21. Republic vs. Mangatora GR No.

170375, July 7, 2010

In G.R. No. 170375, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), by way of
consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari and for Certiorari under Rules 45
and 65 of the Rules of Court, respectively, seeks to set aside the issuances of Judge
Mamindiara P. Mangotara (Judge Mangotara) of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
1 (RTC-Branch 1) of Iligan City, Lanao del Norte, in Civil Case No. 106,
particularly, the: (1) Resolution[1] dated July 12, 2005 which, in part, dismissed the
Complaint for Expropriation of the Republic for the latters failure to implead
indispensable parties and forum shopping; and (2) Resolution[2] dated October 24,
2005, which denied the Partial Motion for Reconsideration of the Republic.

II
THE ANTECENT FACTS
OF THE PETITIONS AT BAR
Expropriation Case
(G.R. No. 170375)
The Complaint for Expropriation was originally filed on August 15, 1983 by
the Iron and Steel Authority (ISA), now the NSC, against Maria Cristina Fertilizer
Corporation (MCFC), and the latters mortgagee, the Philippine National Bank
(PNB). The Complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 106 and raffled to RTCBranch 1, presided over by Judge Mangotara.
ISA was created pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 2729 [24] dated August 9,
1973, to strengthen, develop, and promote the iron and steel industry in the
Philippines. Its existence was extended until October 10, 1988.
On November 16, 1982, during the existence of ISA, then President
Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Proclamation No. 2239, [25] reserving in
favor of ISA a parcel of land in Iligan City, measuring 302,532 square meters or
30.25 hectares, to be devoted to the integrated steel program of the

Government. MCFC occupied certain portions of this parcel of land. When

negotiations with MCFC failed, ISA was compelled to file a Complaint for
Expropriation.
When the statutory existence of ISA expired during the pendency of Civil
Case No. 106, MCFC filed a Motion to Dismiss the case alleging the lack of
capacity to sue of ISA. The RTC-Branch 1 granted the Motion to Dismiss in an
Order dated November 9, 1988. ISA moved for reconsideration or, in the
alternative, for the substitution of the Republic as plaintiff in Civil Case No. 106,
but the motion was denied by RTC-Branch 1. The dismissal of Civil Case No. 106
was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, thus, ISA appealed to this Court. In Iron
and Steel Authority v. Court of Appeals[26] (ISA case), the Court remanded the case
to RTC-Branch 1, which was ordered to allow the substitution of the Republic for
ISA as plaintiff. Entry of Judgment was made in the ISA case on August 31,
1998. In an Order[27]dated November 16, 2001, the RTC-Branch 1 allowed the
substitution of the Republic for ISA as plaintiff in Civil Case No. 106.
Alleging that Lots 1 and 2 involved in the 1997 Cacho case encroached and
overlapped the parcel of land subject of Civil Case No. 106, the Republic filed
with the RTC-Branch 1 a Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Complaint dated
October 7, 2004 and to Admit the Attached Supplemental Complaint dated
September 28, 2004[28] seeking to implead in Civil Case No. 106 Teofilo Cacho and
Demetria Vidal and their respective successors-in-interest, LANDTRADE and
AZIMUTH.
MCFC opposed the Motion for leave to file and to admit the Supplemental
Complaint on the ground that the Republic was without legal personality to file the
same because ISA was the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 106. MCFC argued that the
Republic failed to move for the execution of the decision in the ISA case within the
prescriptive period of five years, hence, the only remedy left was for the Republic
to file an independent action to revive the judgment. MCFC further pointed out
that the unreasonable delay of more than six years of the Republic in seeking the
substitution and continuation of the action for expropriation effectively barred any
further proceedings therein on the ground of estoppel by laches.

In its Reply, the Republic referred to the Order dated November 16, 2001 of
the RTC-Branch 1 allowing the substitution of the Republic for ISA.
In an Order dated April 4, 2005, the RTC-Branch 1 denied the Motion of the
Republic for leave to file and to admit its Supplemental Complaint. The RTCBranch 1 agreed with MCFC that the Republic did not file any motion for
execution of the judgment of this Court in the ISA case. Since no such motion for
execution had been filed, the RTC-Branch 1 ruled that its Order dated November
16, 2001, which effected the substitution of the Republic for ISA as plaintiff in
Civil Case No. 106, was an honest mistake. The Republic filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the April 4, 2005 Order of the RTC-Branch 1.
MCFC then filed a Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. 106 for: (1) failure of
the Republic to implead indispensable parties because MCFC insisted it was not
the owner of the parcels of land sought to be expropriated; and (2) forum shopping
considering the institution by the Republic on October 13, 2004 of an action for the
reversion of the same parcels subject of the instant case for expropriation.
Judge Mangotara of RTC-Branch 1 issued a Resolution[29] on July 12, 2005,
denying for lack of merit the Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated April
4, 2005 filed by the Republic, and granting the Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No.
106 filed by MCFC. Judge Mangotara justified the dismissal of the Expropriation
Case thus:
What the Republic seeks [herein] is the expropriation of the
subject parcels of land. Since the exercise of the power of eminent
domain involves the taking of private lands intended for public use upon
payment of just compensation to the owner x x x, then a complaint for
expropriation must, of necessity, be directed against the owner of the
land subject thereof. In the case at bar, the decision of the Supreme
Court in Cacho v. Government of the United States x x x, decreeing the
registration of the subject parcels of land in the name of the late Doa
Demetria Cacho has long attained finality and is conclusive as to the
question of ownership thereof. Since MCFC, the only defendant left in
this case, is not a proper party defendant in this complaint for
expropriation, the present case should be dismissed.

This Court notes that the Republic [has filed reversion

proceedings] dated September 27, 2004, involving the same parcels of
land, docketed as Case No. 6686 pending before the Regional Trial
Court of Lanao del Norte, Iligan City Branch 4. [The Republic],
however, did not state such fact in its Verification and Certification of
Non-Forum Shopping attached to its Supplemental Complaint dated
September 28, 2004. [It is therefore] guilty of forum
shopping. Moreover, considering that in the Reversion case, [the
Republic] asserts ownership over the subject parcels of land, it cannot be
allowed to take an inconsistent position in this expropriation case
without making a mockery of justice.[30]

The Republic filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated

July 12, 2005, insofar as it dismissed Civil Case No. 106, but said Motion was
denied by Judge Mangatora in a Resolution[31] dated October 24, 2005.
On January 16, 2006, the Republic filed with this Court the consolidated
Petition for Review on Certiorari and Petition for Certiorari under Rules 45 and
65 of the Rules of Court, respectively, docketed as G.R. No. 170375.

III
ISSUES AND DISCUSSIONS
Expropriation Case
(G.R. No. 170375)
The Republic, in its consolidated Petitions challenging the Resolutions dated
July 12, 2005 and October 24, 2005 of the RTC-Branch 1 in Civil Case No. 106,
made the following assignment of errors:
RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ERRED IN ORDERING THE
DISMISSAL OF THE EXPROPRIATION COMPLAINT IN CIVIL
CASE NO. 106 CONSIDERING THAT:
(a) THE NON-JOINDER OF PARTIES IS NOT A
GROUND FOR THE DISMISSAL OF AN ACTION

PURSUANT TO SECTION 11, RULE 3 OF THE 1997

RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE;
(b) AN EXPROPRIATION PROCEEDING IS AN
ACTION QUASI IN REM WHEREIN THE FACT THAT
THE OWNER OF THE PROPERTY IS MADE A PARTY
TO THE ACTION
IS
NOT ESSENTIALLY
INDISPENSABLE;
(c) PETITIONER DID NOT COMMIT ANY FORUM
SHOPPING WITH THE FILING OF THE REVERSION
COMPLAINT DOCKETED AS CIVIL CASE NO. 6686
WHICH IS PENDING BEFORE BRANCH 4 OF
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ILIGAN CITY.[60]

Filing of consolidated petitions under both

Rules 45 and 65
At the outset, the Court notes that the Republic filed a pleading with the
caption Consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari (Under Rule 45) and
Certiorari (Under Rule 65) of the Rules of Court. The Republic explains that it
filed the Consolidated Petitions pursuant to Metropolitan Waterworks and
Sewerage System (MWSS) v. Court of Appeals[61] (MWSS case).
The reliance of the Republic on the MWSS case to justify its mode of appeal
is misplaced, taking the pronouncements of this Court in said case out of context.
The issue in the MWSS case was whether a possessor in good faith has the
right to remove useful improvements, and not whether consolidated petitions under
both Rules 45 and 65 of the Rules of Court can be filed. Therein petitioner MWSS
simply filed an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, but
named the Court of Appeals as a respondent. The Court clarified that the only
parties in an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the
appellant as petitioner and the appellee as respondent. The court which rendered
the judgment appealed from is not a party in said appeal. It is in the special civil
action ofcertiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court where the court or judge is

required to be joined as party defendant or respondent. The Court, however, also

acknowledged that there may be an instance when in an appeal by certiorari under
Rule 45, the petitioner-appellant would also claim that the court that rendered the
appealed judgment acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse
of discretion, in which case, such court should be joined as a party-defendant or
respondent. While the Court may have stated that in such an instance, the petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is at the same time a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65, the Court did not hold that consolidated
petitions under both Rules 45 and 65 could or should be filed.
The Court, in more recent cases, had been stricter and clearer on the
distinction between these two modes of appeal. In Nunez v. GSIS Family Bank,
[62]
the Court elucidated:
In Ligon v. Court of Appeals where the therein petitioner
described her petition as an appeal under Rule 45 and at the same time
as a special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, this Court, in frowning over what it described as a chimera,
reiterated that the remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually
exclusive and not alternative nor successive.
To be sure, the distinctions between Rules 45 and 65 are far and
wide. However, the most apparent is that errors of jurisdiction are best
reviewed in a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 while
errors of judgment can only be corrected by appeal in a petition for
review under Rule 45.

But in the same case, the Court also held that:

This Court, x x x, in accordance with the liberal spirit which
pervades the Rules of Court and in the interest of justice may treat a
petition for certiorari as having been filed under Rule 45, more so if the
same was filed within the reglementary period for filing a petition for
review.[63]

It is apparent in the case at bar that the Republic availed itself of the wrong
mode of appeal by filing Consolidated Petitions for Review under Rule 45 and
forCertiorari under Rule 65, when these are two separate remedies that are
mutually exclusive and neither alternative nor successive. Nevertheless, the Court
shall treat the Consolidated Petitions as a Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45 and the allegations therein as errors of judgment. As the records show, the
Petition was filed on time under Rules 45. Before the lapse of the 15-day
reglementary period to appeal under Rule 45, the Republic filed with the Court a
motion for extension of time to file its petition. The Court, in a Resolution[64] dated
January 23, 2006, granted the Republic a 30-day extension, which was to expire on
December 29, 2005. The Republic was able to file its Petition on the last day of the
extension period.
Hierarchy of courts
The direct filing of the instant Petition with this Court did not violate the
doctrine of hierarchy of courts.
According to Rule 41, Section 2(c) [65] of the Rules of Court, a decision or
order of the RTC may be appealed to the Supreme Court by petition for review
oncertiorari under Rule 45, provided that such petition raises only questions of
law.[66]
A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct
application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the issue does
not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, the
truth or falsehood of facts being admitted. [67] A question of fact exists when the
doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query
invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of the
witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, as
well as their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability of the
situation.[68]
Here, the Petition of the Republic raises pure questions of law, i.e., whether
Civil Case No. 106 should have been dismissed for failure to implead

indispensable parties and for forum shopping. Thus, the direct resort by the
Republic to this Court is proper.
The Court shall now consider the propriety of the dismissal by the RTCBranch 1 of the Complaint for Expropriation of the Republic.

The proper parties in the expropriation

proceedings
The right of the Republic to be substituted for ISA as plaintiff in Civil Case
No. 106 had long been affirmed by no less than this Court in the ISA case. The
dispositive portion of the ISA case reads:
WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 8 October 1991 to the extent that it affirmed the trial
courts order dismissing the expropriation proceedings, is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the case is REMANDED to the
court a quo which shall allow the substitution of the Republic of the
Philippines for petitioner Iron Steel Authority for further proceedings
consistent with this Decision. No pronouncement as to costs.[69]

The ISA case had already become final and executory, and entry of judgment
was made in said case on August 31, 1998. The RTC-Branch 1, in an Order dated
November 16, 2001, effected the substitution of the Republic for ISA.
The failure of the Republic to actually file a motion for execution does not
render the substitution void. A writ of execution requires the sheriff or other
proper officer to whom it is directed to enforce the terms of the writ. [70] The
November 16, 2001 Order of the RTC-Branch 1 should be deemed as voluntary
compliance with a final and executory judgment of this Court, already rendering a
motion for and issuance of a writ of execution superfluous.

Besides, no substantive right was violated by the voluntary compliance by

the RTC-Branch 1 with the directive in the ISA case even without a motion for
execution having been filed. To the contrary, the RTC-Branch 1 merely enforced
the judicially determined right of the Republic to the substitution. While it is
desirable that the Rules of Court be faithfully and even meticulously observed,
courts should not be so strict about procedural lapses that do not really impair the
administration of justice. If the rules are intended to insure the orderly conduct of
litigation it is because of the higher objective they seek which is the protection of
the substantive rights of the parties.[71]
The Court also observes that MCFC did not seek any remedy from the Order
dated November 16, 2001 of the RTC-Branch 1. Consequently, the said Order
already became final, which even the RTC-Branch 1 itself cannot reverse and set
aside on the ground of honest mistake.
The RTC-Branch 1 dismissed the Complaint in Civil Case No. 106 on
another ground: that MCFC is not a proper party to the expropriation proceedings,
not being the owner of the parcels of land sought to be expropriated. The RTCBranch 1 ratiocinated that since the exercise of the power of eminent domain
involves the taking of private land intended for public use upon payment of just
compensation to the owner, then a complaint for expropriation must be directed
against the owner of the land sought to be expropriated.
The Republic insists, however, that MCFC is a real party-in-interest,
impleaded as a defendant in the Complaint for Expropriation because of its
possessory or occupancy rights over the subject parcels of land, and not by reason
of its ownership of the said properties. In addition, the Republic maintains that
non-joinder of parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action.
Rule 67, Section 1 of the then Rules of Court [72] described how expropriation
proceedings should be instituted:
Section 1. The complaint. The right of eminent domain shall be
exercised by the filing of a complaint which shall state with certainty the
right and purpose of condemnation, describe the real or personal
property sought to be condemned, and join as defendants all persons

owning or claiming to own, or occupying, any part thereof or

interest therein,showing, so far as practicable, the interest of each
defendant separately. If the title to any property sought to be
condemned appears to be in the Republic of the Philippines,
although occupied by private individuals, or if the title is otherwise
obscure or doubtful so that the plaintiff cannot with accuracy or certainty
specify who are the real owners, averment to that effect may be made in
the complaint.[73] (Emphases supplied.)

For sure, defendants in an expropriation case are not limited to the owners
of the property to be expropriated, and just compensation is not due to the property
owner alone. As this Court held in De Knecht v. Court of Appeals[74]:
The defendants in an expropriation case are not limited to the
owners of the property condemned. They include all other persons
owning, occupying or claiming to own the property. When
[property] is taken by eminent domain, the owner x x x is not
necessarily the only person who is entitled to compensation. In the
American jurisdiction, the term owner when employed in statutes
relating to eminent domain to designate the persons who are to be made
parties to the proceeding, refer, as is the rule in respect of those entitled
to compensation, to all those who have lawful interest in the property to
be condemned, including a mortgagee, a lessee and a vendee in
possession under an executory contract. Every person having an estate
or interest at law or in equity in the land taken is entitled to share in the
award. If a person claiming an interest in the land sought to be
condemned is not made a party, he is given the right to intervene and lay
claim to the compensation. (Emphasis supplied.)

At the time of the filing of the Complaint for Expropriation in 1983,

possessory/occupancy rights of MCFC over the parcels of land sought to be
expropriated were undisputed. In fact, Letter of Instructions No. 1277[75] dated
November 16, 1982 expressly recognized that portions of the lands reserved by
Presidential Proclamation No. 2239, also dated November 16, 1982, for the use
and immediate occupation by the NSC, were then occupied by an idle fertilizer
plant/factory and related facilities of MCFC. It was ordered in the same Letter of
Instruction that:

(1)
NSC shall negotiate with the owners of MCFC, for and on
behalf of the Government, for the compensation of MCFC's
present occupancy rights on the subject lands at an amount of Thirty
(P30.00) Pesos per square meter or equivalent to the assessed value
thereof (as determined by the City Assessor of Iligan), whichever is
higher. NSC shall give MCFC the option to either remove its aforesaid
plant, structures, equipment, machinery and other facilities from the
lands or to sell or cede ownership thereof to NSC at a price equivalent to
the fair market value thereof as appraised by the Asian Appraisal Inc. as
may be mutually agreed upon by NSC and MCFC.
(2)
In the event that NSC and MCFC fail to agree on the
foregoing within sixty (60) days from the date hereof, the Iron and Steel
Authority (ISA) shall exercise its authority under Presidential Decree
(PD) No. 272, as amended, to initiate the expropriation of the
aforementioned occupancy rights of MCFC on the subject lands as well
as the plant, structures, equipment, machinery and related facilities, for
and on behalf of NSC, and thereafter cede the same to NSC. During the
pendency of the expropriation proceedings, NSC shall take possession of
the properties, subject to bonding and other requirements of P.D. 1533.
(Emphasis supplied.)

Being the occupant of the parcel of land sought to be expropriated, MCFC

could very well be named a defendant in Civil Case No. 106. The RTC-Branch 1
evidently erred in dismissing the Complaint for Expropriation against MCFC for
not being a proper party.
Also erroneous was the dismissal by the RTC-Branch 1 of the original
Complaint for Expropriation for having been filed only against MCFC, the
occupant of the subject land, but not the owner/s of the said property.
Dismissal is not the remedy for misjoinder or
parties. According to Rule 3, Section 11 of the Rules of Court:

non-joinder

SEC. 11. Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties. Neither

misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is ground for dismissal of an
action. Parties may be dropped or added by order of the court on
motion of any party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and

of

on such terms as are just. Any claim against a misjoined party may be
severed and proceeded with separately. (Emphasis supplied.)

MCFC contends that the aforequoted rule does not apply in this case where
the party not joined, i.e., the owner of the property to be expropriated, is an
indispensable party.
An indispensable party is a party-in-interest without whom no final
determination can be had of an action.[76]
Now, is the owner of the property an indispensable party in an action for
expropriation? Not necessarily. Going back to Rule 67, Section 1 of the Rules of
Court, expropriation proceedings may be instituted even when title to the property
sought to be condemned appears to be in the Republic of the Philippines, although
occupied by private individuals. The same rule provides that a complaint for
expropriation shall name as defendants all persons owning or claiming to own, or
occupying, any part thereof or interest in the property sought to be
condemned. Clearly, when the property already appears to belong to the Republic,
there is no sense in the Republic instituting expropriation proceedings against
itself. It can still, however, file a complaint for expropriation against the private
persons occupying the property. In such an expropriation case, the owner of the
property is not an indispensable party.
To recall, Presidential Proclamation No. 2239 explicitly states that the
parcels of land reserved to NSC are part of the public domain, hence, owned by the
Republic. Letter of Instructions No. 1277 recognized only the occupancy rights of
MCFC and directed NSC to institute expropriation proceedings to determine the
just compensation for said occupancy rights. Therefore, the owner of the property
is not an indispensable party in the original Complaint for Expropriation in Civil
Case No. 106.
Assuming for the sake of argument that the owner of the property is an
indispensable party in the expropriation proceedings, the non-joinder of said party
would still not warrant immediate dismissal of the complaint for

expropriation. In Vda. De Manguerra v. Risos,[77] the Court applied Rule 3, Section

11 of the Rules of Court even in case of non-joinder of an indispensable party, viz:
[F]ailure to implead an indispensable party is not a ground for the
dismissal of an action. In such a case, the remedy is to implead the nonparty claimed to be indispensable. Parties may be added by order of the
court, on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the
action and/or such times as are just. If the petitioner/plaintiff refuses
to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, the
latter may dismiss the complaint/petition for the petitioner's/plaintiff's
failure to comply. (Emphasis supplied.)

In this case, the RTC-Branch 1 did not first require the Republic to implead
the alleged owner/s of the parcel of land sought to be expropriated. Despite the
absence of any order from the Court, the Republic upon becoming aware that the
parcels of land involved in the 1914 Cacho case and 1997 Cacho case, claimed by
Teofilo and LANDTRADE, and Vidal and AZIMUTH, encroached into and
overlapped with the parcel of land subject of Civil Case No. 106 sought leave of
court to file a Supplemental Complaint to implead these four parties. The RTCBranch 1 did not take the Supplemental Complaint of the Republic into
consideration. Instead, it dismissed outright the original Complaint for
Expropriation against MCFC.
Forum shopping
The RTC-Branch 1 further erred in finding that the Republic committed
forum shopping by (1) simultaneously instituting the actions for expropriation
(Civil Case No. 106) and reversion (Civil Case No. 6686) for the same parcels of
land; and (2) taking inconsistent positions when it conceded lack of ownership
over the parcels of land in the expropriation case but asserted ownership of the
same properties in the reversion case.
There is no dispute that the Republic instituted reversion proceedings (Civil
Case No. 6686) for the same parcels of land subject of the instant Expropriation
Case (Civil Case No. 106). The Complaint for Cancellation of Titles and
Reversion[78] dated September 27, 2004 was filed by the Republic with the RTC on

October 13, 2004. The records, however, do not show when the Supplemental
Complaint for Expropriation[79] dated September 28, 2004 was filed with the
RTC. Apparently, the Supplemental Complaint for Expropriation was
filed after the Complaint for Cancellation of Titles and Reversion since the
Republic mentioned in the former the fact of filing of the latter.[80] Even then, the
Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping[81] attached to the
Supplemental Complaint for Expropriation did not disclose the filing of the
Complaint for Cancellation of Titles and Reversion. Notwithstanding such nondisclosure, the Court finds that the Republic did not commit forum shopping for
filing both Complaints.
In NBI-Microsoft Corporation v Hwang,[82] the
circumstances when forum shopping exists:

Court

laid

down

the

Forum-shopping takes place when a litigant files multiple suits

involving the same parties, either simultaneously or successively, to
secure
a
favorable
judgment. Thus, itexists where the elements of litis pendentia are presen
t, namely: (a) identity of parties, or
at least such
parties
who represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights
asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts;
and (c) the identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the
two cases is such that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending
case, regardless
of
which
party
is
successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case. Forumshopping is an act of malpractice because it abuses court processes. x x
x.

Here, the elements of litis pendencia are wanting. There is no identity of

rights asserted and reliefs prayed for in Civil Case No. 106 and Civil Case No.
6686.
Civil Case No. 106 was instituted against MCFC to acquire, for a public
purpose, its possessory/occupancy rights over 322,532 square meters or 32.25
hectares of land which, at the time of the filing of the original Complaint in 1983,
was not yet covered by any certificate of title. On the other hand, Civil Case No.
6686 sought the cancellation of OCT Nos. 0-1200 (a.f.) and 0-1201 (a.f.), which

was entered into registration on December 4, 1998 in Doa Demetrias name, on

the argument that the parcels of land covered by said certificates exceeded the
areas granted by the LRC to Doa Demetria in GLRO Record Nos. 6908 and 6909,
as affirmed by this Court in the 1914 Cacho case.
Expropriation vis--vis reversion
The Republic is not engaging in contradictions when it instituted both
expropriation and reversion proceedings for the same parcels of land. The
expropriation and reversion proceedings are distinct remedies that are not
necessarily exclusionary of each other.
The filing of a complaint for reversion does not preclude the institution of an
action for expropriation. Even if the land is reverted back to the State, the same
may still be subject to expropriation as against the occupants thereof.
Also, Rule 67, Section 1 of the Rules of Court allows the filing of a
complaint for expropriation even when the title to any property sought to be
condemned appears to be in the Republic of the Philippines, although occupied by
private individuals, or if the title is otherwise obscure or doubtful so that the
plaintiff cannot with accuracy or certainty specify who are the real owners. Rule
67, Section 9 of the Rules of Court further provides:
SEC. 9. Uncertain ownership; conflicting claims. If the
ownership of the property taken is uncertain, or there are conflicting
claims to any part thereof, the court may order any sum or sums
awarded as compensation for the property to be paid to the court for the
benefit of the person adjudged in the same proceeding to be entitled
thereto. But the judgment shall require the payment of the sum or sums
awarded to either the defendant or the court before the plaintiff can enter
upon the property, or retain it for the public use or purpose if entry has
already been made. (Emphasis supplied.)

Hence, the filing by the Republic of the Supplemental Complaint for

Expropriation impleading Teofilo, Vidal, LANDTRADE, and AZIMUTH, is not
necessarily an admission that the parcels of land sought to be expropriated are

privately owned. At most, the Republic merely acknowledged in its Supplemental

Complaint that there are private persons also claiming ownership of the parcels of
land. The Republic can still consistently assert, in both actions for expropriation
and reversion, that the subject parcels of land are part of the public domain.
In sum, the RTC-Branch 1 erred in dismissing the original Complaint and
disallowing the Supplemental Complaint in Civil Case No. 106. The Court
reverses and sets aside the Resolutions dated July 12, 2005 and October 24, 2005
of the RTC-Branch 1 in Civil Case 106, and reinstates the Complaint for Reversion
of the Republic.
IV
DISPOSITIVE PART
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court renders the following
judgment in the Petitions at bar:
1)
In G.R. No. 170375 (Expropriation Case), the Court GRANTS the
Petition for Review of the Republic of the Philippines. It REVERSES and SETS
ASIDE the Resolutions dated July 12, 2005 and October 24, 2005 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 1 of Iligan City, Lanao del Norte. It further ORDERS the
reinstatement of the Complaint in Civil Case No. 106, the admission of the
Supplemental Complaint of the Republic, and the return of the original record of
the case to the court of origin for further proceedings. No costs.