/';-=09

)(8*=-0/']

11:33:09 AM

VIVARIUM
AN INTERNATIONALJOURNAL FOR THE PHILOSOPHY
AND INTELLECTUAL LIFE OF THE MIDDLE AGES AND
RENAISSANCE
sideofmediaeval
inparticular
totheprofane
vivarium
is devoted
philosophy
lifeoftheMiddle
andtheintellectual
AgesandRenaissance.
- C.H. Kneepkens,
- H.A.G.Braakhuis,
L.M. de Rijk,(Leiden)
EDITORS
(Nijmegen)
- D. Perler,
E.P.
Bos,(Leiden)
(Madison)
W.J.Courtenay,
(Groningen)
- M.G.M.vanderPoel,(Nijmegen).
(Basel)
Board:
Prof.
C.H.Kneepkens.
oftheEditorial
Secretary
be addressed
should
thoseofa business
Allcommunications,
nature,
except
derLetteren,
Faculteit
toC.H.Kneepkens,
Vakgroep
Groningen,
Rijksuniversiteit
TheNetherlands.
P.O.Box716,9700AS Groningen,
Mediaevistiek,
- J.E.Murdoch,
- Albert
TullioGregory,
ADVISORY
Zimmermann,
(Cologne)
(Rome)
COMMITTEE (Cambridge,
MA).
TheNetherlands.
PUBLISHERS Brill,
Leiden,
PUBLISHED Twiceyearly.
and
XLIII (2005)(320pp.):EUR 148(USD 185)forinstitutions,
SUBSCRIPTION
Volume
Price
andpacking.
inclusive
EUR 72 (USD90)forprivate
subscribers,
ofpostage
online
includes
subscription.
volumes
orders
forcomplete
orders
areaccepted
only,
taking
Subscription
onanautowith
thefirst
issueofanyyear.Orders
effect
mayalsobeentered
ifthey
arereceived
willonly
beaccepted
basis.Cancellations
matic
continuing
thecancellation
theyearinwhich
1stoftheyearpreceding
October
before
ifmade
free
ofcharge,
issues
willbemet,
Claims
formissing
istotakeeffect.
for
andfivemonths
customers
forEuropean
three
months
ofdispatch
within
outside
customers
Europe.
orders
should
be sentto:
Subscription
Brill
Academic
Publishers
Stratton
Business
Drive,
Park,
Pegasus
Biggleswade
SGI8 8T), United
Bedfordshire
Kingdom
601604
Fax:+44(0)1767
Tel.:+44(0)1767
604954;
E-Mail:
brill@turpin-distribution.com

areexclusive
ofVAT in EU-countries
Allpricesandpostage
& handling
charges
outside
theEU).
(VATnotapplicable

Nowenjoyfreeonlineaccess to thisjournal
VisittheBrill-Website
withyourprint
subscription.
section.
andentertheonline
www.brill.nl
at http:/
journals
BRILL
LEIDEN BOSTON
ISSN 0042-7543
version
(Online
version)
(Print
); ISSN 1568-5349
in The Netherlands
Printed

on acid-free
Printed
paper

11:33:09 AM

/';-=09

)(8*=-0/']

11:35:10 AM

VIVARIUM
AN INTERNATIONALJOURNAL FOR THE PHILOSOPHY
AND INTELLECTUAL LIFE OF THE MIDDLE AGES AND
RENAISSANCE
sideofmediaeval
inparticular
totheprofane
vivarium
is devoted
philosophy
lifeoftheMiddle
andtheintellectual
AgesandRenaissance
C.H. Kneepkens,
L.M. de Rijk,(Leiden)H.A.G.Braakhuis,
editors
(Nijmegen)
- E.P. Bos,(Leiden).
- W.J.Courtenay,
D. Perler,
(Madison)
(Groningen)
- M.G.M.vanderPoel,(Nijmegen).
(Basel)
C.H.Kneepkens.
Board:
Prof.
oftheEditorial
Secretary
be addressed
should
ofa business
those
Allcommunications,
nature,
except
Faculteit
derLetteren,
toC.H.Kneepkens,
Vakgroep
Groningen,
Rijksuniversiteit
TheNetherlands.
P.O.Box716,9700AS Groningen,
Mediaevistiek,
TullioGregory,
advisory
Zimmermann,
J.E.Murdoch,
(Cologne)
(Rome)Albert
committee (Cambridge,
MA).
TheNetherlands.
publishers Brill,
Leiden,
ca. 320pagesyearly.
published Twiceyearly,

TheNetherlands
BrillNV,Leiden,
Copyright
2005byKoninklijhe
Academic
theimprints
Brill
Brill
NVincorporates
Publishers,
Koninklke
Publishers
andVSP.
Martinus
Nijhoff
in
stored
reserved.
Allrights
Nopartofthis
translated,
maybereproduced,
publication
orbyanymeans,
inany
ortransmitted
a retrieval
electronic,
form
system,
written
without
orotherwise,
mechanical,
prior
recording
photocopying,
ofthe
publisher.
permission
orpersonal
items
tophotocopy
Authorization
forinternal
that
useisgranted
provided
byBrill
toCopyright
theappropriate
feesarepaiddirectly
Suite
910
222Rosewood
Clearance
Drive,
Center,
tochange.
AIA01923,USA.Feesaresubject
Danvers,
PRINTED
INTHENETHERLANDS

11:35:10 AM

CONTENTS
Alessandro D. Conti
Stephen D. Dumont
Giorgio Pini

Paul Vincent Spade

Laurent Cesalli
Alessandro D. Conti
Fabrizio Amerini
Mary Sirridge
DominikPerler

Florian Hamann

Pepijn Rotten
Pekka Krkkinen

Reviews

OF VOLUME

XLIII (2005)

Introduction
Duns Scotus's Parisian Question on the
Formal Distinction
Scotus's Realist Conception of the Categories: His Legacy to Late Medieval
Debates
The Problem of Universaisand Wyclif's
Alleged "Ultrarealism"
de Jean Wyclif
Le pan-propositionnalisme
and
Semantics:
JohannesSharpe'sOntology
Oxford Realism Revisited
What is Real. A Replyto Ockham'sOnto-

1
7

63
Ill
124
156

187
logical Program
Dream Bodies and Dream Pains in Augustine's "De Natura et Origine Animae" .. 213
Emotions and Cognitions. FourteenthCenturyDiscussionson the Passionsof the
Soul
250
Koran und Konziliarismus.Anmerkungen
von Heymericusde Campo
zum Verhltnis
und Nikolaus von Kues
275
"Secundum processum et mentem Versoris":John Versor and His Relation to
the Schools of Thought Reconsidered.... 292
of
Theology,Philosophy,and Immortality
the Soul in the Late ViaModernaof Erfurt 337
M. Kardaun and J. Spruyt (eds.), The
WingedChariot.CollectedEssayson Plato
and Platonismin Honour of L.M. de Rijk
andCostantino
Marmo) 36 1
{rev.byStefania
Bonfiglioli
Frans de Haas and Jaap Mansfield(eds.),
Aristode:cOn Generationand Corruption,'
Book I {rev.byJackupko)
367
Irne Rosier-Catach, La parole efficace:
369
signe,rituel,sacr {rev.byL.G. Kelly)

11:35:10 AM

iv

CONTENTS
Claude Panaccio, Ockham on Concepts (rev.by
377
DominikPerler)
Richard Billingham, 'De consequentiis' mit
Toledo-Kommentar.Kritischherausgegeben,
eingeleitetund kommentiertvon Stephanie
380
Weber (rev.byE.P. Bos)
383

Books Received

11:35:10 AM

DreamBodiesand DreamPains in Augustine's

"De Naturaet Origine
Animae"*
MARY SIRRIDGE

"St.Perpetua,
forexample,
seemed
to herself
in dreams
to be
witha certain
intoa man."
after
wrestling
beingturned
Egyptian
1
De Natura
etOrigine
Animae
Augustine,
Abstragt
In his De NaturaetOrigine
Animae
, an answerto a workby VincentiusVictor,
to answersome questionsabout what
Augustinewas drawnintoattempting
kind of realitydream-bodies,
dream-worlds
and dream-painshave. In this
on Augustine'sattemptsto show thatnone of Victor's
paper I concentrate
of the soul are any good, and thatVictor's
argumentsforthe corporeality
inflatedclaimsaboutthe extentof the soul's self-knowledge
are the resultof
self-awareness
for
takes
the
mistaking
self-knowledge.
Augustine
positionthat
the feelingswe have in dreamsand the feelingsof the dead, althoughthey
are real feelings,
are not alwaysthe feelingstheyseem to be. This position
is consistent
withAugustine's
laterworks,thoughit departsfromhis underof
these
in
issues
his
earliestworks.
standing
In De Naturaet Origine
Animae
, writtenaround 419 A.D., Augustinewas
drawninto attempting
to answersome questionsabout what kindof realand dream-painshave. Did St. Perpetua
itydream-bodies,dream-worlds,
or did she merelydream that she felt
reallyfeel thatshe was struggling,
that way? Was she reallystruggling?
Was she reallywrestling?Was she

* I thank
MarciaColishandFr.RolandTeske,whoheardorreadearlier
versions
of
thispaperandmadeimportant
suggestions.
1 Augustine,
De Matura
etOrigine
Animae
, IV. 16. 26. 405,ed. C.F. Urba& J. Zycha,
Ecclesiasticorum
Latinorum
Corpus
Scriptorum
(hereafter
CSEL)60,Vienna1913,301-419
(hereafter
DNOA).Alsotitled
DeAnima
eteiusOrigine
Cursus
Patrum
Latinorum
, Patrologia
Completus
theEnglish
TheNature
andOrigin
(hereafter
translation,
PL)44,475-548
(I haveconsulted
A Translation
, in: TheWorks
oftheSoul
, Vol. 23.1,ed.
ofSaint
Augustine:
forthe21stCentury
andtransi.
R. Teske,S.J.,HydePark,NY 1997,466-561.
Koninklijke
BrillNV,Leiden,
2005
- www.brill.nl
Alsoavailable
online

Vivarium
43,2

11:33:18 AM

2 14

MARYSIRRIDGE

really a male while wrestlingwith the Egyptian?And what about the

Egyptian?
Augustinegot entangledin a discussionof thesequestionsin the course
of respondingto a treatiseon the soul by one VincentiusVictor.In this
treatise,which has excited effusiveenthusiasmamong Augustine'sown
friendsand associates,2Victor argues that the human soul is corporeal.
In supportof thisposition,he has cited the Bible narrativeabout Lazarus
and Dives. Moreover,Victorconsidersit obviousthateach soul is infused
directlyby God. Given the soul's completeknowledgeof its "properties
and nature" {sua qualitatenaturaque
), Victor argues, simplyby reflecting
should
have arrivedquicklyat the realizahis
own
soul
Augustine
upon
tion that the soul is corporeal,and that each man's soul, then his spirit,
are created de novofromand by the breath of God. From this position
on the originof the soul, Victorarguesforan assortmentof theses,some
of which are typicallyPelagian,3e.g., that thereis no way for the soul
to inheritoriginalsin, and that unbaptizedinfantscan be saved by the
prayersof the faithful.
In thispaper I will not deal directlywithAugustine'sattackon Victor's
brand of Pelagian theologicalviews. I will concentrateinstead on his
attemptsto show that Victor's claims about the extentand value of the
are wildlyexaggerated,and that none of Victor's
soul's self-knowledge
for
the
of the soul are any good. It is in the course
arguments
corporeality
of givinghis own explanationof the storyof Lazarus and Dives that
Augustineis drawn into a discussionof dreaming.With respectto their
actions,bodies and feelings,the dead resembledreamers,he says; but it
is a good deal easier to thinkabout dream experiencethan about afterdeath experience.As an example of dream experience,Augustinepro2 Victor's
a fair
workis lost,andweareleftwithAugustine's
reconstruction,
including
The quotations
ofBookIV,
number
ofpassages
whichpurport
to be direct
quotations.
to Vincentius
Victorhimself,
arepresumably
whichtakestheformofa letter
directed
in themain,sincetheymatchthosein BooksI andII, whichwereoriginally
accurate
Victor's
treatise.
addressed
to recipients
whowerefamiliar
withVincentius
3 In DNOA III. iii.3-xiii.19,Augustine
errors
ofVictor's
work:
that
liststhevarious
thesoulwasmadebyGodoutofhimself;
thatGodwillcontinuously
create
soulsforever;
merit
thatthesoullostsomemerit
withflesh;
thatthesoulregains
bybeingconjoined
from
thatthesouldeserved
tobecome
thatunbaptized
withflesh;
sinful;
beingconjoined
aresaved;thatsomewhoarepredestined
tobe savedmaynotbe saved;thatsome
infants
in theFather's
ofGod;thatChristian
ofthemansions
houseare outside
thekingdom
should
forthosewhodieunbaptized;
thatthosewhodiewithout
sacrifice
be offered
baptismmaybe savedat theLastJudgment.

11:33:18 AM

DREAMBODIESANDDREAMPAINS

215

poses the dream visionsof St. Perpetua describedin the popular narrative of the martyrdomof Perpetua and Felicitas.4He comes to a surprisingset of conclusions:In our dreamsit is withdream-bodiesthatwe
in dream-worlds;nonethelesswe are reallyourhave dream-adventures
selvesin our dreams,and the feelingswe have in dreams are real.
One interesting
implicationof Augustine'sposition on dream-experience is thatthe feelingswe have in dreams and the feelingsof the dead,
althoughthey are real feelings,are not always exactlythe feelingsthey
seem to be. Augustineis aware of this implication,which is in fact in
and body
of self-awareness,
self-knowledge,
keepingwithhis understanding
and soul in his later works,althoughit constitutesa departurefromthe
of these issues expressedin his earliestworks.
understanding
and Self-Knowledge
Self-Awareness
In the course of his argument,Victor has attackedAugustinefor holding that the soul is not corporeal,but spiritual.FurthermoreVictor has
criticizedAugustineforhavingbeen eithertoo cautious or too obtuse to
make a definitedecisionabout whetherthe soul is generated(expropagine)
or derived(extraduce
) fromthe parent'ssoul as bodies are generatedfrom
or
bodies,
whether,like the soul of Adam, each soul is created de novo
God
by being directlybreathedinto its body (insufflata).5
Accordingto
by

4 PassioSanctarum
etFelicitatisi
ed. C.J.M.J.
vanBeek,Noviomagi
1936(herePerpetuae
afterPassio).
Considerable
has surrounded
thePassioSanctarum
et
controversy
Perpetuae
in DNOA (DNOAI. x.
Felicitatis.
Therehavebeendoubts,
first
expressed
byAugustine
herimprisonment;
wrotethesections
12),aboutwhether
Perpetua
actually
describing
inAugustine's
Sermon
is not,however,
281fortheFeast
questioned
Perpetua's
authorship
The authoroftheMartyrs
andFelicitas
(SermoCCLXXXI,PL 38, 1284-5).
Perpetua
is discussed
andAuthorship
inthe"Passio
Philology
shipofthenarrative
byThomasHeffernan,
Emanuela
Sanctarum
etFelicitatis"
50 (1995),315-25.
, in:Traditio
Prinzivalli,
Perpetuae
Perpetua
Women
theMartyr
in:Augusto
Fraschetti
, Chicago& London1994,118-40,
(ed.),Roman
forPerpetua's
ofthePassio
andsummarizes
thescholarly
debateabout
argues
authorship
whether
theextant
Greekversion
ofthetextis theoriginal,
whether
Tertullian
wasthe
andtheextent
author
ofthePassio
as a whole,
towhichthePassio
is a Montanist
work.
5 DNOA IV. v. 6. 386:"Et absurdum
existimas
rationi
utnesciat
atqueincongruum
animautrumnam
divinitus
insufflata
Cf.alsoDNOA I. xiv.
tracta."
sit,an de parentibus
ex propagine,
estadhucundedet,utrum
sicutipsequidem
20. "Itaquaerendum
dat,sed
tarnen
ex propagine
datcorporis
an ueronouumequepropagatum
membra;
singulis
insufflando
distribut."
Fora description
oftheseviewsoftheorigin
ofthehumansoul
in hislaterworks,
andAugustine's
to theproblem
cf.R.J.O'Connell,
approach
S.J.,The
Later
Works
, NewYork1987,esp.251-6.
Origin
oftheSoulinSt.Augustine's

11:33:18 AM

216

MARYSIRRIDGE

Victor,Augustine'sreluctanceto take a positionon the originof the soul

is well nigh indecent:
andunreasonable
thata
absurd
to mecompletely
ButI assureyouthatit appears
theknowltohimself,
thathewhois heldtohaveacquired
manshould
be a stranger
of hisveryself.Forwhat
to be ignorant
shouldbe supposed
edgeof all things
a mananda beastifhe doesnotknowhowto delve
is therebetween
difference
so thatthese
or whathe is like(suaqualitate
hisnature
intoanddiscuss
naturaque),
didnot
hewasinhonor,
arejustlyappliedto him,"Man,although
wordsofScripture
unto
them"
andis likened
as oneofthebeasts,
hehasbecome
understand;
(Psxlix,13).For
mana ratioandcreated
without
itsreason,
sincethegoodGodestablished
nothing
andalivewiththepower
withreason,
endowed
nalanimal,
capableofunderstanding,
what
tohisprudent
devoidofreason
allthings
ofsenseso as toentrust
governance,
manofknowledge
thanto saythatthathe cheated
can be moreunfitting
onlyof
oftruth
towards
theknowledge
whichreaches
oftheworld,
The wisdom
himself?
whomitis
knowHimthrough
becauseitcannot
which
is pointless
withan inquiry
to discover
some
has madetheattempt
nonetheless
to learntruethings,
possible
akin
indeed
ofthesoulthatareneartothetruth,
aboutthenature
practically
things
minded
foranyreligiously
itis,the'n,
andindeedshameful,
toit.Howunbecoming,
himself
to know
orcompletely
forbid
aboutthisverysubject,
manto knownothing
aboutit!6
anything
The comparisonwithbeastsrankles.In book IV, addressedto Victorpersonally,Augustinereturnsto the insultagain and again with fugue-like
obsessiveness."To what extent,"he asks at one point, "will you allow
thatwe can be ignorantof our natureandstillkeepa safedistance
fromthose
concern
to
of
some
it
is
no
doubt
?"7 In addition,
beastsofthe
Augustine
field
6 DNOAIV. ii.2. 381:"Sedmihi,
uidetur
absurdum
satissuperque
crede,
atqueinconcreditur
esse
omnium
aut
rerum
sui
sit
homo
ut
is,
adeptus
rationi,
qui
ipseexpers
gruum
si nescit
de suaqualhomopecore,
sibiipsihabeatur
notitiam,
ignotus.
quidautemdiffert
est:
iniliumconueniat
utmerito
itatenaturaque
quodscriptum
atquedisserere,
disquirere
esteis?namcumdeus
etconparatus
estiumentis
assimilatus
esset
inhonore
homo
cum
, nonintellexit;
intellectus
animal
hominem
"condiderit
nonratione
bonusnihil
rationale,
capacem,
ipsumque
disordinatione
rationis
uiuacem,
expertia
prudenti
quiomniarationis
sensuque
compotem
dicipotest
tribut,
quamuteumsolasuinotatione
quidtaminconuenienter
procreaverit,
et cumsapientia
fraudarit?
quimundi,
superuacua
quaeseseusquead uericognitionem
deminuestigatione
protendit,
quiascirenequitperquemlicetquae suntueracognosci,
animae
natura
ueritati
immoaffinia
quam
dispicere,
uicina,
super
temptauerit
aliquatamen
de hocipseautnihilsapereautpenestreligiosum
indecens
quemquam
atquepudendum
ne sapiat!"
itussibiinterdixisse
7 DNOAIV. 2. 3. 382-3:"Dieergoquatenus
nescire
nostram
nobisnaturam
concedas,
AlsoIV. x. 14;IV. xi. 15;IV. viii.8; V. vii.11.
distantia."
salvasitnostra
uta pecoribus
most
ofVictor's
irritated
is alsoobsessively
theory,
psychological
bythesilliness
Augustine
ofthesoultoourblowing
ofGod'sinsufflation
up of
comparison
byVictor's
particularly
intothebag,butwithout
thatwe we pourourbreath
anylesssupposes
bags.IfVictor
blowintoa bagand
letVictor
or ofourbreath,
suggests,
Augustine
eningofourselves
thathe haslost
to think
andseejusthowlonghe continues
holdhisnoseandmouth,
theorigin
about
we
consider
4
ff
can
How
III.
iv.
noneofhisbreath!
learning
)
(DNOA

11:33:18 AM

DREAMBODIESANDDREAMPAINS

217

that Victor's work providesan accessible,pseudo-scientific

rationalefor
some Pelagian theses.But the principalirritantforAugustinein dealing
withVictor'sworkis that he is faced with disarminga positionwhich is
neitherverycogentlyframednor well argued,thoughit has focussedpopular interestupon questionsthat are very importantand centralto his
own thought,viz., the nature of the soul, its transparencyto itselfand
its connectionwith the body.
"
natuAugustinestartshis refutationof Victor by reading sua qualitate
" in such a
as
to
attribute
to
Victor
a
claim:
raque
way
ridiculouslystrong
Andso youseemtohavetakentheposition
thatmanought
tobe ableto discover
anddiscuss
theentirety
ofhisnature
andattributes
insucha waythatnothing
about
himself
is hidden
from
him.8
This may well be a strongerclaim, than Victor meant to make; but it
allowsAugustineto forcehim onto a slipperyslope. If we can be allowed
ignoranceof the numberof hairs on our heads, he asks, then precisely
what sortsof thingsfall under "qualitateatquenatura
"? Just exactlywhat
kind of self-knowledge
followsimmediatelyupon being human? If there
is anythingabout ourselvesof which we can be ignorant,couldn't we
just as well also be ignorantof the answer to the veryquestionwe are
examining?The way is open forAugustineto subjectVictor's confident
claims about selfknowledgeto criticalscrutiny.
One of Victor's half-developedargumentsis that it would be strange
for man to be able to have knowledgeof all sortsof thingsother than
himself,and yet not to know what he himselfis and is like. He offers
no further
explicitdefenseof thisclaim; but tangledup in Victor'smessy
juxtapositionof "the wisdomof the world,"which attemptsto investigate
the soul, and "the religiously-minded
man," who refusesthe attempt,is
a relevantpoint of comparison.Worldlywisdom fallsshortof the truth
when it looks to thingsoutsidethe soul, because it is ignorantof somethingthatis requiredin orderto come to know truth.9By contrast,even
ofthesoul,he asks,from
someone
whodoesnotevenknowhowhe goesaboutblowing
up a bag?(DNOAI. iv.4; IV. iv.5; IV iv.3).
8 DNOA IV. ii. 3. 382:"quodsensisse
itauideris,
de uniuersa
suaqualitate
tamquam
sichomodisquirere
utnihilenimsuilateat."
debeat,
atquenatura
atquedisserere
9 DNOA IV. ii. 2. 381.The force
of"perquem"(n.6 above)is unclear.
Victor
may
meanthattheylackknowledge
ofnormal
intermediaries
likethesenses
epistemological
and memory,
or knowledge
of howto drawinferences
frompriorand better
known
Ifso,theintended
contrast
is between
mediated
andunmediated
this
premises.
knowledge;
contrast
wouldaffect
believer
andunbeliever
alike.Moreprobably,
though,
'quem'indicates

11:33:18 AM

2 18

MARYSIRRIDGE

thisworldlywisdomcomes veryclose to the truthwhen it turnsits attention to the the soul itself.Victor'spoint,presumably,is thatbetweenthe
that must firstbe known if the
soul and itselfthere is no intermediary
the soul is to know itself(thoughVictor again does not make his point
is a directand immediateconexplicit);ratherthe soul's self-knowledge
thus
of
its
to
requiringno priorknowledge,no
presence itself,
sequence
and
or inferences, no divineillumination.In any
methodof investigation
event,thisis the strategythatAugustineseems to attributeto Victor,for
he undertakesto argue that the soul's immediateaccess to itselfis of
extremelylimitedcognitivevalue.
In arguing against Victor, Augustineneeds to differentiate
carefully
and Victor'sextravagantclaims.
betweenhis own viewson self-knowledge
is essenIn thisverywork,Augustinehimselfassertsthat understanding
we are present
tial to human nature;10that as beingswithunderstanding
to ourselvesand aware of ourselvesin a unique and immediateway;11
and that while we live, we know with immediatecertaintythat we live,
and that we remember,understandand will.12In the argumentsagainst
and
Victor,he is concernedto point out that immediateself-awareness
do not amount to complete knowlour natural level of self-knowledge
and
nature
of
the
soul's
operations,let alone to knowledgeabout
edge
its origin.
We do not know, Augustineargues, how it is that food sustainslife
(DNO A IV. iv. 5). Nor do we know:
orknowledge
lackdivine
illumination
is lacking;
theworldly
notsomething,
thatsomeone,
whom
from
wise"are,though
ofGod.It is notclearwhoVictor's
Tertullian,
"worldly
ofsoul
theStoictheory
aboutthesoul,describes
ofhistheory
Victor
takesa fairamount
Christianorum
Series
De Anima
Cf.Tertullian,
withapproval.
V, ed.J.H.Waszink,
Corpus
would
Latina
1954,781-869,
DA).Victor
esp.786-7(hereafter
CC) 2, Turnholt
(hereafter
to be a
to theStoicsbyTertullian
ofsoulattributed
thematerial
consider
theory
surely
in theorizing
aboutthesoul.
direction
clearstepin theright
10DNOA IV. xi. 15.394:"namsi intellegentia
tibiplacetin natura
hominis,
quoniam
intelad animas
nihilquantum
si earnnonhaberet,
reuera
distaremus,
pecoribus
pertinet,
legequidnonintelligas."
11DNOA IV. xix.30. 409-410:
"Sicenimet nosipsoscertius
nouimus,
quamceteros
et in ea tamen
notaestet uoluntas,
nostra
quamplaneuidemus,
quianobisconscientia
noncernonuidemus,
hancin alio quamuis
similitudinem
praesente
aliquamcorporis
nimus."
12DNOA IV. vii.9. 389: "Eccemodo,mododumsumus,
dumnos
dumuiuimus,
etuellecertissimi
noset intellegere
dummeminesse
uiuerescimus,
sumus,
qui nosnatuII.1-5,ed.
. . ." Cf.AlsoAugustine,
esseiactamus
raenostrae
Solloquia
cognitores
magnos
Enchiridion
CSEL89,Vienna1986,1-98;Augustine,
W. Hrmann,
20,ed. E. Evans,CC
1979,49-114.
LXVI,Turnholt

11:33:18 AM

DREAMBODIESANDDREAMPAINS

219

. . . whenhuman
seedis converted
intoblood,whenintosolidflesh;
whenthebones
andtofillwithmarrow;
howmanykinds
ofveinsandnerves
there
begintoharden
andcircuits
theformer
servetoirrigate,
andthelatter
toconare;bywhatchannels
necttheentire
whether
skinisproperly
ofas nerve,
orteeth
as bone. . .
body,
thought
or again,whatpurpose
is served
instead
of
bythoseveinsin whichaircirculates
blood,thosetheycallthearteries
(DNOA IV. v. 6).
AugustineallowsthatVictorperhapsmisspoke,thathe meantto say only
that the soul had completeknowledgeof its own "nature and quality,"
and not anythingabout its body (DNO A IV. ii. 3). The weaker claim
fareslittlebetterthan the strongerone, however,forit is the soul itself
thatdirectsthe developmentand functionsof its body. And if we do not
know whetheror how the soul sets the veins in motion to animate the
body, and the nervesto make it move, then the soul is ignorantof its
own operations,even thoughthe body is below it metaphysically,
"more
- such
able to give life to the body than to know about it"13
knowledge
as thereis of thesethingsis a matterof art and possessedby veryfew.14
We also do not know fromwhat part of the body thinkingand willing
originateor how we go about simpleactionslike movinga finger(DNO A
IV. vi. 7). The centralregionof the body that initiateslife activityand
actions(ihegemonikon
to us. The conclusionof Augustine's
) remainsa mystery
elaborate discussionof the inscrutability
of the soul's operationsis simIf
we are ignorantof the soul's own presentoperations
ple:
precisely
because we are ignorantof the body it governs , then how should we
expect to have comprehensiveknowledgeof its history,indeed, of an
eventin its historythat is furtherback than birth.And even if the soul
were to have been aware of its startup,is there any reason to suppose
that it would know how it got started?(DNO A IV. v. 6)
Anotherof Victor's argumentsis that it would be absurd for man to
have been given reason and understanding,
then leftunaware of these
abilitiesand activities.SurelyVictor is to some extentright;it would be
extremelystrangefor a rationalsoul to be able, for example, to understandnumbertheoryand make wise decisionswithoutbeing at all aware
- if the
of theseabilitiesand activities
suppositionmakes any sense at all.
13DNOA IV. v. 6. 386: "et cumuisceraintrinsecus
nostra
nonpossint
sineanima
facilius
ea potuit
animauiuificare
nosse."
uiuere,
quam
14Ourignorance
isdueatleastinparttoignorance
oftheworkings
ofthebody,
which
remain
eventoscientists
whospendtheir
livesstudying
them
known,
incompletely
(DNOA
IV. ii. 3. 382-383).
Thesescientists
do not
non-scien, Augustine
adds,go aroundcalling
tists
"cattle"
becausetheyhavenotacquired
thisknowledge.

11:33:18 AM

220

MARYSIRRIDGE

But here, too, Augustineargues,Victor's confidencein the extentof the

soul's self-knowledge
is unwarranted.Even if the soul must be immediit
aware
that
remembers,understandsand wills,Augustineargues,
ately
it does not followeven that it knows whatit remembersor understands
or howstrongly
it wills; he cites the case of one Simplicius,who did not
know that he knew all the books of Virgil frommemory,until he had
performedsuch featsas recitingaloud the last line but one fromevery
book (DNO A IV. vii. 9). Indeed we cannot even fathomhow memory
works; Augustineoffersone of his memoryconundrumsin evidence.
Suppose thereis somethingI once knew,then could not remember,but
now do remember:
inmemory,
andthinking
wedo
Weoften
thatwewillkeepsomething
this,
presume
itdoesnotcometo mindwhenwewantit to,
notwrite
itdown.Thenafterwards
it wouldcomebackto us anddidnotwrite
it
thatwe believed
andwe aresorry
we arenotsearching
it from
downso as to prevent
getting
away.Then,although
whenweknew
comesbacktous.Andso werewenotourselves
after
it,itsuddenly
nowthat
Andthenagain,arewe notwhoweusedtobe <then>,
it<at thestart>?
taken
we are notableto callit to mind?Howis it,then,thatwe are somehow
andthenagainsomehow
backto
from
andalienated
ourselves,
brought
awayfrom
- as ifweweresomeone
elseandsomewhere
elseandwe
andrestored
to ourselves
beenput
becauseof havingsomehow
wereunableto getto ourselves
ourselves
elsewhenwe seekanddo notfindwhatwe haveplacedin ourmemsomewhere
whenwefindit.After
all,wheredo
ory,andas ifwe thencamebackto ourselves
ifnotwithin
ourselves?
Andwhatarewe searching
we search,
for,ifnotforour- as ifwe werenotwithin
to someplaceapart
buthadwithdrawn
selves
ourselves,
Andwhatis
before
suchvastness?
Do younotnoticeandtremble
from
ourselves?
notas itwas,butas itis now?15
thisbutournature,
As forknowingwhat we know,Augustinesays that he himselfhas often
been in errorabout whetherhe knew the answer to a question or not,
he knewthe answerwhen he did not, and vice versa.And Peter,
thinking
he remindshis reader,knew that he was willingto die forhis Lord, but
15DNOA IV. vii.10.389-90:"Saepenospraesumimus
retenturos
et
aliquidmemoria
uenitin mentem
necnobisposteacumuolumus
nonscribimus
cumid putamus,
nosque
cumid non
ne fugeret;
etsubito
neclitteris
uenturum
credidisse
rursus,
inligasse
paenitet
nectamenhoc
nosnoneramus,
occurrit:
quandoid cogitabamus?
numquid
quaeramus,
nonpossumus.
sumusquodfuimus,
quidestergo,quodnescioquoquandoid cogitare
ad nosrednescioquomodo
nobisitemque
modosubtrahimur
proferimur
negamurque
necinuenimus
etalibisimus,
nobis,
quodin
quandoquaerimus
quasialiisimus
dimurque
nostra
memoria
posperuenire
nequenosipsiad nosipsosuelutialibipositos
posuimus,
nisiapudnos?etquid
ubienimquaerimus
simus
ettuncperueniamus
quandoinuenimus?
adtendis
innobisetaliquorecesserimus
a nobis?
nonne
nisinos,quasinonsimus
quaerimus
nonqualis
etquodesthocaliudquamnostra
tantam
etexhorrescis
natura,
profunditatem?
sedqualisnuncest?"
fuit,

11:33:18 AM

DREAMBODIESANDDREAMPAINS

221

was unaware of how weaklyhe willedto do so (DNO A IV. vii. 11). Thus
does not add up to
the fact that the soul has immediateself-awareness
the kindof self-knowledge
Victorwould need to sustainhis claim thatthe
rationalsoul knowseven its own rationaloperationswithfullclarityand
certainty.
does not lead
Augustine'scommitmentto the idea that self-awareness
should not come as much of a surprise.
to very much self-knowledge
tends to identifythe self
Throughouthis career, Augustineconsistently
Animae
with the soul; but by the time of De Naturaet Origine
, Augustine
has come also to emphasizethe factthat the soul is the soul of its body,
a body thatit animatesand directsin ways thatlie outsideits self-awareness. In his discussionof the creationof man in De Civitate
Dei XIII, he
nor
a
is
man
is
soul
but
"both body
that
not
alone,
alone,
says
body
In De Genesiad Litteram
and soul joined together."16
he appeals tentatively
to the soul's "natural appetitefor managing the body"17to explain the
resurrection
of bodies afterthe lastjudgment.But althoughthe soul's animationand directionof the body is a genuinepart of its own operation,
knowledgeof such operationsof the soul is not available fromthe immeand reflection.
diate data of introspection
The soul's ignoranceof how it
animates and directsthe body marks a limit to its self-awareness
that
his
considers
extended
Victor
is
Augustine
significant;
argumentagainst
not a matterof settingfireto a straw man. Failure to understandthe
soul's complex interactionwith the body is the firstof several ways in
which Victor's theorydisasterouslyoversimplifies
the soul's "properties
and nature,"and a fortiori
the extentof the soul's self-knowledge.
the mind's cognitionof its own operations,like rememFurthermore,
and willing,is neithercompletenor infallible.
As Augustine
bering,thinking
has argued in De Naturaet Orgine
Animae
, the mind can be ignorantof
16Augustine,
De Civitate
Dei, XIII,24.409,ed.B. Dombert
& A. Kalb,CC48,Turnholt
1955.(Hereafter
De Civ.Dei).
17Augustine,
De Genesi
ad Litteram
XII. xxxv.68, 485. PL 34, 245-468.(hereafter
De
Gen.
adlitt):"Sedsi quemmouet,
defunctorum
suainresquidopussitspiritibus
corpora
urrectione
. . . siuealialatentiore
causa,siueideoquiainestei naturalis
recipere
quidam
retardatur
ne totaintentione
administrandi;
appetitus
corpus
quo appetitu
quodammodo
inilludsummum
nonsubest
cuiusadministratione
coelum,
pergat
quamdiu
corpus,
appetitusilleconquiescat."
comesveryclosehereto saying
in thefash"somewhat
Augustine
ionofAquinas,
thatthemindis notreally
a complete
without
thebody,"Gareth
thing
andDescartes
onMinds
andBodies
in:G. Matthews
Matthews,
Augustine
(ed.),TheAugustinin
Tradition
& LosAngeles
thinks
thatAugustine
doesnottake
, Berkeley
1999,230.Matthews
thisposition,
itwouldbe opento himto do so.
though

11:33:18 AM

MARYSIRRIDGE

222

the data of its own internallife,e.g., of what it willsor how stronglyand

we finda draunambiguouslyit wills something.Alreadyin Confessiones
matic pictureof the mind's propensityfor obscuringits mixed motives
and imperfectly
realized commitments.
And althoughawareness of our
minds' operationsis indeed the basis for our knowledgeof the structure
and natureof the mind,it is a repeatedthemein Augustine'slaterwork
such as it is, does not amount to knowlthat the mind's self-awareness,
edge of how it works.The mind can be ignorantof how it carriesout
some purelymentaloperation,forinstanceof whetherthewillis prompted
to rememberby images of experiencestored in memory,or is in fact
itselfthe cause of remembering(De trn.XI. 7. 12).18We have difficulty
graspingwhat memoryis at all, and only a lengthyprocess of reasoning
bringsus to an understandingof such factsabout memoryas that the
mind is presentto itselfby way of somethinglike a present-memory(De
triti.
XIV. 11. 14).
does not lead the soul to the
Finally,it is obvious that self-awareness
of
mostbasic and importantfactabout its nature,viz., the incorporeality
mind. The mind does have an immediatesense of what it is, Augustine
says, i.e., of its living,remembering,understandingand willing;in this
sense it knows its own substance."What is so presentto knowledgeas
what is presentto mind?" he asks; "And what is so presentto mind as
the mind itself?"(De trn.X. 7. 10). People who suppose thatthe mindis
corporeal,
as wehave
evenwhenitseeksitself,
. . . overlook
thefactthatthemindknows
itself,
is known
whileits
shown.
Butwe canin no wayrightly
saythatanything
already
itknows
itsownsubsincethemindknows
substance
is unknown.
itself,
Wherefore,
X. 10. 16).
stance{Detrin.
is availFrom thisimmediateawareness,a knowledgeof its incorporeality
and reflection,
able to the mind. Still,for all its powers of introspection
the mind can make a fundamentalmistakeabout its own natureand take
itselfto be corporealbecause it easilyconfusesits own substancewithits
objects. Self knowledgeproperlyso-called requires that the mind strip
18Augustine,
& Fr. Glorie,CC 50, 50A,
XI. 7.12,ed. W.J.Mountain
De Trinitate
XI. 8.13,wherea lengthy
Cf.AlsoDe trin.
De trin).
1968(hereafter
Turnholt,
argument
in thememory
is notthesameas theresulthatwhatis stored
to establish
is required
indeincogitatione
whoremembers
oftheperson
ofit in thethought
tantexpression
[quod
arenotsufficient
todecide
andreflection
because
recordantis
introspection
exprimitur)
precisely
thequestion.

11:33:18 AM

DREAMBODIESANDDREAMPAINS

223

away what it is not fromits view of itselfand concentrateon what it

itselfis.19
but
fora lookat itself
as ifitwereabsent,
.... Letthemindthennotgo seeking
Letitnottryto cometo
rather
takepainsto discern
itself,
giventhatitis present.
toseparate
itself
outfrom
whatitknows
knowas ifitdidnotknowitself,
butrather
tobe other
X. 9. 12).
(Detriti
ad Litteram
workslikeDe Trnitate
and De Genesi
Thus in more sophisticated
,
in
find
a
fit
with
the view
the earlier Confessiones
smooth
and even
, we
in De Naturaet Origine
Animae.
of self-awareness
and self-knowledge
Real Feelings
in UnrealBodies
TheDead and Dreaming:
In addition to his argumentfor the soul's knowledgeof its own origin
based on the soul's immediateawarenessof itselfand itsoperations,Victor
has also given an account of how each soul is directlycreated by God.
Victor'sown theoryseems to have been that the soul or "innerman" is
formedwithina body when the breathof God whirlingabout in it causes
a substanceto congeal [gelante
which is so molded that inside
substantia)
the body anotherbody, the "innerman," comes to be enclosed as if in
the shape of its corporealsheath(uelutiinformauaginaecorporalis
incimurr)?
to the extentthat in its shape it resemblesthe outer man.21By a similar process a thirdcorporeal entity,constitutedby sense and intellect,
takesshape withinthe soul, so that "the whole man consistsof threeelements:the outer,the innerand the innermost"(DNOA IV. xiv. 20). On
19ThusGareth
Matthews'
claim(Matthews
1999,n. 17 above),at 225,thatAugustine
holdsthat"themindofeachofus knows
whata mindis simply
andsolely
byknowing
needsto be understood
either
as veryseverely
restricted
to a kindofnon-themaitself,"
tizedsenseofself,whichthesoulindeedalwayshasofitself,
or as theclaimthatthis
non-thematized
self-awareness
is thenecessary
condition
andsource
bothofthesoul'sparticular
ofitsownstates
andactsandofitsgenuine
ofitsnature.
knowledge
knowledge
20DNOA IV. xiv.20, 399-400."De hac enim[seil,anima]loquebaris,
cumdiceres:
'Et gelante
substantia
nonpoterai,
efficeret
quae conprehendi
corpusaliudintracorpus
naturae
suaeui et spiramine
homointerior
conglobatum,
exindeque
inciperet
apparere,
in forma
ad similitudinem
suidelineauit
exteriinclusum,
quemueluti
uaginaecorporalis
orishominis
habitudo.'"
21Thisaccount
oftheformation
ofthesoulis essentially
theonegivenbyTertullian
in DA IX, 7-9,793-794.
ForTertullian,
whoholdsthatsoulsaregenerated
from
souls
soulresults
fromthedirect
of God;in subsequent
, onlythefirst
(extraduce)
inspiration
breath
ofGodis pouredoutas a kindofvaporwiththeseminal
fluid.
souls,thedivine
Cf.DA XXVII,5-9,823-4.Tertullian
draws
theconclusion
thatoriginal
sinis transmitted
in thepropagation
ofsouls.

11:33:18 AM

224

MARYSIRRIDGE

thisaccount,souls, each created separatelyby God's breath,are entirely

corporeal.
Augustinehas criticismsof this account of the genesis of the soul,22
but he is far more concernedto attack the scripturalargumentsVictor
adduces forthe corporealityof the soul. Victor has cited the case of the
dead Rich Man of Luke 16:24, who looks up and recognizesthe (also
dead) Lazarus in the bosom of the (equallydead) Abrahamand begs that
Lazarus come down to bringhim water to relievehis tormenting
thirst.
Victor has then gone on to make the explicitclaim that being able to
recognizeanythingand impose a name upon it impliesits corporeality:
andwhere
there
You say,"Namesceasetobe given
whenform
is notdistinguished;
thereis no giving
ofnames,"
... You say,"Someone
is no designating
ofpersons,
havea bodily
form
andbe seenbodily."23
whosehelpis implored
must,
assuredly
So, accordingto Victor, if it is the soul that survivesdeath, and after
death the soul is stillbeing recognizedand called by name, and is raisthirstand havingthis or that in its bosom,
ing up its eyes and suffering
then clearlythe soul is a kind of body, which has limbs to move and
senses and the abilityto feel pleasure,pain and emotions.Accordingto
Victor,"bodilymembersare here ascribedto the soul as if it were really
a body."24
Augustinemakes fairlyshortworkhere of the referenceto the bosom
of Abraham;like manyreferencesto bodies and bodilypartsin Scripture,
to referto "that remoteand separate
it must be taken metaphorically,
abode of rest and peace in which Abraham now is."25With respectto
how Dives recognizesLazarus and Abraham,AugustinearguesthatVictor
is makingan assumptionthat is demonstrably
false,i.e., that what lacks
and
therefore
cannot recognizedand
is
formless
bodily reality ipsofacto
22He argues,
caneverbe
forexample,
thatitis hardto seehowsomething
corporeal
can
intheimageofGod,whois incorporeal,
butalsohardtoseehowVictor
constituted
ofGod(DNOAIV. 14.20).
to thesoul'sbeingofthesubstance
avoidbeingcommitted
23DNOAIV. XV.22.402:"Dicisetiam'cessare
illicnomina,
ubinondistinguitur
forma,
. . . 'cuius
ubinullaestdesignado
etnihilillicagereappellationem
nominum,
personarum'
auxilium
est,'inquis,
'corporeus
utiqueuisusestatqueformatus."'
inploratum
24DNOA IV. xvi.23. 402: "'Denique,'inquis,'membra
ut
illicanimaedescribuntur
ueresitcorpus.'"
25DNOA IV. xvi.24. 403-4.Augustine
in
heregivesthesamesortofaccount
found
Adver
sushaereses
DA, ch. 7 and 55. Cf.L.J.vanderLof,
, and in Tertullian's
Irenaeus,
Tertullian
andAugustine
26
Abraham's
Bosom
intheWritings
Studies,
, in:Augustinin
ofIrenaeus,
XII. xxxiii.
Cf.alsoDe gen.ad litt.
(1955),109-23.

11:33:18 AM

DREAMBODIESANDDREAMPAINS

225

named; does Victor need to look at his face in a mirrorin order to recognize who he is, he asks?26Is it not insteadtruethatwe know ourselves
betterthan we know otherspreciselybecause we can directlyrecognize
et voluntas
ourselvesby our own will and consciousness(conscientia
)? And
even in the case of others,we do not know them,properlyspeaking,by
perceivingtheirbodies; we most properlyrecognizeeven othersnot by
theirbodies, but by theirlife and will (vitamet voluntatem
), even if that
spiritualrecognitionis mediatedby bodies in this life.27
But Augustinehas stillgot to explain how Dives can liftup his eyes,
suffer
thirst,and beg Lazarus to dip his fingerin waterto cool his tongue
if Dives has no body. AugustinefollowsIrenaeus and Tertullianin taking the storyof Lazarus and Dives as a real narrative,and notjust as a
parable of some sort.And if the storyis takenliterally,then the souls of
the dead speak, look up and occupy space. ApparentlyDives can see
Lazarus and Abraham above him- otherwisewhy would he make the
- othto liftup his eyes?And apparentlyhe is tormentedby thirst
effort
erwisewhy would he beg for water? Dives, Lazarus and Abraham are
all dead, existingonly as theirsouls. It appears, then,that the souls of
the dead are corporeal.
Augustineis convincedthat by lookingto dream experiencewe can
in principlefind a way of resolvingsuch questions about bodily phenomena connectedwith the dead withoutadmittingthat these "bodies"
in dreams,saysAugustine,
actuallyare physicalbodies.The bodilylikenesses
as bodily likenessesof the dead, but
are of the same kind (ex eo genere)
Victorhas himselfmade
theyare more accessibleto our understanding.28
referenceto St. Perpetua'sdream visionsabout her dead brotherand has
26DNOAIV. XV.21.401:'"Sed,"inquis,
'si animacaretcorpore,
quidestquodapud
nonputas
hominis
inferos
diuesillecognoscit?'
. . . haecdicenssi agnitionem
prouenire
te ipsum,
credoquodassiduespeculum
sinecorporis
ut noueris
ne,si
adtendis,
forma,
faciem
fueris
oblitus
tuam,nontepossisagnoscere."
27DNOAIV. xviii.
recte
dicatsealiquem
hominem
30.409-10:
cognouisse,
"quisautem
eiusuitam
molesnonhabet
nisiinquantum
uoluntatemque
cognoscere,
quaeutique
potuit
neccolores?
sicenimet nosipsoscertius
nouimus,
quamceteros
quianobisconscientia
et in ea tamenaliquamcorporis
similinostra
notaestet uoluntas.
quamplaneuidemus
nonuidemus,
hancin alioquamuis
noncernimus,
etiamcuiusabsentis
tudinem
presente
nostram
uerofaciem
eo modonosse,
faciem
recolimus,
recolere,
nouimus,
cogitamus.
cogitarenonpossumus
ettamen
nosipsosnobismagis
uerissime
dicimus.
quamilium
cognitum
hominis
noti
itadarumestubisitpotior
tia."
ueriorque
28DNOAIV. xviii.28.408:"quamuis
enimetea quaesimilia
ex
corporibus
cogitamus,
coniectura
de dormientibus
ducitur."
eo genere
sint;tamen
adtinet,
aptior
quodad mortuos

11:33:18 AM

226

MARYSIRRIDGE

argued that if the saint dreamed she saw her brotherDinocrates miserable and tormentedby thirstand by the cancer fromwhichhe died, and
then later saw him freeof thirstand pain as a resultof her prayersand
tears,then her dream visionsprove that the unbaptizedcan be saved by
the prayers of the living. In addition to her dreams about her dead
brother,Augustinesays, that same St. Perpetua also dreamed that she
was wrestlingwith an Egyptian,having been turnedinto a man.29
The introductionof St. Perpetua's visionsat this point is some indication thatAugustinehas more at stakein thisdiscussionthan bestinga
fairlysillytheoryput forwardby an inconsequentialopponent.Victor's
appeal to the storyof to St. Perpetua had to do with the possibilityof
saving the souls of the unbaptized and was not directlyconnectedwith
the issue of the corporealityof the soul. But Tertullianin his De Anima
had cited St. Perpetua's dream visions as supportfor his view that the
souls of the dead are in some real place, which is part of his argument
for the corporealityof the soul.30Like Victor, Tertullianhad also used
the storyof Abraham, Lazarus and Dives as scripturalsupportfor his
view that souls are corporeal.But unlikeVictor,Tertullianhad situated
his examples in a frameworkof more general philosophicalarguments
against mind-bodydualism; he is thus a far more formidableopponent
than Victor.The soul cannotimpartmovementto the body or be moved
by externalthings,Tertullianhad argued, unless it is itselfcorporeal.31
Moreover,soul and body exhibita "communionof corporealpassions"
withthe
communio
together[compati)
); the soul suffers
(corporalium
passionum
with
is
afflicted
and
the
its
and
shares
(condo
body
along
pains,
body
the soul in passionslike anxiety,distressand love, and in
lescit/
coaegrescit)

29DNOA IV. xviii.26. 405:"nempe

cumquouisasibiestin somnis
sanctaPerpetua
luctari."
in uirum
conuersa
damAegyptio
30Tertullian
namesPerpetua
onlyin DA LV, 4, wherehe appealsto her
explicitly
thatonly
as a basisforhisargument
theholymartyrs
oftheplaceinwhich
vision
repose
ofHadesand
in paradise;
butthespatialreality
are nowalready
thesoulsofmartyrs
ofthesoulin DA VII.
forthecorporeality
Paradise
arepartofhisargument
31DA VI, 3. 788: "Dehincsi corporis
ab aliquo,ostendimus
estmoueri
extrinsecus
cumfurit,
animam
et ab cilio,cumuaticinatur,
autemsupramoueri
utiqueextrinsecus,
ab aliosecundum
extrinsecus
cumab alio,merito
exempli
propositionem
quodmouebitur
aliud?
si ab aliomoueri
Enimuero
est,quantomagismouere
corporis
agnoscam.
corpus
Ab ilia estenim
forisparent.
eiusextrinsecus
et conatus
Animaautemmouetcorpus,
in
etlinguam
incontactum
etoculosinconspectum
etmanus
etpedesinincessum
impingi
animae?"
Undehaecuisincorporalis
intus
motusuperficiem
uelutsigillano
effatum,
agitante.

11:33:18 AM

DREAMBODIESANDDREAMPAINS

227

fear and shame, as shownby its weakness,blushingand pallor.32By the

Animae
timeofDe Naturaet Origine
, Augustinewas familiarwithTertullian's
which
he
had
,
previouslydiscussedin De Genesiad Litteram
arguments,33
He was aware, then,that he had
althoughnot particularlysuccessfully.34
to give an account of the mode of existenceand experiencesof the dead
and dreamingthat allowed him to separate actions, passions and the
recognitionof othersfromhavingsome sortof body; to do so he needed
to give a convincingresponseto Tertullian'santi-dualisticargumentsby
showingthat the experiencesand actions of the dead describedin the
scripturalpassage are in principleindependentof embodiment.
In dreams,Augustinesays,we remain,to be sure, ourselves.By contrast,"the earth,the sea, the sun, the moon, the stars,and the rivers,
mountains,trees or animals" that we see in our dreams are not bodily
in nature,but only very like bodies.35St. Perpetua was herselfin her
dream,then; but her opponentwas a dream-Egyptian.
What about St. Perpetua'smale body? If we suppose ourselvesto have
corporealbodies in our dreams,Augustineargues,then we would have
to concede that the mountainsand riversof our dreams are corporeal,
for how could a corporealbody ascend a dream-mountain?
But, as we
have seen, the mountainsand riversin our dreams are not corporeal.
Thus St. Perpetua'sbody is only a dream-body,a likeness(.similitudo
) ofa
In
IV.
17.
the
case
of
St.
25).
corporealbody (DNOA
Perpetua,Augustine
32DA V, 5. 787:"Item,
et incorporalium
inter
se noncommucorporalium
passiones
cui laesoictibus
uulneribus
ulceribus
condonicare;porroet animam
compati
corpori,
cuiafflictae
etcorpus
curaangore
amorecoaegrescit
socii
lescit,
animae,
perdetrimentum
cuiuspudorem
etpauorem
rubore
animacorpus
ex
uigoris,
atquepalloretestetur.
Igitur
communione."
corporalium
passionum
33DNOAII. 5. 9. HereAugustine
attributes
toTertullian
theviewthatboth
correctly
Godandthesoularecorporeal.
34Although
De Genesi
adLitteram
wasprobably
in stages,
Augustine's
composed
making
a definitive
BookX. 24-26of thatwork,in which
datingof theworkverydifficult,
discusses
Tertullian's
De Anima
written
before
, wassurely
Augustine
explicidy
Augustine's
answer
to Vincentius
cf.O'Connell1987(n. 5 above),esp.201-45.In De Genesi
Victor;
ad Litteram
to Tertullian's
buthe has notgot
materialism,
Augustine
objects
vigorously
muchofan argument
claimthatthe
it;he is ableto showonlythatTertullian's
against
soultakeson theshapeofthebody,butneverincreases
in size,is fairly
corporeal
silly.
35DNOA IV. xvii.25. 404: "namet in somnis
quandoaliquaduraet molesta
pernosutiquesumus
nobisiliapraetereant,
et,nisieuigilantibus
petimur,
poenasgrauissimas
sedcorpora
essecredere,
et uolitamus
in
pendimus;
quibushacatqueiliacquasiferimur
hominis
de rebustalibus
de hisquippeuisosomnis,
est,qui parumuigilanter
cogitauit.
rumimaginibus
maxime
animaprobatur
nonessecorporea,
nisiuelisetillacorpora
dicere,
nosipsostammulta
insomnis:
uidemus
caelum,
terram,
mare,solem,
lunam,
quaepraeter
ammalia,
haecquicorpora
essecredit
incredibili
terdesipit."
stellas,
fluuios,
montes,
arbores,

11:33:18 AM

228

MARYSIRRIDGE

offersa further
of her dream body.
argumentagainstthe real corporeality
Who could doubt, he asks, that St. Perpetuai soul was "the likenessof
a male body," and not a true male body- since her own body, from
which she was not yet sunderedby death, was lyingon her bed, female
as ever. If the male dream-bodywas a physicalbody, Augustineasks,
sexualorgan(curnonservabat
whydiditnotstillhavetheshapeofitsfemale
vaginae
intheflesh
ofthiswoman,
nomalegenitals
from
suae
all,ithadfound
:)?After
formam
- or,as yousay
- congealing.36
which
itcouldtakeshapebycompressing
itself
Augustinehere forcesan applicationof Victor'sown account of the formation of the soul to the formationof dream bodies; the body of the
sleepingSt. Perpetua must serve as a kind of "sheath" which lends its
shape to the bodilyparts of the corporealsoul formedwithinit. But as
St. Perpetua's own body remainsfemale,thereis nothingin her sleeping body where therewould have to be somethingto lend shape to male
genitals.Thus her male dream-bodymustperforcehave been some mere
likenessof a body.
Dream bodies are produced,Augustinesays, in the same way as the
likenessesof riversand mountainsin dreams: the appearances (species
) of
bodies are formedwhile we are awake and storedin memory;then in
some mysteriousway in our dreams we recollectthem,and theycome
The processis none too predictable.
beforeus as ifwe were seeingthem.37
36DNOA IV. xviii.26. 405:"quisautemdubitet,
in iliasimilitudine
animam
corporis
sensibus
iacebat
sexumanens,
eiusfuisse,
noncorpus,
sopitis
quodutiquein suofemineo
similitudine
luctabatur?
in stratis,
quidhiedicis?
quandoanimaeiusiniliauirilis
corporis
similitudinem
iliauirisimilitudo
an noneratcorpus,
haberet
eratcorpus
uerumne
quamuis
suae
? equeenimin
erat
, curnonseruabat
uaginae
formani
eligequoduelis.si corpus
corporis?
undeitapossetsesecoarctando,
illiusfeminae
carneuiriliarepererat
et,ut tu
genitalia,
De Resurrectione
Tertullian,
(italicsmine).Possibly
following
loqueris,
'gelandoformari'"
had
CC 2.2,Turnholt
Victor
8. 930,ed.J.B.Ph.Borleffs,
Mortuorum
1954,921-1012.
VII,
' to describe
- apparin whichthesoulinheres
used'uagina
thebodyas a sortofsheath
'
'
usedas a
The usageis classical;
ofa swordin a scabbard.
uagina
endyin themanner
Mortuorum
De Resurrectione
is alsofoundin Tertullian,
termfora scabbard
IX, 2, 932.
if<hersoul>
thusalsohasan innocent
rhetorical
reading:
question
Augustine's
naughty
Cf.thetranstheshapeofits<bodily>sheath?
wasa body,thenwhydiditnotpreserve
the
lationofR. Teske(Teske1997,n. 1 above):"Ifitwasa body,whydiditnotretain
form
ofitscovering?"
37DNOA IV. xvii.25. 404-405:"proculdubiotarnen
est,noncorporalis.
spiritalis
nontarnen
etuigilantium
uelutcorporum,
cogitatione
corpora
species
namquehuiusmodi
sinibus
nescioquo
continentur
et ex eiusabditissimis
etprofunditate
memorie
formantur
veret quasianteoculosprolata
modocumrecordamur
et ineffabili
mirabili
prodeunt
et quando
similitudine
si etipsasibiin suicorporis
santur
. . . quidergomirum,
apparet
inea
insomnis
ettarnen
sibiapparet
sinecorpore
apparet?
nequeenimcumsuocorpore

11:33:18 AM

DREAMBODIESANDDREAMPAINS

229

The dream bodies of those who have lost limbs sometimesappear with
fullgrownversionsof the limbs they lost, though they never seem to
); and sometimesthe
appear with the tiny arms they once had (ntegros
On Victor's account,it
partetruncatos).
appear withoutthem (ex quacunque
is impossibleto explain this kind of variability,let alone how Samuel's
- did his soul and soulsoul appeared wearing its customarygarments
clothingsomehowtake shape in his living,clothedbody so that at death
his soul lefthis body wearingsoul-clothing?38
What about St. Perpetua'swrestling?Augustinesays explicitlythat if
our bodies in dreams are likenessesof bodies, we only "seem to climb"
and so St. Perpetua
and "seem to enter"dream-houses;39
dream-mountains
is onlydream-wrestling
Still,Augustinesays,
againstthe dream-Egyptian.
even if she had no body, therewas nonethelessa "certainlikenessof a
or strain{perus
) in which she felttrue struggling
quaedam
body" (similitude*
vera
laetitia
and
true
).40
labor)
joy (
Applyinghis resultsto the question of the alleged corporeal souls of
the dead, Augustineproposes that the souls of the dead are not corporeal; afterdeath and beforethe finaljudgment,thereare only the likenessesof bodies, like the dream-bodiesof dreamers.Justlike the souls of
dreamers,however,the souls of the dead feel real sadness and real joy
and real pain, not just the likenessof such feelings:
in hell,andthedeadrecognize
eachother
Whatifthissamesortofthing
happens
Forwhenwe suffer
sadness
notbytheir
butbylikenesses
ofbodies?
bodies,
(tristia
ofbodily
limbs
itis onlythelikeness
), evenifonlyin ourdreams,
although
patimur
ofsuffering,
limbs
still
there
isnotjusta likeness
which
themselves,
acts,andnotbodily
butrealsuffering;
joyis feltin thesameway.41
et laetasentit
multa
suiquasiperlocaignotaet notadiscurrit
corporis
ipsasimilitudine
ueltristia."
38DNOA IV. xix.29. 409:"cur'Samuhel
utipsequoquecomsanctus
postmortem',
exierat?"
indumento
vestitus
. . . numquid
istedecorpore
uestitus
'solito
memorasti,
apparuit?'
39DNOA IV. xvii.25. 405:"sedputo,quodnectuaudeasdicerefiguram
illamcorin somnis,
uerumcorpusesse,nam
quamsibihabereuidetur
porisatquemembrorum,
et corporea
istomodoerituerusmons,quemsibiuidetur
ascendere,
domus,
quamsibi
subqua sibiuidetur
uidetur
etarboruerolignumque
uerum
habens,
iacere,
intrare,
corpus
uersatur
et omniain quibusquasicorporibus
et aqua uera,quamsibiuidetur
haurire,
si et ipsacorpus
inter
cunctaillauersatur."
est,quaesimili
erunt,
corpora
imagine
40DNOA IV. xviii.26. 406: "si autemnoneratcorpus,
et tarnen
erataliquidsimile
in quo saneueruslaborautueralaetitia
sentiretur
..."
corporis,
41DNOA IV. xiii.27. 406:"Quidsi talealiquidapudinferos
et in eisse non
geritur
animae
cumenimtristia
sedcorporum
similitudinibus
patimur
quaagnoscunt?
corporibus,
sitillasimilitudo,
nonmembra
muisin somnis,
etsimemborum
corporea,
corporeorum
nonesttamen
sedpoena;sicetiamubilaetasentiuntur."
Thisis essenpoenaesimilitudo,

11:33:18 AM

230

MARYSIRRIDGE

Augustinecites the example of Dinocrates, St. Perpetua's brotherwho

appeared to her afterhis death. Surely,he says, it must have been in
the likenessof a body, not a physicalbody, that his soul came to her,
revealed in its "face."
with its suffering
{miseria}
injustthewaythebodyhadbeenafflicted
as ifafflicted
It appeared
because,
though
as
ofitsaffliction
ofthebodyit hadthelikeness
nota body,in beingthelikeness
whichwassignified
in itsunrealbodythesoulfeltrealdistress,
well.Butstill,
by
earned
which
hisholysister's
andfrom
ofthebody's
theappearance
affliction,
prayers
hisdeliverance.42
The deliberateantithesisbetween "unreal body" and "real distress"in
thispassage calls attentionto the metaphysicalpeculiarityof Augustine's
is real, not a likenessof suffering,
though
position.Dinocrates' suffering
it is in a likenessof a body, not a real body, thathis soul undergoesthat
real suffering.
Augustinethus manages to explain the storyof Dives and the dreamvisionsof St. Perpetuawithoutconcedingthat the soul is corporeal,but
at the price of significant
metaphysicalawkwardness.The awkwardness
seems unnecessary.Why allow that the feelingsof the dead and dreaming are genuine?Why not just concede that theyare only similitudesof
and adventuresare merelysimiljust as theirbodies,surroundings
feelings,
itudes,i.e., dream-realities?
Augustine'ssolutionis all the more strikingfor standingat the intersection of philosophicaltraditionswhich stronglyconnect having emotions,pleasures and pains with having a body. Even Neoplatonistslike
Plotinus,who deny that the soul can be affectedby the body, hold that
many emotions,pleasuresand pains are activitiesof soul which respond
Even more relevantis a strain
to its observationof bodily conditions.43
he is
XII. 32-4,though
ad Litteram
thesameaccount
Augustine
givesin De Genesi
tially
notreally
someplace.
to arguethatHellis spiritual,
muchmoreconcerned
there
42DNOA IV. xviii.27. 407:"etquasiuulnerata
fuerat
uulnerauisaest,sicutcorpus
similitudinem
in
etiam
habebat
similitudine
sed
non
erat,
tum,quoniam
corporis
corpus
fuitanimae,
ueramiseria
uulneris.
quaesignificabatur
porroautemin nonuerocorpore
meruit
liberali."
orationibus
sanctae
de qua sororis
adumbrato
uulnere,
corporis
43Forrelevant
and important
commentators
textsfromtheAristotelian
Neoplatonic
200-600A.D.:A
cf.Emotion
, in: RichardSorabji,Philosophy
authors,
oftheCommentators
Passions
Medieval
Theories
andthe
Cf.alsoS. Knuuttila,
Sourcebook
, London/Ithaca
forthcoming.
andMedieval
inAncient
2004;
, Oxford
, in: S. Knuuttila
Philosophy
(ed.),Emotions
oftheSoul
WasIntroduced
HowthePhilosophical
andJ. Sihvola,
S. Knuuttila
, in:
ofEmotions
Analysis
Boston
inHellenistic
TheEmoons
andT. Engberg-Pedersen
, Dordrecht/
Philosophy
(eds.),
J.Sihvola
339-63.
ontheEmotions,
Plotinus
ibid.,
1998,1-19;E.K. Emilsson,

11:33:18 AM

DREAMBODIESANDDREAMPAINS

231

of thoughtwhich can be traced to Plato himself,and especiallyto the

Philebus
, in which physicalpleasure and pain are explained as a sort of
In addition,
intentionalsurfaceof needs or lacks and theirfulfillment.44
Augustinehad access to the Stoic theorythat the emotionsnecessarily
involve and arise in consciousnessout of a bodily firstphase or "first
movement".45
Thus Augustinewould have gottenfromseveral sources
the idea that where thereare genuine emotionsand feelingsof pleasure
and pain, thereis real embodimentin some sense. Indeed in Conjessiones
,
himself
seems
to
be
a
in
Stoic
his
discussion
Augustine
adopting
approach
of the pleasuresand pains of sensingthat followso inevitablyfrombodilystatesas to be unavoidableand thusnot subjectto moral assessment.46
In the lightof thisbackground,it seems thatAugustine'sproposal that
the real misery,
joy, pain and strugglesof the dead and dreamersare felt
in unreal bodies is decidedlyodd. Given the theoryof "intentionalsurfaces"or "firstmovements"thatAugustineappearsto acceptin Conjessiones
,
it is surelya fairquestion about the joys and sorrowsof dreamersand
of the dead how theycanbe fullyreal ifthereare no real or reallyappropriatebodies forthemto arise out of and be feltin. The problemis even
more acute withfeelingsof struggle,fatigueand pain- how can the feeling of struggleor fatigueor physicalpain be real or "true," if thereis
no real body to wrestleor tire or sufferfroma lethal cancerous sore?
Augustineought to concede, it seems, that the pains and passions of
dreamersand of the dead are no more real than theirbodies.
It is temptingto suppose thatAugustinehas forgotten
the largercontextof his responseto Victor,which requireshim to argue forthe nonof the soul to itself,and has slippedintoassuminguncritically,
transparency
as Descartes does in Meditation
//,and as Victor urges,that the mind's
and
(like
operations
judging
willing)and internalstates (like pain and
to
see
the
seeming
light)being whollywithinthe mind, are necessarily
what
seem
to be, because the mind's own statesand operations
just
they
44Plato,Philebus
43 a-c,Platonis
1901.Cf.Knuuttila
2004(n.43
33d-e,
II, Oxford
Opera
ofthePlatonic
andpost-Platonic
oftheories
offeeling
above)fora sketch
development
andemotion.
45Cf.R. Sorabji,
Emotion
andPeaceofMind
foran
, Oxford
2000,esp.355-6,372-84,
ofAugustine's
account
Stoicsources
andhisappropriation
ofthem.Cf.alsoM. Colish,
TheStoicTradition
II, Leiden1985,esp.207-13;G. O'Daly,Augustine's
,
ofMind
Philosophy
London1987,esp.38-60.
46Augustine,
X. 33.49-34.51, 181-182,
ed. L. Verheijen,
CC 27,Turnholt
Confessiones
1981(hereafter
Confi).

11:33:18 AM

232

MARYSIRRIDGE

are, so to speak, transparentto its gaze. Even if he is dreaming,says

Descartes,it is as certainthat he doubts and wills and seems to see the
light as that he exists,for none of these thingsare "distinctfromhis
thought,"or "separate fromhim":
I nowsee thelight,
hearthenoise,andfeeltheheat.Thesethings
Forexample,
Butit is stillcertain
thatI seemto see,to hear
areunreal,
sinceI am dreaming.
andto feeltheheat(.Meditations
, II).47
ofAugustine.
There is some evidenceforthisproto-Cartesianinterpretation
knows
some things
hold
that
the
soul
As we have seen, Augustinedoes
about itselfon the basis of immediateawareness and simple reflection;
we know immediatelyand certainly,for example, that we are, that we
live, and thatwe understand,will and remember.Sometimes,in a manner that anticipatesDescartes' strategy,he cites this knowledgeas eviIn addition,
dence againstthe scepticalpositionthatwe can knownothing.48
more
ourselves
he says explicitlythatwe know (;novimus
)
certainlythan we
do otherspreciselybecause we know ourselvesdirectlyby way of our
consciousnessand will (DNOA IV. xix. 30). If Augustinethinksthatjoy
), pleasure (delectatio
), suffering
), gladness (<laetitia
), sorrow (itristitia
(,gaudium
if
are
real
even
the
distress
person who
(miseria),
disgust(offensio)
),
( poena
feelsthemis dreamingor dead, thismustbe, it seems,because, he thinks
and willing,feelings,emotions,pleasuresand pains
thatlikeunderstanding
have to be whateverthey seem to be, even if theirpurportedexternal
points of referenceare merelyfigments.
With respectto passionslikejoy and fear,it is indeed Augustine'sposition that such emotionsare whollyin the soul; and in a passage from
The Cityof GodAugustineexplainswhy. Augustineis arguingagainstthe
"view of the Platonists"that the emotionsas such invariablyhave their
origin in the body. The argumentitselfis an odd one, invokingthe
authorityof Virgil as a spokesmanfor the Platonists;but it concludes:
itisnotonlybythebodythatthesoulisaffected,
ownadmission,
Thusevenontheir
itcanalsobe stirred
andgrieves;
so thatitdesires,
fears,
up bytheseemorejoices
is whatthewillofa manis
Whatis important
outofthesoulitself.
tions<arising>
47RenDescartes,
Meditations
onFirst
2000,
, transi.
RogerAriew,
Indianapolis
Philosophy
110.
48Cf.De trin.
artesian
is his
forAugustine
as a proto-C
XV. 12.21-2.Otherevidence
wouldbe certain,
andtheirimmediate
definitions
viewthatmathematical
consequences
VII.
I. 9-10,CSELLXXXIX;Enchiridion
or mad;cf.Soliloquies
evenifI weredreaming
1958,23-114.
20,ed. E. Evans,CC 46,Turnholt

11:33:18 AM

DREAMBODIESANDDREAMPAINS

233

like. . . Whenweconsent
toourappetite
forwhatwewill,there
is desire;
butwhen
we consent
to enjoying
whatwe will,thatis calledjoy.Similarly,
whenwe dissent
from
thiswilling
is fear;butwhenwedissent
from
whatwedo notwanttohappen,
whathappens,
we willit notto,suchwilling
is sorrow.
Andthusforthe
though
wholevariety
ofthings
towhich
we aredrawnbyappetite
or from
whichweflee,
as thewillofa manis attracted
orrepelled,
itis changed
orturned
intothisorthat
emotion.49
Whatevertheirsource,then,the emotionsthemselvesare thusintentional
expressionsof the attachmentsof the will; the will'spositiveand negative
attachmentsas theyare presentin and to consciousnessare emotions.
Thus, even if some feelingsdo arise firstin the body, bodilystatesare
not indispensableto emotions.For one thing,not all desires,pleasures,
In the case of demons,forexample,
pains and emotionsare corporeal.50
it is theirverymindswhich are tossed about on a sea of ungovernable
passions{De Civ.Dei IX. 6); their"airybodies" hardlycome into the pictureat all. And the devil,who has no body at all, is nonethelesssubject
to emotionslike envy {De Civ.Dei XIV. 6), which is an emotionof the
'
soul. Angels aside, althoughAugustinetends to use expressions4appetitus
6
'
and libidoin connectionwiththe desiresand pleasuresof sense and sex,
in Confessiones
he refersto "a lust for the knowledgeto be gained from
the senses" {appetitus
noscendi
) {Conf.X. 35. 54) and "the lust forrevenge"
{libidovindicandi
me)'we get pleasure {libeatnos)and feeljoy (gaudium
), he
from
feared
and
loved
others
X.
36.
says,
being
by
{Conf.
58-59). And
even with respectto those emotionsthat do startwith bodily statesand
responses,it is the will thatis the directsource of the emotionsand passions,which are themselveswhollyin the higherpart of the soul, wholly
in the realmof consciousness.51
And so the factthatSt. Perpetuais dreamis
no
reason
for
that
herjoy at her dream victoryover the
ing
supposing
49De Civ.DeiXIV. 5-6.421."Vndeetiamillisfatentibus
nonex carnetantum
afficitur
utcupiat,
uerum
etiamex ipsahispotent
motibus
anima,
metuat,
laetetur,
aegrescat,
agitari.Interest
autemqualissituoluntas
. . . Sed cumconsentimus
hominis
ea
appetendo
cumautem
consentimus
fruendo
hisquaeuolumus,
laetitia
uocatur.
quaeuolumus,
cupiditas;
cumdissentimus
ab eo quodaccidere
talisuoluntas
metusest;cum
nolomus,
Itemque
autem
dissentimus
ab eo quodnolentibus
talisuoluntas
tristitia
est.Et omnino
accidit,
pro
uarietate
sicutallicitur
uel offenditur
uoluntas
rerum,
quae appetuntur
atquefugiuntur,
itain hosuelillosaifectus
mutatur
etuertitur."
hominis,
"Libido
" and
50Cf.G.I. Bonner,
inSt.Augustine
VI
, in:StudiaPatristica
"Concupiscentia"
where
broadandvariable
useofthisterminology
is discussed.
(1962),304-14,
Augustine's
51Augustine's
account
ofemotions
resembles
Plotinus's
ofthepassions,
account
strongly
doesnotholdthatthesoulis notaffected
oreventhat
though
Augustine
bythepassions,
it shouldunaffected
Cf. E.K. Emilsson
1998(n. 43 above),esp. 339-63;
bypassions.

11:33:18 AM

234

MARYSIRRIDGE

dream Egyptianis not realjoy. She could also feelgenuineextremefear,

even if her real body were lyingpeacefullyon the bed withouta hintof
the pallor and tremblingwhich withwhich fear usuallystarts.
Still, even if Augustinecan convincinglyshow that having emotions
does not requirea body, it is hard to see how he can give the same sort
of "internalist"account of feelingslike Perpetua's sense of fatigueand
from his wound, and Dives' tormenting
struggle,Dinocrates' suffering
thirst,for these are the sort of feelingswhich normallyarise fromthe
body and have a somatic component.It seems extremelyproblematic
to claim thatpleasures,pains, thirst,and feelingsof strugphilosophically
and
exhaustion
are real, even when the soul is not appropriately
gle
embodied or not embodied at all, like souls of the dead.
Tertullianhad in factreasonedfromthe realityof the tormentsof the
damned and fromthe principlethat whatevercan sufferhas to be corporeal, thatsouls mustbe corporeal(DA. VII. 4). Augustineis, of course,
not interestedin denyingthatthe sufferings
and joys of the dead are real;
he agrees with Tertullianthat the souls of those who are not saved are
reallyin torment.He does not,however,agree withTertullianthateverything that can be affectedin any way whatsoevermust be corporeal.
Initially,however,it is hard to see how this helps much in explaining
what is going on withthe dead Dinocratesand Dives; even if not every
sortof suffering
involveshavinga body, still,if the dead can suffergenuine thirstand genuinepain froma canceroussore, theymust,it seems,
have some sort of bodies.
Augustine'ssolutionto the problem of the pains of the dead is that
the souls of thosewho are not saved, likeDinocratesand Dives, are really
in torment,thoughtheyhave no bodies; but theyare not reallysuffering
the pains they thinkthey are suffering
or the pains that onlookerslike
The soul of Dinocratesthat comes to
Perpetua thinktheyare suffering.
and Dives is in torment.But in an importantsense
Perpetuais suffering,
Dives is not feelingwhat he thinkshe is feeling,forhe identifies
the torment he is reallyfeelingas a bodily sensationthat he is not reallyfeeling, howevermuch he may appear to himselfto be feelingit. Dives is
said to seek to repair the (real) "ruins of his soul," in which "there is

and"Apatheia":
Some
ona Controversy
inLater
Ethics
Greek
,
J.M.Dillon,"Metriopatheia"
Reflections
in:J. Anton,
andA. Preus(eds),Essays
inAncient
Greek
NY 1983,
I-II,Albany,
Philosophy
508-17.

11:33:18 AM

DREAMBODIESANDDREAMPAINS

235

which "tormentshis soul";52he has no real body, howtrue suffering"

no real thirst.If he is askingfor water,then he is
and
therefore
ever,
mistakenabout whatkindof tormenthe is feeling.The same goes for
Dinocrates.His soul feelsreal torment;but it is not the bodilypain he
thinkshe is feeling.It mustbe, Augustinesays,thatthe souls of the dead
associate with themselves"similitudes"of bodies, as dreamersdo. Here,
as elsewhere,Augustinehas verylittleto say about how such similitudes
or likenessesof bodies are produced. But presumablythey arise out of
the soul's own habitual associationwith its body and its habitual associThus
ation of pleasure,pain and the passionswithcertainbodilystates.53
his
torment
as
from
the
Dinocrates experiences
pain
genuine spiritual
imaginedcanceroussore in his "shadow of a body," and his genuinespiritual frustration
is experiencedas frustration
at being unable to reach the
him
it.
above
and
drink
from
golden cup
When the dead take each otherto be embodied,possiblytheyjust perceive whateverbodilylikenessesother dead souls projectfor themselves.
But it is more likelythat theyreallyperceiveeach otherby the kind of
"interiorsense" by whichwe perceiveourselvesin life,thoughin lifewe
do not have thissame kind of immediateaccess to the "mindsand wills"
of others.They thenconstruethisunaccustomedformof recognizingothers as bodily recognition:
Butwhowouldhavetheability
to investigate
whatpowerofcognition
evensouls
thatarenotgoodwillreceive
after
from
their
death,oncefreed
bodies,
corruptible
so thattheyareabletoperceive
andrecognize
others
as badas theyare- andeven
- bytheir
Willtheyrecognize
thegood
interior
senses?
themnotbyrealbodies,
but
in thesimilitudes
ofbodies?Or bythegoodor evilmovements
oftheirmindsin
whichthereis nothing
liketheshapeof bodilymembers
(so thateventhough

52DNOA IV. xix.29. 409:"curergoaquaestillam

desiderauit
diues?
...
apudinferos
sedinilioueraeratmolestia,
nontarnen
uerum
cuiquaereanima,
quacruciabatur
corpus
retalimenta."
53In De Genesi
adLitteram
, Augustine
saysthatthemechanisms
bywayofwhich
images
comebefore
themind,whether
or visions,
aremysterious,
the
theyaredreams
though
ofall suchimages
is experience.
Cf.De Gen.ad litt.
XII. 18.39-40.Aboutthelikeorigin
nessofthebodythatthesoulhasafter
death,he saysonlythatit is no morepeculiar
thanthebodily
likenesses
thedreaming
associate
withthemselves
XII. 32.
{DeGen.ad litt.
Thesource,
formanaging
thebody,"
however,
60-61).
maybe thesoul's"natural
aptitude
whichis so strong
as to prevent
it from
fulfillment
untilit is reunited
attaining
perfect
withthebody,"so thatit hastheperfect
measure
ofitsbeing,obeying
andcommandandvivifying
withsuchwonderful
easethatwhatwasonceitsburden
willbe
ing,vivified
itsglory"
XII. 35. 68).
{DeGen.ad.litt.

11:33:18 AM

236

MARYSIRRIDGE
form
to him,Dives,in torment,
Abraham's
hadnotbeenknown
bodily
recognized
Father
whosesoulhadmanaged
to holdon to a similitude
ofitsbody,
Abraham,
albeitan incorporeal
one)?Butinfact,cananyofus eversaythatwehaveknown
we wereable to knowthatperson's
lifeand will,which
anybody
exceptinsofar
haveno weight
or color?54
assuredly

Probably,then,the Rich Man recognizesAbraham's "consciousnessand

will" directly,thoughhe thinkshe is seeingAbraham; and so it does not
matterthathe could not recognizeAbrahamby sight.Howevertheprocess
worksin detail,the dead projecttheirreal recognitionof each otheronto
an imagined recognitionof bodies- presumablybecause human souls
become so accustomedto recognizingothersby recognizingtheirbodies.
Augustinegivesno detailedanalysisof Perpetua'svisions;her situationis
somewhatdifferent,
he notes, since she is not herselfdead when she is
allowed to perceivethe sorrystateof her dead brother'ssoul. Still,since
Dinocrates' soul has got no real body, it must be that she misidentifies
her "interiorsense" of his soul as seeinghim bodily;his spiritualtorment
at
from his sore, his thirst,and his frustration
with physical suffering
rim
his
the
of
the
and
his
salvation
with
unable
to
reach
being
cup;
release frompain and thirst.Possiblythis is because he sees himselfin
this way; but perhaps it is only that Perpetua is accustomedto seeing
her brother'sbody whenevershe recognizeshim, and is unaccustomed
to directlyperceivingthe pain and pleasuresof anotherperson's soul.
This is because accordThus Augustineis not a simpleproto-Cartesian.
in
at
the
soul
can
make mistakesabout
some
to
cases,
least,
Augustine
ing
what it is feeling,because it can make mistakesabout the mode of its
dreamand the dead Dinocrates
embodiment.St. Perpetuain her wrestling
and Dives are reallyfeelingsomethingwhen theysense fatigue,struggle
and pain, and theirfeelingsare really theirsand really of the general
kind theyappear to be; but theyare not reallyexacdy the feelingsthey
appear to be, since theyare not reallythe surfacesof bodily statesand

54DNOA IV. xix.30. 409: "Postmortem

ueroquamuimcognitionis
corruptibilibus
malasueletiam
animaeaccipiant
etiamnonbonae,utuelpariter
exoneratae
corporibus
sed
et agnoscere
siuein ipsisnoncorporibus,
sensibus
intueri
bonasualeant
interioribus
in quibusnullasunt
siveinbonisautmalisaffectionibus
similitudinibus
mentis,
corporum
Abraham
undeestetillud,
membrorum,
quodpatrem
quisualeatindagare?
quasiliniamenta
eiusnoneratnota,cuius
cuifigura
diuesille,cumin tormentis
esset,agnouit,
corporis
animaretiere,
similitudinem
potuit
quisautemrectedicat
incorpoream
corporis
quamuis
eiusuitam
nisiinquantum
sealiquem
hominem
cognoscere,
uoluntatemque
potuit
cognouisse,
quaeutiquemolesnonhabetuelcolores?"

11:33:18 AM

DREAMBODIESANDDREAMPAINS

237

In the end, I thinkthatwe mustread Augustine'sreference

operations.55
to a real senseofstrugto Perpetua's"veruslabo in her dream as referring
in
or
or
real
this
case
onto a dream body
effortprojected
gle
fatigue
which participatesin dream adventures.Even if Augustinedoes at one
), elsewherehe says onlythatshe
pointsay thather soul wrestled(,luctabatur
in
a
to
herself
dream
to
wrestle"
{visasibiestin somnisluctari
).56
"appeared
It wouldbe open to Augustineto abandon proto-Cartesian
transparency,
even with respectto the emotionsthat arise withinthe mind itself.His
accountof emotionsgivesus no compellingreason to thinkthatour emotions are invariablythe ones they appear to be. We can be mistaken
about what we will,and about how stronglyand unambiguouslywe will
something.Even if the genuinenessof an emotion is not undercutjust
of its object and circumstances,
still
by the unrealityor inappropriateness
if we can make mistakesabout other statesof consciousness,and emotionsare just consciousexpressionsof statesof will, thereis in principle
no reasonto supposethatwe cannotmisidentify
our feelings.
But Augustine
seems not much inclinedto doubt that in the normal run of thingsthe
mind is prettymuch transparentto itselfwith respectto its feelingsand
emotions.
TheDelights
and Sinning
in One'sSleep
ofDreamers
It would not be surprising
ifAugustine'streatmentof dreamsand dreamers in De Naturaet Origine
Animaecontextproved to be at variance with
what he says elsewhere.Dream realityis not Augustine'smain interest
in thiswork;and his discussionof dream realityis clearlyshaped by its
intendeduse, i.e., to serve as a model for understandingapparentbodAnimaeitselfis topiily phenomena among the dead. De Naturaet Orgine
cal and polemical,writtenin rapid responseto a particularwork,which
55In hisfirst
sermon
fortheFeastofSt.Perpetua
andSt.Felicitas
CCLXXX.
{Sermo
v. 5, PL 38, 1283)Augustine
discusses
thereposeofmartyrs
andthetorments
oftheone
"whothirsts
fora dropfrom
thefinger
ofthebeggar,"
andsaysthatthereis thesame
sortof difference
between
thereposeand torments
of thesesoulsbeforetheDay of
and afterthatdaywhentheyregaintheirbodiesas between
thejoysand
Judgment
ofthedreaming
andthewaking,
"notbecausethesesoulsarenecessarily
maksufferings
likethesoulsofdreamers,"
sitfalli
to
inga mistake
(necesse
) butbecauseit is onething
haverepose
without
to havehappiness
witha glorified
anybodyandanother
body.
56'Uisaest'must,
itseems,
mark
thewrestling
as onlydream-wrestling,
notrealwrestling,
forthere
is no reason
tosuppose
St.Perpetua
havebeenmistaken
aboutwhatsort
might
ofdream-action
herdream
in- thatshemight
instead
havebeendreambodywasengaged
dream-water.
treading

11:33:18 AM

238

MARYSIRRIDGE

was, to all appearances,not verygood philosophicallyor theologically.It

is aimed obliquelyat both Pelagius and Tertullian.
There are two importantpassages that suggestthat Augustinedid
and relatedissues.In Confessiones
indeedchangehis mindabout dream-reality
X Augustineseems to claim thatwe are not morallyresponsibleforour
dream-pleasures;but it is hard to see how he can hold thatwe are not
responsibleforsuch pleasuresif he also holds, as he does in De Naturaet
Animae
, that we are ourselvesin our dreams and that our dream
Orgine
Acadmicos
are
real and reallyours. And in the veryearlyContra
,
pleasures
we
can
know
who
doubts
that
the
to
answer
seems
sceptic
Augustine
anythingby arguingthatwe can know withcertaintywhat pleasureswe
are having- because even if we should be asleep, pleasureshave to be
the ones theyappear to be; this is exactlywhat he seems committedto
Animae.
denyingin De Maturaet Origine
In Confessiones
X. 30 Augustinediscussesthe occurrencein dreams of
sexual activitiesand pleasures that would be illicitin wakinglife. The
lustfulimages encounteredin sleep, Augustinesays,move us more powerfullythan wakingexperienceof the realitiesthemselves.He then profor
ceeds to worryabout whetherthe dreamerhas moral responsibility
experiencingthe pleasure:
stillliveimages
havebeensaid,there
aboutwhich
Butinmymemory,
manythings
themwakI onceclungbyhabit.WhenI encounter
ofthings
towhich
ofthesorts
butevento
butin dreams
theyleadnotonlytopleasure,
ing,theyhavenopower,
...
ad consensionem
anddeed{usque
simillimum).
factumque
something
verylikeconsent
inwhich
I go from
here
AmI notthenI, myLordGod?Andyetin thatmoment
and
between
intosleepor comebackfrom
myself
sleepthereis sucha difference
and
awakeresists
suchsuggestions,
Whereis thatreasonbywhicha person
myself.
be forced
themselves
therealities
evenshould
remains
uponhim?Doesit
unmoved,
Andhowdoesithapofthebody?
closewiththeeyes?Doesitsleepwiththesenses
andremainofourpurpose,
andaremindful
we putup resistance,
penthatoften
And
to
such
no
consent
to
faithful
most
it,
yetthe
temptations?
give
chastely
ing
topeaceofconwereturn
turnoutotherwise,
thatwhenthings
is so great
difference
thetwostates
between
ofthegreatdistance
andon account
science
uponawaking
donein us,to oursorrow.57
thatwe didnotdo whatwassomehow
we discover
57Conf.
in memoria
"Sedadhucuiuunt
X. 30. 41, 176-177:
mea,de qua multalocumihiuigimeafixit,
etoccursantur
rerum
tussum,talium
quasibiconsuetudo
imagines,
sed
autemnonsolumusquead delectationem
in somnis
lantiquidemcarentes
uiribus,
sum
tuncegonon
. . . numquid
simillimum
etiam
, domine
factumque
usquead consensionem
intramomentum
etmeipsum
mepsum
inter
interest
tantum
? et tarnen
deusmeus
quo hinc
resisVbiesttuncratioqua talibus
uelhueinderetranseo'
transeo
ad soporem
suggestionibus
cumoculis?numquid
? numquid
clauditur
inconcussus
tituigilans
et,si resipsaeingerantur
memores
etundesaeperesistimus
cumsensibus
atquein
nostrique
propositi
corporis?
sopitur

11:33:18 AM

DREAMBODIESANDDREAMPAINS

239

Augustine'sconsideredview is clearlythatwe are not responsibleforthe

sexual pleasures in our dreams. He does not fault the "peace of consciousness"to whichhe returnsupon awaking.There is, he says,enough
distancebetweenour sleepingand wakingselves that "we discover(reperiamus
) thatwe did not do" whateverregrettableactionsand indulgences
"were done in us" in sleep. Intuitivelyappealing thoughthis view is, it
is initiallyhard to see how Augustineis entitledto it. He does not doubt
thatthe pleasuresinvolvedare genuineor thattheyare ours or thatthey
are the ones theyseem to be. And so, it seems he shouldbe held morally
accountable for them.58The only way for Augustineto avoid drawing
thisconclusion,it would seem, is to cast doubt on whetherwe are ourselvesin our dreams.
The Confessiones
passage does indeed look to be far more ambivalent
about whetherwe are ourselves in our dreams than the account of
dream identityis
Perpetua's dream-visions.The question of first-person
raisedhere,afterall. Perhapsmore significantly,
explicitly
Augustinenever
uses a first-person
verb
to
refer
to
his
self.
Mattersare
singular
sleeping
blurredfurther
the
reference
to
"so
a
difference"
between
by
repeated
great
self
and
still
dream-selfand
furtherby the forcefuland finalrefwaking
erenceto our regretfor"whatwas somehowdone in us." Still,Augustine
is not ultimately
preparedto doubt that he is himselfin his troublesome
dreams. The question: "Am I not I?" with which he begins the discussion clearlyexpectsa positiveanswer.The firstpersonpluralforms"resisti
"
"
"
musnostriqueand adhibemusused to describeour sleepingselvestiltthe
Animaethat
passage towardsthe unquestionedview of De Naturaet Orgine
" of the
we are ourselvesin our dreams; and the second "meipsum
para" more or less settlesthe matter
doxical "interest
intermeipsumet meipsum
of self-identity:
we are ourselvesin our dreams. But we now face a furtherquestion:If Augustineultimatelyhas no doubt about whetherhe is
in his dreams,thenwhyis self-identity
himself
treatedin such an ambivalent
eo castissime
nullum
talibus
inlecebris
adhibemus
adsensum?
ettarnen
tantum
permanentes
interest
ad conscientiae
redeamus
ut,cumaliteraccidit
euigilantes
requiem
ipsaquedistantiarepeamus
nosnon
in nobisquoquomodofactum
essedoleamus
."
fecisse
quodtarnen
58In OnBeing
Immoral
ina Dream
in: Philosophy
56 (1981),47-54,Gareth
Matthews
thatAugustine
canavoidresponsibility
argues
onlybyholding
(1)thatheis nothisdream
consent
andpleasure
arenotreal;or (3) thathe canself;or (2) thatdreamsuggestion,
notdo otherwise
thanhe doesin hisdreams.
SinceAugustine
doesnotaccept(1) or(2),
andconsiders
hasnotgota verygood
(3) irrelevant
morally,
saysMatthews,
Augustine
reason
fordenying
thatwe areresponsible
forwhatwe do andfeelin ourdreams.

11:33:18 AM

240

MARYSIRRIDGE

way, and why does the passage have such an ambivalentand aporetic
tone overallwith respectto responsibility?
X becomesclearer
The natureof Augustine'sambivalencein Confessiones
if we compare thisdiscussionwithhis much more unambiguousand resin
olute treatmentof the "consentsof dreamers"(consensiones
somniantium)
is
is
someone
who
where
he
De Genesiad Litteram
,
dreaming
discussing
. XII. 15. 31). Such
about havingillicitsexual intercourse{De Gen.ad litt
dream images, says Augustine,come fromour wakinglife. Suppose the
source of the images in questionto be freeof consentto pleasure {placitumconsensionis
) the images come, let us suppose, fromthinkingabout
sexual activitywhile composingthisverychapter:
to think
about
thatI havebeenforced
ofthecorporeal
Theniftheimages
things
in a dreamas bodiesappearto the
in orderto saythisshouldappearas vividly
whowas
sinbysomeone
thatcouldnotbe donewithout
something
happens
waking,
whenhe is speakaboutwhathe is discussing,
awake.Forwhocanavoidthinking
aboutsexmatter
to saysomething
himself
constrained
bythesubject
ingandfinds
inthemindofthespeaker
hehashad?Thenifthisimagethatarises
ualintercourse
to distinguish
thatit is impossible
intothevisionofthesleeper
comesso vividly
andthere
folmoves
theflesh,
itimmediately
itandrealsexualintercourse,
between
without
follows
lowswhatnaturally
sin,to
Still,thishappens
uponthismovement.
has to
manis without
sinwhoundoubtedly
as we saya waking
thesameextent
in orderto talkaboutit.59
aboutsucha thing
think
In this passage, the dreamer's actions are not real ones, only dream
actions. This passage is not ambivalent;the dreamerdoes not sin. The
thathappens to the dreameris presented
reason is fairlyclear: everything
to us as being somethingover which he has no control.The speakerhas
entertainedthe image of engagingin sexual intercourse;thatsame image,
now vivid as life,is forcedupon him in his dream. The occurrenceof
such dream images is no more significant
morallythan the images that
in
sexual
about
activity dreamsthatare forcedupon
accompanyspeaking
And ifthe dreamer'sflesh
the speakerby the need to speak meaningfully.
thenrespondsof its own accord to images thatwould hardlyperturbhim
59De Gen.
rerum
XII. 15.31:"porro
adlitt.
cogiquasnecessario
corporalium,
imagines
in somnis,
si tantaexpressione
taviuthaecdicerem,
quantapraesentanpraesentarentur
nonposset.Quis
illudquodsinepeccatofieria vigilante
fieret
turcorpora
vigilantibus,
semonis
de suoconcubitu
necessitate
et postulante
enimvelcumloquitur,
aliquiddicit,
sermocinanquaefitin cogitatione
quoddicit?Porroipsaphantasia,
possitnoncogitare
utinterillamet veramcommixtionem
in visione
fuerit
somniantis,
tis,cumitaexpressa
movetur
continuo
nondiscernatur,
caro,etsequitur
quodeummotusequisolet,
corporum
cumhoctamsinepeccatofiat,quamsinepeccatoa vigilante
dicitur,
quodutdiceretur
est."
sinedubiocogitatum

11:33:18 AM

DREAMBODIESANDDREAMPAINS

241

at all if he were awake, and the inevitableensues, this is a mere "natand guilt.
ural consequence," and thus not a matterof responsibility
one
credit
or
blame
fordream
no
getsany
any
Generallyspeaking,then,
actions, or for other images that arise in dreams, or for the resulting
physicalresponses.It would be no more appropriateto blame Augustine
forwhat he does and experiencesin his dreams,than to clap the nowawake Perpetua on the back and congratulateher for her pluckystand
againstthe Egyptianor forfeelingexhilaratedat her victory.60
XII offersa far more nuanced examinationof
De Genesiad Litteram
visionsand images,both naturaland divinelyand demonicallyproduced,
But in addition,thereare significant
differences
between
than Confessiones.
X and the dreamerof the Genesis
the dreamerof Confessiones
commentary
which explain how Augustinecan say that the Genesisdreameris innocentpure and simple,whileremainingambivalentabout the moralresponX.
sibilityand guiltof his dreamingselfin Confessiones
In De Genesiad Litteram
Augustinehas deliberatelysimplifiedhis case
morally.First,thoughsexualpleasureis mentionedhereas it is in Confessiones
X, it does not assume much importancein the tale of virtuousrhetoric,
dream images and "inevitableresults."Second, our virtuousdreameris
in no way currentlymorallyresponsiblefor havingthe images he has to
startwith. Perhaps most importantly,
Augustineis supposing that the
"consentof the dreamers,"whichis the subjecthe startedout to discuss,
is only dream-consent.For suppose that I have thoughtabout having
indulgedin all manner of illicitactivitiesin the course of piously condemningthem,and that as a resultthese images now come vivid as life
beforemy sleepingeyes, so that I seem to myselfto be doingjust what
I talkedabout. "The fleshresponds,"says Augustine,"and the inevitable
results."But surelyif I am to be dreamingabout acting(and despitethe
misleadingparallel with memoryimages of the doings of my past self,
thisis the case Augustinehas in mind,and not my dreamingabout someone very like myselfacting while I look on), then in my dream, there
has got to be some elementof intention,consentor involvement.Who
is it, then,that consentsto hopping into bed with Sean Connery,etc.?
Accordingto Augustine,mydream selfis myself;ifanyoneconsents,then,
it mustbe I who consent.To be entitledto the claim thatdream pleasure
60In thecaseoftheverygood,Augustine
admits
thatthesoul'smerits
aresometimes
in itsdreamchoices
manifested
andactions;
evenin hisdream,
thewiseSolomon
asked
Godforwisdom
XII. 15.31),andGodwaspleased.
{DeGen.ad litt.

11:33:18 AM

242

MARYSIRRIDGE

has no moral significance

here,Augustinehas got to hold out that there
to the images,but only
is no real consentinvolvedin my dream-response
occur
as
the
themselves
without"consentto
dream-consent,
images
just
of the passage show
pleasure." The passive and impersonalconstructions
thatthisis just what he is assuming.No real consent,then.And so unambiguouslyno moral responsibility.
All of these simplifications
are lacking in the situationdescribed in
X. First,pleasure is explicitlyinvolved,and AugustineunamConfessiones
takes
dream pleasure to be real pleasure. Secondly,Augustine
biguously
back
seems here to have in mind liminalstatesin which one is drifting
and forthbetweendream and waking,and thereforemore or less tenuouslytied to one's own sleepingbody and wakinglife;it is thereforenot
clear that the consentinvolvedis dream-consentplain and simple.Most
perhaps,in this case the dream images are not introduced
importantly,
into Augustine'sinnerlifeby the melancholynecessityof speakingabout
illicitsexual activity,and they are not images which exerciseno attraction for him. They come frommemoriesof what once attractedhim
strongly;this attraction,he fears,is stillpresentas a secret inclination
but
that is resistedwhen he is awake and on guard againstit (vigilans),
not when his orientationto his main moral purpose is dulled and disX. In
orientedby half-sleep.This is whyAugustinewaversin Confessiones
this case, the dreamer'sconsentmay indeed be a genuinemovementof
the will, and to that extenta cause formoral concern,even thoughthe
dreamer'swill is so weakened and caught so completelyoffguard that
sense.61
its movementsdo not count as consentin a morallysignificant
There is more similaritybetween treatmentsof dreamersand their
than thereiniAnimaeand Confessiones
experiencesin De Naturaet Origine

61Thisambivalence
mirrored
consent
isneatly
aboutdream
ambiguity
bythedeliberate
andsomething
whichcanmean"consent
of"consensionem
simillimum,"
very
factumque
andsomething
likethedeed,"butalso"something
verylikethedeed."
verylikeconsent
doesnotdrawthedistinc1981(n.58 above),whosaysthatAugustine
ThusMatthews
toviewthemind
becauseofhis"tendency
andrealconsent
dreamconsent
tionbetween
toitself"
at 51,underestimates
known
andimmediately
anditsactsas directly
Augustine
CC29,Turnholt
in Contra
Acadmicos
onbothpoints.
III, xii,28,ed.W.M.Green,
Already
Atissue
on dream-assent.
takesa similar
citedas CA),Augustine
1970(hereafter
position
to choosethehighest
thereis thewiseman'sdream-refusal
good.Evenin oursleep,
is wisewhenhe is asleep
thatsomeone
says,we wouldnotdreamofdenying
Augustine
- thenallowing
thathe
in placeoftruths
to falsehoods
he assents
becausein hisdreams
is wiseagainas soonas he wakesup.

11:33:18 AM

DREAMBODIESANDDREAMPAINS

243

tiallyappears to be. The two works agree completelythat our dreampleasuresand dream-painsare real and are reallyours. They agree that
dream images come in the main fromthe experiencesand habitsof our
Animae
, as in the Genesis commentary,
wakinglife;in De Naturaet Origine
thisaccountis extendedto explainthe "somatic"experiencesof the dead.
The two worksagree completelythat we are ourselvesin our dreams.
X passage does not come fromdoubt
The ambivalenceof the Confessiones
on Augustine'spartabout whetherhe is himselfin his dreams.His ambivalence has to do insteadwith the suspicion,all too oftenconfirmed,that
thereis a part of his soul which is not whollyconvertedto his decision,
and remainsalien to himselfand his moral purpose, a subversiveinclination to lower goods that is always present,but ordinarilyresisted.In
the chaptersof Confessiones
X whichfollow,Augustinerepeatedlyexpresses
his anxietyabout the remnantsof misdirecteddesire,both physicaland
the intellectual,
whichremainin his soul and cause it to slideindiscernibly
frompleasures that are natural and unavoidable into some measure of
the guiltypleasuresassociatedwithself-loveand immoralconcupiscence.62
It is significant
that Augustineconcludes the discussionof Confessiones
X
with an appeal to God to freehim fromsuch dreams and responsesto
them,and therebyto cause his ownsoul, freedfromthe snares of concupiscence,to followhim to God.63
62Ishtiyaque
in a Dream
in: Matthews
1999(n. 17
Haji, OnBeing
Morally
Responsible
is surely
on theright
track
in hisguessthatAugustine
is thinking
that
above),222-232,
a dreamer
canbe to someextent
forentertaining
a certain
morally
responsible
thought
whileasleep,ifthethought
arisesfrom
thedesires
ofwaking
life,evenifit thewaking
was"veiled
from
herconsciousness
at 180.In thesubsequent
thought
byrationalization,"
X. 33. 49-X.34. 51,Augustine
describes
thedifficulty
ofdistinguishing
discussion,
Conf.
"libido
" andthe
"
" and"
between
andinevitable
aurium
illegitimate
legitimate
uoluptates
uolup
"
tates
oculorum
which
attend
andseeing;.
Cf.alsoContra
IV. 14,
hearing
Julianum
Pelagianum
"commoditatis which
PL 44,641-874,
where
hedistinguishes
between
thelegitimate
,"
provisio
leadsus to avoidwhatis unpleasant
andpainful,
andwhich
doesnotyetamount
toille"libido".
Cf.alsoDe trin.
Ill, 3, whereAugustine
gitimate
saysthatbeastsaremovedby
"
some naturali
suaeuoluptatis
etdeuitione
molestitiae"
we are
; withourmortal
appetitu
bodies,
movedunavoidably
in thesameway.
63Conf.
X. 30.42. 177:"Numquid
nonpotens
estmanustua,deusomnipotens,
sanare
omneslanguores
animaemeaeatqueabundantiore
motusetiammei
gratiatualasciuos
in memuera
domine,
soporis
tua,utanimamea
extinguere?
Augebis,
magismagisque
mead teconcupiscentiae
uiscoexpedita,
utnonsitrebellis
sequatur
sibi,atqueutinsomnisetiamnonsolumnonperpetrei
istascorruptelarum
animales
turpitudines
perimagines
sedne consentiat
Athisage,he adds,it is surely
no
fluxum,
usquead carnis
quidem."
"
forGodtoprevent
from
him,eveninhisdreams,
great
thing
doingshameful
thingsusque
adfluxum
carnis
eventheslightest
hintofconsent
to them.
," andindeedtoprevent

11:33:18 AM

244

MARYSIRRIDGE

betweenAugustine'saccount of Perpetua'sdream and

The differences
his assessmentof his own dream activitiesand experiencesin Confessiones
X have to do with the peculiaritiesof the two cases. In Confessiones
,
Augustinedoes not, it is true,raise the possibilitythat the sexual pleasures feltin dreams are not the pleasurestheyappear to be. This may
be because he had not yet thoughtof this possibilityin 399-401 A.D.,
when the Confessiones
passage was written.More probablyit is because he
thinksthere is no reason for uncertaintyabout what kind of pleasures
these are, giventhe body's obvious involvementin a liminaldream state.
AnimaeAugustinespends no time worrying
And in De Naturaet Origine
about the statusof the sleepingPerpetua's"consent."This is because the
images in Perpetua'sdreams are not just tossed up by her memoryand
imagination,but divinelysent to prefigureher passion and martyrdom.
Perpetua herselfintroducesthe account of her firsttwo dream-visions
es [PassioVII. 3; VIII. 1); and in describingher
with "Mihi ostensum
66
visionsAugustineuses the well-knownformulafor apparitions, in somnis
visa est" to describePerpetua's dreams.64At the end of her description
of her thirddream, Perpetua herselfprovidesthe interpretation:
the
butagainst
notagainst
thatI wouldfight,
I awoke.AndI understood
beasts,
time
thisa short
wouldbe mine.I havecompleted
devil;butI knewthatvictory
wishes
letwhoever
as to whattakesplaceat theexhibition,
theexhibition;
before
itdown.65
write

64'Ostensio/
inbothTertullian
est'hasan established
ostensum
use,found
postclassical
usestodescribe
Theformula
visions.
todowith
andApuleius,
Perpetua's
Augustine
having
. . . visus
uses"msomnis
describes
is onethatoften
dreamvisions
Virgil
justsuchportents.
"
thewounds
to Aeneas,
dreamappearance
Hektor's
mihito introduce
estadesse
"bearing
II. 270).The
in hisfinalbattleand afterwards"
thathe received
{Aeneid,
germs)
(vulnera
fleeCarthage
to
make
haste
him
to
tell
Aeneas
to
to
of
form
of
"the
Mercury"
appearance
DeDivinatione
IV. 554).Cicero,
es' {Aeneid
itavisamonere
is introduced
rursusque
by"insomnis
"
cona loveindeorum
estinsomnis
thevisionofHannibal
I. iv.49,introduces
with,visum
ofthewoman
ofhisownvision
is saidtohavebegunhisreport
ciliovoca'andSocrates
"
xxiv.52).In the
se insomnis
enim
hisdeath,"vidisse
whoforetold
ofgreatbeauty
[ibid.,
describes
andSt.Felicitas,
fortheFeastofSt.Perpetua
secondofhisSermons
Augustine
ofherlikethevision
thepiousmindtobeholda vision
"Itdelights
(spectaculum)
Perpetua:
intoa
beenturned
thathaving
saidshehadbeenshown
selfSt.Perpetua
esse),
(revelatum
CCLXXXI.ii. 2 (n. 4 above)at
withthedevil",Sermo
sefactam
man(virum
) shefought
1284.
65Passio
diasedcontra
menonad bestias,
sum.Et mtellexi
X. 14-15:"Etexperrecta
Hoc usquein pridiemuneris
mihiessevictoriam.
sedsciebam
bolumessepugnaturum;
scribat."
si quisvoluerit,
actum,
ego;ipsiusautemmuneris

11:33:18 AM

DREAMBODIESANDDREAMPAINS

245

ClearlySt. Perpetuai feelingsand dream experiencesprefigureher marthe dispositionof her will. Perpetuai decityrdompreciselyby reflecting
sions and feelingsin her dream are more in characterthan those of the
theyare in linewithhermainmoralpurpose.Something
sleepingAugustine;
of her real commitmentto her passion and martyrdom"shinesthrough"
in her dream-consentto fightthe Egyptianin the dream that prefigures
her passion. In the passion narrativeitself,thisclose connectionbetween
dream and lifeis reflectedstrikingly
by the tone of St. Perpetua's autoin
which
she
describes
her imprisonment
and trial
narrative,
biographical
and her threevisions,and even by its grammar.66
sortof
Contra
Acadmicos
III. xi. 26 seems to presentus witha different
In this early work,Augustineincludes pleasure and pain
inconsistency.
the
states;we can be sure that we are experiencamong
self-presenting
and
certain
about
what kind of pleasure it is:
ing pleasure,
ThisI say,thatwhena mantastes
he can swearin goodfaith
thathe
something,
knows
itis sweetto hispalateor thatitis not.Norcananytrickery
oftheGreeks
himofthisknowledge.
Forwhowouldbe so outrageous
as to sayto me
dispossess
whileI am licking
it,andthisis
awaywithdelight,
"Perhaps
youare nottasting
AmI contesting
this?Butevenin a dreamitwoulddelight
me.67
onlya dream"?
There is some slippage in this passage. It seems to startwith the claim
that I am warrantedin sayingthat I know with certaintywhether
someor
me
or
if
I
tastes
bitter
sweet
to
not
even
am
that
I
,
thing
only dreaming
am tastingit; but it seems to end with the weaker claim that I know
with certaintythatI am havingthepleasure
, even if I am not tastinganyor
not
sweet.
Even
the weaker claim that I can
thing,
tastinganything
know certaintythat I am feelingsensorydelightif I feel that I am, even
if I am dreaming,is not reallyconsistentwith Augustine'sapproach in
66Passio
in Perpetua's
X. 7, 26. Gender
in whichshe"becamea
third
dream-vision,
man"andvanquished
in a wresding
theEgyptian
match
is grammatically
unambiguously
"
shewastransformed
intoa man,"facta
summasculus
X. 7, 26);shewas
feminine;
{Passio
"
"
lifted
intotheair, sublata
sum(.Passio
X. 11, 26);thearbiter
hailsheras victor
with"Filia
"
" ,
X. 13,26);andshedescribes
herawakening
from
thedream
vision,Et
{Passio,
paxtecum
"
sumPassio
, X. 14,26).
experrecta
67CAIII. xi.26. 50: "Illuddico,possehominem,
cumaliquidgustat,
bonafideiurare
se scirepalatosuoilludsuaueessevelcontra
necullacalumnia
Graecaab istascientia
dicat:forsit,quimihicumdelectatione
possededuci.
Quisenimtaminpudens
ligurrienti
tassenongustas,
sedhocsomnium
est?numquidnam
resisto?
Sed mihitarnen
in somnis
etiamdelectaret."
For"numquidnam
resisto
?"JohnO'Meara(transi.),
St.Augustine:
the
Against
Academics
which
makes
for
, NewYorkNY 1951,at 129,reads"Do I stopmysavoring?",
a slighdy
different
trainofthought,
butthesamesortofconclusion.

11:33:18 AM

246

MARYSIRRIDGE

Animae
De Naturaet Orgine
, where he wants to say that the souls of the
dead and dreamingcan misconstruetheir experienceto the extentof
makingmistakesabout what sortsof pleasures they are feeling.But in
any event,the surroundingcontextmakes it clear thatAugustinemeans
the strongerclaim,forhe has been belaboringthe point thatI can know
that there appears to me to be a bent stickin water or that something
looks whiteto me or that somethingtastesbitterto me at thismoment,
even if it does not stilltaste bitterto me later,or tastessweet to a cow
at this very moment (CA III, xi, 26, 50). Like instancesof logical or
mathematicaltruths(CA III, x, 23, 48), such claims are said to be in
absolutelyno danger of being undercuton the groundsthat they are
fromvery similarclaims that are false (CA III, xi, 26,
indistinguishable
- in this
because no good faithclaimsabout our own intentional
case,
50)
betweenappearance and realitydoes
statesare ever false.The distinction
not apply to intentionalrealities.The Academic can startus down the
slipperyslope towardsassentingto nothingonly if we ourselvesslip over
into claims about the extramentalcauses of our intentionalstates,by saying, e.g., "This ice cream tastesscruptious."
Acadmicos
betweenthe Contra
There is a degreeof genuinedisagreement
Animae.This is not surpassage and the much later De Naturaet Origine
of
the
increasingsophistication Augustine'sphilosophyof
prising,given
mind and the fact that the later worksput strongeremphasison man's
essentialembodiment.68
Equally importantis the factthat the philosophical objectivesof Augustine'searliestworksand his later worksare very
In Contra
Acadmicos
different.
Augustine'saim is to disarmepistemologica! skepticism.His strategyis to appeal to immediateperceptualcontents
and feelingsof pleasure and pain; these,he says,can be knownwithcertainty.Even ifwe are dreaming,Augustineargues,we can be sure about
the "intentionalsurface"of our experience,where a distinctionbetween
appearance and realitymakes no sense. A proto-Cartesianidentification
of knowledgewith certaintyand the idea that the immediateand comforcertainty
is importantto this
plete presenceof some givenis sufficient
, fromthe same period,puts forwardthe actual presagenda. De Magistro
68In stressing
to
between
theconnection
maybe reacting
bodyandsoul,Augustine
buthe hasalsobegun,
andrelated
ofhisviewson embodiment
criticism
issues;
Pelagian
adLitteram
ofDe Genesi
from
ca. 412A.D.,toworkon thelatersections
, andso
perhaps
Cf.O'Connell1987
is Godgiven.
thefactthatembodiment
he cannot
verywellignore
(n.5 above).

11:33:18 AM

DREAMBODIESANDDREAMPAINS

247

enee of somethingto the mind as a necessaryconditionforlearninganythingabout it. If I am asked about somethingsensiblelikethe new moon,
and if it is presentto me I can answertrulyabout it:
Butiftheperson
whoasksmedoesnotseethemoon,he acquires
a belief
aboutit
he doesnot);buthe doesnotlearnanything
aboutitunless
(or,as often
happens,
he himself
seeswhatis beingtalked
about.69
In his later works,by contrast,Augustinedoes not care as much about
disarmingscepticism.Indeed, given the increasedprominenceof will in
his later philosophyof mind and epistemology,
he cannot affordto care
very much about it. Cognition for the later Augustineis markedlya
processof selection,attention,thinkingand speaking,which requiresskill
and strategy;and the measure of objectivityof such activityis its success. Despite Augustine'sincreasedinterestin the soul's multifarious
opacstillreflectsto some extent
ity to its own introspective
gaze, Confessiones
the epistemologyof presenceof the earlierperiod. But by the finalsectionsof De Trinitate
have changed con, Augustine'sviewsin epistemology
siderably,in large part because they are now shaped by his interestin
showinghow the human mind and its operationsfurnishan image of the
divineTrinity.The Academics achieved theirpaltrysuccess,he says,by
castingdoubt in obviousways on our perceptualknowledgeof the world
based on the data of the senses.Anyonewho wantsto read more against
the Academics is welcome to consulthis youthfulwork,he adds. But in
fact the Academics never succeeded in casting any doubt on a much
more significant
kind of knowledgesuch as that we live, and thinkand
will. Furthermore,
he concludes:
Farbe itfrom
us to doubtthatthethings
we learnthrough
thebodily
sensesare
aboutheavenandearthand all thethings
in
true,forbythemwe havelearned
themwhichareknown
to us,so faras He whocreated
bothus andthemwilled
thatwecometoknowthem.
Andfarbe itfrom
us to denythatweknowwhatwe
havelearned
from
thetestimony
ofothers.
Otherwise
we wouldnotknowthatthe
69Augustine,
De Magistro
at
XII, 39,ed. K.-D.Daur,CC 29,Turnholt
1970,157-203,
omniaquaepercipimus,
autsensucorporis
autmente
Illa
197,says:"Namque
percipimus.
haecintellegibilia
rumloquar,illacarnalia,
haecspiritalia
sensibilia,
siue,utmorenostro
nominamus.
De illiscuminterrogamur,
si praesto
suntea, quae sentimus,
respondemus,
uelutcuma nobisquaeritur
intuentibus
lunamnouam,qualisautubi sit.Hic ille,qui
si nonuidet,credit
uerbiset saepenoncredit,
discitautemnullomodo,nisi
interrogat,
etipsequoddicitur
ubiiamnonuerbis,
sedrebusipsiset sensibus
discit."
uideat,
Pretty
meanstoallowthatI, whoseethemoon,thereby
cometoknowsomeclearly
Augustine
aboutitwhenitis present;
he hasthusmovedawayfrom
therearguard
thing
epistemotheAcademic
in Contra
Acadmicos.
logica!campaign
against

11:33:18 AM

MARYSIRRIDGE

248

Wewould
andthelandsandcities
weknowaboutfrom
oceanexists,
copious
reports.
werepeopleanddeedsthatwe learnaboutfrom
hisnotknowthatthere
reading
all over,andare
thatarereported
We wouldnotknowthethings
dailyfrom
tory.
wewouldnotknowwhere
andconsonant
evidence.
confirmed
Finally,
byconsistent
because
these
wewereborn.<Wewouldnotknowthese
andofwhatparents
things>
ofothers.
Andifitis completely
absurd
we believe
on thetestimony
areall things
that
thenit hasto be admitted
to saythis[sc.thatwe do notknowsuchthings],
to our
butthoseofothers
haveaddedenormously
notonlyourownbodily
senses,
XV. xii.21).
(Detrin.
knowledge
In thiscomplexprocess of knowingand willingof thingsand events,we
dimlyresembleGod; forall thesethings,whetherwe come to knowthem
by our own experienceor by the testimonyof others,we have a word
within.We resembleGod only dimly,because for his part He knows
thingsin a single Word and does not know thingsbecause they are;
rathertheyare because He knowsthem {De trin.XV. xii. 22).
Conclusion
Augustinehardlyever pursued epistemology,ontologyor philosophyof
mind for theirown sakes; on any topic, what we findin his thoughtis
a consistentphilosophicalcore, with the actual workingout of the position shaped decisivelyby Augustine'sparticularorientationand developing agenda, by his currententhusiasms,and by the opponent of the
Animaeadheres
moment.Like the otherlater works,De Naturaet Origine
onwardsAugustine
to a consistentcore of thought.From De LiberoArbitrio
the
a
answer
to
definite
to
declines
questionof the soul's
give
consistently
deviates
fromhis discovery
He
never
creates
souls.
how
God
of
origin,
that the soul is immaterialand immortal,or fromthe assumptionthat
of personal identityand have a
firstperson experiencesare constitutive
the
self.
He in factholds consistently
to
and
immediate
givenness
special
thatdream-assentand dream-consentin normalcases are not morallyor
significant.
epistemologically
Animaealso fitsinto a general progressionfroma
De Naturaet Origine
nave, proto-Cartesianphilosophyof mind to an interestin the dynamdemands an
ics of embodimentand the convictionthat self-knowledge
and
and
moral
labor
of
rigorousphiloarchaeology
psychological
ongoing
statesthatAugustine
The simpleview of self-presenting
sophicalreflection.
has givenway to the position,alreadyclearly
Acadmicos
exploitsin Contra
in De Trinitate
that the
articulated
in
and
,
powerfully
present Confessiones
locus
the
also
but
selfis not just the sum of its first-person
experiences,

11:33:18 AM

DREAMBODIESANDDREAMPAINS

249

of reflectionupon its own experiences,and that self-awarenessmerely

As a result,Augustineis increassuppliesessentialdata forself-knowledge.
the
in
to
that
various
inglyopen
suggestion
ways our first-person
experiencesmay not be the experiencestheyappear to be. Augustine'sresponse
to VincentiusVictor,cranky,topical and polemicalthoughit is, is neverthelessfirmlyfixedin the landscape of Augustine'slater works.
Baton Rouge, Louisiana
LouisianaStateUniversity
Department
ofPhilosophy

11:33:18 AM

Emotionsand Cognitions
Discussionson thePassionsof theSoul
Fourteenth-Century
DOMINIK PERLER

Abstragt
Medievalphilosophers
clearlyrecognizedthatemotionsare not simply"raw
mental
statesthatincludecognitivecomponents.
but
They
feelings" complex
both
on the sensoryand on theintellectual
these
level,
components
analyzed
thatare involved.
to thedifferent
attention
typesofcognition
payingparticular
This paperfocuseson WilliamOckhamand AdamWodeham,twofourteenthcenturyauthorswho presenteda detailedaccountof "sensorypassions"and
"volitional
provided
passions".It intendsto showthatthesetwophilosophers
and a functional
both a structural
analysisof emotions,i.e., theyexplained
emotionsand delineatedthecausal relations
thevariouselementsconstituting
betweentheseelements.Ockhamas wellas Wodehamemphasizedthat"sensorypassions"are not onlybased upon cognitionsbut includea cognitive
In addition,theypointedout that
intentional.
componentand are therefore
and an evaluation
"volitionalpassions"are based upon a conceptualization
enabled them to
to
emotions
of given objects. This cognitivist
approach
a
of
emotional
the
conflict, phenomenonthat
complexphenomenon
explain
has its originin the co-presenceof variousemotionsthatinvolveconflicting
evaluations.
I
Suppose that,duringyourchildhood,you had a best friendwho was very
close, withwhom you shared not only most of your time,but also most
of your secrets.The two of you were inseparable at school and went
throughall the stormystagesof adolescencetogether.But then,one day,
your friendsuddenlydisappeared withoutany explanation.You heard
rumorsthatshe had gone to Australia,but you receivedno messagefrom
her- no phone call, no postcard,nothing.It took you years to come to
termswiththisstrangebehavior.Yet one morning,when you were about
to leave your apartment,all of a sudden she was standingat your door,
smilingat you as if nothinghad happened. How would you react?You

Vivarium
43,2

BrillNV,Leiden,
Koninklijke
2005
online- www.brill.nl
Alsoavailable

11:33:26 AM

ANDCOGNITIONS
EMOTIONS

251

would be in a complex emotional state, I assume, and you would go

throughvariousstages.First,you mightfeel sheerpleasure at seeingher,
a pleasure that would immediatelytriggerbodily actions like running
towardher and embracingher. But thenyou mightalso feelanger.Why
did she leave so abruptly?And whydid she show up afterso manyyears
withoutwarningyou? Finally,you mightalso feel a bit guilty.Afterall,
you could have done somethingto learn about her whereabouts.You
neglectedto keep in touch as much as she did.
It is quite easy to imagine such a situationand to give a detailed
ofthecomplexemotionalstatea personis likelyto be confronted
description
with.However,it is far fromeasy to provide a philosophicalanalysisof
this state. In such an analysis,we need to do at least two things.First,
we ought to give a structural
explanationof the emotionalstate,i.e., we
need to indicatewhat kind of componentsor elementsare to be taken
intoaccountand how theseelementsare interrelated.
Thus, it is necessary
to delineatewhatwe need to considerwhen we describea personas feeling pleasure,anger, and guilt.Does such a person have mere feelings,
or does she have
comparableto sensationslike feelinghungryand thirsty,
mentalstateswitha cognitivecontent?And how can we characterizethis
content?Second, it is also necessaryto provide a functional
explanation
of the complex emotional state, spelling out what causes the various
componentsand what they cause in turn. Should we say, for instance,
that seeing an old friendcauses pleasure? And should we assume that
pleasure,in turn,causes an action like embracing?Or should a different
causal role be assignedto pleasure?
Philosophersin the laterMiddle Ages triedto answerall of thesequestions by providingboth a structuraland a functionalanalysisof emotionsor, more precisely,of "passionsof the soul" (passiones
animae
), as they
used to call the mentalphenomenaa person experiencesor "undergoes"
when she is in an affectivestate.1Since most fourteenth-century
authors
workedwith an Aristoteliantheoryof the soul, theyexamined two levels when analyzingpassions.2First,theyturnedto the sensorysoul,which
1 Forthetechnical
use of theterm"passio",
rootedin Aristotelian
see
metaphysics,
V. Hirvonen,
Passions
in William
Ockham's
, Dordrecht
2004,47-73.
Philosophical
Psychology
2 Ockham
stresses
thatthesetwolevelsarereally
andnotsimply
distinct;
conceptually
see Quodl.
Allreferences
to Ockham's
works
II, q. 10 (OTh IX, 156-161).
applyto the
Opera
Philosophica
(= OPh)andOpera
Theologica
(= OTh),ed.byG. Gietal.,St.Bonaventure,
On themetaphysical
framework
of hispsychology,
see M. McCord
N.Y., 1967-1988.
Ockham
View
Ockham's
Adams,William
, NotreDame 1987,654-64,andG. J. Etzkorn,
of

11:33:26 AM

252

PERLER
DOMINIK

was divided into two parts: "cognitive"and "appetitive".They investigated the passionswe findon thislevel and the causal role theyplay in
our actions.Second, theyexaminedthe levelof the intellectual
soul,which
theyalso dividedinto a "cognitive"and an "appetitive"part,askingagain
what kind of passions are to be found there and how theydifferfrom
sensorypassions.In theirview, we are utterlyunable to understandpassions unlesswe analyze the relationshipbetweencognitiveand appetitive
partson each level as well as the interactionbetweenthe two levels.Only
then do we get a clear pictureof all the structuralelements,and only
then can we explain the causal role of all the relevantelements.
In lightof this architectureof the soul, I intendto examine how two
WilliamOckham and his pupil
philosophers,
prominentfourteenth-century
Adam Wodeham, analyzed passions on both levels. It goes withoutsay-
ing thatI will not be able to take into account all the dimensionsof their
complex explanatorymodel. I will discussneithermoral aspects(e.g., the
passionsforthe developmentofvirtues)
importanceattachedto higher-level
nor theologicalones (e.g., the role passionsplay in the theoryof beatific
vision).3Since I am primarilyinterestedin structuraland causal aspects,
especiallyin the way later medievalphilosophersrelatedelementsin the
cognitivepart of the soul to those in the appetitivepart, I will focuson
the interplaybetweentheseparts and on the impactit has foran explanation of human actions.
I should point out that speakingabout
To avoid misunderstandings,
parts of the soul does not amount to introducingvarious homunculior
separate faculties.Ockham emphasizes that intellectand will are not
entitieswithinthe human soul. Ontologicallyspeaking,theyare
different
one and the same substancethat is capable of bringingabout different
statesor acts. Thus, the intellectis nothingbut the intellectualsoul insofaras it producescognitiveacts,and the will is the verysame soul insofar
as it produces volitionalacts.4There is only a real distinctionbetween
intellectualand sensorysoul, not between intellectand will. In giving
such an ontologicallyparsimoniousexplanation,Ockham clearlyuses his
of entitiesand reallydistinctparts.5
"cleaver" to cut away a multiplicity
and
in theLight
Passions
theHuman
, in: W. Vossenkuhl
ofhisPhilosophical
Anthropology
Ockhams
R. Schnberger
1990,265-87.
, Weinheim
(eds.),DieGegenwart
3 Fora comprehensive
seeS. Knuuttila,
account
ofbothmoralandtheological
aspects,
andMedieval
Emotions
inAncient
2004,ch.4.
, Oxford
Philosophy
4 See Reportatio
II, q. 20 (OTh V, 435-6).
5 On thismethodological
Cleaver
seeJ. Boler,Ockham's
Studies,
>in:Franciscan
principle,
45 (1985),119-44.

11:33:26 AM

EMOTIONS
ANDCOGNITIONS

253

It is thereforehardly adequate to investigatethe relationshipbetween

variouspartsunderstoodas special entities,even if ones uses the expressions "intellect"and "will", as Ockham (and followinghim Wodeham)
himselfdoes. The basic questionsshould ratherbe how intellectualand
volitionalactsare interrelated
and how theyare based upon acts brought
about by the sensorysoul.
II
If we want to understandthe activitiesof the sensorysoul, we need to
look at the way Ockham explains sensorycognition{notitia
In
sensitiva).
his view, this type of cognitionprovides informationabout particular,
materialthingsand can be eitherintuitiveor abstractive,dependingon
the senses that are involved.6If the externalsenses are activated,and if
theygraspsomethingpresentto themas presentand existent,an intuitive
cognitionoccurs. If, however,only the imaginationas an internalsense
is active and apprehendsa thingwithouttakingnotice of its existence,
thereis mere abstractivecognition.This distinction
can be illustrated
with
a simpleexample. Suppose thereis an apple in frontof you and you see
it as an existentapple. In thatcase, you have a sensoryintuitivecognition.
If thereis no apple physicallypresentto you, but you are terriblyhungryand visualize an apple in your imagination,then you have nothing
more than a sensoryabstractivecognition.Normally,such an abstractive
cognitionpresupposesan earlier intuitiveone, for you cannot visualize
an apple if you have not already seen one.
So far, the intellecthas not been involved in the cognitiveprocess.
There is intellectualcognition(notitiaintellectiva
) only when the intellect
startsformingmental terms,i.e., concepts,and when it apprehendsthe
between
Here, Ockham again distinguishes
objectby meansof theseterms.7
intuitiveand abstractivecognition.8Intuitivecognitionoccurs when the
6 SeeReportatio
The
II, q. 12-13(OThV, 256-61);
III, q. 3 (OThVI, 114-25).
Reportatio
thesis
thatsensory
intuitive
thebasisforfurther
is already
cognition
provides
cognition
in Ordinatio
stated
I, prologus
(OTh I, 25).
7 On Ockham's
identification
ofconcepts
withmental
discussed
terms,
thoroughly
by
recent
see C. Panaccio,
Lesmots,
lesconcepts
etleschoses.
La smantique
de
commentators,
Guillaume
d'Occam
etlenominalisme
Theorien
, Montral-Paris
1991,andD. Perler,
d'aujourd'hui
derIntentionalitt
imMittelalter
a. M. 2002,361-85.
, Frankfurt
8 See Ordinatio
On
I, prologus
(OTh I, 30-3)and Quodl.
V, q. 5 (OTh IX, 495-500).
thisdistinction,
discussed
in recent
see theconciseanalysis
widely
literature,
secondary
La thorie
Nominalisme.
dela signification
d'Occam
provided
byC. Michon,
, Paris1994,108-26,

11:33:26 AM

254

PERLER
DOMINIK

intellectapprehendsa presentand existentthing as an existentthing.

More precisely,Ockham claims thatby means of thiscognition"one can
know whetheror not thereis a thingsuch that,if thereis a thing,the
intellectimmediatelyjudges that it is and knows with evidence that it
is."9Thus, an intuitiveintellectualcognitionis alwaysfollowedby a judgofthecognitive
mentabouttheexistenceor non-existence
object.Abstractive
is
not
followed
other
intellectualcognition,on the
hand,
by such a judgment. In that case, the intellect"abstractsfromthe existenceor nonexistenceand fromotherconditionswhich contingently
apply to a thing
This means that if I simplyconceive of
or are predicatedof a thing."10
an apple, I do notjudge about the actual existenceof an apple. I merely
grasp a certaincognitivecontent.
This distinctionbetweensensoryand intellectualcognitionis crucially
of the passions,because Ockham emphaimportantforan understanding
sizes that it is sensorycognition,not the externalobject or intellectual
cognitionof this object, that immediatelycauses passions such as pleasure, desire, and sadness.11Thus, when I meet an old friend,it is not
about her,but my seeingher thatcauses
the friendherselfor my thinking
pleasure in me. BeforeI activatemy intellectand, accordingly,beforeI
formor use any concepts,my seeingimmediatelytriggersa passion.12Of
course,Ockham acknowledgesthatin mostcases sense and intellectcooperate so thatthe intellectworksupon the materialprovidedby the senses
and comes up with an intellectualcognition.But he insistson the fact
thatsensorycognitionis not necessarilyfollowedby, or transformed
into,
an intellectualone, as becomes clear when you considerinfantswho do
andAbstractive
Ockham'
s Misunderstood
andE. Karger,
, in: P. V.
Cognition
ofIntuitive
Theory
York
204-26.
to
Ockham
The
1999,
,
Cambridge-New
Companion
Spade(ed.), Cambridge
9 Ordinatio
cuius
virtute
reiesttalisnotitia
intuitiva
I, prologus
(OThI, 31): . . notitia
et
earn
esse
iudicat
intellectus
statim
si
res
ita
vel
res
sit
utrum
sciri
sit,
non,
quod
potest
earnesse..."
evidenter
cognoscit
10Ordinatio
secundum
abstractiva
quod
cognitio
I, prologus
accipitur
(OThI, 31):"Aliter
accidunt
etab aliiscondicionibus
etnonexsistentia
ab exsistentia
abstrahit
quaecontingenter
de re."
reivelpraedicantur
11See Quaestiones
variae,
q. 6, art.9 (OThVIII, 251);QuodlIII, q. 17 (OTh IX, 268I, dist.1,q. 3 (OTh I, 420).
72);Ordinatio
12Ockham
cause.
be morethana mediate
itclearthattheexternal
makes
objectcannot
obiectum
variae
apprehensum
, q. 6, art.9 (OThVIII, 252):"Etperconsequens
Quaestiones
sisitcausa[...], estsolum
Sedsolum
istarum
nullomodoestcausaimmediata
passionum.
causat
naturaliter
causae
causa
et
solum
illius
causamediata
quatenus
respectu passionis
causatimmediate
in sensuet earnconservt,
intuitivam
pasquae cognitio
cognitionem
modopraedicto."
sionespraedictas

11:33:26 AM

ANDCOGNITIONS
EMOTIONS

255

not yetuse conceptsbut nevertheless

have sensorycognitionscausingpassions (e.g., seeingthe motheror tastingmilkcauses pleasure).13It is even
more obviousin the case of bruteanimals.Ockham mentionsthe famous
case of the sheep that fleeswhen seeing a wolf.14The mere act of seethe sheep and makes it flee. Thus, there can be a sensory
ing terrifies
cognitioncausinga passionwithoutthepresenceof any intellectual
activity.
This claim inevitablyraisesthe questionof how we should understand
this type of cognition.What exactlydoes it mean that we (as well as
brute animals) can see somethingwithout making use of concepts?
Ockham does not give a detailed answerto thisquestion.
Unfortunately,
Modern readersmay immediatelyraise the objectionthatit hardlymakes
sense to speak about pre-conceptualseeing.15If seeing is more than the
mere receptionof sensoryinputs,it alwaysinvolvesan explicitor implicit
use of concepts:we always see somethingas something
and therebycategorize the perceptualobject. For instance,you see the red, round thing
in frontof you as an apple or simplyas a red, round thing.That is why
you make use of conceptsin the very act of seeing and not in a later
act of intellectualapprehension.So, Ockham's claim that thereare preconceptualsensoryacts of cognitioncausing passions beforethe intellect
providesconceptslooks questionable.
Althoughit is temptingto argue in this way, I do not thinkthat
Ockham's claim should be dismissedso easily.Let me tryto explain this
by probingthe examples he discusses.The most illuminatingcases are
those of animals that have mere sensorycognition.16
When a sheep sees
a wolf,it apprehendsthe so-called "externalsensible qualities" of the
wolf,i.e., its color, its shape, its size, etc., and it immediatelycognizes
that a thinghaving all these propertiesis dangerous. Ockham emphasizes thatthe sheep does not apprehendthe conceptsof color,shape, etc.
It simplyperceivessome patches that happen to have a certain color,
as a special quality
shape,etc. Nor does it graspdangerousnessor hostility
13Infants
arementioned
inReportatio
IV, q. 14 (OThVII, 314),andin QuodlI, q. 15
states:
et nonintellectualiter
..
(OTh IX, 84),whereOckham
"puervidetsensibiliter
He evenassumes
thattheyhavesomeformof non-intellectual
judgment.
Theyjudge
thatsomething
is agreeable
or disagreeable
without
and
usingtheconcepts
"agreeable"
"disagreeable".
14See Ordinatio
I, dist.3, q. 2 (OTh II, 410-1).
15In thecurrent
MindandWorld
debate,
, Cambridge,
J. McDowell,
Mass.,1994,
oftheories
ofpre-conceptual
46-65,takesthislinein hiscritique
perception.
16See Reportatio
IV, q. 14 (OTh VII, 314-5),and Ordinatio
I, dist.3, q. 2 (OTh II,
410-1).

11:33:26 AM

256

PERLER
DOMINIK

thatwould be added to the sensiblequalities.Criticizingsome of his predecessors,among themThomas Aquinas, Ockham holds thatthereis no
, as claimed by these authors,17that could be grasped.
special intentio
Dangerousnessis simplywhat resultsfroma thingdisplayingcertainqualities.That is why the sheep graspsthe sensiblequalitiesof the wolfand
its propertyof being dangerousat the same time. In addition,the sheep
is also capable of distinguishing
the wolf from other thingsdisplaying
othersensiblequalities.Ockham even claims thatthe sheep is capable of
makingsome kind of judgment,althoughhe hastensto add that it does
not forma full-fledged
judgmentthatwould involvethe use of concepts.
The sensoryjudgmentis a mere act of recognizingand locatinga certain patternof sensible qualities. When performingthis act, the sheep
sees the wolfas something,
, in the sense that it sees it as a specificbundle
of colors, and it is capable of discriminating
this bundle fromanother
from
the
one
it
sees
when
at
one, say
looking a fellowsheep. Yet it is
utterlyunable to see the wolf as a wolf,simplybecause it cannot apply
an appropriateconcept to what it sees.
In lightof the specificcapacitythat an animal withmere sensorycognitionhas, we can conclude thatthistypeof cognitionis indeed pre-conceptual, but neverthelessmore than the receptionof an unstructured
streamof sensoryinputs.It has a distinctcontentthatenables an animal
different
to distinguish
thingsin the materialworld.This is importantfor
an understanding
of the genesisof sensorypassions,forit is preciselythe
sensorycognitionhaving a distinctcontentthat causes them. Ockham
sayswithrespectto the fleeingsheep: "Then I ask: what could cause this
act of desiringto flee?Not the hostility,
forthereis no such thingthere,
and what does not existcannot be a cause of anything.Therefore,this
act is caused by a cognitionof the externalsensiblequalities. . ."18So it
is the act of seeing,not the thingitselfor a mysterious
entitycalled "hosa
This
that
causes
occurs
without
tility",
passion.
naturally,
any intellectual intervention.
Ockham acknowledgesthatnot onlyanimalsexperience
such passions. Human beings have them as well. That is why he claims
that human pleasure and desire are oftennaturallycaused by sensory
17See ThomasAquinas,
Summa
Turin-Rome
, ed.byP. Caramello,
1952,pars
theologiae
I, q. 78,art.4, corp.
18Ordinatio
illeactus
I, dist.3, q. 2 (OTh II, 411):"Tuncquaero:a quo causaretur
nullius
esse
Nonab inimicitia,
quia nullaestibi,et non-ens
potest
appetitivus
fugiendi?
a cognitione
..."
causatur
sensibilium
exteriorum
causa;igitur

11:33:26 AM

EMOTIONS
ANDCOGNITIONS

257

cognitions,withoutthere being any use of concepts. To illustratethis

pointwitha modernexample,we may say: when I see and smella bouquet of freshflowers,it is not the use of the concepts "flowers"and
"fresh"and, hence,not the conceptualizationof the presentsituationthat
makes me feelpleasure. Rather,the simplefactthat I experienceenjoyable sensiblequalitiescauses my pleasure.
This has a consequence for an explanationof how passions can be
controlledor corrected.Do I have directcontrolover my pleasurewhen
I see and smellfreshflowers?Hardly,Ockham would respond.The flowers
cause a certaintype of sensorycognitionin me, which in turn
naturally
causes
naturally
pleasure. I cannot dictateto my senses not to provide a
certainvisualand olfactory
cognition,and not to cause pleasure.Similarly,
the sheep cannot decide not to be terrified
when it sees the wolf. The
this
arises
does
not mean that we have no
passion
naturally.However,
controlwhatsoeverover our sensorypassions. Ockham carefullypoints
out thathuman beings,unlikebruteanimals,can exercisea certaincontrol over them,because they are capable of bringingabout acts of the
will. But these acts cannot directlychange or influencepassions. They
are only capable of producinga certain dispositionthat influencesthe
way we see things."Or," Ockham continues,"perhapsthe act of the will
is a mediatecause withrespectto these passions,because it is the cause
of the cause. For it is the partial immediatecause of an apprehension
that precedes such an act called 'passion'."19This claim can easily be
illustrated.Suppose thatI decide to go to a flowershop where I will be
exposed to exquisitescentsand colors. In that case, my decision (an act
of the will) is a mediate
cause of pleasure,because it makes me go to a
place whereI will acquire a certainsensorycognition.This cognitionwill
then cause pleasure. But the act of the will can by no means function
as the immediate
cause of pleasure. Were I exposed to rottenflowers,I
could not command myself:feel pleasure!No matterhow much I want
a sensorypassion,I cannot have it unlessI have previouslyhad the necessarysensorycognition.20
The factthatacts of the will can be an indirectcause showsthatthere
is an importantdifferencebetween human beings and brute animals.
19Reportatio
estcausamediIII, q. 12 (OTh VI, 411):"Velforte
ipseactusvoluntatis
atarespectu
illarum
passionum,
quiaestcausacausae.Estenimcausaimmediata
partialis
talemactumquivocatur
apprehensionis
praecedentis
passio."
20Notethatthiscognition
doesnotneedto be direcdy
causedbyan external
object.

11:33:26 AM

258

DOMINIK
PERLER

When a sheep sees a wolf,it cannot want to avoid the passion of fear,
simplybecause it lacks volitionalacts. It cannot even want to be in a situation where it would not be scared. We human beings,on the other
hand, can want to expose ourselvesto situationswherewe have different
sensorycognitionsand, consequently,different
passions. In addition,we
can use our intellectin order to conceive of one and the same situation
in different
ways. Suppose you sufferfromwolf-phobiajust like a sheep,
but you learn that thereare nice, tame wolves in the circus.Then, you
can want to go to the circus so that you will have a sensorycognition
of a wolf that will be shaped by what you have learned. That is, you
will no longer see the wolf as a mere bundle of sensiblequalities that
scaresyou. You will see it as a tamed animal. This may make you overcome your wolf-phobia.So, unlike the unfortunatesheep, you can do
to changeyourpassions.This is an important
something
pointin Ockham's
not
under
the
immediate
control
of
acts of the will,
While
theory.
being
passions are not out of controleither.We can forceourselvesto an dusentimentale
cation
(a) by exposingourselvesto situationsin whichwe acquire
thesebasic cognitions.
certainsensorycognitionsand (b) by conceptualizing
At this point someone mightvoice a fundamentalobjection against
Ockham's claim thatsensorycognitionscause passions.Why does he not
admitthatobjectsin the worldplay thiscausal role? Could he not appeal
to his famous ontological razor or "cleaver" and claim that the wolf
immediatelycauses fear when it is presentto a person or to a sheep?
No doubt,Ockham would rejectthissuggestionbecause it missesthe cruour senses- nothingmore.
cial pointthatan objectin itselfsimplytriggers
In some passages, he presentsan explicitargumentendorsingthe thesis
that it is the sensorycognition,not the externalobject, that plays the
causal role.21If the object caused a passion, he says, the passion would
disappearas soon as the objectwould be removedor destroyed.However,
it is possible for a passion to persistafterthe removalor destructionof
the object. (Suppose you see a wild wolf in the dark and are terribly
scared.Then the wolfdisappears.Yet you are stillshakenby fearbecause
of something
big,dark,and threatening.
you stillhave the strongimpression
it can be causedby the
Sinceit can also be abstractive,
i.e.,an act ofimagination,
I canforce
ofa
to comeup withan imagination
soulitself.
Forexample,
myself
sensory
willcausepleasure.
delicious
apple,which
21See Quaestiones
variae
Ill, q. 17 (OTh IX,
, q. 6, art.9 (OTh VIII, 251-2);Quodl.
268-9).

11:33:26 AM

ANDCOGNITIONS
EMOTIONS

259

It is the persistingcontentof your previousact of seeing that maintains

to corroborate
yourfear.)Ockham even adduces an argumentex hypothesi
this claim: "If God preservedthe seeing of a pleasurable or saddening
object and destroyedthe object of thatact of seeing,the pleasureor sadness in the appetite followingthe sense of sight could immediately
be caused, as is clear fromexperience."22
Appealing to experiencemay
in this case, but the crucial point is clear. A passion can be
be difficult
caused even withoutthe presence of an externalobject; therefore,the
externalobject cannot be the immediatecause of a passion. This is an
importantthesisthat should not be neglected.In Ockham's view, passions should not be explained in a crude behavioristway, because it is
not simplythe stimulusstemmingfroman externalobject that causes a
passion as a reaction.Rather, our sensorycognitionplays the decisive
causal role. To put it in a nutshell,we may say that it is not the world
itself,but our sensorycognitiveattitudetowardthe worldthatcauses passions. This is why passions are "cognitivelypenetrable",as modernpsychologistsand philosophersof mind would say.23Shiftsin the way we
cognize the world immediatelyaffectour passions.
Now one may stillwonderin what sense passionsare "cognitively
penetrable".Does that mean that we firstneed to have a sensorycognition
so thatwe can acquire a passion that,takenin itself,is a mere sensation?
Or does it mean that we need to have a sensorycognitionso that we
can acquire a passion that has in itselfa cognitivecontent?This questionarisesbecause in his discussionof sensorypassions,Ockham mentions
notjust pleasureand desire,but also pain.24Yet pain seems to be a state
withouta cognitivecontent.Using modern terminology,
one could say
thatpain has a certainphenomenalquality(it feelsa certainway to have,
say, a headache), but not a cognitivecontent(a headache is not about
somethingand does not representa certain object or quality in the
If Ockham treatspain along withothersensorypassions,it seems
world).25
22Quaestiones
visionem
variae,
q. 6, art.9 (OThVIII,251-2):"Si etiamDeusconservaret
alicuius
obiecti
delectabilis
veltristabilis
etdestrueret
obiectum
illiusvisionis,
statim
potest
causari
delectatio
veltristi
tiain appetitu
sicutpatetperexperientiam."
visum,
sequente
23I borrow
thisexpression
from
Z. Pylyshyn,
andCognition
Mass.
, Cambridge,
Computation
1984.
24Painis thepassionhe discusses
mostextensively
in Quodl.
III, q. 17 (OTh IX,
269-70).
25Thisis,ofcourse,
a controversial
claimthatwouldnotbe unanimously
in
accepted
thecontemporary
debate.It is usually
discussed
as "thephenomenological
for
theory",

11:33:26 AM

260

PERLER
DOMINIK

as ifhe were reducingall passionsto mere sensationsthatlack a cognitive

content.
may be, it would not be a correct
Tempting as this interpretation
In
his
account of Ockham's theory.
explanationof various sensorypassions,he makesit clear thatmostof themare aboutsomething,and therefore have a cognitivecontent.He states,for instance,that pleasure is
about somethingpresent,whereas desire and avoidance are about some
thingthat is not presentand not possessed.26This clearlyshows that he
takesthesepassionsto be intentionalstates:theyare directedtowardpresent or non-presentobjects. Even pain is intentionalin his view.27Or to
be more precise,pain as a passionateattitudetowardsomethingbad that
affectsthe body is intentional.Ockham carefully
distinguishes
pain, understood in thissense,frompain understoodas a mere feeling.28
Therefore,
it would be erroneousto say that Ockham considerspassionsto be nonintentionalsensationsor moods. Most of them are fullycognitive:not
only are they caused by sensorycognitions,they also have a cognitive
contentin themselves.
Ill
Sensorycognitionis the startingpointforeverycognitiveactivityand the
firstcause of passions. Yet it is clear that human beings also have an
intellectualsoul, which,just like the sensorysoul, can bringabout cognitiveacts (so-called"intellectualacts") and appetitiveacts (so-called"volihumanbeingsfrombrute
tionalacts"). This is preciselywhat distinguishes
with
a
endowed
which
are
animals,
sensorysoul. Since humanbeings
only
introduces
Ockham
can have higher-level
acts,
"passionsof the will" that
His mostextensivediscussion
play a decisiverolein his theoryof emotions.29
. AnIntroduction
andO. R. Jones,ThePhilosophy
instance
, CambridgeofMind
byP. Smith
NewYork1986,193-206.
26Quaestiones
variae,
q. 6, art.9 (OTh VIII, 256).Ibid.(OTh VIII, 252),he saysthat
et nonhabitorum".
obiectorum
absentium
are"respectu
desireandavoidance
27Quodl.
veldolordealiquoobiecto,
Ill, q. 17(OThIX,271):". . . quandoestdelectatio
toanother
from
onepassion
thetransition
Ockham
cesstactusdesiderandi."
by
explains
which
hasnotbeenpresent,
Iftheobjectofdesire,
totheobjectofthepassion.
referring
desire
ceasesandis replaced
becomes
(iftheobjectis good)
bypleasure
present,
suddenly
withrespect
aredefined
thatpassions
shows
orpain(iftheobjectis bad).Thisexplanation
to a certain
object.
28See Quodl.
Ill, q. 17 (OTh IX, 269).
29He explicitly
in Quodl.
forinstance
II, q. 17 (OTh IX, 187):
speaksaboutpassions,

11:33:26 AM

ANDCOGNITIONS
EMOTIONS

261

of these passions can be found in a contextthat may look strangeto

modernreaders,but was of great importancein the later Middle Ages,
namely the debate about enjoyment{fruitio).According to traditional
Christiandoctrine,God is the highestand finalobject- the only object
humanbeingsenjoyforits own sake, not withregardto somethingelse.30
The mostperfectenjoymentwill be reached in the beatificvision,when
human beings contemplateGod in, and for, himself.This theological
thesis immediatelyraises the philosophical question of what kind of
emotionalstateenjoymentis. Given thatthe human soul, separatedfrom
the body, can have it, it is certainlynot a sensorypassion. And given
that it is not implementedin the body, it does not bring about bodily
actions. So, what is it, and how is it caused? These questionssparked
a general discussionabout the structureand the causes of non-sensory
passions.
All philosophersand theologiansinvolvedin this debate agreed that
enjoyment,unlikesensorypleasure,is a conceptualizedformof passion.
If someoneenjoysGod's presence,one loves him as God, categorizinghim
as the highestand mostdesirablebeing. Given thisobviousfact,one may
be temptedto say that enjoymentand other formsof higher-levelpassions are an intellectualaffair.That is, the intellectualsoul, by grasping
an object and conceptualizingit, bringsabout all these passions in its
cognitiveactivities.

"... dicoprimoquodpassiones
suntin volntate,
et gaudium
quiaamoret spes,timor
suntinvolntate,
communiter
Similiter
delectado
ettrisquaetarnen
ponuntur
passiones.
titiasuntin volntate,
etc."Ockham
wasbyno means
quaeetiamsuntpassiones;
igitur
thefirst
medieval
author
to speakaboutpassions
ofthewill.He followed
who
Scotus,
a detailed
ofthesepassions,
andshifted
thefocus
from
thesenalready
presented
analysis
level.Thiscrucial
shift
is analyzed
Emotions
inAncient
sorytothevolitional
byS. Knuuttila,
DunsScot:
andMedieval
Existe-t-il
despassions
de
(n. 3), 265-71,andO. Boulnois,
Philosophy
la volont
P.-F.MoreauandL. Renault
etmdi?,in:B. Besnier,
(eds.),Lespassions
antiques
vales
in general,
see B. Kent,
, Paris2003,281-95.On theriseofvoluntarist
psychology
Virtues
intheLateThirteenth
D.C.
, Washington
oftheWill.TheTransformation
ofEthics
Century
1995.
30PeterLombard
states
thisthesis
inthevery
first
ofhis48 distinctions,
where
herefers
to theAugustinin
distinction
between
anduse{usus):
Godis theonly
enjoyment
{fruitio)
foritsownsake,notusedforsomething
else.Giventhisclassical
distincobjectenjoyed
on theSentences
dealtwiththequestion
of
tion,all medieval
theologians
commenting
whatkindof emotional
stateenjoyment
is. On thetheological
and its
background
- Towards
see A. S. McGrade,Ockham
onEnjoyment
an
debates,
impacton philosophical
andPsychology
, in:The ReviewofMetaphysics,
ofFourteenth
Understanding
Century
Philosophy
33 (1981),706-28.

11:33:26 AM

262

PERLER
DOMINIK

Ockham firmly
approach,holdinginstead
opposes such an intellectualist
that "enjoyingis an act of the will alone."31He acknowledgesthat conceptualizationplays a decisiverole. But in his view,thisdoes not amount
to claimingthat enjoymentis nothingbut a special formof intellectual
activity.Rather,it is the will thatbringsabout an act of enjoymentwhen
the intellectpresentsa certainobject. Thus, when a person thinksabout
God, he or she performsan act of enjoymentthatis a distinctvolitional
act. This separationof two acts seemsto hintat a perfectanalogybetween
"lower" and "higher"passions. As we have seen, on the sensorylevel,
thereneeds to be a sensorycognition,which,however,is not in itselfa
passion. Rather, a sensorycognitioncausesa sensorypassion. Similarly,
one may say that on the higherlevel, there needs to be a conceptual
cognition,which,takenin itself,is not yeta passion. Rather,a conceptual
cognitioncausesa passion, i.e., a volitionalact such as enjoyment.
Althoughit is temptingto constructsuch an analogy, it would not
expressOckham's opinion. He explicitlyrejectsthe claim that the intellect causes passions of the will, claiminginstead: ". . . when the intellect
presentsan enjoyableobject to the intellect in a clear or in an obscure
way, in particularor in general , the will can activelyproduce an act
of enjoymentwith respectto that object, and this happens on natural
Quite obviously,Ockham emphasizesthatthereis no simple
grounds."32
causal mechanismthat makes the will come up with a certainpassion
The will can prowheneverthe intellectdeliversa particularcognition.33
duce an act of enjoyment,but it need not.
Lurkingin the backgroundof thisthesisis Ockham's famousdoctrine
withobjectsand
of the libertyof the will: the will can act in conformity
have
to.34Even if
it
does
not
but
the
intellect,
judgmentspresentedby
31Ordinatio
estquodfruiestactus
I, dist.1, q. 2 (OTh I, 395):". . . primoostendum
soliusvoluntatis."
32Ordinatio
ostenso
fruibili
I, dist.1,q. 2 (OTh I, 397):". . . dicoprimoquodobiecto
siveinuniversali,
siveinparticulari
siveclaresiveobscure
voluntati
potest
perintellectum
circailludobiectum."
ethocex purisnaturalibus,
actumfruitionis,
activeelicere
voluntas
33Ockham
defended
thethesis,
others,
(seehisScriptum
Aquinas
by,among
clearly
rejects
1 ad 1),that
art.
Paris
dist.
P.
ed.
1.,
1929,
1,
Mandonnet,
Sententiarum,
q.
by
super
primm
follows
theintellect.
thewillalways
34Ordinatio
obiecti
cuiuscumque
I, dist.1, q. 2 (OTh I, 399):"Sedvoluntas
respectu
ab actu
cessare
suaabsoluta
de potentia
libere
etcontingenter
potest
simpliciter
agit,igitur
suo."See alsoibid.,q. 6 (OTh I, 503);Reportatio
IV,
III, q. 11 (OThVI, 355);Reportatio
see
ofindifference,
oftheso-called
liberty
analysis
q. 16 (OTh VII, 350).Fora concise
andMorality
onWill,
Ockham
M. McCord
Nature,
, in:P. V. Spade(ed.),TheCambridge
Adams,
toOckham
(n.8), 245-72.
Companion

11:33:26 AM

ANDCOGNITIONS
EMOTIONS

263

the intellectconceivesof an object as somethinggood and desirable,the

will is freenotto accept it and, consequently,notto enjoy it. In fact,the
will has threeoptions:it can accept it, not accept it, or take a neutral
stance. For that reason, enjoymentis not automaticallycaused by an
intellectualapprehension.When such a passion arises,it requiresits own
cause: the will.35
Now one mightwonderhow the structureof a volitionalact of enjoyment is to be understood.Since Ockham oftenemphasizesthat this act
is distinctfroman intellectualactivity,
it can hardlydisplaythe verysame
structure.Is it an act that has a mere phenomenalquality,comparable
to a good feeling?Or is it an act that also comprisesa cognitivecomfroman intellectualact? To answerthese
ponent,even thoughit differs
we
need
to
look
at
how Ockham explains the relationship
questions,
betweenan act of enjoymentor a more mundane act of love (dilectio
) and
an act of pleasure(delectatio
his
). Criticizingsome of
contemporaries,
among
them Peter Auriol,he pointsout that thereis a real distinctionbetween
these two acts. That is, a lovingperson who feelspleasure has two acts:
(i) an intentionalact of lovingdirectedtoward a certainperson or state
of affairs,
and (ii) a non-intentional
act of experiencingpleasure.The reason forthisdistinctionis quite simple:therecan be an act of love without therebeing an act of pleasure.36Ockham adduces a colorfulexample
to illustratethis thesis.A devil can love to seduce a human being and
make him sin, but he does not experienceany pleasure in this despicable deed. He has, as it were, a cool-heartedlove.37This example shows
that an act of love is neitheridenticalto, nor necessarilyaccompanied
by, an act thathas a certainphenomenalquality.It is not simplyan act
of "feelinggood". Rather,an act of love (or in the case of love of God:
an act of enjoyment)is an act thatis aboutsomethingand can be identified
throughits content.This contentmay be characterizedin variousways,
both as being propositionaland non-propositional.
Thus, the devil's act
of love has the contentthatthehumanbeingshouldsin, whereas a human
35It should
be notedthatthisappealto a distinct
causedoesnotinvolve
an ontologicalcommitment
to a spooky
called"thewill".As pointed
outabove(seen. 4),
entity
Ockham
doesnotintroduce
thewillas an entity
or faculty
thatwouldbe really
distinct
from
theintellect.
The expression
"thewill"is always
to be understood
as "theintellectualsoulinsofar
as itproduces
volitional
acts".Thereis onlyan ontological
commitment
tovarious
acts
ofthesoul.
, nottovarious
parts,
36See Ordinatio
I, dist.1,q. 3 (OTh I, 407).
37See Ordinatio
I, dist.1,q. 3 (OTh I, 408).

11:33:26 AM

264

PERLER
DOMINIK

being's act of enjoymentsimplyhas the contentGod.No matterhow the

contentis structured(in a "complex" or a "simple" way, as Ockham
would say), an act of love always has a content,and is thereforeto be
understoodas a cognitiveact. An act of pleasure,on the otherhand, is
a mere feelingthat may or may not go along with the cognitiveact.
IV
So far, it has become clear that volitionalpassions such as enjoyment
and love are not onlybased upon cognitiveacts,but are themselvesintentional acts with a cognitivecontent.But how then can we distinguish
them fromsimple intellectualacts? What, for instance,is the difference
betweenthe mere act of thinkingabout God and lovingGod, if it is not
just a phenomenalqualitythatnecessarilygoes along withthe second act
and characterizesit? It looksas ifthe cognitiveapproach Ockham takesto
acts.
themcompletelyto intellectual
thevolitionalpassionsrisksassimilating
In lightof this difficulty,
it is not surprisingthat Ockham's contemporaries and successorsanimatedlydiscussed the question of how we
of a volitionalpassion.Adam Wodeham,
shouldcharacterizethe structure
Ockham's pupil and secretary,deals withthisproblemin a verydetailed
Followinghis teacher,he subscribesto the thesisthat enjoyment
study.38
and love are acts of the will, which are not to be identifiedwith or
acts. He unmistakably
reducedto intellectual
posirejectsthe intellectualist
tion, claimingthat "the firstcognitionof an enjoyable object, be it an
intuitiveor an abstractivecognition,is reallydistinctfroman enjoyment
of that object, and vice versa, an enjoymentfrom this cognition."39
Wodeham acknowledges,however,thatintellectualacts are necessaryfor
the genesisof passions.If someone had no idea whatsoeverof God, they
could clearlyhave no love of God. This factshowsthatcognitionsbrought
roleof a partialcause. However,
about by theintellect
play theindispensable
it by no meansprovesthattheyare the totalor unique cause.40In addition,
38Wodeham
Walter
todiscuss
thisproblem.
wasbynomeanstheonlyauthor
Chatton,
alsoanalyzed
it in detail.
ofRimini,
PeterAillyandothers
Richard
Fitzralph,
Gregory
atOxford
Ockham:
seeA. S. McGrade,
Foran overview,
after
Philosophy,
Psychology,
Enjoyment
toWyclif,
Oxford
From
Ockham
andM. Wilks
Love
andthe
1987,
, in:A. Hudson
(eds.),
ofGod
andMedieval
inAncient
Emotions
63-88,andS. Knuuttila,
(n. 3),275-82.
Philosophy
39Lectura
Sententiarum
secunda
inlibrum
N.Y.,
, ed. byR. Wood,St.Bonaventure,
primum
siveabstracsiveintuitiva
fruibilis,
1990,dist.1,q. 5, 4 (vol.I, 277):". . . primanotitia
ab illacognitione."
istafruitio
et econtra
a fruitione
eiusdem,
tiva,realiter
distinguitur
40Wodeham
thattheyare thetotalcause,because
arguesthatit is evenexcluded

11:33:26 AM

ANDCOGNITIONS
EMOTIONS

265

Wodeham pointsout that "experienceteaches that we frequently

apprehend thingswhich we neitherhate nor love."41This simple fact shows
that an intellectualcognitiondoes not automaticallycause a passion: we
can simplycognize God, or a fellowhuman or a materialthing,without being compelledto have any passion. Nor is an intellectualcognition
in itselfa passion. Otherwiseevery person cognizing a certain object
would inevitablybe in a passionate state. The wide diversityof human
reactionstowardone and the same object- some people feel love when
cognizinga certainperson, others do not clearly shows that passions
mustnot be identifiedwith intellectualcognitions.
Now Wodeham faces a dilemma. On the one hand, he concedes that
intellectualcognitionsare the partialcause of passions,and thatpassions
comprisea cognitiveelementbecause they are always about a certain
of passions with
object. On the other hand, he rejectsan identification
How are the two thesesto be reconciled?Wodeham
cognitionstoutcourt.
triesto finda solutionby claimingthat passions are indeed stateswith
a cognitivecontent,but volitionalstatesthat are caused partiallyby cognitionsof the intellectand partiallyby the will itself.That is why they
are higher-level
cognitions.In fact,Wodeham presentshis second thesis
as follows:"Second I say- not as the expressionof an assertionbut of
an opinion- thateveryact of desiringand hating,and hence enjoyment,
is some cognitionand some apprehension,because everyexperienceof
an objectis some cognitionof thatthing."42
Obviously,Wodeham defends
a strongcognitivist
Not
are
position.
only
passionsof the will based upon
caused
a
(and partially
by) conceptualizationof things,passionsarea way
of conceptualizingthings.Therefore,it does not make sense to open a
gap betweenthe intellectthatis responsibleforconceptsand the will that
canfully
causeitself,
cannotfully
causea cognitive
See
i.e.,a cognition
nothing
passion.
Lectura
secunda
, dist.1,q. 5, 4 (vol.I, 277).
41Lectura
secunda
docetquodfrequenter
, dist.1,q. 5, 4 (vol.I, 278):"Item,
experientia
necdiligimus."
apprehendimus
quaenecodimus
- nonasserendo
42Lectura
secunda
sed
, dist.1, q. 5, 4 (vol.I, 278):"Secundodico
omnis
actus
et
et
ita
est
et
odiendi,
frui,
opinandoquod
appetendi
quaedamcognitio
alicuius
obiecti
estquaedamcognitio
eiusquaedamapprehensio,
quiaomnisexperientia
dem."Although
outthatheholdsthisposition
hepresents
cautiously
pointing
"opinando",
itindetail
anddefends
itagainst
accounts.
Notethatthe"cognitio"
Wodeham
non-cognitivist
refers
to is nota basiccognition.
It is rather
a cognition
thatpresupposes
a basiccognitionsupplied
He makesthisclearwhensaying
in Lectura
secunda
, dist.1,
bytheintellect.
causatus
q. 5, 6 (vol.I, 282):". . . dicoquodactusamandinaturaliter
requirit
Cognitionen!
praeviam
quaenonsitamor."

11:33:26 AM

266

PERLER
DOMINIK

desires.Rather,the will is to be understood

merelycauses non-cognitive
as a capacitythatmakesuse of the conceptssuppliedby the intellectand
produces conceptualizedpassions. Let me illustratethis importantpoint
with a modern example.
Suppose that you meet an old friendand are immediatelyfilledwith
joy. In this case, you do not only have a sensorycognition(you see a
familiarpatternof colors and smell a well-knownscent)that makes you
have the sensorypassion of pleasureor "feelinggood". You also recognize
the personyou meet as yourfriendand therefore
conceptualizewhatyou
see and smell. This is what makes you feeljoy. The importantpoint is
thatin the veryact of conceptualizingyourfriendas yourfriendyou feel
joy. Joy is not to be separatedfromthisconceptualcognition.It is some
formof cognition.Yet it is not a basic formof cognition.Otherwise,
everyoneconceptualizingyour friendas, say, the neighborliving next
door or a six-foottall person,would feeljoy. You need to conceptualize
your friendas yourfriendor as a goodpersonin order to feeljoy.
If we understandWodeham's claim that everypassion "is some cognition and some apprehension"in this way, it comes close to what is
theoryof emotions.But how then is
nowadaysknown as the cognitivist
the special way of cognizingto be understood?In the currentdebate,
givea clear answerto thisquestion.M. Nussbaum,forinstance,
cognitivists
claims that emotionsare "judgmentsof value," i.e., ways of evaluating
Following this line, one mightinterpret
thingsand states of affairs.43
Wodeham as claimingthatpassionsof the will are a special kindofjudgment- a judgmentby which we evaluate thingsas good or bad forus.
AlthoughWodeham clearlydefendsa cognitivistposition,we should
be carefulwhen appealing to judgmentsin a modernexplanationof his
view. If one takes a judgmentto be somethingcomposed of the propoor denyingand a propositionalcontent("I
sitionalattitudeof affirming
Wodeham
then
that
clearlydenies that passions of the
affirm/deny p"),
will are alwaysjudgments.In his thirdthesis,he unequivocallysays that
"a volitionone has formedis an apprehendingcognition,not an assenting
one"44and argues for this claim as follows:". . . somethingpleasurable
can be loved if it is apprehendedexclusivelyby a simple,non-complex
43Shecallshertheory
"thecognitive-evaluative
view";seeM. C. Nussbaum,
Upheavals
York2001,23.
TheIntelligence
, Cambridge-New
ofEmotions
ofThought.
44Lectura
secunda
, dist.1, q. 5, 5 (vol.I, 281): . . volitio
aliquacreataestcognitio
conclusio."
essetertia
Et haecpotest
etnonassensiva.
apprehensiva

11:33:26 AM

ANDCOGNITIONS
EMOTIONS

267

cognition.And somethingcan be loved when it is apprehendedin a complex way, withoutthere being any assent or dissent.Therefore,a volitionalact is only an apprehension."45
This sounds like puzzlingscholastic
jargon, but it makes perfectsense when we illustrateit with the example I just mentioned.When you meet an old friend,you can apprehend
her as a friendor as a goodperson.This simple apprehension,which does
not involvethe objectivejudgmentthat she reallyis a good person (she
mightappear to be good just to you or just in a specificsituation),suffices
fora cognitivepassion. You then love her as the person you apprehend
under a certain aspect. And even if you apprehend your friend"in a
complexway", i.e., by graspinga propositionalcontent,all you need to
apprehend is thatshe is a goodperson.In Wodeham's terminology,this
thatcannotbe reduced
propositionalcontentis a "complexesignificabile"
to somethingnon-complex.46
The importantpointis thatyou do not have
to come up with the full-fledged
judgment "I affirmthat she is a good
person" graspingthe propositionalcontentsuffices.For it is one thing
to graspsuch a content,quite anotherto give an assentor dissentto that
content.47
Wodeham concedes that theremay be judgmentsin some cases, and
providesan illustrating
example.48If someone is happy about the death
of his enemy,he does forma judgment in the very act of happiness,
namely"The enemyis dead", which includesan assent to the fact that
a certainperson,apprehendedas an enemy,is dead. It may be spelled
out as follows:"I affirmthat the person apprehended as an enemy is
dead and I am happy about this fact." But the importantpoint is that
45Ibid.: . . aliquiddelectabile
tantummodo
notitia
simpotest
diligisi apprehendatur
et aliquidpotestdiligiquandoapprehenditur
pliciincomplexa,
complexe
absqueomni
assensu
veldissensu.
estapprehensio
tantum."
Igitur
aliquavolitio
46He presents
histheory
ofthe"complexe
inLectura
secunda
, dist.1,q. 1,
significabile"
ofthistheory,
seeD. Perler,
LateMedieval
7-9(vol.I, 192-7).Foran analysis
Ontologies
77 (1994),149-169;
E. Karger,
William
Chatton
, in:The Monist,
ofFacts
, Walter
ofOckham
andAdam
Wodeham
ontheObjects
andBelief
33 (1995),171-96;
A. de
Vivarium,
ofKnowledge
La reference
vide.
Thories
delaproposition
Libera,
, Paris2002,157-226.
47Notethatthisdistinction
is notidentical
withSeneca'sfamous
between
opposition
thefirst
andthesecondmovement
ofan emotion;
seeDe iraII, iv, 1, andtheanalysis
Emotion
andPeace
From
Stoic
toChristian
provided
byR. Sorabji,
ofMind.
,
Agitation
Temptation
Oxford
movement
is involuntary
anda mere"preparation
for
2000,66-75.Seneca'sfirst
a passion",
whereas
Wodeham's
emotion
is an actofthewillandconstitutes
apprehensive
in itself
a passion.
The distinction
between
andjudgments
is a distinction
apprehensions
within
therealmofvolitional
passions.
48Thisis hisfourth
thesis.
See Lectura
secunda
, dist.1,q. 5, 5 (vol.I, 282).

11:33:26 AM

268

PERLER
DOMINIK

theredoes not need to be a judgmentin everycase of a cognitivepassion. That is whyWodeham suggeststhatwe should carefullydistinguish
between(a) cognitivepassions that are mere apprehensionsand (b) cognitivepassions that involvejudgments.This distinctionhas an important
of passions,as Wodeham is
consequenceforthe problemof truth-values
of
has
a
If
one
out.49
to
passion type (a), the contentof the
quick point
a
truth-value.
have
not
does
Thus, ifyou simplylove your
passion clearly
friendas a good person,the contentas a goodpersonis neithertrue nor
false. If, however,someonejudges that the enemyis dead and is happy
is deadis trueor false.It is preabout thisfact,the contentthattheenemy
a propositionalcontentfrom
such
that
distinguishes
ciselyits truth-value
one.
a non-propositional
The crucial point is that in everypassion,whetherit involvesa judgment or not, an object or a state of affairsis apprehendedin a certain
way. This apprehensionis not descriptivebut evaluative,as Wodeham's
own example of love makes clear. For even if the lovingpersondoes not
formthejudgment"x is a pleasurablething",she apprehendsx under a
In doing so,
certainaspect, namelyas somethingpleasurable {delectabik).
froma
This
differs
a
x
as
she clearlyevaluates
having positivequality.
mere descriptiveapprehension,an apprehensionof x as beingtall or dark,
for instance.This example shows that a cognitivepassion, though not
being an evaluativejudgmentin the strictsense, includes an evaluative
element that distinguishesit frombasic cognitions.This is one of the
main reasonswhy a cognitivepassion is a higher-level
cognition.In havfeaturesof
describe
not
does
one
a
such
perceptible
simply
passion,
ing
an object. One also evaluates the object as good or bad, agreeable or
disagreeable.
we can draw a picturewith the following
In lightof this distinction,
of
hierarchy cognitions:50
49See Lectura
secunda
, dist.1,q. 5, 7 (vol.I, 284-5).
50Thispicture
all
intoaccount
without
structure
thehierarchical
taking
simply
presents
makesimultalevels.Sincehumanbeings
thevarious
between
interrelations
thepossible
levelmayvery
on a higher
activities
andintellectual
neoususeoftheir
capacities,
sensory
ofandcategorize
thewaywe conceive
wellshapethoseon a lowerlevel.Forinstance,
thereare
them.Forthatreason,
on thewaywe seeandimagine
hasan impact
objects
level(as in thecaseof
on thefirst
actsofseeingandimagining
notonlypreconceptual
Aristotle
ones.Following
butalsoconceptualized
II, 19;lOObl),
brute
(seeAn.Post.
animals),
individual
seeor apprehend
thatwe do notsimply
conceded
items,
authors
all medieval
theuseofconbutalsouniversais
presupposes
(e.g.,weseeCalliasas a man).Thisclearly
ceptsin theveryactofseeing.

11:33:26 AM

ANDCOGNITIONS
EMOTIONS

269

:
seeing or imaginingx (pre-conceptual)
cognition
sensory
:
intellectual
cognition
apprehendingx as being F (conceptualand descriptive)
x as beinggood/bad (conceptualand
volitional
:
cognition(a) apprehending
evaluative)
(b) judging that x is F and taking this fact to be
good/bad (conceptualand evaluative)
levels of cognitionwas by no means
To be sure, thisappeal to different
authors.Gregory
the standardapproach chosen by all fourteenth-century
of Riminiand Peterof Ailly,forinstance,rejectedWodeham's claim that
thereare varioushigher-level
cognitions,some at the intellectuallevel and
some at the volitionalone. In particular,they criticizedthe thesisthat
passionsof the will shouldbe treatedas formsof apprehension.51
Gregory
triedto beat Wodeham with a typicallyOckhamistweapon, namelyby
appealing to the principleof parsimony.He claimed: "He [Wodeham]
superfluouslyposits a plurality of cognitions. He unnecessarily and
In Gregory'sview, the
superfluously
posits somethingas a cognition."52
will does not produce an additionalcognitionwhen it comes up with a
passion like love or hate. The intellectalreadyprovidesa fullcognition,
both descriptiveand evaluative,while the will simplyadds an affective
component.
This reactionto Wodeham's analysisshowsthatthe cognitivist
account
of passionssparkeda heated debate about the structure
of emotions.This
debate focusedon the fundamentalquestionof how passionscan acquire
a cognitiveelementthat goes beyond a mere descriptiveaccount of a
thingor a stateof affairs.Whereas Wodeham triedto locate thiselement
in a specificevaluation,othersdenied thatthe will is responsibleforsuch
an element.Consequently,they rejected the postulationof higher-level
cognitions.
Yet Gregoryof Rimini's claim that the will does not add a cognitive
elementbut simplyan affective
one, raisesan importantquestion.Is there
an
for
affective
any place
componentin Wodeham's theory?It looks as
51See Gregory
ofRimini,
Lectura
etsecundum
Sententiarum.
Tomus
I: super
super
primum
primm
etdist.1-6, ed. byD. TrappandV. Marcolino,
Berlin-New
York1981,dist.
prologus
deanima
1, q. 1, 212-7;PeterofAilly,Tractatus
, editedin: O. Pluta,Diephilosophische
desPeter
vonAilly
, Amsterdam
1986,83-4.
Psychologe
52Gregory
ofRimini,
Lectura
etsecundum
Sententiarum
, dist.1,q. 1 (ed.Trapp
super
primum
andMarcolino,
notitiarum
etinutiliter
seusuperflue
212):". . . superflue
ponitpluralitatem
ponitaliquamremessenotitiam."

11:33:26 AM

270

PERLER
DOMINIK

if he were presentingan analysisof emotionsthat identifiesthem with

"cool-hearted"higher-level
cognitions.For instance,lovingsomeoneseems
to amountto comingup withan evaluationof thatpersonas being good.
But what about the aspect of desperatelylongingforthisperson or feeling good when being with her? Are these non-evaluativeelementsmissing in Wodeham's theory?Not quite so. In his analysisof enjoyment,
Unlike
Wodeham emphasizesthat"beatificenjoymentis reallypleasure."53
Ockham,he does not separatepleasure(<delectatio
) fromlove (<dilectio
). These
are not two distinctstatesthatcan but need not co-exist.In Wodeham's
view,love or enjoymentalwaysincludespleasurebecause enjoymentis a
excluded".54Therefore,it hardlymakes
state"by whichmiseryis formally
sense to say that the devil enjoys deceivinghuman beingsbut feelsmiserable about it. If he reallyexperiencesenjoyment,the feelingof pleasure necessarilygoes along withit. (Of course,the devilmay have another
kind of emotionthat includesthe elementof feelingmiserable.But this
emotionwould not be plain enjoymentbut, say, sadisticjoy.) The fact
thatWodeham explicitlyincludesan affective
componentin the emotion
and even considersit to be a definingfeatureof thatemotion,showsthat
he does not adopt a purelyrationalist
explanationof emotionsthatignores
elements.Rather,he offersa sophisticatedexplanation,
all non-cognitive
both a cognitivecomponent(an evaluativeappreinto
account
taking
hension or a judgment) and an affectivecomponent.In fact,it is the
emotionlike
presenceof both componentsthatcharacterizesa full-fledged
love or enjoyment.For it is neithera "cool-hearted"evaluationof a state
a certain
of affairsnor a simple feeling,but an evaluationthat includes
feeling.
V
of Ockham's and Wodeham's account of the
I hope my reconstruction
that
these
clear
philosopherstookpassionsto be thoroughly
passionsmakes
"cognitively
penetrated",both on the sensoryand on the intellectuallevel.
In theirview, passions are not mental statesthat are somehowopposed
to, or isolatedfrom,cognitions.Quite to the contrary,neitherthe genesis
53Lectura
secunda
, dist.1, q. 6, 2 (vol.I, 295): . . teneoprimoillamconclusionem
delectatio."
estrealiter
beatfica
quodfruitio
54Lectura
beatifica
secunda
per
, dist.1, q. 6, 2 (vol.I, 295): . . solailiaestfruitio
miseria."
formaliter
sibi
sic
scilicet
formaliter
excluditur
miseria,
repugnet
quod
quam

11:33:26 AM

ANDCOGNITIONS
EMOTIONS

271

of passions, nor their internalstructure,can be explained withoutan

appeal to cognitiveactivities.This has an immediateconsequence foran
of the relationshipbetween the so-called "cognitive"and
understanding
the "appetitive"part of the soul. When Ockham and Wodeham referred
to theseparts,theydid not intendto divide the soul into two neatlyseparated sections.Nor did theywant to introducevarious homunculithat
would somehow be hidden but neverthelessactive in a human being.
that a person perRather,theirintentionwas to referto mentalactivities
formswhen he or she copes with complex situations.It is in fact the
coordinationof variousmentalactivitiesthat distinguishes
a person from
a bruteanimal, on the one hand, and froman angel, on the other.For
an animal, endowed witha sensorysoul, is capable of havingmere sensorypassions that enable it to behave in an appropriateway. But it is
utterlyunable to conceptualizethe situationwithwhich it is confronted.
Consequently,it cannothave higher-level
passionsby whichit would evaluate or assess a given situation.Nor can it tryto conceptualizethe situation in variousways,so thatit would come up withdifferent
passions.
It is a helplessvictimof its naturallycaused passions.Angels,on the other
hand, endowed with an intellectualsoul, are clearlycapable of forming
intellectualand volitionalacts, and are thereforeable to develop a conceptualizedpassionate attitudetoward thingswith which they are confronted.55
Yet angels lack sensorycognitionand thereforecannot have
bodilypassions that would make them cry or laugh. As fleshlessbeings,
theyare condemnedto have fleshlesspassions.Occupyinga middleposition betweenanimalsand angels,human beingshave both a sensoryand
an intellectualsoul. This allows them to bringabout lower-and higherlevel passions,i.e., embodied and conceptualizedemotions.In fact,it was
this middle position on which Ockham, Wodeham, and many other
medievalphilosopherswere focusingwhen theytried to explain human
passions.This enabled themto avoid reducinga human being to a mere
bodilycreature,condemnedto have naturallycaused sensorypassions,or
to some kind of free-floating
soul, limitedto immaterialpassions.
At thispoint,someone workingon contemporary
theoriesof emotions
and influencedby neurobiologicalresearchmay raise a seriousobjection.
If Ockham and Wodeham were indeed concerned with the interplay
betweenvarious mental activities,and if theylocated some of them in
55Ockhamdiscusses
is love)in Quaestiones
variae,
angelicpassions
(hismainexample
q. 6, art.9 (OThVIII, 257-8and269-70).

11:33:26 AM

272

PERLER
DOMINIK

the body, why did theynot analyze theirmaterialimplementation?

Why
did theynot look at how theyare presentin the brain? Should an adequate theorynot givea detailedexplanationof theneurobiological
processes
that are necessaryforthe rise of passions?
In responseto this objection,one could point out that Ockham and
Wodeham, like the majorityof later medievalthinkers,
certainlydid not
locate all mental activitiesin the body. Since theytook the intellectual
soul to be an entitythatis not subjectto materialconditions,theywould
have denied that there could be a neurobiologicalexplanation (or in
medieval terms:an explanationwithinthe frameworkof the physica)of
all the passions. They were quite obviouslyonly "semi-materialists"
in
theirmetaphysicsof the soul.56But even on the level of the sensorysoul
and itsactivities,
whichclearlyare subjectto materialconditions,Ockham
and Wodeham did not attemptto providea biologicalor a physicalanalysis,as some of his contemporaries
(e.g. the membersof the medicalschool
of Padova) did for good reason. For, if one deals with passions, one
shouldcarefullydistinguish
betweena philosophicaland a scientific
enterIn
a
one
does
indeed
look
at
the
material
prise.
scientific
investigation,
of passionsand at thebiologicalprocessesthatare required
implementation
In thefourteenth
forsuch an implementation.
suchan investigation
century,
would have concentratedon the arrangementof so-called"ventricles"in
the brain. In a philosophical
however,one ought to look at
investigation,
the different
elementsthatplay a role in the genesisof passionsand at the
in one way
functionalmechanisms,whichmay be biologicallyinstantiated
or another.Such a functionalexplanationmust not be conflatedwith a
materialone, foreven if one has perfectknowledgeof the somaticbasis,
one stillought to explain what happens on this basis. And it may well
are keen to point out, that a certaintypeof
be, as modernfunctionalists
in different
can
have
different
material
instantiations
humanbeings.
passion
and
Wodeham's
functional
Ockham's
Therefore,
explanationis not as
as
it
look
at
a
first
It
is
an explanationthat
incomplete
may
glance.
appeals (a) to functionalelementsprovidedby the various mentalactivities,and (b) to functionalmechanismsthat relatethese elementsto each
other.This type of explanationmay help shed lighton the problemof
56I borrow
R. Pasnau,Theories
intheLater
Middle
thisexpression
from
,
Ages
ofCognition
York1997,36.
Cambridge-New

11:33:26 AM

EMOTIONS
ANDCOGNITIONS

273

emotionalconflict,probably one of the most bewilderingproblemswe

are confronted
withwhen tryingto cope withemotions.Let me highlight
to the exampleI mentionedat theverybeginthisadvantageby returning
ning of thispaper.
I asked you to imaginethe case of a friendwho had leftyou without
any explanationand reappearedaftera couple of years.When she shows
up, you are likelyto react withmixed emotions:you are pleased, angry,
and you may also feel guilty.How is this possible?How can you have
both positiveand negativeemotions?Using Ockham's and Wodeham's
functionalmodel, one could give the followingexplanation.The sensory
causes the sensory
cognitionyou have when seeingyourfriendimmediately
passion of pleasure,a passion that arisesnaturally.Yet at the same time,
yourintellectconceivesof yourfriendas someone who had leftyou without any warning.This triggersyour will, which evaluates the friendas
an unreliable,or even a betraying,person and bringsabout the passion
of anger. Your intellectalso conceives of yourselfas a person who did
not tryto remainin contactwithyourfriend.This makesyourwill evaluate yourselfas an unreliableor betrayingperson as well; consequently,
you feel guilty.Given the simultaneouspresence of all these acts, you
have all three passions at once. And you are in an emotional conflict
because the threepassions,based on different
cognitionsand evaluations,
each
other.
oppose
It was thispossibility
of conflictthatlate medievalphilosopherswanted
to point out in their functionalexplanation: differentcognitionsplay
different
causal roles in the mechanismof the mind, and consequently,
theygive rise to different
passions.Their intentionwas not simplyto dissolve emotionalconflictby claimingthat, say, the will as a higherfaccontrolsall the passions and unifiesthem. They admitted,
ultyperfectly
of course,that the will has a certainrulingpower, and in theirtheories
of virtues,theyassignedto it the task of bringingabout the best possible
higher-level
passions,which would become some kind of second nature
and influencethe genesis of our sensorypassions. Yet they insistedon
the fact that the so-called lower-levelpassions should not be neglected.
The will is not a magic power that could, or should, make the sensory
passions disappear. Nor can it arrange all the higher-level
passions in a
harmonious way. It is just one capacity of the soul that cooperates
with other capacities to bring about a multitudeof passions- passions
that may be in conflictwith each other. One can do justice to the

11:33:26 AM

274

PERLER
DOMINIK

complex emotionallife of a person only if one acknowledgesthe possibilityof such a conflictand if one triesto analyze the elementsthatplay
a role in this conflict.57
Berlin
HumboldtUniversitt

57Earlier
Saint
de Montral,
at theUniversit
ofthispaperwerepresented
versions
in all three
I am grateful
to theaudience
andWashington
LouisUniversity,
University.
andcritical
remarks.
questions
placesforstimulating

11:33:26 AM

KoranundKonziliarismus.
zum Verhltnis
Anmerkungen
de CampoundNikolausvonKues
vonHeymericus
FLORIANHAMANN

Abstragt
This paper deals withthe relationbetweenNicholasof Cusa and the Dutch
de Campo. Nicholasis celebratedforhis ratherposHeymericus
philosopher
itiveattitudetowardsIslam. In De pacefidei(1453) he presentsthe visionof
unareligio
inrituum
varietate
and in his Cribratio
Alkorani
(1460/61)Nicholastries
to proveChristiandogmason the basis of the Koran. This idea he had discussedwithhis Dutch friendseveraldecades earlier.In his Disputatio
depotestateecclesiastica
thequestion,whether
thehighest
(1433/34)Heymericscrutinizes
in the churchbelongsto the pope or the council,on the basis of
authority
the Koran. He presentsten arguments
in favourof the counciland one in
favourof the pope. This showsthatNicholasdevelopedpartsof his excepin conversation
tionalthought
withHeymericand suggests
thata closerexaminationof Heymeric'stextswill reveala new side of the youngCusanus.
I. WarHeymerich
derLehrer
des Cusanus?
Rudolf Haubst und Eusebio Colomer haben in ihren bis heute
einflussreichen
StudienHeymericusde Campo als den Lehrerdes Nikolaus
von Kues bezeichnet,der das Denken des AlbertusMagnus und des
Raimundus Lullus sowie die Theorien der theologia
circularis
und der
Koinzidenzan seinenSchlervermittelt
habe.1Beide verstehenHeymerich
dabei nichtals originellenDenker, sondernblo als Vermittler.Colomer
1 R. Haubst,
wieCusanus
ihnsah,in: G. Meyer/A.
Zimmermann
Albert,
(Hg.),Albertus
- Doctor
Universalis
1280/1980
Studien
, Mainz1980(Walberger
Magnus
6). Ders.,DasBild
desEinen
und
Dreieinen
Gottes
inderWelt
nach
von
Kues
Nikolaus
Fortleben
, Trier1952.Ders.,/um.
Alberts
desGroen
beiHeymerich
vonKamp
undNikolaus
vonKues
Albertina.
, in: Studia
Festschrift
1952(BGPhThMA
zum70. Geburtstage
, Mnster
frBernhard
Geyer
Supplementband
4)
420-47.Ders.,DerjungeCusanus
warimJahre
1428zu Handschriften-Studien
in Pans
, in:
undForschungsbeitrge
der Cusanus-Gesellschaft,
14 (1980),198-205.
Mitteilungen
E. Colomer,
vonKuesundRaimund
Llull.
AusHandschriften
Nikolaus
derKueser
Bibliothek
, Berlin
1961.Ders.,Zu demAufsatz
vonRudolf
Haubst
warimJahre
1428zu
DerjungeCusanus
inParis",
in:Mitteilungen
undForschungsbeitrge
derCusanus-Gesellschaft,
Handschriften-Sidien
15 (1982),57-70.
Koninklijke
BrillNV,Leiden,
2005
- www.brill.nl
Alsoavailable
online

Vivarium
43,2

11:33:34 AM

276

FLORIAN
HAMANN

schreibt:Dabei darfman den eigentlichen

philosophischen
Rang Heimerics
nicht berschtzen. Auch wenn ihm die logische und systematische
Denkkraft
nichtfehlt,bleibtsein Denken dennochim Groenund Ganzen
dem Epigonentumder sptmittelalterlichen
Philosophie verhaftet.Der
ist die Rolle des Heimericin Bezug
EigenartseinesDenkens entsprechend
auf Cusanus die philosophischbescheidenere,jedoch geschichtlichnicht
eines Vermittlers
unfruchtbare
gewesen."2
Die Vermitder-Thesesttztsich auf die Tatsache, dass sich Cusanus
an der auch Heymerich
1425 an der Klner Universittimmatrikulierte,
lehrte.3Doch ist es zumindest diskussionswrdig,ob man aus dem
von 1425 tatschlichden Schluss ziehen darf,
Immatrikulationsvermerk
Cusanus sei ein Studentdes niederlndischenDenkers gewesen.InteressanterweiselistetHermannKeussen,der die Klner Matrikellisten
edierte,
Cusanus unter den Juraprofessorenauf.4 Es muss also zunchst der
Bildungsgangbeider Denker verglichenwerden.
das Studienjahr
Nikolausvon Kues war 1401 geborenworden,verbrachte
1416/175 an der UniversittHeidelbergund studiertevon 1417 bis 14236
in Padua Kirchenrecht.Ebendort erwarb Cusanus 14237 den Titel des
Dabei
doctor
decretorum
, unterdem er sich auch in Kln immatrikulierte.
wurdenihm aufgrunddes Ansehensseiner Person {ob reverentiam
personae)
die Immatrikulationsgebhrenerlassen, wie das bei hochgestellten
erhob den
blich war.8 Der Titel des doctordecretorum
Persnlichkeiten
auch
nicht
wenn
in
adelshnliche
eine
adelsgleicheStellung.Der
Trger
Erwerb des Titels in Norditalienunterschiedden Spitzenjuristenvom
der nrdlichder Alpen studierthatte.9Somit bot
Durchschnittsjuristen,
besonders fr reiche Brgershnegute
der Titel des doctordecretorum
2 E. Colomer,
und
vandenVelde
vonKuesundHeimeric
Nikolaus
, in: Mitteilungen
4 (1964),198-213,
bes.213.
derCusanus-Gesellschaft,
Forschungsbeitrge
3 E. Meuthen
vonKues,
Bd. 1,
desNikolaus
zurLebensgeschichte
Quellen
(Hg.),ActaCusana.
de Cusadoctor
Mai 17),Hamburg
1 (1401-1437
1976,Nr.25,9: Nycolaus
Lieferung
sed iuravit
Nihildeditob reverenciam
Treuerensis
in iurecanonico
persone,
dyocesis.
complete."
4 H. Keussen
Bonn1928,ND
Kln
derUniversitt
, Bd. 1 (1378-1475),
(Hg.),DieMatrikel
Dsseldorf
1979,Nr.44, 72*.
5 AC I (s.o.,Anm.3),Nr. 11,3.
6 AC I (s.o.,Anm.3),Nr.15-18,
inPaduagibtes keine
5f.Frdieersten
Studienjahre
Belege.
gesicherten
7 AC I (s.o.,Anm.3),Nr. 18,6.
8 R.C. Schwinges,
derUniversitt
inW. Regg(Hg.),Geschichte
DieZulassung
zurUniversitt,
Mnchen
inEuropa
1993,172-4.
, Bd. 1 (Mittelalter),
9 P. Moraw,
imSptmittelalter
ber
, in:J.Petersohn
Augiensia.
(Hg.),Mediaevalia
gelehrte
Juristen

11:33:34 AM

KORANUNDKONZILIARISMUS

277

Kirche Karriere zu machen. Da

Chancen, in der sptmittelalterlichen
Nikolausvon Kues brgerlicher
Abstammungwar, wre ihm ohne diesen
Titel die steileKarriereverwehrtgewesen,die ihn bis zum Kardinal und
Bischofvon Brixenfhrensollte.
Heymericusde Campo indes wurde um 1395 in Son bei Eindhoven
in den heutigenNiederlandengeboren,studiertein Paris die artessowie
die Theologie und immatrikulierte
sich 1422 an der UniversittKln.
sententiarius
1423 wurde er baccalaureus
1424 baccalaureus
biblicus,
, 1425 baccalaureus
und 1428 schlielichmagister
.10Obwohl Heymerich
formatus
theologiae
etwa sechsJahre lter als Cusanus war, erlangteer erst mehrereJahre
nach ihm die Promotion,da das Studium der Theologie blicherweise
Im Vergleichzu dem Titel
lngerdauerteals das der Rechtswissenschaft.
des doctor
decretorum
erffnete
der magister
theologiae
hauptschlichdie Chance
auf eine Universittskarriere,
wie sie auch Heymerichin Kln und spter
in Lwen gelingensollte.
Aus dem Vergleichbeider Ausbildungswege
muss festgehalten
werden:
Cusanusbesa imJahre 1425 eine soziale Stellung,die der des Heymericus
de Campo mindestensebenbrtigwar. Erich Meuthen hat bereits 1964
darauf hingewiesen,dass Cusanus kein gewhnlicherStudentwar, sondern aller Wahrscheinlichkeit
nach in Kln Juravorlesungen
hielt.11Das
Verhltnisbeiderzueinandersolltealso eher als kollegialerAustauschoder
intellektuelle
Freundschaft
gewertetwerden.
Dennoch ist die These, Heymerichsei der Lehrer des Cusanus gewesen, keineswegsabwegig,denn die intellektuelle
Biographiedes Nikolaus
von Kues weist eine Lcke auf: Cusanus studiertelediglichein Jahr die
artesin Heidelberg und sechs Jahre Kirchenrechtin Padua. Ob er in
diesenJahrendie Zeit und die Mglichkeitbesa, sich derartprofunde
philosophischeund theologischeKenntnisseanzueignen,wie sie fr die
erforderlich
sind,ist unklar.Doch besteht
Abfassungvon De doctaignorantia
zwischendem Ende seines Studiumsin Italien im Jahre 1423 und der
1440 eine Lcke von immerhin17Jahren.
Abfassungvon De doctaignorantia
desMittelalters.
vondenMitgliedern
desKonstanzer
Arbeitskreises
zurGeschichte
Forschungen
Vorgelegt
Geschichte
, Stuttgart
2001,125-47.
flirmittelalterliche
10E. Meuthen,
Klner
Kln/Wien
, Bd. 1 (DiealteUniversitt),
1988,
Universittsgeschichte
187-9.
Lescrits
deCampo
d'Aristo
J.-D.Cavigioli,
te,in:
d'Heymericus
(1395-1460)surlesuvres
Zeitschrift
flir
undTheologie,
bes.296ff.
28 (1981),
Keussen
293-371,
Freiburger
Philosophie
1928(s.o.,Anm.4),Rektorat
Nr. 132,Immatrikulation
Nr. 124,240.
11E. Meuthen,
Das Trierer
Schisma
von1430aufdem
Basler
des
Konzil.
ZurLebensgeschichte
vonKues
Nikolaus
, Mnster
1964,78f.

11:33:34 AM

278

FLORIAN
HAMANN

In dieser Zeit unterhieltCusanus tatschlicheinen engen Kontakt zu

Heymerich.Beide kanntensich nicht allein von der UniversittKln,
sondernnahmen zeitgleichvon Ende 1432 bis zum Frhjahr 1435 am
Austauschvon wenigstens
Basler Konzil teil,12so dass ein intellektueller
zehn Jahren anzunehmenist. Hiervon zeugen die Basler Schriftendes
Heymericusde Campo, wie sie in der ehemaligenBibliothekdes Nikolaus
von Kues bis auf den heutigenTag erhaltensind.13
Da die biographischenDaten zu einem zwiespltigemErgebnisfhren,
vermagallein ein inhalicherVergleichdas Verhltnisbeider Denker zu
erhellen.Dabei mssenThemen ausgewhltwerden,die frbeide Denker
gleichermaenspezifischsind. In wenigstensdrei Gebietenragen die beiden Philosophengemeinsamaus der Masse der Denker des frhen15.
Jahrhundertsheraus: Das erste ist die Lullrezeption,die bereits von
wordenist. Leider hat er dabei die Frage weitgehend
Colomer untersucht
welche
Bedeutungden lullschenberlegungenin Heymerichs
bergangen,
Zweitensverfgenbeide Philosophenber
eigenem Denken zukommt.14
eine geometrischeTheologie. Heymerichbezeichnetseine theo
logiafiguralis
und behandelt sie in wenigstensvier seiner
auch als sigillumaeternitatis
Denkerdrfteder einzigeScholastiker
Der niederlndische
BaslerSchriften.15
des Sptmittelalters
sein, der eine eigene geometrischeTheologie entwikwrde tiefin Heymerichs
kelte.Die UntersuchungdieserFragestellungen
Denken einfhren,was an dieser Stelle nicht geleistetwerden kann.16
Drittensrezipierenbeide Denker den Koran. Letzteresscheintvorerst
zu sein,denn unterdem Eindruckdes Vormarsches
keineEigentmlichkeit
12Vgl.(FrHeymericus)
und
Kln
imgroen
Schisma
derUniversitt
H. Keussen,
DieStellung
frden
Vereins
des Historischen
des15.Jahrhunderts
zu denReformkonzilien
, in: Annalen
1964(s.o.,Anm.11).
115(1929),225-54.(FrNvK)Meuthen
Niederrhein,
13Bernkastel-Kues,
desCod.Cus.106in:Heymericus
106.Beschreibung
Cusanus-Hospital,
Schweiz
selecta
de Campo,Opera
2001,
7, hg.vonR. ImbachundP. Ladner,
Freiburg/
20/21.
14Colomer
1961(s.o.,Anm.1),5-46;ders.1964(s.o.,Anm.2), 198-213.
15Heymericus
1, (s.o.,Anm.13),
selecta
eternitatis
desigillo
de Campo,Tractatus
, in: Opera
des
EinBeitrag
desHeymericus
deCampo.
DerAblass-Traktat
99-128.P. Ladner,
zurGeschichte
71 (1977), 54, 138.
frschweizerische
Basler
Konzils
, in: Zeitschrift
Kirchengeschichte,
undin denvier
depotestate
ecclesiastica
er sie nochin seiner
Zudembehandelt
Disputatio
dieserTextewirdals Anhang
EineTeiledition
die derCod. Cus. 106enthlt.
Figuren,
dieSiegelthematik
Auerdem
werden.
Dissertation
mitverffendicht
meiner
greift
Heymerich
Proeve
totinventarisatie
auf.Vgl.L. Burie,
des15.Jahrhunderts
inden50erJahren
nochmals
uitdeXVeeeuw
werken
vandeleuvense
bewaarde
vandeinhandschrift
,
theologieprofessoren
ofindruk
BEThL45 (1977),230.
Lovaniensis
S. Theologiae
in:Facultas
1432-1797,
16Dies istderGegenstand
derEwigkeit.
mitdemTitel:Das Siegel
meiner
Dissertation
Aufsatz
ist
Der vorliegende
de Campo.
beiHeymericus
undKonziliarismus
Universalwissenschaft

11:33:34 AM

KORANUNDKONZILIARISMUS

279

der Osmanen wurden seit den spten 40er Jahren des 15. Jahrhunderts
diverseSchriften
zum Islam verfasst.
Doch HeymerichsAuseinandersetzung
mit dem Koran datiertbereitsaus dem Jahre 1433 und ist damit viele
Jahre lterals alle anderenbekanntenZeugnisseder Koranrezeptiondes
15.Jahrhunderts,
zumindestsoweitsie aus der BaslerTheologengeneration
stammen.17
Zudem weist Nikolaus von Kues in seiner Cribratio
Alkorani
daraufhin, er habe den Koran auf dem Basler Konzil kennengelernt.18
So ergibtsich ein direkterZusammenhangzwischender Koranrezeption
beider Denker. Um eine vergleichendeUntersuchungzu ermglichen,
werden zunchst die Grundberlegungender cusanischen Auseinandersetzungmit dem Islam dargelegt.Die Forschunghat sich intensiv
hiermitbeschftigt,
so dass ich mir nur einige Anmerkungenerlaube.19
II. CusanusundderIslam
Nikolausvon Kues verfasste
De pacefidkurznach dem Fall Konstantinopels
am 29. Mai 1453. Darin wird ein Mann geschildert,
der die prachtvolle
Stadt mit eigenen Augen gesehen hatte. Als dieser Mann die Nachricht
vom Sieg der Osmanen und deren angeblicherGrueltatenvernommen
hatte,verfieler ins Grbeln und flehteGott an. Darauf wurde ihm die
Schau (visio)eines himmlischenReligionsgesprches
zuteil.20
Aufgrundder
Leiden der Religionskriege
habe der Allmchtigedie Weisen aller Vlker
eineVorstudie
zu einerumfassenderen
derKoranrezeption
im Kontext
Untersuchung
seines
Denkens.
philosophischen
17Vgl.F. Hamann,
DerKoran
alsekklesiologische
Autoritt
beiHeymericus
deCampo
(f 1460),
in:Freiburger
Zeitschrift
frPhilosophie
undTheologie,
50 (2003),150-62.
18Nikolaus
vonKues,Cribratio
Alkorani
h VIII, Hamburg
, hg.v. LudwigHagemann,
n. 2, 5: Feciquampotuidiligentiam
librum
1986,Prologus,
intelligendi
legisArabum
abbatem
Cluniacensem
nobisprocuratam
Basileae
quemiuxtatranslationem
perPetrum
habuicumdisputatione
eorumnobilium
unussociusMahumeti
nisus
Arabum,
quorum
fuitaliumtrahere,
et magnus
interArabesChristianam
fidem,
qui doctior
quamzelose
ostendit
tenendam."
coluit,
potius
19L. Hagemann,
DerKur3
an in Verstndnis
undKritik
beiNikolaus
vonKues.
EinBeitrag
zur
islamisch-christlicher
Geschichte
a. M. 1976.W. A. Euler,Unitas
undPax.
, Frankfurt
Erhellung
beiRaimundus
Lullus
undNikolaus
vonKues
1990.
, Wrzburg
Religionsvergleich
20NvK,Depace
h VII, Hamburg
undH. Bascour,
1959,I 1,
fidei,
hg.v. R. Klibansky
3f:Fuitex hiis,quae apudConstantinopolim
saevissime
actaperTurkorum
proxime
regem
divulgabantur,
quidamvirzeloDei accensus,
quilocaillarum
regionm
aliquando
ut pluribus
oraretomnium
creatorem
viderat,
gemitibus
quodpersecutionem,
quae ob
diversum
ritm
suapietate
moderaretur.
Accidit
utpostdies
religionm
plussolitosaevit,
forte
exdiuturna
continuata
visioquaedam
eidem
zelosomanifestaretur,
meditatione,
aliquot,
exqua elicuit
omnium
talium
diversitatum
quodpaucorum
sapientum
quaeinreligionibus

11:33:34 AM

280

FLORIAN
HAMANN

und Religionenzu einem himmlischenKonzil (in concilio

excelsorum
) herUnter
dem
Vorsitz
des
verbum
sollten
sie
die
beigerufen.21
Religionsdie den Anlasszu so vielLeid gaben.Im Gesprch
diskutieren,
streitigkeiten
solltedie Wahrheitzum Vorscheinkommen,dass der innersteSinn aller
Religionenidentischist und blo die Riten voneinanderabweichen,es
also nur religio
una in rituum
varietate
gbe.22Die Weisen aller Vlkerdiskutierennun unterdem Vorsitzdes verbum
die wichtigsten
Glaubensthemen.
Die Argumentation
allerVertretersttztsich dabei alleinauf die Vernunft
und nichtauf Autoritten,
denn Cusanus vertritt
die Auffassung,
dass allen
der
Gehalt
zu Eigen
Religionen eigentlich
gleiche christlich-platonische
ist.23
Aus diesemGrundebezeichnetCusanus den Vorsitzendendes himmlischen Konzils nicht als Christus,sondern als verbum
, um aufzuzeigen,
dass es sich um das allen ReligionengrundlegendePrinzipdes gttlichen
Wortes handle. Am Ende schlielichbekennensich alle Teilnehmerzu
dem Konsens, dass tatschlichalle Religionenin ihremGehalt bereinstimmenund dass sich lediglichdie Riten unterscheiden.24
Im Winter1460/61 verfasste
Cusanus schlielichseine Cribratio
Alkorani.
In der Siebung des Korans" versucht Cusanus den Koran auf das
Evangeliumhin zu sieben".25Die Wahrheitdes Evangeliumssoll aus
unampossefacilem
concordantiam
peritia
quandam
perorbemobservantur
pollentium
ac pereaminreligione
ac veracimedioconstitui."
reperiri,
pacemconvenienti
perpetuam
21NvK,Depace
estenimad quandam
intellectualem
, I 2, 4: Raptus
altitudinem,
fidei
examen
huiusce
reiin concilio
ubiquasiinter
eosquivitaexcesserunt
excelsorum,
praeitahabitm
est."
sidente
Cunctipotenti,
22NvK,De pacefidei
et
cessabit
et odiilivor,
, I 6, 7: Si sicfacere
dignaberis,
gladius
omnes
nonestnisireligio
unainrituum
varietate."
quaequemala;etcognoscent
quomodo
23Vgl.K. Flasch,
vonKues.Geschichte
einer
Nikolaus
zurEinflihrung
Entwicklung.
Vorlesungen
inseine
, Frankfurt/Main
1998,330-82.
Philosophie
24NvK,Depace
XIX 68,62: Postquam
cumsapientibus
haecsiepernationum
fidei,
et
eorumqui de veterum
observantiis
tractata
suntlibriplurimi
sunt,produeti
scripsere,
inomnilingua
utapudLatinos
Marcus
Eusebius
excellentes,
Varro,
quidem
apudGraecos
et plerique
alii.Quibusexaminatis
omnem
diversidiversitatem
collegit,
qui religionm
in ritibus
estfuisse
tatem
quemab initio
quamin uniusDei cultura,
potiuscompertum
in
et in omnibus
culturis
coluisse
ex omnibus
omnespraesupposuisse
semper
scripturis
unumcollectis
licetsimplicitas
tenebrarum
prinpopularis
saepeperadversam
reperiebatur,
Conclusa
in caelorationis
abducta
nonadverteret
estigitur
cipispotestatem
quidageret.
modoquo praemittitur."
concordia
religionm
25NvK,Cribratio
Alkorani
n. 10, 1If:Intentio
autemnostra
estpraesuppo, Prologus,
librum
Mahumeti
etostendere
illainipsoetiam
librohaberi,
sitoevangelio
Christi
cribrare
si attestatione
valdeconfirmaretur,
etquod,ubidissentit,
indigeret,
perquaeevangelium,
ex perversitate
hocex ignorantia
et consequenter
intenti
Mahumeti
evenisse
Christo
non
veronondei gloriam
et
sed dei patriset hominum
Mahumeto
suamgloriam
salutem,
salutem
hominum
sedgloriam
quaerente."
propriam

11:33:34 AM

KORANUNDKONZILIARISMUS

281

Es handeltsich also um eine besondem Koran herausbewiesenwerden.26

dersausgeklgelte
christliche
die
Apologie, den Koran nichtmitVterzitaten
oder mitVernunftargumenten
widerlegenwill,sondernsich auf die hchste Autorittder Muslime selbst sttzt.Entsprechendist der Tonfall
vergleichsweisekonziliant,auch wenn gewisse polemische uerungen
nichtfehlen.Dieses Unterfangensetztfreilichvoraus,dass die christliche
- wennauch entstellt
- im Koran durchscheint.
Botschaft
Mit der gesamten
mittelalterlichen
TraditionverstandCusanusden Islamnichtals eingestndige
oder gar neue Religion,sondernals christlicheHresie. Cusanus erzhlt
die klassischechristlichePolemik,wonach Muhammad den Koran unter
dem Einflussdes verstoenenMnches Sergius und von Juden aus der
Bibel kompiliert
habe. Es handlesich somitum eine nestorianisch
geprgte
christlicheHresie.27Tatschlich handelt der Koran an vielen Stellen
von Jesus und Maria, was erst die cusanische Interpretationsstrategie
erlaubt.28
III. Die Koranrezeption
beiHeymerich
ecclesiastica
zwischen April
Heymerichschrieb seine Disputatiode potestate
1433 und Februar 1434 auf dem Basler Konzil. Er errtertdie damals
aktuelleStreitfrage,
ob dem Generalkonziloder dem Papst die oberste
Gewalt in der Kirche zusteht.Zunchst werden die Argumentefrdie
Superioritt des Generalkonzils angefhrt,anschlieend die fr die
des Papstesund in derDeterminatio
wirddie Streitfrage
schlielich
Superioritt
entschieden.29

26NvK,Cribratio
Alkorani
n. 4, 7: Egoveroingenium
utetiamex
, Prologus,
applicui,
Alkorano
verum
ostenderem
..."
evangelium
27NvK,Cribratio
Aliusprologus,
n. 11,13:Refert
illeArabsChristianus,
nobilis
Alkorani,
dequosupramemini,
monachum
de monasterio
suoeiectum
Mecham
Sergium
applicuisse
idolatras
etIudaeos
ibidem
fidem
Christianam,
ibiqueduospopulos
repperisse
praedicasseque
illamtenuit,
ut fratres
suosilliussectaeplacaret
ad gratiam,
et omnes
proutNestorius
idolatras
convertisse
ad fidem
de idolasuam,inter
erat,qui conversus
quosMahumetus
triamortuus
estChristianus
Nestorianus.
Sedtresastutissimi
IudaeiseMahumetum
coniunut ipsumaverterent,
ne perfectus
et illisuaserunt
variamala.Postvero
xerunt,
fieret,
mortem
Mahumeti
omnibus
ad suamsectam
illiIudaeiaccesserunt
revertentibus
Halifilium
cuiMahumetus
suascollectiones
etpersuaserunt
dimisit,
ei,utsicutMahumetus
Habitalip,
itaet ipsese in prophetam
et apposuerunt
et deposuerunt
de libroMahumeti,
elevaret,
quaevoluerunt."
28Zurcusanischen
s. Hagemann
1976(s.o.,Anm.19),69ff.
Koranhermeneutik,
29Hamann2003(s.o.,Anm.17),152ff.

11:33:34 AM

282

FLORIAN
HAMANN

nur eine sehrenge Fragestellung

Obwohl die Disputatio
behandelt,zhlt
sie samt den Anhngen an die 100 fol., denn Heymerichversuchtdie
auf mglichstbreitemFundamentzu untersuchen.Es
Superiorittsfrage
und Gegenstandsbereiche
ist sein erklrtesZiel, hierzualle Wissenschaften
heranzuziehen:das Trivium,das Quadrivum, die Hauptwissenschaften,
Lulls und schlielichseine eigene Universalwissenschaft.30
die arsgeneralis
Doch Heymerichgreiftnoch weiteraus und versuchtdie Superiorittsfrage
schlielichsogar auf der Grundlagedes Korans zu errtern.Der Koran
eine Stellung
Autorittaufgewertet,
wird damitzu einer ekklesiologischen
Im Einzelnen
dem Koran zubilligte.31
die keinandererAutordes Mittelalters
listetHeymerichzehn Argumentefr die Superiorittdes Konzils auf;
ein weiteresArgumentfrdie Superiorittdes Papstes findetsich unter
den proppstlichenSyllogismen.
1. Laut dem Koran sei ein Heilsgesetz umso besser,je mehr es den
Krftender Glubigen angepasstist, die jenem Gesetz unterliegen.Da
dies eher auf das Generalkonzilals auf den Papst zutreffe,
gebhreder
Pontifex.
Dies
ber
den
obersten
die
ergibtsich aus
Synode
Superioritt
wonach es die gesamteKirche,
des Generalkonzils,
dem Selbstverstndnis
Das Konzil als gesetzgebendeGewalt
alle Glubigen also, reprsentiert.
ist demnach mit den Glubigen, die seiner Gesetzgebungunterliegen,
sich von
zumindesttendenziellidentisch.Der Papst indes unterscheidet
den brigenGlubigen,die seinerRechtsprechungunterstehen.
Folglich
bei dem Generalkonzilgrerals beim Papsttum,
istdie bereinstimmung
woraus dessen Superiorittresultiert.32
30DieDisputatio
Eineerste
findet
wirdalsDPE zitiert.
depotestate
ecclesiastica
Transkription
sichauchin: Hamann2003(s.o.,Anm.17),160-2.DPE, Cod. Cus. 106,fol.158r,
artisLullii,
arcium
Z. 27-31:. . . et sicde aliispriusperdiscursum
liberalium,
septem
sacre
et utriusque
iurisnecnon
artismee,que dicitur
eternitatis,
perauctoritates
sigillum
racionum
numerus
nedum
revocentur,
comparabitur
que,si ad medium
pagineassumptis,
sedhabundanter
racionibus
generali,
preinductus
proconcilio
propapaadducipossibilium
excrescerent."
31ImUnterschied
desMittelalters
zu fastallenKoraninterpretationen
Heymerich
verfolgt
Ausderchristlichen
Grundton
Zumpolemischen
Interesse.
hierkeinapologetisches
TheMaking
andtheWest.
s. N. Daniel,Islam
mitdemIslamimMittelalter,
einandersetzung
1960.
Edinburgh
ofanImage,
32DPE, Cod. Cus. 106,fol.116r,Z. 21-8:Adidempotestarguiad hominem
ex
viribus
inquodicitur,
Alchorano
Machometi,
recipienproporcionata
quodlexsalvacionis
conciliorum
ciumestmelior
est,quodlexcanonica
quam,que nonesttalis.Sed certum
divinior
tum
lex
salubrior
ecclesie
universali
est
quia
apostolica
pape,
quam
generalium
tumquia universalior
a providencia
sancti,
utputa
spiritus
procedens
utputaimmediate
sinodaliter
etprocedens
sapientum
plurium
{que}exiudicio
papametsuossubiectos
regulans

11:33:34 AM

KORANUNDKONZILIARISMUS

283

2. Der zweiteSyllogismus
gehtauf die Aussagedes Korans zurck,wonach
das evangelische Gesetz Christi die Rechtleitung,das Licht und die
Wahrheit ist. Der Koran sttzt also das Evangelium und laut dem
und den einzelnenAposteln
Evangeliummusszwischenden versammelten
unterschieden
werden. Petrusist zwar der ersteder Apostel,doch ist er
selbstder Gemeinschaft
der Aposteluntergeordnet.
Ebenso untersteht
der
als
oberster
Richter
dem
Generalkonzil.33
Papst
3. Im drittenArgumentsttztsich Heymerichauf die mittelalterliche
berzeugung,dass der Koran eine hretischeKompilationaus dem Alten
und Neuen Testament sei. Dadurch impliziert der Koran auch die
dass die beiden Testamentezusammen heilsamerund vollAuffassung,
kommenersind als eines der beiden Testamente fr sich allein. Die
Autorittdes Generalkonzils, cnoneszu erlassen, beruht auf beiden
Testamenten.Das apostolischeGesetz des Papstesjedoch sttztsich allein
auf das Neue Testament.Heymerichreduziertdas ppstlicheGesetz auf
die Verpflichtung
zur Pastoralfrsorge,
indem er Jo 21, 17 zitiert:pasce
ovesmeas.34
4. Nach dem viertenSchluss ist dasjenige Gesetz vorzuziehen,das universalerist,indem es viele Menschen zum Heil fhrt.Dies trifft
auf das
kanonischeGesetz des Generalkonzilszu, weshalb ihm auch ein hherer
des Generalkonzils
Rang gebhrtals dem Papsttum.Aus der Universalitt
resultiert
auch seine Legitimationzur Streitvorbeuge,
Ketzerbekmpfung
und Sittenreform.
Da Friede,Glaube und Reformdie drei Aufgabendes
Basler Konzils waren, fhrtHeymerichauch sie ber den Mittelbegriff
der Universalittauf den Koran zurck.35
et siede aliis,utpredictum
est.Ergolegitima
auetoritas
concilii
congregatorum
generalis
estpociorquampotestas
sedisapostolice."
legitima
33DPE, Cod. Cus. 106,fol.116r,Z. 28-31:Adidemin eodemAlchorano
habetur,
luxet Veritas
manifesta.
Sed in illa
lesu,filiiMarie,estdireccio,
quodlex ewangelica
ecclesiastice
collecti
suntiudices
seorsum
habetur,
quodapostoli
singulorum
delinquencium,
inter
quosestPetrus
primus
papa.Ergoidem,quodprius."
34DPE,Cod.Cus.106,fol.116r,Z. 32-7:Adidemineodemhabetur,
quodlexconiunetaex legeveteri
etnova,cuiusdicitesselegemMachometi,
mediocriter
est
complexa
etsalubrior
tantum.
Sedlex,exquaformantur
conciliorum
cnones
perfeccior
quamaltera
nonesttantum
sedeciamveteris
sicutpatetdiffuse
in
testamenti,
generalium,
ewangelica,
volumine
Deere
lexautemapostolica
dumtaxat
illis
torum,
papeinnititur
leginove,utputa
verbis
Christi:
pasceovesmeasetc.Ergoetc."
35DPE,Cod.Cus.106,fol.116r,Z. 37-41:Adidemineodemhabetur,
quodilialex
estprior,
et pluresducitad salutem
que estuniversalior
quam,que nonesthuiusmodi.
Sedlexcanonica
conciliorum
esthuiusmodi,
exquoperhanceradicantur
heregeneralium
litesetreformantur
mores
intotomundo
seuuniverso
Christi
nomine
ses,sedanteceduntur
dedicato.
Ergoetc."

11:33:34 AM

284

FLORIAN
HAMANN

5. Das fnfteArgumentsttztsich auf die Aussage des Korans, wonach

Gott durch sein Wort und seinen Geist alles geschaffen
habe.36Derartige
an
finden
sich
tatschlich
Stellen
vielen
des
Korans.37
Cusanus
Wendungen
sah hierineinen Hinweis darauf,dass auch der Koran die Logostheologie
aufweist,wonach Christusdas Wort Gottes ist. Selbst nach dem Koran
wre Christus nicht nur Prophet oder Bote, sondern Sohn Gottes.38
diese Suren ekklesiologisch.Muhammad
Heymerichindes interpretiert
habe sein Gesetz aus der Vorsehungdes gttlichenWorteserhalten.Das
Verhltniszwischendem Wort Gottes und Muhammad entsprichtalso
dem zwischen Konzil und Papst. Heymerichsieht hierin seine Grundbestimmungdes Konzils als legislativeGewalt und des Papstes als exekutive Gewalt begrndet.Der Zusammenhangmit der Logostheologie
ergibtsich aus der konziliaristischen
berzeugung,wonach das Konzil
vom Heiligen Geist beseeltist.
6. Im sechstenArgumentzitiertHeymerichdie berhmteSure 4, 3 des
Korans, worin Muhammad die Polygamie erlaubt. Dies verstand die
christliche
Polemikals Aufrufzu sexuellerAusschweifung,
wie sie beispielsweiseJohannesvon Segovia den Muslimen vorwarf.39
Doch Heymerich
siehtselbstin der Sure 4, 3 einen Hinweisdes Korans auf die Superioritt
des Generalkonzils.Die Erlaubniszur Polygamiedrfenichtnur wrtlich
verstandenwerden,sondernman mssesie auch mystisch
verstehen.Nach
der chrisdichenBrautmystik
die
die
Kirche
Braut Christi.
reprsentiert
Wenn die Kirche durch den Papst reprsentiertwird, herrschteine
monogameEhe zwischenKirche und Christus;wenn allerdingsdas Konzil
die Kirche reprsentiert,
knne man von einerpolygamenEhe sprechen,
da die vielenKonzilsteilnehmer
die Braut Christiausmachen.Wenn man

36DPE, Cod.Cus.106,fol.116r,Z. 41- fol.116v,Z. 6: Adidemineodemhabetur,

quodestextraipsumad modum,
quoddeuspersuumverbum,
quo Platoponitmentem
et Perypatetici
intelligencias,
[116v]et cumeiusspiritu,
ponunt
qui se habetut anima
Platonem
velanimanobilis
secundum
fecit
universa
etper
mundi
secundum
Peripatticos,
estdatalexsalvacionis,
ex hocarguens
concors
decretum
illorum
sermodeiMachometo
de superno
concilio
Cumergose papa
illiuslegisperfeccionem,
quodprodierit
plurium.
suam
Machometus
ad providenciam
deiverbi
etsuscipit
habeatad concilium
sicut
generale
mutui
utfingit,
concilii
dictatam,
patetpropositum."
legem,
permodum
37Koran4, 171;Vgl.Koran2, 117;36,82; 6, 73.
38NvK,Cribratio
I 13,n. 60,52: Adhuc
verbodei
siccertum
estexAlkorano
Alkorani,
dei increatum
omniaessecreata.Verbum
est,quoniam
peripsumomniacreata
igitur
sunt."
39Johannes
inconcilio
auctoritate
de Segovia,
Uberdemagna
, hg.v. Rolf
generali
episcoporum
de Kegel,Freiburg/
Schweiz1995,X, 6 1, 377f.

11:33:34 AM

KORANUNDKONZILIARISMUS

285

den Wortlautdes Korans mittelsdes sensusmysticus

dann sei
interpretiert,
die Polygamietatschlichder Monogamie vorzuziehen.40
7. Laut dem siebtenArgumenthabe Muhammad den Koran von Gott
erhalten,als er durchseinenDiener, den ErzengelGabriel,in den siebten
Himmel getragenworden sei.41Hiermitgibt Heymerichdie muslimische
Bei seinerHimmelsreise
Legendevon MuhammadsHimmelsreisewieder.42
habe Muhammad den Koran ohne eigene Verdiensteals Gnadengabe
empfangen.Muhammads Funktionwar die eines Dieners und Boten
dem Verstndnis
Muhammadsim Koran entspricht.
Gottes,was tatschlich
Das VerhltnisGotteszu Muhammad gleichtdem zwischenGeneralkonzil
und Papst. Der Papst fungiert
also als Knecht und Bote des vom Heiligen
Geist inspirierten
Konzils.
8. Das achte Argument verbindet den Koran mit der christlichen
Zweischwerterlehre.
Das geistlicheund das weltlicheSchwertstehenfiir
die zwei Gewalten,das geistlichefr die Amtskircheund das weltliche
frKnige und Frsten.Im Konzil sind nun beiderleiGewaltenvertreten.
Der Papst indes fhrtnach Heymerichlediglichdas geistlicheSchwert.
Folglichist die konziliareGewalt hher anzusiedelnals die des Papstes.43
40DPE,Cod.Cus.106,fol.116v,Z. 6-14:Adidemsecundum
diffinicionem
Alchorani
lex poligamie
estpociorlegemonogamie,
concedit
nedum
propter
quodMachometus
luxurie
sed spiritualiter
et mistice
bigamiam,
concubitus,
ymmoquoscumque
loquendo,
externe
contra
hiccumeademquoddam
quisquediscipulus
sapiencie
coniugium
nupciale
secundum
illudSapiencie
7: quesivi
michi
habere
earn.Ergoconcilium
prosponsa
generale,
ubiconvenit
multitudo
continet
talemultiforme
sapiencium,
coniugium,
quodinsolopapa
estuniforme
et monogamum.
Eciamquilibet
estspiritualis
eiuspastorecclesie
sponsus
auteminconcilio
ecclesie
seupastores,
etpapaesttantum
dem,concurrunt
plures
prelati
unuseiusmodi.
Ergoidem,
prius."
41DPE, Cod. Cus. 106,quod
fol.116v,Z. 14-21:Adidemsecundum
idemAlchoranum
Machometus
Gabrielis
suscipit
legemsuama deoperministerium
ipsumsuperius
usque
ad septimum
celumportantis
ratificatam
eiusdem
Gabrielis
et Michaelis
pertestimonium
cuiuslegisprofitetur
se servum
sinemeritis.
angelorum,
Ergo,cumse papa habeatad
a spiritu
sanctoet eiustestibus
fidedignissinodaliter
collectis
sicut
legemdictatam
Machometus
ad dictacionem
suelegis,patetpropositum,
cumconstat
ex supratestesque
et servus
estsubiectus
suomissori."
dictis,
quodnuncius
42AufderBasisderSure17,1 hattesichdie
vonMuhammads
Himmelsreise
Legende
imIslamentwickelt.
Der Liber
scalae
Machometi
wurdeim 13.Jahrhundert
inslateinische
bersetzt
undwurdein einigen
Versionen
dercollectio
toletana
s. E. Werner
mitberliefert,
scaleMachometi.
Dielateinische
desKitab
al mi'radj,
Dsseldorf
1986.
(Hg.),Liber
Fassung
43DPE, Cod. Cus. 106,fol.116v,Z. 21-30:Adidemdicitur
in eodemAlchorano,
estpotissime
quodideolexMachometi
salutaris,
quia coniungit
gladium
spiritus
gladio
obedientes
variis
etlibertatibus
consolando
temporali,
blandimentis,
fabulis,
promissionibus
etdelectando,
rebelles
veropenaliter
cohercendo.
In signum
illius
tenet
nudatum
pretor
regis
inmanu.Sedinconcilio
illorum
universaliter
gladium
generali
uterque
concurrit,
gladiorum

11:33:34 AM

286

FLORIAN
HAMANN

Heymerichkann hierfrden Koran zitieren,da der Islam tatschlich

keine Unterscheidungzwischengeisdicherund weltlicherGewalt kennt.
9. Laut dem neuntenArgumentverbietetder Koran das Hren, Studium
und die Riten jedweden anderen Gesetzes.44Ebenso verhlt sich die
Gesetzgebungdes Konzils gegenberdem Papst. Das Generalkonzilkann
also dem PapsttumGesetze und Urteile untersagen.Heymerichbringt
in Verbindung,
dies ausdrcklich
mitdem Nichtigkeitsdekret
(decretam
irritam)
wurde.Im Rahmen der Kirchenreform
das 1433 auf dem Konzil diskutiert
durch die Kurie
versuchtedas Konzil die mter-und Pfrndenvergabe
zu reduzieren,was im Wahldekretgeschah.45Whrend der Vorbereitung
zum Streit,ob ihm
dieses Dekreteskam es unterden Konzilsteilnehmern
eine clausulairritons
eingefgtwerden sollte oder nicht.Demnach wren
in die Amtervergabe
alle Eingriffe
durchdas Papsttum,die dem Wahldekret
fr
vorab
zuwiderliefen,
ungltig erklrtworden, was eine harsche
Vorrechte
gewesen wre. Doch in der verabBeschneidungppstlicher
schiedeten Fassung des Wahldekretes vom 13. Juli 1433 findetsich
diese Klausel nicht, denn die gemigte Linie des Konzilsprsidenten
Mit der These, dass sich
Giuliano Cesarini hatte sich durchgesetzt.46
aus dem Koran ergebe,sprichtsich Heymerichan
das Nichtigkeitsdekret
dieser Stelle frdie radikalereFraktioninnerhalbdes Konzils aus.
10. Der zehnte Syllogismussttztsich auf die Unterscheidungvon vis
Laut dem Koran ist dasjenige Gesetz gerechter,
coactiva
und vis executiva.
Die vis coactivastelltdie
bei dem beide am ehesten bereinstimmen.47

celiet terre
virtuosam
catholicam
et potestatibus
ex quo representai
ecclesiam
regalibus
in celoet in terraetillud:ecceduogladii
secundum
illud:dataestmihiomnispotestas
illud:mitte
usumgladiispiritualis
secundum
sunthic,papa autemhabetdumtaxat
gladiumin vaginam.
Ergoillud,quodprius."
44DPE, Cod.Cus. 106,fol.116v,Z. 30-4:Adidemlexfungens
universaliter
decreto
studium
et
talisestlexMachometi
irritante
estpotissima,
auditum,
prohibens
siquidem
Sedlexcanonica
conauttributi.
alterius
ritum
seuusumcuiuslibet
legissubpenamortis
incorpore
casibus
esthuiusmodi
ciliorum
patetdeplerisque
respectu
pape,sicut
generalium
summi
contra
iuriscontentis,
quossimpliciter
prohibetur
dispensacio
pontificis."
45Conciliorum
i. Br.1962,Sessio
u. a., Freiburg
decreta
oecumenicorum
, hg.v. G. Alberigo
DieReform
derKirchenverfassung
Konzil
zuBasel
,
XII, 13.Juli1433,445-8.R. Zwlfer,
aufdem
Zumppsdichen
undAltertumskunde,
frGeschichte
28 (1929),169ff.
Zeitschrift
in:Basler
am
Provisionen
Kollatur
und
undRom.Ordentliche
s. A. Meyer,
Provisionswesen
ppstliche
Rurich
1316-1523
Frau-undGromnster
1986,25-114.
, Tbingen
46COD (s.o.,Anm.45),SessioXII, 13.Juli1433,445-8.
47DPE, Cod. Cus. 106,fol.116v,Z. 34-43:Adidemex eodemaccipitur,
quodlex,
estequioret
suinuncii
siveexecutoris,
virtuti
estproporcionata
cuiusviscoactiva
proprie
In signum
cuiusdicitMachometus,
iustior
adequari.
quam,que nonpotesthuiusmodi

11:33:34 AM

KORANUNDKONZILIARISMUS

287

Richterdar und die vis executiva

fhrtihre Urteile aus. Zur Konzilszeit
stimmenbeide berein,denn die apostolischeKirche und die katholische
Kirche machen die Gesamtkircheaus, die vom Konzil reprsentiert
wird.
Der Papst allein kann frsich nur die exekutiveGewalt beanspruchen,
die der Gewalt der Gesamtkircheuntergeordnetist. Heymerichzitiert
hierfrdie klassischechristlichePolemik,wonach der Koran nichtdurch
Wunder,sondernallein durch die Gewalt des weltlichenArmesbesttigt
worden sei.48
Im zweitenTeil der Disputatio
fhrtHeymerichdie Gegenargumentefr
die Superiorittdes Papstes an. Dabei sttzter sich weitgehendauf die
gleichen Autorittenwie in den Argumentenfr die Oberhoheit des
Konzils. Doch ist der proppstlicheAbschnittwesentlichkrzerund zhlt
lediglichein Argumentauf Grundlagedes Korans.
Laut dem Koran sei jene Rechtsprechungheilsamer,die sich den
Bedrfnissender gefallenen Natur des Menschen anpasst und ihm
angenehmesund leichtesvorschreibtals jene Rechtsprechung,die den
Menschen die volle Hrte des abstraktenGesetzes auferlegt.49
Hiermit
thematisiert
das
zwischen
Sinn
dem
und
Heymerich
Spannungsverhltnis
dem Wortlautdes Gesetzes. Durch die unerbittliche
kann
Anwendung
sich ein Gesetz in sein Gegenteilverkehren,was an dem Umstand liegt,
dass ein Gesetz notwendigerweise
abstraktist und nichtjeden Einzelfall
kann.
bercksichtigen
Heymerichsprichthier also den Grundsatz der
an
und
zitiert
die
Politik,
Epikie
einschlgigeStelle aus der aristotelischen
wonach es besser sei, dass ein Gemeinwesenvom besten Mann als vom
sedfortitudine
amoris
brachii
secularis.
Sedvis
miraculis,
quodsualexnonestconfirmata
in concilio
executiva
iurium
decretorum
viribus
suorum
generali
adequatur
apostolicis
ex quo idemsunttempore
concilii
executores
iuxtaillud:
executorum,
iudicii,
quiiudices
Sedconstat
hociudicium
iudicium
quecumque
alligaveritis.
supervenire
pape,ex quoipse
estperilludiudicabilis
secundum
illudprelibatum:
in te frater
si peccaverit
tuus,die
ecclesie."
48Vgl.Daniel1960(s.o.,Anm.31),73ff.
49DPE,Cod.Cus.106,fol.152v,Z. 19-29:Siliceatraciocinad
ad hominem
exypothesi
Alchorani
tuncliqueret
exlegesuasupeMachometi,
ipsius
perversoris
legisChristiane
riusrecollecta,
estfinaliter
omniasuaviter
et
salubrior,
quodillaiurisdiccio
que disponit
leviter
secundum
infirmitatis
nature
oblecta
carnis
mentis,
exigenciam
lapseetad fruendum
vehementer
onusdis<pro>porcionatum
et difficile
tali
inclinate,
quamilla,que imponit
dicente
domino:
enimsuaveetonuslevemeum.
Sediurisdiccio
nature,
iugum
legisanimate
bonihominis,
cuiusmodi
estpapa,qui ideodicitur
esthuiusmodi
respatersanctissimus,
pectuiurisdiccionis
legisabstracte,
quamfertconcilium
generale,
proutpatetex auctoritate
III Politice,
dicentis
Philosophi
quodmeliusestcivitatem
regivirooptimo
quam
legeoptima.
Ergoetc."

11:33:34 AM

288

HAMANN
FLORIAN

besten Gesetz regiertwerde.50Der Papst msse nun dieser beste Mann

sein, der das Gesetz im Einzelfall auer Kraft setzen knne, um die
zu wahren. Das Generalkonzilsei indes frdie abstrakten
Gerechtigkeit
die in den Konzilsdekreten
formuliert
werden.Da
Gesetze verantwortlich,
der Papst die Gesetze auer Kraftsetztenkann,um unntigeHrten zu
vermeiden,stehter auch ber dem Generalkonzil.Indem der Koran ein
leichtesGesetzist,sprichter sich also frdie Epikieaus. Interessanterweise
Polemikgegen den Koran ins Positive
wird hier abermalseine christliche
Koran
von
seinen Glubigenkeine Strengeverdenn
dass
der
gewendet,
Leben ermuntere,
zu
einem
sondern
angenehmenlasterhaften
sogar
lange,
Vorurteil.
ist ein klassischeschristliches
beider
Denkerunddas BaslerKonzil
Koranhermeneutik
IV. Die hnliche
Schon in De pacefideilsst Cusanus Auffassungen
erkennen,die mit dem
was sichvor allem an der angenommenen
BaslerKonzil zusammenhngen,
Es
wird
von einem Konzil als Versammlung
Gesprchssituationzeigt:
der Weisen gesprochen.Es hat universalenCharakter,da alle Vlkerund
aus, das zumindest
Religionenvertretensind. Den Vorsitzbt das verbum
die christlichenVertreterunschwer mit Christus identifizieren.Die
der Christhat also keinen
Teilnehmersind prinzipiellgleichberechtigt,
Redefreiheit
und im Gesprch soll
Araber.
Es
besteht
vor
dem
Vorrang
die Wahrheitzum Vorscheinkommen,woraus am Ende der einmtige
Konsens aller Teilnehmerresultiert.
wobei
hier also den Idealtypeines Generalkonzils,
Cusanus konstruiert
er wenigeran eine vom Papst dominierteSynode denktals vielmehran
die Basler Verhltnisse,denn das Basler Konzil verstandsich ebenfalls
als eine universaleVersammlungder Weisen, nmlich der Klerikeraus
Das Konzil solltedirektvon Christus
der gesamtenwestlichenChristenheit.
nicht
vom
und
werden
Papst, was freilichspirituellzu verstehen
gelenkt
besaen trotzunterschiedlicher
ist.51Die verschiedenenKonzilsteilnehmer

50Aristoteles,
6. Aufl.,
Pol.III 15,1286a9-ll.K. Mrsdorf,
, in:Staatslexikon,
Aequitas
Bd. 1 (1957),54-60.
51DieseAuffassung
daseinewichtige
Dekret
haec
sancta
zurck,
gehtaufdasKonstanzer
s. COD (s.o.,Anm.45), Concilium
Basisfrkonziliaristisches
darstellt,
Gedankengut
SessioV, 6. April1415,385: Et primodeclarat,
Constantiense,
quodipsain Spiritu
catholicam
militantem
etecclesiam
concilium
sancto
faciens,
congregata,
generale
legitime
immediate
habet..."
a Christo
potestatem
repraesentans,

11:33:34 AM

KORANUNDKONZILIARISMUS

289

und durftensich freiuern.53In

Weihegradedas gleiche Stimmrecht52
da das Konzil
solltedie Weisheithervortreten,
den Konzilsverhandlungen
als vom Heiligen Geist erleuchtetverstandenwurde. Schlielichsollten
mnden.In
die Diskussionenin den Konsens der Konzilsentscheidungen
die
sondern
der
war
dabei
nicht
Mehrheitsentscheidung,
Glaubensfragen
Totalkonsensdas Ziel, wie er in De pacefideiprsentiertwurde.54
Das Basler Konzil, wie spter auch das Konzil von Ferrara-Florenz,
sah tatschlichseine Aufgabeunteranderem darin, die Glaubenseinheit
ber die Streitpunkte
solltedisputiertund verhandelt
wiederherzustellen.
eine
bis
schlielich
werden,
einmtigeLsung gefundenwerden konnte.
im Frhjahr1433 in Basel statt.55
Dazu fanddie groeHussitendisputation
Nach den anschlieendenVerhandlungenschloss das Konzil schlielich
die PragerKompaktatenab und fhrtedie Hussitendamitin den Augen
der Konzilsvterzur katholischenKirche zurck. Ebenso strebtendie
Konzilsteilnehmer
und deVPapst eine Vereinigungmit der Ostkirchean,
wie sie nichtin Basel, sondernauf dem Konzil von Ferrara-Florenz1439
verabschiedetwurde.56
Die Vision des Himmelskonzilsvon Nikolaus von Kues hat also eine
realgeschichtliche Basis in den konziliaren Bemhungen um die
der Schau des Himmelskonzils
Glaubenseinheit.
Der literarische
Kunstgriff
erlaubte es Cusanus, die realpolitischenProbleme dieser Bestrebungen
auszublenden, um den Idealtyp eines Glaubenskonzils zur Geltung
auch mit den Muslimen anstrebte.
zu bringen,wie er es offensichdich
solches
Konzil
mit den Muslimenzumindest
wurde
eine
Mglicherweise
theoretischam Rande des Basler Konzils errtert.
Mit Sicherheitjedoch wurde in Basel auch die MglichkeiteinerposizwischenHeymerichund Cusanus diskutiert,
was
tivenKoranhermeneutik
sich an ihrer sehr hnlichen Interpretationsstrategie
nachweisen lsst.
Autorittsetzt
HeymerichsVerwendungdes Korans als ekklesiologische
dass
man
die
Wahrheit
des
Christentums
auf der Basis
nmlichvoraus,
52P. Lazarus,Das BaslerKonzil
. SeineBerufung
undLeitung,
seineGliederung
undseine
, Berlin1912,33-7.
Behrdenorganisation
53J.Helmrath,
DasBasler
1431-1449.
undProbleme
Konzil
, Kln1987,27ff.
Forschungsstand
54Vgl.W.Krmer,
Konsens
und
der
Kirche
imBasler
Konziliarismus
,
Rezeption.
Verfassungsprinzipien
Mnster
Der Begriff
1987(s.o.,Anm.53),32ff.
1980(BGPhThMA
19).Vgl.Helmrath
wurde
vonHelmrath
Totalkonsens"
geprgt.
55F. mahel,
DieHussitische
Revolution
v. ThomasKrzenk,
Bd.3,Hannover
, bers,
2002,
1560ff.
56COD (s.o.,Anm.45),Concilium
SessioVI (6.Juli1439),499-504.
Florentinm,

11:33:34 AM

290

FLORIAN
HAMANN

des Korans beweisen kann, wie es Cusanus Jahrzehntespter in seiner

unternommenhat. Der Aufbau der Kirche beruhtnach
Cribratio
Alkorani
christlicherberzeugung selbstverstndlichauf der Bibel und dem
christlichen
Glauben. Wenn nun ekklesiologische
Fragen aus dem Koran
heraus beantwortetwerden knnen, muss der Koran die christliche
- wenn auch dunkel- beinhalten.Die
Botschaft
einschlgigenArgumente
Alkorani
ecclesiastica
und die Cribratio
beruhen
aus der Disputatode potestate
also auf der gleichenberzeugung,wonach der Koran selbstvon Christen
positivgedeutetwerden kann.
nur
Der niederlndischePhilosoph erlutertseine Koranhermeneutik
es
sich
seinen
daraufverweist,
dass
bei
kurz,indemer mehrfach
Darlegungen
handle.57 Bei einer derartigen
um eine rf-Aowz^m-Argumentation
werden fremde Thesen fr den eigenen Beweis
Argumentationsweise
wenn
zweifelhaft
auch
ist, ob sie wahr sind. Heymerich
herangezogen,
auf der Grundlage des Korans diskukann somit die Superiorittsfrage
tieren,selbstwenn er den Koran frhretischhlt. Eben diese Theorie
findetsich auch bei Cusanus in einem Brief,den er am 29. Dezember
1454 an Johannes von Segovia schrieb: Die Paradiesfreuden,die der
Koran seinen Anhngernverheit,drfeman nichtwrtlichverstehen.
Paradiesdem
Schon Avicennahabe in seinerMetaphysikdas intellektuelle
also
durch
das Bild der
Muhammad
habe
der Sinnenfreuden
vorgezogen.
sinnlichenFreuden die intellektuelleGlckseligkeitbeschrieben.Wenn
man von der wrtlichenBedeutungdes Korans absehe, knne man ihn
verwenden.58
Cusanus
frseine eigenenchristlichen
Argumentationszwecke
um seine
verweist also ebenfalls auf eine arf-Aomm^m-Argumentation,
zu skizzieren.Demnach verfolgenbeide Denker eine
Koranhermeneutik
die derartungewhnlichist, dass ein
sehr hnliche Koranhermeneutik,
57Die konziliaristischen
werden
wiefolgt
DPE, Cod.Cus. 106,
eingeleitet,
Argumente
. . .",ebenso
exAlchorano
Machometi
fol.116,Z. 2If:Adidempotest
arguiad hominem
dasproppsdiche
DPE, Cod.Cus. 106,fol.152v,Z. 19-21:Si liceatraciociArgument,
Machometi
..."
Alchorani
ex ypothesi
nanad hominem
perversoris
legisChristiane
ipsius
58NvK,Epistula
u. Hildebrand
ad.Ioannem
deSegobia,
Bascour,
Klibansky
hg.v. Raymond
maxime
de faciliconclusio
h VII, 99: De paradiso
suorum,
capi,etiamex dictis
potest
deliciarum
intellectualium
suapraefert
Avicennae,
paradiso
paradisum
quiinMethaphisica
Alchorani
locutum
Etiam
videtur
inAlchorano
sensibilium
persimiliscriptorem
descriptum.
metse
Nampostmultas
recitationes
deliciis.
de futuris
deliciarum
tudinem
corporalium
Unde
desiderabitis.'
etquidquid
hocestomnebonum
dicens:
'Istaetistahabebitis,
glost
sitquodliberiste,qui apudeos estin auctoriad hocconandum
videtur
quodsemper
ineo taliaquaeserviunt
Namreperimus
nobis;etaliaquaecontate,pronobisallegetur.
trariantur,
perilla."
glosabimus

11:33:34 AM

KORANUNDKONZILIARISMUS

291

zwischenihnenals erwiesengeltenkann.Auch
Diskussionszusammenhang
die historischenUmstnde besttigendiese These: Beide pflegteneinen
de potestate
ecclesiastica
ist
jahrelangenKontakt und HeymerichsDisputatio
in Bernkastelnach heutigemKenntnisstand
alleinin der Cusanus-Bibliothek
Kues berliefert.
ber 20 Jahre lterist als der Briefdes
Obgleich HeymerichsDisputatio
Cusanus an Johannes von Segovia, lsst sich hieraus nicht schlieen,
Cusanus habe seine Koranhermeneutikvon Heymerich bernommen.
Anders als Lull und Meister Eckhartkannte Cusanus Heymerichnicht
vornehmlichaus seinen Bchern,sondernstand mit ihm in engem persnlichenAustausch.Die Diskussionen,die beide am Rande des Basler
Konzils fhrten,
fandenalso auch Eingangin HeymerichsBasler Schriften.
Falls seineIslamkenntnisse
hauptschlichaus solchenGesprchenstammen
wrde
dies
sollten,
erklren,wieso seine Koranzitatederartungenau sind.
Heymerichwar demnachwenigerder innovationsloseLehrer des jungen
Cusanus, wie Colomer meinte,59als vielmehreiner seiner wichtigsten
intellektuellen
Freunde und ein originellerGesprchspartner.
3
Schne
Aussicht
D-30989 Gehrden

59Vgl.Colomer
1964(s.o.,Anm.2),213.

11:33:34 AM

"Secundum
et mentem
Versons
processum
and His Relationto theSchoolsof Thought
Reconsidered*
John Versor
PEPIJNRUTTEN

Abstract
JohannesVersor (f after1482) was a prominentphilosopherin the late
fifteenth
In recentscholarship,
century,whose workswere widelydiffused.
Versor has been associated with two schools of thought:Thomism and
Albertism.
wererivals
These,however,
especiallyin Cologne,whereVersor's
workswere printedrepeatedly.Given this historicalcontext,how should
Versor'spositionamidstthe quarrelsof the schoolsbe interpreted?
Although
he evidentlyused the worksof both Albertand Thomas, thereis no evidence thatVersorever committed
himselfto eitherAlbertism
or Thomism.
In addition,the Cologne printings
of his workssuggestthatVersor'sconconsideredhiman independent
VersorcanTherefore,
temporaries
authority.
not be ratedamongthe membersof eitherschool.
1. JohnVersor
and theSchoolsof Thought
in theFifteenth
Century
When the fifteenth-century
philosopherJohannesVersor (f after 1482),
in his commentary(Quaestiones
) on Aquinas' De enteet essentiadiscusses
* Research
forthisarticle
wasfunded
forScientific
bytheNetherlands
Organisation
Research
as partoftheprogram
The
Nominalism.
Thomism,
Albertism,
(NWO)andconducted
intheLateMiddle
Traditions
Someofthetopicsdiscussed
here
ofIntellectual
Ages.
Dynamics
werepresented
in first
draft
theworkshop
Transition.
Intellectual
and
Tradition,
Truth,
during
Culture
at RadboudUniversity
4-5March2004.I
Spiritual
oftheFifteenth
Century
Nijmegen,
thank
Maarten
AndreaRobiglio
and SigridMllerfortheir
Hoenen,GallanLedsham,
comments
andsuggestions.
manyhelpful
1 I quotefromthefollowing
edition:
omnes
libros
novae
Versor,
Johannes
Super
logicae,
Nachdruck
Frankfurt/
Main1967.Thisvolume
alsoincludes
Kln 1494,Unvernderter
on De ente
etessentia
hereQuestiones
Versoris
Versor's
, entitled
magisti
Johannis
commentary
etessentia
sancti
Thome
deAquino
ordinis
De ente
fratrum
super
predicatorum
(below:
Johannes
De ente
etessentia),
on ff.s4ra-u2rb.
The quotation
is fromq. 2,
Versor,
Questiones
super
f.s5ra-b.
Cf.L. Hain,Repertorium
Parisiorum
, vol.II-2,Stuttgartiae-Lutetiae
bibliographicum
DerBuchdruck
Klns
biszumEndedesfunj.
zehn1838,487a(*16029,
*16030);E. Voullime,
ten
Bonn1903,520 (no. 1215).As forthenameofJohnVersor:
Scholars
Jahrhunderts,
there
is someevidence
thatthis
thesurname
seemtoprefer
"Versor",
generally
although
cf.L. Mahieu,
deFlandre
shouldrather
be called"Versoris";
(XVe
Dominique
philosopher
Sa mtaphysique
, Paris1942,22-5.
sicle).
BrillNV,Leiden,
Koninklijke
2005
- www.brill.nl
Alsoavailable
online

Vivarium
43,2

11:33:44 AM

TO THE SCHOOLSOF THOUGHT

VERSORANDHIS RELATION

293

the questionwhetherthe essenceof a compositesubstancecomprisesboth

matterand form,he firstfollowsThomas' answer,but then adds a short
note on how to respondaccordingto Albertthe Great: "Dubitaturprimo
qualiterest respondendumad quesitumsecundumAlbertm."Versorexplainsthataccordingto Thomas the definition
comprisesboth matterand
whereas
Albert
believes
that
it
form,
comprisesform,and that matteris
onlyincludedas the end termof thefluxusof a form.2At firstsightVersor
seemsto takeoverThomas' view,but he does so withoutrejectingAlbert's
opinion.The doubt ("Dubitatur. . .") obviouslydoes not concernthe truth
of Albert'sanswer to the question,because the passage merelytells us
what that answer is.3 This awkwardpassage is difficult
to interpretfor
two reasons:First,Versoris generallyregardedas an importantThomist.4
2Johannes
De ente
etessentia
"Conclusio
Versor,
Questiones
, if.s4vb-s5ra:
super
prima:
Essentia
substante
nonestmateria
necforma
necrelatio
tantum,
tantum,
composite
que
estinter
materiam
etformam,
necaliquid
istis
. . . Conclusio
secunda:
Essentia
superadditum
in substantiis
materiam
et formam
. . . Dubitatur
compositis
perse comprehendit
primo
estrespondendum
ad quesitum
secundum
Albertm.
qualiter
Respondetur
quodcontrariumsententie
iamhabite
estde opinione
Alberti
... Etdicitulterius
Albertus
quodmateindiffinitione
rianonponitur
substantie
materialis
forme
sed
totius,
tanquam
parsessentie
Fluxus
is a central
in Albert's
terminus
fluxus
forme
naturalis."
notion
tanquam
thought,
which
cannot
be discussed
ushereis merely
thewayinwhich
Versor
here;whatconcerns
treats
ofthenature
offlowing
in hiscomAlbert's
Albert
position.
givesa longaccount
on theBookofCauses
De causis
etprocessu
universitatis
a prima
; cf.Albertus
mentary
Magnus,
causa
vol.XVII-2),Monasterii
Westfalorum
, lib.1,tr.4, ed. W. Fauser(ed.Coloniensis,
thispassageis discussed
as Emanation.
The
1993,42.35-58.30;
by T. Bonin,Creation
inAlbert
theGreat's
On theCausesandtheProcession
oftheUniverse,
ofDiversity
Origin
Albert
leGrand
etlaphilosophie
NotreDame2001, 15-21. Cf.alsoA. de Libera,
, Paris1990,
117-77.
On thenotion
offorma
totius
, seebelow, 4.2.
3 K. Feckes,
seesan indubitable
ofAlbert's
viewsin Versor's
comhowever,
rejection
Das opuscuforthedistinction
between
andessence);
cf.K. Feckes,
mentary
(except
being
9 imLichte
lumdeshl. Thomas
vonAquin'De ente
etessentia
seiner
Kommentare
, in: A. Lang,
M.
Schmaus
Aus
der
Geisteswelt
desMittelalters.
Studien
undTexte
Martin
J. Lechner,
(eds),
vonFreunden
undSchlern
Grabmann
des60.Lebensjahres
zurVollendung
, Mnster
1935,
gewidmet
1. Halbband,
at 672.
667-81,
4 C. Prantl,
derLogik
imAbendlande
Geschichte
Berlin1955,IV, 200 (note126),
, Reprint
Mittelalterliches
Geistesleben.
derScholastik
und
zurGeschichte
220-1;M. Grabmann,
Abhandlungen
n. 3),671-672;
A. Birkenmajer,
, BandIII, Mnchen
1956,230;Feckes1935(above,
Mystik
DieWiegendrucke
der
Werke
Ver
in:Bok-ochbibliotekshistoriska
studier
sors,
physischen
Johannes
tillgnadeIsakCollijn,
Etudes
desscid'histoire
Uppsala1925,121-35[Repr.in:A. Birkenmajer,
ences
etdela philosophie
duMoyen
Warszawa-Krakw
Age(StudiaCopernicana,
I), WroclawLatinAristotle
Commentaries.
Authors:
de
1970,551-65],at 121;C. Lohr,Medieval
Johannes
in: Traditio:
in Ancient
Studies
and Medieval
and
Kanthir-Myngodus,
History,
Thought,
TheEclipse
27 (1971),251-351,at 290; E.J.Ashworth,
, in:
Religion,
ofMedieval
Logic
N. Kretzmann,
A. Kenny,
Medieval
,
J Pinborg
(eds),TheCambridge
Histoiy
ofLater
Philosophy
etc.1982,787-96,at 788.Forfurther
see O. Weijers,
Le travail
references,
Cambridge
intellectuel
la Facult
desartsdeParis:textes
etmatres
desnoms
), V.Rpertoire
(ca.1200-1500
partir
D.), Turnhout
deJohannes
2003,170-6.
commenant
parJ (suite:

11:33:44 AM

294

ROTTEN
PEPIJN

Second, his commentaryon De enteet essentia

(as so many of his other
- home of the fiercedoctrinal
in
was
quarrels
works)
printed Cologne
betweenAlbertistsand Thomists.5Why does Versor refrainfromtaking
betweenAlbertand Thomas?
a standon a matterof obviousdisagreement
of
Scholasticthoughtin the fifteenth
century, which Versor would seem
a typicalexponent,has one ubiquitous characteristic:the formationof
conschoolsof thought.Philosophersand theologiansat manyuniversities
sideredthemselvesas belongingto a particularintellectualtraditionthat
was in one way or anotherdistinctfromotherintellectualtraditions.To
thesetraditions,
, scotheyused such denominationsas thomistae
distinguish
The
and of course antiquiand modernit University
albertistae
nominales,
tistae,
of Paris, where Versor studied and taught,was no exceptionto this.7
What, then,is Versor'srole in thissetting?Does he belong to one of the
schools of thoughtor not? This question is relevantfor three reasons:
First,Versor'sworkswere so widespreadthathe became one of the most
influentialauthorsof his time. His commentarieson Aristotleand Peter
of Spain all appeared in printbefore 1500 and were reprintedseveral
times.8Second, in the recent literaturethere is a tendencyto regard
5 Cf.Voullime
1903(above,n. 1),58-60(nos.144,145,147,148)and518-33(nos.
and
Lohr1971(above,n. 4),290-9.See alsobelow,
2 and6. ForAlbertism
1211-43);
1935.
in thenextnote,esp.Meersseman
listed
in Cologne,
seetheliterature
Thomism
6 Fundamental
undviamodStudien
2: Viaantiqua
are:G. Ritter,
studies
zurSptscholastik,
desXV.Jahrhunderts
Universitten
ernaaufdendeutschen
1922;F. Ehrle,Der
, Heidelberg
Alexanders
V EinBeitrag
vonCandia,
desPisaner
Peters
zurScheidung
Sentenzenkommentar
Papstes
undzurGeschichte
desWegestreites
desvierzehnten
inderScholastik
derSchulen
, Mnster
Jahrhunderts
desKlner
HeftI: DiePariser
Geschichte
desAlbertismus,
Albertismus,
1925;G. Meersseman,
Anfnge
Kontroversen
Klner
desAlbertismus
Parisiorum
Lutetiae
,
, HeftII: Dieersten
1933;id.,Geschichte
undModerni.
Romae1935.Morerecenttitlesinclude:A. Zimmermann
(ed.),Antiqui
imspten
Mittelalter
undFortschrittsbewutsein
Mediaevalia,
9),
(Miscellanea
Traditionsbewutsein
aux
etrealistes
doctrinales
Paris.
Nominalistes
York1974;Z. Kaluza,Lesquerelles
Berlin-New
and
duXIVeetduXVesicles
Hoenen,
1988;M.J.F.M.
, Bergamo
J.H.J.Schneider
confins
YorkLeiden-New
intheMiddle
Universities
andLearning.
G. Wieland
Ages,
(eds),Philosophy
undderAlbertismus.
HoenenandA. de Libera(eds),Albertus
Kln1995;M.J.F.M.
Magnus
1995.
York-Kln
desMittelalters
Kultur
Deutsche
, Leiden-New
philosophische
7 Forthedoctrinal
and297-326;
n. 6), 114-40
inParis,cf.Ehrle1925(above,
quarrels
DieMatrikel
derUniversitt
in Paris,cf.H. Keussen,
Kaluza1988(above,n. 6). ForVersor
2003(above,
Kln,
III, Bonn1931,54 (n. 897);Lohr1971(above,n. 4), 290;Weijers
The mainsourceforthe(nowno longer
further
n. 4), 170-1(with
accepted)
references).
Coloniae
Bibliotheca
tobeJ.Hartzheim,
seems
atCologne
viewthatVersor
Coloniensis,
taught
first
wasa member
(thatVersor
1747,206.Hartzheim
mayhavecometo hisconclusion
on thebasisof someof the
of theCorneliana)
and subsequendy
of theBursaMontana
cf.below, 2 and6.
ofVersor's
ofCologneeditions
works;
colophons
8 Prand1955(above,n. 4), 220-1;Birkenmajer
1925(above,n. 4), 121.On Versor's
des
biszurMitte
Artisten-Fakultt
senderKlner
in Cologne
cf.G.-R.Tewes,DieBur
influence

11:33:44 AM

TO THE SCHOOLSOF THOUGHT

VERSORANDHIS RELATION

295

Versornot as a Thomist,but (at leastin some of his works)as an Albertist,

whichreinforces
the impressionthatVersoris a problematiccase.9Third,
the "Versor case" urgesus to reflecton the verynotionof philosophical
schools.The real problemmay not be Versor's position,but ratherthat
we need to fine-tuneour conceptsin orderto be able to understandthat
position.
There has been some discussionin the literatureabout what a school
of thoughtreallyis. Hans GerhardSenger raised the issue when he questionedtheexistenceof an Albertist
schoolin thefifteenth
century.
Discussing
the influenceof Albert the Great on thinkerssuch as Heymericusde
thewritings
of Heymericus
Campo (1395-1460),Sengersharplydistinguished
in Cologne. He confromthose of his successorsat the BursaLaurentiana
sideredHeymericus(whowas certainly
inspiredby Albert)closerto Cusanus
and to humanism,than to those later heads of the Laurentiana
, whom he
In
this
as
of
difference
regarded mere epigones Albert.
Senger's view,
meant thatthe BursaLaurentiana
may have been the home of an Albertist
school duringthe late fifteenth
century,but thatits instigatorHeymericus
was not properlyspeakingan Albertist.10
This conclusionfollowedfrom
in Cracow,cf.
16. Jahrhunderts
, Kln-Weimar-Wien
1993,389-90;on his influence
S. Swiezawski,
La philosophie
l'universit
deCracovie
dsorigines
au XVIesicle
, in:Archives
d'Histoire
Doctrinale
etLittraire
duMoyen
at89;M. Markowski,
Age,30 (1963),71-109,
Diewissenschaftlichen
derKlner
undderKrakauer
Universitt
imMittelalter
zwischen
,
Verbindungen
in: A. Zimmermann
Universitt
imMittelalter.
undsoziale
Wurzeln
(ed.),Die Klner
Geistige
Wirklichkeit
York1989,274-86,at 285;
Mediaevalia,
(Miscellanea
20), Berlin-New
Z. Kukse
derKlner
im15.Jahrhundert
Universitt
wicz,DieEinflsse
,
Philosophie
aufdieKrakauer
in:Zimmermann
at 289-292.
See alsobelow( 2).
1989,287-298,
9 Forinstance
2003(above,n. 4), 170;hersourceis E.P. Bos,JohnVersos
Weijers
Albertism
inhisCommentaries
onPorphyry
andtheCategories,
in:P.J.J.M.
Bakker
(ed.),Chemins
delapense
mdivale.
Etudes
Jfenon
Turnhout
Kaluza,
2002,47-78.Cf.alsoLohr1971
offertes
n.4),290,whonotes,
reference
without
toa source,
thatVersor
isa "Thomist,
'sed
(above,
cf.alsoBos2002,49,andC.H. Kneepkens,
Namdefecatum
vasquandoque
Albertizaba";
servat
amatum.
AnUnconventional
Access
toLate-Medieval
PhiloElementary
Aids-to-study:
University
de philosophie
45 (2003),105-29,
at 116(note29).I amin, in:Bulletin
mdivale,
sophy
debted
to Henrik
Welsforpointing
outto methesourceofthequotation
givenbyLohr
ItwasVersor's
ofFlanders
whoqualified
theopinion
of
('sedAlbertizaba):
pupilDominic
histeacher
onthesubject
oflogicas being
influenced
theGreat.
Cf.Dominicus
de
byAlbert
XIIlibros
1499(NachFlandria,
Quaesones
, lib.4,q. 5,a. 2,ad 5,ed.Venice
super
Metaphysicorum
druck
Frankfurt
f.15ra.Thepassage
wasalready
n.1),
1967),
quoted
byMahieu1942(above,
EenVlaamsch
Dominicus
vanVlaanderen
22,and(though
,
incorrectly)
byG. Meersseman,
Wijsgeer:
in:Thomistisch
voorkatholiek
at 395.
1-2(1930),385-400,
kultuurleven,
tijdschrift
3
10H.G.Senger,
Albertismus?
im15.Jahrhundert
zur'viaAlberti
, in:A. Zimmermann
berlegungen
derGrosse:
seine
seinWerk,
seine
Mediaevalia,
(ed.),Albert
eit,
(Miscellanea
Wirkung
14),BerlinNewYork1981,217-36,
in Cologne,
seeTewes1993(above,
esp.229-36.On thebursae
n. 8),esp.279-394.

11:33:44 AM

296

RUTTEN
PEPIJN

the criteriaSenger formulated:In order to speak meaningfullyof an

Albertistschool, he argued, there must be a distinguishable,
consistent
and coherentphilosophicalsystemwhichis based upon Albert'sprincipal
philosophicaltenetsand which can be reconstructed
historiographically.11
that
such
criteria
Senger convincinglyargued
by
Heymericuswas not
an
for
one
he
was
Albertist;
simply
thing,
heavilyinfluencedby other
traditionsand thinkers,such as Raymond Lull.
about the differences
Still,Heymericuswrotethe Tractatus
problematicus
betweenAlbertismand Thomism,whichpaved the way forthe doctrinal
quarrels that were to pervade intellectuallife at Cologne for the next
hundredyears.MaartenJ.F.M. Hoenen therefore
righdycriticizedSenger's
criteriaand showed that it is possible to identifya school of thoughtby
its own (limited)set of characteristic
theses.12This is obvious,e.g., from
in
his
method
Albertist
the so-calledTractatus
manifesto,
Heymericus'
problematicus
: He does not presenta syntheticphilosophicalprogramme,but
a list of eighteenproblems(problemata
) divided over all branchesof philin
Whether
or
the
case
of Albertism,the characteristic
not,
osophy.13
theses all derive fromAlbertis of secondaryimportance.The interests
of fifteenth-century
fromAlbert's
philosophersmay have been different
interests.
To a certaindegreethe appeal to Albert'sauthority
is a different
of Albert'sthought.Furthermore,
issuefromthe actual inheritance
Hoenen
of
a
the
notion
school
from
the
more
distinguished
philosophical
general
notion of an intellectualtradition.He defineda philosophicalschool as
a traditionof thoughtwhich (1) expresslyclaims to followthe doctrine
of a school leader, (2) is connectedmainlyto a teachingprogramor to
a particularscientificeducation (in which philosophyhas a preparatory
or instrumental
function),(3) defendsa particularset of axiomatictheses,
and (4) is also characterizedby externalfactors,such as the writingson
which its doctrineis based.14The schools of thoughtare not restricted
to universityeducation. As C.H. Kneepkens has recentlyshown, the
11Senger1981(above,n. 10),218-9.
12MJ.F.M.Hoenen,
vande Velde
desAlbertismus:
(f 1460)unddieGeschichte
Auf
Heymeric
in:Hoenen
Intellektlehre
desTractatus
derSuche
nach
denQuellen
deralbertistischen
problematicus,
andde Libera1995(above,n. 6), 303-31,
esp.305-6.
13Heymericus
Thomam
adutriusque
inter
Albertm
etSanctum
de Campo,Problemata
Magnum
multum
1935(above,n. 6),
, Cologne1496;cf.Meersseman
conferentia
opinionis
intelligentiam
Voullime
1903(above,n. 1),246(no.546).
14M.J.F.M.
Das entstehen
unddieBedeutung
Skotismus
undAlbertismus.
Hoenen,Thomismus,
fr
Mittelalter
Schulen
imspten
vonphilosophischen
, in: Bochumer
Jahrbuch
Philosophisches
at 81-5).
undMittelalter,
Antike
2 (1997),81-103,
esp.81-94(definition

11:33:44 AM

TO THE SCHOOLSOF THOUGHT

VERSORANDHIS RELATION

297

different
viaemanifestthemselveseven on the very elementarylevels of
linguisticsthat were taughtin grammarschool.15
A confessionof discipleship(the firstcharacteristic
mentioned)should
not be regarded as an external characteristicor a purely strategical
manoeuvre,even if it does have rhetoricalqualities.There are numerous
examples of authorswho explicitlyclaim to follow a leader. Consider
who pledge theirloyaltyto Albert:iuxtaviam
theseexamplesof Albertists
doctoris
venerabili
s domini
Alberti
etexpositionem
(Arnold
magniacerrimique
philosophi
tribuit
eis
vener
abilis
sententiam
of Tongeren),secundum
peripatheticorum,
quam
.
subtilitatis
de
Nova
Albertus
dominus
Domo), ego(. .)
magni
Magnus(Johannes
de Campo).16
's incultus
Alberti
(. . .) interpreti
discipulus
(Heymericus
peripateticorum
A school is named afterthe philosopherwho is regardedas its leader;
this school name is used by the authorsthemselves:Albertiste
, de quorum
Statementssuch as these may seem
numero
me essefateor(Heymericus).17
obligatory,but they are historicaldata that must be accounted for. In
fact,they are (or should be) the reason why we investigateschools of
of late medievalthought
thoughtin the firstplace. In the historiography
in
we
use
whatever
labels we consider
may
(and of philosophy general)
convenientto categorizeindividualphilosophersand philosophicalmovements.For instance,we may say thatAlbertismis a formof neo-platonism.
This may not be uninformative
or inaccurate,but we should carefully
distinguishsuch categoriesfrom those that are presentin the sources
centhemselves.Understandingthe philosophicalschools of the fifteenth
in
of
school
the
it
means
the
use
sources;
designations
interpreting
tury
whateveralternativedesignationswe may prefer.
does not meanjustifying
When we investigatethe worksofJohn Versor anew, theseworksmay
be used as a testcase forthe notionof philosophicalschoolsas described
above. If the characteristics
mentionedare universallyapplicable, they
15Kneepkens
of
n. 9), 125-7(with
further
Cf.alsotheanswer
2003(above,
references).
theUniversity
ofCologne
ofthePrince
edited
Electors,
(24December
1425)totheletter
in Ehrle1925(above,n. 6), 281-5,at 283.The professors
claimthatall students
have
beenintroduced
tooneoftheviaebefore
theycometo theuniversity,
namely
by
already
in grammar
their
teachers
school.
16Arnoldus
sivereparationes
veteris
etnove
de Tungeris,
Arestotelis,
Epitomata
logice
Cologne
1903(above,
n. 1),69 (no.164).Johannes
de NovaDomo,
1496,title
page;cf.Voullime
Tractatus
deesseetessentia
ed. G. Meersseman,
in: Meersseman
1933(above,
, praefatio,
n. 6), 91-191,at 91; Heymericus
de Campo,Probiemata
inter
Albertm
etSanctum
Magnum
Thomam
Thomistic
seenote111below.
(above,n. 13),f.a2r.Forsimilar,
examples,
17Heymericus
de Campo,Probiemata
inter
Albertm
etSanctum
Thomam
Magnum
(above,
n. 13),f.h6v.

11:33:44 AM

298

ROTTEN
PEPIJN

should enable us to defineVersor's positionwith respectto the philosophical debates of the schools (whetherhe will eventuallybe regarded
as belongingto one of the schools or not); and that is the aim of this
paper. Of course, it is not necessarythat Versor was eithera Thomist
or an Albertist.He may have been neitheror he may have been both,
at different
momentsin time or in different
works.In the following,I
will firstdiscussthe reasonsput forwardin the literatureforconsidering
Versor a Thomist or an Albertist( 2), then Versor's alleged confession
of Albertism( 3), next Versor's position on some of the fundamental
doctrinaldifferences
between Albertistsand Thomists( 4) and his use
of Albert'sand Thomas' Aristodecommentaries( 5), and finallysome
aspects of the Cologne editionsof Versor'sworksthat urge us to reconsider his "Thomism" ( 6).
a Thomist?
2. Was Versor
The Parisian Master of ArtsJohannesVersor is generally(at least since
Prantl's Geschichte
derLogikim Abendlande)
considered one of the most
influential
Thomistsof his time.18In the last two decades of the fifteenth
were printedmany
century,his commentarieson the corpusaristotelicum
times:all of themin Cologne, some of themalso in Lyon, one in Leipzig
and one in Metz.19Later, his workswere printedforinstanceat Cracow
, 1514) and in Venice (Commentarieson Peter of
(Questionson De anima,
Spain, 1572).20E.J. Ashworthnotes that "the ThomistJohn Versor" was
commentator"
on thelogicalworksofAristode
perhaps"themostsuccessful
and Peterof Spain.21Prantl,Grabmannand Swiezawskiall qualifyVersor
as a Thomist,althoughttheyappreciatehis worksin different
ways.Where
Grabmannfinds"richcontentsand clarity",
Prandsees "dryand dull"explanationsand Swiezawskia "banal and popular formof Thomism".22The
18Forreferences,
seeabove,notes4 and8.
19Lohr1971(above,n. 4), 292-9.
20Lohr1971(above,
n. 4),296;Petrus
Summulae
cumVersorii
Parisiensis
Hispanus,
Logicales
Clarssima
Hildesheim-New
York1981).Versor's
com1572(reprint
, Venetiis
Expositione
on PeterofSpainwasprinted
as earlyas 1473and 1477(inItaly)andas late
mentary
as 1622(inCologne);
cf.Ashworth
n. 4), 788,andHain1838(above,
n. 1),
1982(above,
487 (nos.16031and 16032).
21Ashworth
1982(above,n. 4), 788.
22Prantl
1955(above,n. 4), 200(n. 126:"derentschiedene
Thomist
200-21
Versor"),
undlangweiligen
Grabmann
1956(above,
("zeigter sichals einentrocknen
Erklrer");
n. 4),230("Inhaltsflle
undKlarheit");
Swiezawski
n. 8),89 ("thomisme
1963(above,
...

11:33:44 AM

VERSORANDHIS RELATION
TO THE SCHOOLSOF THOUGHT

299

reason why these scholarsput the label "Thomism" on Versor seems to

be a general impressiongiven by his writings.In Prantl's perception,
Versor basicallyexplains the works of Aristotleaccordingto Thomistic
principles:He does not quote many authorities,but generallyfollows
Thomas.23Moreover,he wrotea commentaryon Thomas' De enteetessentia. In this work he may not always dismissAlbert'sopinion decidedly,
but on thewholehe certainly
seemsto takeoverThomas' line of thought.24
Versor mightalso be considereda Thomist for other reasons. The
Thomistsat Cologne repeatedlycommissionedCologne printersto print
on Aristotle's
his works.The BursaMontanahad some of his Quaestiones
, De celo,Meteoraand Parva
physicalworks(namelythose on De generatione
in
Molner
Theodoricus
1485/6,
naturatici)
again by Conradus
printedby
Welkerin 1488, and again by HenricusQuentellin 1493.25Between 1489
and 1497, Quentell also printedVersor's commentarieson the Physics
and theNovalogica
, theArsvetus
, all of themcommissioned
(twice),De anima
Thomistic
Bursa
Corneliana.
Tewes
the
arguesthatthereprobablywere
by
this
contacts
between
members
of
college and Versor himself.26
personal
The colophons of these Cologne printingssuggestthat Versor was a
versoris
Thomist of the Cologne type: Et sic estfinisquestionum
superduos
degeneratione
scilicet
etcorruptione
secundum
burse
librosarestotelis
;
processum montis
in
bursa
Cornelii
in
versoris
iuxta
textum
de
anima
conecte
Questiones
diligentissime
Colonia]etc.27It seemsreasonableto presumethattheseworkswere meant
to be used in the educationalprogramsof the colleges mentioned.This
presumptionis corroboratedby the fact that Thomists of the Montana
referto Versorin theirown writings(in spiteof the factthatit was rather
unusual to mentioncontemporaryauthors by name).28Thus, it would
seem that Versor can indeed be regardedas a Thomisticauthor.
sousforme
banalise
comme
danslescrits
deJeanVersorius").
Markowski
etpopulaire,
alsoqualifies
Versor's
as a banalform
ofThomism;
cf.M. Markowski,
Albert
und
thought
derAlbertismus
inKrakau
1981(above,n. 10),177-92,
, in:Zimmermann
esp.187.Cf.also
Ritter
n. 6), 73,note3: "tatschlich
Versors
Lehrbcher
sie
1922(above,
(soweit
gehren
mirbekannt
undFarblosesten,
das es damalsgab.Eben
sind)zu demVerwaschensten
darauf
beruhte
wohlihregroe
undihreVerwendbarkeit
alsMaterialsammlung."
Verbreitung
23Prantl1955(above,n. 4), 200-21.
24Feckes1935(above,n. 3),672;cf.above, 1.
25Tewes1993(above,n. 8), 389;Birkenmajer
1925(above,n. 4), esp.134.
26Tewes1993(above,n. 8), 389-90.
27Cf.Voullime
1903(above,n. 1),520-9(nos.1214,1216,1220,1224,1225,1230,
1234).
28Copulata
diversis
exautoribus
inunum
inveterem
artem
Arestotelis
cum
pulcherrima
logice
corrogata

11:33:44 AM

300

RUTTEN
PEPIJN

some of Versor'slogHowever,EgbertP. Bos has recentlyinvestigated

ical writings
his
commentaries
on
and Aristotle's
(namely,
Isagoge
Porphyry's
and
has
come
to
an
different
conclusion.
Categories)
entirely
Accordingto
Bos "Versor unquestionablywas a prominentAlbertistin Paris between
1407 and 1437".29Justas Prantl'sconclusion(based on the same works!)
that Versor was a Thomist, Bos' contraryconclusion that he was an
Albertistalso reflectsa generalimpressionof the contentsof theselogical
works.Bos notesthaton severalissues(suchas thenumberof thecategories,
the analogyof the notionof being,the natureof substanceand the theory
of universais)Versor agrees with Albert.30In addition,Versor refersto
he rateshimself
Albertmore oftenthan to Aquinas.31More importantly,
,
among the Albertists.In a passage in his commentaryon the Categories
where he explicitlyclaims to followAlbert,Versor repeatedlyspeaks of
"our way of understanding".Bos explainsthisphrase as a confessionof
loyaltyto the Albertistschool: When Versor writes"our way" he refers
to the Albertistway.32On the basis of these facts,the long-standing
conclusionthat Versor was a Thomist suddenlyseems to have become
untenable.
sofs AllegedConfession
3. Ver
ofAlbertism
In view of the importanceattachedto what I have labeled "confessions
of discipleship"(cf. 1), the firstpointto consideris Versor'sallegedconAs said above, in his commentaryon the Categories
fessionof Albertism.33
Colonie
in
textu
eiusdem
secundum
viam
dividoctoris
Thome
deAquino
etiuxta
magistrorum
processum
bursa
Montis
(scilicet
regentium,
Cologne1494,f.22vb:"ethancopinionem
Egidiide Roma
Versor
sancti
Thomeet
de principio
individuations,
PR) tangit
superDe enteetessentia
Cf.Voullime
1903(above,n. 1),51 (no.134).
earnibidem
improbat."
29Bos2002(above,n. 9), 78.
30Bos2002(above,n. 9), 65-75.
31Bos2002(above,n. 9),53.
32Bos2002(above,n. 9), 53 and78. ForVersor's
1 below.
seeAppendix
text,
33Thisstudy
in printat the
ofVersor's
works
as theyappeared
is basedon several
In general,
I willhaveto assume
thatthesearereliable
ediendofthefifteenth
century.
hasnotyet
It should
however
be notedthattheir
tionsofauthentic
authenticity
writings.
of"Versor's"
inmanuscripts
ofsomeattributions
beenproven;
indeed,
(ofseveral
byreason
intheincunable
editions
their
attribution
toVersor
works
toother
maybedoubted:
authors)
Dieverschiedenen
literarischen
derAristoteleskommentare:
Cf.C. Fleler,
Gattungen
ZurTerminologie
ettechniques
decours
undKolophone
derberschriften
, in:J. Hamesse(ed.),Manuels,
programmes
international
deLouvain-la-Neuve
danslesuniversits
mdivales.
Actes
ducolloque
(9-11
d'enseignement
authors
at80-4.On theother
1993
1994,75-116,
hand,other
%Louvain-la-Neuve
septembre
intotheir
"own"
andthus
transformed
them
Versor's
commentaries,
writings
mayhaveadapted

11:33:44 AM

TO THE SCHOOLSOF THOUGHT

VERSORANDHIS RELATION

301

in the same passage

Versoruses the phrase "our way of understanding";
and also followshis explanationof Aristotle's
he mentionsAlbertexplicitly
of thatphrase: Accordingto Bos, Versor
text.Hence Bos' interpretation
"professesto belong to a certainway of thought,namelyAlbertism"and
"is consciousof belongingto a distinctschool in contrastto others",when
he uses the phrase "secundumnostrummodum intelligendi".34
However,
is a misunderstanding.
The expression"secundumnosthisinterpretation
trummodum intelligendi"does not referto a particularway of thought
at all- in which case one should have expectedsomethinglike the usual
,35Versor'swords
or processus
via,expo
sitio,doctrina
, but not modusintelligendi
in general.He uses themwhen
concernthe human way of understanding
whether
the
notion
of substanceis the most genthe
discussing question
His expositionof the problem
eral genus in the categoryof substance.36
.37
closelyresemblesa passage fromAlbert'scommentaryon the Categories
Indeed, a comparisonof the two textssuggeststhatVersorbased his text
on Albert's.(I have included both textsin Appendix 1.) Versor distinguishes three meanings of the term "substance": (1) the metaphysical
notuncommon
at thetime;cf.P. Rutten,
Contra
occania procedure
which
wascertainly
TheSo-Called
De universali
realiandthe
Dissemination
camdiscoliam
modernorum:
ofAlbertist
in:Bulletin
de philosophie
45 (2003),131-65
Polemics
thevia moderna,
mdivale,
against
ofHeymericus
de Campometwiththe
demonstrates
thattheTractatus
(which
problematicus
Lohr1971(above,n. 4), 297-8,
samefateduring
thecourseof thefifteenth
century).
ofVersor's
works
have"variant
notedthatsomemanuscripts
already
incipits
reflecting
different
redactions
or different
As Fleler
has stressed
elsewhere,
authorship."
possibly
medieval
commentators
Versor
cf.below,
based
Aristotle's
himself;
(including
5) usually
onthose
ofother
cf.C. Fleler,
Diestemmatischen
Verhltnisse
their
commentaries
commentators;
in:Freiburger
Zeitschrift
frPhilosophie
undTheologie,
48 (2001),
derAristoteleskommentare,
182-90.
34Bos 2002(above,n. 9) discusses
thispassageon 71-3;forhisinterpretation
ofthe
modum
cf.53 and78.I usethefol"secundum
nostrum
(as quoted),
phrase
intelligendi"
totarn
edition
is thesameas Bos used):Johannes
Versor,
Quaestiones
(which
lowing
super
veterem
artem
Nachdruck
Frankfurt/
Main 1967).The tableof
, Kln 1494(unvernderter
on ff.75rb-76ra
ofthisedition
someof
questions
givesthetidesforthedifferent
parts,
which
I willusewhenreferring
toorquoting
from
thisedition:
libri
Questiones
scilicet)
(primi
libri
libri
Arestotelis,
Questiones
Questiones
quinqu
predicabilium
Porphirii,
predicamentorum
primi
Perihermeniarum
Arestotelis.
35Cf.M.J.F.M.
Via Antiqua
andVia Moderna
intheFifteenth
Doctrinal,
Hoenen,
Century:
Political
inthe
andChurch
Factors
in:R.L.Friedman
andL.O. Nielsen
Institutional,
Wegestreit,
TheMedieval
inEarly
Modern
andModalTheory,
Dordrecht
1400-1700,
(eds.),
Heritage
Metaphysics
in note111 below.
2003,9-36,at 13-4.See alsotheexamples
36Johannes
libri
Arestotelis
Versor,
Questiones
(above,n. 34),q. 6, f.30rb:
predicamentorum
utrum
substantia
sitgenusgeneralissimm."
"Queritur
37Albertus
Liberdepraedicamentis
, tr.2, c. 1, ed. A. Borgnet
omnia,
Magnus,
(Opera
vol.I), Parisiis
167b.
1890,166a-

11:33:44 AM

302

ROTTEN
PEPIJN

notionof essence [essentia

simplex
), which is the firstand principalpart of
a being (primaet principalis
pars entis
), (2) the logical notion of the first
of
substance
etsimplicissimum
thingpredicable any
[primm
), and
predicabile
(3) the notion of an individualsubstance[substantia
particularis
), which is
the subjectof all otherthings(accidents)and of all predications.38
Logic,
says Versor,is concernedwithtwo notionsof substance,namelythe second and the thirdmeaning of the term.The second meaning of "substance" is a genericnotionand is the subjectof logical enquiry,because
it is the "firstpredicable",to which anythingelse thatcan be predicated
of any substance whatsoever (e.g., "horse", "man", "angel") can be
reduced.39With respectto thisprimum
Versor (stillfollowing
praedicabile
Albert)formulatesa sub-question:What is thisgenus composed of, since
thereis nothingbeforeit, of which it could be composed?In his answer
to this question,Versor mentionsnostrum
modumintelligendi.
The highest
because there
genus itselfcannot be composed of genus and difference,
is no highergenus: Being [ens)is not a genus with respectto the catethe
goriesof being,since therecannot be specificdifferences
constituting
in
because
evades
the
that
a
difference
categories,
nothing
being
way
evades a genus. Hence, in the highestgenus thereis no real composition
of genus and species,nor of matterand form.Nevertheless,
we conceive
of thisgenus as being composed of potencyand act, or quodestand quo
est, or ensand perse. In Albert'swords,thereis an "intellectualcomposition"of ensand per se: "Est enim ens, et est per se, quod addit super
In Versor's words: secundum
ens intellectualemcompositionem."40
nostrum
modum
we
can
think
of
the
most
intelligendi
only
generalgenus according
to the model of compositionof act and potency:41
38Albertus
tr.2, c. 1, ed. A. Borgnet
omnia
,
(Opera
Magnus,Liberdepraedicamentis,
vol.I), Parisiis
libri
Arestotelis
1890,166a;Johannes
Versor,
Questiones
predicamentorum
(above,
1 below.
n. 34),q. 6, f.30rb-30va.
Thecomplete
texts
arein Appendix
39Albertus
Liberdepraedicamentis
omnia
, tr.2, c. 1, ed. A. Borgnet
,
(Opera
Magnus,
vol.I), Parisiis
libri
Arestotelis
1890,166a167b;Johannes
Versor,
Questiones
predicamentorum
1.
(above,n. 34),q. 6, f.30va.See Appendix
40Albertus
Liberdepraedicamentis
omnia
, tr.2, c. 1, ed. A. Borgnet
,
(Opera
Magnus,
libri
Arestotelis
vol.I), Parisiis
1890,167a;Johannes
Versor,
Questiones
predicamentorum
(above,
n. 34),q. 6, f.30va.See Appendix
1.
41In other
Thecomposition
is notrealbutrational.
ThomasAquinas
usesthe
words:
in thesameway,con"modusintelligendi"
(albeitwithout
adding"noster")
expression
andwhatis merely
intheintellect
whatis real{secundum
rem
, inreorrealiter)
{tantum
trasting
libros
inintellectu
orsecundum
modum
Cf.Thomas
Sententiarum,
intelligendi).
Scriptum
super
Aquinas,
lib. 1, d. 2, q. 1, a. 3, corp.,ed. R.P. Mandonnet
1929,68: ". . . sicut
(vol.I), Parisiis
enimrelationes
nosdicimus
de relationibus
de Deo dicuntur;
hujusmodi
quaeex tempore

11:33:44 AM

TO THE SCHOOLSOF THOUGHT

VERSORANDHIS RELATION

303

a substance
is understood
to be comto ourwayofunderstanding
. . . according
we understand
bywayofa compoposedofbeingandperse,whichcomposition
ofby-which-it-is
ofactandpotency,
sition
(quod
[quoest)andthat-which-is
namely
because
ofgenus
anddifference,
isnocomposition
there
there
. . . However,
being
est)
ofbeing.
whichevadesthenotion
sincethereis nothing
can haveno differences,
in general,
nor
andform
do notcompose
substance
Andthusitis clearthatmatter
itis comtoourwayofunderstanding
but,as said,according
genusanddifference,
andby-which-it-is.42
or ofthat-which-is
posedofactandpotency
In using the expression"our way of understanding"Versor is not professingto belong to the Albertistway of thought,but nonethelesshis text
is evidentlybased on Albert's(see Appendix 1). In as much as Versor
rephrasesAlbert'stext,he also seems to adhere to Albert'sphilosophy.
For thatreason,Versormightstillbe regardedas an Albertist.One could
argue that doctrinalcongruenceis more importantin this respectthan
overtloyaltyto Albertor the Albertistschool.
Doctrinal
4. Fundamental
Differences
in order to find
When we look fordoctrinalagreementor disagreement,
in
symptomsof school formation a particularperiod of time,the question is what problemsor positionsare relevantin that particulartime.
With respectto philosophyin the late Middle Ages, a general doctrinal
agreementbetweentwo or more thinkersdoes not necessarilyconstitute
a philosophicalschool. Yet for some scholarsthis was preciselythe criterionfor using labels such as "Thomist" and "Albertist"in relationto
Versor (cf. 2). Above ( 1) it was statedthat the doctrinalprofileof a
horum
modum
. . . rationes
in Deo secundum
remnonsunt,sed sequuntur
intelligendi
in intellectu,
et nonin re,quae Deus est."Cf.Thomasde
attributorum
sunttantum
vol.XXV-2,
dequolibet
6, q. 1, a. 1, corp.,ed. Leonina,
, Quodlibet
Aquino,Quaestiones
nonponitin numerum
cumunitate
Roma-Paris
". . . unitaspersonae
1996,295.42-5:
modum
setsolumsecundum
essencie
ab ea differens,
Closely
intelligendi."
quasirealiter
in theintellectual
these
tothistopicis thequestion
aboutcomposition
related
substances;
De ente
ofquoestandquodest.Cf.,e.g.,Thomasde Aquino,
arealsosaidtobe composed
ThomasAquinas,
vol.XLIII,Roma1976,376.90-377.166;
etessentia
, cap.4, ed.Leonina,
vol.V, Romae1889,6b.
Summa
, la, q. 50,a. 2, ad 3, ed. Leonina,
theologiae
42Johannes
Arestotelis
libri
Versor,
Questiones
predicamentorum
(above,n. 34),q. 6, f.30va:
ex enteetper
". . . secundum
nostrum
modum
substantia
intelligendi
intelligitur
componi
ex actuetpotena nobisintelligitur
se,quequidem
permodum
compositionis
compositio
estibicompositio
exgenere
etdifferentia,
exquoestetquodest. . . Nontarnen
tia,scilicet
cumnihilsitquodrationem
entissubterfugere
haberenonpotest,
quia ensdifferentias
incommuni
noncomponunt
substantiam
Etsicpatetquodmateria
etforma
accepta
possit.
modum
sedutdictum
estsecundum
nostrum
intelligendi
equeetiamgenusetdifferentia,
ex actuetpotentia
seuex quodestet quo est."(SeealsoAppendix
1.)
componitur

11:33:44 AM

304

RUTTEN
PEPIJN

school of thoughtratherensuesfroma set of axiomaticthesesconcerning

fundamentalissues. What, in the case of Albertismvs. Thomism,these
issuesare becomesapparentfromseveralsourcescontemporary
to Versor's
writings.In thissectionI will discussthreeof these issues: First,Albert's
doctrineof inchoatio
formarum
(incipientactualityor inchoatenessof forms);43
the
distinction
between
second,
formapartisand formatotius( 4.2); third,
the principleof individuation( 4.3). A considerationof Versor'sposition
on these issues will cast lighton his place in the battle of the schools.
4. 1. TheDoctrine
ofinchoatioformarum
When Aristotle,in the firstbook of the Physics
, discussesthe principlesof
threeprinciples:matter,formand privation.These
nature,he distinguishes
are the threeprinciplesthataccount forall change in the physicalworld.
Matter is the subject which is in itselfundeterminedand which underlies the formsdetermining
it. Form and privationare two contraryprinthat
account
for
ciples
any particularthingbeing so-and-soor not being
so-and-so.Change means that matterreceivessome formwhich it was
previouslydeprivedof; it is a transitionfromprivationto form.Every
or "somethingdivine,good, and desirable",
formis a kind of perfection,
as Aristotleadmitsin his discussionwithPlato, whereasmatteris imperfect.All natural change should thus be consideredas a naturalstriving
At this point
for perfection:Matter desires to be perfectedby form.44
difficulties
arise. On the one hand, it is matterthatdesiresform,forprivation is contraryto form:When any formis receivedby matter,the
correspondingprivationcontraryto that formmust necessarilycease to
exist.Nothing,however,desiresits own destruction.
Therefore,the desire
On
for formcannot be in its privation,but must be in matteritself.45
43Themetaphysical
ofAlbert's
doctrine
ofinchoatio
andhistorical
formarum
backgrounds
3 "inchoatio 3' in:id.,
Studi
di
d'Alberto
suli
areexplored
formae
Magno
byB. Nardi,La dottrina
from
Rendiconti
medievale
(Storiae letteratura,
78),Roma1960,69-101[Reprint
filosofia
e Filologiche
dell'Accademia
dei Lincei,ser.6,
dellaClassedi ScienziMorali,Storiche
librorum
totius
natuvol.12,fase.1-2(1936),3-38].Cf.M.J.F.M.
Hoenen,The(Reparationes
'
and
debates
between
Albertistae
ralisphilosophiae
1494)as a source
forthelatemedieval
(Cologne
IV (1993),307-44,
filosofica
e studisullatradizione
Thomistae
medievale,
, in:Documenti
TheConcept
is suggested
byJ.A.Weisheipl,
actuality"
"incipient
esp.323-6.Thetranslation
inGreek
and
Science
inFourteenth
, in:E. McMullin
ofMatter
(ed.),TheConcept
Century
ofMatter
at 151-2.
Medieval
, NotreDame 1963,147-69,
Philosophy
44Aristotle,
Berolini
1831,192a16-34.
I, 9, ed. I. Bekker,
Physics
45On Albert's
forform,
cf.Hoenen1993
ofmatter's
discussion
ofthenature
appetite
(above,n. 43),324-6.

11:33:44 AM

TO THE SCHOOLSOF THOUGHT

VERSORANDHIS RELATION

305

the other hand, since matterhas nothingin common with form,how

can it be susceptibleat all to the perfectionentailedby a form?There
mustbe some intrinsic
principleto accountforthe factthatmatterdesires
form,in particularbecause that desire must be natural, not violent.46
between
Accordingto Aristotle,
privationis thatprinciple.The controversy
Albert and Thomas concerns the question whetherprivationis to be
or ratheras a potencywhich is
regardedas purelypassive potentiality,
in some way active.
Accordingto Albert,privationin itselfis just the absence of a form
This
it does not contributeanythingpositively(nihilponit).A1
carenila
(
formae)',
is in accordance withAristotle'sdistinctionbetweenmatterand formas
the principlesperse of any compositebeing and privationas a principle
, which distinctionis taken over by Albertand Thomas alike.
peraccidens
Yet privationcannot be reducedto absolutelynothing,in Albert'swords,
in
because it leaves an aptitudebehind in the subject (relinquit
aptitudinem
of matterwith respectto form;
This aptitudeis the potentiality
subiecto).
also thatwhichmakesmatterreceptiveto change.48Nothing,
it is therefore
however,desiresanythingelse, unlessit alreadyhas some incompletelikeness to it. Therefore,the appetiteforformin mattermustbe of such a
.49
naturethat it has a beginningof form:an inchoatio
formae
(or incohatio)
As Albertexplains,the "Peripatetic"account he givesof the natureof
to form avoids the problems caused by the two
matter'ssusceptibility
46Albertus
, lib. 1, tr.3, c. 15, ed. P. Hossfeld
(ed. Coloniensis,
Magnus,Physica
Westfalorum
vol.IV-1),Monasterii
1987,69.22-30.
47Cf.Albertus
, lib. 1, tr.3, c. 9, ed. P. Hossfeld
(ed. Coloniensis,
Magnus,
Physica
vol.IV-1),Monasterii
Westfalorum
1987,54.74-91.
48Albertus
, lib. 1, tr. 3, c. 9, ed. P. Hossfeld
(ed. Coloniensis,
Magnus,Physica
vol.IV-1),Monasterii
Westfalorum
1987,54.39-50.
49Albertus
omnia
Liberdepraedicabilibus
, tr.5, c. 4, ed. A. Borgnet
,
(Opera
Magnus,
nonestmateria
vol.I), Parisiis
1890,96b:". . . materia
subjecperhocquodestnudum
in materia
sedpotius
ad formam
tumformae
ab omniforma
denudatum,
(lege,
potentia)
in ipsa.Et ideodicitur,
desiderat
sicut
formae
formam,
quodmateria
perinchoationem
noninquantum
estfoemina,
sedinquantum
estimperfecta.
foemina
masculum:
(. . .) nec
autemillanecessario
in quo nonestaptitudo
ad perfectionem.
Aptitudo
perfici
potest,
nonappeteret
ad perfectionem."
Thesuggestion
toread
aliquidestperfectionis,
quiaaliter
Nardi1960(above,n. 43),84. Albertus
for"materia"
comesfrom
Magnus,
"potentia"
vol.IV-1),Monasterii
Westfalorum
, lib.1,tr.3,c. 10,ed.P. Hossfeld
(ed.Coloniensis,
Physica
aliudnisipersimili"Etideoverissime
dictum
est,quodnihilapptit
1987,72.92-73.6:
tudinem
incompletam,
quamhabetad ipsum.Et ideoapptit
compleri
pertransmutationem
ad ipsum,
licetenimenscompletum
salvari
tamen
appetat,
appetitus
quodapptit;
nonestnisiincompleti.
transmutationis
Et ideotalisappetitus
estmateriae,
quaepermixturam
cumipsaformae
habetincohationem,
ad quamtransmutan
desiderat."
privationis

11:33:44 AM

306

RUTTEN
PEPIJN

extremepositionsof Anaxagoras and Plato (whichAristotlehimselfalso

discusses).Anaxagoraspostulatedthe latentpre-existenceof all formsin
matter(latentia
), whichentailsthe falseconclusionsthatgeneration
formarum
is really alteration and that ultimatelyeverythingis everythingelse.
Accordingto Plato, on the otherhand, matterhas no privationand no
formarum).
incipientform;all formscome fromthe giver of forms(dator
This leads to the false conclusionthat change in the physicalworld is
because it has an externalefficient
not natural,but violent (violentimi),
cause.50Accordingto a Peripateticdictum,however,formsare extracted
de materia
frommatter(educuntur
).51Therefore,althoughthe positionsof
are
to
be avoided, the Peripateticsolutionto
and
Plato
both Anaxagoras
the problemis closer to Anaxagoras than to Plato.52
On thislast point Thomas Aquinas agrees withhis teacher:The idea
of incipientformscomes close to assuminga latencyof formsin matter.53
For Thomas, this is all the more reason to dismissthe idea of incipient
both in his theologicaland in his
which he does consistently,
formality,
50Albertus
vol.
lib. 1, tr.3, c. 15,ed. P. Hossfeld
(ed.Coloniensis,
Physica,
Magnus,
andibid.,c. 16,71.15-73.27.
Westfalorum
IV-1),Monasterii
1987,68.72-70.76,
51Theorigin
mateae
educuntur
depotentia
educuntur
dematena
orformae
oftheformula
formae
ofThomas'
in Mandonnet's
edition
animalium
to De generatione
The reference
is unclear.
innote56 below.Cajetancallsita secretum
cf.thequotation
seemsmistaken;
periScriptum
Summa
cf.ThomasAquinas,
anddoesnotgivea reference;
la, q. 90,
theologiae,
pateticum
Cardinalis
vol.V, Romae1889,387b(Commentaria
a. 2, ad 2, ed. Leonina,
Caietani).
52Albertus
omnia
Liber
depraedicabilibus,
tr.5, c. 4, ed. A. Borgnet
, vol.
(Opera
Magnus,
ut
haec
determinanda
"Ad
omnia
autem
95a-b:
Parisiis
est,
1890,
quod
praenotandum
I),
et
et indistincta,
sedforma
et confusa,
dicitAverroes,
generalis,
genusnonestmateria,
vocant
formam
etconfusam
inmateria
nondeterminata
diffusa
quamdiffusam
performam:
inmateria
diffusam
formae
formae
inchoationem:
ipsa
quaminchoationem
propter
quidam
inquolatent
formae:
etideolatenlocusformae
materia
a quibusdam
dicebatur,
antiquis
eterathocdictum
utdictum
estinPhysicis,
tiamformarum
fecerunt,
Anaxagorae:
principium
omnes
foreducide materia
dixerunt
etomnes
Peripatetici
quodetiamAristoteles
propter
"
claims
withAverroes
thatthe
Albert
Elsewhere
extrnseco.
mas,etnonesseeas a datore
thembutlackedthewordsto express
meantthesameas Aristotle,
otherphilosophers
cf.Albertus
selvescorrectly;
, pars2, q. 4, m. 2, a. 4, ed.
theologiae
Magnus,Summa
omnia
A. Borgnet
1895,90a: "ideodicitCommentator
, vol.XXXII),Parisiis
super
(Opera
etponentes
etponentes
aliiPhilosophi,
scilicet
XI primae
latentiam,
, quodomnes
philosophiae
et formativis
et elementalibus
virtutibus
coelestibus
datorem
formarum,
qui mediantibus
idemdicerequod
in materiam,
voluerunt
formas
influit
etinvehit
virtutibus,
generantium
nesciverunt
inmateria
sedverbis
essent:
formae
dixit
Aristoteles,
propriis
potentia
quodscilicet
..."
exprimere
53ThomasAquinas,
lib.7, lect.8, ed.
Aristotelis
libros
In duodecim
exposition
Metaphysicorum
M.-R.Cathala/ R.M. Spiazzi,Taurini-Romae
1950,352-3(no. 14426):"Haecautem
formarum.
Cumenimnihilagatnisi
latitationem
ponentibus
propinqua
opiniovidetur
formarum
vel
inchoationes
in
si
actu:
est
secundum
quae suntin materia,
partes
quod

11:33:44 AM

TO THE SCHOOLSOF THOUGHT

VERSORANDHIS RELATION

307

, in his commentaryon the

philosophicalworks.In the Summatheologiae
and theMetaphysics
on thePhysics
and in his commentaries
Sentences
, Thomas
in
sense
the
explained by Albert.54
formae
rejectsthe notion of inchoatio
Thomas explains that mattercannot have an intrinsicactive principle.
Such a principlewould mean that somethinghas the abilityto effect
change in itself,which only occurs in livingcreatures,not in inanimate
Thomas endorsesthe view thatformsare extractedfrommatter,
things.55
but denies thatthisentailsan activepotencyin matter.He also expressly
thesupposedlyviolent(i.e. unnatural)
countersAlbert'sargumentconcerning
withoutthe participationof an activepotency
characterof change effected
to
in matter;formatterassistsin generation,not by activelycontributing
the process,but by reason of its aptnessto receive forms.That aptness
may be called "appetitusmateriae" or "inchoatio formae",but it is a
purelypassive potency.56

habent
activam,
sequitur
quodsintaliquomodoactu,quodestponere
aliquamvirtutem
formarum."
latitationem
54ThomasAquinas,In octolibros
Aristotelis
, lib. 1, lect.13, ed.
expositio
Physicorum
intentionem
Taurini-Romae
M. Maggiolo,
1954,58 (no. 114):"Patetergosecundum
non
estaliqua
naturae
Aristotelis
accidens,
per
ponitur
principium
privatio,
quae
quod
velaliquodprincipium
velinchoatio
ad formam,
activum,
formae,
imperfectum
aptitudo
accidit."
velcontrarium
formae
sedipsacarentia
utquidamdicunt,
formae,
quodsubiecto
Aristotelis
In duodecim
libros
Cf.ThomasAquinas,
, lib.7, lect.8, ed.
expositio
Metaphysicorum
Thomas
Taurini-Romae
M.-R.Cathala
/ R.M.Spiazzi,
1950,352-3(no.1442oc-Q;
Aquinas,
lib.2, d. 18,q. 1,a. 2, ed.P. Mandonnet
libros
Sententiarum,
(vol.II),Parisiis
super
Scriptum
Summa
, Ilia, q. 32, a. 4, corp.,ed. Leonina,
1929,450-4;ThomasAquinas,
theologiae
vol.XI, Romae1903,337a-b.
55ThomasAquinas,
Aristotelis
In duodecim
libros
, lib.7, lect.8, ed.
expositio
Metaphysicorum
M.-R.Cathala/ R.M. Spiazzi,Taurini-Romae
1950,353(no.1442e).
56ThomasAquinas,
Sententiarum
libros
, lib.2, d. 18,q. 1, a. 2, corp.,ed.
Scriptum
super
R.P. Mandonnet
1929,450-454:". . . aliidicunt
quodcumomnesfor(vol.II), Parisiis
edumateriae
animal
De gener.
., lib.II, cap. 3, de potentia
mae,secundum
Philosophum,
inmateria
secundum
cantur,
quamdam
quasi
incomplete,
ipsasformas
praeexistere
oportet
sedviolenta
. . . Hoc
mutatio
inchoationem
. . . aliterenimnonessetgeneratio
naturalis,
illatarnen
formae
educantur
depotentia
nonvidetur:
autem
verum
materiae,
quiaquamvis
sicutenim... inmotulocalioportet
materiae
nonestactiva,
sedpassiva
tantum;
potentia
et ponitexemplum
ita etiamin motualterationis;
essealiudmovens
et motum,
quod,
corestsanans,
et aliamembra
sanata. . . Nectamen
naturaliter
sanatur,
quandocorpus
naturalis:
si in materia
estpotentia
quia
quodnonsitgeneratio
passivatantum,
sequitur,
ad recipiendum
sedinquantum
esthabilis
ad generationem
nonagendo,
materia
coadjuvat
formae
...
materiae
dicitur
et inchoatio
talemactionem,
appetitus
quae etiamhabilitas
Et ideo concedoquod in materianullapotentiaactivaest,sed purepassiva".Cf.
vol.IV, Romae
ThomasAquinas,
Summa
la, q. 45, a. 8, corp.,ed. Leonina,
theologiae,
vol.V, Romae1889,152a-153a.
andIbid
1888,477a-b,
., q. 65,a. 4, corp.,ed. Leonina,

11:33:44 AM

308

ROTTEN
PEPIJN

Albert'spositionis adopted by his early followers,such as his pupil

It is again takenup by
Udalricusde Argentina(Ulrichvon Strassburg).57
as
de
Nova
Domo and Heymericus
Albertists
such
Johannes
fifteenth-century
de Campo. In his treatiseon being and essence,Johannesde Nova Domo
ascribesan essence to prime matter,because everybeing (esse)is the act
of an essence and in matterthere is formableformalbeing (esseformale
This essence
and formale
, as opposed to formale
formans
formtm).
formabile
of primemattercomprisesa subjectivepotencyand an aptitudeforform.
From this essence flows(fluii) the formableformalbeing, which is also
and which is essentiallythe same as form.
called esseformalisinchoationis
takes
over
Albert's
Thus, Johannes
position that matter'spotencywith
Heymericusde Campo
regardto formis alreadysomethingformalitself.58
does the same in the treatisewhich explicitlydiscussesthe "problems"
betweenAlbertistsand Thomists,the Tractatus
problematicus.59
Heymericus
also adopts Albert'sdoxographicperspectiveon the historyof philosophy
), accordingto which there
(fromAlbert'scommentaryon the Metaphysics
are threemain philosophicalsects: Peripatetics,Epicureansand Stoics.60
the Epicureans(includingthepre-socratic
The Peripatetics
followAristotle,
natural philosophers) follow Anaxagoras and the Stoics (including
Pythagoreansand Platonists)follow Plato. Heymericus'account of the
. . . viammediamtenentes)
Platonist,Epicurean and Peripatetic(Peripatetici
57Cf.UlrichvonStrassburg,
De summo
lib.4, tr.2, cap. 7, ed. S. PieperhofF
bono,
at 128.257-8:
Liber
bono,
4, Tractatus
1987,128.251-131.364;
1-2,7),Hamburg
(Desummo
estin ipsaprivatio,
fornisiinquantum
"materia
nonapptit
formam,
quaeestincohatio
"forma
estin materia
secundum
esse
maein materia";
Ibid.,at 131.345-6:
peressentiam
et confusum
potentiale."
imperfectum
58Johannes
deesseetessentia,
de NovaDomo,Tractatus
q. 4,prop.2,ed.G. Meersseman,
to Albert):
in: Meersseman
1933(above,n. 6), 91-191,at 135-7(withreferences
"Quia
estactusessentiae
. . . ideoubicumque
totum
suumambitm
essesecundum
esse,
recipitur
formalis
Omnisenimessentia
ibirecipitur
essentia.
est,quiaab ea fluit
esse,etitahabet
In natura
velformantis
dicovelformabilis
velformatae.
formalis
modm
formalis
formae;
in essentia.
etproportionabile
esseformale
materiae
formabile,
reperitur
reperitur
primae
subiectinomine
materiae
invenitur
In essentia
potentiae
primae
aliquidquodimportatur
cumpotenseuhabilitas
ad formam;
estaptitudo
vae,cuiconcreata
quaequidem
aptitudo
esseformalis
a quafluit
esseformale
vocatur
tiamateriae
formabile,
essentia,
quodvocatur
essentiam
cumforma."
de quo soletdiciquodestidemsecundum
inchoationis,
59Heymericus
Thomam
Albertm
etSanctum
inter
de Campo,Problemata
(above,
Magnum
ad eanforme
cumformali
estnegatio
n. 13),probi.7, f.elr-v:". . . privatio
aptitudine
etinchoationem."
inmateria
formalem
dem,etperconsequens
aptitudinem
oportet
ponere
60On Albert's
cf.
in hiscommentary
on theMetaphysics,
doxography
philosophical
I della"Metafisica",
diAlberto
al libro
dei
Il commento
Storia
della
e storia
G. Santinello,
filosofi:
fibsofia
XVI (1990),43-70.
in:Medioevo,

11:33:44 AM

TO THE SCHOOLSOF THOUGHT

VERSORANDHIS RELATION

309

views on the relationbetween matterand formcompletelycorresponds

to Albert's.61
Heymericuswarns that the Albertistswith their"formable
essences"
formal
may inclinetowardsAnaxagoras' theoryof latentforms,
whereasthe Thomists,who acknowledgeonlya passivepotencyin matter,
may inclinetowardsthe "stoic" theoryof "sterile"matter.62
in whichHeymericussketches
The passagefromthe Tractatus
problematicus
thisspectrumof positionsis incorporatedalmostword forword in a work
in 1494, the Reparationes
librorum
thatwas publishedby the BursaLaurentiana
m In addition,this work also includes an indetotiusnaturalis
philosophiae.
ofAlbert'sthought,
whichrepeatsthe main arguments
pendentassimilation
advanced by Albert:Only on account of the inchoatestatusof formscan
one explain that formsare extractedfrommatter,that mattercan be
perfectedby form,and thatchange in naturalthingsdoes not come from
outside.64In sum, there is an obvious, Albertistline of thoughtwhich
clearlyhas a directrelationto the writingsof Alberthimself.
61Cf.above.Heymericus
de Campo,Problemata
inter
Albertm
etSanctum
Thomam
Magnum
"DicebatenimPlatoquodmateria
datori
estcoeterna
(above,n. 13),probi.7, f.d5r-v:
formarum
. . . cuiilledatorsolasuabonitate
stimulatus
conformes
suis
imprimit
ymagines
rationibus
... E contra
autemdicunt
Epicurei,
ydealibus
quorum
caputfuitAnaxagoras,
estuniversorum
etperfectissimum
primum
principium
quodin se prehabet
quodmateria
omnium
formas
sustentt
sedvelamento
accidentium
quas subiective
ipsamvestientium
ne alicuiappareant
earnque datmaterie
in hocvelin ilionomen.
occultantur
Et
preter
dicithuiusmodi
latentias
illucescere
naturalia
removentia
ab ipsamateria
talia
peragentia
lucemtalium
accidentia
occultantia
etobumbrancia
itaquodgeneratio
nonest
formarum,
aliudquamrevelatio
forme
substantialis
intussepulte
in caligine
materie.
Et alteratio
est
revelatio
alicuius
forme
accidentalis
similiter
latitantis
. . . Peripatetici
vero,quorum
archipaterfuitArestoteles,
viammediam
tenentes
dixerunt
materiam
necomnino
essenudamet
sicutaiuntPlatonici
et Stoyci,
necprorsus
fecunditate
formarum
sicut
sterilem,
actuatam,
sedprehabere
easformas
secundum
etab agentibus
pretendunt
Epicurei,
potentiam
expectare
illius
formativos
ed.
ab omnibus
sectatoribus
Arestotelis
[formativus
] actus,
potentie
quisermo
concorditer
accipitur."
62Ibid.,f.d5v:"Sedeiusintelligentia
adeodispar
invenitur
decsic,quodhiividentur
linaread opinionem
hiiveroad positionem
Nobisenim,iuxta
Stoycorum,
Epicureorum.
in materia
viametintellectum
Doctoris
suasforMagnitalesformas
preesse
peressentias
malesformabiles
errorAnaxagore,
sicutet sectatoribus
Doctoris
ponentibus,
inponitur
solampotentiam
subiectivam
materie
error
Sancti,
confitentibus,
impingitur
Stoycorum."
63Reparationes
librorum
totius
naturalis
philosophiae
(anonymous),
Cologne1494;cf.Voullime
1903(above,n. 1),443 (no. 1016).See thepartconcerning
thePhysics
, lib. 1, tr.4, ff.
On theseReparationes
and thegenreofreparationes
in general,
cf.Hoenen1993
c2v-c3r.
n. 43).
(above,
64Reparationes
librorum
totius
naturalis
n. 63),inPhys.
lib.1,tr.4, f.c2r:
(above,
philosophiae
secundum
inmatesintinchoate
"Queritur
quomodo
patetquodforme
aliquodesseearum
ria.. . Ratione
sicprimopatet,quianihileducitur
de aliquonisialiquomodoprefuerit
ineo.Sedforme
educuntur
depotentia
esseearum
fuerunt
materie,
ergosecundum
aliquod
in materia.
Hoc autemesseestformale
formabile.
Secundoprobatur
sic.In omnimotu

11:33:44 AM

310

RUTTEN
PEPIJN

JohannesVersor brieflydiscussesthe same topic of incipientformality

in his commentaryon the Isagoge
. Again (cf. 3), his textis based loosely
on Albert'scommentary,
but he keepshis distancefromthekindof loyalty
to Albertdisplayedby Heymericusor the Reparationes.
Insteadof defending
eitherAlbert's or Thomas' position,he juxtaposes theirviews without
showinga preferencefor either one.65The theoryof inchoatio
formarum
is encounteredhere in a logico-metaphysical
context,because it elucidates
the relationbetween a genus and its differences.
Just as prime matter
is not purelypassive and uninformed,
so a genus is a "general,confuse
and indistinctform"which potentially(i.e. on account of a potestas)
containsthe specificdifferences
and whichis called inchoatio
Versor's
formae.66
paraphraseof the passage fromAlbert'scommentarydoes not contribute
a single original thought,but he does mention the fact that Thomas
Aquinasholdsa different
opinion:"It seemsthattheHoly Doctorcontradicts
of formsin matter."67
On the next page,
the
inchoateness
him, negating
Versor mentionsthe same disagreementbetween Albert and Thomas
velmutatione
et formaliter
Sed hocquodsicintrinsece
perfici.
oportet
aliquodintrinsece
nonpotest
essesubstantia
scilicet
eiussubiectiva,
materie,
perficitur
potentia
quiailiasemsubdiversis
formis.
Sederitaliquodpreter
materiam
pereademmanet
ipsimaterie
superin actum.
scilicet
formalis
materie
transit
Et hocvocatur
additum,
que identice
potentia
ratione
forme
forme
inchoatio.
Tertioprobatur
sic.Si nonessent
secundum
aliquodesse
in materia
venirent
de foris,
tuncomnesforme
omnes
inchoate,
quodtamenestcontra
rationales
philosophos."
65Albertus
Liberdepraedicabilibus,
tr.5, c. 4, ed. A. Borgnet
omnia
,
(Opera
Magnus,
vol.I),Parisiis
1890,91b-97a;
Versor,
Questiones
Johannes
quinqu
predicabilium
Porphirii
(above,
n. 34),q. 26,ff.21ra-21vb.
66See Albertus
Liber
depraedicabilibus
, tr.5, c. 4, ed.A. Borgnet
omnia,
(Opera
Magnus,
ofwhether
oneshould
vol.I), Parisiis
above,n. 52).Forthequestion
1890,95b(quoted
orpotestas
94a-96b
andthesummary
, cf.Ibid.,
Versor,
Questiones
byJohannes
speakopotentia
Porphirii
(above,n. 34),q. 26,f.2Ivb.
quinqu
predicabilium
67Johannes
n. 34),q. 26,f.21rb:
Versor,
Questiones
Porphiri
(above,
quinqu
predicabilium
"Ex quo oritur
de modoquomodo
differentie
suntin genere,
eta quo
dubitatio
opposite
a seipsovelab alio. . . respondet
venerabilis
dominus
Albertus
genushabeteas,autscilicet
sibicontradicere
videtur
doctor
sicut
notando
sanctus,
punctis
aliqua,et ibiin aliquibus
Albertus
. . . quodgenus
cauteadvertenti.
Nottigitur
venerabilis
dominus
notabitur
primo
inmateria,
confusa
etdistincta
diffusa
nonestmateria,
sedestforma
quamforgeneralis,
in materia,
inchoationem
formarum
mamvocatAlbertus
qui ponitquodin naturalibus
in materia,
in essetamen
antegenerationem
formaliter
forma
confuso,
indistincto,
preest
videtur
sibicontradicere
formabili
et distinguibili.
(. . .) DoctorSanctus
negansinchoatinmateria
formarum
habetur
Phisicorum.
ionem
formarum
(. . .) Etdeistainchoatione
primo
was
"sibi"is usedin a non-reflexive
Videibi."Notethatthepronoun
wayhere,which
mediae
etinfimae
vol.6, Parisiis
common
at thetime;cf.G. Du Cange,Glossarium
latinitatis,
Latinitatis
Medii
vol.
/ M. Gumbert-Hepp,
Lexicon
Nederlandicae
Aevi,
1846,235b;O. Weijers
VII, Leiden2002,4602(S 433):"sibi,= ei: passim".

11:33:44 AM

TO THE SCHOOLSOF THOUGHT

VERSORANDHIS RELATION

3 11

Yet compared to the way in which,forinstance,Heymericusde

twice.68
Campo opposes Albertto Thomas and refutesThomas' views,Versor's
textreads like a truce.Versor does not side withAlbertlike Heymericus
or Johannes de Nova Domo did, he merelyrepeats him. He does not
of opinion,and that
side withThomas either.He mentionsthe difference
is all.
In his commentaryon Aristotle'sPhysics
, however,John Versor unamAlthoughthiswork
biguouslyrejectsAlbert'snotion of inchoate forms.69
bears tracesof both Albert'sand Thomas' influence(throughtheircommentarieson the Physics)
, Versor decidedlyfollowsAquinas on the issue
As in his commentaryon the Isagoge
to form.70
of matter'ssusceptibility
,
betweenAlbertand Thomas explicitly.
Versor mentionsthe controversy
Aftera lengthy
Here, he also devotesa separatequestionto its solution.71
discussionof arguments,includinga sketch of the doctrinalspectrum
VersorconcludeswithThomas ("Conclusio
(Anaxagoras,Plato,Peripatetics),
that substantialformshave no formal
cum
doctore
sancto")
responsalis
in
the
matter
before
compositethingis generated.The main argubeing
menthe advances here to supportthisconclusionis thatsubstantialforms
present
give substantialbeing; hence,if a substantialformwere essentially
68Johannes
Versor,
Questiones
predicabilium
Porphirii
(above,n. 34),q. 26,f.2Ivb:
quinqu
an differentie
sintin generesicutin quodamseminario,
"Et cumquerebatur
respondit
in materia
formarum
dicitur
essesemen
dominus
Albertus
quodsic,quiarealisinchoatio
Thomasbeneconvenit
cumeo in hoc
omnium
formarum
. . . Sed sanctus
specificarum
ingenere
causeformalis
nonformantis
etdeterdifferentiarum
quodgenusestprincipium
Sed in ponendo
taleminchoationem
realem
dissedformabilis
etdistinguibilis.
minantis,
in genererealiter
sintinchoate
sed
cumeo. Ideo nonponitquoddifferentie
convenit
tantum
secundum
rationem."
69I use theedition
Lyon1489
printed
by MathiasHussin Lyon:PhisicaVersoris,
onallphysical
Thisedition
includes
ff.clva-c4va.
(= Hain*16023),
questions-commentaries
De generatione,
De anima,
Parvanaturalia).
Cf.Birkenmajer
works
, De celo,
Meteora,
(Physica
1925(above,n. 4), 131-5;Hain 1838(above,n. 1),486.
70One of themanuscripts
cod. L 37, at
(Praha,Knihovna
Metropolitn
Kapituly,
works
notesthatthey
are"Collecte
exCommentariis
f.252r)ofVersor's
physical
explicitly
Thomede Alquino
etdomini
clarissimorum
etillustrium
videlicet
doctoris
sancti
virorum,
as quoted(sic)byFliieler
1994(above,n. 33),83.
Alberti
magniEpiscopi
Ratisponensi";
71Phisica
Versons
sanctum
Thomamtalisaptitudo
(above,n. 69),f. clvb:"secundum
a
materie
ad formam,
(scilicet
PR) nonestaliquidrealiter
[realeed.]distinctum
aptitudo
materia
sedsolumratione
. . . Dicittarnen
Albertus
seuappetitus
est
quodhecaptitudo
forma
a materia,
habitualis
inchoatio
materie
et distincta
realiter
superaddita
quia talis
cumforma
. . . De istacontroversia
in sequentibus
inchoatio
esteiusdem
essentie
latius
The discussion
ofthecontroversy
thenfollows
in thesecondnextquestion;
videbitur."
utrum
forma
substantialis
antegenerationem
rei
decimooctavo
Ibid.,f. c2vb:"Queritur
cuiusestforma
sitin materia
secundum
esseformale
formabile."

11:33:44 AM

3 12

RUTTEN
PEPIJN

in matterbeforethe generationof the compositething,substantialgenerationwould be impossibleand onlyaccidentalchangewould be possible:

All generationwould be mere alteration.Thus, Versor accuses Albertof
fallinginto the error of Anaxagoras.72This is the same argumentthat
Thomas Aquinas had already advanced againstAlbert.73
To sum up: Versor is obviouslyaware of the controversyover the
notion of inchoate formality,
but, whereas in his commentaryon the
he defendsThomas' position,in his commentaryon the Isagogehe
Physics
leaves the matterundecided. In order to know whetherthis disparityis
accidental or structural,we will have to investigateother contentious
issues. In the followingI will brieflydiscusstwo more problemsput forward by Versor himself.The firstconcernsthe distinction
betweenforma
totiusand formapartisin substancescomposed of matterand form( 4.2);
the second concernsthe principleof individuation( 4.3).
4.2. The Theoiyofformatotiusand formapartis
The theoryof formapartisand formatotiusplays an importantrole in
Albert'sthought.In his discussionof the ontologicalstatusof universais
in his commentaryon Porphyry,Albertraises the questionwhetherthe
universalis matteror form.Since it cannot be matter,the next question
? The formapartisis the form
is: Is it theformapartisor theformatotius
a
and
which
informs
the otherpart, namely
which is part of composite
matter.The formatotius
is the formof a compositewhole,i.e. its essence.
In man, theformapartisis his soul which informshis body, whereas the
is human nature.The forma
partiscannotbe the universal,since
formatotius
it is not predicatedof thatwhichit informs:Man is not his soul.74Hence
72Phisica
sancto:
cumdoctore
Versoris
responsalis
(above,n. 69),f. c4ra:"Conclusio
nonestin materia
secundum
antegenerationem
reicuiusestforma
Formasubstantial
estdareessesim. . . Probatur
. . . De ratione
forme
substantial
formabile
esseformale
secundum
substantial
estinmateria
Si ergoforma
essentiam,
sequitur
quodipsa
pliciter.
advenit
Et ita
et perconsequens
materie
datessesimpliciter
quicquid
postestaccidens.
essetalterali,
utponebant
substantialis
etomnefieri
omnisgeneratio
destrueretur
antiqui
Philosophi."
73Cf.above,n. 53.
74Albertus
omnia
tr.2, c. 8, ed. A. Borgnet
Liberdepraedicabilibus,
,
(Opera
Magnus,
ut
sit?Estenimforma
forma
vol.I), Parisiis
totius,
1890,37b:". . . quaeritur
cujusmodi
humani.
hominis:
autforma
sicutanimaestforma
estforma
humanitas
corporis
partis,
seduniversale
nonpraedicatur
de re cujusestforma,
sivemateriae
Formaautempartis
velmateriae
secundum
Universale
benepraedicatur.
quodmatepartis
ergononestforma
riaperficitur
performam."

11:33:44 AM

TO THE SCHOOLSOF THOUGHT

VERSORANDHIS RELATION

313

the universalmustbe theformatotius

, but thisformcan be designatedin
or fortwo ways: Eitherit is designatedas the mere form(formatantum)
is
the
or
it
mal essence {essentia
of
designatedas
formalis)
compositebeing;
esse)of a compositeof which it is the
expressingthe whole being (totum
form.In the firstcase, a man's formis expressedby the word "humanIn the second case, a man's formis expressedby the
ity" (humanitas).
"man"
or
"human" [homo).Only when designatedin the second
word
be predicatedof the comway can the formof the whole {formatotius)
is
for
we
cannot
"Socrates
whole,
humanity"but we can say
say
posite
"Socratesis human".75Therefore,the universalis the formof the whole,
designatedas expressingthe whole being of the particularthing.76
is whetherthe
One ofJohannesVersor's questionson the praedicabilia
universalis matteror formor the compositewhole; it mirrorsthe pasVersortakes
sage just discussedfromAlbert'scommentaryon Porphyry.77
over both Albert'sdivisionof the two kinds of formand his account of
the twofolddesignationof theformatotius
Having concluded that the
universalis the formof the whole in as much as it expressesthe whole
75Albertus
Liberdepraedicabilibus,
tr.2, c. 8, ed. A. Borgnet
omnia,
(Opera
Magnus,
in nomine:
totius
vol.I), Parisiis
1890,38a: "Sedforma
dupliciter
designatur
designate
estforma
ut forma
enimut forma
sicuthumanitas
tantum,
tantum,
quae est
designata
etideononpraedicatur
de eo cujusestforma,
essentia
formalis:
quiahomononestessentia
etiamutforma
totius
suaformalis,
necaliquidaliorum
habent.
Designatur
quaeformas
et tuncdesignatur
totum
essedicenscujusestforma:
peressequoddatei in quo estet
totius
dathuiccomposito
sicuthomodicitesseformale
nomen,
quodesthie
quodforma
homo."
76Ibid.:
sitforma
totius
uttotum
essedicens
ergo,
quoduniversale
designata".
"Relinquitur
imMetaphysikkommentar
Alberts
desGrossen
Cf.G. Wieland,
zumSeinsbegriff
(Beitrge
Untersuchungen
undTheologie
NeueFolge,7),Mnster
zurGeschichte
derPhilosophie
desMittelalters,
1972,27-31.
77Johannes
n. 34),q. 15,ff.13vaVersor,
Questiones
quinqu
predicabilium
Porphirii
(above,
depraedicabilibus
omnia
Liber
,
14ra;Albertus
, tr.2, c. 8, ed. A. Borgnet
(Opera
Magnus,
vol.I), Parisiis
1890,37b-39a.
78Johannes
n. 34),q. 15,f.13va-b:
Versor,
Questiones
quinqu
predicabilium
Porphirii
(above,
forma
"Sciendum
scilicet
quodduplexestforma,
partisque estactuset perfectio
partis
sicutanimain homine
estactusmaterie
hominis.
Alia
scilicet
tantum,
materie,
compositi
estforma
totius
nonestactusmaterie
sedestactustotius
tantum,
que scilicet
compositi
ex materia
et forma
Uno modopernomen
Et hecforma
partis.
dupliciter
designatur:
abstractum
forme
tantum
cumprescisione
sicut
materie,
perquodsignificatur
permodum
hocnomenhumanitas
formam
totius
forme
et ideonon
tantum,
significai
permodum
de eo cuiusestforma.
Aliomododesignatur
concretum
predicatur
pernomen
perquod
utdiceres
totum
esseeiuscuiusestforma,
etitasignificatur
forma
totius
significatur
per
universale
nomen
utestinhabente,
sicuthocnomen
homosignificai
formam
totius
utest
in habente,
et ob hocpredicatur
de eo cuiusestforma."

11:33:44 AM

3 14

RUTTEN
PEPIJN

esseof that of which it is the form,Versor goes on to ask whetherthe

formof the part and the formof the whole are one and the same form
the opinrem.79
Versorrespondsto thisquestionby distinguishing
secundum
ions of Thomas and Albert.They agree as faras the separatesubstances
are concerned,in which thereis no real compositionaccordingto both
Dominicandoctors,but theydisagreewithrespectto compositesubstances.
Thomas says thatin compositesubstancesthereis also a real distinction,
because theformatotiuscomprisesthe essence of both matterand forma
. Accordingto
, and hence theformapartisis a part of theformatotius
partis
not include
totius
of
a
substance
does
the
Albert,however, forma
composite
matter,but merelyform.80
VersornotesthattheAlbertists
) explainthispositionin different
(albertiste
Some
Versor,
Albertists,
interpretAlbert'swordsin termsof
says
ways.81
whereasotherstakehim to mean a real distinction.82
a rationaldistinction,
He does not mentionany Albertists
by name, but it seems reasonableto
assume that if he knew anythingabout Albertism,he would have been
Johannesde Nova
acquainted with some worksof the Parisian Albertist
Domo (Versor himselfbeing active in Paris).Johannes de Nova Domo
also elaborateson the relationbetweenthe two formsin order to solve
79Ibid.,
estforma
totius
uttotum
essereidicens
secunda:
Universale
f.13vb:"Conclusio
forma
totius
sintuna
Utrum
. . . Dubitatur
illiuscuiusestforma
partiset forma
primo:
rem."
forma
et eademsecundum
80Ibid.'"Adhocrespondet
exforma
etmateria
Thomas
sanctus
compositis
quodinrebus
essentiam
totius
secundum
rem,quia secundum
complectitur
ipsumforma
distinguuntur
sicuttotum
Et sicforma
totius
se habetad formam
forme
et etiammaterie.
partis
partis
nondistinguuntur
etforma
totius
a materia
forma
ad partem.
Sedinrebusseparatis
partis
Albertus
aliam.Etinhacpartebeneconvenit
secundum
rem,quiaunanihilcontinet
preter
dicitAlbertus
ex materia
et forma
cumdoctore
sancto.Sed in rebuscompositis
quod
in hominenonincludit
materiam
sed estformatantum."
formatotiusut humanitas
vol.XLIII,Roma1976,
etessentia
De ente
Cf.Thomasde Aquino,
, cap. 2, ed. Leonina,
cumprecisione
naturaspeciei,
id undesumitur
"nomenautemsignificans
373.281-91:
ut forma
Et ideohumanitas
formalem.
materie
significatur
partem
designate,
significai
non
forma
dicitur
est
et
essentialibus,
totius;
partibus
quasi
superaddita
quidem
quedam,
quod
eius:sed
domussuperadditur
sicutforma
forme
et materie,
scilicet
integralibus
partibus
cumpretarnen
etmateriam,
formam
scilicet
complectens
queesttotum,
magisestforma
ForAlbert's
eorumperque nataestmateria
cisione
view,cf.Wieland1972
designali."
(above,n. 76),29-31.
81Johannes
n. 34),q. 15,f. 13vb:
Versor,
Questiones
(above,
Porphirii
predicabilium
quinqu
albertiste."
"Etilluddiversimode
exponunt
82Ibid
totius
intellexisse
Albertm
., if.13vb-14ra:
quoda forma
"Quidamenimdicunt
Albertm
. . . Sed aliidicunt
tantum
<forme
nondistinguuntur
partis>re sed ratione
unaforma
distincta
cummateria
rsultat
scilicet
intellexisse
partis
quodex unioneforme
etmateria
etforma."
et a totocomposito
et a materia
realiter
a forma
partis

11:33:44 AM

VERSORANDHIS RELATION
TO THE SCHOOLSOF THOUGHT

315

the problemwhetherthe distinctionis real or rational.83His account of

the relationplaces him in the second group of Albertistsmentionedby
Versor.Accordingto Johannesde Nova Domo, in substancescomposed
of matterand formthere is a real distinctionbetweenformapartisand
The Copulata
formatotius.M
pulchenima
compiledby the Thomistsfromthe
BursaMontanaat Cologne also note thatthe opinionsconcerningthe distinctionofformapartisand formatotiusdiverge.This text argues against
those who deny that in compositesubstancesthe distinctionis real, and
thusit represents
a positioncorresponding
to Versor's accountof Thomas'
that
the
distinction
is
position(namely,
real).85On thispoint,then,Thomas
Aquinas,Johannesde Nova Domo and the Thomistsseem to agree. Both
Versorand the Thomistsin Cologne mentionthe opinionof others(some
of the Albertists,
is rational.Now
accordingto Versor)thatthe distinction
thispositioncan be foundin the worksof Heymericusde Campo- not
in the Tractatusproblematicus
divinorum.
, but in the Compendium
Here,
Heymericusexplicitlydenies that the distinctionis real.86Thus, although
it is obvious that the problemof the distinctionbetweenformatotiusand
formapartisplays a role in the school debates, at this point it seems too
of Versor'splace in those
complicatedto contributeto our understanding
debates. From a doctrinalpoint of view, it remainsunclear which position would count as distinctly
Thomisticdoctrineand which as distinctly
Albertistdoctrine.However,the way in whichVersor treatsthe problem
does reveal somethingelse: AlthoughVersor mentionsthe Albertists,
he
does not count himselfamong them.Moreover,as in the case of his discussion of inchoatio
, he does not
formaein his commentaryon the Isagoge
83Johannes
de NovaDomo,Tractatus
deesseetessentia
, q. 4,prop.2,ed.G. Meersseman,
in:Meersseman
1933(above,n. 6), 149-68.
84Ibid
in substantia
secundum
remsitreperire
formam
., 149-50:"Quamvis
composita
distinctam
realiter
contra
formam
tamen
esseformae
totius
rsultat
etemanat
totius,
partis
ab esseformae
Esseformae
totius
vocoquodperdiffinitum
dicitur
etper
partis.
implicite
diffinitionem
rei,aliiessentiam
rei,aliinaturam
explicite,
quodquidamvocant
quiditatem
formalem.
Esseveroformae
estesseenthelechiae
Actus
autem
siveenthelechia
partis
corporis.
a totoesserei."
corporis
distinguitur
85Copulata
n. 28),f. llrb.Thefamous
Lambertus
de Monteis somepukherrima
(above,
times
as themostimportant
contributor
toworks
suchas theseCopulata
, which
regarded
are collective
efforts
of themasters
of theBursaMontana
2003(above,
; cf.Kneepkens
n. 9), 117.Lambertus
de MontewasheadoftheMontana
fornineteen
years(1480-1499);
cf.Tewes1993(above,n. 8), 34.
86Heymericus
de Campo,Compendium
divinorum
in:J.B.Korolec,
IV, ed.J.B.Korolec,
"
divinorum
deCampo
wrkp.
"Compendium
, in:Studia
Heimeryka
BJ695.Dohoczenie
mediewistyczne,
9 (1968),3-90,see55.860-56.925,
esp.56.911-9.

11:33:44 AM

316

ROTTEN
PEPIJN

even take positionin the debate. Here, Versormerelylistswhat Thomas,

Albertand the different
Albertistssay. But again thereis anotherwork
in which he discussesthe same topic and argues in favourof Thomas.
In his commentaryon De enteet essentia,
, Versor poses the same question
about formapartisand formatotiusagain.87Here, he is not commenting
upon an Aristotelianor Porphyriantext, but on a work of Thomas
with the parallel passage fromhis commentary
Aquinas. The difference
on the Isagogeis revealing.Again, Versor writesthat Thomas Aquinas
argues that in compositesubstancesthere is a real distinctionbetween
formapartisand formatotius.One reason is that the formof the part can
remain when the formof the whole is corrupted;e.g., when Socrates
dies, his soul survives.Yet now Versor adheres to thisview and declares
that, althoughAlbert and othershold the opposite,theiropinion "can
easilybe provenwrong."88
4.3. ThePrinciple
ofIndividuation
The last topic I want to address brieflyis advanced byJohannesVersor
himselfas a much disputedproblem: the principleof individuationin
it is
In Versor's commentaryon De enteet essentia
corporealsubstances.89
the thirdquestion he proposes; his discussionreflectsthe controversial
statusof the issue.90Having said that there were many opinions about
87Johannes
De ente
etessentia
Versor,
Questiones
(above,n. 1),q. 6, ff.tlvb-t2ra:
super
ab invicem
etforma
forma
totius
in substantiis
utrum
"Dubitatur
partis
compositis
primo
realiter
distinguuntur."
88Ibid.,f.t2ra:"In oppositum
ratione
Et arguitur
etAvicenna.
sanctus
estdoctor
sic,
Sorte
forma
ut corrupto
remanente
forma
totius
partis,
corrumpi
quia in eodempotest
realiter
etforma
totius
forma
eiusetnonsuaanima.Igitur
humanitas
partis
corrumpitur
forma
materialibus
ad dubium
Tuncrespondetur
partis
quodin substantiis
distinguuntur.
aliiteneant
etquidam
. . . UndelicetAlbertus
totius
distincte
suntrealiter
etforma
oppositum,
faciliter
ex supradictis
hoctamen
improbari."
potest
89Backgrounds
und
Individualitt
andA. Speer(eds),
Individuum
in:J.A.Aertsen
andanalyses
York1996.Cf.inthisvolume
imMittelalter
Mediaevalia,
esp.
24),Berlin-New
(Miscellanea
umdasIndividuationsprinzip
individuando.
A. Speer,"Yliathin
ZurDiskussion
quodestprincipium
M
von
undThomas
Albertus
deNovaDomo,
beiJohannes
Hoenen,
, 266-86,
Aquin
Magnus
den
inderAuseinandersetzung
Das Prinzip
derIndividuation
Thomistae".
autem
dicunt
"Aliter
zwischen
cf.inthesame
forAlbert,
Mittelalters
undScotisten
desausgehenden
Albertisten
, 338-52;
, Thomisten
des
inderAnthropologie
undIndividualitt
vonIndividuum
volume
alsoH. Anzulewicz,
Grundlagen
The
viewcf.alsoM.J.F.M.
Albertus
Hoenen,
, 124-60,
esp.132-6.FortheThomistic
Magnus
Sources
andAlbertist
Thomistic
in15th-Century
Thomistic
, in:Medioevo.
ofIndividuation
Principle
XVIII (1992),327-57.
dellafilosofia
Rivista
di storia
medievale,
90Johannes
n. 1),q. 3, ff.s5ra:"Utrum
De ente
etessentia
Versor,
Questiones
(above,
super
individuationis."
sitprincipium
materia

11:33:44 AM

VERSORANDHIS RELATION
TO THE SCHOOLSOF THOUGHT

317

the principleof individuation,Versor decides to consideronly three of

them: The first,which is ascribed to Giles of Rome, is that the principle of individuationis quantity;the second, which is ascribed to Albert
the Great, is that it is matter;the third,which is defendedby Thomas
, is that it is signatematter.91
Aquinas in De enteet essentia
offers
a similaraccountof thisissuein theTractatus
de
Heymericus Campo
He
does
not
consider
Giles' view, but he representsAlbert
problematicus.
and Thomas in the same way.92The same holds forthe professorswho
lead the BursaLaurentiana
afterHeymericus,such as Arnold of Tongeren
and Gerald of Harderwijk.They defendthe "sententiavenerabilisdomini
Alberti"(Arnold)that the principleof individuationis matteragainstthe
- a
Thomisticthesisthatit is mattersignatedby quantity
positionwhich
is indeed defendedby the ThomisticCopulata
pulchemmaP
Again,the same
issueand thesame Albertist
and Thomistpositionsoccurin thePromptuarium
and Thomistsolutions
argumentorum
(Cologne 1492),whichdiscussesAlbertist
to a number of logical questions.94In short,it is apparent frommany
91Ibid
estsecundo
individuations
multe
fuerunt
I, f.s5va:"Sciendum
quodde principio
sedsolum
ad presens
de tribus
videndum
est.PrimaopinioestEgidiide Rhoma
opiniones,
de se estprincipium
dicentis
individuationis.
SecundaestAlberti
dicentis
quodquantitas
estde se hecetincommunicabilis
etde se sufficiens
reddere
formam
quodmateria
quam
et sicesttotaleet sufficiens
individuationis
secunincommunicabilem;
suscipit
principium
dumipsum.
verofuit
(. . .) Tertia
opiniosanciiThomedicentis
quodmateria
signata
quantitate
estprincipium
individuationis
etnonmateria
modoaccepta."
Cf.Thomas
quocumque
de Aquino,
De ente
etessentia
vol.XLIII,Roma1976,371.73-7:
"Et
, cap.2, ed. Leonina,
ideosciendum
estquodmateria
nonquolibet
modoaccepta
estindiuiduationis
principium,
sedsolum
materia
etdicomateriam
dimensionibus
signata;
signatam
quesubdeterminatis
considerato."
92Heymericus
de Campo,Problemata
inter
Albertm
etSanctum
Thomam
Magnum
(above,
n. 13),probi.3, ff.b4v-b6v.
ForJohannes
de NovaDomo,cf.Speer1996(above,
n. 89).
93Heymericus
de Campo,Ibid.Gerardus
de Harderwyck,
inIsagogas
Commentaria
Porphirii
on theold logic),Cologne1494,ff.EElra-EE2vb;
commentary
(partofhiscomplete
cf.Voullime
1903(above,n. 1), 195 (no.439).Arnoldus
de Tungeris,
sive
Epitomata
veteris
etnove
Arestotelis
reparationes
logice
(above,n. 16),ff.d2v-d3r:
"Queritur
quidestprinindividuationis.
Solutioquodde hocsuntapuddiversos
valdediverse
etvarieopincipium
dimissis
verior
videtur
sententia
venerabilis
domini
Alberti
dicentis
iones,quibusomnibus
se solaestprincipium
individuationis."
quodmateria
Copulata
pulcherrima
(above,n. 28),
ff.20vb-21va,
atf.20vb:"relictis
omnibus
istisopinionibus
dicendum
quodinmaterialibus
materia
sitprincipium
individuationis."
Arnold
ofTongeren
alsodiscusses
signata
adequatum
andrejects
theScotist
ofhaecceitas
de Tungeris,
Ibid.
., f. d3r),and the
theory
(Arnoldus
Thomists
oftheMontana
evendiscuss
andofcourseThomas)
Albert
theviewsof
(besides
ofGhent
andGilesofRome(Copulata
n.28),ff.20vb-21va).
Scotus,
Henry
(above,
pulcherrima
94ThePromptuarium
was(anonymously)
in Cologne
argumentorum
printed
byH. Quentell
in 1492;ithasbeenfalsely
ascribed
to Heymericus
andwasreprinted
as Heymericus
de
1903(above,n. 1),431 (no.
1992.Cf.Voullime
, Frankfurt/Main
Campo,Promptuarium
andHoenen1992(above,
n. 89),351-3.Forthequestion
, ff.ilr-i3v
980).SeePromptuarium

11:33:44 AM

318

RUTTEN
PEPIJN

issue
sourcesthatthe problemof individuationwas a highlycontroversial
at the timeand, in particular,thatAlbertistsand Thomistsheld different
opinionsabout it.
In his commentaryon De enteet essentia
, JohannesVersor,determining
his solutionto the questionproposed,takesover Thomas' standpointand
statesthatmatter"signated"by quantityis the sufficient
principleof indithis in the second conclusion,statingthat the
viduation.95He reaffirms
between the essence of a species and the essence of an
only difference
individuallies in the fact that in the firstcase matteris not signate,
whereasin the second case it is. Again, theseare almostliterallyThomas'
words.96Thereafter,Versor discussesthe doctrinesof Giles of Rome and
Albertthe Great. His rejectionof both opinionsis unequivocal.97As in
the case of the distinctionbetweenformapartisand formatotius
, Versor's
of
the doctor
to
a
clear-cut
defence
text
amounts
on
Thomas'
commentary
sanctus.There is no sign at all of sympathytowardsAlbert'spoint of
view.98Compared to his writingson the logicavetus
, the commentaryon
Schools
LateMedieval
seeM.J.F.M.
ofthecontents,
ofauthorship
andan analysis
Hoenen,
ThePromptuarium
Textbooks.
in theMirror
(Cologne
argumentaram
ofUniversity
ofThought
andWieland1995(above,n. 6), 329-69.
Schneider
1492),in:Hoenen,
95Johannes
n. 1),q. 3,f.s5va:"Conclusio
Deente
etessentia
Versor,
Questiones
(above,
super
individuationis."
estsufficiens
Materia
principium
signata
prima:
quantitate
96Ibidr.
non
ut Sortiset hominis,
"Conclusio
secunda:Essentia
specieiet individui,
De ente
etessentia
Cf.Thomasde Aquino,
et insignatum."
diffrant
nisipenessignatum
,
indiffinitione
materia
"Hecautem
vol.XLIII,Roma1976,371.77-87:
cap.2,ed.Leonina,
in diffinitione
Sortis
si
sedponeretur
in quantum
esthomononponitur,
que esthominis
nonsignata:
materia
In diffinitione
autemhominis
haberet.
Sortesdiffinitionem
ponitur
hocos etheccaro,sedos etcaroabsolute,
hominis
nonenimin diffinitione
que
ponitur
Sortis
hominis
etessentia
Sic ergopatetquodessentia
hominis
nonsignata.
suntmateria
et nonsignatum."
nisisecundum
nondiffrant
signatum
97Johannes
"Dubitatur
n. 1),q. 3,f.s5va-b:
Deente
etessentia
Versor,
Questiones
(above,
super
de
utdicitEgidius
individuationis
de se sitprincipium
sufficiens,
quantitas
primoutrum
de se nonestsufficiens
ad dubium
Rhoma. . . Respondetur
principium
quodquantitas
etsufficiens
sitde setotale
utrum
materia
secundo
. . . Dubitatur
individuationis
principium
se
secundum
ad dubium
. . . Respondetur
utdicitAlbertus
individuationis,
quodmateria
individuationis."
principium
acceptanonesttotalenecsufficiens
98Ibid.,ff.s5vb-s6ra:
materia
sitde se totaleet sufficiens
secundo
utrum
"Dubitatur
Et videtur
ut dicitAlbertus.
individuationis,
[seclusus
quodsic,quia seclusis
principium
et habent
duo individua
a Sorteet Platoneadhucremanent
accidentibus
ed.]omnibus
secundum
ad dubium
distinctas.
realiter
formas
et materias
quodmateria
Respondetur
Patetquia materia
individuationis.
se acceptanonesttotalenec sufficiens
principium
vel ad multaindiad multas
et indifferens
se acceptaestcommunis
secundum
species
Et
ad hicet nuncvel ad particulare.
determinationis
nonestprincipium
vidua.Igitur
Ad
individuationis.
dicisufficiens
se acceptanonpotest
secundum
sicmateria
principium
adhucremanera SorteetPlatone
accidentibus
omnibus
rationem
dubiidicitur
quodseclusis
suam
retineret
nammateria
entindividu
[i]a, quia in quolibetessetmateriasignata,

11:33:44 AM

TO THE SCHOOLSOF THOUGHT

VERSORANDHIS RELATION

319

character.Whereas in the first

is of an entirelydifferent
De enteet essentia
Versor remainsneutralon the issues of inchoatio
, in
formaeand formatotius
also
on
issues
but
on
these
not
the second he sides with Aquinas,
just
towards
Thereforeit seemsthathis neutrality
theprincipleof individuation.
is a matterof
Albertin his commentarieson Porphyryand the Categories
choice ratherthan a slip of the pen. How could thisapparentlydeliberate
strategybe accounted for?
' Commentaries
on theOld Logic
and Thomas
5. VersoriUse ofAlbert's
The reasonwhyVersoroftenseemsto agreewithAlbertin his commentaries
is that large parts of these
on Porphyry'sIsagogeand Aristotle'sCategories
are based on thoseof Albert.We have seen severalexamples
commentaries
of this in the previoussections(see also Appendix 1). The reason why
he used Albert'scommentariesis obvious: Thomas did not writecommentarieson these works.Hence, even if Versor preferredto draw on
he had no
in the case of the Isagogeand the Categories
Thomas' writings,
scholastic
author
a
For
choice but to rely on Albert.
fifteenth-century
such as Versor,Thomas and Albertwere the mostprominentauthorities
fromwithinthe scholastictradition.He may have preferredThomas,
but stillAlbertwould have been the natural second choice. Below, we
will see that Versor indeed preferredThomas, for in the case of Peri
he did have a choice, and he chose to use Thomas' commenhermeneias
tary.First,some more samples will illustratepreciselyhow Versor used
Albert'scommentaries.
The second question Versor poses in his commentaryon Porphyry's
Isagogeis: Whetherlogic should be called a part of philosophy."Albert
the Great discussesthe same questionin the second chapterof the first
m A
treatiseof his Liberde praedicabilibus.
comparison of the two texts
clearlyindicatesthatVersor'stextis an adaptation(in some instancesno
more than an excerpt)fromAlbert'schapter,althoughVersor does not
referto Albertat all.101Versor rephrasesAlbert'sargumentsaccordingto
ad esseparratione
cuiusessetdeterminata
subquantitate,
quampriushabuit
signationem
ticolare."
99Johannes
artem
totam
veterem
Versor,
Quaestiones
(above,n. 34),q. 2, ff.2vb-3ra.
super
100
omnia
Liber
depraedicabilibus,
tr. 1, c. 2, ed. A. Borgnet
Albertus
,
(Opera
Magnus,
vol.I), Parisiis
1890,2b-4a.
101Cf.Fliieler
ofthiscommon
medieval
2001(above,n. 33),esp.183,foran account
practice.

11:33:44 AM

320

RUTTEN
PEPIJN

the rigidscheme of his own text,which is composed and formulatedin

a way that guaranteesmaximumstructuralclarity:Questions startwith
secundo
, etc.) and seriesof arguments
, argumentsare counted{primo,
queritur
are introducedby phraseslike arguitur
and counter-arguments
, in
quodnon
conclusio
are
marked
as
In
conclusions
etc.
,
,
addition,
prima
arguitur
oppositum
marked
sciand
other
of
interest
are
distinctions
etc.; important
by
points
are introducedby dubitatur
endum
, etc.; additionalcounter-arguments
primo
Versor's argumentationfollowsalong
and theirrejectionsby respondetur.
the lines set out by Albert.Their answer to the question raised is that
logic is a part of philosophy,if philosophyis takenin a generalsense.102
In the firstargumentquodnon(to prove that logic is not a part of philosophy)Versor rephrasesAlbert'swords in the manner describedand
also adds a referenceto Aristotle:
Albertus
Versor,
, Johannes
Questiones
predicabilium
quinqu
Magnus,Liberdepraedicabilibus
tr.1,c. 2, ed. A. Borgnet,
2b-3a:
Porphirii,
q. 2, f.2vb:
Philoautoritate
estomnis "Arguitur
scientiam
"Hancautem
quodnonprimo
quimodus
tantum
tres
esse sophisextoMetaphisice
ponentis
quidamnullampartem
philosophiae,
mathematicam
non
nisitres partes
dicentes
, scilicet
contendunt,
phisicam,
philosophie
philosophiae
mathe-etmethaphisicam
scilicet
essepartes
, ergoet cetera."
physicam,
philosophiae,
etmetaphysicam
maticam
sivedisciplinabilem,
sivedivinarti."
The second argumentquodnonalso correspondsto Albert'sargument(see
Appendix 2). The thirdargumentwordlyreflectsAlbert'stextagain, the
In Albert's
and linguisticsimplifications.
onlychangesbeing some stylistic
assertionis
"Addunt
etiam
ad
suae
the
text,
argument begins by:
Versor replaces this phrase by the words
confirmationem,
quod . .
"Tertio arguitur."Likewise,Albert'sfinal phrase "nec videtur. . . contineri"is abridgedby Versor:
Ibid
Albertus
Versor,
., f.3ra:
Ibid.,3a:
Johannes
Magnus,
cum
recuius
reimodus
confirma-"Tertio
ad suaeassertionis
Nullius
"Addunt
etiam
arguitur:
Sed /oinsuigeneris
divisionem.
venit
cumrecujus estmodus
reimodus,
tionem,
quodnullius
nonvenit
indiviConstat gicaestmodus
ingeneris
suidivisionem.
modus
venit
est,
ergo
philosophie,
dictamodussionem
autem,quod logica
parseius."
philosophie
tanquam
generaliter
adphilovenire
videtur
est.
Nonergo
philosophiae
inaliquaparte
divisionem
, necvidetur
sophiae
contineri."
hujus
generis
quodestphilosophia
102
omnia
Liber
depraedicabilibus
Albertus
,
, tr. 1, c. 2, ed. A. Borgnet
(Opera
Magnus,
vol.I), Parisiis
Versor,
Questiones
1890,4a-b;Johannes
Porphirii
(above,
quinqu
predicabilium
n. 34),q. 2, f.3rb.

11:33:44 AM

VERSORANDHIS RELATION
TO THE SCHOOLSOF THOUGHT

321

The argumentsquod sic are again roughlythe same in both texts,

althoughVersor'sversionof the firstis considerablyshorterthan Albert's:
Where Albertoffersa lengthyexpositionof the diverseways in which
Versor omits this part
beings can be related to human understanding,
which
and simplyconcludesthatsincelogic concernssecondaryintentions,
are beings,it is a part of philosophy.Versor'ssecond and thirdarguments
are again copied almostwordlyfromAlbert'stext (see Appendix 2).
In his commentaryon Perhermeneias
(publishedin the same volume as
on Porphyry
and the Categories103)
Versorfollowsa similar
thecommentaries
this
his
text
does
fromAlbert'scomnot
derive
time,
procedure.Only
from
that
Thomas
The
close
but
of
relationbetween
mentary,
Aquinas.104
parts of Versor's text and that of Aquinas becomes apparent from a
passage concerningAristotle'sremarkthat truthand falsitypertain to
the intellectin so far as it composes and divides.105
Versor listsseveral
all
. . .) that are
taken fromThomas. His own
pointsto notice (,sciendum
consistsmainlyof changingthe orderof the words:Whereas
contribution
Thomas firstnames both operations ("indiuisibilium intelligencia"
and "secundum quod huiusmodiSimpliciaconcepta simul componitet
diuidit")and then states that truthand falsityare not in the firstbut
in the second operation("in hac secunda operatione. . . inueniturueritas
et falsitas... in primaoperationenon inuenitur"),
Versorplaces the denial
of truthand falsityin the firstoperationrightafterthe descriptionof this
... et in hac operatione. . .
operation("Una est simpliciumintelligentia
non est Veritasvel falsitas. . . Alia est . . . compositio et divisio... et
in hac operatione... est Veritasvel falsitas).In addition,Versor simplifiesThomas' textby omittingthe word "indivisibilia"and insteadusing
"simplicia" twice, whereas Thomas uses both words to denote simple
concepts:

103
totam
veterem
artem
Versor,
Quaestiones
Johannes
(above,n. 34).
super
104
Gf.alsoKneepkens
2003(above,n. 9), 116-7.
105
The complete
textofthispassageis givenbelowin Appendix
3. Cf.Thomasde
libri
lib.1,lect.3, ed. Leonina,
Editioalteraretractata,
vol.
Expositio
Aquino,
Peiyermenias,
libri
Perihermeniarum
1*1,Roma-Paris
1989,14.39-16.138;
Versor,
Questiones
Johannes
primi
Arestotelis
n. 34),q. 3,if.61va-b.
Forother
Thomasde Aquino,
(above,
examples,
compare
Ibid.
Ibid.
and 12.184-208,
and
, 6.80-8.168,
, lect.2, 9.20-11.133
Ibid.,lect.4, 21.85-107
toJohannes
ff.59va-b,
23.207-24.279
Versor,
Ibid.,
60rb-60va,
60vb,62va,and62vb-63ra,
respectively.

11:33:44 AM

322

ROTTEN
PEPIJN

Periherlibri
libriPeryerThomasde Aquino,Expositio
Versor,
Questiones
primi
Johannes
vol.1*1, meniarum
lib.1,lectio3,ed.Leonina,
Arestotelis,
q. 3, ff.61va-b.
menias,
14.39-16.138.
secundo
Vbioportet
dicebatur,
quod,utprius
opera-Sciendum
quodunaduarum
intelligere
Unaestsimplicium
intellectus.
estoperatio
estindiuisibilium
tionum
intellectus
, duplex
intelligencia
intelintellectus
absolute
scilicet
cuius- intelligentia,
absolute
scilicet
intellectus
inquantum
quando
intelligit
essentiam
sive
rei
se
siue
essenciam
rei
per
cuiuscumque
quidditatem
ligit
per
ipsam,
cunque quiditatem
velquidestalbum
uel aliud seipsam,
uelquidalbum
;
utputa
quidesthomo
putaquidesthomo
non
uthabettextus,
estsecun- et in hac operatione,
intellectus
aliauero
huiusmodi;
operatio
intellecAliaestoperatio
velfalsitas.
simul estVeritas
dumquodhuiusmodi
concepta
Simplicia
etdivisio,
Dicitergoquod in hac tusqueestcompositio
etdiuidit.
que fitcum
componit
et
etdividit;
simul
s et intellectus
scilicet
secunda
componit
intellectus,
Simplicia
componenti
operatione
etcomintellectus
sicdividentis
ueritas
etfalsitas,
inuenitur
diuidentis,
relinquensinhacoperatione
velfalsitas.
estventas
. . . ponents
noninuenitur
operatione
quodinprima
In Versor's next three items,fragmentsof Thomas' commentarykeep
appearing(see Appendix 3). From these textualcomparisons,it becomes
clear thatJohn Versor does not limit his resourcesto the works of a
thinker.He draws inspirationfromboth Albertand
single authoritative
Thomas. In particular,his use of Albert'scommentarieson the Isagoge
and the Categories
explains why he would seem to agree with Albertin
his own commentarieson thesewritings:His discussionof Porphyry'sor
Aristotle'stextis oftennot much more than a copy of Albert'sexposition.
forthepassage about thecategoryof substance
This has been demonstrated
on
fromVersor'scommentary the Categories
( 3; cf. Appendix 1) and for
two passages fromhis commentaryon Porphyry:one about incipientformality( 4.1), and one about logic as a part of philosophy(thissection).
However, the consensusis only apparent. In the same sections(and in
4.2) I have shown that Versor does not take sides with eitherAlbert
or Thomas in these logical works,whereas in some of his otherworks
he commits
(his commentarieson the Physicsand on De enteet essentia)
himselfto the doctrineof Aquinas- even if these worksare based (as is
on thePhysics
the case withthe commentary
, cf. 4.1) on thecommentaries
of both Thomas and Albert.
reconsidered
"Thomism"
6. Versor's
The reason why Versor relies on Albertfor his own commentarieson
is that he had no choice, because Thomas
the Isagogeand the Categories
did not writecommentarieson those works.This also explainsVersor's
neutralitytowardsAlbert.It would have been no sinecureforVersor to
base his own commentaryon Albert's,while at the same time criticising

11:33:44 AM

TO THE SCHOOLSOF THOUGHT

VERSORANDHIS RELATION

323

Albertfor every disagreementwith Thomas. However that may be, it

should be clear by now that neitheron account of his use of Albert's
works,nor by reasonof the philosophicalviewsdefendedin his ownworks
On the whole, Versor's docVersor can be regardedas an Albertist.106
trinalprofileseems indistinctand at best a blurredformof Thomism.107
This "albertizingThomism" may have been typicalof a realisttradition
in an environment(probablyParis) where "Albertists"and "Thomists''
were not so much rival parties as allies facinga common enemy (e.g.,
nominalismor Scotism).108
However,severalof Versor'sworkswereprinted
at Cologne by orderof the Thomists,who evidentlyalso used them.This
was one of the reasons put forwardfor acceptingthe view that Versor
should be considereda Thomist (cf. 2). Let us have a closer look at
those Cologne editionsof Versor'sphilosophicalworks.
At the end of the fifteenth
century,Cologne was at the same timethe
centreof Thomist-Albertist
rivalryand of the promotionand expansion
of Versor'slegacy.Both phenomenaare closelyrelatedto the educational
programof the arts facultyin Cologne, and they are both reflectedin
thebook productionin Cologne duringthe lasttwo decades of thefifteenth
or Summulae
logicales
by
century.The worksof Aristotleand the Tractatus
Peter of Spain occupied a centralplace in the educationalprogramof
In his Der Buchdruck
Klns
the artsfacultiesat late medievaluniversities.109
a
list
of
E.
Voullime
bis zum Ende desfnfzehnten
,
compiled
Jahrhunderts
books printedat Cologne before 1500, which includes over 1200 titles.
kindsof works(quaestiones,
Among these are 88 titlesconcerningdifferent
106
in hiscommentary
on
Remember
whendiscussing
thatVersor,
incipient
formality
he rejects
Albert's
cf.the
refers
tothefirst
bookofthePhysics
, inwhich
theory;
Porphyry,
innote67 above.Thatitis notsuspicious
fora Thomist
toquoteAlbert
(even
quotation
Albert
le
is shown,
withrespect
toJohnCapreolus,
by S.-Th.Bonino,
quitefrequently)
Grand
danslesDefensiones
deJeanCabrol
la recherche
surlesogines
(f 1444).Contribution
de thologie
et de philosophie,
deValbertisme
Revuedoctrinale
] in: Revuethomiste:
tardif,
99-1(1999),369-425.
107Cf.theremarks
andZwiezawski
byRitter
quotedin n. 22 above.
108Forthe"albertizing
in thisrespect
Thomism"
cf.note9 above.Interesting
is the
ofVersor's
on theMetaphysics
whichremarks
thatit
ofa manuscript
explicit
commentary
Cf.themanuscript
knihovna
eskRepubliky,
follows
themodus
Praha,Nrodn
parisiensis.
cod.IV.E.25,f.96v,as quotedbyFleler
1994(above,n. 33),82: "Expliciunt
questiones
XII librorum
secundum
modumparisiensem
. . .". Cf.alsothequotation
Metaphysicae
in note70 above,to theeffect
from
another
thatVersor's
works
are
manuscript
physical
collected
from
thecommentaries
ofbothAlbert
theGreatandThomasAquinas.
109ForCologne,
seeF.J.vonBianco,
DiealteUniversitt
Kln
unddiesptem
GelehrtenSchulen
dieser
Stadt
oftheArtsFaculty
from1398).
, I. Theil,Kln1855,71 (statutes

11:33:44 AM

324

ROTTEN
PEPIJN

, etc.) relatedto writingsof Aristotleand Peterof Spain

copulata,
reparationes
or
Summulae
).110In a general sense I
logicaksand Parva bgicalia
{Tractatus
All
as
will referto these works "commentaries". of these are worksby
authors;not one of Albert'sor Thomas' commentaries
fifteenth-century
on the corpusaristotelicum
were printed.The titlesand colophons quoted
a
clear
indicationof the situationat Cologne: 31 of
Voullime
by
give
the 88 commentariesinclude a referenceto the Thomisticdoctrineof
the BursaMontana
; 20 include a referenceto the Albertistdoctrineof the
Bursa Laurentiana'
three include a referenceto Scotism; one volume of
Peter
of Spain's Summulae
) has no referenceto any via.m
copulata(on
Clearly the only school doctrinesrelevantin Cologne at the time were
Thomism and Albertism.The rest of the 88 titlesare works by John
Versor: in total 33 titles of commentarieson works of Aristotle(28)
and Peter of Spain (5).112Thus, John Versor is the authorof more than
one thirdof all commentarieson the basic philosophicalworksprinted
at Cologne before1500, whichmakeshim by farthe mostprintedauthor
in this domain.

110
because
ofitsextensive
n. 1).Voullime's
isprecious
1903(above,
Cf.Voullime
study
A smallnumber
ofdubiouscases(suchas
fromtitlepagesand colophons.
quotations
suchquotations;
theseI have
islisted
without
works
listed
untraceable
byother
repertories)
listedseparately
in mystatistics.
It shouldbe notedthatsomeofthetitles
notincluded
wereactually
volumes)
pub(andregarded
byhimas separately
published
byVoullime
n. 4).
cf.Birkenmajer
1925(above,
lished
(aspartsofoneandthesamevolume);
together
111Someexamples
exautoribus
inunum
diversis
oftitles
are:Copulata
logice
corrogata
pukhmima
Thome
etiuxta
secundum
viam
dividoctoris
deAquino
cumtextu
eiusdem
artem
Arestotelis
inveterem
secundum
Arestotelis
inbursa
Montis
Colonie
(no.133);Metheororum
regentium
processum
magistrorum
librorum
deceloet
Coloniensis
burse
laurentii
studii
albertistarum
(no. 149);Commentarla
processum
Colonie
in
Alberti
etprocessum
iuxta
viam
venerabilis
domini
mundo
Arestotelis
regentium
magistrorum
iuxta
doctrinam
Arestotelis
cumtextu
tres
libros
deAnima
bursa
Laurentii
super
(no.408);Copulata
tractatuum
Petri
omnium
sancti
Thome
deAquino
doctoris
excellentissimi
Hispani
(no.723);Copulata
doctrinam
diviThome
cumtextu
secundum
etparvorum
etiam
Aquinatis
logicalium
sincathegreumatum
circa
libros
Montis
Colonie
inbursa
iuxta
phisiregentium
(no.928);Positiones
magistrorum
processum
Colonie
inbursa
etdisputativum
Arestotelis
iuxta
ordinarium
corum
etdeanima
magistrorum
processum
necessarie
minus
utiles
etrespondendum
non
adopponendum
montis
(no.977);allquoted
quam
regentium
tothebursae
works
thatarerelated
n. 1).I havenotincluded
1903(above,
after
Voullime
or PeterofSpain,suchas thePromptuarium
to Aristotle
butnot(explicitly)
argumentorum
on Donatus.
(above,n. 94) orcommentaries
112Forexample:
totam
veterem
artem
Versoris
domini
venerabilis
(no.
Questiones
super
Joannis
cum
textu
Petri
tractatus
(no.1240);cf.Voullime
hyspani
Magisti
super
septem
1213);Dictaversoris
1930(above,n. 1).

11:33:44 AM

TO THE SCHOOLSOF THOUGHT

VERSORANDHIS RELATION

325

in Cologne
1500.
onAristotle
andPeter
Table 1: Commentaries
before
ofSpainprinted
Voullimenos.
Schooldesignation
or author
on
on
Commentaries
Commentaries
Peterof Spain
Aristotle

Total numberof
titles

Thomistic
/Bursa 132-134,136-140, 921, 922, 927-932, 31
113
Montana
150, 720-731,977 1135
Bursa
Mbertist/
114
Laurentiana

141, 142, 149, 159, 167,443(b),

160, 164, 165,408, 444-446
438-443(a),610,
1016115
JohannesVersor 144, 145, 147, 148, 1239-1243
1211-1218,12201222, 1224-1236
"ad mentem
352-354
JohannisScoti"
no designation
925

20

33
3
1

n. 1).
Voullime
1903(cf.above,
Source:
Of those 33 worksby Versor, 25 contain no referencesto the Cologne
bursaeat all. Five are worksthatwere (accordingto theirexplicits)revised
Of the threeremainingworks,two are
by mastersof the BursaCorneliana.
bursemontis
and one as in via sancti
processum
presentedas being secundum
Whereas 51 worksby otherauthorscontainreferencesto the rival
Thome.
of the Universityat Cologne, only these
parties(Thomistsand Albertists)
three(out of 33) worksby Versorsuggestthathe may have been regarded
as a Thomist at Cologne. Two of the 25 titleswithoutreferenceto the
because of theirexplicits,which mencollegesin Cologne are intriguing
versoris
: Et sic terminantur
et mensVersons
tion a processus
superduos
questiones
113The mostimportant
is Lambertus
de Monte(nos.
authoramongtheThomists
720-731).
114
de Harderwyck
is Gerardus
The mostimportant
author
(nos.
amongtheAlbertists
to Gerardus,
is actually
No. 442,although
ascribed
byJohannes
438-446).
byVoullime
de Nrtingen;
cf.Birkenmajer
1925(above,n. 4), 135,n. 1.
115
librorum
totius
naturalis
Albertist
workReparationes
No. 1016is thecryptophilosophiae
Aristotle's
Albertistarum
etThomistarum
secundum
(above,n. 63),whichsummarizes
processum
a neutral
thetitlemight
worksin accordance
withAlbert,
suggest
although
physical
cf.Hoenen1993(above,n. 43).
approach;

11:33:44 AM

RUTTEN
PEPIJN

326

et mentem
eiusdem
secundum
Arestotelis
et corruptione
librosdegeneratione
processum
conecte(no. 1231); Et sic terminantur
ver
sortsdiligentissime
magisti
questiones
Arestotelis
secundum
et corruptione
superduoslibrosde generatione
Joannisversons
correcte
versons
etmentem
eiusdem
verum
(no. 1232). These
diligentissime
processum
solutionto our problem.Could it be thatVersor
titlessuggesta different
was regardedas an authoritysui generisi
onAristotle
andPeter
commentaries
Table 2: Versori
ofSpain
in Cologne
1500.
before
printed
Total number
of titles

Schooldesignation

Voullimenos.

no designation

144, 145, 147, 148, 1211-1213, 23

1215, 1217, 1218, 1221, 1222,
1226-1228,1233, 1235, 1236,
1239-1243
5
1214, 1216, 1220, 1224, 1225

revisedby mastersof the

BursaCorneliana
"secundum
processum
bursemontis"
"in via sanctiThome"
"secundum(verum)
et mentem
processum
eiusdemversoris
correcte"
diligentissime

1230, 1234

1229
1231, 1232

1
2

n. 1).
1903(cf.above,
Source:
Voullime
etcorruptione
The two editionsof Versor'squestionson De generatione
(Voull.
et
1231 and 1232) that are presentedas being secundum
processum mentem
in
1489 and 1493
Henricus
were
Versoris
eiusdem
Quentell
printed by
These questionswere also printedtwice before,namelyby
respectively.
TheodoricusMolner in 1485/6 and by Conradus Welkerin 1488 (Voull.
were
1230 and 1234). In all four cases, the questionson De generatione
celo
on
De
Versor's
also
included
which
volume
of
a
questions
larger
part
first
In
the
alia
.116
and the Parvantur
etmundo
addition,
(Molner
, theMeteora
1485/6), third(Quentell 1489) and fourth(Quentell 1493) volumes all
includedworksby the ThomistGerardusde Monte: both his commentary
concordantiam
ostendens
on De enteetessentia
(withThomas' text)and his Tractatus
116Birkenmajer
1925(above,n. 4).

11:33:44 AM

TO THE SCHOOLSOF THOUGHT

VERSORANDHIS RELATION

327

These volumes were therefore

Sancii Thomaeet DominiAlberti}11
dictorum
Bursa
Montana
the
commissioned
, of whichGerardusde Monte
by
probably
had
been
one of the most illustrious
de
of
(critic Heymericus Campo)
That explainswhythe firsttwo editions(Voull. 1230 and 1234)
leaders.118
ationeare (accordingto theirexplicits)
of Versor'scommentaryon De gener
This
means
thatthe Thomistsof theMontana
secundum
burse
montis.
processum
if
as
it
were a genuineThomistictext.
used
Versor's
commentary
initially
They may even have adapted it to make it harmonizewith theirown
doctrines.However,the reprints(Voull. 1231 and 1232) indicatethatthe
text has been "carefullycorrectedaccordingto the true procedureand
intentionof Versor", which makes sense if it means that the text has
been restoredto its originalform.So it would seem that the Thomists
of the MontanafirstregardedVersor as a Thomist,but eventuallyhad to
of the
recognizethathe was not "one of theirown". The contraposition
Versoris
bursemontis
and the verus
processus
clearlyshowsthatVersor
processus
does not fitin the Thomist-Albertist
rivalry.
The editionsthat were in all probabilitycommissionedby the Bursa
Corneliana
(the otherThomisticcollege at Cologne) confirmthat Versor's
and also that they were revisedfor
writingswere used for instruction,
conecte
... in bursamagthatpurpose: Some of them are only accuratissime
ad communem
scholarium
utilitatem
istiCornelii
de Dordraco
(Voull. 1225; 1220
burseCornelii
and 1224 similar),but othersare a magistris
quibusipsasincumbit
studioatquediligentia
dernorevise
ac emendate
exercere
summo
, conecte
(Voull. 1214
it
and 1216). From the factthat theyused Versor's textsforinstruction,
with
is evidentthatthe Thomistsin Cologne recognizedVersor'saffinity
Thomas Aquinas. One edition of his commentaryon De celo(included
in the volume printedby Quentell in 1493; Voull. 1229) bears the title
subtilissime
in via sanctiThomemagisti
Questiones
Johannisversons
superlibros
is
an
that
de celoet mundo
which
confirmation
of
,
explicit
recognition.But
it is also the only explicitstatementof Versor's connectionto the "way
of Thomas Aquinas" in the tidesand colophonsof all the Cologne editions.
mastersand
Moreover,fourof the fiveworkscorrectedby the Corneliana
a
is thesame
bear
woodcut
on
their
title
which
printedby Quentell
pages,
in all fourof them: The woodcut depictsa teacher surroundedby four
pupils. Writtenbelow it are the words: "Versor cum discipulissuis."119
117
Ibid.
118Gf.inter
al. Meersseman
1935(above,n. 6),passim.
119Cf.Voullime
1903(above,n. 1),520-4(nos.1214,1216,1220,1225).

11:33:44 AM

328

RUTTEN
PEPIJN

Similar woodcuts depictingThomas or Albertin the same way can be

found in many works of the other colleges {Montanaand Laurentiana).
This is anotherclear indicationthatVersor was not deemed a Thomist,
Thomas and his pupilswould have
in whichcase a woodcutrepresenting
been more appropriate.Instead,thesewoodcutsin Versor'sworks(edited
by thoseThomistsat Cologne who supposedlyhad the closestconnection
to Versor)121
promotehis authorityas an independentteacher,on a level
withAlbertand Thomas.
7. Conclusion
on Aristotleand Peterof Spain were printed
All of Versor'scommentaries
in Cologne, most of themseveraltimes.The Thomistsin Cologne, espeYet in most of
, used them for instruction.
cially at the Bursa Corneliana
thereis no linkbetweenVersorand theseThomists
thetitlesand imprints
withAquinas. Rather,
whichis tellingpreciselybecause of Versor'saffinity
the titlessuggest(as does the sheer quantityof editions)thatVersor was
an authorityon a par withAlbertand Thomas.122Versor'scommentaries
Albertistarum
Thomistarum
or theprocessus
do not followtheprocessus
, but are
et
mentem
eiusdem
Versoris.
In
the
of the
secundum
eyes
composed
processum
Thomistsand Albertistsat Cologne, Versor obviouslyhad his own way
of commentingon Aristotle.The factthat he was not fromthe Cologne
milieu,thathe was not a memberof one of the rivalcolleges,is decisive
show how thephilosophical
here.The books printedby orderof the bursae
schoolsin Cologne definedthemselves:by referenceto the via of Thomas
of theirown college (in most cases either
or Albertand to the processus
Versorhad to be regarded
theMontanaor theLaurentiana
).123In thissetting,
as an outsider,not as a Thomist.
120Cf.Voullime
1903(above,n. 1),56-7,61, 66, 70, 197,199,413,487 (nos.141,
ofthistype
142,150,159,164,441,442,932,1135)andXLVIII-LV.A relevant
study
undMagister
cumdisandP. Heitz,Diedeutschen
ofwoodcuts
is W.L. Schreiber
"Accipies"
1908.
alsHilfsmittel
zurInkunabel-Bestimmung,
, Strassburg
cipulis-Holzscfmitte
121Cf.above, 2, andTewes1993(above,n. 8), 389-90.
122Thisis alsosuggested
cf.above,
as an authority;
bythefactthathewasmentioned
of"Versorismus".
n. 22),183and187,evenspeaks
1981(above,
2,esp.n. 28.Markowski
123See theexamples
in note111 aboveandHoenen2003(above,n. 35),13-4.The
from
I
have
Ibid.)thatin theincunables
(as opposedto Hoenen,
givensuggest
examples
since"via"is generally
havedifferent
"via"and"processus"
theterms
meanings,
Cologne
is associated
witha colwhereas
withan authoritative
connected
"processus"
philosopher,
andthat
content
abovealltothedoctrinal
wouldbe that"via"refers
lege.Myconjecture

11:33:44 AM

TO THE SCHOOLSOF THOUGHT

VERSORANDHIS RELATION

329

In sum, it has been shown that neitherVersor himselfnor his contemporariesattestto his alleged Thomism (not to mentionhis alleged
Albertism).From a doctrinalpoint of view, one mightstillwant to argue
that Versor neverthelesswas a Thomist.Afterall, upon examinationof
some of the fundamentalissues that divided the schools of thought(in
particularAlbertismand Thomism) in the fifteenthcentury,Versor's
to the thoughtof Thomas Aquinas than to
writingsreveal more affinity
thatof Albertthe Great. However,ifJohnVersorreceivesthe designation
that predicate is not historically
"Thomist" on account of this affinity,
In
historical
his
context,i.e. the philosophicalschool
proper
justified.
debatesof the fifteenth
century,Versorcannotbe regardedas a Thomist.
has become clearerbyjudging
ThusJohnVersor'spositionin the Wegestreit
of schools of thought(cf. 1):
it in relationto the four characteristics
Althoughhis workswere used by Thomists and his views accord with
Aquinas and the Thomistschool on severalfundamentalissues,theydo
not reveal any confessionsof loyaltyto Aquinas and they are certainly
not exclusivelybased on Aquinas' works.Whetherthat is preciselythe
reason why they were so popular, as Ritter suggested,remains to be
investigated.124
Nijmegen
RadboudUniversity
Nijmegen
Facultyof Theology

the
refers
moreto thepedagogical
(thewayandorderofexplaining
practice
"processus"
butthisneedsfurther
authoritative
investigation.
texts),
124See above,n. 22.

11:33:44 AM

330

RUTTEN
PEPIJN
Appendices

The following
appendicesoffersome of thepassagesdiscussedfromVersor's
In each case
and Perihermeneias.
commentarieson the Isagoge
, the Categories
Versor's source text (i.e., Albert'sor Thomas' commentary)is presented
in the leftcolumn.To facilitatethe comparison,I have italicisedthe correspondingwords. Therefore,the originalitalicsin Borgnet'seditionof
Albert'stexthave been omitted.
1
Appendix
Cf. 3.
libri
Liber
depraedicamentis,
tr.2, Johannes
Albertus
Versor,
Questiones
predicamentoMagnus,
Arestotelis
n.34),q. 6,f.30rb-30va:
c. 1,ed.A. Borgnet
omnia
, vol.I),Parisiisrum
(above,
(Opera
167b:
1890,166aSciendum
estprimum
substantia
accipiatur.
primoquodsubstantia
CaputI. Inquasignificarne
secundum
ordina- ens,quiapecedit
alianatura,
diffinitione
et
Jamde praedicabilibus
ut habetur
tionemeorumad unumquod est gene- tempore,
Metaphisice.
septimo
substantie
inordine
iliotractandum
est.Quia Ideodepredicamento
ralissimm
priustractandum
videndum
estinquasignificatone
estsubstantia,
ideoprimoest.Etprimo
autemomnium
prima
substantia
secundum
dicamus.
Estautem
substantiae
desubstantia
triplexaccipiatur
quoda logico
Estigitur
circahocadvertendum
considerato.
Unaquidem
secundum
quodsub- consideratur.
substantie
etprincipalis
stantia
estparsentis
Albertus,
, quae quod,utinquitdominus
prima
Primaestinquantum
aliisexis- esttriplex
consideratio.
inseveraestetcausaestomnibus
etprincipalis
estprima
tendi.
Secundaautemsecundum
parsentis.
quodsub- substantia
Secunda
estsecundum
stantia
estprimum,
adquod
estreductio
prediquodestprimum
praedkabile
ad quodestomnium
reductio
cabile
omnium
suae coordinationis.
predicabilium
praedicabilium
secundum
Tertiaautem
que substantiam
significant.
pri- et subiicibilium
quodsubstantia
subiecad subjectumTerciaestsecundum
mm
est,ad quodsicut
quodestprimum
subjectum
tum
substat.
modopraedicabilium
omnium
quodomnibus
quocumque
adiddequoestpraedicatio.
estreductio,
sicut
Primo
modosubstantia
estessentia
Primo
modosubstantia
est
,
simplex
igitur
quidem
aliisestcausa
necin alionecab alio que in se vereestet omnibus
ensperse existens,
se necestgenus
necest
Et secundum
causam
habens:
ethocmodo essendi.
suaeexistentiae
necproprium
indinecdifferentia
et vereens,et est species
substantia
estprimum
eque
necaccidens
necuniversale
necparessentia
invariabilis
et incorruptibilis
quae viduum
Et
sed hec omniasibiaccidunt.
aliiscausa
estexistendi.
Estautem
actus ticulare,
omnibus
consihoc modoconsideratam
sub- substantiam
causae,
perquemomnia
simplex
primae
sistunt
, quiconsidrt
primus
philosophus
qualiter
quaeperse sunt:ettalemactumad drt
et
sensibilis
ad insensibilem
reducitur
suaeproducit
similitudinem
substantiae
prima substantia
ad intellectualem,
etintellectualis
ad
causa:et estperse existens
quia nonper insensibilis
Sed substantia
secundo
modoconsed divinam.
aliudvelab alioestquodsitcausatum,
in modoexis- siderata
interomniadicibilia
estprimum
ipsumestcausatum
primum
Ideo
tendiad similitudinem
quesubstantiam
significant.
primaesubstantiaeincomplexa,
ad primum
et simplicisest ad ipsamtamquam
Et haecsubstantia
simplex
productum.
omnia
alia quesubstantiam
Et simum
exlibroCausarum.
essentia
, sicuthabetur
predicabile

11:33:44 AM

VERSORANDHIS RELATION
TO THE SCHOOLSOF THOUGHT

331

haecsubstantia
secundum
habet significant
reducuntur.
Et sicdicitur
confuse
et
processum
materialitatem
et variabilitatem
et particu-inpotentia
totum
essecuiuslibet
et
substantie,
laritatem:
etdeterminabile
quorumnihilhabetsecundumestquidformabile
perdiffrentias
hoc ad diversas
substantie.
Et hocmodoa
species
quodin primacausaest,et secundum
scilicet
subratione
considerato^
quodestab ipsa.Et sicde substantia
agi- logico
primi
ad genus
ubisensibilis
substantia
adinsensibilem
reduci-predicabilis
ad quodtanquam
tur,
geneetinsensibili
'sadintellectualem
ralissimm
omniaquesubstantiam
, etintellectualis
tur,
significant
addivinam:
tractatus
de substantiareducuntur.
Terciomodoestabactu
substandi
cujusmodi
adprimum
dieta.
Et hocmodosolasubstantia
pertinet
philosophum
particularis
[Philosophum
estprimumdicitur
a quanulla
exit.
Sed
substantia,
ed.].Secundomodosubstantia
predicatio
commune
ad quodomne
estsubiectum
omnium
modo
subipraedicabile,
praedkabile
quequocumque
reducitur.
Et quia nihil iduntur
etsubstant.
Etquiainhoclibro
intendit
(quodestsubstantia)
in generetamin
de aliquonisiquodesttotum Philosophus
de ordinabili
praedicatur
etforma
totius
dicitipsius, ratione
subiicibilis
ideo
ipsius
quaetotum
quampredicabilis,
etesseipsiusquodestinpotentia
velactu. substantia
istomodoaccepta
etiam
considrt
insubstantialogicus,
in
Cumsubjectum
autem
scilicet
subratione
subiecti
primum
primi
sitcom- quoomniasuntvelde quoomniadicuntur.
(de quo omniaalia praedicantur)
a logico
positum,
oportet
quodetproprium
primumEt sic patetquomodosubstantia
sitcompositum,
etforma
totius consideratur.
praedicatum
essetotius
totum
dicenssecundum
quodest
in quo praedicatio
deipsiustotum,
potest
et haecestsubstantia
de qua intensignali:
ditlogicus.
Haecautem
substantia
estprimum
intotacoorvelsubjicitur
quodsupponitur
dinatione
descensus
et
eorum,a
perordinem
etindividua:
hocenim
species
specialissimas
inomniaquaesuntsuae
estgenus
formabile
coordinationis
etspecies
etindividua.
genera
Et cuilibet
potest
patere,
quodhaectotius
illiuscoordinationis
estprimum
principium
etestcompositum,
quiaaliternonessetin
seperseexistens.
Estautem
compositum
formale
a forma
essesecundum
, quaedicittotum
pmam
notionem
inquaratio
substantiae
intelsubstantiae,
. . . Tertioautemmodosubstantia
ligipotest
dicitur
ab actusubstandi
sub, et tuncdicitur
stantia
et omnibus
aliis
quaeperse substat,
datquodsubstant:
ethocmodo
quaesubstant,
substantia
individua
estsubstantia
sola,a qua
tamennulla
estpraedica, utinferius
patebit,
tio
: sedomnis
omnium
subjicibilitas
quaequibusestab ipsa.Et quia nos
cumque
subjiciuntur
in hoclibrointendimus
de praedicabilium
secundum
suascoordinationes
reductione
ad
ideohancsubstantiam
unum,
primam
oportet
ponere:quae tamenultimaestsecundum
ordinem
etsecundo
mododictaesubprimo
stantiae.
Secundum
intentionem
ergoprimam
substantia
estessentia,
est,nec
quaenecgenus
necindividuum
Secundo
, sedestsimplex.
species,
autem
mododictasubstantia
est,
composita

11:33:44 AM

332

RUTTEN
PEPIJN

et estprimm
sequentibus
genusomnibus
adesse
etdeterminabile
specmum
formabile
differenis
Tertioautemmododicta
etindividuorum.
etsupermateria
estdeterminata
substantia
velillud."
ficieetlocoad hocsingulare
"ratiosubstantiae
Ibid.,167a (between
and "Tertioautemmodo
potest"
intelligi
substantia"):
subdecompositione
dubium
"Si autemquaeritur,
quaesintcomponen-Sedhicoritur
Resut estgenusgeneralissimm.
seexquocom- stantie
habeat
ante
cumnihil
tiaipsum,
Albertus
extrinsecum
Dicendum
quodsubstantia
pondetdominus
quodnihil
poni
possiti
dicitaliquid
habetintel- ingenere
ei antesehabetintrase tarnen
accepta
generalissimo
totum
Estenimens
lectum
distinguentem
, formtm
performam
ipsum.
componentium
secundum
substantie
et estperse,quodadditsuperensintellec-essecuiuslibet
primariam
in quasciseu rationem
tualem
substantie,
est,et notionem
quia exente
compositionem:
Et
substantie
ex eo quodestperse,esthoc.Et,ut dicit licetratio
intelligi
potest.
primo
a qua sicsumitur
forma
aliud huiusmodi
aliudhabetquoestaliquid,
prima
Boetius,
exquosit
nihil
antesehabet
habetquohocestethaecestforma
composi-notiosubstantie
Etitasubhabet
tionis
materiae,
equerenequeratione.
quamvis composita,
ejus,quianihil
non
ingenere
Et haecestprima stantia
habeatid quodestetesse.
accepta
generalissimo
ex
actuali
est
de
omnibus
notiosubstantiae
compositione
composita
praediquae
et
caturquae in rectalineapraedicamentali
ipsamformaliter,
precedentibus
aliquibus
hicadverEsttarnen
Sunt ideononestdiffinibilis.
substantiae.
suntin praedicamento
modum
nostrum
nonquia tendum
tarnen
quodsecundum
substantiae,
quaedicuntur
ex
substantia
vel participantintelligent
hancsubstantiae
componi
intelligitur
recipiunt
a nobis
etperse,que quidemcompositio
ente
essentialiter
sedquiasunt
rationem,
principia
exactu
dici- intelligitur
sicutforma
constituentia
compositionis
permodum
substantiam,
ex quoestetquodest,ita
scilicet
dicitur
etmateria
tursubstantia,
substantia,etpotentia,
et quod
Sed haecnonsuntin quodenshabeatmodum
ut dicitAristoteles.
potentie
actuset [ex
substantiasecundumrectumordinem est,et perse habeatmodum
estibicompositio
ad substan- ed.]quo est.Nontamen
sedreducuntur
praedicamenti,
ensdifferentias
et
ex
hanc
substantiae
tiamutprincipia
differentia,
quia
genere
digper
nitatem,
quodnihilquodpersuiessentiamhaberenon potest,cumnihilsit quod
entissubterfugere
Hoc rationem
estnonsubstantia.
facitsubstantiam,
possit.Et sic
noncompoet forma
et patetquodmateria
a logico
considerata
modosubstantia
igitur
incommuni
substantiam
nunt
intentionis."
estpraesentis
neque
accepta
est
sedutdictum
etdifferentia,
etiam
genus
comnostrummodum
secundum
intelligendi
seuexquodest
exactuetpotentia
ponitur
et quo est."
2
Appendix
Cf. 5.
tr.1, Johannes
Liber
depraedicabilibus,
Albertus
Versor,
Questiones
predicabiquinqu
Magnus,
n. 34),q. 2,ff.2vb-3ra:
vol.I), lium
c. 2, ed. A. Borgnet
omnia,
(above,
Porphirii
(Opera
Parisiis
1890,2b-4a:

11:33:44 AM

VERSORANDHIS RELATION
TO THE SCHOOLSOF THOUGHT

333

secundo:
Utrum
debeatdici
sitpars
?" "Queritur
logica
logica
philosophiae
"CaputII. Utrum
?
parsphilosophie
PhiloHancautem
scientiam
estomnis Arguitur
quodnonprimoautoritate
quimodus
tantum
tres
esse sophisextoMetaphisice
ponentis
quidamnullampartem
philosophiae,
scilicet
mathematkam
dicentes
non
nisitrespartes
contendunt,
philosophie,
phisicam,
philosophiae
essepartes
scilicet
mathe-etmethaphisicam,
ergoetcetera.
philosophiae,
physicam,
maticam
sivedisciplinabilem,
etmetaphysicam
sivedivinam.
Cumenimdiffinitio
dicens
estmedium
demonquidetpropter Secundo
Diffinitio
arguitur:
sitin scien
non strationis
scire
tia,et diffinitio
, ergototsuntpartes
quid medium
facientis
vanannisitpliciter
, scilicet
possit
quodaut philosophieet non pluresquot modis
materiam
sensibilem
variantur.
Seddiffinitiones
non
vari, quae cummotudiffinitiones
concipiat
estetmutatione;
autconcipiat
materiam
intel-antur
reiconnisitpliciter,
quiaveldiffinitio
nonestcummotuet cipitmotum
vel materiam
sensibilem
et est
, cujusessentia
ligibilem
mutatione
secundum
a motuet
rationem,
quamvis diffinitio
phisica,vel abstrahlt
secundum
essesitin materia
licetnona matena
sensibili,
quaeestcum materia
intelligimutatione
et motu,sicutestmagnitudo
et bili
vel
, et sic estdiffinitio
mathematica,
autnecsecundum
nec abstrahit
a motuetmatena
tamsennumerus;
essentiam,
penitus
secundum
esse
materiam
vide- sibiliquamintelligibili,
sensibilem'.
concipiat
quia talisresbene
turquodphilosophia
nonhabeatnisitres potest
essesinemateria,
et sic estdiffinitio
sicutetAristoteles
dicere metaphisica.
Et nonpossunt
modis
essentiales,
partes
pluribus
videtur.
sci- rerum
diffinitiones
nonest
narrari,
quodnonnulli
logicam
Propter
ergologica
entiam
siverationalem,
nullam
dicunt parsphilosophie.
partem
esse
philosophiae.
ad suaeassertionis
Addunt
etiam
confirma- Tertioarguitur:
reimodus
cumre
Nullius
reimodus,
cumrecujus cuius
estmodus
venit
insuigeneris
divisionem.
Sed
tionem,
quodnullius
modus
venit
ingeneris
suidivisionem.
estmodus
nonvenit
indiviConstat logica
est,
ergo
philosophie,
dietamodussionem
autem,
philosophie
quod logica
generaliter
tanquam
parseius.
est.
venire
videtur
adphiloNonergo
philosophiae
inaliquaparte
divisionem
, necvidetur
sophiae
contineri.
hujusgeneris
quodestphilosophia
Hancautemopinionem
aliiquidamim- In oppositum
arguitur
primo
quiaphilodicunt
esse sophiasecundum
pugnantes
philosophiae
generalis
genussuu<m>estcompreintentionem
omnium
modohensio
omnium
secundum
omnem,
entium,
quocumque
quorumeumque
entium
hominiquodpossibile
esthomini
taliaentiacomprehenveritatem,
comprehendere
quantum
estcomprehendere
earnsecundum
rationem
dere
secundum
rationem
etintellectum.
Sedlogica
possibile
etintellectum.
Ea autemquaesunt,dicunturestcomprehensio
alicuius
entis,
quiaestde
esseautab operenostro,
sivea volntate,secundis
intentionibus
adiunctis
primis;
ergo
siveetiamab intellectu
scientiam
quae- estparsphilosophie.
auta naturageneraliter
rente:
dicta,quae
ab operenostro
causari
nonpotest.
Etcum
ea quaea natura
sintcausae
sunt,nostrae
etnonnossumus
causaipsorum,
scientiae,
nonpotestde illisessescientia
practica.
Relinquitur
ergo,quodde talibus
apudnos
nonestnisiscientia
contemplativa,
quae
lumine
Eorum
autem
perficitur.
intelligentiae
nossumuscausapervoluntatem,
quorum
nonpotest
esseapudnosscientia
speculativa,
sedtantum
Eademenimsuntin
practica.

11:33:44 AM

334

ROTTEN
PEPIJN

scibiliprincipia
et causaeet eiequolibet
mentacognoscendi,
quae suntprincipia
essendi:
quodidquod
quiaaliter
sequeretur,
idquodest,
secundum
scitur
a nobis,
nonscitur
id quodnon
secundum
sedpotiussciretur
omnequod
est.Et sicfalsomodosciretur
est.Relinquitur
scitur,
igiquodabsurdum
non
a natura
turquodde entibus
causatis,
essescientia
perea quaesunta nobis,
potest
ex prineorumhabetur
sedpotiusscientia
et esseeorum
essentiam
cipiiscausantibus
in natura,
quae nonnisipercontemplaEorum
autem
tionem
suntinomnibus.
quae
essescientia
vera
sunta nobis,nonpotest
quaesuntin
apudnosnisiperea principia
nobis,perquae nossumuscausaeorum,
nonestverum,
cujusfinis
quaea nobissunt:
est.Similiter
sedbonum,
quodnobisbonum
comeritintentio
igitur
alicujus
philosophiae
ductu
veritatem
ejusquodrationis
prehendere
omnium
via est in omnemcognitionem
fitin nobisperea
eorumquorum
cognitio
suntapudnos,ex quibusnos
quaecognita
Erit
ad scientiam
incognitorum.
proficiscimur
etiamlode intentione
philosophiae
igitur
gicascientia
quaeestrationalis.
scilicet
autem
Adhuc
dicunt,
peiypotetihujus
signum
quodapud Secundoapudphilosophos
inphisidwiditur
suidivisione
intres
divi- cosphibsophia
prima
partes
prima
Peripatticos
philosophia
dictam
ethicam
die- camgeneraliter
scilicet
sione
divisa
dictam,
est,inphysicam
generaliter
generaliter
dicetrationalem
sivesermocionalem
etrationalem
tarn
, etethicam
dictam,
generaliter
generaliter
verogeneraliter
dictasecundum
Dico autemphysicam
similiter
gene- tam.Phisica
acceptam.
naturalem
etnaturalem
et omnesperypoteticos
raliter
dictam
, quaecomprehendit
comprehendit
etmetaphiskam.
Ethica
mathematicam
etdivinam.
Ethicam
autem
, philosophiam,
generlem
disciplinalem
verogeneraliter
dieta
continet
subsemonasticam,
etoeconomicam
etmonasticam
quaeinsecontinet
etpoliticam.
Rationalis
autemgeneRationalem
autem
etcivilem.
generlem
quaecom-yconomicam
omnem
modum
deveniendi
dieta
denotoad raliter
omnem
modm
deveniendi
comprehendit
prehendit
ad ignoti
modo:quod
noticiam,
quod
permulta
genera
permulta
ge- denoto
ignotum
quocumque
ostendetur.
nera
, utinsequenti
fit.Ergophilosophi
perypotetici
propositionum
fit
probationum
esse
Manifestum
estigitur,
philosophie.
logicam
partem
aliquapars dixerunt
quodbgica
estphilosophiae.
Illudnecessario
estde
Adhucautemsi aliquidestde intentione Tertioarguitur:
devenire
sine
intentione
deintentione
tunchocmaxime
potest
philosophie,
quonullus
philosophiae:
alicuius.
Sednullus
inphilosophiaincognitionem
sinequonullus
erit,
ignorans
logiphilosophiae
in aliquam
devenire
cogpotest
acquirere
ignoti
perfectam
cognitionem.
Ignoranscamalicuius
potest
nitionem
estdeintentione
nullus
autem
, ergologica
philosophie
perfectam
potest
acquirere
logicam
ignoti
modum
, eo quodignort
perquem etparseius."
cognitionem
notitiam.
de notoad ignoti
devenire
oportet
essedeintenVidetur
praecipue
ergologicam
tione
."
philosophiae

11:33:44 AM

TO THE SCHOOLSOF THOUGHT

VERSORANDHIS RELATION

335

3
Appendix
Cf. 5.
libri
PeriherdeAquino,
libri
Thomas
Questiones
Versor,
Johannes
primi
Expositio
Peryermenias,
Arestotelis
lib. 1, lect.3, ed. Leonina,Editioaltera meniarum
(above,n. 34),q. 3, ff.
vol.1*1,Roma-Paris
1989,14.39- 61va-b:
retractata,
16.138:
"Vbioportet
"Sciendum
secundo
opeintelligere
quodunaduarum
quod,utpriusdicerationum
intelkctus
estindiuisibilium
estoperatio
intelkctus.
Unaestsimbatur,
intelligencia,
dupkx
cuius- pliciumintelligentia,
inquantum
scilicet
intelkctus
absolute
scilicet
intellectus
intelligit
quando
reiquiditatem
siueessenciam
reiquidditatem
sive
cunque
perseipsam, absolute
intelligit
cuiuscumque
uelquidalbum
uel aliud essentiam
vel
putaquidesthomo
perseipsam,
utputa
quidesthomo
intelkctus
estsecun- quidestalbum;
aliauero
etinhacoperatione,
uthabet
huiusmodi;
operatio
dumquodhuiusmodi
simul textus,
nonestVeritas
vel falsitas.
Aliaest
Simplicia
concepta
etdiuidit.
Dicitergoquod in hac operatio
etdivisio,
intelkctus
componit
queestcompositio
que
scilicet
'set fitcumintellectus
secunda
simul
et
intelkctus,
componenti
operatione
Simplicia
componit
ueritas
etfalsitas,
inuenitur
etinhacoperatione
intelkctus
sicdividendiuidentis,
relinquensdividit;
noninuenitur,
ut tisetcomponentis
estventas
velfalsitas.
quodinprima
operatione
in III De anima.
etiamtraditur
. . . Adhuiusigitur
euidenciam
conside- . . . Sciendum
tercio
reperitur
quodVeritas
in aliquoinuenitur
randum
estquod ueritas
inaliquo
Unomodo
sicut
ineoquod
dupliciter.
ineoquodestuerum;estverum
unomodo
sicut
seusicutin reque estvera;ethoc
dupliciter:
aliomodo
indicente
uelcognoscente
sicut
uerum;modo
ventas
taminsimplicibus
in
reperitur
quam
inuenitur
autem
ueritas
sicut
ineoquodestuerumcompositis.
Aliomodo
invenitur
inaliquo
tamquam
taminsimplicibus
incompositis,
setsicut
in incognoscente
etdicente
etsic<non>inveniquam
verum;
dicente
uelcognoscente
noninuenitur
nisi turnisiincompositione
uerum,
etdivisione
intelkctus
; et
etdiuisionem.
secundum
hocmodointelligitur
cumdicit:
compositionem
Philosophus
circacompositionem
etdivisionem
intellectusestVeritas
sicutindicente
et
falsitasque,
verum
velfalsum.
cognoscente
ut
enim,
Pro cuiusdeclaratione
est sciendum
Quod quidemsicpatet.Verum
Philo
estbonumquarto
dicit
in VI Ethicorum,
sexto
verum
sophus
quod,utdicitur
Metaphisice,
dequocunque
dicatur
intelkctus,
unde,
uerum,
estbonum
intelkctus.
Habetur
tarnen
ibiquod
oportet
sitperrespectum
adintellectum.
verumet falsum
suntin mente,
id estin
quod
Comparantur
ad intellectum
autem
uoces
sicut
res intellectu;
bonumautemet malum
suntin
signa,
quidem
autem
sicut
eaquorum
intelkctus
sunt
similitudines.
rebus.Ex quosequitur
quodde quocumque
dicitur
verum
necesse
estquodsitperrespectum
ad intellectum
verumet
, cuiusintellectus
Adintellectum
bonumestperfectio.
comparanturvoces
sicut
eius;et ita
signa
conceptuum
vocesdicuntur
verequia suntsignaveri
intellectus.
Resautem
quodestinconceptione
ad intellectum
sicut
ea quorum
concomparantur
intelkctus
suntsimilitudines
et ita res
ceptiones
nonpotest
diciveranisiperrespectum
ad
intellectum.
Sed si quereret
aliquisutrum
reseodemmododicatur
verasecundum
intellectus
quod ad diversos
comparatur,
respondetur
quodnon.

11:33:44 AM

336

ROTTEN
PEPIJN

Procuiussolutione
sciendum
Considerandum
autemquod aliquares
quinto
quod
resnaturalis
constitua
estinter
duos
intelad intellectum
Vnomodo quelibet
comparatur
dupliciter.
interintellectum
divinum
ad
sicutmensura
ad mensuratum,
et siccom- lectus
, scilicet
ressicutartificiata
ad
resnaturales
ad intellectum
parantur
specu- quemcomparatur
et effectus
ad causamsivemensuralatiuum
humanum.
Etideointellectus
dicitur artem
et proportionabiliter
uerussecundum
rei,fal- tumad mensuram;
quodconformatur
de artificiali
ad intellectum
nossusautemsecundum
a re. diceretur
quoddiscordt
Ideoresnaturalis
Res autemnaturalis
nondicitur
esseuera trum
practicum.
percomad ipsumdicitur
essentialiter
ad intellectum
nostrum,parationem
percomparationem
suamimitatur
sicutposuerunt
quidamantiquiNaturales,veraproquantoperformam
seu illudquodde re ipsa
rerum
estimantes
ueritatem
essesolumin artemdivinam
eratinintellectu
hoc quodestuideri:secundum
hoc enim producendo
preconceptum
etsicomnino
ad ipsam
essent
simul divino;
comparatur
sequeretur
quodcontradictoria
mensuratum
ad mensuram.
Et proportioncadunt
subdiuer- sicut
uera,quiacontradictoria
utdictum
dereartificiali
sorum
Dicitur
tamen
est,diceretur
opinionibus.
aliquares abiliter,
in ordine
ad intellectum
nostrum
uerauel falsapercomparationem
ad intellectum
practicum
que
vera
essedicitur
rationem
artis
non
essencialiter
uel
seteffectiue,
nostrum,
inquantum
attingit
formaliter,
inquantum
scilicet
nataest
deseueram
uel que estin intellectu
artificis,
falsa
practico
facere
a ratione
artis.
Si ergo
falsam
estimationem
hocdicitur verum
; etsecundum
inquantum
deficit
constituitur
interintellectum
aurumuerum
uelfalsum.
Aliouero
modo
res resnaturalis
ad quemcomparatur
ut effectus
ad intellectum
sicut
mensuratum
ad divinum,
comparantur
nostrum
utpatet
in intellectu
mensuram,
spepractico,
quiest ad causam,et interintellectum
adquem
sicut
mensura
ad
causarerum.
Vndeopusartificis
dicitur
esse culativum,
comparatur
ad ipsum
non
uerum
inquantum
ad rationem
, tuncperrespectum
artis,
attingit
fal- mensuratum
dicitur
vera
essentialiter
velformaliter
sedeffective,
sumuero
inquantum
a ratione
artis"
deficit
scilicet
nata
estapudintellectum
nosinquantum
trumdesefacere
veram
cuius
existimationem,
dixerunt
oppositum
aliquiantiquiconstituentes
rerum
veritatem
consistere
solum
in hocquodestvideri
nobisseuapparere.
Ex quo errore
sequeretur
quodduo contradictoria
essentsimulvera.Et sic patet
in aliquoinvenitur,
Veritas
qualiter
qualiter
etiamresnaturales
diversimode
ad diversos
intellectus
dicuntur
vere."
comparate

11:33:44 AM

and Immortality
of theSoul in the
Theology,
Philosophy,
Late Via Moderna of Erfurt
PEKKA KRKKINEN

Abstract
of the
In 1513 the FifthLateran Council determinedthatthe immortality
but also in philosophy.
The deterrationalsoul is not trueonlyin theology,
minationcan be relatedalso to the actual teachingof philosophy.In the
ofErfurt,
Bartholomaeus
Arnoldide Usingenandjodocus Trutfetter
university
at thattime.Usingen'sand Trutfetter's
wroteexpositions
on naturalphilosophy
De
anima
a
whichfaithfully
followsin methodof
expositions
represent position,
the tradition
of the viamoderna.
Furthermore,
theygive
ologyand aspirations
and theology,
which
an interpretation
of therelationship
betweenphilosophy
of
and the formulations
Trutfetter
consideredconsonantwiththe intentions
even presentsa practical
the FifthLateran Council; and finally,Trutfetter
applicationof the Council'srecommendations.
of the
In the early 16thcenturythe questionof immortality
vs. mortality
human soul became a crucial point in understandingthe relationship
betweentheologyand philosophyof nature.As one culminationpoint of
on thepoint
thisdevelopment,
theFifthLateranCouncilof 1513 determined
thatthe immortality
of the rationalsoul is not only truein theology,but
critics.1
also in philosophy,againstsome of the so-calledseculararistotelian
This determination
can also be relatedto the actual teachingof phiof Erfurt,
wheretwo notable
losophy,as seen in the case of the University
German
via
moderna
Bartholomaeus
Arnoldi
de Usingen
of
the
late
,
figures
Trutfetter
wrote
(d. 1519),
(d. 1532) andjodocus
expositionson natural
as teachersof the
at
that
time.
These
two
later
known
men,
philosophy
youngMartinLuther,includeda sectionon psychologyin severalof their
workson naturalphilosophy.Also in theircareers theywere borderline
figuresbetweenphilosophyand theology.Whereas both were originally
1 On thepreceding
discussion
on immortality
of thesoulsee Eckhardt
Keler,The
Intellective
in:Charles
B. Schmitt
Soul,
, Cambridge
(ed.),Cambridge
ofRenaissance
History
Philosophy
Thetextofthedetermination
iscitedhereaccording
toNorman
P. Tanner
1988,485-534.
Volume
1: Nicaea
I toLateran
Councils,
V,London1990,605-6.
(ed.),Decrees
oftheEcumenical
BrillNV,Leiden,
Koninklijke
2005
- www.brill.nl
Alsoavailable
online

Vivarium
43,2

11:34:03 AM

338

PEKKAKRKKINEN

teachersof philosophyin the artisticfaculty,Usingen later became an

friarand a fierceadversaryof theReformation,
whileTrutfetter
Augustinin
movedfromthe artisticfacultyto the theologicalfaculty,
firstto Wittenberg
in 1506. In 1510 he came back to Erfurt,to the theologicalfaculty,but
in 1515 he was commissionedas a lectureron Aristotlein the artistic
faculty,which was quite exceptionalfor doctorsof theology.2
To illustratethe theme, I shall treat some relevantpassages from
workson naturalphilosophy,where theydisUsingen's and Trutfetter's
cuss the problemsof psychology.The earliestof themis Usingen'sPawulus
his collection
naturalis
from1499. Next follows,chronologically,
philosophie
in
of questionscalled Exercitium
de anima
, published
1507, several years
beforethe Council. Finallycomes Trutfetter's
onlypublicationin natural
totam
which
Summa
in
came
out in 1514, in the year
philosophy,
physicen^
the
determination.3
following
I shall not, however,begin by analyzingthe discussionof the immorbut I shall first
talityof the soul by Usingen and Trutfetter
immediately,
make some remarkson theirnominalistmethodin generaland then on
will I proceed with their
theirpsychologyin particular.Only thereafter
views on immortality
vs. mortality
of the soul, particularly
on the central
questionof the originof human souls, focusingon how it relatesto the
question of the relationshipbetween theologyand natural philosophy.
The question of the originof the soul, whetherthere are causes other
than materialbeings in its generationis, in the medievaldiscussion,tied
to the questionof the mortalityof the soul, and the answerto the question determines,whetherthe soul is conceived in a materialistic
way as
mortalwith the body, or whetherit is seen as being immortal,existing
in some formafterthe bodily death.4

2 ErichKleineidam,
Universitas
studii
//,Leipzig1992,205-7.On Usingen's
erffrdiensis
andTrutfetter's
1992,290-1;298-9.
lives,seeKleineidam
3 Bartholomaeus
naturalis
Arnoldi
de Usingen,
Pawulus
, Leipzig1499;Exercitium
philosophie
natuintotam
hocestphilosophiam
Summa
deanima
Trutfetter,
, Erfurt
1507;Jodocus
physicen:
Isennachcensis
ingimnasio
vere
ralem
queestTheologia
perD. Judocum
conformiter
siquidem
sophie:
1514.I shallnotdiscuss
herethefurther
etedita
elucrabata
, Erfurt
developments
Erphordensis
whichcouldbe interesting
for
in thelatereditions
ofUsingen's
andTrutfetter's
works,
in Usingen's
humanist
thesakeofincreasing
influence,
especially
writings.
4 Apartfromthisparticular
wheretheinterplay
thereare severalthemes,
question
thequestion
on thepluis realized.
andphilosophy
between
See,forexample,
theology
ofthesoulseparated
from
thebodyplaysan important
offorms,
where
thenotion
rality
Pawulus
See Usingen,
rolein theargumentation.
, ff.86rv.

11:34:03 AM

IMMORTALITY
OF THE SOULIN THE LATEVIA
OF ERFURT339
MODERNA
1. Philosophical
Methodof theErfurtian
Via Moderna
The Universityof Erfurtwas one of the most famousamong the via modernaof the late Middle Ages. If we pass the difficult
questionof what,in
between
the
via
and
via
moderna
at the time,
antiqua
general,distinguished
I shall referto the witnessof the Erfurtiansthemselves,which considers
of theirposition.This is to
theirphilosophicalmethodas a characteristic
where
the author cites the
Summule
totiuslogice
be found in Trutfetter's
,
conclusionsof the influentialquodlibetaldisputein 1497, which became
a startingpoint of the ockhamisticreformof studiesin Erfurt.5
witnessthe positionof via moderna
Accordingto Trutfetter's
("terminist" as he calls it) is based on a carefulanalysisof the signification
of the
about
conclusions
the
terms,therebyavoiding overlyhasty
ontological
structureof the world,accordingto the principleof economy.The error
of the rival("realist")position,whichpresupposesmanyunnecessaryontological entities,is based on ignoranceof the art of dialectic,particularly
concerningthe connotationsof the terms.6This is seen as an integral
part of the semanticanalysis,which has been commonlyconsideredas
workforthe othersciences,e.g. in physicsor metanecessarypreliminary
Trutfetter
notes
that early theologiansand philosopherswere
physics.7
5Jodocus
Summule
totius
Trutfetter,
, Erfurt
1500,if.M1V-M2V.
logice
6 Trutfetter,
Summule
illiseffingere
entitates
ab aliisdis, ff.Mlrv:"Necoportet
proprias
tinctas
modorum
Hincinhisa multis
ac propriam
incaute
seducsignificandi.
proqualitate
tionem
ubiperfacile
consuleret
dialecticus.
Accidit
enimerror
iste
requiritur
metaphysica,
ex solaartisdialecticae
et connotationis
terminorum
nescientia.
Id quodannoa natali
Christiano
1497in universali
in haecverbaconvocant,
disputatione,
quamquotlibetum
Summule
inpropriam
nonnulli
seductionem
incaute
metaclusimus.";
, f.Mlv:"Errant
igitur
ubidialecticus
facileconsuleret,
utveritati
sicetAristoteli
physicam
requirentes,
quorum,
adversa
estuniversalium
numero
nostro,
confictio,
atquererum
signorm
multiplicado."
7 Trutfetter,
Summule
rationis
nihilcurant.
, f.Mlv:"Sedacclamant
alii,quodde entibus
ad res,vilemhabentes
irridentes
ad
Vadamus,
terministam,
inquiunt,
quodomniarefert
remperquirimus,
ad remimus,quidad nosde terminis,
signa.Nos,inquiunt,
quaside
rebussineterminis
essesermo,
Sicfuitetestin
possit
quasidialctica
penitus
supervacua.
involvunt
curaet erroribus
inextricabilibus,
pluribus,
qui se gratis
quossolaseitetpotest
dialctica
resolvere
cummodis
terminorum
definiendo,
dividendo,
deniqueconnotationes
vivaciter
necnonsophismatum
fantasticas
detesignificandi
exponendo,
paralogisationes
dialecticen
ettheologiea,
ita
gendo.Necob id dicosufficere
procognitione
metaphysicae
haudopussit,quomdialctica
nondat cognitionem
quodplurimorum
perscrutatione
illarum
scientiarum
sedcertis
modisiterexpedit,
As Urbannotes,
quo ad illasvenitur."
thepassageis paraphrased
from
Gerson's
Collectorium
Tract.2. See
Jean
super
Magnificat,
an derUniversitt
am Vorabend
derReformation,
in:
Urban,Die 'viamoderna'
Wolfgang
Erfurt
HeikoA. Oberman
von
Werk
undWirkung
biszurReformation
Rimini,
, Berlin
1981,
(ed.),Gregor
311-30,
esp.327,n. 54.

11:34:03 AM

340

PEKKAKRKKINEN

already aware of different

figurativemodes of speech, and interpreting
them presupposescarefulattentionto those figures.Moreover, all the
realistsdo observethe possible equivocationsof terms,in which theydo
not differfromterminists.8
One could illustratethe differenceby sayingthat, as in the case of
relationalterms,it does not implythat these termssignifysome kind of
relationalentitywhich is reallydistinctfromsingularbeings,but rather
that the relationaltermmerelysignifiesall beings of its scope and additionallyconnotestheirstandingin relationto otherentities.In a similar
way, the existenceof several other entitiesas being reallydistinctfrom
substancesand absolute qualitieswas denied.9
In addition to this general semanticorientation,the frequentlyused
authoritiesare also found among the reprsentantsof the via moderna.
Here it should be noted that Erfurtianteaching followedtraditionally
along the lines ofJean Buridan and Marsiliusof Inghen ratherthan that
of Ockham, the Venerabili
, althoughOckham, togetherwithPierre
inceptor
was
and
of
favored,especiallyby Usingen
Rimini,
Gregory
strongly
d'Ailly
An example of the continuingimportanceof Buridanis
and Trutfetter.10
de anima
, publishedin 1507. The
seen, however,in Usingen's Exercitium
8 Trutfetter,
f. M2r:"Hancveritatem
omnesantiqui
et
Summule
doctores,
philosophi
animadverterunt
veladvertere
... Et quianonsemper
sanctinonignorarunt.
cogitarunt
et tropice
suntlocuti,
reversedaliquando
ad sermonis
figurate
improprie,
proprietatem,
sedpotius
dictanoninsensuquemverbafaciunt,
etillorum
enter
suntinterpretandi
quem
suntreducenad proprietatem
et itaeorumimproprietates
accipienda,
ipsiprese ferunt
In hac veritate
si augetur
dae nequaquam
deceptio.
Alioquin
quidmirum
ampliandae.
a terministis,
minime
licetsepius
nominis
nonaberrant
omnes
dissident,
reaiistae,
quisaltem
liteminter
eosconstitut."
incomponibilem
aequivocatio
9 Cf.Trutfetter,
duobuspraedicaSummule
rerum
varietate,
, Mlv:"In tamnumerosa
octoextrinsecis
habitudinis
abunde
et qualitate,
substantia
intrinsice,
mentis,
reliquis
aut
nullaestentitas
indivisibilis,
universalis,
respectiva,
privativa,
significata.
Simpliciter
a quolibet
forma
auttotalitas,
nullum
totius,
successiva,
singulari,
significabile,
complexe
I willnotgivea detailed
accounthereof how
ac permanenti
absoluto,
sequestrata."
wasunderstood
andother
andontology
therelation
between
byTrutfetter
signification
nominalists.
10See Kleineidam
notes(ibid.,142),commenting
1992(above,n. 2), 141.Kleineidam
Pierre
favoured
in 1497,thatUsingen
Ockham,
strongly
dispute
uponthequodlibetal
andMarsilius
of
likeBuridan
evenagainst
oldauthorities
ofRimini,
andGregory
d'Ailly,
thegeneral
standoftheseauthorities,
Thisdoesnotsayverymuchconcerning
Inghen.
shared
theopinion
Buridan
andMarsilius
becauseon thisparticular
represented
question
Pawulus
andd'Ailly
ofOckham
thecontrary
,
(seeUsingen,
position
byviaantiqua
against
forUsingen,
see
whichwasnotabsolute
ofOckham,
theauthority
f. 125r).
Concerning
wasdisregarded
ofRimini
Urban1981,325and329;butalsothemuch-favored
Gregory
ofcomplexe
on thequestion
, as we shallsee.
significabilia

11:34:03 AM

OF ERFURT341
OF THE SOULIN THE LATEVIA
IMMORTALITY
MODERNA
dispositionof thiscollectionof questionsresemblesa similarcollectionby
form.11
JohnBuridan,whichwas availablein Erfurtlibrariesin manuscript
on theScienceofPsychology
2. Usingen
Soul as the proper subject of this science is discussedin the firstquestion of Exercitium
de anima.The nominalisticapproach described above
of the object of psychology.According
also dominatesUsingen'sdefinition
is threeto him, the object of demonstratedknowledge(scientia
adhaesiva)
as a necessarilytruepropofold:firstly,
the conclusionof a demonstration
the entity
sition;secondly,the subjecttermof the conclusion;and thirdly,
as it is signifiedby a true propositionand its subject term.12The division is attributedby Usingen to the "common way of speakingamong
the via moderna"13
and at the beginningof the Exercitium
, more
physicorum
a
is
and
but
to Marsiliusof Inghen
Ockham,14
parallel to be
specifically
de anima.15
found in the correspondingpassage of Buridan's Questiones

11On theBuridanian
ofquestiones
deanima
seePeterMarshall,
Parisian
tradition
Psychology
et littraire
du moyen
d'histoire
doctrinale
intheMid-Fourteenth
, in:Archives
ge,
Century
menofBuridan's
deanima
50 (1984),101-193.
See alsoErfurtian
Questiones
manuscripts
in BenoitPatar,Le trait
del'me
deJeanBuridan
tioned
, Louvain1991, 34*and48*-9*.
12Usingen,
idestprimo
estcuipropinque,
etimmeEx.an.,f.A2r:"Scibile
propinquum
demonstrata
veldemonstrabilis,
utestconclusio
diate,
assentitur,
quiailiaestverum
propoadhaesivum
etprimarie
termint
actum
sitionale
intellectus,
quemadmodum
quodimmediate
essedebeatconclusio
scibilis
enstermint
actumapprehensivum,
qualisautemhabitudinis
esseverorum
notitiorum
docetPhilosophus
Posteriorum
dicensscientiam
perpetuoprimo
non
aliter
etsingulares
rumetimpossibiliter
se habentium,
contingentes
quiapropositiones
terminabiles
cumnonsintmansive
demonstrabiles.
Remotum
sunt
demonstrativam
perartem
conestcuiremote,
id estmediate,
assentitur
veri,utestterminus
tanquam
partitotius
dicitur
scibilepartiale,
assentiens
enim
clusions
putasubiectum,
quarescibileremotum
estcuiremotissime,
totiassentit
estconstitutum.
Remotissimum
partieiusex qua totum
id estmediatissime,
assentitur
obiectoet reisignificatae
tanqu[a]m
perverum
propositionale
et subiectum
eius."
13Usingen,
iuxta
estscientiae
adhaesivae
essescibile
Ex.an., f.A2r:"Notandum
triplex
remotum
etremotissimum."
communem
usumloquendi
viaemodernae
scilicet
propinquum,
14Usingen,
Exercitium
, Erfurt
1507,f.A2V:"Ut habetOckhamet Marsilius
physicorum
a threefold
circaprimum
Sententiarum."
Thedivision
between
resembles,
objectofscience
andthemostremote
forthemost
Marsilius'
division
between
remote
immediate,
object
part,
ofscience
ofInghen,
libros
Sententiarum
, I, 2,ed.Manuel
Questiones
(seeMarsilius
super
quattuor
in thiscontext.
S. Noya,Leiden2000,78,23-79,7). Marsilius
alsorefers
to Ockham
15JeanBuridan,
deanima
, I, 1, ed. Patarin Patar1991,168,80-7.Buridan
Questiones
in thiscontext
didnot,however,
thedoctrine
ofcomplexly
as
argueagainst
signifiables,
Marsilius
didinhisSentences
healsodoesnotusetheterms
remote
immediate,
commentary;
andthemostremote,
seemstohavetaken
thecontents
ofBuridan's
threefold
butUsingen

11:34:03 AM

342

PEKKAKRKKINEN

Psychology,accordingto Usingen,properlyconsistsof knowledgein the

lattertwo meanings,namelyas concerningthe 'soul5as the subjectterm
conclusionand as an entityof whichsuch a conclusion
of a demonstrated
claims some state of affairs.16
For him it is enoughto say thatsince a propositionis assentedthrough
a previousdemonstration,
throughit the truthof some stateof affairsis
This
also assentedconcerningthe subjecttermand the entityit signifies.
is due to Usingen'sdenial of the existenceof so-calledcomplexe
significabilia.
This means that the conclusionitselfdoes not signifyanythingthat its
individualtermsdo not signify.So thereis again no need forsuch additotale
tionalentitiesas signification
, as the thingsignified
by the whole propositionwas called by Gregoryof Rimini and otheradherentsof complexe
doctrine.As a matterof fact,the existenceof complexe
significabilia
significabilia
was one of the thingsalready denied in the programmaticquodlibetal
dispute of 1497. Because there is only one entity,the soul, which the
thereis also no need for diverse
conclusionand its subjecttermsignify,
acts of assent,which formthe psychologicalknowledgein question.It is
the verysame act, wherebythe conclusion,its subjectterm,and the thing
are assented,whichis called knowledge.So here also the semantic
signified
theviewof the ontological
tendstowardssimplifying
analysisof signification
structureof being.17
ofMarsilius.
The
it withtheterminology
division
of theobjectofscienceto combine
ofBuridan's
hasbeenquestextofthefirst
redaction
oftheedited
Quaestiones
authenticity
inScholarship
Some
Recent
Trends
SeeJ.M.M.HThijssen,
Late-Medieval
tioned.
Natural
,
Philosophy:
67 (2000),158-190,
at 179-80.
in: Recherches
de Thologie
et Philosophie
mdievales,
I haverelied
athandavailable,
arenoother
editions
ofthequestions
sincethere
However,
on Patar'sedition.
16Usingen,
ad questionem
Ex.an.,f.A3r:"Quibuspremissis
perduasconrespondetur
de scibili
remoto
et remotisPrimaconclusio.
De animaestscientia
clusiones.
tanquam
animaesse
habetduaspartes,
simo.Haec conclusio
quarum
primavultde iliotermino
conclusionem
de scibili
scientiam
demonstrabilem,
remoto,
quiaillepotest
ingredi
tanquam
animaesse
remote
sciri.Secundavultde re significata
perillumterminm
ergopotest
de scibiliremotissimo,
scientiam
perconclusionem
quia ilia potestsignifican
tanquam
ut
vel consimili,
et subiectum
demonstrabilem
eius,ut patetin illa demonstratione
anima
est
actus
anima
inhaeret
et
inhaeret
est
actus
igitur
corpori,
corpori
corporis,
quidquid
corporis."
17Usingen,
non
cumcomplexe
Ex. an., if.A2rv:"Idemenimsignificant
significabilia
et Henricus
de Hassiautpatetcirca1.
Ariminensis
sintponenda
quaeposuitGregorius
necparseius,quareremotissime
talisnecestpropositio
istaeniminquantum
Physicorum,
declaratio
adhaesivum
termint
actum
intellectus,
patetinhacdemonexemplaris
quorum
et omnishomoestanimalrationale,
ut omneanimalestrisibile,
stratione
velconsimili,

11:34:03 AM

IMMORTALITY
OF THE SOULIN THE LATEVIA
OF ERFURT343
MODERNA
Similarlytherewere otherdoctrinesconnectedto thesethemes,where
there was a notable disagreementamong the adherentsof the via moderna.For example,Usingenargues againstthe position,thattherewould
be knowledgeof the thingitselfprimaryto the propositionalconclusion
concerningit. This passage is found in Usingen's earlierwork,Parvulus
naturalis
philosophie
(1499), where he notes that this opinion is "obscure,"
"not internallyconsistent,"because knowledgeof an extramentalentity
and
includes,properlyspeaking,the knowledgeof conceptstheysignify,
so the contraryopinion is easier to understandand compatiblewiththe
common presuppositionsof the via moderna.
The issue was also considered as being a sharplydivisivequestionwithinthe via moderna
, as it was
of thatschool. In the same way
arguedfromthe commonpresuppositions
Gregoryof Rimini,whom Usingen mentionsas an adherentof the comdoctrine,was in many ways a respectedauthorityof the
plexesignificabilia
via moderna
in Erfurt.Usingen's positionsreaffirm
the importanceof the
semanticanalysisas the firststep in the philosophicalmethod,as it was
18
vehementlyconfessedby the Erfurtiansin 1497.
The procedureof semanticanalysisalso precedes the definitionof the
termcsouPas an object of knowledgein psychology,
it from
differentiating
the understanding
of the termwithoutreferenceto its operationsin the
body, contraryto metaphysics.One must note here that Usingen conceived the soul as the substantialformof the body, and denied,together
withthe common traditionof the via moderna
Ockham's idea of the pluralityof substantialformsin man.19Calling soul a substantialformdoes
not contradictit being a substance,when it informsthe body, because
essentialpartsof substancesare also called substances.20
the
Furthermore,
human soul is immaterialand independentof the body, so that afterits
separationfromthe body it can existas a substancein the meaning"res
perse subsistens."21

omnishomoestrisibilis.
Sciuntur
autemistatriascibiliauna scientia,
igitur
quae est
assensus
conclusioni
totali
ventati
simul
conclusionis,
quiaassentiendo
propinque
tanquam
assentitur
subiecto
eiusremote,
idestpartialiter,
etreisignificatae
obiecto
perearntanquam
eiusremotissime."
18Usingen,
Parvulus
, ff.8v-9r.
19Usingen,
f.87r,according
towhich
thedefense
relies
onGregory
ofRimini's
Parvulus,
ScotusandOckham.
See alsoEx.an.ff.D2V-E1V.
arguments
against
20Usingen,
Ex.an., ff.C5r-C6r.
21Usingen,
Ex.an., ff.L3r-L4v;
M4r-Nlr.

11:34:03 AM

344

PEKKAKRKKINEN

Soul is consideredby Usingen as the most general termin psychology,

which then confersupon it the reason for the unityof this science and
forits distinctionfromothersciences.Soul is, however,understoodhere
in a qualifiedsense,namelyconnotatively,
connotingits operationsin the
of
soul
are
The
not,
body.22
operations
strictlyspeaking,the object of
is
in
nor
the
soul
itself,
psychological
knowledge,
apartfromtheseoperations.
This is definedby describingthe semanticcharacterof the termsoul in
this context.In psychology'soul' is namelya connotativeconcept,since
it connotescertainoperationsin the body. It is definedas a substantial
statusas a formof
form,which is called 'soul' by virtueof its vivifying
a body. Solely metaphysicsconsidersthe soul in an absolute manner,
withoutany concernwhetherthissubstantialformactuallyinformsa body
or not, because metaphysicsconsidersthe things"fromthe viewpointof
rationes
earumabsolutas).23
their absolute formativeprinciples" (.secundum
Thereforethe notionof a soul separatefromthe body,or a soul as mover
of celestialbodies, is excluded fromthe psychologicalconcept of soul.24
on Theolog))
and Psychology
3. Usingen
This definitionleaves room for certaintheologicalconsiderations,as is
the case laterin Exercitium
, where Usingen treatsthe questionwhetheror
not the soul is a formof body both on the basis of Catholic teaching

22Usingen,
animaconnotative
conclusio.
Illeterminus
Ex.an., f.A3r:"Secunda
captus
etcausae
deanima,
diffinitio
subiecti
attributionis
scientiae
estsubiectum
quiahuicconvenit
estsubiectum
attributionis
esseternotandum
eiusdem."
Ibid.f.A2V:
"Quarto
assignations
et ab
in aliquascientia
totalia quo sumit
unitatem
extrinsicam
minm
communissimum
distinctionem."
aliisscientiis
arguitivam
23Usingen,
animam
Ex.an.f.A2V:
"Tertio
notandum
estcircapartem
quaesiti,
dupliciter
noncurando
an ab
namprimo
utestquaedamforma
substantial,
absolute,
considerali,
a corpore
etiam
dicitur
animaseparata
velforis
manendo
informando
anima,
dieta,
qualiter
rationes
considrt
ressecundum
etitanondebetcapiinpraesenti,
quiasolametaphysica
forma
substantialis
ab informando
utestquaedam
Secundo
earumabsolutas.
connotative,
inquoestprincipium
idestvivificans
dictaanimans,
vitalium,
qualiter
operationum
corpus,
secundo
huiusdicensearnesseactumcorporis,
eamPhilosophus
diffinit
quodfacitvitaIn Parvulus
Seealsoibid.,f.A3V.
etitadebetcapiinpraesenti."
liter
(f.81r)Usingen
operari
usesof'soul,'butnotes,
absolute
andconnotative
between
makes
no suchdistinction
e.g.,
of
as in thecategory
of'body'suchthatit can be understood
theconcept
"absolutely,
disCf.a similar
ofquality,
as it is an abstract
term."
and"inthecategory
substance"
inMarsilius
ofInghen,
andinmetaphysics
Godintheology
tinction
,
Quaestiones
concerning
I, 2, ed. Noya,129,17-23.
24Similarily
Parvulus
in 1499,seeUsingen,
, f.81r.
already

11:34:03 AM

OF THE SOULIN THE LATEVIA

OF ERFURT345
IMMORTALITY
MODERNA
and as a philosophicalquestion.25Moreover,the followingquestionson
of the rationalsoul
the unityof the intellectualsoul and on immortality
are explicidytreatedbecause of the heresiesrelated to them.26Here it
should be noted, that the seminal quodlibetal dispute of 1497 already
addressed the question of the origin of the human soul, among other
the Catholic doctrineof the creationand immortality
topics,reaffirming
of individualsouls.27
The questionconcerningthe intellectionof a soul separatedfromthe
,
body is a special case, which Usingen does not deal with in Exercitium
in accordance with the definitionthat this theme is not treatedin psynaturalis
(1499) Usingenhas indeed addressed
chology.In Pawulusphilosophie
such a question,but also therehe noted thatAristotledoes not deal with
.28
thisthemein De anima
In PawulusUsingen tends to make a differencebetween pure philosophical analysis and the philosophicalanalysis from the viewpointof
Christiantheology.There he notes,commentingon the textconcerning
habitsof the soul,thatthe authortreatsthe subjectnot as "a pure philosopher, but as a theologian,that is, as a Catholic philosopher."The distinctionmade thereis the one betweenacquired and infusedhabits,which
accordingto Usingen cannot be done by a pure philosopher,who does
not need the concept of infusedhabits.29
As we shall see, a similardistinctionis seen in Usingen'streatmentof
the originof the rationalsoul in Pawulus
, whichhe sees as a centralquestion determiningthe nature of the intellectualsoul, because many heathen philosophersdifferhere fromthe Catholic Christiandoctrine.His
aim is to consider,not onlyifthe Catholic and heathenviewsdifferfrom
In the index of queseach other,but also in which respecttheydiffer.30
tionsfoundat the end of the work,the questionwas entitledas "whether
25Usingen,
Ex. an., if.L4V-M2V,
"Utrum
intellectus
humanus
sitforma
subquestions
humani"
and"Utrum,
stantialcorporis
fidecatholica,
rationaturalis
dictaret
circumscripta
intellectum
humanum
esseformam
humani."
corporis
26Usingen,
Ex.an ff.M3r-Nlr.
27Trutfetter,
Summa
, f.P4r.
28Usingen,
Pawulus
, f. 124r.
29Usingen,
Pawulus
autorem
, f. 112v:"Ettalissecundum
duplexest,scilicet
acquisitus
etinfusus,
id estacquisitus
sinepraeviis
ubiautorloquitur,
peroperationes,
operationibus,
nontanquam
sedtanquam
catholicus,
purusphilosophus,
theologus,
qui estphilosophus
nihilnoverunt
de habitibus
infusis."
quiapuriphilosophi
30Usingen,
Pawulus
multarum
hiefieri
, f. 111r:"Prosolutione
questionum
quaepossent
depotentia
rationali
etintellectu
notandum
estquidphilosophi
ethnici
etgentiles
humano,

11:34:03 AM

346

PEKKAKRKKINEN

human intellectis derived fromthe potenciesof matter,"althoughthis

titledoes not appear in the text.The main questioncan be formulated,
so thatit asks whetherthe generationof a human soul happensby virtue
of naturalagents,thatis, withoutany supernaturalinfluence.31
The question was importantfromthe viewpointof creationistic
theoryconcerning
the originof the soul, which Usingen shared,accordingto whichhuman
souls are created individually,togetherwith the formationof the body,
to which they are then infused,which was consideredas the Catholic
Christianview on the matter.32
In thisquestion,Usingenpresentsnot onlythe threecommonlyknown
positionsof AlexanderAphrodisias,Averroes,and Aristotleas in the average Buridaniantradition,but he also presentsPlato as a fourthposition.
ConcerningAlexander'smaterialistic
position,he says thatit is sharedby
while
it
is
difficult
to falsifyit merelyon the
many gentilephilosophers,
33
lumen
basis of naturalreason (.secundum
purum
naturae).He also maintains
thatmanypeople of his own timeshare Alexander'sposition,but his tarIn the 14th century,Blasius of Parma had
get here is hard to identify.34
the
Alexandrist
represented
position,but the contemporary
philosophers
favoredmainlythe Averroisticview.35
in some sense, the positionof the via moderna
,
Usingen'spoint reflects,
in which Alexander'spositionappears to be the most convenientforthe
natural reason. He does not, however,share Buridan's (and Ockham's)
view that its falsenesscannot be demonstratedby argumentsof natural
This
to falsify
reason alone, but thinksonlythatit is "difficult
effectively."
also fromPierre d'Ailly'sformulationin
formulationdifferssignificantly
his Tractatus
de anima
, that Alexander'spositionis for the naturalreason
in quo cumveritate
catholica
concordent
senserunt
de animarationali,
utsimulvideatur
etin quo discordent."
31Usingen,
humanus
siteductus
depotentia
materiae."
f.140v:
"Utrum
intellectus
Parvulus,
32Usingen,
A creationistic
viewis articulated
alsobyJohannes
Parvulus
Dorsten,
, f.112v.
in thelate15thcentury.
in Erfurt
Dorsten
couldalso
whowasan influential
theologian
hisargumentation
onGiles
oforiginal
sindespite
thisview,
thetransmission
basing
explain
nach
der
Gnade
undVerdienst
ofRome'sviews.See AdolarZumkeller,
, Rechtfertigung
Erbsnde,
desSptmittelalters
Lehre
derErfurter
1984,324.
, Wrzburg
Augustinertheologen
33Usingen,
multorum
Parvulus
fuit
, f.11lv:"Haecopinio
gentilium
philosophoquondam
efficaciter."
lumennaturae
difficulter
secundum
rum,quoniam
potest
reprobali
purum
34Ibid.,f. 11lv:"Ettimeohodieearnessemultorum
insensatorum
hominum,
quinon
et scripturae
sanctae
testimoniis."
credunt
cordedivinis
eloquiis
35Keler1988,487(above,
inMittelalterund
n. 1);OlafPluta,
Kritiker
derUnsterblichkeitsdoktrin
included
Pietro
Renaissance
1986,51.Suchcontemporary
, Amsterdam
Pomponazzi,
philosophers
ofAlexander's
fordefending
thephilosophical
wholaterbecamefamous
validity
position.

11:34:03 AM

IMMORTALITY
OF THE SOULIN THE LATEVIA
OF ERFURT347
MODERNA
the most probable.36There are some terminologicalsimilaritiesto be
observedin Lawrence of Lindores5Quaestiones
de anima
, which maintains
that accordingto the natural lightof reason (standoin luminenaturali
) it
cannotbe conceded as provedthatthe human intellectis eitherimmortal
or corruptible."Philosophicallyspeaking" (jburephilosophice
loquendo
), the
of
Alexander
to
be
more
than
the
Averroistic
opinion
appears
probable
position.37A distrustof the probabilityof Alexander's view, even in a
philosophicalanalysis,allowsUsingensuch extremeexpressionsas of those
who defendthe Alexandristposition,who "do not believe in theirhearts
in the divine sayingsand the testimoniesof the sacred Scriptures,"and
who thinkof the Christianfaithas a mere fabulation.38
Against the solution of Averroes,which presupposes one common
intellect,Usingen notes that it is condemned by the Church. There he
supposedlyhas in mind the statutesof the Council of Vienna in 1312,
wherethisdoctrineof Averroeswas firstcondemned,althoughthe importance of Averroesin psychologypersisteduntil the late 15th century.39
Usingenbringsno argumentsagainstthisposition,but refersto the authorityof Augustineand furtherto that of Gregoryof Rimini,whose proofs
- as Averroisthinks
- he
that this is not a correctreading of Aristotle
takes forgranted.40
36On Buridan,
seePluta1986(above,n. 35),41; on Pierre
seehisTractatus
de
d'Ailly,
desPeter
von
anima,
6, 1,ed. OlafPluta,Diephilosophische
, Amsterdam
1987,
Psychologu
Ailly
Pluta1986,42.
35,andon hislaterviews,
37Lawrence
ofLindores,
deanima
Questiones
, III, 4, citedin Pluta1986,107.
38Usingen,
Parvulus
hodieearnessemultorum
insensatorum
, f.lllv: "Ettimeo
hominum,
cordedivinis
etscripturae
sanctae
sedinnitentes
suis
testimoniis,
quinoncredunt
eloquiis
dicunt
catholica
essecomposita.
In quorum
ea,quaefides
docet,
capitibus
persona
loquitur
Ex nihilonatisumus
etposteaerimus
nonfuerimus.
ItemEcclesiastes:
sapiens:
tanquam
Unusestinteritus
hominum
et iumentorum
et aequeutriusque
et nihilhabet
conditio,
homoiumento
etc.Haec opiniopercatholicam
doctrinam
dudumexplosaest,
amplius
quarenonsitcurecatholico
philosopho."
39Usingen,
Parvulus
estab ecclesia,
, f. 11lv:"Sedhaecopiniodamnata
quiafidecredimusquemlibet
hominem
suumhabereintellectum
numeraliter
distinctum
ab intellectu
alterius.".
See Keler1988(above,n. 1),486.
40Usingen,
Parvulus
in secundo
De liberoarbitrio:
, f. 11lv: "Et hocdicitAugustinus
Manifestum
estrationales
mentes
habere.
Ethancposisingulos
quosquenostrum
singulas
tionem
Ariminensis
circasecundum
Sententiarum
nonfuisse
de intenprobatGregorius
tione
sedCommentatorem
deridendum
eamintentioni
Aristotelis,
esse,quiaascribit
Aristoteli,
ubivideassiplacet."
See Gregorius
Lectura
etsecundum
Sententiarum
Ariminensis,
,
super
primum
II, d. 16 et 17,q. 1, art.2, ed. A. DamasusTrappOSA,Berlin1979,Tomus5, 330,
5. Theargument
theAverroistic
which
outis dis36-331,
against
position,
Usingen
brings
cussedbyGregory
ibid.,art.2, ed. Trapp,326,14-9;327,2-329,37. The sametextof

11:34:03 AM

348

PEKKAKRKKINEN

Plato is passed over by Usingenwithno discussionconcerningwhether

or not his ideas contradictthe Catholic doctrine,in contrastto what he
does with the other three philosophers.Usingen only brieflydescribes
Plato's doctrinesof the pre-existenceof souls and anamnesis-theory
and
his notion of the soul afterdeath.41
Aristotleis again discussedin detail, and particularlyhis relationto
Catholic doctrineis examined.In evaluatingAristotle'sdoctrinefromthe
viewpointof Christiantheologyhe detects one point, where Aristotle
clearlydeviatesfromit. This is the questionof whetherthe human soul
is generatedfrom the potencies of matter,where Usingen thinksthat
Aristotlealso understandsthe generationhere takingplace by virtueof
natural agents which does not considerany supernaturalinfluence.For
this reason Usingen thinksthat Aristotlealso understoodthe generation
of the soul as being derivedfromthe potenciesof matter(.sentit
animam
educidepotentiis
materiae
where
it
differ
rationalem
does
not
from
the
),
generationof animal souls.UsingenunderstandsthatAristotlecould not have
known any other manner of generation,being a pure philosopher;but
for the Christian theologian, such an understandingof generationis
The Christiannotion of creation,which is not the same as
insufficient.
the purelyphilosophicalconceptof generation,presupposes,accordingto
Usingen,a predisposedsubject,where the soul will be created,but does
not take place by virtueof natural agents,but ratheras the divine act
of creationinstead.Concerningthe generationof the soul, Usingenseems
to implyhere that there were no lines of argumentationthat Aristotle
could have established,based upon his naturalreason. This comes close,
by the way, to Buridan's view that Alexander'sposition,which in this
cannotbe falsified
matteris sharedby Aristotle,
by naturalreasonalone.42
here(ed.Trapp,326,
from
De libere
arbitirio
2, 7, 15 is alsocitedbyGregory
Augustine
33-4).
41Usingen,
ff.lllv-112r.
Parvuliis,
42Usingen,
in
an haecpositio
Aristotelica
if. 112r
v: "Sed quandoquaeritur,
Pawulus,
unamparticuconcordet
cumveritate
omnibus
catholica,
respondetur,
quodsic,praeter
iliomodoquoAristoteles
animam
rationalem
lam,qua sentit
generali,
quianongeneratur
estprocedere
de nonessead
de generatione,
Aristotelem
quiasecundum
generali
loquitur
virtute
esseinmateria
naturalium,
quodnonestaliudquameduci
agentium
praedisposita
educide potentiis
Et sic Aristoteles
sensitanimamrationalem
de potentiis
materiae.
nonestaliusmodus
eumoctavoPhysicorum
sicutbrutalem,
materiae
quia secundum
formae
de non
emanandi
effectus
a suacausa,quampergenerationem,
quaeestprocessus
Dei velsupernaturalis
actiospecialis
essead essevirtute
naturalium,
quoniam
agentium
... Etillacreatio
animae
nonfuit
sicutestcreatio
velannihilatio.
cognita
purophilosopho
creationem
extra
subiectum
eteductionem
depotentiis
rationalis
estquasiactiomediainter

11:34:03 AM

IMMORTALITY
OF THE SOULIN THE LATEVIA
OF ERFURT349
MODEMA
On the immortality
of the soul afterdeath Aristotlethinksotherwise,
to
according Usingen,agreeingforthe most part withthe Catholic view
whichunderstandsthe human soul as being immortal.Although,Usingen
himselfshares the view expressed by Pierre d'Ailly and Gregory of
Rimini43
and he refuses
thatAristotlespeakson thesemattersambiguously,
statementsfound in Aristotle'swritings.
to harmonizethe contradictory
In his opinion,Aristotleis more likelyto hold the opinion of the perpetuityof the human soul, and thereforeconcedingto Christiandoctrine.
It is evident,nevertheless,
thatUsingen understandsthisas a mere opinion of Aristotle,which is again groundedupon no conclusivephilosophical proofs.44
A similarsolutionis evidentlater in 1507, when Usingen discussedsevde anima.The centralquestion of
eral related questionsin his Exercitium
whetheror not the intellectualsoul is derivedfromthe potenciesof matter is not discussedthere,but Usingen notes thatAristotleis holdingthe
affirmative
view on the question against the Catholic doctrineof creation.45On theimmortality
of the soul afterbodilydeath,wherebyUsingen
is persuadedof itsexistence,is concededas truthin thephilosophybecause
it does not contradictthe naturalreason, but is proved on the contrary
by dialecticalarguments althoughnotby logicallyvalidproofs.Additionally,
et tarnen
nonproducitur
virtute
subiectum
materiae,
quiapraesupponit
dispositum
agentiumnaturalium,
vocatur
vocatur
creatio,
quarea theologis
quandoque
quandoque
genesednonad sensum
ratio,
purephilosophicum."
43Petrus
Tractatus
deanima
Lectura
Alliaco,
, 6, 1,ed. Pluta,35; Gregorius
Ariminensis,
,
5.
II, d. 16 et 17,q. 1,art.2, ed. Trapp,330,37-331,
44Usingen,
Pawulus
eumamplius
esseperpetuum.
Etquamvis
Aristoteles
, f.112r:"Etdixit
videtur
taliasensisse
tarnen
nonadducit
efficaces
de
probationes,
quia,ut Cameracensis
eo testatur,
de his,quaein discrimen
sonabant
quandoAristoteles
loquebatur
religionm
iamhocpotius
inplerisque
etpertinebant
aliudpersequendo.
paucistransivit
Quarerepetitur
locisde eademre contrarie
scripsisse,
quiain primoDe animadicit:Nonreminiscimur
in secundo
verodicit:Separetur
hoc ab hoc tanquam
a corpostmortem,
perpetuum
etconse,utpatetclare.Necestopusexponere
ruptibili,
quaeduomanifeste
impugnant
ac si in nulloerrasset
necin aliquosibicontradixisset,
est
cordare,
quodpotiusdivinum
. . . Quia autemAristoteles
fuerit
huicpositioni
quamhumanum.
magisinclinatus
quam
de perpetuitate
claret
ex hoc,quodeiusscripta
animae,
oppositae,
signanter
magissonant
proilio."
45Usingen,
Ex.an., f.L3V:"Tertio
notandum
estomnem
formam
substantialem
materialem
etcorruptibilem
de potentiis
materiae
esseeductam
etrurgenerabilem
generando
in potentias
sumretransire
materiae
corrumpendo,
quia secundum
Philosophum
primo
materia
estprimum
subiectum
talisformae.
Etquidcorrumpitur
inhocabibit
Physicorum
sedanimarationalis
iuxtaveritatem
catholicam
nonsiceducitur,
sedimmediate
ultimum,
a Deo creatur
incorpore.
inmorte
Necretransit
inpotentias
hominis
sedsepamateriae,
a corpore
ratur
esseperse subsistentiae."
acquirens

11:34:03 AM

350

PEKKAKRKKINEN

in spiteof some
Aristotleis reckonedamong the adherentsof immortality,
others.46
which
Usingen discusses,among
contraryarguments,
On the question whetherthe human soul is the substantialformof
the body, Usingen defineshis view of the relationbetweentheologyand
philosophy.Afterdiscussingthe question on the basis of the Catholic
he asks in a separate
Christianpositionas a part of his argumentation,47
from
the
defended
can
be
standpointof the arguquestion,ifthe position
rationaturalis
mentsof pure naturalreason (utrum
circumscripta
fidecatholica
answeris
final
His
humani
esseformam
humanum
intellectum
dictaret
).48
corporis
latter
holds
the
where
contrastedwithOckham's positionin his Quodlibeta
,
as
evior
demonstrate
cannot
the view that the natural reason
prove
soul is theformof thebody.According
dentlyprobablethattheintellectual
and dialectialiterpersuasibile)
to Usingen this is naturallybelievable (natur
him
answerhis
to
for
is
which
conclusibile
dialectice
enough
),
callyprovable(<
natural
reason
to
the
main questionaffirmatively,
namelythat according
this position is to be consideredtrue.49A similarview is expressedin
concerningthe questionwhetherit is to be
physicorum
Usingen'sExercitium
to
the
conceded, according
philosophyof nature,that the Firstmoveris
The answeris groundedon
whichhe answersaffirmatively.
omnipresent,
reasoningthatthistruth,whichis knownto be truefromrevelation,does
not contradictthe principlesof naturalscience because of the coherence
conditionfor its being true also in
of all truths,and this is a sufficient
naturalscience.So in theory,Usingenincludessuch articlesof faith,which
do not contradictthe principlesof naturalscienceas a part of the natural
sciences themselves.He also findsit importantto note here, however,
that this truthcan be deduced fromthe principlesof naturalscience as
a probable, althoughnot evident,truth.50
46Usingen,
Ex.an., ff.M4V;Nlr.
47Usingen,
Ex.an.,ff.L4V-M1V.
48Usingen,
Ex.an., ff.M1V-M2V.
49Usingen,
non
Ockham
Guilhelmum
secundum
dicitur
Ex. an., f.M2V:"Adtertium
esseforhumanum
intellectum
veldemonstrabile
evidenter
naturali
esseratione
probabile
etdialecestenimnaturaliter
utdoetin Quodlibeto;
mamcorporis
persuasibile
humani,
ad veritatem
fidecatholica,
etcircumscripta
seclusa
ticeconclusibile,
responsionis.
quodsufficit
nec
sintdemonstrabilia
determinata
fideiet in conciliis
An autemarticuli
perecclesiam
naturalis
andratio
naturae
lumen
usestheexpressions
in theologia."
Usingen
ne,habetvideri
lumen
useoftheconcept
ofLindores'
Lawrence
from
andhediffers
clearly
interchangeably,
Ex.
See Usingen,
truths.
demonstrated
or naturally
naturae
, whichincluded
onlyevident
deanima
ofLindores,
f.lv;Lawrence
an., f.MlrandEx.Phys.,
, III, q. 4, cited
Questiones
in Pluta1986(above,n. 35),107.
50Usingen,
affirmative.
ad questionem
ff.2rv:"Quibus
Ex.phys.,
respondetur
praemissis

11:34:03 AM

OF ERFURT35 1
MODERNA
OF THE SOULIN THE LATEVIA
IMMORTALITY
FollowingMarsiliusof Inghen,Usingenexplainsthatthisdoes not contradictthe idea that Christianfaithdoes not depend on philosophical
proofs.Only some articlesof faith,like the ones concerningthe Trinity
and the Incarnation,are known only throughrevelation;there are several othersthatare knownby naturalreason also, but one's faithin them
because theywould
does not relyon theirphilosophicaldemonstrability,
be believedalso, even when therewere no philosophicalproofsforthem.51
So we can sketchthe positionin these controversialmattersin Erfurt
of the FifthLateran Council. In the questions
beforethe determination
discussedabove, Usingen seems to thinkthat in the controversialdoctrinesconcerningthe intellectthereare no evidentphilosophicalgrounds
thatwould necessarilycontradictthe Catholic doctrine.There are some
doctrines,like the soul being derived frompotencies of matter,where
pure philosopherslikeAristotlefollowtheirerroneousviewssystematically,
because theyknownothingof Christianrevelation,but Christiandoctrine
does not reallycontradicttheirviews, but ratherincludes it since it is
in itself.Notably,thisdoctrinewas not amongthosecondemned
insufficient
the
Fifth
Lateran Council,but onlythe relatedquestionon the immorby
talityof the soul afterdeath.52
Usingen does not see in this doctrinea necessaryconnectionto the
as Aristotleholds both of them.In thisdoctrine
questionof immortality,
and
most
Aristotle,
philosophers,even agreed withthe Christiandogma,
and not logibut theirproofswere a type of dialecticaldemonstration,
callyvalidconsequences.Discussingthe questionon the soul as a substantial
formof the body, the dialecticalproofwas takenby Usingen as a philotruthin the naturalsciences.It may
sophicallyplausibleway of affirming
seem that this view exceeds the limitsof natural philosophy,which he
de anima.There he
set for himselfin the initial question of Exercitium
definedthe knowledgeof the soul to be founded on the demonstrated
autoritate
. . . Rationesic,quia nonrpugnt
Haec responsio
et ratione.
prinprobatur
rationis
cumsitverum,
uttestatur
fidesorthodoxa,
sedomneverum
vero
cipiisnaturalis
divine
autemnaturalis
rationis
omniasuntveracuminnitantur
consonai,
principia
et mensura
omnium
verorum.
Etiampotest
deduci
veritati,
probabiliter
quaeestmetrum
ex principiis
naturalis
sed nonevidenter,
ut dicitLondorius,
rationis,
quia estquedam
veritas
conformis
lumini
naturalis
ad quampossunt
movere
rationis,
naturalia,
principia
hereexplicitly
of Lindores
sed nonevidenter
to Lawrence
probare."
Usingenrefers
(Londorius).
51Usingen,
Ex.an.,f.M2V.
52See Decrees
Councils
605-7.
, ed. Tanner,
oftheEcumenical

11:34:03 AM

352

PEKKAKRKKINEN

truthsof the soul, althoughhe did not discusstherewhetherthe demonstrationmustbe evidentor not.53
whichthe FifthLateran
One shouldnote here concerningthe doctrines,
Council later declared as orthodox,that Usingen thoughttheywere also
philosophicallythe most probable, althoughnot to be demonstratedby
logicallyvalid proofs.He even strivedto refuteany argumentsagainst
them,as the Council also recommendedand urged.54
and theFifthLateranum
4. Trutfetter
Summa
As one mightexpect,thereare some new aspects in Trutfetter's
in totam
, which came out in 1514, the year afterthe decree of
physicen,
describeshis workas an epitome
the FifthLateran Council. Trutfetter
, an
into naturalphilosophy,which mainlydescribesthe position
introduction
withoutgoing into a detailed discussionon individual
of the via moderna
work can also be consideredas a nominalistcountopics.55Trutfetter's
for
a
via
philosophica
antiquacompendiumof philosophy:Margarita
terpart
Reisch
(1503), which was actuallyone of its sources.56
by Georg
The lattercontainsextensivediscussionson theologicalmattersin its
could make use of.57The theologbook on psychology,which Trutfetter
ical interestin Margaritafitwell withinTrutfetter's
concept,as he consideredSummaaccordingto its title"an expositionof naturalphilosophy
with the true wisdom, which is theology."Despite this
in conformity
does not contain as much theologicaldiscussionin
emphasis Trutfetter
53See above,n. 13.
54Decrees
Councils
606,7-10.
, ed. Tanner,
oftheEcumenical
55Trutfetter,
ut dici
omnesquumnecetiamin transitu,
A5r:"Has siquidem
Summa
dissaltem
ratiosinat,collibeat
commemorare
solet,et superficie
posthabitis
compendii
necesminus
superioribus,
probationibusque
speculationibus
supervacaneis,
ceptationibus
cuihocEpitome
et necessariora
sariispauculaquedamgeneraliora
aetati,
(quaetantillae
simulac ad altiora
nimosoblectare
et initiatorum
dedicareconstituimus,
congruere
ac stiloplano,eorumsolum,
narratione
quos
valeant)
simplici
preinstruere
capescenda
in marginae
cumannotationibus
recitando
sententiam
nominales
pro
vocant,
quibusdam
ofnatural
Theworkis a compendium
lectionem
fusiorem
philospraelibare."
ampliorem
dialectice
oflogicBreviarium
ofhisowncompendium
(1500,laterunder
ophyinthemanner
Summa
Scheurl
callsTrutfetter's
Humanist
seubreviarium
thenameEpitome
Christoph
logice).
Scheurls
naturalem
universam
enchiridion
seupotius
Christoph
philosophiam,"
"compendium
ed. F. F. vonSodenand
undihrere
derReformation
einBeitrag
zurGeschichte
eit,
Briefiuch,
13 December
to Trutfetter
1514).
1867,137.(Letter
J. K. F. Knaake.Vol. 1, Potsdam
56I useherethe1508edition
1508.
ofMargarita
, Strasbourg
philosophica
57See e.g.Trutfetter,
cited.
Summa
, ff.Y4randZlr,whereReischis explicitly

11:34:03 AM

OF ERFURT353
MODERNA
OF THE SOULIN THE LATEVIA
IMMORTALITY
his expositionas Reisch, and focusesmore along the lines of Usingen's
Powulus
, presentingmainly an introductionto natural philosophy,with
certaindiscussionson the relevanttheologicalissues.58
tier'sexpositionof psychologyin SummaresemThe beginningof Trutfe
the materialfromAugustine,which
but
bles Reisch'sMargarita
,
rearranging
Firsthe removesdoubts that no such thing
Reisch cites word-for-word.
as the soul existswhatsoever.He does thisby an earlyformof Cartesian
This statesthatno wise man would
"cogito"fromAugustine'sDe trinitate.
doubt itselfindicatesa livingthing,
while
the
of
a
the
existence
soul,
deny
the doubtingindicatesa memoryand finallya doubtingperson understandshimselfdoubting.So threebasic elementsof a soul, namelylife,
acts concerning
are indicatedby its reflective
memoryand understanding,
the verydoubt of its existence.59
Afterthat Trutfetter
proceeds by introducingthe varietyof opinions
concerningthe essence and originof the soul, with a special consideration of theirerroneousnature.Some of them implythe mortalityof the
rationalsoul, since theysee the soul as materialor being some sort of
bodilycomposition.He sees the errorof the soul's materialnaturerefuted
(as Reisch does) alreadyby Aristotlein the firstbook of De animawhere
Later on Trutfetter
the Philosophertreatssome viewsof his predecessors.60
himself
is
not
that
Aristotle
as
does
admits,
unambiguouson
Usingen,
58"Summa
naturalem
veraesophiae,
hocestphilosophiam
intotam
siquidem
physicen,
ingymnasio
elucrabata
Isennachcensem
Erphordiensi
perD. Judocum
quaeesttheologia,
famewasso widespread
Trutfetter's
tohisfriend
etedita".According
Scheurl,
Christoph
from
the
oftheviamoderna
1513someadherents
in German
universities
thatin autumn
in Breisgau
askedforTrutfetter's
ofFreiburg
books,whichScheurl
fervendy
University
were
ofphysics
and metaphysics
delivered
to them.Especially
expositions
subsequendy
at thattime.See Christoph
on logicwereavailable
butonlytextbooks
anticipated,
eagerly
toTrutfetter,
n. 55),125.(Letter
25 August
ScheurVs
, ed.vonSoden(above,
1513.)
Briefbuch
andthereis againevidence
hadfinished
hisSumma
Trutfetter
Abouta yearafterwards,
accomwasnominor
work
onnatural
thatthewriting
ofthisfirst
from
Scheurl
philosophy
to
See Christoph
Scheurls
forTrutfetter.
, ed. vonSoden,138.(Letter
Brefluch
plishment
et noctes[noctis
iamlongotempore
13 December
Trutfetter,
ed.]di1514):"Laborasti
metam:
ad dulcem
xisti
absolvisti
novum
insomnes,
rogo
opuscummagnalaude,pervenisti
curavaletudinem;
te resume
te quiescemodo,obsecro
vires,dormi,
ede,bibe,laetare,
valetstudiosa
valetposteritas."
valetFriburgum,
namtevalente
valetErphordia,
iuventus,
59Trutfetter,
dubitavit.
f. X4V:"Tale equidemaliquidessenullussapientum
Summa,
c. 10 ait)enimsi quisdubitai,
lib.10 De trinitate
(vtbeatusAugustinus
Quandoquidem
se intelligit."
si dubitai,
dubitare
si dubitai,
undedubitet,
meminit;
vivit;
60Trutfetter,
mortalem
essesenserint,
Summa
, f.X4V:"Ethi omnesanimam
quiasive
nonpossetutiqueimmortaliter
essetsivealiquacorporis
permanere."
compositio,
corpus
See alsoibid.,f.Y3r.

11:34:03 AM

354

PEKKAKRKKINEN

of the rational soul, and cites here Pierre

the question of immortality
He
that
would not conformto Aristode's
even
immortality
suspects
d'Ailly.
ideas on the eternityof the world and the denial of an actual infinite.61
conformsto decisionsmade
The intereston the questionof immortality
Council
towards
the
end
of
the
the
Lateran
year(19 December
previous
by
in
1514.62 In fact,
transmitted
to
Trutfetter
which
were
early
1513),
Trutfetter's
expositionfollowsalong the basic guidelinesposed by the
Council, which
in theuniversiwhoteaches
publicly
enjoinon eachandevery
philosopher
strictly
oraddress
totheir
audience
theprinciples
thatwhentheyexplain
tiesorelsewhere,
areknown
todeviate
from
ofphilosophers,
where
these
thetruefaith
orconclusions
orofthere
ofthesoul'smortality
as in theassertion
beingonlyonesoulorofeter- theyare obliged
to devotetheir
nityoftheworldand othertopicsofthiskind
to teach
listeners
oftheChristian
effort
to clarify
fortheir
thetruth
religion,
every
andtoapplythemselves
tothe
so faras thisis possible,
itbyconvincing
arguments,
to refuting
anddisposing
ofthephilosophers'
fullextent
oftheirenergies
opposing
areavailable.63
sinceall thesolutions
arguments,
This kind of method is followedquite clearlyin Trutfetter's
exposition
on De anima
, culminatingat the point where he presentsa collectionof
certain sentences concerningthe rational soul, which every Christian
should agree upon for his salvation.64
was writinghis Summa
One mustremember,in any case, thatTrutfetter
as a teacherof the theologicalfaculty,whichwould have givenhim par-

61Trutfetter,
ex librisipsius
de hac re senserit,
Y3V:"QuidautemAristoteles
Summa
hominum
sectaset religiones
nonhabetur,
autenticis
quiade hisquaetangunt
perspicue
certum
sibirepugetobscure
Hoctamen
communiter
est,quodnonnulla
ambigue
loquitur.
mundum
fuisse
ab aeterno,
Nonvideoenimquodsibiconsonant
nantia
singulorum
ponit.
actu
et nonessemultitudinem
et perpetuas
hominum
esseanimasimmortales
singulas
of
deanima
Tractatus
infinitam."
See Petrus
, 6, 1, ed. Pluta,35. AlsoGregory
Aillyaco,
ofindiis directed
theideaoftheimmortality
Rimini
which
notedthisargument
against
of
oftheworldandtheactualexistence
to himtheeternity
vidualsouls,butaccording
inpotentia
Deiabsoluta.
See Gregorius
number
ofsoulsarepossible
theinfinite
Ariminensis,
andAverros'
Lectura
, II, d. 16 et 17,q. 1,art.2, ed. Trapp,331,6-8.Alexander's
posibefore
thatofAristotle,
aredescribed
tions
alongthesamelinesas Usingen
following
shortly
in hisearlier
works.
62A letter
indicates
toTrutfetter
dated23 March1514clearly
from
Scheurl
Christoph
atthattime.See Gerhard
decision
withthecounciliar
wasfamiliar
thatTrutfetter
Ebeling,
to thedecreeis
Lutherstudien
1982,76,n. 60. An explicit
, Vol. 2/2,Tbingen
allegation
Leo
modernus
constitutionem
inTrutfetter,
Summa
found
, f.Y4r:"Quamquidem
pontifex
novissimis
hisdiebusinnovavit."
in concilio
Lateranense
decimus
63Decrees
606.
Councils
, ed. Tanner,
oftheEcumenical
64Trutfetter,
Summa
, f.Y2V.

11:34:03 AM

OF ERFURT355
IMMORTALITY
OF THE SOULIN THE LATEVIA
MODERNA
the Council also
ticularinterestin theologicalmattershere. Interestingly,
takesa positionon the lengthof the studiesin naturalphilosophy,when
immediatelyafterthe afore cited passage it is recommendedthat after
fiveyears of studiesin natural philosophy,one should proceed in this
area only togetherwiththeologicalstudies,in order to avoid the embellishmentof heresiesamong the secular philosophers.65
On the other hand, Trutfetter
himselfunderlinesthe importanceof
the studyof psychologyfor theologians.Afterhaving discussedthe distinctionof the potencies of the soul, he emphasizes the importanceof
this studyfor theologians,alludingto the theologicalnotion of the soul
as an image of the Trinity.Althoughhe leaves the detaileddiscussionon
the theologicalimplicationsto theologicalstudies,he implies a connection between philosophicalpsychologyand theology,the formerbeing
helpfulin the clear expositionof thistheologicaldoctrine.It is not to be
overseen,however,that the psychologicalanalogy was widelyused, for
example,in the sermonson the Trinity.66
In accordance with Usingen, Trutfetter
notes that the 'soul' is here
used as a soul connectedwiththe body,excludingGod or variousmovers
of celestialbodies, etc.67He even explicatesthe science of psychologyin
a similarmanner,notingthat metaphysicsexplicatesthe soul in absolute
terms,while psychology,as a part of natural philosophy,treatsit with
termsthatconnotemovementand change. Of some interestis Trutfe
tier's
notion that the absolute termsof metaphysicsare of the kind that they
are essentially
to distinguish
predicatedof a soul.68Otherwisehe is satisfied
65Decrees
Councils
606.
, ed. Tanner,
oftheEcumenical
66Trutfetter,
Summa
cumtamstudiosa
, f.Z4r:"Seddiceret
quis:quidtheologis
disquisitione
distinctionis
vide
turnamquerelinquenda
Is sciat
animae;
potentiarum
philosophis.
earnnonparumconferre
ad convenientem
beatissimae
theologis
assignationem
imaginis
inanimarationali,
inhistribus
Trinitatis
consistere
astruunt
memoquamquidam
potentiis,
riascilicet
etvolntate,
aliiiterum
intellectu
recentiores
veroin essentia
animaeet
aliter,
duobusactibus
nobilissimarum
scilicet
intellectus
et voluntatis,
utpatetplepotentiarum,
niuscircadist.3. Magisti
ad specialem
, quaemissafacio
[libri]1. [Sententiarum]
potentiarum
tractatum
ofuseofthepsychological
properans."
Contemporary
examples
analogy
= WA),
canbefound,
D. Martin
Luthers
Werke
Edition
Weimar
Luther,
(Weimar
e.g.,inMartin
1883-,1,85,29-86,7; 4, 599,10-21.
67Trutfetter,
Summa
, f.X5r.
68Trutfetter,
Summa
instituimus
sci, f.X6V:"Caeterum
quianuncde animatractatum
nonessenostri
nunctractare
de animapertrminos
absolutos
etessenendum,
propositi
tialiter
depronomine
animam
demonstrante
deea considrt),
praedicabiles
(quodmetaphysica
sedpertrminos
motum
et mutationem
connotantes
(qui ad naturalem
philosophiam
spectant)."

11:34:03 AM

356

PEKKAKRKKINEN

psychologyfromthe other sciences,such as physics,moral philosophy,

rhetoric,botany,and zoology,with briefremarks.69
considersthe empirAlthougha part of naturalphilosophy,Trutfetter
if its
ical or rationalphilosophicalapproach to psychologyinsufficient,
conclusionswould striveagainstcertainbasic theologicaltruthswhich,as
noted above, are to be believed by everyChristianat the foundationof
divine revelationin the Scripturesand in the testimonyof the Catholic
fathers.As such, neitherof these truthscontradictthe teachingsof many
as several
pagan philosophers,but are in factalso foundin theirwritings,
also
noted.70
in
have
theologians history
In addition to its basic positiveattitude,Trutfetter's
expositiondoes
of the Fifth
reveal a consciouslynominalistreadingof the determination
LateranCouncil. Firstof all, he findsit necessaryto emphasize,as Usingen
did in his Exercitium
, that he does not implythoughtssuch that doctrinal
truthswere to be understoodby naturalreason alone. So, he alludes to
several explanationsas to why some theologicaltruthsare to be found
in the writingsof some pagan philosophers.Morover,his emphasisupon
these doctrinalsentencesconcerningthe rationalsoul are to be believed
whichleads
the philosophicalargumentation,
in the case of contradicting
to similarthoughts.71
mentionsthatAquinas discussesthe doctrinesof
ThereafterTrutfetter
the soul as a formof body and itsimmortality
but,as Ockham has shown,
So
Trutfetter
his proofsare not conclusive.
denies,as does Usingen,the
of conclusivephilosophicalproofsforthesedoctrines,but relies
possibility
of the articlesof
insteadon ockhamisticprincipleof non-demonstrability
of
that
the
like
have
faith.Trutfetter
immortality
Usingen,
thought,
may
69Trutfetter,
Summa
, f.X6V.
70Trutfetter,
firmata
estsanctarum
satisabundeque
"HaecVeritas
Summa
, ff.Y2v-Y3r:
catholicorum
testimoniis,
longe
quae cuiquechristiano
quoquedoctorum
scripturarum
efficaci
autquantumcumque
omnihumana
valeredebent
persuasione
experientia,
amplius
sacraefideiveritatem
Hanc praeterea
demonstratione.
(utet omnedivinaereligionis
aitlibriDivi,institu.
invenientibus
diversa
diversis
(utLactantius
archanum)
particulatim
nullus
summam
7. c. 7.) philosophi
potuerit."
comprehendere
quamvis
attigerunt,
71Trutfetter,
me in earn
velimcandidelector,
Summa
, f.Y3r:"Nectamensuspiceris
humana
inscrutabilia
sacraefideinostrae
stoliditatem,
mystria
quo sentiam
delapsum
velMosi
velexpaterna
sedea inlibris
ratione
instructione,
gentilium
sparsa,
comprehensa,
revedivinaautdiabolica
velspeciali
sciendi
studiosa
aviditate
lectione,
prophetarumque
libris
falseab haereticis
velquiaillagentilium
ascripta
(etPelagianis
potissimum)
latione,
See alsothe
ascribebant."
et nongratiae
archana
sint,quo fideinostre
purisnaturalibus
note.
previous

11:34:03 AM

OF ERFURT357
OF THE SOULIN THE LATEVIA
MODERNA
IMMORTALITY
the soul can, in some weaker sense, be proved by the philosophers,but
belongsbasicallyto the articlesof faith.72
collectionof sentences,which he requiredto be believed
Trutfetter's
regardingthe rationalsoul, is in itselfan elucidatingaccount of his views
on the relationshipbetween theologyand philosophy.As noted above,
the passage seemsto be influencedby the newlyissued decree concerning
also comes to note
of the soul. For thisreason Trutfetter
the immortality
on the soul as being separated from the body, although he had just
excluded it from the foregoingtreatise.73The other importantsource
seems to be the Sentencescommentaryof Gabriel Biel, which was used
in the Summa.
extensively
introducessome sentencesconcerningthe originof human
Trutfetter
souls. He statesthat rationalsouls are created individuallyafterthe formation of their respectivebodies, and that they are infusedinto their
The notion
bodies, viz., unitedto informthem as theiressentialforms.74
afterthe bodies is alreadyclearly
thathumansoulsare createdindividually
cites
of Peter Lombard (2 Sent. 17). Trutfetter
articulatedin the Sentences
with
the
creation
Lombard word forword earlierin the Summa
, dealing
of man.75There he also notes that this theme was already discussedin
the influentialquodlibetaldisputeof 1497, which preceded an extensive
ockhamisticreformin the studies of the philosophical facultyof the
pointsout the unanimityof the Catholic
Universityof Erfurt.Trutfetter
by Lombardand themainconclusionoftheErfurtians.76
positionformulated
72Trutfetter,
mefugit
doctorem
sanctum
1. q. 75 ar. 6
Summa
, f.Y3r:"Necprorsus
intellectivam
esseformam
animaeimmortalitatem,
item76.ar. 1 animam
(etita
corporis
sedidminus
dictae
veritatis
attentasse
efficaciter
aliosaliosquosdam
demonstrare,
artculos)
OckamGabriel
subtilis
li. 4. dist.43. q. 2. et postGuilhelmum
effectum
probatdoctor
homini
ubisupraatqueproinde
solafidecredita."
73It mustbe admitted
thatin thisrespect
therehad beenprevious
deviations,
e.g.
from
oftheintellection
ofthesoulas beingseparate
the
hadtreated
thequestion
Usingen
inAristotle.
in 1499,although
thatthistheme
is notfound
hementions
See
bodyalready
f. 124r.
Parvulus,
Usingen,
74Trutfetter,
iamformato
f.Y2V:"Cuiquecorpori
ac sufficienter
Summa,
disposito
proinfunditur
animaa deo creatur,
illi,quae [quoded.],tancreandoque
priapeculiarisque
utperse etessentialis
forma,
unitur,
informationem,
quamproprio
perfectibili,
perrealem
maiorem
annonam
mereatur."
utinibiDeo creatori
suofamulans
75Trutfetter,
Petrus
d. 17,c. 2.
ff.P3v-4r
2 Sent.,
Summa,
Lombardus,
citing
76Trutfetter,
f. P4r:"Hoc siquidem
intellectu
et sensunecsecusannosalutis
Summa,
nostre
1497indisputatione
de quolibet
inter
aliaconclusimus.
conditoris
demenPraelarga
tiahomini
animantium
ac omnium
facile
nonsinemembrorum
corpus
prestabilissimo
optimo
decoraet commoda
commensuratione
donanscapitiomnem
coeliornatum
inscribendo,
animam
liberi
muere
ad scientias
immortalem
arbitrii
praeditam
virtutesque
capescendas

11:34:03 AM

358

PEKKAKRKKINEN

Apart fromthe word 'infusion'used by Lombard, Biel adds the word

'union5saying hereto that rational souls are created by God, and the
into man,
meaningof Gen. 2:7, wherebythe soul is said to be insufflated
is to be understoodas God makingthe individualspiritand "uniting"it
withthe man.77The Council and Peter Lombard talk only of the "infucombinesthese two formusion" of souls, so it is naturalthat Trutfetter
lations.The notion of the soul as an essentialformis also foundin the
of the Council,whichcitesthe decreeof theVienna Council
determination
view of one commonrationalsoul,which
of 1312, wherebytheAverroistic
without
the
bodies
beingtheiressentialform,was rejected.78
merelygoverns
are
immaterialand independentfromthe
souls
rational
Furthermore,
determiningof a body and not to be located in any particularpart of
the body. Again, theyare immutable,indivisible,and immortal,so that
in an animal
in death the soul leaves the body,but withouttransmigration
in
the blessed
led
into
eternal
life
final
is
to
be
or a plant. Their
destiny
bothaccordingto theirindividual
visionof God or intoeternalpunishment,
merits,wherebytheyare reunitedto theirbodies which theyhad before
theirdeath.79
disac viribus
modocoelestium
naturalibus
indidit
habentem
semina
sphaerarum
potentiis
Ex. an.,f.L3V:"Sed animaratiotinctis
earninsignando
ed.]."Cf.Usingen,
[insignendo
incorpore."
a Deo creatur
sedimmediate
nonsiceducitur,
catholicam
nalisiuxtaveritatem
77Gabriel
libros
Sententiarum
circa
, II, 17,q. 1 G, 37-8,ed. W.
Biel,Collectorium
quattuor
394:"Sextaopinioet catholica
& U. Hoffmann,
Werbeck
est,quod
1973-92,
Tbingen
Ibid.II, 17,q. 1
de potentia
materiae."
et noneducitur
a Deo creatur
animaimmediate
secunvel'insufflare'
dicendum
D 2-3,ed. Werbeck,
391:"Adprimam
quod'inspirare'
facere
et' eum
'idemestquodspiritum
in praedicta
auctoritate
dumaliamtranslationem
on thesametext.Cf. also
unire."BielciteshereBonaventure's
commentary
corpori
haeretici
Summa
, f.P3V:
Trutfetter,
(utquidam
putaverunt),
"QuamnecDeusde suaessentia
univit."
sed<de> nihilocreatam
necde aliquamateria
formatam,
78Decrees
Councils
605,21-5:"Cumilianonsolumperse
, ed. Tanner,
oftheEcumenical
Clementis
recordationis
forma
sicutincanonefelicis
humani
etessentialiter
existt,
corporis
verum
et
concilio
editocontinetur,
in generali
Viennensi
nostri
papaeV praedecessoris
et
multitudine
et procorporum
multiplicabilis,
immortalis,
singulariter
quibusinfunditur
of'subin Trutfetter
instead
form'
sit."The term'essential
etmultiplicanda
multiplicata,
in Usingen's
works
form'
stantial
, f.81v)alludesto the
(seeEx. an., f.A2VandParvulus
Summa
See alsoTrutfetter,
ofthedetermination.
influence
, f.Y4r:"Maledictus
quoqueille
uniri
dumtaxat
sedperassistentiam
substantiales
eas nonesseformas
Averrois
corporum,
damnavit
ethaereticum
Ecclesia
navibus,
quemerrorem
atquerectores
proinde
corporibus
et fidecatholica,
in Clementina
unicaDe summatrinitate
ut habetur
quam
declaravit,
novissimis
inconcilio
Lateranense
Leo decimus
modernus
constitutionem
pontifex
quidem
hisdiebusinnovavit."
79Trutfetter,
necullamsibicorporis
Summa
, f.Y2V:"Immaterialis
particulam
siquidem,
Nonmaiorin
totasimulassistens.
sed omnibus
determinans,
particulis
corporis
proprii

11:34:03 AM

OF ERFURT359
OF THE SOULIN THE LATEVIA
MODERNA
IMMORTALITY
This latterpart of the passage seems to be influencedby the Council
of the soul onlyin generalterms,and it describes
regardingtheimmortality
destiniesof the rationalsoul in far more detailed a manner
the different
than the Council's Determination.In it Trutfettergathersand refutes
variousphilosophicalopinionsthatwould contradictthe CatholicChristian
he continues
doctrine.So ifhe were at firstinspiredby the Determination,
farbeyondits actual contents.By doing this,he bringsforthsome results
of a previousdiscussionon theologicaldoctrinesin psychology,to point
to psychology.
out to his readersthisproblematicin the veryintroduction
One cannot pass over the allusionto similarthemesin the disputation
by Trutfetter's
pupil and a fellowcolleague froma neighboringuniversity
some yearslater.In the philosophicalthesesof the HeidelbergDisputation
of the soul as one
in 1518, MartinLutheralso discussedthe immortality
of the themes.Luther'smain point was to show that Aristotlesystematically teaches the mortalityof the soul, in which Luther clearlydiffered
fromhis teachers.His main argumentwas linkingthe question to the
doctrineof the eternityof the world,whichwas also noted by Trutfetter
as a questionablepointagainstAristotle.In additionto this,he also extensivelydiscussedlargelythe textualevidencefromAristotleon immortality,
but consideredit in supportof his own interpretation.80
Remarks
5. Concluding
betweentheologyand philosophyin the early
Concerningthe relationship
16thcentury,Usingen'sand Trutfetter's
expositionsof De animaare notein
two
worthy,mainly
respects.Firstly,theyrepresenta position,which
follows,in methodologyand aspirations,the traditionof the late
faithfully
medievalviamoderna.
Secondly,fromthatstartingpointtheygive an interthe
on
relationshipbetween philosophyand theology,which
pretation
in minoribus,
necad membri
seo
sedindivisibilis
necminor
maioribus,
inpartibilisque,
dissectum
vivificare
tionem
divisionem
necretrocedens,
sedmembrum
desinens,
patiens,
in corpore
necpostinteritura.
Nonin caelestia,
nonmoriens
bestiarum,
plantarumque
sedimmortalis
exuta
autdemonum
naturas
perseverans,
corpore
transmigrans,
corpora
adhucpropeccatis
suorum
(nisidebitum
aliquodsatisfaciendi
promeritorum
qualitate
vel limpidissimam
aut mortalibus,
venialibus
retardaverit)
quo ad culpamhic dimissis,
velaeternae
damnationis
moxconsequitur.
Tandem
divinitatis
beatificam
visionem,
poenam
in adventu
iterum
districti
iudicis
ipsoeodemcorpore,
quodhiepermortem
deposuerat,
inilioquoque,autproiustitia
autprosceleribus
poena,aeternaliter
supervestienda
premio,
afficienda."
80Luther,
3.
WA,59,410,15-420,

11:34:03 AM

360

PEKKAKRKKINEN

of the FifthLateran
Trutfetter
consideredconsonantwiththe formulations
Council of 1513 on the same matter,even showingsimilarintentionsas
also providesa practhe Council in its expressions;and finally,Trutfetter
tical applicationof the Council's recommendations.
Universityof Helsinki
ofSystematic
Department
Theolog)}

11:34:03 AM

Reviews
inHonour
onPlatoandPlatonism
Collected
Chariot.
TheWinged
, eds.
ofL.M. deRijk
Essays
M. KardaunandJ. Spruyt.
2000,xxvi& 331 p. ISBN
Brill,Leiden-Boston-Kln
90 04 114807
Introduction
of
a complete
a goodbook,thatnotonlyoffers
It is nottoolateto review
bibliography
in andofhisdeepknowlinterest
ofhislively
picture
prof.L.M.de Rijkanda detailed
butgivesalsoan ideaofhowhisschoolfollows
andmedieval
philosophy,
edgeofancient
oftheauriga
theWordoftheTeacher(orbetter,
hispathwithout
, as the
justaccepting
them.
andsometimes
hisinterpretations
butdiscussing
tidesuggests),
correcting
each
intotenchapters,
divided
as a sortof monography,
itself
The volume
presents
The choice
order.
a chronological
or topics,
withoneor moreauthors
following
dealing
to theLate
fromAntiquity
thecenturies,
and theirdistribution
ofthethemes
through
fiveovertenchapters
are
de Rijk'sscientific
somehow
MiddleAges,reflects
production:
butnotonly);fourofthemdealwiththeMiddle
toAntiquity
devoted
(Plato,ofcourse,
author
to a Neoplatonic
(JohnPhiloponus).
Ages;andonlyoneis dedicated
withthefirst
thesechapters,
anddiscuss
wewillpresent
In whatfollows,
part
dealing
withtheremnants.
andfinally
thenwiththoseaboutXllth-century
as a whole,
authors,
1. Thethird
wayofthelogos
remark
that"thecoreofPlato'swork
ofessays,
theeditors
In introducing
thiscollection
of
the
and
semantics
the
is formed
XII).
Undoubtedly,
bythisclaim
Being"
(p.
logic
by
owetode
studies
thedebttheir
intend
here,as inmanyother
passages,
highlighting
they
on theSophist.
in hisCommentary
as argued
toPlatonic
issues,
especially
Rijk'sapproach
domain
is developed
thatthisthematic
However,
onlybyoneoftheessays
theyspecify
article
refer
toD. O'Brien's
Theeditors
texts.
toPlatonic
devoted
two),
(chapter
expressly
about'whatis not'.On the
andPlato'spositions
Parmenides'
where
theauthor
compares
in
reveala fruitful
assertion
we think
thatthispreliminary
perspective
might
contrary,
ofthefirst
orderto givean account
partofthebookas a whole.
that
Let us start,then,fromtheend of thisfirst
part,i.e. fromtheconclusions
to her,
ofart.According
drawsin heressayaboutthePlatonic
M. Kardaun
conception
from
thetheory
nordifferent
towards
results
neither
thisconception
negative
completely
in thisnewandmore
Platonic
arttheory
in hisPoetics.
ofartheldbyAristotle
Reading
termmimeofthepivotal
reconsideration
bya preliminary
wayis madepossible
complex
rather
thanbytheusual'imitotranslate
Kardaun
chooses
sis, which
by'representation'
theworsekindofmimetic
Sheprefers
tousethesecondwordonlyforsignifying
tation'.
theone
ofmerephantasmata
in theproduction
and,consequently,
art,theone implied
to
itis possible
toadmitin theidealcityoftheRepublic.
which
Platorefuses
Nonetheless,
sinceitis basedupon
whichis notcondemned,
finda higher
levelofartistic
production
oftheWorldofIdealForms.
ofsomething
therepresentation
Vwarmm
43,2

BrillNV,Leiden,
2005
Koninklijke
online- www.brill.nl
Alsoavailable

11:34:12 AM

362

REVIEWS

ofartistic
literainherited
from
Platotheconsideration
Kardaunaffirms
thatAristotle
ina picturelike,
immeitsobject
inthesensethatit"represents
tureas a mimetic
medium,
thescholar
herthesis,
diate,non-discursive
quotesa passage
way"(p. 161).To support
is compared
to a painter
Poetics
fromAristotle's
(1460b),wherethepoetas a mimts
(<konopoios
) (p. 139,note27).Butarewesurethat
) ortoanyother
image-maker
(,zgraphos
as claimed
itsuseofwords",
a literary
textis mimetic
byKardaun?
"notwithstanding
the
kinds
ofmimesis-,
of
the
two
discusses
the
A Platonic
in
problem
dialogue, particular,
an ontological
thedialogue
pointofview.
, thatis exacdy
byO'Brienfrom
analysed
Sophist
intoa third
thescholar
In his(very)
overview,
ontological
inquires
longandfascinating
theParmenidean
dichotomy
byPlato,a waythatis able to go beyond
wayproposed
That
unthinkable
andunsayable.
'whatis' and'whatis not',thelatter
between
resulting
is thewayofotherwithout
third
anycontradiction,
beingandnot-being
way,entailing
ofthedialogue
Letus quotesomeother
ness,as O'Brienremarks
prepassages
(p. 55ff.).
Thetwomaincharacters
O'Brien's
thoseonwhich
andfollowing
essayis focused.
ceding
needtotackle
thequestions
andTheaetetus,
oftheSophist
, theEleaticStranger
concerning
ofall,is to define
whatan imageis. Theaetetus
first
becausetheirproblem,
otherness,
is nothinthedialogue
tomean'image'ingeneral,
chosen
thatan eidolon
claims
, theterm
to (<
toiouton
) whatis true
aphomoimenon
such)in itsbeingsimilar
(another
ingbuta heteron
ofthediaarefixed
thatway,thecharacters
as soonas imagefeatures
(240a).However,
aboutimage
, viz.mimma
, butonlyandexpressly
speakabouteidolon
loguecanno longer
inthedialogue.
ofimagepresented
240b),thatisaboutoneofthetwokinds
quaicon(eikn:
andthe
as thebetter
eikn
andphantasma
between
Thediaeresis
, considered
respectively
thesophist's
essence
from
initsturn,
theneedforgrasping
kindofmimma
worse
, derives,
inhisbeinga conhadbeenfound
definition
ofhisnature
Theaptest
bya clearformula.
in
: 225b,232b)ableto denyanyargumentation
troversialist
and,consequently,
(<
antilogikos
- alsoquotedbyKardaun
atp. 139).In fact,
234b
hisbeingan image-maker
{eidla
poiein:
aboutall (233b-d),
a realknowledge
seemsto possess
thesophist
in denying
everything,
butan illusory
be anything
itcannotforcely
eventhough
joke(234a).Alsothe
claiming
offalseappearances
on thecreation
is a jokefounded
artofcreating
however,
images,
: 234c).Fromthisit
are "saidimages"
in thecaseofthesophist,
which,
{eidla
legomena
the
from
can notbe dissociated
derives
thatimages'wayofbeing,i.e. theirotherness,
dealsessenin anyway,although
thediaeresis
ofthelogos
semantics
concerning
images
whatkindofimages
mimmata.
withvisualartistic
intheSophist
Thereby,
(235d-236c),
tially,
definition
ofthesophist
with?The conclusive
concerned
aresophistic
discourses
depicts
himto a mimtik
techn
maker
andconnects
himas a phantasmata
onlyableto createa
- viz.the
withepistm
The mimsis
on theopinion{doxa).
founded
practiced
knowledge
'
related
to
instead
as
considered
of
mimsis
is
level
sophos
linguistic
represenonly
higher
mimthehigher
whatkindofimages
nowto understand
It remains
tations
(266d-268d).
with.
be concerned
sisshould
theMlanges
andcontinue
unanswered
thequestion
Letusleaveforthemoment
reading
whichis
comesbackinJ.M.vanOphuijsen's
deRyk.The opposition
essay,
epistm-doxa
ofitspossible
theperspective
from
considered
ofpistis
on Plato'sconcept
focused
(trust),
claimsarenegative
Van Ophuijsen's
offaith.
notion
influence
on thefollowing
religious
oneself
tobe
in thesense"ofallowing
oneintends
aboutthelegacyat issue,unless
pistis
because
thatis in thiscasecorrect
a reliance
{orthori)
upon,another;
by,ofrelying
guided
is associwhoknows
theguideis theperson
pistis
(hasepistm)"
(p. 124).In theRepublic,
in whichit is collocated
at thesecondrung
ladderofknowledge,
atedto a hierarchical
andopposed
to thetwohigher
withdoxastik
from
thebottom,
degrees
cognition
dealing
is alsopreThesameopposition
anddianoia.
thetop,epistm
ofknowledge,
thatare,from
to van
thenameofa sophist),
sentin Plato'sGrgias
where,
according
(notbychance,
withonethatfurnishes
ofpersuasion:
aretwotypes
"there
belief-upon-trust
Ophuijsen,

11:34:12 AM

REVIEWS

363

and one thatdoesfurnish

and is consequently
"an
outknowing,
(episteme)"
knowledge
from
rhetoric,
(seep. 125,forthequotations
Grgias
too).Whereas
instructing
teaching
type"
to thefirst
on thecontrary
thedidactical
thatis sophistic
art,belongs
clearly
type,
type
ofpersuasion
willpertain
to thephilosopher's
aboutthings.
(orsophos
') wayofspeaking
totheRepublic's
Thepaideutic
ofphilosopher's
leadsusbackexactly
logos
purpose
questions
invirtue
ofthehigher
education
citizens
kindofmimesis
, in
) offuture
(paideia
concerning
Theproblem
is really
theverywayinwhich
theyarediscussed
byKardaun(pp. 143-4).
creations
ofthelogos
thesame,sincethesemantic
seen,areimages.
, as we havealready
intheSophist
O'Brien's
ofPlatonic
"moves"
the
right
interpretation
Following
(p. 55ff.),
third
is in themiddle
between
thetwowayspresented
wayofotherness
by
ontological
in anywayat all (midamos
becauseitis nota wayofnot-being
: Soph.
Parmenides,
237b,
240e),buta wayofnot-being
(andcontemporaneously
being)in somerespect
(jbos,kata
from'.
ti: 24Id).Being'other
than'meansnot-being
Hence,wewould
qua'beingdifferent
in thenot-being
liketo addto O'Brien's
ofotherness
insofar
analysis,
anyimageshares
as itis,at thesametime,
different
from
andin relation
to whatitrepresents
(itsmodel:
Platois heretalking
aboutthesemiotic
235d)(cf.Soph.
255d).In otherterms,
paradeigma,
nature
ofevery
(.symploke
) of'whatis' and 'whatis not'(240c)in its
image,itsweaving
allimages,
which
stands
forsomething
else.Quaother,
alsothosebelongbeingsomething
in relation
shareinfalsehood
to their
which
domain,
ingtothelinguistic
paradigms
only
aretrueinasmuch
as really
: 240b-c)
howcanthecontent
(onts
being.Butat thispoint,
ofa discourse,
falsein virtue
ofitssemantic
be paideutic
andableto
nature,
necessarily
in anyway?
offer
knowledge
Thereis another
Platonic
relevant
to in thisvolume,
but
passagethatis notreferred
thatisstrictly
linked
tothese
sinceittalks
aboutthesemantics
ofeikones
andproposes,
issues,
oncemore,a parallelism
between
andvisualarts.In Cratylus
bothan
432b-d,
language
i.e. a significant
described
as mimmata
onoma,
word,anda picture
(,zgraphma
) arefirstly
thenspecified
as eikones
ofwhattheyrepresent,
becausetheydo nothavetobe
(430b-d),
similar
to itin all respects
(homoia)
(pantachi
). Otherwise
theyin factwouldbe a double,
nota signofthemodel.In parallel:
theirrelation
ofsimilarity
to themodelinvolves
a
semantic
selection
ofitsfeatures.
selection
is thereasonfordescribing
Justthissemantic
as hetera,
different
from
in theSophist.
their
model,
But,on thebasisofthesame
images
eikones
in somerespects,
as 'such',naturally
selection,
since,though
maybe alsodefined
falsequaother,
ofwhatis represented.
This'sometheyareableto preserve
something
in theCratylus
which
in theSophist
tothat
(432e)is calledtypos
(trace),
thing',
corresponds
trueproportion
in an imageallowsto distinguish
(althin
235e)whosepresence
symmetri.
eikones
from
thecomplete
falsehood
ofphantasmata.
semantic
Thepassages
from
theSophist
andtheCratylus
showthatKardaun
inherunderis right
theneedfordistinguishing
at leasttwoPlatonic
ofmimesis.
However,
lining
conceptions
wedo notagreewithherclaims
aboutthenon-discursive
character
ofthehigher
kindof
mimesis
to theterminology
usedin theSophist
, thatis theiconicone,at leastaccording
inthefollowing
weshallrefer
linestoo).Itis difficult
toadmit
thatthesemantics
(towhich
ofa textis mimetic
in theCratylus
itsuseofwords",
after
that
"notwithstanding
reading
a single
wordis considered
The iconicsemantic
modelseemsin
byPlatoas a mimma.
factextended
from
themeaning
ofwordsto thatoftexts.
in theSophist
Besides,
, at the
levelofpropositional
Platousesonlyoneterm,
in ordertodefine
logoi,
symploke
(weaving),
boththeir
iconiccontent
andtheir
thatis syntactical,
Thesymploke
discursive,
composition.
ofan onoma
anda rhma
is in facttheleastcondition
to createa logos
(262c)and,conseitssemantic
in theirturninvolving
a weaving
ofbeingandnot-being.
quendy,
images,
Notonly:logos
totheBeings
which
derive
from
thesymploke
ofForms
and
{taonta)
belongs
sharetheimagenature
so farin reading
thefirst
(259e).So, thepathwe havefollowed
seems
tocoincide
withoneofthemany
senses
inwhich
Plato's
partoftheMlanges
ontology

11:34:12 AM

364

REVIEWS

hintin their
suchas theeditors
andlogicalperspective,
a semantic
be readfrom
might
introduction.
'whatis' and'whatis not',is the
in themiddle
between
The third
wayofotherness,
inthemiddle,
aretwice
Whenever
theseareiconic,
semantic
they
images.
wayoflinguistic
and
andfalsehood,
between
truth
is a third
as faras their
identity
waybetween
similarity
ofthisthird
iconicwaythatPlato
We think
thatit isjustin virtue
otherness.
complete
thatwithout
in logos,
to sucha pointto claimin theSophist
logos
maystillplacehistrust
in otherterms,
wouldnotexisteither
ofphilosophy
(260a).Evenifexpressed
anyform
notquotedyet:theoneby
coreofthetwoessays
thethematic
be considered
thismight
incosmological
debates
dialectical
thePlatonic
wayofproceeding
concerning
J.Mansfeld,
Trustinlogos
letsPlato
ontheTimaeus.
inthePhaedo
, andtheonebyD.T. Runia,focused
inorder
thehighest
issues
mechanisms
totackle
testitsmostcomplex
useitandespecially
the"dialectical
method"
from
ones.So,beginning
suchas thecosmological
ofhisphilosophy,
whichRuniaseesin the
ofdiscussion
syllogism
up to thecategorial
(Mansfeld,
p. 13ff.)
would
to thetwoscholars,
uteris
in Plato'sworks
a logica
Timaeus
, according
(cf.p. 107ff.),
theorized.
Aristotle
tobe explicitely
havealready
beenhinted
at,evenifithadto expect
mimesis
is notableto offer
itis clearthatlinguistic
In conclusion,
immediately.
episteme
thecreation
from
in fact,thelogos
doesnotresult
In theSophist
disjoined
(263d,264a-b),
intoBeing.
ortrueandmakeroomforan inquiry
thesemaybe correct
ofdoxai;
however,
tothephantout
court
thisis notthecaseoftheopinions
, thosefalseandlinked
Naturally,
seemsto
theiconicwayofthelanguage
On thecontrary,
discourses.
ofsophistic
tasmata
andin histryin hissearchfortruth
be thewayfollowed
bytraces
bythephilosopher
aboutit.
someknowledge
ingto communicate
Plato:
theHighMiddle
without
Platonism
2. Medieval
Ages
(almost)
didn'tgo handbyhand
realism
If,as we willsee,in thelatemiddle
ages(Aristotelian)
for
In IXthcentury,
wentdifferently.
centuries
in theprevious
withPlatonism,
things
started
theps.Dionysius
an authentic
author,
beingvery
instance,
Areopagita,
neoplatonic
It is onlyin Xllthcentury,
and metaphysics.
at leaston theology
however,
influenciai,
at leastforsomewriters
as authority,
a prominent
thatPlatohimself
position
acquired
The contriofhisTimaeus.
to theLatintranslation
thanks
ofConches,
suchas William
andPlatonic
ofChristian
to theintegration
devoted
ofW. Otten,
bution
cosmology
by
ofPlato'smodelbothin stimulating
makesclearhowdeepwastheinfluence
William,
As faras the
a methodology.
andin shaping
abouttheuniverse
formation,
speculations
toget
as
the
Plato's
Timaeus
Conches
took
William
of
is
first
concerned,
opportunity
point
thatconstitute
realities
intoinvisible
an insight
every
physical
(suchas thebasicelements
theapplito be continued,
modelworth
buthe sawin italsoa literary
through
object);
of
account
to givea rational
or allegoric
thatis myth
cationofintegumentum,
narrative,
decadeor so Platowould
"inanother
hischapter,
As W. Ottensaysconcluding
nature.
thatwouldrevolutionise
in a scholastic
to Aristotle
succumb
philochangeofauthorities
ofthis
Thisexplains
andtheological
chapters
whythetwofollowing
speculation".
sophical
toonethemostimpora third
ofthewholebook)arededicated
volume
(70pages,nearly
havebeenstudied
theories
whosesemantic
tantXllth-century
byde Rijkin
theologians,
As we willsee,Platodoesnotappearamonghis
de la Porre.
Gilbert
various
articles,
ofBoethius.
hisinfluence
neoplatonism
sources,
bythe(derived)
beingmediated
is
Thefirst
dealwithverydifferent
Thetwochapters
one,written
byJ. Spruyt,
topics.
ofthemeaning
inGilbert's
theories
usesoflanguage
different
between
aboutthedistinction
domain
andthenatural
withthetranscendent
ofterms
one;thesecondchapter,
dealing
PeterHeliasand
between
a veryinteresting
comparison
proposes
byC.H. Kneepkens,

11:34:12 AM

REVIEWS

365

Gilbert
on somegrammatical
and semantical
The twochapters
sharesome
problems.
butoffer
twodifferent
to thestudy
ofGilbert's
andsemanpoints,
approaches
linguistic
in a veryfruitful
ticthought
andcomplete
eachother
thatintegrate
way.
Asitsauthor
tries"toexplore
Gilbert's
ideasas to
saysat thebeginning,
chapter
eight
howthesignificates
ofterms
areinfluenced
whentransportation
from
onedomain[i.e.
theTranscendent]
to theother[thesublunary
one]takesplace"(p. 205).The exposition
ofGilbert's
itdiscusses
andcorrects
is verydetailed;
previous
thought
interpretations,
givfrom
Gilbert's
butalso(a difficult
taskindeed!)
the
works,
ingnotonlylongquotations
translations
ofall ofthem,
whichhelpandguidethereader
theintricaEnglish
through
ciesofa notalwaysperspicuous
Latintext.As saidabove,Gilbert's
Platonism
doesn't
derivefromPlato,butfromthelatinassimilation
ofNeoplatonism
madebyBoethius.
Notions
suchas participatio
or denominato
between
idquodestandidquoest
, thedistinction
,
in Gilbert's
thatarecentral
andhisfollowers'
stembackto Boetius'
semantics,
theologicaltreatises.
efforts
arecompletely
devoted
tothereconstruction
ofGilbert's
theSpruyt's
oriesfrom
hiscommentaries
on Boethius'
tracts
andtheyoffer
a convincing
theological
ofthem,
whendealing
withthenotion
ofpersona
inspiteofitscenthat,
picture
especially
tralroleintrinitarian
andcontrarily
toother
words
totheTranscendent
theology
pertaining
hasitsproper
usefornaturali
anditis tranferred
totheother
domain
domain,
things
only
exproportioned
so that"onlypartofthesignificative
content
ofpersona
appliesto Divine
worksouthistheory
as theologian,
and sometimes
persons"
(p. 234).Gilbert
mainly
- he says
- holdthat,whatever
refers
to otherphilosophers,
as at p. 209.Someofthem
objecttheyspeakabout,"bythesamecauseas theyare(esse),
theyarea something
(esse
Therefore
someothaliquid).
theysaythattheverb'is' is saidofall things
equivocally";
that"entities
maintain
thatsubsist
are(esse)
subsisteners,on thecontrary,
owingto their
ce andarea something
tothethings
thataccompany
thelatter",
that
(esse
aliquid)
owing
is quantities
andqualities
to all othercategories,
subsistent
arenor
neither
(owing
things
area something
ofthischapter,
andexclusively
dedicated
to
r).The author
beingcoherently
theinterpretation
ofGilbert's
texts
is notan easytask),
leaveshowever
thereader
(which
withsomequestions
ofthesephilosophers
andtheposition
taken
openabouttheidentity
on thesubject.Fortunately,
thefollowing
by Gilbert
chapter
givesthereaderthese
answers.
Theapproach
in thischapter
is theopposite:
Gilbert's
andhis
byKneepkens
adopted
inrelation,
followers'
theories
areconsidered
andinopposition,
tothoseoftheChartrians,
andamong
themespecially
tothoseofPeterHelias,themostinfluenciai
commentator
on
Priscian's
Institutiones
He doesnottrytodescribe
thewholetheories
ofthetwo
grammaticae.
butpreferes
to analyse
therespective
aboutthesemantics
oftheverb
authors,
positions
esse(thesubstantive
in orderto showtheirdifferences.
The
verb)as a relevant
example,
between
thetwotheories
is centered
aroundthedifferent
ofsubopposition
conception
stance
as specialmeaning
or resverbi
oftheverbessetheyadopt.According
to PeterHesubstantia
as itderives
from
substare
to theGreekterm
lias,itsignifies
, whichcorresponds
andis tobe identified
withthebearer
offorms
thatunites
themtoitself
andto
hypostasis
eachother,
butregardless
ofwhatforms
theyare.Thisis thereason
whytheverbesseis
of substances
of theAristotelian
and only
predicated
(as instances
properly
category),
or transumptive
ofaccidents.
Thisdoesnotmeanthatessesignifies
improperly
everything
in an equivocal
omnia
utequivocum),
butonlythatit is saidequivocally
of
way(significare
deomnibus)
Thispointis made,as Kneepkens
everything
(diciequivoce
shows,
(pp.252-55).
in theolderversion
of Helias'commentary
on Priscianus
thatis
minor,
veryclearly
nottaken
intoaccount
ofHelias'Summa.
It mustalsobe saidthatthispoint
bytheeditor
ofdoctrine
is verysubtle,
butitis crucial
fortheunderstanding
ofboththeories.
When
he comesto Gilbert's
andhisfollowers'
itis clearthatPeterHeliasis oneofthe
theory,
ofthefirst
abovementioned,
andalsothat
possible
representatives
groupofphilosophers

11:34:12 AM

366

REVIEWS

ofthegroupofphilosophers
whomakea distinction
between
the
is "a partisan
Gilbert
on oneside,andquality
andquantity,
thatis substance,
causesofesseandessealiquid",
sevenaccidentia
ontheother,
leaving
aparttheother
(p. 260).In thelastpartofthischapwereadopted
suchas Peter
shows
howGilbert's
ter,Kneepkens
positions
bythePorretani,
in CIMAGL57, 1988,by
Porretana
ofPoitiers
andtheauthor
oftheGrammatica
(edited
- we regret
in thebibliography),
thatthisreference
is missing
and Kneepkens
Fredborg
In conandin grammar
forsyntax).
bothin theology
(withsomerelevant
implications
a better
understandbothchapters
shedlighton eachotherandhelpus getting
clusion,
debatearoundthemid-XIIth
century.
Onlyone pointremains
ingof thesemantical
forthecreation
ofthoseterms,
suchas esse
to us:theroleofimpositio
obscure,
according
thedivine
while
in Gilbert's
andbonum,
Form,
view,haveas their
that,
primary
meaning
thisForm.Giventheimporallother
canbe saidtobe orgoodonlybypartaking
things
andlogicians,
onewonders
whether
andinwhich
texts
forgrammarians
tanceofimpositio
anda philosophical
onewouldemerge
on
a theological
an opposition
between
perspective
thistopic,too.
toconciliate
PlatoandAristotle?
is itpossible
andlateMiddle
3. LateAntiquity
Ages:
is followed
five,
byM. Kardaun,
bya veryinterchapter
Goingsomestepsbackwards,
oflearning
to reconcile
Plato'stheory
as recon Philoponus'
contribution
attempt
esting
conceived
ofas thatofa
ofhumanintellect's
andAristole's
ollection
potentiality,
theory
FransA.J.de Haas,
ofthiscontribution,
tabletwithno signon it.The author
writing
toprof,
de Rijkthanfor
fordeclaring
hisgratitude
seemstofocuson thistheme
mainly
as a matter
offact,he stresses
ofhisteacher:
to oneofthecontributions
itsconnection
thematerial
thatremoves
intellect
as theactiveintellect
theroleoftheteacher's
impedowethanks
to him",
oftruth
theknowledge
iments
towards
(andthat'swhy"wealways
p. 183).
ofuniversais,
ofhowmengettotheknowledge
account
Thereference
totheNeoplatonic
ofthirteenthandsomedevelopments
thisthemes
alsoa linkbetween
however,
represents
in Scotus'writings
andScotism
a kindofapex.To the
thatfound
century
metaphysics,
cattheAristotelian
Petrus
oneofScotus'followers,
Thomae,
distinguished
wayinwhich
ofthisvolume,
thelastchapter
from
oneanother,
is devoted
byE.P. Bos.Asthe
egories
Thomae"canbelabelled
Petrus
makes
clearattheendofhisintroductory
author
remarks,
offact,
a Platonist",
only"ifonetakesthislabelin broadsense"(p. 278).As a matter
this
wouldhaverejected
at theendofthirteenth
eventhemostrealist
century
philosopher
on thePerihermeneias
didinhisfirst
label,as Scotushimself
(q. 1).In
questions
implicitely
didnot
andthey
tobe Aristotelian,
allphilosophers
wanted
Xlllthcentury,
(orpretended)
rather
totalkaboutRealism
Platonic
Ideas.It is thenmoreappropriate
accepted
separate
andthisis whatBosendsup doing(p. 285:"he [i.e.
forthisperiod,
thanofPlatonism,
Hisconception
ofthings.
as principles
thedifferent
Petrus
categories
Thomae]interprets
inspiteofhis
an author,
suchas Robert
forinstance
is realist.").
Grosseteste,
Considering
on the
to Philoponus'
andinparticular
connections
to Neoplatonism,
direct
commentary
realist
Posterior
, wouldhaveled to thesameconclusion:
XHIth-century
philosoAnalytics
tried
Ideasin God'smind,
ofPlatonic
theexistence
always
pher,evenwhenhe accepted
abouta septhatis thestatement
ofas thecorePlatonism,
toreject
whatwasconceived
An., 1.15,wheretheseIdeasaredefined
In Post.
ofIdeas(cfr.Grosseteste,
arateexistence
Thomae's
Petrus
whenitfailstounderstand).
as monsters,
, formed
bytheintellect
prodigia
contra
Ockham
withtheLogica
another
tractis however
example,
together
veryinteresting
worked
out
tools
of
how
the
theoretical
of
the
-Richard
Scotus,
mainly
by
Campsall,
by ps.
ofpredihistheory
ultimata
in histheological
abstraction
formalis,
(suchas distinctio
writings

11:34:12 AM

367

REVIEWS

oflogico-metaphysical
to thediscussion
weresystematically
cationindivinis)
probapplied
ofthecategories.
status
lems,suchas theontological
Bologna

Marmo(2-3)
StefaniaBonfiglioli
( 1) andCostantino

'OnGeneration
andCorruption
Fransde Haas andJaapMansfeld
/ BookI.
(eds),Astotle:
Oxford
Clarendon
2004347p. ISBN0 199242925
Aristotelicum.
Press,
Symposium
heldat
Aristotelicum
ofpapersfromthe15thSymposium
Thisvolume
is a collection
in keeping
withtheformat
ofthesymin 1999.It is organized
theNetherlands,
Deurne,
a closereading
ofa pre-assigned
witheachofthemainparticipants
porgiving
posium,
andtheirrelation
to
ofAristotle's
on thestructure
tionofthetext,focusing
arguments
those
Aristode
as wellas toother
texts
within
theAristotelian
other
figures,
especially
corpus
to thetenchaptenessays
Thevolume
features
tooktobe hisopponents.
corresponding
andconcluding
I (hereafter
GCI), plusan introductory
etCorruptione
tersofDe Generatone
behind
thechoiceofGCI as thetopicforthe15thSymposium
(the
essay.Therationale
to
in 2000,appliedthesame,chapter-by-chapter
14th,published
analysis
by Oxford
inthedevelopment
ofAristotle's
theory,
especially
physical
XII) is itscentrality
Metaphysics
butalsoofalteration
and
notonlyofgeneration/corruption
itsarticulation
oftheconcepts
in
GC
II
and
account
for
the
all
of
which
are
essential
understanding
growth/decay,
matter
ofhomoeomerous
IV oftheconstitution
blood,andbone)from
(flesh,
Meteorology
thatis
In thisway,GC I maybe seenas a textofappliedphysics
thefourelements.
account
ofmotion
forthelifesciences.
it,welearnhowthegeneral
Through
preparatory
therudiments
for
whichin turnprovides
in thePhysics
realm,
appliesto thesublunary
in theDe Anima
andtheParva
There
ofliving
Naturalia.
themotion
things
understanding
andmoddifficult
textforbothancient
is alsothefactthatGCI hasbeenan especially
on
is roomforimprovement
"there
so that,as oneoftheeditors
ernreaders,
remarks,
(1).
existing
scholarship"
a carefully
exereasoned
theseaims.Eachessayprovides
Thevolume
morethanmeets
ofitssignificance
within
the
ofthetextas wellas an interpretation
gesisofitsportion
Ofcourse,
where
there
isinterpretation
natural
broader
ofAristotelian
philosophy.
program
abouttheir
areat leastforthright
butthecontributors
there
is alsocontroversy,
disagree- and
- severed
at theSymposium
havebeencarried
overfrom
discussion
ofwhich
ments
to
see
what
is
at
stake.
to
allow
thenotesaregenerous
non-specialists precisely
enough
tradition
on GCfrom
arealsoliterate
aboutthecommentary
Thecontributors
Simplicius
in itsimpact
on scientific
the
so thatforthoseinterested
to C. J. F. Williams,
posterity,
canbe relifortunes
ofa particular
(or,moretothepoint,
misinterpretation)
interpretation
of
on theartscurriculum
Ofcourse,
GCwasoneofthe'booksofAristotle'
ablytracked.
in what
withlecturing
on it wereinfluenced
themasters
medieval
universities;
charged
ofearlier
saidbythecommentaries
(viaMichaelScot's
byAverroes
figures,
especially
they
ofhisMiddleCommentary
on GC),Avicenna
Latintranslation
(through
thirteenth-century
in a latethirteenth-century
translation
ofhisKitb
andeventually
various
intermediaries
al-Shif
(viaAverroes).
), andPhiloponus
is thewayeachessaydescends
totherelevant
Oneofthestrengths
ofthevolume
pararesingle-minded
about
andthison twofronts.
On theonehand,theauthors
ticulars,
in connection
ofAristotle's
to recover
thedialectical
context
trying
arguments,
especially
ofmatter
hismostformidable
wherethetheory
withhisreply
totheatomists,
opponents
is concerned.
On theother,
to follow
someofthepractical
theyaredetermined
implicaofmaterial
sketched
in GC
tions
ofAristotelian
natural
science
theprinciples
given
change

BrillNV,Leiden,
Koninklijke
2005
- www.brill.nl
Alsoavailable
online

Vivarium
43,2

11:34:12 AM

367

REVIEWS

oflogico-metaphysical
to thediscussion
weresystematically
cationindivinis)
probapplied
ofthecategories.
status
lems,suchas theontological
Bologna

Marmo(2-3)
StefaniaBonfiglioli
( 1) andCostantino

'OnGeneration
andCorruption
Fransde Haas andJaapMansfeld
/ BookI.
(eds),Astotle:
Oxford
Clarendon
2004347p. ISBN0 199242925
Aristotelicum.
Press,
Symposium
heldat
Aristotelicum
ofpapersfromthe15thSymposium
Thisvolume
is a collection
in keeping
withtheformat
ofthesymin 1999.It is organized
theNetherlands,
Deurne,
a closereading
ofa pre-assigned
witheachofthemainparticipants
porgiving
posium,
andtheirrelation
to
ofAristotle's
on thestructure
tionofthetext,focusing
arguments
those
Aristode
as wellas toother
texts
within
theAristotelian
other
figures,
especially
corpus
to thetenchaptenessays
Thevolume
features
tooktobe hisopponents.
corresponding
andconcluding
I (hereafter
GCI), plusan introductory
etCorruptione
tersofDe Generatone
behind
thechoiceofGCI as thetopicforthe15thSymposium
(the
essay.Therationale
to
in 2000,appliedthesame,chapter-by-chapter
14th,published
analysis
by Oxford
inthedevelopment
ofAristotle's
theory,
especially
physical
XII) is itscentrality
Metaphysics
butalsoofalteration
and
notonlyofgeneration/corruption
itsarticulation
oftheconcepts
in
GC
II
and
account
for
the
all
of
which
are
essential
understanding
growth/decay,
matter
ofhomoeomerous
IV oftheconstitution
blood,andbone)from
(flesh,
Meteorology
thatis
In thisway,GC I maybe seenas a textofappliedphysics
thefourelements.
account
ofmotion
forthelifesciences.
it,welearnhowthegeneral
Through
preparatory
therudiments
for
whichin turnprovides
in thePhysics
realm,
appliesto thesublunary
in theDe Anima
andtheParva
There
ofliving
Naturalia.
themotion
things
understanding
andmoddifficult
textforbothancient
is alsothefactthatGCI hasbeenan especially
on
is roomforimprovement
"there
so that,as oneoftheeditors
ernreaders,
remarks,
(1).
existing
scholarship"
a carefully
exereasoned
theseaims.Eachessayprovides
Thevolume
morethanmeets
ofitssignificance
within
the
ofthetextas wellas an interpretation
gesisofitsportion
Ofcourse,
where
there
isinterpretation
natural
broader
ofAristotelian
philosophy.
program
abouttheir
areat leastforthright
butthecontributors
there
is alsocontroversy,
disagree- and
- severed
at theSymposium
havebeencarried
overfrom
discussion
ofwhich
ments
to
see
what
is
at
stake.
to
allow
thenotesaregenerous
non-specialists precisely
enough
tradition
on GCfrom
arealsoliterate
aboutthecommentary
Thecontributors
Simplicius
in itsimpact
on scientific
the
so thatforthoseinterested
to C. J. F. Williams,
posterity,
canbe relifortunes
ofa particular
(or,moretothepoint,
misinterpretation)
interpretation
of
on theartscurriculum
Ofcourse,
GCwasoneofthe'booksofAristotle'
ablytracked.
in what
withlecturing
on it wereinfluenced
themasters
medieval
universities;
charged
ofearlier
saidbythecommentaries
(viaMichaelScot's
byAverroes
figures,
especially
they
ofhisMiddleCommentary
on GC),Avicenna
Latintranslation
(through
thirteenth-century
in a latethirteenth-century
translation
ofhisKitb
andeventually
various
intermediaries
al-Shif
(viaAverroes).
), andPhiloponus
is thewayeachessaydescends
totherelevant
Oneofthestrengths
ofthevolume
pararesingle-minded
about
andthison twofronts.
On theonehand,theauthors
ticulars,
in connection
ofAristotle's
to recover
thedialectical
context
trying
arguments,
especially
ofmatter
hismostformidable
wherethetheory
withhisreply
totheatomists,
opponents
is concerned.
On theother,
to follow
someofthepractical
theyaredetermined
implicaofmaterial
sketched
in GC
tions
ofAristotelian
natural
science
theprinciples
given
change

BrillNV,Leiden,
Koninklijke
2005
- www.brill.nl
Alsoavailable
online

Vivarium
43,2

11:34:23 AM

368

REVIEWS

withwhatwefindinother
butthevolume
arenotalways
consistent
I. Theresults
works,
- and
to fitthepiecestogether
ofan Aristotle
leavestheimpression
struggling
valiantly
matter
if
he
to
the
between
he
must
is
inert,
elementary of
bridge gap
relatively
struggle
inpossibilities.
ofliving
a stuff
much
richer
matter
thecosmos
andthehomoeomerous
things,
Froma scholarly
pointofview,thereis nota weaklinkin theentirecollection.
is thequesinthree
there
interested
willbe especially
First,
Medievalists,
however,
topics.
In the
in theAristotelian
theotherlibri
naturales
tionoftheplaceofGCvis--vis
corpus.
foran audicontends
thatGCmusthavebeenwritten
introductory
essay,
MylesBurnyeat
"as thephysics
ofthebottom,
encealready
familiar
withthePhysics
, andthatstructurally,
think
ofdeCeloI andGCI as a pincer
... we might
GCis twinto deCelo
movement,
from
theother
theverytopandmoving
downtotheelements,
onestarting
from
starting
"thehabitat
and moving
theverybottom
mixtures,"
creating
up to homoeomerous
Aristotle
willdevote
hismostscrupulous
attention"
towhich
fortheliving
(14-15).
things
ofnatural
Howdid
a research
forthehistory
to suggest
Thisought
philosophy:
program
inrelation
tothePhysics?
With
understand
thesetexts
readers
ofGCanddeCelo
medieval
- I willmention
hereonlythefinevolume
edited
a fewnotable
byHansThijssen
exceptions
(Degeneratione
etcorruptione}
Tradition
onAristotle's
The Commentary
andHenkBraakhuis,
(Bre- recent
on subsidiary
toignore
commentaries
scholars
havetended
1999)
pols,Turnhout
ofnatural
sciandpractice
tofindoutaboutthetheory
likeGCwhentheywanted
texts
did
withthisis thatmedieval
encein theMiddleAges.The onlyproblem
philosophers
until
oftheperiodwillremain
thatourpicture
notignore
them,
incomplete
suggesting
on those
whattheythought
we can understand
theyweredoingin theircommentaries
texts.
in threeessaysin the
discussed
issueofprimematter,
Thereis alsothemuch-vexed
doesittake
ofprime
andifso,whatform
havea doctrine
DoesAristotle
volume.
matter,
matter
in GC?KeimpeAlgrashows
playsno rolein thetextofGC
why,although
prime
orevenintrinsiunfindthenotion
commentators
1.3andmodern
Aristotelian,
"basically
and Thomas
bothPhiloponus
including
manyoldercommentators,
callyincoherent,"
in ordertomakesenseofthenotion
ittoAristotle
itnecessary
to ascribe
found
Aquinas,
fola quoofsubstantial
as theterminus
of'non-being
(92).SarahBroadie
change
simplicit
"isa principle
ofchange
matter
thatforAristode,
lowswithan essayarguing
only,
prime
"notstuffing
butpotentiality"
foritsrealization
notofbeing
," requiring
(138).She then
each
ofelemental
oftheaccount
changein GC1.4whereby
rereading
givesan elegant
driven
occurs
as partofa four-stage
from
element
toelement
transition
by
process
simple
as proper
to theentire
ofthesun;changeis thenunderstood
thesingular
cycle
agency
todo "thedonkeybodiesleft,
withelementary
oftransformations,
enough,
appropriately
intera slightly
different
DavidCharles
world"
workofthesublunary
(141n58).
provides
with
ofa logicalobjectin KitFine'sReasoning
Arbitrary
bytheconcept
pretation
inspired
matter'
ofthe'now'in Aristotle's
, 'prime
Physics
1985).Liketheconcept
Objects
(Oxford
thatpersists
or logical'underlier'
substratum
is theimmaterial
(andhenceimperceptible)
of
no material
substance
does.Thus,theconcept
elemental
changeeventhough
through
orquasi-material
toAristotle,
ascribed
matter
substratum,
i.e.,as material
traditionally
prime
in terms
of
or physically,
Charles'suggestion,
can be avoidedontologically,
following
ofelemental
Broadie's
change.
cycles
in GC 1.10,whichwastakenup with
treated
thereis thetopicofmixtures
Finally,
Liber
ofAvicenna's
theappearance
in thefourteenth
renewed
interest
century
following
for
someofthereasons
Dorothea
Fredeexplores
etcomtptione.
degeneratione
tertius
naturalium
as
"mixis
is noteasilyclassified
Aristotle
undueattention
theseemingly
givestomixtures:
shepoints
oneof thetencategories,"
a kindofchangewithin
out,and,unlike
proper
remain
sincethey
their
butdo notdisplay
retain
mixed
original
qualities,
patk,
ingredients
about
werealsoworried
Aristotelians
medieval
Of course,
(290-92).
separable
potentially
or at leastaboutthosethatdidnotappearto be ofdivine
extra-categorial
phenomena,

11:34:23 AM

REVIEWS

369

Fredealsoshedslighton Aristotle's
withan interesting
origin.
larger
project
comparison
ofthetreatments
ofmixture
andhomogenous
matter
in GC1.10andhomoeomerous
tisinMeteorologica
suesofliving
is thatwhiletheAristotelian
IV.8-12.Whatthisshows
things
natural
scientist
hasan economical
ofthematerial
in terms
account
universe
ofthefour
elements
andtheir
basicproperties,
thissameeconomy
"a desperate
of
produces
shortage
differentiae
at a higher
levelofcomplexity,"
thenoni.e.,whenit comesto explaining
forhere"nature
needsdifferent
andmoresophisticated
homogenous
partsoforganisms,
meansofproduction"
Thevolume
closeswitha brief
(312-13).
essaybyJohnCooperconthatcommentators
sincePhiloponus
havebeenquicktoreadAristotle's
of
tending
theory
as involving
mixture
thetotalinterfusion
ofingredients
in GC1.10to
evidence
(despite
thecontrary)
becausetheywere"surreptitiously"
influenced
of
by theStoicdoctrine
towhom"a mixture
in fully
contains
within
itself
actualized
form
Chrysippus,
according
allofitsingredients"
thelaterhistory
ofthisStoicreading
ofAristotle
should
(325).Again,
be ofgreatinterest
toscholars
as theyuncover
moreofthecommentary
tradition
on GC.
In short,
onecouldnothopefora better
introduction
to Aristotle's
GC.
philosophical
In itspages,onecanappreciate
tophilosophers
from
whyGCwasofcentral
importance
lateantiquity
untiltheearlymodern
we tendto think
thatthe
period,
though
nowadays
tellsus allweneedtoknowaboutthewayAristotelians
conceived
oftheworkings
Physics
ofthenatural
world.
GA
Atlanta,
Emory
University,

JackZupko

IrneRosier-Catach,
La parole
sacr.
ditions
duSeuil,Paris,2004,780p.
efficace:
sime,
rituel,
ISBN2 02 0628058
In herLa parole
comme
acte(1994),IrneRosier-Catach
ofthisbook
gaveus a foretaste
witha section
on scholastic
discussions
ofthesacraments
as signs.Butwherethatshort
discussion
wasessentially
hereshetraces
thedevelopment
ofsacramental
synchronic,
speculative
from
thespectacular
intervention
ofBerengarius
ofTours(ca 1010-1088)
theology
to theuncompromisingly
ofDunsScotus(ca 1265-1308).
philosophical
approach
The bookopenswitha forward
twodistinctions
byAlainde Liberawhichdiscusses
crucial
to Rosier's
andbetween
case,thosebetween
publicandprivate
signs,
signand
The needforthesedistinctions
wasamply
illustrated
debates
sursymbol.
bythefurious
thelaw of 10 February
thewearing
ofreligious
2004forbidding
in
rounding
symbols
schools:
between
and
theyplayedfastandloosewiththedistinction
signsandsymbols,
lacked
a theological
eventhough
muchofthereasoning
inthese
debates
dimension,
implicit
andinthelawitself
derives
from
thecatholicism
ofpre-revolutionary
In hisview
France.
theremedy
to thewoolly
in thatcontroversy
evident
liesin bookslikethisone,
thinking
which
ofthereligious
thearcheology
itsfindings
to modern
investigates
signandrelates
workon language
acts.
ownintroduction
Rosier-Catach's
in thecontext
themselves
of
placesthesacraments
a society
withreligious
andsecular
andtheir
within
itsextraritual,
permeated
theology
richdiscourse
on language.
Heraimis to "reconstitute
thetheoretical
coherordinarily
ence"ofmedieval
on thesacraments
howtheyusedthelanguage
thought
byexamining
oftheirtimes,
an approach
medieval
wouldhaveunderstood:
Albert
theory
theologians
theGreatcitesitsetymology
to showthattheology
wasdiscourse
aboutGod.However
shedoesnotaimtoclarify
issues
ofmedieval
buttheologians'
ideasonlanguage.
theology,
Thisdemands
shefocuson thecontextualisation
oflanguage
itscommunicathrough
tivefunctions,
which
wereinvestigated
in somedepthbyRogerBaconinparticular,
and
tracethetheologian's
ofthecurrent
andsemiotic
ideasto their
own
adaptation
linguistic
purposes.
Koninklijke
BrillNV,Leiden,
2005
- www.brill.nl
Alsoavailable
online

Vivarium
43,2

11:34:23 AM

REVIEWS

369

Fredealsoshedslighton Aristotle's
withan interesting
origin.
larger
project
comparison
ofthetreatments
ofmixture
andhomogenous
matter
in GC1.10andhomoeomerous
tisinMeteorologica
suesofliving
is thatwhiletheAristotelian
IV.8-12.Whatthisshows
things
natural
scientist
hasan economical
ofthematerial
in terms
account
universe
ofthefour
elements
andtheir
basicproperties,
thissameeconomy
"a desperate
of
produces
shortage
differentiae
at a higher
levelofcomplexity,"
thenoni.e.,whenit comesto explaining
forhere"nature
needsdifferent
andmoresophisticated
homogenous
partsoforganisms,
meansofproduction"
Thevolume
closeswitha brief
(312-13).
essaybyJohnCooperconthatcommentators
sincePhiloponus
havebeenquicktoreadAristotle's
of
tending
theory
as involving
mixture
thetotalinterfusion
ofingredients
in GC1.10to
evidence
(despite
thecontrary)
becausetheywere"surreptitiously"
influenced
of
by theStoicdoctrine
towhom"a mixture
in fully
contains
within
itself
actualized
form
Chrysippus,
according
allofitsingredients"
thelaterhistory
ofthisStoicreading
ofAristotle
should
(325).Again,
be ofgreatinterest
toscholars
as theyuncover
moreofthecommentary
tradition
on GC.
In short,
onecouldnothopefora better
introduction
to Aristotle's
GC.
philosophical
In itspages,onecanappreciate
tophilosophers
from
whyGCwasofcentral
importance
lateantiquity
untiltheearlymodern
we tendto think
thatthe
period,
though
nowadays
tellsus allweneedtoknowaboutthewayAristotelians
conceived
oftheworkings
Physics
ofthenatural
world.
GA
Atlanta,
Emory
University,

JackZupko

IrneRosier-Catach,
La parole
sacr.
ditions
duSeuil,Paris,2004,780p.
efficace:
sime,
rituel,
ISBN2 02 0628058
In herLa parole
comme
acte(1994),IrneRosier-Catach
ofthisbook
gaveus a foretaste
witha section
on scholastic
discussions
ofthesacraments
as signs.Butwherethatshort
discussion
wasessentially
hereshetraces
thedevelopment
ofsacramental
synchronic,
speculative
from
thespectacular
intervention
ofBerengarius
ofTours(ca 1010-1088)
theology
to theuncompromisingly
ofDunsScotus(ca 1265-1308).
philosophical
approach
The bookopenswitha forward
twodistinctions
byAlainde Liberawhichdiscusses
crucial
to Rosier's
andbetween
case,thosebetween
publicandprivate
signs,
signand
The needforthesedistinctions
wasamply
illustrated
debates
sursymbol.
bythefurious
thelaw of 10 February
thewearing
ofreligious
2004forbidding
in
rounding
symbols
schools:
between
and
theyplayedfastandloosewiththedistinction
signsandsymbols,
lacked
a theological
eventhough
muchofthereasoning
inthese
debates
dimension,
implicit
andinthelawitself
derives
from
thecatholicism
ofpre-revolutionary
In hisview
France.
theremedy
to thewoolly
in thatcontroversy
evident
liesin bookslikethisone,
thinking
which
ofthereligious
thearcheology
itsfindings
to modern
investigates
signandrelates
workon language
acts.
ownintroduction
Rosier-Catach's
in thecontext
themselves
of
placesthesacraments
a society
withreligious
andsecular
andtheir
within
itsextraritual,
permeated
theology
richdiscourse
on language.
Heraimis to "reconstitute
thetheoretical
coherordinarily
ence"ofmedieval
on thesacraments
howtheyusedthelanguage
thought
byexamining
oftheirtimes,
an approach
medieval
wouldhaveunderstood:
Albert
theory
theologians
theGreatcitesitsetymology
to showthattheology
wasdiscourse
aboutGod.However
shedoesnotaimtoclarify
issues
ofmedieval
buttheologians'
ideasonlanguage.
theology,
Thisdemands
shefocuson thecontextualisation
oflanguage
itscommunicathrough
tivefunctions,
which
wereinvestigated
in somedepthbyRogerBaconinparticular,
and
tracethetheologian's
ofthecurrent
andsemiotic
ideasto their
own
adaptation
linguistic
purposes.
Koninklijke
BrillNV,Leiden,
2005
- www.brill.nl
Alsoavailable
online

Vivarium
43,2

11:34:31 AM

370

REVIEWS

ofthesacramental
thearticulation
between
thenature
The bookexamines
sign,the
of thesacraments,
thesacramental
whichgoverns
theoperation
formulas,
causality
and receiver
ofthesacrament.
The chapters
outhow
theintentions
ofminister
setting
onthearguments
overthewords
arefollowed
theseissues
bya massive
chapter
developed
is supported
ofconsecration
at Mass.Eachofthesechapters
byan annexecontaining
from
herauthorities
translated
intoFrench,
withtheLatin
extended
extracts
excellently
Sheconcludes
herbookwitha carefully
andsomeotherimportant
documents.
originals
a comprehensive
andsubject
a hughseriesofendnotes,
crafted
conclusion,
bibliography,
andperson
indexes.
claimbyBerengarius
of
ofthecontroversial
The first
chapter
openswithan account
after
ofconsecration
thatthesubstance
ofbreadremained
thewords
Tours(ca 1010-1080)
ofthe
He supported
hiscaseagainst
thesoliddefence
hadmadeitintoa signofChrist.
witha massive
dossier
traditional
doctrine
oftranssubstantiation
(1005-1089)
byLanfranc
ofthesign:
ofAugustine's
definition
itona dialectician's
from
exegesis
Augustine,
centring
exsefaciens
sensibus
aliudaliquid
estenimrespraeter
speciem
quamingerit
Signum
theoutward
incogitationem
venire.
which,
[Asignisa thing
quiteapartfrom
appearmakes
elsecomeintothemind.]
anceitpresents
tothesenses,
(Dedoctrina
something
Christiana
2.1.1)
tothe
Asa signis bynature
readsthisdefinition
perceptible
veryliterally.
Berengarius
from
itself
different
andpresents
senses,
aliud)to themind,he draws
(aliquid
something
ofsimilito themindis in a relation
theconclusion
thattheimagetheEucharist
brings
he reinforces
Thissemiotic
notin oneofidentity.
tudeto Christ,
bydialectical
argument
14 andPorphyry's
andbytheprinciple
thataccifrom
drawn
Isagoge,
Categories
principles
a human
substance:
canonlybe supported
dents
bodycannotsupport
byan appropriate
theaccidents
ofbreadandwine.
forlaterdevelopments
as Rosier-Catach
Thesearguments,
out,setouttheterms
points
wasreplacing
the
result
It wouldseemtheirmostlong-lasting
in sacramental
theology.
reisacrai)
as "a signofa sacredthing"
ofa sacrament
(.signum
bythe
vaguedescription
which
isstillfound
"anoutward
definition,
byJesusChrist",
graceinstituted
signofinward
interThe immediate
wasdefusing
in modern
catechisms.
issue,however,
Berengarius's
doca rational
basisfortraditional
anddeveloping
ofAugustine's
signtheory,
pretation
worked
To thisendtheologians
useofhismethods.
trine
independently
bymoreflexible
Theirexammodelofperception.
intotheir
ofArtstobuildinterpretation
oftheFaculty
Petrus
redefinition
ofAugustine's
terms:
setoffrigorous
ofthenotion
ofvisibility
ination
ofsomething
between
the"direct
Cantor
forinstance,
immediately
visibility"
distinguishes
likea handinside
ofsomething
andthe"indirect
obvious
tothesenses,
hidden,
visibility"
cleardiswithblurring
credits
thissortofthinking
a glove.Rosier-Catach
Augustine's
Richard
Fishacre
forinstance,
andsignified:
tinction
between
(d. 1248),oneof
signifier
andthe
thatboththesensibile
at Oxford,
observes
ofAristotelian
thepioneers
philosophy
sacr
amentum
wasthattheword,
Hiscorollary
andsignificates.
canbe signs
, meant
intelligibile
ofthe
effect
a material
three
), andthepermanent
(ressacramenti
sign,itssignificate
things:
rite.
sacramental
wasa causeas wellas a signof
thattheEucharist
chiefsticking-point,
Berengarius's
weresigna
Eventhough
sacraments
to dialectic.
recourse
grace,wasdealtwithbyskilled
thepotencyinvoked
andBonaventure
Thomas
oftheir
databyreason
institution,
Aquinas
havea natural
in grammar:
likewordssacraments
modelwhich
is frequent
and-act
aptiin a
is realised
whichpassesto actwhentheirsignification
to signify,
tudeor potency
andsignification
The contradiction
between
context.
byinstitution
bynature
signification
seemstobe duetoRogerBacon,thata natural
which
wasresolved
sign
bytheassertion,
ofsimiliso thatit couldbe in botha relation
to signify
couldbe designated
relations,

11:34:31 AM

REVIEWS

371

withitssignificate.
forinstance,
wasa natural
tudeanda causalrelation
sign
Baptism,
withwater
anditspowerofcleansing,
butChrist
gaveitthetasks
signifying
bysimilitude
Sinbyinstitution.
ofimparting
graceandcleansing
Original
him
between
Christ
andhispresence
tothemindandthelackofitbetween
Similitude
andthebreadhadbeenoneofBerengarius's
transubstantiation.
Rosieragainst
arguments
theconcept
of
Catachtraces
howthethirteenth
metthisargument
century
bydeveloping
Thiswasinpartfunction:
forexample,
breadandwinearetemsimilitude.
proportional
theEucharist
Butsheshows
thatthere
a distinction
between
spiritual.
developed
poralfoods,
whichwasnatural,
andbyinstitution
whichwas
relation
ofsignto thing
bysimilitude,
While
citethebarrel-hoop
before
a tavern
as a conventional
grammarians
hanging
voluntary.
further
Fishacre
is among
thefirst
tociteitas a signwhich
comment,
signofwinewithout
because
itsmeaning
ona similitude
notimmediately
obvirequires
interpretation
depended
ous.It is a signofwinetodrink,
itwasa partofthebarrel
thewinewasshipped
because
in.Likewise,
evenifsacraments
didnothavea physical
havea conventional
similitude,
they
similitude
function.
to their
significate
through
Thischapter
alsotracesdevelopments
ofBerengarius,
likethescholastic
independent
ofdemonstrative,
andcommemorative
It is through
thesocial
typology
prognostic
signs.
ofthesevarious
repercussions
typesofsignsthatsacraments
playan important
partin
truths
andin thecohesion
oftheChristian
Thereis alsoa
teaching
religious
community.
short
which
Rosier-Catach
laterreturns
onAnselm's
centred
account,
to,ofhowdiscussions
ofthetruth
ofa sign(rectitudo
and
). As a signmustbe "true"in bothinstitution
concept
ofa sacrament
wasintimately
linked
withitsinstitution.
The rest
use,theadministration
ofthischapter
themedieval
outlines
elaboration
ofAugustine's
matter
andform
model
ofthesacraments.
Twelfth
discussion
ofthematter
wassomewhat
but
century
haphazard,
thethirteenth
formalised
it on Aristotle's
model.The matter
ofa
century
hylomorphic
or an act,or bothtogether,
sacrament
wasa thing
anditsform
wasthespoken
words.
Theform
ofthespoken
formula
wasitssignification,
which
defines
thepurpose
andintent,
andfrom
whichitsefficacy
The primemover
ofthisdevelopment
is derived.
according
to Rosier-Catach
wasHughofSt Cher(1190-1263).
Thetworivalhypotheses
abouttheefficacy
ofthesacraments,
and
"physical
causality"
in thenextchapter,
discussed
illustrate
how
causalit-pacte
(causality
bybinding
agreement)
theprinciple
ofsignas causefrom
withtheworld
atlarge.
theologians
developed
analogies
wasfirst
mooted
whocompared
Physical
causality
byStephen
(ca 1150-1228),
Langton
sacraments
to medicines.
It wasfurther
developed
byHughofSaint-Cher
amongothers,
whoappealed
to Avicenna's
modelofthereception
ofform
Avicenna
bymatter.
postulatedtwoparallel
causes:onewhich
thematter
to receive
theform,
thesecond
prepared
whichattributed
theform
to thematter.
medicines
and sacraments
two
Hughascribed
efficient
causes:apothecaries
medicines
fora specific
andGodinstituted
prepared
purpose
thesacraments,
whilea doctoradministered
medicine
and a minister
thesacraments.
thehypothesis
thatsacraments
actedthrough
somevirtus
in itsmatter
inherent
Secondly
either
created
institution
or a specialintervenbyGod orplacedin thematter
through
inthecommon
tionhaditscounterpart
which
hasbiblical
belief,
backing
(cf.Ecclesiasticus
medicinal
tocertain
substances
atthetimeofcreation
38.4)thatGodhadgiven
properties
andoccasionally
infused
themintothings
in existence.
already
In thatintellectual
climate
theanalogies
withpopular
beliefs
onwhich
physical
causality
wasbasedwereinevitably
tosearching
scientific
Theauthor
states
subjected
testing.
blundy
thattheobjections
thusraisedplayedan important
ofcausalitpartin thedevelopment
To mymindtheyrecallthethreemeanings
Fishacre
pacte.
gavetheword,sacramentum.
Unlike
thevirtus
creata
ofmedicines,
thenature
andmodeofactionascribed
tosacraments
couldnotbe described
inphysical
there
wasnowayofknowing
whether
thevirtus
terms,
ofa sacrament
wasconferred
at thetimeofinstitution
ofadministration,
andthere
was

11:34:31 AM

372

REVIEWS

no senseofhowlongtheefficacy
ofa sacrament
lasted.
theassumption
thatthe
Further,
virtus
ofa sacrament
wasan internal
accident
rancounter
totheprinciple
thatsacraments
areinrelation
tothegracethey
ofa sacrament
thevirtue
addsnothing
bring.
Consequently
itsessence,
norcanitbe a basisforitsaction(cf.Aristotle,
V.2.225.bl
1).
Phys.
a pivotal
rolein theestablishment
ofcausalit-pacte
Rosier-Catach
: in his
givesFishacre
viewGodwastheonlyproper
inthe
causeofthesacraments.
thecausality
Consequently
from
a contract
sacraments
resulted
between
GodandMan.Manfulfilled
hiscontractual
intheconventions
Godimposed.
Thisprinciple
illustrated
byfaith
obligations
theologians
ofmoney:
itsvalueis notan accident
from
theessence
of
byAugustine's
rising
example
thecoins,
buta relation
between
itanditsvaluemaintained
conventions.
byagreed
They
sacraments
toinsignia
ofoffice
andrings
likea wedding
alsocompared
ringora bishop's
theseactas signsgiving
a particular
therecipient
status
conferred,
ring.Whenpublicly
andimposing
Sherefers
tohowcausalit-pacte
onthealmost
responsibilities.
briefly
impinged
in magicduring
universal
belief
theMiddleAges.Shebegins
withAugustine's
distinction
between
andtruereligion,
andgoeson toa brief
discussion
ofhow
superstitious
practices
medieval
usedAugustine's
todistinguish
between
thesacraments,
which
ruling
theologians
in humanaffairs
weresupernatural
interventions
legitimated
bya pactwithGod,and
whichwasalsointervention
buttheseinterventions
were
forces,
bysupernatural
magic,
invited
bypactswithSatan.
FromthetenorofRosier-Catach's
it is clearthatcausalit-pacte
wasno less
discussion,
controversial
thanphysical
heraccountof mid-thirteenthcausality.
Running
through
discussions
is theimplication
thatthearguments
do not
against
physical
causality
century
andthatseveral
Thomas
andHenry
ofGhent,
always
theologians,
including
apply,
Aquinas
todenote
a signwhich
an effect
onthe
whodo notusetheterm,
signum
efficiens
produces
ofcausalit-pacte.
sawphysical
as an instrument
Shepasseson to the
observer,
causality
howtheconcept
ofefficacy
Anselm's
rectitudo
fourteenth
as
century
byshowing
displaced
a measure
ofa sacrament.
TheFranciscan,
PeterOlivi,postulated
ofthevalidity
thatthe
andefficacy
iftheintentions
administration
ofa sacrament
couldonlyactuate
itssignification
itsinstitution.
ofminister
andrecipient
wereconsonant
withthedivine
intention
governing
in orderto refute
intoa definitive
version
ofcausalit-pacte,
ThisDunsScotusdeveloped
a sacrament
is in relation
as relative
to
viewofthematter.
As a signum
effkiens
Aquinas's
and theelement
correlative
to bothitssignificate
thatthatsignificate
is founded
on,a
inwhich
on
relation
intention
role.The chapter
finishes
witha comment
playsa pivotal
in theFaculty
ofArts.Rosier-Catach
to two
discussions
aboutmeaning
drawsattention
runparallel
andphysical
tendencies
which
tothetheologians'
causalit-pacte
causality
opposing
idea thatword-meaning
waspurely
and the
theAugustinin
conventional,
respectively:
inparton
inparticular,
thatmeaning
Aristotelian
viewadopted
bythemodistae
depended
Sheleavesthequestion
ofwhether
there
wassomecross-influence
features
ofthesignificate.
in theair.I wouldthink
was.
there
between
thetwofaculties
hanging
ofbothhypotheses
aboutthe
theauthorimplies
thatsupporters
Quitedeliberately
weredealing
withan assembly
ofintractable
variables
thateven
ofthesacraments
efficacy
Thereader
likeAquinas,
Bonaventure
andScotus,
couldnotmanage.
themosteminent,
or perhaps
it could
wasneverresolved,
is leftwiththesensethattheissueofcausality
notbe resolved.
in thesubtext
ofRosier-Catach's
on sacramental
The mostimportant
element
chapter
inbuilding
inthefaceofan almost
doctrine
tradition
formulas
is theroleofauthoritative
forThe medievais
claimed
thatthesacramental
lackof Scriptural
authority.
complete
in a manner
withthespirit
ofwhat
consonant
mulashadbeenauthored
bytheChurch
in
were.Forexample,
thebaptismal
formula
Biblical
accounts
there
"N.,egote baptizo
Sancti"[N.,I baptise
nomine
et Filiiet Spiritus
Patris,
youin thenameoftheFather,
mandate
totheapostles,
"Euntes
is basedon Christ's
oftheSonandoftheHolySpirit.],

11:34:31 AM

373

REVIEWS

sancti."
et Filii,et Spiritus
eos in nomine
Patris,
baptizantes
ergodoceteomnesgentes:
in
of
the
and
the
name
them
and
teach
all
Father,
nations,
forth,
therefore,
baptising
[Go
oftheSon,andoftheHolySpirit.]
28.19),whichtheologians
arguedwasa
(Matthew
oftheir
ofa description
hadcouched
itinterms
evenifChrist
totheAposdes,
command
responsibilities.
roseoutofthe
whoseimportance
oftheformulas,
The secondissueis theadequacy
The author
ofthesacraments.
as forms
andtheir
function
institution
twinissuesoftheir
in
in theLatinChurch
thatLatinwasthelanguage
theunconscious
remarks
assumption
ofminute
discussions
of
Heraccounts
hadoriginally
beendrafted.
whichtheseformulas
formula
showthetheologians'
ofeachwordintheLatinbaptismal
theforce
deepconcern
thatis at issue:itis the
Foritis notonlythemeaning
effect
ofwords.
withtheforensic
ofresponsisuchas thepriest's
ofeachwordin theformula,
socialfunction
assumption
oftheactbytheverb,
theredundant
, theprecise
ego
designation
through
pronoun,
bility
on the
section
oftherecipient
, andtheprecise
byte.Herinteresting
designation
baptizo
intotheverformulas
shouldbe translated
thatsacramental
almost
unknown
proposals
ofvernacutheintroduction
forpastoral
reasons
recallthearguments
naculars
justifying
issues
thattheological
thetwentieth
larliturgies
century.
Againshedemonstrates
during
couldbe preserved
theefficacy
oftheformulas
means:
wereresolved
depended
bysecular
andonAristotle's
thatgrammar
wasthesameinalllanguages
ontheprinciple
arguments
theuniversality
of
Thisguaranteed
of thepassions
acrosslanguages.
fortheidentity
oftheword),
which
could
theimitas
nominis
ortoputitmoretechnically,
(unity
significates,
for
differences
becausetheywerebynatureaccidental:
notbe impugned
bylanguage
wereconsidered
the"same"wordbecausetheysharethe
homo
and avGpomo
example,
andbeire
wereidentical
becausetheyarerelated
andpater
samedefinition,
byetymology.
seeeyetoeye,wasthe
didnotalways
Thelastsubstantive
issue,onwhich
theologians
of
whenpronounced,
a worry
becauseoftheuncertain
oftheformulas
Latinity
integrity
of
the
betone
the
of
the
medieval
and,
stylistic
pretensions
suspects,
parish
clergy,
many
much
wasbecoming
account
shows
thattheology
ThetoneofRosier-Catch's
tereducated.
likeBernard
ofClairvaux
initsoutlook.
moreformalist
argued
Twelfth-century
theologians
didnotdamagethe
theformula
had theproper
thatifa minister
intention,
mangling
initsintention.
On theother
resided
as thevirtus
ofa formula
hand,mostthirmeaning,
andargued
thattheforas a feature
ofthesignitself,
scholastics
sawvirtus
teenth-century
andmodus
werenotefficacious
unless
bothsignificatum
as they
mulashadtobe word-perfect
ofa
modifications
harmful
to theefficacy
remained
intact.
Theydistinguished
significarteli
Forexample
Genitor
andrhetorical
sacrament
from
harmless
,a
analysis.
bygrammatical
forPater
on theactofbegetting,
couldnotbe substituted
titlefocussing
, whichdenoted
as a person.
theFather
onminister
andreciparound
revolves
theobligations
Thechapter
onintention
imposed
Rosierofthesacraments
andtheir
ientbythedivine
institution
bytheChurch.
acceptance
andintention
wouldindicate
institution
brief
lookat therelations
Catach's
posedbetween
ofa word.Wherea properly
sawinstitution
as akinto theimposition
thattheologians
ona word,
as theproperly
a meaning
Christ
qualified
"imposqualified
impositor
imposed
ofa sacrament
andunified
thedisparate
tothematter
itor"hadgivena specific
meaning
and
theminister
actsas Christ's
elements
ofthesacramental
deputy
sign.Consequently
laiddownbytheinstitution
ofthesacraoffulfilling
theconditions
takesontheobligation
inquestion.
ofthelively
debates
aboutthevalidment
Thechapter
thengivesan account
in thestateofsin,their
andpriests
intentions
administered
ityofsacraments
byheretics
theprescribed
rituals.
andtheminister's
torespect
atthetimeofadministration,
obligation
madeitdifficult
tojudgethe
Concern
thatfollowing
theritual
laiddownbytheChurch
overtheprimacy
ofword
somediscussion
oftheminister's
intention,
sincerity
produced
in a liturgical
orintention
ritual.

11:34:31 AM

374

REVIEWS

theproduction
andreception
ofsacramental
formulas
tobe subject
Theologians
expected
to a "symmetry
ofintention"
between
minister
andrecipient
ofa sacrament
andalsoto
"between
mouth
andheart".
Evenifthegrammarian
harmony
(likethemodern
linguist,
itmust
be said)concentrated
ontheproduction
thetheologian
wasequally
ofanutterance,
interested
itsreception,
whoseefficacy
on theintentions,
andinteldepended
knowledge
lectual
oftherecipient,
andhisassent
totheproceedings.
Theauthor
details
the
capacity
uncomfortable
discussions
aboutforced
andmarriages
baptisms
provoked
bytheneedfor
assent.
Theroleofassent
often
onwhatsortofcausality
thetheologian
concerned
depended
forthesesacraments.
postulated
Thesection
onoaths,
liesandperjury
draws
thereader's
attention
tothekeenmedieval
senseoftheresponsibility
ofa speaker
to express
hismeaning
andtheresponsibility
of
himwithin
thehearer
toreciprocate
thesenseandintent
ofhisutterance.
byinterpreting
Thissenseofresponsibility
underlies
theimportance
debates
on the
placedbytheological
moralandsocialrepercussions
ofutterances
andtheir
onthevalidity
ofthesacrabearing
Anoathwasa publicutterance
ments.
Godtowitness
thetruth
ofa statement
or
calling
thesincerity
ofa promise.
Deliberate
liesweresinson thepartofa person
andalsoacts
Anutterance
withsocialrepercussions.
istrueifthemodesofunderstanding
andthemodes
A lie therefore
ofsignifying
match.
harms
thesocialfabric
theexpressive
byfrustrating
andcommunicative
oflanguage.
inperjury,
Oathsandliescometogether
which
purpose
callsGodtowitness
thetruth
ofa falsestatement,
or thevalidity
ofa promise
onedoes
notintend
to keep.Hence,though
liesanddeception
ofothersacranegatethevalidity
in matrimony
harmful
whoseessence
is thepublicexchange
of
ments,
theyarecrucially
consent
between
brideandgroom.
ofthischapter
is themoralprinciple,
thewholethrust
enunciated
as early
Underlying
as Hilary
ofPoitiers,
thatthesignificance
ofa statement
should
bejudgednotonlyonits
butalsoon itsintention.
Thisprinciple,
which
waspartofthelawofcontract
meaning,
footnotes
to Gratian,
shecouldalsohavementioned
Rosier-Catach
thatithaditssource
in RomanLaw.
inthelongest
Theproblems
result
andmostcomplex
bytheEucharist
posedtheologians
in thebook.The Eucharist
is theonlysacrament
whichbrings
aboutcomplete
chapter
transformation
ofitsmatter
(thebreadandwinebecomethebodyandbloodofChrist),
formula
andwhose
sacramental
isitssoleefficient
cause.Moreover
thewords
ofconsecration
aretheonlysacramental
formula
tohavesomething
closetoverbatim
authority:
scriptural
ofthewordsattributed
in thethree
to Christ
and
theyarea conflation
synoptic
gospels
in St Paul,1 Corinthians
Onceagain,theologians
basedall theirargumenta11.23-24.
tionon theLatintext.
to Berengarius,
andhisclaimthatHocestenim
The chapter
corpus
openswitha return
because
itwaslogically
todenote
thecomplete
transmeum
denoted
inadequate
impanation
Rosier-Catach
counformation
showshowtheologians
postulated
bytranssubstantiation.
himwith
useofhisownweapons.
Shegives
a longlistofthirteenth-century
tered
sophisticated
was exegesis
of thisformula
and elimination
ofheresy
whosepurpose
by
paraphrases
in terms
a terminus
thedoctrine
oftranssubstantiation
ofa movement
between
a
couching
likepanis
transit
in(fit)corpus
Christi
wereacceptable;
adquern.
, anda terminus
quo
Paraphrases
a causalrelaChristi
wasnotacceptable
becauseitimplied
depane
, forinstance,
fitcorpus
ofChrist.
Shesumsup thewholeargument
between
thebreadandthepresence
tionship
in an informative
theextant
andillegitimate,
tablewhich
matches
paraphrases,
legitimate
from
handbooks
ofdialectic
andtheprinciples
withmodelsentences
theyexemplify.
on howtheologians
usedarguments
oftheformulas
themselves
focusses
Herdiscussion
to clarify
thebalancebetween
andperdrawnfrom
andthePhysics
meaning
grammar
substance
andnotperson,
theneuter
demonstrative
formative
function.
Asitdenotes
proarepresent
ofbreadandthesubstance
ofChrist
states
thatboththesubstance
noun,hoc,

11:34:31 AM

REVIEWS

375

onthealtar.Therewasnever
overwhenthebreadceasedtobe precomplete
agreement
andoverthenature
ofpresence
tothemind.
sentandChrist
become
present,
Theologians
rather
hadmoresuccess
withthesubstantive
existence
than
verb,est(is),whichdenotes
bound
anditsrelation
totheconversion
oftheelements.
by
change,
Theywere,ofcourse,
ifChrist
theGospeltext.Suggestions
thatitwouldhavebeenbetter
hadusedfit(becomes)
or a jussivesubjunctive
on thegrounds
thatestis a performa{sitorfiat)weredismissed
tivebyfunction
becausea sacramental
formula
mustsignify
theoutcome
ofitssacrament,
whichcanonlybe donebythepresent
indicative.
The third
wasthesuppositio
difficulty
ofmeum
: it didnotseemlogicalthatit shouldrefer
to boththeperson
whosaidit and
toChrist
whowasbeingreported.
thebreadseparately
from
thewine
Finally,
consecrating
raisedtheinsoluble
ofwhether
Christ
underbothforms.
wasentirely
question
present
UnlikeBerengarius
whohadappliedthelawsofdialectic
without
context
into
taking
tookit forgranted
thatthewordsofconsecration
couldonlyfuncaccount,
theologians
tionwithin
their
context.
oftheLast
narrative
liturgical
Theyaretheclimaxofa short
ofthelively
ofthepriest's
Rosier-Catach's
account
discussions
roleillustrates
how
Supper.
thetheologians
mollified
uneasewiththedirect
narrative
quotesintheliturgical
byslightly
thenorms
ofdialectic.
Therewasagreement
thatpriest
recitatwisting
byspeaking
begins
tive
Butwhenhe recites
thewordsofconsecration,
he is taking
on
, thatis as narrator.
thepersona
ofChrist,
whichraisedtheissueofwhether
he is stillspeaking
as narrator,
orsignificative
had.The majority
answer
to thisconundrum
wasthatthepriest
, as Christ
wasspeaking
bothrecitative
andsignificative,
a solution
meum
havedoublesupdemanding
The development
ofthetheory
ofdemonstratio
in thelate1240swascrucial
in
position.
thepragmatics
oftheEucharistie
formulas.
Rosier-Catach
traces
itsdevelsolving
succinctly
andlogicians
as a preface
toan account
ofthetheologians'
opment
bygrammarians
rejectionofdemonstratio
ofdemonstration)
in favour
as theoperative
factor
of
concepta
(concept
demonstratio
exercita
ad intellectum
aboutto theintellect).
She takes
(demonstration
brought
as thepivotal
on ideasfrom
theorists,
AquinasandBonaventure
building
manyothers,
Robert
shegivesDunsScotusthefinal
word.Forhe took
However,
Kilwardby.
including
theargument
aboutthevalidity
of theEucharistie
formula
ideasof
beyondAnselm's
rectitudo
andsettled
on theefficacy
oftheformula
as a gaugeofitsvalidity.
ForScotus
themechanism
oftranssubstantiation
wassubstitution
ofanother
rather
thanconversion
being
ofwhathadbeenthere,
andhisseemsto be thelastwordon thesubject.
The conclusion
sumsup thethreemajorlessons
ofthebook.It emphasises
thatthe
interaction
between
andthelanguage
in common,
sciences
roseoutofsources
theology
likeDonatus,
Priscian
and theAristotelian
butthattheyusedthemdifferently
corpus,
becauseofthedifferences
in attitudes
to language
between
artsandtheology.
Thisis as
onewouldexpect,
becausegrammar,
havedifferent
which
logicand theology
objects,
indifferent
result
ofdata.Thesecondissueis therelation
between
inevitably
expectations
theefficacious
theories
oflanguage
acts.The author
makes
signofthetitleandmodern
between
theworkofGriceonimplicature,
Austin
andSearle's"language
easyconnections
exercitatus
acts",andThomasReid's"socialacts"andtheactus
(actbrought
about)or the
ofhermedieval
Thisshestrengthens
signum
ejficiens
theologians.
by sidelong
glancesat
andothers
whoanalysed
as a toolofteaching.
Herthird
Augustine
language
pointtakes
thedifference
a signanda
between
foreword,
up an issuemadeexplicit
byde Libera's
Shemakes
a particularly
remark
thatsacramental
isoneimmense
symbol.
striking
theology
Dedoctrina
Christiana
thereader's
attention
tooverriding
, drawing
glossonAugustine's
importanceofthetheologians'
ofAugustine's
definition
ofthesign.Theyemphasised
exegesis
thetworelations
it enters
into:as a signproperly
it is in relation
to reality
to
so-called,
itssignificate,
butas a symbol
it is in relation
to theperson
whoreceives
it andinterintoa shortdiscussion
ofthedoublevalueofthesign,as
pretsit.Thisthendevelops
witha meaning
andas something
thathasan effect
on itsreceiver.
something

11:34:31 AM

376

REVIEWS

offaith
as an intelin thisbookis theexplicit
constant
The mostimportant
ranking
inteloftheology
asfides
definition
tomindStAnselm's
which
lectual
quaerens
brings
power,
between
which
setouttherelationship
an aphorism
insearch
ofunderstanding),
lectum
(faith
it.As
nottooverturn
toexplain
sciences
andtheology.
theservant
belief,
Theyarethere
ofbeingovertheindignity
anddialectic
suffer
oftheology,
handmaids
versatile
grammar
belief.
Yet
ofsanctioned
thebounds
whentheybegintopushbeyond
ruledor retrained
tothe
areampletestimony
ofBerengarius
thefateandcontinuing
unacknowledged
presence
in thesciences
oftheTrivium.
vested
powertheology
ofthedifference
careful
in
bookistheauthor's
element
this
Thesecond
analysis
important
Thisis only
andthatofthegrammarians.
tolanguage
thetheologians'
between
approach
is
as faras language
different
havecompletely
as thetwosciences
tobe expected
objects
thatGod
Sheshows
eveniftheyexemplify
concerned.
that,
againandagaintheprinciple
is coupled
with
ofutterances
orthodox
their
to grammar,
is notsubject
analysis
relatively
Whether
thisis due
incontext,
whether
itbe socialorliturgical.
a keensenseoflanguage
I doubtifRosier-Catach
is ina posithelanguage
within
todevelopments
sciences,
solely
and
itself
withitsmoralconcerns
is thattheology
tionto determine.
My ownfeeling
hadmuchtodowith
overthewritten,
valuedthespoken
which
medieval
language
society
in thisbook.
functions
senseoflanguage
thestrong
highlighted
developing
to
issueis theskillwithwhichtheologians
The third
weapons
adaptedBerengarius's
hisviolently
contextrosefrom
he raised.Berengarius's
dealwiththespectres
problems
Rosier-Catach
which
wascountered,
with
freedealings
definition,
unconsciously
Augustine's
three
hisdefinition
around
hadconstructed
thatAugustine
terms,
bytherealisation
implies,
ofthisprinciple
mind.Themoralandsocialdevelopments
andinterpreting
sign,signifier
oneofthemostimportant
constitute
sciences
tothemedieval
techniques
general
through
to the
whoseimportance
Their
other
the
book.
threads
achievement,
through
running
ofAugustine's
is their
setsoutin somedetail,
theauthor
sacraments
watertight
rereading
it
elsewhere:
hasrelevance
between
distinction
This,ofcourse,
signified.
signandthing
to be in
resandratio
between
turns
, whichwereconsidered
intelligendi
up in therelation
intherelation
between
wasreplicated
tosign,andthisrelationship
ofthing
a relationship
andratio
ratio
significando
intelligendi
wonfound
acteI haveat times
Laparole
comme
readRosier-Catach's
SinceI first
myself
wouldhavehadtheinfluence
viewofgrammar
whether
RogerBacon'sfunctionalist
dering
viewswerenotthepropButfunctionalist
itdidifhe hadnotbeena skilled
theologian.
withhisfriend,
in
discussions
if
I
were
and
wonder
of
Bacon
alone,
developed
they
erty
andof
discussion
oftheological
ofthevigour
Shegivesan excellent
Bonaventure.
picture
Shecites
ofreceived
doctrine.
within
thebounds
andoriginality
andferocity
itsfreedom
is due.
where
credit
innovation
credit
forsignificant
oftheologians,
a wholegalaxy
giving
Thomas
andtheDominican,
theFranciscan,
sheaccords
The importance
Bonaventure,
from
Duns
refinements
ofthesacraments
fortheir
is no surprise,
(with
analysis
Aquinas,
manuals.
Whatis
in twentieth-century
version
wasstillthereceived
theological
Scotus),
from
theearly
thirteenth
lesser
known
istheattention
century,
however,
figures
given
telling,
oftheir
ofMeliton.
andWilliam
Richard
likeRichard
Middleton,
pioFishacre,
Byreason
between
of theologians
contributions
theystandoutamongthehugenumber
neering
ofthetheoretical
tothebuilding
ofHades
whocontributed
andWilliam
Abelard
significantly
Rosiersetouttofind.
coherence
ofthe
ofthedevelopment
soberaccount
ofthisbookis theauthor's
The lastvirtue
lies
ideasonlanguage
withmodern
anditskinship
ofthesignum
acts,which
efficiens
theory
of
in showing
howslowwasthedevelopment
Sheis right
ofherenterprise.
at thecentre
to
eveniftopicsessential
ofthesignum
ofthetheory
intoa prototype
demonstratio
efficiens,
thebook.Hercomparison
andsignification,
truth
acts,likeintention,
permeate
language
is a
workofSearleandAustin
ofthepointreached
byDunsScotuswiththemodern

11:34:31 AM

REVIEWS

377

on thehuman
toignore
whatgoeson underone'snose.
comment
verytelling
propensity
thathighly
ritualised
tohavedrawn
theconclusion
that
Onemight
haveexpected
society
andhavea majoreffect
on the
actsor utterances
couldgenerate
theirownsignificates
somewhat
moreexpeditiously.
their
recipients
concerned
withsacraAs Rosier-Catach
sheis notprimarily
saysin herintroduction,
Herbook,however,
account
ofhow
mental
theology.
givesa well-documented,
perceptive
and is, in effect,
de
toolsfromthelanguage
sciences,
theologians
developed
analytical
ofthereligious
ofitssubject
itis an extremely
Libera's
"archeology
sign".Bythenature
bookwhich
demands
careful
at leasta rudimentary
reading,
graspofsacramencomplex
taldoctrine
withthephilosophical
context.
Eventhough
and,I wouldthink,
familiarity
aboutthesacraments
will
thosewhoexpect
medieval
to reachfirm
conclusions
casuistry
be disappointed,
Rosier-Catach
showsthatargument
anddiscussion
certainly
conclusively
attained
coherence
ofprinciple
andmethod
whileallowing
forthedisamong
theologians
overmajorpoints
whichsurvived
theshrewd
theGreat,
analyses
byAlbert
agreements
ThomasAquinas
andBonaventure.
ingeneral
I wouldhopethathistorians
oftheology
andmedievalists
wouldbenefit
from
thisbookas muchas I have.OnceagainRosier-Catach
hasmadea majorcontribution
to ourknowledge
ofthelanguage
oftheMiddleAges.
scholarship
L.G. Kelly

DarwinCollege,
Cambridge

ClaudePanaccio,
Ockham
onConcepts
in Medieval
Studies
(Ashgate
Philosophy).
Ashgate,
Aldershot
2004,xi + 197p. ISBN0 754632288
Ockham's
ofconcepts
hasbeensubject
toheateddebates
forthelasttwenty
theory
years.
A number
ofdistinguished
commentators
thesignificance
andfunction
carefully
analyzed
inphilosophy
ofthistheory
oflanguage,
andepistemology.
thesusYet,despite
ontology
tained
effort
toshedlight
onthisinfluential
remained
unanswered.
doctrine,
many
questions
Is Ockham
a reductionist
in hisaccount
ofthebasicstockofconcepts?
Is he committed
in theworld?
to theposition
thatconcepts
aresomehow
"similitudes"
ofthings
Doeshe
an explanation
fortheorigin
oflogical
moreproblems
Theseandmany
provide
concepts?
In hishighly
innovative
andstimulating
book,
gaveriseto controversial
interpretations.
ClaudePanaccio
a solution
toallofthem,
thusproviding
a comprehensive
interpresents
anddefense
ofOckham's
ofconcepts.
He doesnotconfine
himself
to
pretation
theory
somedetails
to an ongoing
butintends
to demonstrate
"thatmostofthe
debate,
adding
current
abouthis[Ockham's]
ofconcepts
canbe setinterpretative
disagreements
theory
tled[. . .] on thebasisofwhathe actually
wrote."
thisis a boldclaim.
(p. 2) No doubt,
ButPanaccio
shows
thata number
ofdisagreements
and
canindeed
be settled
successfully
thatthetheory
Ockham
defends
is notonlycoherent
andwellargued
for,butalsoastonsimilar
tocontemporary
tothose
thatappealtosemantic
atomism
theories,
ishingly
especially
andrepresentationalism.
In hisreconstruction
andinterpretation
ofOckham's
Panaccio
combines
a careful
theory,
examination
ofkeytexts
witha critical
ofrecent
assessment
literature.
Thisis
secondary
theright
method
to choose.Giventhevastamount
ofrecent
itis
certainly
publications,
notnecessary
to start
from
scratch
whenapproaching
Ockham's
Norshould
one
theory.
summarize
themaintheses
in a descriptive
of
simply
way.Whatis neededis a discussion
- a discustheproblems
andallegedinconsistencies
outbyrecent
commentators
pointed
sionthatis basedupona detailed
oftherelevant
sources.
It is precisely
analysis
primary
to thisneedthatPanaccioresponds.
He tackles
thecrucial
thatM. McCord
problems
P. V. Spade,C. Normore,
C. Michon,
andothers
Adams,
J.Biard,E. Karger
emphasized
Koninklijke
BrillNV,Leiden,
2005
- www.brill.nl
Alsoavailable
online

Vivarium
43,2

11:34:31 AM

REVIEWS

377

on thehuman
toignore
whatgoeson underone'snose.
comment
verytelling
propensity
thathighly
ritualised
tohavedrawn
theconclusion
that
Onemight
haveexpected
society
andhavea majoreffect
on the
actsor utterances
couldgenerate
theirownsignificates
somewhat
moreexpeditiously.
their
recipients
concerned
withsacraAs Rosier-Catach
sheis notprimarily
saysin herintroduction,
Herbook,however,
account
ofhow
mental
theology.
givesa well-documented,
perceptive
and is, in effect,
de
toolsfromthelanguage
sciences,
theologians
developed
analytical
ofthereligious
ofitssubject
itis an extremely
Libera's
"archeology
sign".Bythenature
bookwhich
demands
careful
at leasta rudimentary
reading,
graspofsacramencomplex
taldoctrine
withthephilosophical
context.
Eventhough
and,I wouldthink,
familiarity
aboutthesacraments
will
thosewhoexpect
medieval
to reachfirm
conclusions
casuistry
be disappointed,
Rosier-Catach
showsthatargument
anddiscussion
certainly
conclusively
attained
coherence
ofprinciple
andmethod
whileallowing
forthedisamong
theologians
overmajorpoints
whichsurvived
theshrewd
theGreat,
analyses
byAlbert
agreements
ThomasAquinas
andBonaventure.
ingeneral
I wouldhopethathistorians
oftheology
andmedievalists
wouldbenefit
from
thisbookas muchas I have.OnceagainRosier-Catach
hasmadea majorcontribution
to ourknowledge
ofthelanguage
oftheMiddleAges.
scholarship
L.G. Kelly

DarwinCollege,
Cambridge

ClaudePanaccio,
Ockham
onConcepts
in Medieval
Studies
(Ashgate
Philosophy).
Ashgate,
Aldershot
2004,xi + 197p. ISBN0 754632288
Ockham's
ofconcepts
hasbeensubject
toheateddebates
forthelasttwenty
theory
years.
A number
ofdistinguished
commentators
thesignificance
andfunction
carefully
analyzed
inphilosophy
ofthistheory
oflanguage,
andepistemology.
thesusYet,despite
ontology
tained
effort
toshedlight
onthisinfluential
remained
unanswered.
doctrine,
many
questions
Is Ockham
a reductionist
in hisaccount
ofthebasicstockofconcepts?
Is he committed
in theworld?
to theposition
thatconcepts
aresomehow
"similitudes"
ofthings
Doeshe
an explanation
fortheorigin
oflogical
moreproblems
Theseandmany
provide
concepts?
In hishighly
innovative
andstimulating
book,
gaveriseto controversial
interpretations.
ClaudePanaccio
a solution
toallofthem,
thusproviding
a comprehensive
interpresents
anddefense
ofOckham's
ofconcepts.
He doesnotconfine
himself
to
pretation
theory
somedetails
to an ongoing
butintends
to demonstrate
"thatmostofthe
debate,
adding
current
abouthis[Ockham's]
ofconcepts
canbe setinterpretative
disagreements
theory
tled[. . .] on thebasisofwhathe actually
wrote."
thisis a boldclaim.
(p. 2) No doubt,
ButPanaccio
shows
thata number
ofdisagreements
and
canindeed
be settled
successfully
thatthetheory
Ockham
defends
is notonlycoherent
andwellargued
for,butalsoastonsimilar
tocontemporary
tothose
thatappealtosemantic
atomism
theories,
ishingly
especially
andrepresentationalism.
In hisreconstruction
andinterpretation
ofOckham's
Panaccio
combines
a careful
theory,
examination
ofkeytexts
witha critical
ofrecent
assessment
literature.
Thisis
secondary
theright
method
to choose.Giventhevastamount
ofrecent
itis
certainly
publications,
notnecessary
to start
from
scratch
whenapproaching
Ockham's
Norshould
one
theory.
summarize
themaintheses
in a descriptive
of
simply
way.Whatis neededis a discussion
- a discustheproblems
andallegedinconsistencies
outbyrecent
commentators
pointed
sionthatis basedupona detailed
oftherelevant
sources.
It is precisely
analysis
primary
to thisneedthatPanaccioresponds.
He tackles
thecrucial
thatM. McCord
problems
P. V. Spade,C. Normore,
C. Michon,
andothers
Adams,
J.Biard,E. Karger
emphasized
Koninklijke
BrillNV,Leiden,
2005
- www.brill.nl
Alsoavailable
online

Vivarium
43,2

11:34:47 AM

378

REVIEWS

to resolve
or
andtriesto showeither
thatOckham
hasthetheoretical
resources
them,
ifonecombines
all thepiecesofhistheory.
Letmefocuson three
thattheydisappear
ofscholarly
debates.
thathavebeenat thecenter
problems
ofconnotative
terms.
Itiswellknown
thatOckham
Thefirst
concerns
thestatus
problem
thatincludes
andconnotakesconcepts
to be partsofa mental
bothabsolute
language
between
thesetwotypes
ofterms
tobe understood?
tative
terms.
Buthowis therelation
allthesimple
connotative
terms
arereducible
toabsolute
P. V. Spadeargued
that,
ideally,
is "purged"
Foriftheidealmental
ones.Yetthiswouldhavefatalconsequences.
language
Thatis,it hasno
ofsimple
connotative
thereareno simple
relational
terms,
concepts.
without
theseconsuchas 'father'
or 'taller'.
Buthowcanthere
be a language
concepts
from
non-relational
ones?It seems
thatthey
cannot
be constructed
exclusively
cepts,
given
reductionist
is doomed
to failure:
itignores
thesimple
factthat
thatOckham's
approach
andnon-eliminable.
relational
arenon-reducible
concepts
from
a falseunderstanding
of
Panaccio
shows
thatthisproblem
originates
convincingly
tobe somesortofidealconstruct.
Ockham
doesnottakethislanguage
mental
language.
whenexplaining
ofmental
thevarious
Nordoeshe choosea reductionist
types
approach
In hisview,connotative
termsare notdispensable
and cannotbe completely
terms.
in nominal
of'father'
wouldbe somedefinitions.
Forinstance,
thedefinition
eliminated
In addia child','child'beinganother
connotative
term.
like'maleanimalhaving
thing
termis notsynonymous
tion,Panacciopointsoutthatin manycasestheconnotative
indicates
"theontological
definition.
The definition
withitsnominal
simply
import"
intheworld
clearwhatobjects
aresignified
i.e.,itmakes
bythatterm.
(p. 90)ofa term,
in manydifferent
can be signified
Buttheseobjects
ways.Thatis whytheconnotative
it is
definition.
Andin fact,quiteoften
termcannotsimply
be replaced
bythenominal
- tohavea concept
is notthesameas tospelloutitsnominal
notreplaced
bythespeaker
definition.
ofa smalldetail.
is farmorethana correction
Thisrejection
ofSpade'sinterpretation
ofmental
to introduce
thetheory
It elucidates
thebasicideathatledOckham
language.
inwhich
all connotative
terms
areelima "pure"language
Hisaimwasnotto construct
whenhe orsheis in
terms
a speaker
whatkindofmental
buttoexplain
inated,
acquires
ina cerintheworld.
Sincetheseobjects
arealways
ordered
natural
contact
withobjects
thatsignify
the
terms
includes
connotative
terms
tainway,thesetofmentad
inevitably
inthebackground:
orderIt is therefore
an ontological
thesis
thatlurks
various
orderings.
buttheway
isolated
terms
thatdo notsimply
signify
things,
ingsin theworldrequire
to eachother.
theyarerelated
ofthings
thesis
thatconcepts
are"similitudes"
Another
controversial
pointis Ockham's
forficta
in theworld.
makessensein thelightofhisearly
Thisthesis
(i.e.,
/cto-theory,
of
canindeedbe takento be intellectual
with"objective
pictures
being")
specialentities
ofthelater
within
theframework
be understood
Buthowcanthethesis
external
things.
Somecommentators
actbe a similitude
ofanexternal
Howcana mental
thing?
act-theory?
Others
tothiscrucial
a satisfying
answer
failed
toprovide
thatOckham
question.
thought
ofconcepts.
infavor
ofa causalexplanation
thathegaveup theideaofsimilitude
argued
in Ockham's
to crucial
bothinterpretations.
Panacciostrictly
Referring
passages
rejects
rolein theacthe shows
thattheideaofsimilitude
laterworks,
theory.
playsa prominent
intellectual
thatthisideacan be givena clearsenseifonecompares
Andhe contends
a ball.WhenI graspa ball,myhandshavea ceractssuchas catching
actstophysical
when
ballsthathavethesameshape.Likewise,
thatfits
thisballandallother
tainposition
thatfitsthisobject
takesa certain
I intellectually
"posture"
myintellect
graspan object,
likeit.The important
thatarerelevandy
andall otherobjects
pointis thatitfitsmany
actinto
"Whattransforms
thegrasping
a general
andthereby
becomes
concept:
objects

11:34:47 AM

REVIEWS

379

thusresembling
it
a general
is thatitfitstheshapeofthegrasped
object,
representation
to someextent
. . (p. 124).
ittakes
No doubt,
thisis an elegant
thathasat leasttwoadvantages.
First,
explanation
it intoa naivepicture-theory.
Ockham's
without
talkaboutsimilitude
seriously
turning
in addition
to causality.
Forcausality
is required
Second,it makesclearwhysimilitude
an actto a single
similitude
relates
it to manyobjects
and
relates
objectonly,whereas
Panaccio's
therefore
enables
theactto be a general
concept.
Despiteitselegance,
explanation
leavesa crucial
why
question
open.In thecaseoftheball,it is understandable
canfit
theposition
ofthehandscanfittheball:thematerial
(hands)
shapeofonething
thematerial
(ball).In thecaseoftheobjectthatis intellectually
shapeofanother
thing
thesimilitude
is notso easilyunderstandable.
Howcantheimmaterial
"posture"
grasped,
fitthematerial
Panaccio
usestheexpression
oftheintellect
shapeofan object?
frequently
intheimmaterial
realm.
without
ita precise
What
unfortunately
giving
meaning
"posture",
takesa certain
whenitgrasps,
doesitmeanthatmyintellect
say,a tree?
exactly
posture
likean immaterial
from
the
Doesit acquiresomething
shapeofthetree,distinguishable
Andis there
a one-to-one
relation
between
immaimmaterial
shapeofa ballora house?
terial
andmaterial
It seemstomethatthecomparison
witha "manual
shapes?
concept"
- questions
arefully
answered
thatinevitably
onlyifthesequestions
(p. 124)is informative
arisewithin
an ontological
framework
thatdistinguishes
between
immaterial
andmaterial
entities.
A third
issuethathasbeeneagerly
debated
commentators
concerns
theorigin
byrecent
in mental
oflogicalconcepts.
Ockham
includes
theseconcepts
whenhe
clearly
language
claims
aremental
Buton whatbasisaretheyformed?
thatthere
terms.
syncategorematic
terms
arenormally
formed
onthebasisofanimmediate
relation
Categorematic
perceptual
intheworld;
withthings
ofa treeenables
metocomeupwiththeterm'tree'.
myseeing
Butthereis no thing
suchas "an if"thatwouldtrigger
theformation
oftheterm'if'.
So howcanI comeup withthissyncategorematic
term?
Panacciois wellawareofthis
Thistermcannotsimply
be formed
on thebasisofa spoken
or written
term.
problem.
a significant
Otherwise
wouldbecomederivative
ofconventional
partofmentad
language
Thatis whyPanacciothinks
thatOckhamsubscribes
to innatismi
". . . these
language.
actscorrespond
toinnate
." (p. 154)Thisis a convincing
logical
capacities
ofthemind
explanaevenifthetexts
as Panaccio
arenotveryexplicit,
concedes.
It provides
an
torystrategy,
answer
tothequestions
of(a) whyall human
areabletoacquirethesame
elegant
beings
stock
oflogical
oftheobjects
and(b)whythe
concepts,
regardless
theyareintouchwith,
formation
oftheseconcepts
doesnotdependon themastering
ofa specific
conventional
In addition,
thisexplanatory
thestriking
language.
nicelyillustrates
strategy
similarity
between
Ockham's
andFodor'sapproach
to mental
Yetoneshouldnotoverlanguage.
lookan important
thisexplanation
has:itmakesOckham
a
to someextent
consequence
whodoesnotexclusively
rationalist,
i.e.,a philosopher
appealto"conceptual
empiricism",1
butwhoclaims
thata significant
is notacquired
partoftheconceptual
apparatus
through
sensory
experience.
Panaccio's
careful
showsthatmost(perhaps
notall) exegetical
interpretation
puzzles
canbe resolved.
Andthecomparison
he drawsbetween
andFodor's(tosome
Ockham's
extent
alsoPutnam's)
ofconcepts
makesclearthatthere
is "nofatalincommensutheory
medieval
andmodern
doctrines.
Itisinfactthecommensurability
rability"
(p. 181)between
thatallowshimtopresent
Ockham
as a philosopher
whoelaborates
a theory
ofconcepts
1 ThisishowM. McGord
William
Ockham
Dame:Notre
DameUniversity
Adams,
, Notre
Press1987,495,characterizes
Ockham's
project.

11:34:47 AM

380

REVIEWS

a
whodefend
butalsoto analytic
notjut to medievalists,
thatis appealing
philosophers
from
andnominalist
ofconcepts.
Whatemerges
externalist,
conception
representationalist,
withcontemporary
resurrectus
whocaneasilyengagein discussions
hisbookis a Guilelmus
thinkers.
zu Berlin
Humboldt-Universitt

Perler
Dominik

9mitToledo-Kommentar.
Kritisch
'Deconsequentiis
Richard
herausgegeben,
eingeleitet
Billingham,
B.R.Grner,
Amsterdam/
Weber.
2003.
vonStephanie
undkommentiert
Philadelphia
+ 335S., ISBN90 6032367X
Band38).xxviii
Studien
zurPhilosophie,
(Bochumer
Richard
In derGeschichte
dermittelalterlichen
(floruit
Billingham
LogikistderEnglnder
siveTerminus
est
Puerorum
bekannt
um 1350)zweifelsohne
Speculum
wegenseinesTraktates
d.h.indiesem
orientierte
isteineempiristisch
inquem.
DieseArbeit
Fall,eineLogik
Logik,
von
individuelle
die besonders
(d.h.die Untersuchung
Eigenschaftsgraden
Gegenstnde,
'Sortes
istgrsser
als Plato')undphysische
zumBeispiel
Stzemit'mehroderweniger',
DieseLogikist,glaubeich,aufdiese
'Ende'usw.)bercksichtet.
('Anfang',
Gegebenheiten
Petrus
desSummulisten
Theorie
zu derSuppositionslehre
Weiseeinerivalisierende
Hispanus.
De conseeinTraktat
unteranderen
hatabermehrgeschrieben,
Richard
Billingham
Buchaufvorzgliche
Weberhatin demhierzu besprechenden
Dr. Stephanie
quentiis.
underklrt.
kritisch
WeisediesesTraktat
herausgegeben
undeinenKommentar
zu
in dreiVersionen
nurdasTraktat
Sie hatnicht
Billinghams
in einer
Cab.94-27,ff.75r-90v,
Textdersichin Toledobefindet,
Catedral,
Billinghams
kommenundhistorisch
Edition
kritischen
situiert,
jedochdiesenauchkritisch
vorgelegt
LebenundWerke.
berBillinghams
Sie gibtweiter
tiert.
einigeBemerkungen
nichtnur
die Handschriften,
Dr. Weberprsentiert
ZumErstendie Editionselbst.
Arbeit
verwendet
die zurAusgabe
werden,
jedochauchdie zur
Billingham's
diejenigen
manindrei
findet
Traktat.
Dieseletzte
zumBillinghams
Edition
desToledo-Kommentars
Bodleian
Bibi.Universitaria
Versionen
Lib.,Lat.misc.
Oxford,
1882,ff.120r-123v;
(Salamanca,
Es gibteinevierte
E 100,ff.56r-62r;
5445,ff.108Ar-119v).
Roma,Bibl.Casanatense
Version(Barcelona,
ACA,Ripoll
, 166,ff.lr-5r),
jedoch,wie Dr. Webersagt,istder
nichtsinnvoll
wre.
so dasseineEdition
Handschrift
zu stark
beschdigt,
der
Textabzufertigen:
sichzu sehrumeineneinheitlichen
unterscheiden
Die Versionen
Puerorum
desSpeculum
sein.In denEditonen
wrdeunbersichtbar
criticus
, die
apparatus
vonA. Maierin 1970und,aufneueWeise,vonL.M.de Rijkin 1975hergestellt
sind,
daseinenTextdesSpculums
sehen.
FastjedesManuskript
lsstsichauchdieseSchwierigkeit
Version.
enthlt,
gibteineeigenefastselbstndige
imTraktat
denFolgerungsbegriff
Dr.WeberzumErsten
ImInterpretationsteil
bespricht
die materielle
derVerfasser
Weiter
kommentiert
( 1.2),unddie
Folgerung
Billinghams.
imToledo-Kommentar
undungltigen
Definition
dergltigen
( 1.3).In diesem
Folgerung
die sichin
undgenerellen
die speziellen
sie weiter
Regeln,
bespricht
Interpretationsteil
undlateiniundIndexe(Eigennamen
EineBibliographie
Traktat
vorfinden.
Billinghams
- Begriffe)
- nichtdeutsche
dasBuchab.
schliessen
sche
WiesieauseinanderThema:die Folgerungslehre.
einwichtiges
Dr. Weberbehandelt
in dermittelalterlichen
setzt,istdieseLehreein neuesElement
Logik.Die Logikdes
auf
dieFolgerungslehre
aufTermini;
undorientiert
warsyllogistisch,
Aristoteles
dagegen
aufdiederStoabasiert,
Lehreistnicht
ist.Die mittelalterliche
Stze,wasmehr
prinzipiell
Im 12.Jahrhundert
neu entwickelt.
im 14.Jahrhundert,
aberbesonders
gab es auch
wie
habendiesenicht
des 14.Jahrhundert
aberdieMeister
gekannt,
Neueuntwicklungen,
siemitRechtsagt.
Vivarium
43,2

BrillNV,Leiden,
2005
Koninklijke
- www.brill.nl
online
Alsoavailable

11:34:47 AM

380

REVIEWS

a
whodefend
butalsoto analytic
notjut to medievalists,
thatis appealing
philosophers
from
andnominalist
ofconcepts.
Whatemerges
externalist,
conception
representationalist,
withcontemporary
resurrectus
whocaneasilyengagein discussions
hisbookis a Guilelmus
thinkers.
zu Berlin
Humboldt-Universitt

Perler
Dominik

9mitToledo-Kommentar.
Kritisch
'Deconsequentiis
Richard
herausgegeben,
eingeleitet
Billingham,
B.R.Grner,
Amsterdam/
Weber.
2003.
vonStephanie
undkommentiert
Philadelphia
+ 335S., ISBN90 6032367X
Band38).xxviii
Studien
zurPhilosophie,
(Bochumer
Richard
In derGeschichte
dermittelalterlichen
(floruit
Billingham
LogikistderEnglnder
siveTerminus
est
Puerorum
bekannt
um 1350)zweifelsohne
Speculum
wegenseinesTraktates
d.h.indiesem
orientierte
isteineempiristisch
inquem.
DieseArbeit
Fall,eineLogik
Logik,
von
individuelle
die besonders
(d.h.die Untersuchung
Eigenschaftsgraden
Gegenstnde,
'Sortes
istgrsser
als Plato')undphysische
zumBeispiel
Stzemit'mehroderweniger',
DieseLogikist,glaubeich,aufdiese
'Ende'usw.)bercksichtet.
('Anfang',
Gegebenheiten
Petrus
desSummulisten
Theorie
zu derSuppositionslehre
Weiseeinerivalisierende
Hispanus.
De conseeinTraktat
unteranderen
hatabermehrgeschrieben,
Richard
Billingham
Buchaufvorzgliche
Weberhatin demhierzu besprechenden
Dr. Stephanie
quentiis.
underklrt.
kritisch
WeisediesesTraktat
herausgegeben
undeinenKommentar
zu
in dreiVersionen
nurdasTraktat
Sie hatnicht
Billinghams
in einer
Cab.94-27,ff.75r-90v,
Textdersichin Toledobefindet,
Catedral,
Billinghams
kommenundhistorisch
Edition
kritischen
situiert,
jedochdiesenauchkritisch
vorgelegt
LebenundWerke.
berBillinghams
Sie gibtweiter
tiert.
einigeBemerkungen
nichtnur
die Handschriften,
Dr. Weberprsentiert
ZumErstendie Editionselbst.
Arbeit
verwendet
die zurAusgabe
werden,
jedochauchdie zur
Billingham's
diejenigen
manindrei
findet
Traktat.
Dieseletzte
zumBillinghams
Edition
desToledo-Kommentars
Bodleian
Bibi.Universitaria
Versionen
Lib.,Lat.misc.
Oxford,
1882,ff.120r-123v;
(Salamanca,
Es gibteinevierte
E 100,ff.56r-62r;
5445,ff.108Ar-119v).
Roma,Bibl.Casanatense
Version(Barcelona,
ACA,Ripoll
, 166,ff.lr-5r),
jedoch,wie Dr. Webersagt,istder
nichtsinnvoll
wre.
so dasseineEdition
Handschrift
zu stark
beschdigt,
der
Textabzufertigen:
sichzu sehrumeineneinheitlichen
unterscheiden
Die Versionen
Puerorum
desSpeculum
sein.In denEditonen
wrdeunbersichtbar
criticus
, die
apparatus
vonA. Maierin 1970und,aufneueWeise,vonL.M.de Rijkin 1975hergestellt
sind,
daseinenTextdesSpculums
sehen.
FastjedesManuskript
lsstsichauchdieseSchwierigkeit
Version.
enthlt,
gibteineeigenefastselbstndige
imTraktat
denFolgerungsbegriff
Dr.WeberzumErsten
ImInterpretationsteil
bespricht
die materielle
derVerfasser
Weiter
kommentiert
( 1.2),unddie
Folgerung
Billinghams.
imToledo-Kommentar
undungltigen
Definition
dergltigen
( 1.3).In diesem
Folgerung
die sichin
undgenerellen
die speziellen
sie weiter
Regeln,
bespricht
Interpretationsteil
undlateiniundIndexe(Eigennamen
EineBibliographie
Traktat
vorfinden.
Billinghams
- Begriffe)
- nichtdeutsche
dasBuchab.
schliessen
sche
WiesieauseinanderThema:die Folgerungslehre.
einwichtiges
Dr. Weberbehandelt
in dermittelalterlichen
setzt,istdieseLehreein neuesElement
Logik.Die Logikdes
auf
dieFolgerungslehre
aufTermini;
undorientiert
warsyllogistisch,
Aristoteles
dagegen
aufdiederStoabasiert,
Lehreistnicht
ist.Die mittelalterliche
Stze,wasmehr
prinzipiell
Im 12.Jahrhundert
neu entwickelt.
im 14.Jahrhundert,
aberbesonders
gab es auch
wie
habendiesenicht
des 14.Jahrhundert
aberdieMeister
gekannt,
Neueuntwicklungen,
siemitRechtsagt.
Vivarium
43,2

BrillNV,Leiden,
2005
Koninklijke
- www.brill.nl
online
Alsoavailable

11:34:53 AM

REVIEWS

381

abersetzt
dieseindenhistorischen
nicht
nurBillinghams
Dr.Weber
Theorie,
prsentiert
nichtderwichtigste
dermittelalterlichen
Textistvielleicht
Kontext.
Logik.
Billinghams
undwichtiger.
undBurleys
sindumfangreicher
ZumBeispiel
diedesOckhams,
Buridans
Buch.Billinghams
Traktat
istehereine
sichauchaufdiesein ihrem
Dr. Weberbezieht
Dann
diemanbraucht.
hiernicht
immer
Klarheit
derGedanken,
Manfindet
Kompilation.
Puerorum
des Billinghams
undwannbezieht
sie auchTeiledes Speculum
dabei,unddas
ihrBuchhilfreich
frdiesesTraktat
macht
(S. 167).
in':eine
die Folgerung
mitHilfedes Konzepts
definiert
formelle
,intelligitur
Billingham
Wie derAutorsagt,
derKonsequent
verstanden
wirdimAntezedent.
istdiejenige
wenn
Folgerung
weil
nichtmitetwa'es istverstanden',
verstanden'
bersetzt
solldiesmit,wird
werden,
wiemanes in der
es ihnenumeineTtigkeit
Erkenntnis,
geht,nichtomeinobjektives
imMittelalter
Der Kontext
derFolgerungslehre
neuzeidichen
versteht.
Logikmeistenfalls
zu
oftimRahmen
derObligationes.
isteineaktuell
Billingham
gehrt
gefhrte
Disputation,
in materialis
undformalis
nachwelcher
manconsequentia
einteilt
derenglischen
,
Tradition,
undmit,intelligitur
in' definiert.
zu Billingham.
Dies
einesKommentars
Wiegesagt
gibtDr. WeberaucheineEdition
nochnichtvielweiss.
weilmanvondiesenKommentaren
istauchdaruminteressant,
was die speziellen
DieserKommentar
bertrifft
besonders
RegelnderFolgerungslehre
dieTheorie
desBillinghams.
betrifft,
berzu einemsystematischen.
DerAutor
Auseinandersetzung
gehtvonderhistorischen
Sie weistdarauf
interessant.
DiesmachtdiesesBuchbesonders
hin,dassdiemittelalterin einemerweiterten
nichtimmer
strikt
lichenLogiker
Consequentia
jedoch
interpretieren,
dieLehre
in' wirdnicht
beimateriellen
Sinn.Das Kriterium
erfllt,
,intelligitur
Folgerungen
beschrnkt
sichnichtaufdielogischen
Regeln(S. 161).
Die
Buchistsorgfaltig
undklargeschrieben,
undgutdokumentiert.
Das vorliegende
Man findet
auchKorrektionen
derSumma
scheint
undaktuell.
vollstndig
Bibliographie
Ockhams
derTeilberObligationes
istnicht
unumstritten
desOckhams
(zumBeispiel:
Logice
73 sagtsiemitRecht,
einenKorrekturvorschlag
Fussnote
153,
(S. 150,Fussnote
64);an S.
' in
Summa
III-3.1(ed. 1970,S. 589,L. 55)
F. Schupps
dass'non
Ockham,
logice
folgend,
werden
soll).
gestrichen
Ich
NurseltenhtteichandereLesungen
Die Edition
istguthergestellt.
gewnscht.
ausdie Consequentiae
desBillinghams
gebeeinigeBeispiele
ichschlage
voretwas
wie:'sedaliquidicunt
S. 30,1.5 vonunten:
<quod>istisequuntur';
S. 45,1.5 vonunten:
'quo;
'quostatt
S. 45,1.3 vonunten:
'ultimo'
oder'ulterius'
statt'ultimum';
S. 45,1.2 vonunten:
'quando'statt'quod';
'etcetera'
S. 46,letzte
Zeile:nach'sicpatet':
'etcetera'
sollmanbesser
streichen;
ergnzt
undhatkeinelogische
dieRegelimManuskript,
Bedeutung;
S. 81,1.9 vonunten:
sollwahrscheinlich
sein:'significans';
'singularis'
dieFormen
S. 82,1.2 vonoben:'logicali'
et 'naturali'
sindgewhnlich
desAblativus;
man
S. 83,1. 12vonunten:
'tria':wohinverweist
derText?DreiBemerkungen
findet
imText.
nicht
sollvielleicht
sein:'sex'?
S. 92,1.4 vonoben:'quinqu'
S. 94,1.12vonUnten:
sollmanlesenstatt
weiter:
'dubita'
'regulas'
'regule';
(Imperativ)
ichnicht;
verstehe
S. 98,letzte
nach'quod';
Zeile,einVerbfehlt
S. 100,1.4 vonoben:sollmanhiernicht
lesenwieetwa:'terminm
stareimmobiliter
<est> quando'?
In derEdition
desToledo-Kommentars
indenText
hatDr.Webereinige
Fragezeichen
wo siedasManuskript
nicht
lesenkonnte.
IchhabedieseTextprobleme
koneingefhrt,
trolliert
mitderHandschrift,
aberkanndiekorrekten
auchnicht
Lesungen
geben.

11:34:53 AM

382

REVIEWS

NocheineKorrektion:
UnterdenArbeiten
erwhnt
Dr.WebereineLogica
Billinghams
Details.Das vonihrerwhnte
(S. xxiii,Nr. 13).AufS. 321gibtSie weitere
Manuskript,
Staatsbibliothek
nicht
eineArbeit
enthlt
des
Mnchen,
, Clm4385,if.107v-112r,
Bayerische
auchnichteinTraktat
wo Billinghams
Themenaus demTraktat
Billinghams,
Speculum
behandelt
wieDr.Webersagt,sondern
einKommentar
zu demSpeculum
werden,
puerorum
puerorum.1
Zusammen
Dr. Weberhateinsehrempfehlenswertes
Buchverfasst.
gefasst:
Leiden
Universitt

E.P. Bos

1 Das Incipit
CIRCAMATERIAMLIBRIBILIGAM
Circamateriam
libriprimo
videtur
huiusetpropria
queriquidsitsubiectum
presentis
huiuslibri;tertio
huiuslibri,
scilicet
quidsitauctor
quidsitutilitas
quare
passio;secundo
huiuslibri.
studetur;
quartoquidsittytulus;
quintoet <ultimo>quidsuntcausescientie
immeAdprimum
hoccomplexum
termini
'propositio
probabilis
respectu
respondetur:
velfalsum
Et licetinlibro
diatiin ea positi',
etpropria
passioeiusest'verum
probabile'.
nonratione
mediati
etiamhabetur,
tarnen
termini
Topicorum
primi
Et si diceretur.
si istaestconcedenda
'homotantum
tuncistaetiam
Das Explicit
curri,
verum
tarnen
illa
'hoctantum
estconcedenda
curri,
est,et quandodiceretur.
respondetur.
curriinfert
'tantum
homocurri,
'hoctantum
(Mmg)istum
quianonrefert
preponere,
licetquoadterminm
tarnen
refert
singulrem
quoad
respondetur
quodnonrefert
preponere
sedibi'tantum
nondistribuite,
aliumterminm,
curri,
ly'curri
quiaibi'hoctantum
et ergorefert
hoccurri,
ibily'curri
distribuitur,
preponere.

11:34:53 AM

BooksReceived
De V universalibus,
ed.
Albertus
omnia.
TomusI ParsIA: Super
Porphyrium
Magnus,
Opera
Mnster
i. Westfalen
M. SantosNoya.Aschendorff,
2004xxv& 201 pp. ISBN
3 402 047527
Cahiers
del'Institut
duMoyen-ge
etlatin
contents:
, 75 (2004),220pp.ISSN 0591-0358.
grec
ontheRising
andSetting
Ascribed
toRoger
S. Pedersen,
TheTreatise
;
ofSigns
ofHereford
D. Bloch,TheManuscripts
Chr.Schabel&
oftheDe sensuandtheDe memoria;
Trinitarian
andPhilosophical
Issues
& St.
R.L. Friedman,
IV]I. Rosier-Catach
Theology
+ Boethius
deDacia
: Syllogizantem
estterminus;
Petrus
deAlvernia
Ebbesen,
ponendum
toCIMAGL68, 71,72,74
Addenda
etcorrigenda
- Burlington
Richard
onGod.Ashgate,
Aldershot
2005302 pp. ISBN
Cross,DunsScotus
0 754614026 [Hbk]1403[Pbk]
medievale
e. Cerami,
Documenti
e studi
sullatradizione
, XV (2004)603pp. contents:
filosofica
A andMetaphysics
TheAristotelian
Luna,Alessandro
g
Analysis
ofGeneration:
Physics
B dellaMetafisica:
diAfrodisia
e Siriano
sullibro
tecnica
e struttura
delcommento
; A. Longo,
Siriano
e i precedenti
aristotelici
delprincipio
dellacontraddizione
; A. Ua Jurez,
prea la Quaestio
Estudio
introductorio
de ideisdesanAugustin.
Platonismo
, medievo
;
y modernidad
Ta calluqal-nafs
M. Sebti,Uneeptre
indite
bi-l-badan
de
dAvicenne,
(De l'attachement
l'me
etducorps):
dition
traduction
etannotation
La conversion
tar; R.M.Marcotte,
critique,
dive
d'un
: Abal-Barakt
vers
sur'L'intellect
et
(mort
545/1150)
philosophe
al-Baghddr
wa mhiyyatu-hu);
G. Endress,
sa quiddit'
melife.
Averroes
IfGodwillgrant
(Al-Aql
the
Studies
ontheHistory
onthe
Averroes
; M.D. Giovanni,
Philosopher:
ofHisDevelopment
of Genusas Matter;
en Averroes;
Doctrine
Sustancia
J. PiugMontada,
y forma
D.L. Black,Models
andThomistic
oftheMind:Metaphysical
Presuppositions
oftheAverroist
ontheStructure
Accounts
; G. Galluzzo,
ofIntellection
Aquinas
ofAristotle's
Metaphysics;
G. Pini,Absoluta
consideratio
naturae:
Tommaso
etla dottrina
avicenniana
deld'Aquino
La divisiotextus
nelcommento
di Egidio
Romano
l'essenza
; M. Bertagna,
agliAnalitici
III; M. Pickav,
Parte
Posteriori.
as a First
Science:
theCaseofPeter
Auriol
;
Metaphysics
A.D. Conti,La conoscenza
delsingolare
in Walter
F. Amerini,
Thomas
Burley;
Aquinas,
Alexander
andPaulofVenice
ontheNature
Indice
deimanoscritti;
ofAlexandria,
ofEssence;
indice
deinomi
Franciscana.
Bolletino
dellaSociet
distudi
VI (2004)vi & 381pp.ISSN
internazionale
francescini,
contents:
R. Rusconi,
Francesco
d'Assisi
e lapolitica:
ilpotere
delle
1129-230X
istituzioni
e l'annuncio
dellapaceevangelica
di Stanislao
di Cracovio
nella
; F. Simoni,
L'immagine
prostorico-letteraria
traXII e XIII secolo
CL.I. 18 (258)de
duzione
; D. Ruiz,Le manuscript
l'Archivio
Generale
desFrres
Mineurs
Conventuels
Rome;
A. Cadili,I frati
Minori
dell'anLetter
Reverendissime
Niccol
V;E. Casteen,
tipapa
John
ofRupesscissa's
pater(1350)in
the
Black
Death
dellaCronica
XXIVGeneralium
; M.T.Dolso,I manoscritti
Aftermath
ofthe
Ordinis
M. Rossi,I frati
Minori
a Verona
nelTrecento:
da un'indagine
suitestaMinorum;
menti:
Lettere
diPaulSabatier
a Costantino
Fontani
; A.B.Langeiii,
Plato.From
Ancient
toMedieval
Plato,Tracing
Gersh,
Stephen
Reading
Commentary
Reception.
Aldershot
Collected
2005ISBN0 86078969 1 (Variorum
Studies
Ashgate,
Series)
Giraldus
OdonisO.F.M.,Opera
, Volumetwo:De intentionibus
, byL.M. de Rijk.
philosophica
Leiden Boston
2005xi & 894pp. ISBN 90 04 111174
Brill,
Koninklijke
BrillNV,Leiden,
2005
- www.brill.nl
Alsoavailable
online

Vivarium
43,2

11:35:02 AM

384

BOOKSRECEIVED

selon
d'Autrcourt.
Lesprincipes
dela connaissance
Croire
etsavoir.
Nicolas
Grellard,
Christophe
Vrin,Paris2005313pp. ISBN 2 711617351
offertes
MariaCndidaPacheco.
mdivale
tudesde philosophie
Itinraires
dela raison.
2005XV & 444 pp. ISBN
dites
FIDEM,Louvain-la-neuve
parJ.F.Meirinhos.
deM.C.Pacheco
contents:
2-503-51987-3
; Cerqueira
Gonalves,
Prface'
Bibliographie
- Crise
et
A propos
dequelques
ouHiato?;
Medievalidade
techniques
d'interprtation
J. Hamesse,
observations
etcompendia
destexts.
decompilation
; O. Weijers,
Quelques
Paraphrases,
florilges
etmathmatique
C.A.R.Nascimento,
duterme
surlesdivers
Physique
employs
disputatio;
ante
los
El Cristianismo
dAristo
dela Physique
unpassage
te;J.M.da CruzPontes,
d'aprs
la sntesis
R.R.Guerrero,
hasta
Lashesitaciones
dela Patrstica
valores
culturales:
agustiniana;
en
Etica
enal-Frbi;
conocimiento
La teocracia
islmica:
y poltica
J.P.Montada,
y poltica
del'argument
du
etBonaventure.
Ausujet
Anselme
M.L.L.de OliveiraXavier,
Averroes;
Ch.
d'Ablard
dans/Hymnarius
L'artpotique
P. Bourgain,
Paraclitensis;
Proslogion;
inBritish
Abelard.
TheMarginalia
A NewStudent
Burnett
& D. Luscombe,
Library
forPeter
duXIIe
lesavoir.
Unschma
dessciences
Dessiner
Faustina
Ms Cotton
A.X;J. Meirinhos,
?
contre
Alistte
G. Dahan,L' Ecclstiaste
deSantaCruzdeCoimbra;
sicle
dansunmanuscript
A. Poppi,
L'itinerario
bonavendeEccl1,13et17-18auXIIeetXIIIesicles;
Lescommentaries
inHexameron;
nelle
Collationes
trasant'Antonio
eDunsScoto
allaplenitudo
turiano
sapientiae
di
hominis
nelDe exterioris
etinterioris
e rivelazioni
Visioni
B. Faesde Mottoni,
compositione
TheRoleofthePhilosopher
diAugsburg
Davide
; M. Toste,Nobiles,
viri,
philosophi.
optimi
inParisintheLateThirteenth
at theFaculty
inthePolitical
J.A.
Century;
ofArts
Community
e oslimites
dopoder
O.Min.(1248-98)
deJooOlivi,
de C.R. de Souza,Pedro
papalna
O problema
da concluso
o canto
XXXIIIdoParaso.
L.A.De Boni,Dante:
esfera
temporal;
Tmaginatio
e teologia
trinitaria
in
manuductiva:
A. Maier,
daviagem
ao outro
mundo;
logica
del
delperiplo
uncaptulo
Aristteles
enelRenacimiento.
diPulkau;
F. Bertelloni,
Pietro
(Sobre
dela docSurla rception
Despassions
vertueuses?
M.S. de Carvalho,
corpusaristotlico);
la
P. Parcerias,
del'anthropologie
la veille
despassions
thomiste
L'vnement,
moderne;
tyrine
deWhitehead
JeandeRipa,
unitinraire
dela difference:
etleretour
vrit
ontologique
chaotique
indexes
dedifference;
leconcept
travers
critical
edition
and
Summulae:
De practica
introduction,
Buridanus,
sophismatum,
Johannes
Turnhout
2004xlix& 193pp.ISBN2 50351720X
indexes
byF. Pironet.
Brepols,
Clarendon
II: Medieval
ANewHistory
, Volume
Philosophy.
ofWestern
Philosophy
Anthony
Kenny,
Oxford
2005xvii& 334pp. ISBN0 19 875275X
Press,
le Grand.
Albert
etnotique:
Alainde Libera,
Vrin,Paris2005431pp.ISBN 2
Mtaphysique
71161638X
von
Mittelalter
undimlateinischen
imarabischen
Das Organon
undTheologie.
, herausgegeben
Logik
- Boston2005vi & 511pp. ISBN 90 04
D. Perler
undU. Rudolph.
Brill,Leiden
111182
dell'Alto
Medioevo.
latini
Testi
Latinitas.
Napoli2004 105
grammaticali
LuigiMunzi,Multiplex
di Napoli'L'Orientale'.
Dipart.
(AION.Annalidell'Universit
pp. ISSN 1128-7217
antico.Sezionefilologico-letteraria,
di studidel mondoclassicodel Mediterraneo
of:Quaesunt
editions
quaeandAggressus
9)- contents:
Quaderni
- Burlington,
VT 2004xi & 197
Aldershot
onConcepts.
Ockham
ClaudePanaccio,
Ashgate,
8
ISBN
0
7546
3228
pp.
denosjours?
entirer
au moyen
etmusulmans
chrtiens
entre
culturelles
Lesrelations
leons
ge.Quelles
le
mercredi
octobre
20
la
Fondation

2004,
(Paris)
Singer-Polignac
organise
Colloque
Turnhout
2005166pp.ISBN2 50351803
Actesdits
Brepols,
parMaxLejbowicz.
Mdivales
6 (Rencontres
5)- contents:M. Cazeaux,Introduction;
Europennes,
E. Piatti,
entre
l'islam
etlechristianisme?;
un
T a-t-il
euauMoyen
R. Brague,
Age dialogue
- Bruges;
- Beauvais
etles
au latin
au XIIesicle
del'arabe
Lestraductions
J.Jolivet,
Bagdad
autochtone
assum
del'esprit
nouvelle
d'une
; M. Lejbowicz,
Dveloppement
philosophie
prmices

11:35:02 AM

BOOKSRECEIVED

385

musulL'amour
arabes
etlesmystiques
etacculturation
dissimule
chezlespotes
; R. Arnaldez,
del'islamisme
etleurs
mans
; P. Le
; Kh. AbouDiab,Lesmutations
impacts
gopolitiques
UnIslam,
musulmanes
enFrance
Conclusion
descommunauts
Pautremat,
?; A. Besanon,
imBlickaufHervaeus
und
Christian
dePrato.
Facetten
seiner
Natalis
Rode,Francisco
Philosophie
Wilhelm
Ockham.
FranzSteiner
2004 316 pp. ISBN
Verlag,Wiesbaden-Stuttgart
3 515085084
A Journal
ontheInheritance
Sacris
Erudiri.
, 43 (2004),513
ofEarlyandMedieval
Christianity
GodandChrist
as Agonothetae
inthe
J. Leemans,
pp. ISBN 2 503 514790 contents:
R. Courtay,
recherches
surla transmission
duDe
Nouvelles
ofGregory
ofNyssa;
Writings
TheAuthentic
theGreat.
Antichristo
deJrme.
; W.Verbaal,
; P. Meyvaert,
Dialogues
ofGregoiy
Lektre
vonWalahfrid
Strabos
ErosimKrutergarten:
einespiritual-pdagogische
Hortulus;
A method
collections.
D. Bauer,Thecontent
; L. Saraceno,
ofhistorical
interpretation
ofcanonical
e il ruolo
ecclesiale
delcharisma
eremitico.
Solitudine
e comunione:
la dimensione
pneumatica
tracharisma
e istituzione,
L. Karfikov,
Homoopustemporis.
Romualdo
e PierDamiani
desBernard
Silvestris
Die ewigkeit
undeitnachderCosmographia
; G. Dinkova-Bruun,
Poetic
onPoetic
intheTheologwal
Schools
ca. 1200andtheLatin
Notes
Composition
Anthology
956:A Critical
DieTroiagedichte
desPetrus
Ms.Harley
Edition
; C. Wollin,
Rigainden
from
secondo
Tommaso
Carmina
Burana(CB102undCB99a);E. Portalupi,
d'Aquino:
L'ipocrisia
deilemmi
e hypocrite;
ad redactionem
index
codicum
analisi
transmissa;
Opera
hypocrisies
C. SiratetM. Geoffroy,
arabe
dugrand
commentaire
Averroes
auDe animad'Aristote.
L'origine
Prmices
del'dition.
Vrin,Paris2005123pp. ISBN 2 711617491 (Sicet Non)
La mtaphysique
dela singularit.
Gerard
DunsScot.
Vrin,Paris2005238pp. ISBN
Sontag,
desphilosophes)
2-7116-1729-7
(Bibliothque
contents
i.a.: A. Cizek,NeueErkenntnisse
ber
Voces
, 14 (2003)196pp. ISNN 1130-3336
denDonatusmetricus
anhand
desLehrgedichts
NovusGrecismus
Konrads
vonMure
;
etenjeux
A. Grondeux,
dicitur
vide
turettangitur:
d'une
;
dfinition
quidquid
Origins
Corpus
Estudio
deunneologismo
E. PrezRodrguez,
Primiclerus:
; R. MiguelFranco,
hispnico
enla correspondencia
deAgustn
deHipona
Relaciones
depoder

11:35:02 AM

/';-=09

)(8*=-0/']

11:35:10 AM

/';-=09

)(8*=-0/']

11:35:10 AM

text
induplicate
andbe accompanied
Contributions
should
be submitted
byan electronic
on diskor as an emailattachment
(c.h.j.m.kneepkens@let.rug.nl).
(Microsoft
Word)either
andthetextmust
in either
French
or German
shouldbe written
English,
Manuscripts
The manuscripts
mustbe numbered
correct
andin goodliterary
be grammatically
style.
all notes,
andcomplete,
references,
including
bibliographical
consecutively,
double-spaced,
etc.
tables,
AnEnglish
abstract
ofno morethan300wordsshould
yoursubmission.
accompany
within
whichshould
be returned
to theeditor
forreading,
Authors
receive
galley
proofs
arereadbytheeditor.
oneweekofreceipt.
Pageproofs
forchanges
madetoproofs
other
than
tocharge
authors
Thepublisher
reserves
theright
errors.
or conversion
correction
ofcompositor's
Current
Citation
/abstracted
in: Artsand Humanities
Vivarium
is indexed
Index;BibLing;
IndextoBlackPeriodicals;
Internationale
IndexPhilosophicus;
Dietrich's
Contents;
Bibliographie
ofBook
International
ausallenGebieten
desWissens;
derZeitschriftenliteratur
Bibliography
and Language
of Scholarly
International
Reviews
Bibi.;Linguistics
Literature;
Philosophy
MiddleEast:Abstracts
& Index;MLA;M L A International
Behavior
MathSci;
Abstracts;
andLiteratures;
OldTestament
ontheModern
ofBooks& Articles
Languages
Bibliography
IndexOne:Periodicals;
Contents
Periodicals
Index;Religion
Index;Philosophers
Abstracts;
Works.
IndexTwo:MultiAuthor
Religion

Brill
TheNetherlands
Copyright
2005byKoninklijke
NV,Leiden,
Brill
Academic
Brill
theimprints
NVincorporates
Publishers,
Koninklijke
Martinus
Publishers
andVSP.
Nijhoff
stored
in
reserved.
bereproduced,
Allrights
Nopart
translated,
ofthis
publication
may
orbyanymeans,
a retrieval
ortransmitted
inany
electronic,
form
system,
orotherwise,
without
written
mechanical,
recording
prior
photocopying,
.
permission
ofthe
publisher
orpersonal
useisgranted
tophotocopy
items
Authorization
forinternal
to
that
theappropriate
feesarepaiddirectly
byBrill
provided
Clearance
Suite
222Rosewood
910,
Center,
Drive,
Copyright
tochange.
MA01923,USA.Feesaresubject
Danvers,
PRINTED
INTHENETHERLANDS

11:35:10 AM

/';-=09

)(8*=-0/']

11:35:10 AM