MANIAGO v. COURT OF APPEALS, HON.

RUBEN AYSON
G.R. No. 104392, 20 February 1996, SECOND DIVISION, (Mendoza, J.)
In Baguio City, Ruben Maniago was the owner of shuttle buses. One day, one of his buses had a vehicular accident
with a passenger jeepney owned by Alfredo Boado along Loakan Road, Baguio City. A criminal case for reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property and multiple physical injuries was filed against petitioners driver,
Herminio Andaya. Then, a civil case for damages was filed by Boado against Maniago himself.
RTC dismissed the motion to dismiss filed by Maniago. The CA affirmed.
ISSUE:
Despite the absence of reservation of Boado to bring a separate civil action, may Boado bring an action for
damages against Maniago?
RULING:
NO.
Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, while reiterating that a civil action under these
provisions of the Civil Code may be brought separately from the criminal action, provides that the right to bring it
must be reserved.
Private respondent admits that he did not reserve the right to institute the present civil action against
Andayas employer.
Section 1 quite clearly requires that a reservation must be made to institute separately all civil actions
for the recovery of civil liability, otherwise they will be deemed to have been instituted with the criminal
case. Such civil actions are not limited to those which arise "from the offense charged," as originally provided in Rule
111 before the amendment of the Rules of Court in 1988. In other words the right of the injured party to sue
separately for the recovery of the civil liability whether arising from crimes (ex delicto) or from quasi-delict
under Art. 2176 of the Civil Code must be reserved otherwise they will be deemed instituted with the
criminal action.
A civil action for the recovery of civil liability is, as a general rule, impliedly instituted with the criminal action,
except only (1) when such action arising from the same act or omission, which is the subject of the criminal
action, is waived; (2) the right to bring it separately is reserved or (3) such action has been instituted prior to
the criminal action. Even if an action has not been reserved or it was brought before the institution of the criminal
case, the acquittal of the accused will not bar recovery of civil liability unless the acquittal is based on a finding that the
act from which the civil liability might arise did not exist because of Art. 29 of the Civil Code.

HYATT INDUSTRIAL MANUFACTURING, CORP. v. ASIA DYNAMIC ELECTRIX CO. & CA

G.R. No. 163597, 29 July 2005, SECOND DIVISION, (Puno, J.)
In Mandaluyong City, Asia Dynamic purchased from Hyatt various electrical conduits and fittings. Asia Dynamic
issued several checks as payment. The checks, however, were dishonored by the bank on the ground of insufficient
funds/account closed. First, Hyatt filed separate criminal complaints for violation of B.P. 22 against the officers of
Asia Dynamic. Then, Hyatt filed a complaint for recovery of sum of money against Asia Dynamic. The complaint
further alleged that respondent failed to pay despite demand.
The RTC dismissed the motion to dismiss by Asia Dynamic. However, the CA reversed the RTC ruling.
ISSUE:

May a separate civil action be filed for violation of B.P. 22?

RULING:
NO.
Upon filing of the criminal cases for violation of B.P. 22, the civil action for the recovery of the
amount of the checks was also impliedly instituted under Section 1(b) of Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal
Procedure. Under the present revised Rules, the criminal action for violation of B.P. 22 shall be deemed to include the
corresponding civil action. The reservation to file a separate civil action is no longer needed.
It should be stressed that the policy laid down by the Rules is to discourage the separate filing of the civil
action. The Rules even prohibit the reservation of a separate civil action, which means that one can no longer file a
separate civil case after the criminal complaint is filed in court. The only instance when separate proceedings are
allowed is when the civil action is filed ahead of the criminal case. Even then, the Rules encourage the consolidation
of the civil and criminal cases.

KRIZIA KATRINA TY-DE ZUZUARREGUI, PETITIONER, VS. THE HON. JOSELITO C.

VILLAROSA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH 66 OF THE RTC OF MAKATI
CITY, AND FANNIE TORRES-TY, RESPONDENTS.

FACTS
Petitioner and Rosemary entered into a compromise agreement for the settlement of the estate of the latters
mother, Bella, and after which the Pasig City RTC approved. Claiming that they are also biological children of the late
Bella, Peter, Catherine, and Fannie filed with the CA a petition to annul the judgment approving the said agreement.
While the action for annulment of judgment was pending before the CA, Fannie filed a complaint for falsification and
perjury against petitioner and Rosemary alleging that they falsely and maliciously stated in the pleadings filed before
the RTC that the late Bella had only two heirs, namely the two of them. Petitioner and Rosemary filed a joint motion
to suspend the preliminary investigation on the ground of a pending prejudicial question before the CA but which was
subsequently denied by the investigating prosecutor asserting that the issue before the CA is the validity of the
compromise agreement which is not determinative of the criminal case which involves the liability of petitioner and
Rosemary for falsification.

ISSUE
WON the prejudicial question in the civil case would cause the suspension of the criminal action

RULING
YES.
Under Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, a criminal action may be suspended
upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action. Thus, for a civil action to be considered prejudicial to
a criminal case as to cause the suspension of the criminal proceedings until the final resolution of the civil case,
the following requisites must be present: (1) the civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon
which the criminal prosecution would be based; (2) in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil
action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined; and (3) jurisdiction to try said
question must be lodged in another tribunal.
A perusal of the allegations in the petition to annul judgment shows that civil case pending before the Court of
Appeals is principally for the determination of the validity of the compromise agreement which did not include Peter,
Catherine, and Fannie as heirs of Bella. Peter, Catherine, and Fannie presented evidence to prove that they are also
biological children of Bella and Alejandro. On the other hand, the criminal case before the MeTC involve the
determination of whether petitioner committed falsification of public documents in executing pleadings containing
untruthful statements that she and Rosemary were the only legal heirs of Bella. It is evident that the result of the civil
case will determine the innocence or guilt of the petitioner in the criminal cases for falsification of public documents.
If it is finally adjudged in the civil case that they are not biological children of the late Bella and consequently not
entitled to a share in her estate as heirs, there is no more basis to proceed with the criminal cases against petitioner
who could not have committed falsification in her pleadings filed before the Pasig City RTC, the truth of her
statements regarding the filiation of Peter, Catherine and Fannie having been judicially settled.
Petition is granted. The criminal proceedings before the Makati City MeTC are hereby ordered suspended until
the final resolution of the pending civil case.

AS ABUNADO, PETITIONERS, VS. PEOPLE OF

THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
G.R. No. 159218, March 30, 2004

TOPIC: Elements of Prejudicial Question, Sec. 7, Rule 111

FACTS: n eptem er ,
, alvador married ar isa Ar eno at the Manila City Hall before Rev. Pedro
Tiangco. In 1988 Narcisa left for Japan to work but returned to the Philippines in 1992, when she learned that her
husband was having an extra-marital affair and has left their conjugal home.
After earnest efforts, ar isa fo nd alvador in
e on ity oha itin ith e ora on lato. he also
dis overed that on an ary ,
, alvador ontra ted a se ond marria e ith a ertain enaida inas before Judge
Lilian Dinulos Panontongan in San Mateo, Rizal.
On January 19, 1995, an annulment case was filed by Salvador against Narcisa. On May 18, 1995, Narcisa
filed a case for bigamy against Salvador and Zenaida in RTC, Branch 77, San Mateo, Rizal. Salvador admitted that he
first married Zenaida on December 24, 1955 before a municipal trial court judge in Concepcion, Iloilo and has four
children with her prior to their separation in 1966. It appeared however that there was no evidence of their 1955
marriage so he and Zenaida remarried on January 10, 1989, upon the request of their son for the purpose of
complying with the requirements for his commission in the military.
On 2001, the trial court convicted petitioner Salvador Abunado of bigamy, while enaida inas was acquitted
for insufficiency of evidence. On appeal, the Court of Appeals MODIFIED RT s de ision as to the penalty
imposed but AFFIRMED in all other respects. Petitioner filed for a petition for review before the SC. In one of the
issues raised, the petitioner claims that his petition for annulment/declaration of nullity of marriage was a
prejudicial question, hence, the proceedings in the bigamy case should have been suspended during the
pendency of the annulment case. Petitioner, in fact, eventually obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his
marriage to Narcisa on October 29, 1999.

ISSUE: WON the petition for annulment/declaration of nullity constitutes a prejudicial question to a
criminal case of bigamy.

RULING: No.
A prejudicial question has been defined as one based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that
it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves
facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues
raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. The rationale behind the principle of suspending
a criminal case in view of a prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions.

The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial because prior to the
declaration of nullity, the crime had already been consummated. The outcome of the civil case for annulment of

petitioners marria e to ar isa had no earin pon the determination of petitioners inno en e or ilt in the
criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be
subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted.

Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared
otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In this case, even if petitioner eventually obtained a declaration that his first
marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the first and the second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage
was annulled.

ALFREDO CHING, PETITIONER, VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ZOSIMO Z. ANGELES,
RTC - BR. 58, MAKATI, METRO MANILA, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND ALLIED
BANKING CORPORATION, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 110844 April 27, 2000

TOPIC: Elements of Prejudicial Question, Sec. 7, Rule 111

FACTS: On 04 February 1992, petitioner was charged before the RTC- Makati with four counts of estafa. On or
about the (18th day of May 1981; 3rd day of June 1981; 24th day of June 1981 and 24th day of June 1981), in the
Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, the above-named accused having executed a trust receipt
agreement in favor of Allied Banking Corporation in consideration of the receipt by the said accused of certain goods,
under the terms of which the accused agreed to sell the same for cash with the express obligation to remit to the
complainant bank the proceeds of the sale and/or to turn over the goods, if not sold, on demand. However, the
accused, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert to his own personal use and
benefit the said goods and/or the proceeds of the sale thereof, and despite repeated demands, failed and refused and
still fails and refuses, to account for and/or remit the proceeds of sale thereof to the Allied Banking Corporation.
On 05 March 1992, petitioner Ching, together with Philippine Blooming Mills Co. Inc., filed a case against
Allied Banking Corporation before the RTC-Manila for declaration of nullity of documents and for damages.
On 07 August 1992, Ching filed a petition before the RTC-Makati, for the suspension of the criminal
proceedings on the ground of prejudicial question in a civil action. RTC-Makati denied the petition for suspension, as
a result, petitioner moved to reconsider. RTC-Makati then denied petitioners motion for re onsideration. etitioner
brought before the CA a petition for certiorari and prohibition, which sought to declare the nullity of the
aforementioned orders and to prohibit the RTC-Makati from conducting further proceedings in the criminal cases.
CA denied the petition ruling that the declaration of nullity of the trust receipts in question is not a prejudicial
question to the criminal case pending before the RTC-Makati. Consequently, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration of the decision, which the appellate court denied for lack of merit.
Petitioner filed before the RTC-Manila an amended complaint declaring the Trust receipts as null and void
for failure to express the true intent of agreement, and declaring the transaction subject hereof as one of pure and
simple loan without any trust receipt agreement and/or not one involving a trust receipt and that all the documents
were mere loan documents.
Through the expediency of Rule 45, petitioner seeks the intervention of this Court to render judgment
reversing the decision and resolution, and order the suspension of the criminal cases pending before RTC-Makati until
final determination of the civil case pending before RTC-Manila.

ISSUE: WON the civil action for declaration of nullity of documents and for damages constitute a
prejudicial question to the criminal cases for estafa filed against petitioner Ching.

RULING: NO.

A prejudicial question is question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines
the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately
related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil
case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.
More simply, for the court to appreciate the pendency of a prejudicial question, the law, in no uncertain
terms, requires the concurrence of two essential requisites, to wit:
a) The civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and
b) The resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

Verily, under the prevailing circumstances, the alleged prejudicial question in the civil case for declaration of nullity of
documents and for damages, does not juris et de jure determine the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal
action for estafa. Assuming arguendo that the court hearing the civil aspect of the case adjudicates that the transaction
entered into between the parties was not a trust receipt agreement, nonetheless the guilt of the accused could still be
established and his culpability under penal laws determined by other evidence. To put it differently, even on the
assumption that the documents are declared null, it does not ipso facto follow that such declaration of nullity shall
exonerate the accused from criminal prosecution and liability. Criminal liability under Art 315 1(b) of the RPC may
still be shown through the presentation of the evidence to the effect that the petitioner misappropriated or converted
the goods and/or the proceeds of the sale despite the obligation to sell or remit the proceeds with the abuse of
confidence to the damage and prejudice of Allied Banking Corporation.
etitioners amendment of the omplaint here he onseq ently laimed that the transaction between
Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) and private respondent Allied Banking Corporation does not fall under the category
of a trust receipt arrangement claiming that the goods were not to be sold but were to be used, consumed and
destroyed by the importer PBM is a stealthy attempt to circumvent the principle enunciated in the case of Allied
Banking Corporation vs. Ordonez where the court ruled that the provision of P.D. 115 encompasses any act violative of
an obligation covered by the trust receipt; it is not limited to transactions in goods which are to be sold (retailed),
reshipped, stored or processed as a component of a product ultimately sold.
Therefore, the civil action for declaration of nullity of documents and for damages does not constitute a
prejudicial question to the criminal cases for estafa filed against petitioner Ching.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MARLENE OLERMO

G.R. No. 127848, 17 July 2003, FIRST DIVISION, (Azcuna, J.)
Separate informations were filed before the RTC of Valenzuela, Marlene Olermo a.k.a. Marlene Tolentino was
accused of illegal recruitment in large scale and five counts of estafa. The trial court rendered a decision convicting
Olermo of the crimes charged.
ISSUE:

Can Olermo be convicted of large scale illegal recruitment in the RTC of Valenzuela?

RULING:
YES.
The Rules of Court provide that in all criminal prosecutions, the action shall be instituted and tried in the
court of the municipality or province wherein the offense was committed or any of the essential ingredients
thereof took place. In the case at bar, the prosecution proved that the element of offering, promising, and
advertising overseas employment to the complainants took place in appellant's office in Valenzuela. Furthermore, it is
elementary that jurisdiction in criminal cases is determined by the allegations in the information. In this case,
the information filed against appellant for illegal recruitment in large scale clearly placed the locus criminis in Valenzuela.
Where some acts material and essential to the crime and requisite to its consummation occur in one
province or city and some in another, the court of either province or city has jurisdiction to try the case, it
being understood that the court first taking cognizance of the case will exclude the others.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MAIDO TOMIO & NAKAJIMA TAGAHIRO

G.R. No. 74630, 30 September 1991, THIRD DIVISION, (Davide, Jr., J.)
An Information for Kidnapping and serious illegal detention for ransom was filed against Tomio and Tagahiro with
the RTC of Manila. The accusatorial portion of the Information reads:
"That on or about May 2, 1986, and subsequently thereafter, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederating together with six (6) others whose true
names, real identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and helping one another, being then
private individuals, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, for the purpose of
extorting ransom from the immediate family of TATSUMI NAGAO, kidnap or detain the latter and
deprive him of his liberty, without legal justifications and against his will.
Contrary to Law."
The RTC found them guilty of the charge. On appeal, Tomio and Tagahiro allege that the RTC of Manila has no
jurisdiction over the crime charged because it was not committed in Manila. That if it was committed at the Holiday
Inn Hotel, which is located in Pasay City, the proper court of Pasay which has jurisdiction over it.
ISSUE:

Does the RTC of Manila have jurisdiction even if the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention, as
alleged by Tomio and Tagahiro, was committed in Pasay?
RULING:
YES.
From the totality of the evidence presented by both parties, the conclusion is inescapable that during the
period from 2 to 12 May 1986, the complainant was brought to or taken from different places by the appellants. More
specifically, on 2 May 1986, the day when they made their initial, but crucial move on their target, the complainant,
appellants, through the overt act of accused Tomio and another Japanese, brought complainant to "some other places
in Manila" after they succeeded in getting his trust and confidence, following a conversation over lunch in a coffee
shop at Holiday Inn Hotel.
The essential ingredients of the crime charged were thus committed in various places. The case can,
therefore, be filed with the appropriate court in any of the places where the complainant was brought to by
the appellants in the pursuit of or in connection with the crime charged. Section 15 of Rule 110 of the Rules of
Court provides that subject to existing laws, in all criminal prosecutions, the action shall be instituted and tried in
the court of the municipality or territory wherein the offense was committed or any one of the essential
ingredients thereof took place.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DARWIN VELOSO Y MILITANTE ALIAS

"CARLITO VILLAREAL," accused-appellant.

FACTS
Appellant and five others, still-at-large, were charged with robbery with homicide and double serious physical
injuries. The prosecution evidence showed that one evening, appellant and five other men, both masked and armed
with guns, forced their way into the residence of Filemon Odiamar and his family at Naga City where they staged a
hold-up and ransacked the house for cash and valuables. In the course thereof, appellant, fatally shot Odiamar's son
on the chest as he pleaded for the life of his mother whom he saw had been injured by the intruders. Appellant was
apprehended in Makati and was brought to Naga City and in a written statement given at the Office of the City,
admitted participation in the robbery and the killing of Odiamar's son which he claimed was accidental. After trial, the
court a quo found appellant guilty as charged and sentenced him to death which the appellant assailed on automatic
review and contended, among others, the jurisdiction of the trial court for lack of preliminary investigation.

ISSUE
WON the trial court is bereft of jurisdiction for lack of preliminary investigation

RULING
NO.
It is well settled that the right to preliminary investigation is not a fundamental right and that the
same may be waived expressly or by silence. And it has been held that such waiver carried with it the waiver
of any procedural error or irregularity that may have attended the preliminary investigation.
The record shows that a preliminary examination was conducted, and on the basis of the sworn statements of
Filemon Odiamar and his witnesses, the corresponding information was filed on in the City Court of Naga City.
Subsequently, the case was set for preliminary investigation to afford the accused the occasion to confront the
witnesses against him and to present his own evidence. But instead of availing himself of this opportunity, the accused
filed a manifestation stating that he "waives his right to present evidence at the second stage of the preliminary
investigation." Hence, the case was forwarded to the CFI of Camarines Sur for further proceedings. It further
appears that accused entered his non-guilty plea without raising the question of lack of preliminary investigation. The
aforesaid actuations on the part of the accused constitute waiver of his right to preliminary investigation.

b. Nature
LEJANO VS DE LEON
FACTS: On June 19,1994, the NBI filed with DOJ a letter-complaint charging petitioners Webb, Gatchalian, Lejano,
and six others with the crime of rape with homicide committed on June 30, 1991 against Carmela, Estrellita, and Anne
Marie Jennifer Vizconde in their home in BF Homes, Paranaque. The DOJ then formed panel of prosecutors to
conduct preliminary investigation. During the said investigation, the NBI presented several sworn statements and
genital examination of Carmela which confirmed the presence of spermatozoa. The DOJ Panel, on August 8, 1995,
issued a 26-page resolution finding probable cause to hold respondents for trial and recommended the filing of
information against the petitioners before the RTC of Paranaque. New warrants of arrest were issued by Judge
Tolentino after Judge Escano inhibited himself. Webb, Gatchalian, and Lejano surrendered themselves to the
authorities.
ISSUE: Whether or not the DOJ Panel denied them of due process during their preliminary investigation and
whether or not the Judges committed grave abuse of discretion in finding probable cause against the respondent
without conducting preliminary examination
RULING: No.
The need for a probable cause is dictated by the Bill of Rights which protects the right of the people to be
secure in their persons against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature. The absence of such probable
cause is considered an unreasonable seizure of a person and violates the privacy of persons which ought not to be
intruded by the State. In determining probable cause, the average man weighs facts and circumstances without
resorting to the calibrations of the technical rules of evidence of which his knowledge is nil. In the case at bar, the
DOJ Panel did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it found probable cause against the petitioners. The Court
restated the purpose of preliminary investigation under Section 1, Rule 112 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure and
that is to determine hether there is a s ffi ient ro nd to en ender a ell-grounded belief that a crime cognizable
by the Regional Trial Court has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be
held for trial." The D
anel ei hed the eviden e presented y
I and the petitioners and it held that the
voluminous number of exhibits submitted by respondent Webb to support his defense of denial and alibi
notwithstanding, the panel, after a careful and thorough evaluation of the records, believes that they cannot outweigh
the evidence submitted by the complainant. Alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification made by a prosecution
itness. The o rt said that a findin of pro a le a se needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than
not a crime has been committed and was committed by the suspects. Probable cause need not be based on clear and
convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and definitely, not on
evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. As well put in Brinegar v. United States, while probable cause
demands more than "bare suspicion," it requires "less than evidence which would justify conviction." A finding of
probable cause merely binds over the suspect to stand trial and not a pronouncement of guilt. Clarificatory hearing is
also unnecessary when the investigator finds the evidence on hand already yields a probable cause. It is addressed to
the sound discretion of the investigator and the investigator alone. Preliminary investigation is not a part of trial and it
is only in a trial where an accused can demand the full exercise of his rights, such as the right to confront and crossexamine his accusers to establish his innocence. The DOJ Panel, then, correctly adjudged that enough evidence had
been adduced to establish probable cause and clarificatory hearing was unnecessary.
Regarding the issuance of warrants of arrest, the Court deemed that the judges did not commit grave abuse of
discretion even in the absence of preliminary examination. What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and
personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself
of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally
examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally
evaluate the report and the documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the
basis thereof, issue a warrant; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's

report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusions as to the
existence of probable cause. The analysis of evidence submitted by the DOJ Panel, the two sworn statements of
Alfaro, sworn statements of Carlos Cristobal, and Lolita Birrer as well as the counter-affidavits of the petitioners
satisfied both judges that there is probable cause to issue warrants of arrest against petitioners. Again, the Court
stresses that before issuing warrants of arrest, judges merely determine personally the probability, not the certainty of
guilt of an accused. Judges are not required to conduct new hearing to determine the existence of probable cause.
They just personally review the initial determination of the prosecutor finding a probable cause to see if it is supported
by substantial evidence. The sufficiency of the review process cannot be measured by merely counting minutes and
hours. The fact that it took the respondent judges a few hours to review and affirm the probable cause determination
of the DOJ Panel does not mean they made no personal evaluation of the evidence attached to the records of the
case.
There is no merit in the contention of the petitioners that the DOJ Panel conducted the preliminary
investigation with indecent chaste. Petitioners were afforded all the opportunities to be heard. Petitioner Webb
actively participated in the preliminary investigation.

PAUL G. ROBERTS, JR., et al, Petitioners vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et. al, Respondents
G.R. No. 113930 March 5, 1996

TOPIC: Two kinds of Preliminary investigation

FACTS: In the month of February, 1992, in Quezon City, Philippines and for sometime prior and subsequent
thereto, the petitioners, being officers and members of the board of the Pepsi Cola Products Philippines, Inc.
announced and advertised their m er ever romotion. Customers whose crowns/caps bear the number "349"
presented said crows to the petitioners and demanded payment, however they refused to pay. These customers filed
with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City complaints against the petitioner's in their respective capacities
as officers for the following crimes: (a) estafa; (b) violation of R.A. No. 7394, otherwise known as the Consumer Act
of the Philippines; (c) violation of E.O. No. 913; and (d) violation of Act No. 2333, entitled "An Act Relative to
Untrue, Deceptive and Misleading Advertisements," as amended by Act No. 3740. After appropriate proceedings, a
Joint Resolution was released recommending the filing of an information against the petitioners only for the crime of
estafa under Art. 318 of RPC, which was approved by the City Prosecutor, with amendment as to the persons to be
charged, and further approved by the Chief of the Prosecutor Division.
On April 12, 1993, an information was filed in the RTC, Quezon City. On April 14, petitioners filed with the
Office of the City Prosecutor a motion for the reconsideration. A day after, petitioners filed with the DOJ a Petition
for Review praying that Joint Resolution be reversed and the complaints dismissed.
On 15 April 1993, petitioners Roberts, et al. filed a petition for review to the Department of Justice seeking
the reversal of the finding of probable cause by the investigating prosecutor. They also moved for the suspension of
the proceedings and the holding in abeyance of the issuance of warrants of arrest against them. Meanwhile, the trial
prosecutor also moved to defer the arraignment of the accused-appellants pending the final disposition of the appeal
to the Department of Justice.
On 21 April 1993, acting on the Petition for Review, Chief State Prosecutor issued a 1st a 1st Indorsement, 17
directing the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to inform the DOJ whether the petitioners have already been arraigned,
and if not, to move in court for the deferment of further proceedings in the case and to elevate to the DOJ the entire
records of the case, for the case is being treated as an exception pursuant to Section 4 of Department Circular No. 7
dated 25 January 1990.
On May 1993, the motions filed by the accused and the Trial Prosecutor are denied by the respondent judge,
directing the issuance of the warrants of arrest "after June 1993" and setting the arraignment on 28 June 1993.
Respondent judge stated in his order that since the case is already pending in this Court for trial, following
whatever opinion the Secretary of Justice may have on the matter would undermine the independence and integrity
his court. To justify his order, he quoted the ruling of the Supreme Court in Crespo vs Mogul, which stated:
In order therefor to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of the Secretary of
Justice who reviewed the action of the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary
of Justice should, as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal
from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been filed in Court.
The matter should be left entirely for the determination of the Court.

On 7 June 1993, the petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition with application for a temporary restraining order.
D dismissed the petitioners petition to revie the oint Resol tion attesting that once a complaint or
information is filed in Court, any disposition of the case as to dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused
rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of
criminal cases even while the case is already in Court, he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The court is the
best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. . . ." (Crespo vs. Mogul, 151 SCRA 462)
The Court of Appeals promulgated a decision dismissing the petition because it had been mooted with the
release by the Department of Justice of its decision. Motion for reconsideration was filed before the DOJ, but was
denied. The petitioners likewise filed a motion to reconsider the aforesaid Court of Appeals' decision, which the said
court denied in its resolution. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:
1. Whether public respondent Judge Asuncion committed grave abuse of discretion in denying, on the basis
of Crespo vs. Mogul, the motions to suspend proceedings and hold in abeyance the issuance of warrants of
arrest and to defer arraignment until after the petition for review filed with the DOJ shall have been resolved.
2. Whether the DOJ, through its "349" Committee, gravely abused its discretion in dismissing the petition
for review on the following bases: (a) the resolution of public respondent Court of Appeals denying the
application for a writ of preliminary injunction and (b) of public respondent Asuncion's denial of the
abovementioned motions.

RULING:
1. YES.

There is nothing in Crespo vs. Mogul which bars the DOJ from taking cognizance of an appeal, by
way 'of a petition for review, by an accused in a criminal case from an unfavorable ruling of the investigating
prosecutor. It merely advised the DOJ to, "as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for
review or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been filed in
Court."
Accordingly, it was premature for respondent Judge Asuncion to deny the motions to suspend
proceedings and to defer arraignment on the following grounds:
This case is already pending in this Court for trial. To follow whatever opinion
the Secretary of Justice may have on the matter would undermine the independence and
integrity of this Court. This Court is still capable of administering justice.
The real and ultimate test of the independence and integrity of this court is not the filing of the
aforementioned motions [to suspend proceedings and issuance of warrants of arrest and to defer
arraignment] at that stage but the filing of a motion to dismiss or to withdraw the information on the basis of
a resolution of the petition for review reversing the Joint Resolution of the investigating prosecutor.
However, once a motion to dismiss or withdraw the information is filed the trial judge may grant or deny it,
not out of subservience to the Secretary of Justice, but in faithful exercise of judicial prerogative.

2. YES.

As earlier stated, per its 1st Indorsement of 21 April 1993, the DOJ gave due course to the
petitioners' petition for review pursuant to the exception provided for in Section 4 of Circular No. 7, and

directed the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to forward to the Department the records of the
cases and to file in court a motion for the deferment of the proceedings. At the time it issued the
indorsement, the DOJ already knew that the information had been filed in court, for which reason it directed
the City Prosecutor to inform the Department whether the accused have already been arraigned and if not yet
arraigned, to move to defer further proceedings. It must have been fully aware that, pursuant to Crespo vs.
Mogul, a motion to dismiss a case filed by the prosecution either as a consequence of a reinvestigation or upon
instructions of the Secretary of Justice after a review of the records of the investigation is addressed to the
trial court, which has the option to grant or to deny it.
Hence, the DOJ committed grave abuse of discretion when it executed on 23 July 1993 a
unilateral volte-face, which was even unprovoked by a formal pleading to accomplish the same end,
by dismissing the petition for review. It dismissed the petition simply because it thought that a review of
the Joint Resolution would be an exercise in futility in that any further action on the part of the Department
would depend on the sound discretion of the trial court, and that the latter's denial of the motion to defer
arraignment filed at the instance of the DOJ was clearly an exercise of that discretion or was, in effect, a
signal to the Department that the determination of the case is within the court's exclusive jurisdiction and
competence.