivo variables but also by a
tl~eoreticalaccount showing why this linkage should exist and by evidence
suggestiiig support for the theorized linkage. Althougll social research does
not always achieve this ideal, efforts to syste~naticallytrace social processes
can make an essential contributio~~
to the rigorous assessment of claims
about social causation (Hennett and George 1997; Hall 2002). Here the
o n a l call
relatively small nuniber of cases in many llistorical i ~ ~ s t i t ~ ~ t istudies
become an advantage, allowing for exactly the sorts of detailed exa~ninations of processes needed to evaluate clainis about causal inechanislns.
Important as these gencral methodological advantages are, historical
institutionalists are also pushing beyond the111to theorize about historicuf
dimelzsions of cuz~satiolz.As we are about to see, historical institutionalist.,~Iists
have recently begun to underline the theoretical power of their dvizamic
approach to social change and politics. Without the kincl of attentiveness to
temporally sl~ecifiedprocess that is a distinctive hallmark of historicalinstitutionalist scholarship, important outcomes may go unobserved,
causal relationships may be misunderstood, and v a l ~ ~ a hhypotheses
le
may
never receive consideration.

ists, whose studies thus contribute empirical substance to debates raging

among political theorists. What is illore, research ager~dassl~apedby historical institutionalists may draw considerable interest from formal theorists
and behavioralists. 'I'he literature on the development of modern welf~l-e
states exemplifies ~nultipleforins of bridging. Normative concerns about
equalib, democracy, and liberty are frankly acknowledged and explored in
this literature. And because research illvariably focuses on major, realworld developments and dilemmas-as historical institutionalists preferchoice theorists and survey researchers have been drawn into academic
dialogues remarkably free of sterile paradigm disputes. Theoretical and
methodological dialogues have been higllly fruitfiil, and particular studies
often combine inlodes of analysis (see the literature reviews in Anienta
2002; Pierson 2000d). With historical institutionalists playing a central
role, the entire research c o ~ n m u n i bhas used a full rallge of methods and
research designs to develop ever sharper and broader explanations-and
richer normative understandings-of the origins and dynamics of national
syste~nsof eco~lomicreg~lationand social provision. Everyone seems to realize that theoretical eclecticism, inl~ltipleanalytic techniques, and a broad
colliparative and historical purview works best.

Tracing Historical Processes

Historical institutionalists may ask big questions and bridge divides within
and beyond academia, but how do they go about developing explanations?
Wc have already alluded to what is perhaps the most distinctive feature of
this approach: U\;lether particl~lar~vorksuse comparisons or analyze various aspects of oilc theoretically justified case, historical institutio~ialists
take history seriously, as something much more than a set of facts located
ill the past. 'To ~mderstandan interesting outcorne or set of arrangements
usually mealis to analyze processes over a substantial stretch of years,
maybe eve11 illany decades or centuries. Scholars working in this tradition
have developed c o ~ n ~ e l l i n~nethodological
g
and theoretical iustifications
for historically grounded i~~vestigatio~~s,
by which they mcan investigations
that look not just at the past but at processes over time.
Soine reasons for taking history seriously concern methodology and
are alre;~dyrecognized (if not always practiced) by political scientists of
many perstiasions. Extending the tirne frame of social inquiry obviously
widens the range of experience available for examination. This simultaneously makes more data available and generates greater variation in outcomes. Such widening of the empirical terrain is especially important for
political scientists, because many matters of great interest-eapeciaily
macrophenomena sucli as revolutions, state building, democratization, the
construction of welfare states-occur relatively infrequently, or o111ypar-

A central example of why history may be causally critical involves clai~ns

I

:
'

,.

about path dependence that are common in historical institutionalist scholarship (see, e.g., Collier and Collier 1991; Ertman 1997; Hacker 1998;
Shefter 1977; Huber and Stephens 2001). Path dependence can be a faddish term, lacking clear meaning, but in most liistorical-institutionalist
scholarship, it refers to the dynamics of sclf-reinforcing or posilive feedback
processes in a political system (Pierson 2000a; cf. Mahoney 2000b). A clear
logic is involved in such path-dcpcndent processes: Outcomes at a critical
jurlcture trigger feedback mechanisms that reinforce the recurrence of a
articular pattern into thc fiiture. Such processes have very interesting
characteristics. They can be highly influenced by relatively modest perturbations at early stages. Once actors have ve~ituredfar down a particular

path, however, they are likely to find it very difficult to reverse course. Political alternatives that were once quite plausible inay become irretrievably
lost. Thus, events or processes occurrillg during and immediately following
critical junctures emerge as crucial.
There are strong theoretical grounds for believing that self-reinforcing
processes are prevalent in political life. Once established, patterns of political mobilization, the institutional rules of the game, and even citizens'
basic ways of thinking about the political world will often generate selfreinforcing dynamics. In addition to drawing our attention toward critical
junctures or formative moments, arguments about path dependence can
thus help us to understand the powerful inertial "stickiness" that characterizes many aspects of political development. 'Fhese argunlents can also
reinvigorate the analysis of power in social relations, by showing how
inequalities of power, perhaps modest initially, are reinforced and can become deeply embedded in organizations, institutions, and dominant
modes of political understanding. Path-dependence arguments also provide a useful and powerful corrective against tendencies to assume ftinctionalist explanations for important social and political outcoines. Perhaps
most important, an appreciation of the prevalence of path dependence
forces attentiveness to the temporal dimensions of political processes. It
highlights the role of what Arthur Stinchcornbe (1968) has termed historical causation in which dynamics triggercd by an event or process at one
point in time reproduce themselves, even in tlie absence of the recurrcnce
of the original event or process.
A11 appreciation of increasing returns dynamics is one iinportant justification for the focus on issues of timing und sequeizcing that constitutes a
second important theoretical rationale for examining historical processes.
In path-dependent processes, the order of events inay make a fundamental
difference. Historical institutionalists tracing broad patterns of political development across a number of countries often argue that the timing and sequence of particular events or processes can matter a great deal (Anderson
1986; Gerschenkron 1962; Kurt11 1979; Shefter 1077; Ertman 1997). I11
Ertman's analysis of Europeail regime formation, for example, it is the sequence of two processes-the expansion of literacy and the onset of military competition-that is crucial to paths of state building. T h e prevalence
of literacy powerfully affected the bargaining position of those who would
collect state revenues. Where cou~ltriesfaced intense military challenges
prior to the era when literacy became widespread, the character of the
state's fiscal apparatus was likely to be very different than when the order of
these two processes was reversed. Crucially, because of path-dependent effects these differences were long lasting; that is to say, a country's bureaucratic structures, established at an early juncture, did not simply adjust
once literacy rates rose to a higher level.
Jacob Hacker's study (2002) of the development of U.S. social policy
presents a secoild compellillg example of this kind of argument. Hacker

,+

explores the distinctive paths of de\,elopment of p b l i c versus private, employer-based systems of health care and pension provision in the United
States over the past century. Although both policy sectors have roughly
e q u d mixes of public and privatc spending, they de\,eloped along fundamentally different lines. In health care, public interventions have served as
supplements or compensations added to a prior set of institutions featuring
private provision. By contrast, in pensions, a public core system of retirement provision developed first, with private arrangements playing a supplementary or complementary role. 'l'hrough processes of policy feedback,
these different sequences of public and private intervention generated
quite different interest group environments, shifting botli the policy preferences and political resources of crucial actors like employers. Moreover,
the differei~tpattcr~lsof d e v e l o p i ~ ~ eproduced
i~t
very different distributional
outcomes, profoiindly shaping the contours of contemporary political
struggles over social provision. Any scholar who merely discusses these contemporary struggles without awarcness of thc history that shaped the terrain
of preferences and actors will miss much of central causal relevance to explaining politics ant1 policymakiiig today.
Waldner's stiidy (1990) of state building and economic
in late-developing cotintries rests on a similar claim. He contrasts Syria and
Turkey, wlierc statc building and mass incorporation occurred simultaneously, with Korea and 'liiwan, where greater elite consensus allowed state
building to prccedc mass incorporation. In tlic lattcr cases, state elites were
able to institutionalize structures that facilitated long-terin economic developmc~itbefore the cl~allengesof bargaining with nonelites had to be
confronted. In the foriner cascs, patterns of state building were fundamentally altercd b y tlie immediate need to win support from broader social
groups. 'I'lius Waldner identifies two distinctive paths of late state development, generated by different sequences of state building and incorporation.
Like these arguments of Ertman, Hacker, and Waldner, most propositions historical iilstitutioilalists offer about the causal i~lipactof sequences
are grounded in claims about self-reinforcing or positive feedback
processes (Pierson 2 0 0 0 ~ ) Relative
.
timing, or sequence, matters because
self-reinforcing processes, playing out over time in political and social life,
transform the consequences of later developments. Path-dependent arguments about self-reinforcement explain why and when sequencing can
matter. Increasing returns processes occurring during particular periods
generate irreversibilities, essentially removing certain options from the subsequent menu of political possibilities.
Although many path-dependent arguments stress the institutionalization of particular configurations that subsequently prove difficult to dislodge, the focus on sequencing illuminates how arguments about
path-dependent processes can be incorporated into explanatio~lsof political change as well as political inertia. For instance, path-dependent
processes may operate to institutionalize specific political arrangements

PIERSON
A N D S K O C P O L HISTORICAI.
INSI'ITCJ'I'IONAI.ISM
(
703
that ultimately prove vu1neral)le to somc disl~lacingevent or process
einerging at a later stage in political devclopmeilt (Collier and Collicr
1991; 1,uebbert 1991). T h e Colliers' work on labor incorporation in Latin
America provides an excellent example. In some of their cases, labor was
excluded froin political participation at a critical juncttire, and positive
feedback lcd to the institutionalizatio~~
of regimes wherc organized labor
had little access to political influence. Over time, however, key changes in
social and ecoi~omiclife made it impossil~leto maintain these systeins of
labor exclusion. Eventually, orgaiiized labor had to be iilcorporated. When
this took place at a later stage of political development, llo\vever, it necessarily occurred 011 quite different tcrms and with different consequences
thaii was true for countries cxperieucillg early incorporation. 'The key point
is that options available for earl). i~~corporators
were not available for late
incorporators.
It is highly instructive to contrast these arguments about pathdependent sequences with arguments ratioiial-choice theorists have inadc
about sequences withill highly instit~itionalized settings (Shepsle 1986).
U'orking froin Arrow's impossibility tlleorel~l,w l ~ i c lsuggests
~
the prospect
of endless cycling in many collective-choice situatioiis, rational-choicc tlicorists have argued persuasively that iiistit~itioiialarrailgements governii~g
ageiida control and decision-~naking I~roced~ires
can produce stable outcomes. By dcinonstrating the crucial rolc of scqucncing as choiccs arc
mecllamade, these arguments rest on the cquivalei~tof a patl~-del~eiidcnt
nism: Steps in a sequence arc irreversible because institutional rules causc
forgone alternatives in early rounds to bc dropped from the range of possible later options (as, for cxan~ple,in con~nlitteevoting rules that requirc a
sequence of binary choices, with losers eliminated). By showing how such
irreversibilities can be generated in a wide variety of social contexts, however, it is possible to expand this crucial finding to a far broader range of social phenomena than those covered by the rational-choice literature
sterllmiilg froin Arrow's work. In comparative historical analyses, analogous
arguments are often applied to large-scale social changes stich as deinocratization (Collier and Collier 1991; Collier 1999), industrialization (Gerschenkron 1962; Kurth 1979), state building (Ertman 1997; Shefter 1977),
or welfare state developnleilt (Huber and Stephens 2001). Sequencing
matters not only for collective choices within legislatures but also potentially for any sociopolitical process ~vhereself-reinforcelllent means that
forsaken alternatives become increasingly unreachable with the passage of
time.
Historical institutionalists also employ timing and sequence arguinents to highlight conjunctures-interaction
effects between distinct
causal sequences that become joined at articular points in time (Arninzade 1992; Orre11 and Skowrollek 1994; Sewell 1996). 'The ability to identify and explore such colljunctures is a major advantage of the more
macroscopic inclinations of historical institutionalism. For example,

Skowronek's account (1993) of U.S. presidential leadersl~ipemphasizes the

interaction of slowly developing modern institutional capacities and the
particular position of an individual president within the sequential rise and
decline of a dominant political coalition. 'The explanatory power of
Skowronek's analysis therefore derives from l~igl~ligl~ting
the intersection of
long-term develol~mentswith recurrent political cycles. Other historical institutional accou~ltshavc focused on the political effects produced when
separately unfolcling processes conjoin. 'Thiis Ertrnan (1997) stresses links
between military coinpetition and developing social capacities for bureaucratic governance, Shefter (1977) analyzes the interaction of state building
and party formation, 2nd Skocpol (1979) attributes social revolutionary
outbreaks to conj~irlcturesof donlestic and interilational conflicts. These
analysts focus on distinct sociopolitical processes that becoine linked in different and causally crucial ara),sdepending on relative timing. 'The causal
centrality of such coilj~li~ctures,
it should be stressed, would never be
noted by analyses investigating or t l ~ e o r i z i i about
l~
single processes in isolation.

Another theoretical justification for foci~singon historical process is to

draw attention to lengthy, large-scale, but often very slow moving social
processes (Pierson 2002). Historical institutionalists seek to be attentive to
the unfolding of both causal processes and important ~oliticaloutcomes
over extended periods of time. Most political scientists are strongly predisposed to focus on aspects of causal processes and outcomes that unfold
very rapidly. Yet many tliings in the social world take a long time to happen. Seine causal processes and outcon~esoccur slowly because they are
incremental; it simply takes a long time for thein to add up to anything.
Changes in pensioll systeins, for exai~nple,are not fully translated into levels of public spending for a half-century or more. A second possibility is the
presence of threshold effects; marly social processes inay have little significance until they attain a critical mass, which may then trigger major
change (McAdam 1982; Goldstone 1991; Baulngartner and Jones 1993).
may involve transformations that are
Alternatively, slow-moving ~~rocesses
probabilistic during any particular period and therefore several periods
may be necessary before the transformation occurs. Under such circumstances, the social outcome of interest rnay not take place until well after
the appearance of key causal factors. Particularlj. when it foc~ises on
macroscopic processes, historical-institutionalist research is often primarily
interested in such structural preconditions for particular outconles, rather
than the specific timing of those outcornes (Collier 1999; Moore 1966;
Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens 1992). When either structural
causes or threshold effects are at work, analj,sts adopting a short time frame
are likely to focus erroneously on the more idiosyncratic or precipitating
u'

PIERSON
A N D SKOCPOL
1 H I S T O R I C A~I N
. S ~ . I ~ I . ~ ~ T I O N ~ I . I S M 705

I
i

factors that trigger outcomes. Because some crucial social conditions may
change only slou.ly, analysts studying a narrow time frame will be strongly
inclined to take thern as fixed and therefore irrelevant to their causal accounts (Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens 1992; Kitschelt 199 1).
Another possibility is that causal processes iilvolve chains wit11 several
links, which require some time to work theinselves out. To the extcnt that
causal chains of this sort are at work, analyses must frame their studies on a
broad time scale. Collier and Collier's influential work on labor incorporation in Latin America presents arguments of this kind, in which the ultimate outconles of interest reflect a sequence of key developments over
extended periods of time (Collier and Collier 199 1). Indced, this type of
claim about long-term, multistage causal processes is often invoked in
work 011 state building (Flora 1999a, I,) or de~nocratization (Luebbert
1991; Collier 1999).
Swank (2001a) offers an instructive recent example. In assessillg the
impact of political institutions on welfare state retrenchment, h e criticizes
the view that frag~nentedinstitutions \vill limit cutbacks by increasing thc
number of veto points available to defenders of the status quo. Swank argues that this is t r ~ as
~ efar as it goes hilt notes that the long-term, indirect
effects of institutional fragmentatioil run largely in the other direction. Not
only does institutional fragmentation limit the initial expansion of tllc wclfare state, I>ut it also reinforces social heterogeneity, inhibits the growtl~of
e~lcompassinginterest grol~ps,and weakens ciiltural commitments to universalist social policies. All of these long-terin effects strengthen the \vclfare
state's oppo~le~lts
and weaken its advocates. Thus nlany of the most iinportant effects of institutional fragmentation work themselves out only indirectly and over extended periods of time. Ahistorical analyses t)picall\.
seek to consider the effects of institutions while holding constant other
variables, but these variables are in part the long-term consequences of institutional structures. Ahistorical investigations are therefore likely to systematically rnisread the impact of institutional structures on the politics of
the m:elfare state.
Analysts who fail to be attentive to these slow-moving dimensions of
social life may ignore potentially powerfill hypotheses. They are particularly likely to miss the role of many sociological variables, like demography
(Goldstone 1991), literacy (Ertman 19971, or tecl~nology(Kurt11 1979), as
u.ell as the impact of other slowly building pressures such as international
military competition and fiscal overload (Skocpol 19791. Their explanations may focus on triggering or precipitating factors rather than deeper
causes (Kitschelt 1991). Perhaps most fundamental of all, they may fail to
ei:en identify some important questions about politics because the relevant
outcomes happen too slowly and are therefore simply off their radar
screens.

I11 the ways we have just surve!.ed, tl~eoreticalattentiveness to historical

processes represents a formidable conlparative advantage of historical institutionalism, especially sincc this attentiveness is linked to macroscopic
analysis focusing oil institutions and organizations in addition to aggregates
of people. Most research in the behavioral tradition uses surveys that offer
a snapshot in time. And e\:en when surveys are repeated to offer a longitudinal series, it is rare indeed for behavioral analysts to consider changing
institutional contexts, critical conjunctures, or path-dependent large-scale
processes as causally rele\ant to the clianging inodes of individual behavior
theq. prohc. l h e r e are exceptions, certainly, such as Carmines and Stiinson's dissection of the processes by which racc became a transfornliilg issue
in U.S. partisan politics, or Piitnam's consideration of the iillpact of \2'orld
War I1 and other watershed historical events on "life course" develop~nents
for latc-twentieth-cei~ttir~
U.S. adults (Carmines and Stimson 1989; Putnam 21)00). Rut for the most part, s(ir\,cy a~ialysisrelies on o~ic-ti111c
data
about attitudes and self-reported bcliaviors to explorc i~itlividual-levelhypotheses about mass patterns. Change over timc oftell e ~ ~ t ethe
r s discussio~i
only. speculatively,
as
w
l
~
e
n
a
researcher
rcports
differences
behvccil
Lvork.
ing womcn and Ilousewives at a monlcnt in time, and thcil go on to speculate that the changing proportions of such persolls i l l the population ma),
signify a continuous social change.
To I>e sure, some rational-choice scholars have turilcd to Ilistorical
case studies in recent years. Rut most of the analytic advantages we have
outlined are al>sent in this work, because the past enters only in a highly
restricted scnse, as what might be termed illustrative history, the mining of
the historical record for outcomes that can be "explaine~"by prticular
rational-choice models. Previotisly established models may be applied in
interesting ways to examples in the past (cf. Bates et al. 1998), but the tools
of game theory turn out to be poorly suited to analyzing conjunctures
or exploring slow-moving macroprocesses. Rational-choice theory faces
considerable difficulties in rnoviilg froin the micro- to the meso- or
macrolevels of analysis that are typically featured in works that analyze
processes over long stretches of time (Elster 2000; Munck 2001b). Rational
choice's reliance on theory-driven agendas and on the identification of empirical terrain favorable for its preferred methods leads relentlessly back to
an emphasis on the micro. And the results of game theory quickly becorrle
indeterminate or unmanageably coinplex as one increases the number of
actors involved (indeed, in game theory the problem of indeterminacy is
often rife even at the microlevel). T h e fact that man! macroprocesses take
considerable time to play out presents a further difficulb, since game theory generally requires that all the relevant actors, preferences, and payoffs
be established and fixed simultaneously at the beginning of a game. 111

1
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actors may be greatly concer~ledabout the future in their efforts to design

institutions, they operate in settings of tremendous complexity. 4 s a consequence, they will often make mistakes. Thus institutions ma! not be functional even in a context of far-sighted actors, because they do not operate as
intended. Although \videly acknowledged to be significant in actual politics, political scientists often treat unintended consequences as an error
term or simply ignore them by failing to investigate institutions over time.
In cross-sectional studies of institutions, the issue of unintended consequences vanishes from view, since either the long-term consequences of institutional choices or the original factors generating the institutional choice
will be outside the scope of the analysis. By contrast, historical institutionalists examining institutional development often stress the surprising longterm consequences of earlier political choices and conflicts (Anderson
1986; Luebbert 1991; Skocpol 1992; 'l'helen 1999, 2002).
Historical institutionalists, finally, emphasize the ways in which institutions are remade over time ('l'lielen 1999, 2002). Because of strong pathdependent effects, institutions are not easily scrapped when conditions
change. Instead, institutions will often have a highly "layeredn quality
(Schickler 2001; Stark and Bruszt 1998). New initiatives are introduced to
address contemporary demands, but they add to rather than replace preexisting institutional forms. Alter~iatively,old instit~itionsmay persist but be
turned to different uses by ~ie\vlyascendant groups. In either case, the original choices are likely to figure heavily in the current functioning of the institution. l h u s institutions will rarely look like optimal solutions to present
collective action problems.
Clearly, attentiveness to history and the investigation of meso- or
macrolevel institutional corifigurations are highly complementary strategies of analysis. 'I'racing politics through time is very helpful for identifying
the boundary conclitions for particular theoretical claims. Even more significant, the emphasis historical institutionalists place on conjunctures and
sequencing draws attention to the temporal connections among social
processes, and highlights the importance of meso- or macrolevel analysis of
institutional configurations. Furthermore, while path-dependent or increasing returns processes can play out at a microlevel (e.g., in the way individuals de\:elop and reinforce particular mental maps of the social
world), they are often most significant at the meso- or macrolevel. Particular sets of institutions and organizations are often mutually reinforcing or
complementary-the presence of each enhances tendencies for the development of others-in a manner that can be seen as a kind of coevolutionary or selection process playing out over considerable stretches of time. A
good example is the recent research in comparative political econoiny focusing on varieties of capitalism (Hall and Soskice 2001b; Estevez-Abe,
Iversen, and Soskice 1999; Soskice 1999). This work stresses how differellt
political econolnies have developed along quite different lines because of
the coevolution of nlutuall!- reinforcing institutional and organizational

capitalism that operate in fu~ida~nentally

different manners. Outcomes are
generated not by somc universal operating principles characteristic of a
gi\:c~ib p e of actor or realm of activity but by intersectio~isof organized
practiccs (such as labor markets, firm structures, or crucial policy arrangements). 'l'hese practices will often have originated at different times and
thcn for~liedconfigurations that advantage key actors (such as employer associations and labor unions). These actors, ill turn, will generally work to
maintain the configuration with 0 1 1 1 ~incremental adjustliients even when
economic, c~iltural,and geopolitical circumstances shift.

I s s ~ ~ eofs long-term institutional developr~ientare also ceiitral to historical

i~istit~itional
research agendas (l'helen 1999). Historical institutionalists
are typically suspicious of fi~nctionalexplanations, in which institutional
outco~ncsare explained by their consequences. In such functional acc o ~ ~ i l ti~~~stitutions
s,
de\:elop because of their capacib to solve ccrtain collective problems. 'l'he implicit or explicit claiill is that rational actors
produced these outcomes in order to solve these problems.
As suggested above, concern with issues of instit~itionaldevelop~nent
within historical institutionalis111 is strongly lii~kedto theorizing about the
caiisal relevance or origins, sequences, aiid temporal proccsses. F~~nctional
accounts of institutions seen1 inost plausible when i~ivestigations
take a
one-tiinc snapshot, because long-term effects and inconsistent "layers" of
instit~~tio~lal
development (see Schickler 2001) are not so readily noticed
i l l such studies. I11 most cases, synchronic analysts simply probe an extant
institution to uncover benefits for partic~~lar
actors. Analysts tlien infer that
these benefits explain the institution, implying that the actors who are
presentl\ advantaged (or their forebears) created the institution to produce
the benefits. This is a plausible hypothesis, but it is only a hypothesis and
over-time i~ivestigationof institutional origins and dynamics often does not
bear out such lines of reasoning.
By examining issues of institutional origins and change over an extended time frame, historical institutionalists have been able to highlight a
number of potential problems for f~inctionalaccounts (see Thelen 1993,
1994, 1999; Pierson 2OOOb for relevant findings and arguments). Functional interpretations of politics are often suspect because of the sizable
temporal gap between actors' actions and the long-term consequences of
those actions. Political actors, facing the pressures of the immediate or
skeptical about their capacity to engineer long-term effects, may pay limited attention to the long run. Thus the long-term effects of institutional
choices, which are frequently the most profound and interesting ones,
should often be seen as the by-products of social processes rather than the
realization ("congealed preferences" as Riker put it) of actors' goals.
A second issue concerns unintended consequences. Even where
<,
1.

PIERSON
A N D S K O C P O L ~ ~ I S T O RINSTITU'TIONALISM
IC~~I.
1

structures. Patterns of fir111 organization, systems of interest intermediation

and key social and econoinic policy structr~rescontain institutional cornplementarities that place national political economies on distinct, pathdependent courses of development.
O n e can also see the advantages of a combii~edfocus on institutions
a ~ i dtemporal processes in the development of extensive historical institutionalist work on policy feedbacks (Heclo 1974; Weir and Skocpol 1985;
Pierson 1993). Marly of the works cited here emphasize that government
policies establish some of the most important structuring rules of modern
societies. 'The specific design of policies can have an enormous effect on
the resources and strategies subsequently available to political actorsindeed, in inany contexts, policies can be as important as formal political
institutions in shaping political processes and outcomes (Esping-Andersen
1990; Skocpol 1992; Weir 1992a; Pierson 1994; Huber and Stephens 2001;
Carnl>bell forthcomirlg; Hacker 2002). 'l'hc success of this line of argument de~no~lstrates
very clearly how the particular vantage points encouraged by different analytical strategies can either highlight or obscure
important aspects of social reality. Because rational-choice scholarship is so
focused on the pursuit of broad generalizations, it has concentrated almost
elltirely on recurrent, carefully delimited formal institutions such as legislatures or central banks.
Only a few rational-choice scholars (such as Bates 1988b) focus on the
state overall and highlight the ulterior effects of state policies. In forinal institutioilal accot~nts,policies are usually treated as dependent variables,
with their further political consequences through feedbacks falling beyond
the scope of analysis, either because these consequences are seen as too
idiosyncratic or because analysis of policy feedbacks ~vouldrequire attentiveness to processes unfolding over time. But this omission will not do, because the expanding activities of states-and the policy feedbacks flowing
from them-have been a central fact of modern life. Fortunately, state expansion and policy feedbacks have been at the center of historicalinstitutionalist analyses, even as these phenomena have largely vanished
off the radar screen of the more universalist studies of formal institutions.
T h e distinctive foci and contributions of rational-choice and historicalinstitutionalist work on institutions tliils provide a clear demonstration of
the advantages of pluralist political science, employing multiple strategies
of inquiry. Without coinpetitive pl~ralismin social science theorizing and
research, important issues can too readily fall off the agenda of scholarship.

T h e strong emphasis on interaction effects in historical institutionalism reflects some core working assumptions about how most sociopolitical
processes operate. Analysts are strongly affected by their basic presump-

711

tions about how social processes work; and they tend to frame their problems, generate hypotheses, and employ nlethods of analysis alid rescarch
designs that fit such presumptions (ilbbott 1988; Hall 2002). Behavioralists, for example, are happy to use statistical techniques to analjzc data
from as many "cases" as possible-often data from surveys of tliousi~ndsof
al
individuals-because they are prepared to assume that very g e ~ ~ e r variables operating independently of one another come together to accotult for
the patterns of behavior they are trying to explain. Historical ii~stitutionalists, by contrast, assume that operative variables may not be i n d e p e ~ ~ d eof
nt
each other at all. When it comes to analyzii~gthe origins and iinpact of institutions, causally i~llportantvariables are often bundled together in the
real world; and there may be alternative causal patl~sto siinilar outcomes
(Ragin 1987; Shalev 1998). Historical institutionalists tend to suspect from
the get-go that causal variables of interest will be strongly influenced by
overarching cultural, institutional, or epochal contcxts. This is not a matter
of getting mired in thick descril>tion. As Andrew Abbott puts it: "Context
has t\?.o senses. . . . 'I'hc strict sense . . . denotes those things that enviroil
and thereby define a thing of interest. l'hc loose s e ~ ~ siinply
se
denotes detail. T h e acute reader will notc that these correspond nicely to tlie two
judg~neiitsof the scientific worth of contextual information. If decontextualization is merely thc reinoval of excess detail, then it's a fiiie thing, scie~ltifically. If, on the other hand, it is the rc~iiovalof defining locational
information. it is a scientific disaster" (1997, 11. 10). Because historical institutionalists share thc latter set of expectations, researchers in this tradition tend to nlove LIP from single institutions to broader contexts-they
look at forests as well as trees. Arid they almost always seek to discover and
explicate the impact of configl~rationsof organizations and institutions on
outcomes of interest (Katznelson 1997).
In addition to presuming-and concentrating attelltion on-causal
configurations conceptualized at the organizational and institutional level,
there is another way in wl~ichhistorical institutionalists highlight interaction effects. They often do this by pointing to overarching contexts-types
of regimes, eras, regions, and cultures-that place bounds around the theorizing being done in any given study. Historical institutionalists rarely aim
to write about all of humankind through all of global history. Scan the titles of major historical-institutionalist works, for example, and you will often find the proper names of regions of the world or the beginning and
ending dates of the specific period that the argument is to cover. This is not
done because historical institutionalists in political science are trying to be
historians; they do not aspire to just tell stories about a time and place. Nor
are dates given only to describe critical junctures when a change occurs
that the analyst seeks to explairi (e.g., Clemens 1997; Skowronek 1982).
Beyond such an obvious use of dates and place, historical institutionalists
often set limits to the applicability of their causal arguments, arguing in

theoretically explicit ways why variables appear and combine in characteristic m,ays in one era but might not exist or combine in the same way in
other eras.
(or not) and success or failFor example, in his book about the
ure of guerrilla-led revolutionary moveinents, Timothy Wickhaln-Crowley
(1992) develops a rigoro~iscausal analysis and suggests [in his conclusion)
that his model links up with theoretical explanations of re\olutions in
many regions a i d eras. But Wickham-Crowley carefully boullds his own
argument, restricting it to Latin An~ericasince 1956. In analytical terms,
he explains that specific d e ~ e l o ~ ~ n eand
n t sevents created background conditions to generate many guerrilla moveinents with similar aiins and inetllods, thus setting the stage for the variables he explores to account for
movement growth and success or failure. In the end, Wickham-Crowley's
careful delineatioil-and explanation-of the overarching context within
which his variable-based analysis applies reinforces its theoretical power. As
we move to other continents and periods, we call ask about changes that
might influence tlie \;ariables in play and tlie likely relationships ainong
theni.
Another way in which historical-institl~tiollalistworks highlight overarching coiltexts is by deliberately juxtaposing two or more coritexts, to
le
show how variable configuratiolls already analyzed (across n i r ~ l t i ~ cases)
niay plav out in new ways u~llentlle overarching context changes. 111 the
revolutions literature, Good\viu (2001) does this by, first, developing explanations for revolutionary successes and failures within Central America
and East Asia, and then kiigl~li~l~ting
the somewhat different actors and
conditions that come into play within each region. Addressillg a very different problem-Pierson (1994) identifies variables about institutions and
established policy characteristics that can explaiil why British and U.S.
conservative politicians succeeded or failed with attempted cutbacks in a
ilurnber of social policy areas. Yet h e also steps back and stresses that the
key causal relationships governing policy determination are quite different
in the recent period of austerity than they \Yere when welfare states were
greatly expanded.
Scholars in other major political science traditions are often much less
attentive to overarchillg contexts than historical institutionalists, in part because they prefer to focus on individual-level behavior or inicroprocesses
but also because they are reluctant to write like historians. Ironically, the
result can be less theoretically
work. Behaviorialists happily rely
on types of data only available at one point in time or just for short time
spans b ~ i tdo not necessarily think through what that means. As a result,
significant overarching contexts can go unnoticed, ~ i n c o n c e ~ t ~ l a l i z e d .
For example, behavioralists sometiines fail to notice that very similar
individual-level patterns-joining illore or fewer voluntary organizations,
voting at different rates-can end up having very different meanirlgs, depending on the kinds of organizations or institutions that predominate in a

given nation or era. 'I'heories invoked in behavioralist studies can elid up

b e i ~ ~profollndly
g
~mderspecified.
Rational-clloice scholars, meanwhile, often write as if the models the!;
present were infinitely generalizeable, even as they slnuggle all kinds of institutional, cultural, and epochal specifics into their enipirical operationalizations. This may seein an optimal way of arguing; isn't social science
supposed to generalize? Biit, in practice, this kind of approach means that
we leave importarit variables i~nplicitand we fail to see how c h a ~ i ~ i n g
background conditions iriight cause the same variables to play out ill very
different ways. Again, the preference of rational-choice theorists for exaliiining microsettiilgs strongly reiiiforces this tendency.

Research Strategies and the Accumulation of

Knowledge

Tackling big, real-world qnestioils; tracing processes t h r o ~ ~ gtiine;

li
and allalyzing iiistitt~tiolialconfigl~ratio~~s
and coiitexts-these are tlie features
that define llistorical institutio~ialismas a nlajor stratcgy of rescarch in contemporary political scieiice. We have stressed the coiilparative advalitages
these approaclles afford to all who would bctter t~nderstaildgoveriinlellt
and politics. But wc must also ackilowledgc the claims of critics who dismiss historical institutio~ialisinas a valid approach to doing cumulative social science. Critics of historical institutionalisln sometimes pen manifestos
announcing that casc studies and small-n comparisons cannot generate
valid knowledge, bccause cases are not randoinly selected and there may
not be enough statistical degrees of freedom to test all conceivable hypotheses rigorously icf. Geddes 1990; Goldthorpe 1991; Lieberson 1991).
Statistical methodologists (such as King, Keohane, and Verba 1994) also
worry that the llistorical-ir~stitutio~lalist
proclivity for tackling significant issues predisposes them toward "selection on the dependent variable," that
is, choosing cases where a phellomenon of interest has occurred, while ignoring the instances where it has ilot occurred.
Historical institutionalist books and articles are sometimes denounced
in ways such as these one at a time, in isolation from one another-an approach that surely ~ ~ o u be
l d laughed out of court if applied to isolated
works in any other tradition. In all research traditions, individual works
build on orie another, often extending lines of analysis, retesting arguments, and correcting for earlier limitations. The real issue is whether historical institutionalists in general have headed up blind alleys, because
their studies, considered collectirely as well as individual13 are improperly
designed. This is not the place for an exhaustive review of the profusion of
recent n~ethodologicalreflections in this genre, but the major signposts on
the road can be mentioned.

in many topic literatures-analyses have juxtaposed time periods, regions,

and policy sectors, turning what appear to be one or a few national instances into settii~gsfor many carefully compared cases. And even within
what appear to be single case studies, empirical observations have often
been nlultiplied by formulatiilg and testing hypotheses about thc inechanisrns that connect causes to effects (Bennett and George 1997). All of
these strategies of analysis have been used to good effect by scientifically
sound historical-institutional studies, and the rapidly developing methodological literatures will make it easier for future scholars to recognize and
apply the standards and rationales for best practices ill case-based and
small-n research.
No matter what theories or research methods are deployed, individual
studies in isolation never do inore than move the scholarly enterprise a step
or two forward. Scholarship is an inllerently commuilal eilterprise, and so
it is appropriate to reflect on how well clusters of scholars do at uccun~uluting valid and ilnportant findings. Here is where historical institutionalists
do quite well, in our view, because substantively compellillg, problemdriven research facilitates exactly the sort of iiitellectllal cu~iiulationtliat
allows a community of researcliers to make clear progress over tilne.
Because historical institutionalists tend to tackle big, Iiumanly i~nportant questiolls, scholars are likely to come back to the issues again and
again over several acadeiilic generations. Within each generation as well,
smart people jump in, willing to argue about how best to frame the questions and describe patterns wort11 explaining, as well as about how to formulate and test hypotheses. Researchers reexamine cases and llypotl~eses
and extend established l~ypotl~eses
to new sets of cases. A good example is
spelled out in James Mahoney's review of several decades of llistoricalinstitutionalist research 011 the origins and dynamics of democratic and
authoritarian regimes. In this literature, research took off from pioneering agenda-setting works (i.e, Moore 1966; O'Donnell 1973; Linz 1978),
with waves of succeeding scholars executing dozens of historical a i d
comparative-historical studies that served to refute some argu~nents,refine
others, discover new lines of causal argument, and extend findings across
eras and continents. Cumulative research now offers a convincing picture
of when, why, and how different types of regimes have emerged in various
continents over much of modern world history. "Most of our knowledge
about the relationship between democracy and various other factors (social
classes, international conditions, elite behavior) has been derived through
such step-by-step accumulation . . ." Mahoney concludes. "Plainly, if one
were to strike all comparative-historical research from the record, most of
what we currently know about the causes of democracy and authoritarianism would be lost" (Mahoney 2002). What Mahoney demonstrates abotlt
the literature on democracy and authoritarianism holds as well for literatures o n revolutions, state building, and varieties of public policymaking,
to name just some areas of clear-cut progress in recent decades. In each of

Methodological challenges have, ill our view, been good for historical
institutionalism. Not only have these critiques been testimony to the visibility and intellectual impact of the studies they have dissected. Challenges
have had a bracing impact, prompting historical institutionalists to spell
out their metatheoretical presumptions and sharpen rationales and tools
for doing valid macroscopic and historical studies. A number of scholars,
for exarnple, have asked how studies can best be designed to take intuitions
about configurational causation and temporal process seriously. In other
words, if historical institutionalists doubt that single, highly general variables have uniforin effects across contexts, and regardless of iilteractions
with other factors, how can research designs allow for adequate einpirical
exploratioli of hypotheses about contexts and configurations (see Abbott
2001; Mahoney 1999; Hall 2002; Ragin 2000)? If historical institutionalists
stress mechanisms rather than silnple associatioli in causal arguments, how
can process tracing be done in a rigorous way? And \?,hat criteria nlust be
met to demonstrate valid arguments about path depeildence, critical conjunctures, or sequence effccts? Although Picrson (2000a, 2002), 'l'helen
(1999, 2000a), a i d others have primarily focused on the tlleoretical cliaracteristics of argriments about temporal causality, their reflections also set
empirical standards to be met in case aiialyses and comparative studies that
aim to establish the presence of causally relevant processes or events.
Reflecting on the stre~lgtlisand limits of hundretls of studies in various
important literatures, metl~odologicallyoriented historical institutionalists
have also n u d e the case for circumstances under which in-depth case studies a i d small- to mediuln-n comparisons are an optimal research strategy
(Collier 1993; Mahoney 20002; Munck 1998; Ragin 1987; Rueschemeyer
and Stephens 1997; Tilly 1984). Random selection of cases-say, of particular regimes or nations froill hundreds across the globe-is often not appropriate; and it is far from the only way to test hypotheses rigorously.
Whatever the risks or drawbacks, hypotheses can be rigorously tested even
when scholars cannot sainple from large numbers of truly independent
cases (for an excellent overview of strategies of inference in small-n research, see Mahoney 20002). Alternative strategies of causal inference have
been developed and applied, because there are important intellectual and
practical advantages to focusiilg agendas of research on a small to interlnediate number of cases, including instances of substantively compelling outcomes and arrangements we want to understand.
For example, a scholar who wants to understand revolutions is u11likely to be willing to start with a purely random set of times and places;
she will want to make sure that clear-cut revolutions are iilcluded in her research. But in the best past studies of revolutions-as in many other historical-institutionalist literatures-it has long been standard to test hypotheses
with comparisons between positive cases, where phenomena of interest occur, and closely matched negative cases, where the phenomena do not occur (Skocpol 1979; Goodwin 2001). Speaking about comparative studies

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A N D SKOCPOI,8 H I S I O R I C A L
~NS'TITL~'I.IONALISM
four time period5 (eacll time period lasting a decade or more). The result
is the most serious effort yet to test the strength of a numbcr of prominent
theories of institutional choice over an extended time period, a11d [he develop~llentof some strikingly original insights into the sources of change
a ~ continuity
~ d
in legislative rules.
enAcross the globe, new democracies are emergir~gfrom
trenched authoritarian polities. Explaining variations in new institutional
rules and ill the processes by which thcv take shape reprcse~ltsa ~najor
challenge for students of comparative politics. In her new book OII Institutiolaal Change and Political Coiatii~uityin Post-Soviet Ceratrul Asiu, Paulinc
Luong (2002) compares the establishment of electoral systcn~sin Kaz21kl1stan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan and, in the process, develops of ~ l c w
and potentially generalizeahle theory of "institutions designed under
transitional circu~nstances,"blending insights fro111both rational-cl~oiceinstitutio~~alisiil
and historical instit~~tionalis~~l.
Altlio~~gll
historical institlitionalists have directed our attention to persistent legacies fron~t l ~ cpast.
new rules of the gallle can and do c m e q e from strategic IjargC I. I I ~ Salliollg
elites, especially in a period of crisis and l~ilcertai~lty.
Yet rational-choicc
aplxoxlies too easily fall into the trap of assutni~~g
that clite bargaining
over new arra~ige~ne~its
occi~rsO I I a tabula rasa, \vithoi~tregard to elltrcnched understandi~lgsand power relatio~lships.111 Jones's model, actors
cllallgc goals a ~ l dperceptions in rcsponse to unccrt~lintyand bargain in a
dynamic way, producing different otltconles ill three ccntral I\sian polities
with many prior structural si~nilarities.But elites work fro111 power positions and understandings cmbcdded in inherited arrangements-i~~tleetl
they try to encode those older meanings and powcr relationships into
seenringly new structures. 1.11ong'swork would not have been possiblc
witllout prior breakthrouglls in game theory. At the sa111e time, she is inspired by the theoretical agendas set out b), such historical institutionalists
as Kathleen Thelen. calling for careful analyses not just of institutional
outco~nesbut of the temporally and structurally ernbedded processes by
which actors entrenched in previous institutions maneuver to create modified arrangements that retain many continuities from the past. Rilethodologically, moreover, Luong nlakes a pon!erft~lcase for close compariso~lof
kindred polities within a geocultural region, as a valuable laboratory for
working out expla~iationsof institutional change that may have nlucll
broader theoretical application.
In different ways, both Schickler and Luong work at the intersection of
rational-choice theorizing and historical-institutional analysis. Our third
instance of creative synergy, Andrea Campbell's Shaping Policy, Shapii~g
Citizens: Senior Citizen Activism (2nd the American LYe1f;lre State (forthcoming) exelnplifies possibilities for coll~biningstrong points of surveybased behavioral ailaly5is with analytic stratcgies that have been developed
by historical institutionalists. Campbell's subject is a traditional focus of
behavioralis~n:citizen participation. Specifically, she is iuterested in thc

721

changing patterns of political beha~iorof the U.S. elderly, and she ably
uscs survcy results to docunleilt aggregate behaviors and attitudes.
:It the same t i ~ n e Can~pbcll
,
drabvs two major insights fro111historical
institutionalisn~.First, she stresses the in~portanceof studying participatio~~
over time, both to increase variation in her outcome and to identify and assess the contrib~~tion
of rclativcly slow moving factors to changing patterns
of participation. Second, she liighligl~tsthe contributions of policy feedbacks-specifically fro111Social Security and 1CIedicare-to both the lcvel
and style of citizen participatio~~
among the elderly. 'I'llrol~ghthe paiustaking assenlbly of longitudinal iiiicrodata on participation among the elderly
and thc thoughtful con~binationof multiple traditions, Campbell demonstrates how major federal programs both raised t l ~ elevel of eltlerly participation and prodllced a n uniusual pattern of participation. Aino~ig
working-aged 1J.S. adults, participation is heavily skewed toward bettered~~catetl
slid Ilighcr-i~lco~ile
groIips, L L Ithis
~ "~~pwilrd"
bias is Iargcly absent amolig thc eldcrly, where concerns about Social SecuriQ and
Medicarc l~avcL-~~couragctl
~l~itldleand lower-strata elders to participate
much inore fillly. 'l'hrough its crcative combinatio~~
of behavioral and
historical-institutio~~al
analysis, C a ~ n ~ ~ b e study
l l ' s speaks to major issues of
our timc. Its findings are highly rcleva~~t
to ongoing public as well as schol~ ~ sa b o ~civic
~ t engagelllent in U.S.
arly debatcs about e u t i t l e ~ ~ i er ~c lf to r ~ and
democracy.
h o n e of the exemplary new studies we have just described could have
bcen protluced without illlagillative cfforts to draw on and combine the
best of ~nultipleanalytical stratcgies. By featuring thesc studies, we mean to
underline that it has not bee11 our purpose to pit major approaches against
one another in any kind of zero-sum game. We have simply sought to clarify the distinctive contributio~rsand advantages of historical-institutionalist
scholarship Indeed, a good reasoil to clarify distinctions among approaches and highlight potential comparative advantages of each is to facilitate exchanges that corllbi~lethe strengths of different approaches to
maximunl effect. We have made the case for historical institutionalism as
one of the three research pillars in contemporary political science, and our
task has been made easy by the outpouring of so much excellent work in
recent years. Historical institutionalism has become, of late, more selfconscious both theoretically and n~ethodologically,in ways we have indicated and illustrated throughout this review essay. Readers who wonder
what political sciei~cewould be like without self-conscious historical institutionalisrn need only ask what we would have lost if all the works in our
bibliography, and many others like them, had not been published. We
think the answer is obvious: without historical institutionalism, our discipline would be shorn of inoch of its ability to tackle major agendas of concern to all political scientists. And without historical institutionalists,
political science would have much less to say about questions of great import to pcoplc beyond as well as within the ivory tower.