Documentos de Académico
Documentos de Profesional
Documentos de Cultura
1I:::':II7;lk::-.B;;:rU~J~1k;:-;h~o::-T=s-:-t
---------------------
l'
115. Marcuse,
"Zur Kritik des Hedonismus," in Marcuse ' Sclmifiten 3 (Frankfurt am
mam,
1979), 284f.
116. "Rationalismusstreit," 51/BPSS.
1 7. "TraditionelIe," 259/CT, 204.
J
Although it has often been declared dead, the critical theory of the
1930s and 1940s exhibits an astonishing ability to survive. If at times
it has appeared to be only of historical interest,l today there are more
and more who directly or indirectly link their work to the intentions
of its so.(}aJ~s.~<;,ntific
ro ramo The best-known recent example isJrgen Ha ermas, who has described "early critica1theory" as an important approach to explaining "those pathologies of modernity that other
approaches pass right by for methodological reasons."2\For Habermas, what "remains instructive" above al! is the "interdisCiplinary research program/' which in his eyes offers greater intel!ectual stimulus
for a critical theory of society than the later theses on the "dialectic of
enlightenment" and the concept of "instrumental reason."3 Neverthe1ess, Habermas himse1f concedes that this is only a "conjecture"
whose validity may wel! be contested.4
Th~sJLI2recise1 the starting point for this c!Iapt~r. It attempts to
explicate the interdisciplinary program of early critical theory from
thr~e persp~ctives. :he first ste is to rec~mstruct the basic arguments
and underl}'il!g concepts formulated EJ Horkheimer in his'reflections
on the p'ossibilit'i;;sand limits of scientific knowledge. He;;I will show
~nditiofl
..C?f~!:!ti<:<ll.~l1eory
in the ~arly 1930s.~s.~_~P.<:,9.fic
~.<>.f.tlJ,~50nt~Il).PC?.!~ry_~i?~i<:t.!
sciences, in both their ".~()ll.rg~ojs"
:'materiali~t" ~~r.~2!1s.,Se!:Qnd,according to these analyses, not
"--onlythe bourgeois (or idealist) paradigm but also the materialist version of science exhibits specific aporias, which are different but not
independent. A critical theory, Horkheimer concludes, must reflect
IDO
101
Wolfgang BonB
"a productive power and a means of production," science also t!.a~forms societ}'since it expands the power of human control and pro-;ides the intellectual preconditions for a growing domination of outer
and inner nature.
--~--
-.~
_.
--_
. _-~--_.-
. ---
.- .
te::
---
102
103
WolfgangBonB
--
0,0
-- --
"
-~----
104
105
WolfgangBon6
11
11
11
is Iy h
fir
1",
Iw( 11111
fOl'
1,1
1.,1'
1 dI.
l'
111,111
111
1111
1.111
106
Wolfgang
107
BonB
of nature, and the'''idea that we may have already passed the optimum leve! of technological productivity" is foreign to it ("Metaphysik," 16/CT, 26-27).
Such confidence in the positive possibilities of the deve!opment of
productive forces may seem almost naive today. But in contrast to
contemporary cultural pessimism a la Spengler, it is completely understandable, and the idea of the rational domination of nature retains its sense if conceived in noninstrumental terms as the possibiJity
of a rational alterability of the worId. Qne might welIdispute whether
this interpretation was actualIy Horkheimer's during the early 1930s.
In favor of such a reading, however, is the fact that he also accorded
the assumption of a potential and, in principIe, rational alterability
the stat~s of a fund.a~ental epistemological principIe. A~<:?rdi!$.-,,~
~~IIl.~!'!.fFlat(malist
tb,pllght jlo9.i.stjng!1~hed by.J~ fu~a.f.Il~
tally opent:.!:.~tl:lre; it refC:E~
..!(),a.'.'c?!1~~pt.ofknowledge as a nonindepe!1.gen~p~ce~~hi~h ~~ho~C:.
~.efi':ledonlt ionthe. co~t~xt of the
dr!!~mil: of s?~!::~"("MetaphysIl<.,"19/Cr, 30). lt~lealsneither t~a-solute truth nor to ultjmate~definitive ~tatement~b;';-t'~~ti~-~i~
-a..::d-ialec,~~al'_:.relati0lJshiP.~~!ll.~_()cial_~~~elopment.- . . 'o
For .f:I
__
2.r.!<-.h~!J.I1t':.!:!.
"di~lectics"constitutes (he ultimately.decisive key
to ch~.!:.ao<:!~!io~ing_tJ1e,
o..r.c:n-en<!e.dne.ss.?!:.
J!la!~riaIist kIl2wledz..e.He
distinguishes two stages in the develo mept?f the dialectical conc~
.ion o nowleCr-e:AccoraingtO his interpretation, the first"is found
10 fIege! who, in The Phenomenology 01 Sprit, worke ' ou f e processual character of scientific knowledge. Here truth is not an ontological
condition but is realized onl in the movement of though~ k-;;'O"wle eo
e conlitioned char~so
ate:rcontents and in t eIr
progressive transformation:
--
,..--(
----
Nevertheless, Hegel himself undermines his own processual approach, since he conceives of an immediate identity of being and con- .
-t'q. }~E.l.J:y~<:_s
__
to.__
s<:~en@ctht:ory"
108
109
WolfgangBon/3
the ir~e.glvabl.ediff~!_ence
between concep~ and real!!y" ("Wahrheit,"
345/"Truth," 438). It refers to an experience of contradiction whose
truth is considered in scientific discourse and decided in social praxis.
Aware of this, it guides social praxis without being able to replace it.
From these characteristics, it also follows that Marxist theory can
hardly be reduced to a cognitively or strategicalIy "fixed" explanatory
model; if it serves "as a universal method of construction in place of
concrete investigations" ("Geschichte," 132/BPSS), then it transforms
itself into a "closed, dogmat;ic metaphysics," which seems just as suspect of being an ideology as its bt:>urgeoiscounterparts. On the other
hand, the critique of political,economy remains a valid model if, in a
historically reflective attitude, ,itis applied to itself and developed further. T~_:'!a,'Ys" ~f_social development worked out by Marx do n2..t
r~p.!~~.eJ:!t
I?wsin~,l1e sense of the .natur:al sciences" which ob!:<linil!d~!1der:!~!Y.,,2f.!I1~~~j~c;t,tct::_"Ygr<l~~~_,!g.e,"
..4.()~ff); r<1ther,,~~
represen~~~t:~_~i.~~e~<1r.:ching,str.:uctur.:al
..~nd fU,~.~,~~0!1(lJ
r.:.elationshjps
whose concr~~~J()!'.~must,constantly be worked out andjustified al1~w
accordi[lK.t.<?,a_
K~Y_~_[l
c~E..!.~!~~~~~~!issues.
In materialist theory after Marx, however, this demand was repressed rather than fulfilled-a repression that increased in tandem
with the integration of the working class into the bourgeois structure
of domination. This development, which became increasingly clear
after 1918, not only caIled into question the unity of theory and praxis;
it also affected the scientific claims of the materialist paradigm, which
had not anticipated the absence or failure of revolution. Horkheimer's sharpest formulation of this problem was his note, "The Impotence of the German Working Class," in which he emphatically
distinguished between a crisis of materialist praxis and a theoretical
deficit connected with it. The practical crisis, that is, the stagnation of
the workers' movement, was explained in terms of the developmental
dynamic of capitalismJ'which had destroyed the unity of the proletariat: "In our time, the gulf between the employed and those who only
work sporadicalIy or not at all is as wide as that between the entire
working dass and the lumpenproletariat at an earlier periodo ... Work
and misery no longer come together, people no longer experience
both .... But the employed worker is no longer typical of those who
most urgently need change" (Dam1lU!rung,282-83/DD, 61-62). Only
the unemployed still have an interest in socialism, but they lack "the
I '
\,.}~
~~
'"
Out ()f this necessa.rily_~rises ".div~si?!l))~t,~e~n,tll~_~~()_t:~~olu,ti~'p. -f'\~~t....
contemporary
Germany,
it expresses
through
the existence
of
two workers' parties
and the
wavering itself
of sizable
segments
of the unemployed between the Communist and the National Socialist parties.
It dooms the workers to practical impotence" (Dammerung, 283-84/
DD,62-63).
According to Horkheimer, these oppositions between the unemployed and the employed, interests and consciousness, radicalism and
reformism also result in a massive internal crisis of materialism, which
shows itself in a false connection to theory and in gaps in research and
\
110
III
Wolfgang BonE
blind ~~VLll!!On~rLI.hetoric
and a!1.eqllally b~il1daccommodation to
~oor cQnditi<;msn~~~y~l'y.supplement 0n.eanother,just as do positivIsm and me~phys_~c.,J:lingeri.ng
,?()~h.a real explanation of the crisis
01 the~Q!:.~e.J::
movement and practical steps to overcome i!.'
The Construction of Interdisciplinary
Materialism
,"
1I;...
(1, 3
112
Wolfgang BonB
relationships" ("Bemerkungen,"
6/CT, 9). On the side of the eco nomy, what had to be considered above all were "the pressures tending
toward the planned regulation of the economy" ("Vorwort," 111), which
gained importance with the transition to monopoly capitalism.12 Along
with this, the apparent decline in class consciousness, the growing role
of conservative and reactionary attitudes, and the obviously retarding
influence of cultural traditions would have to be elucidated. As
Horkheimer stated in his inaugural address as director of the Institute for Social Research, against this background the substantive work
of interdisciplinary materialism should center on one question, "that
is, on the question of the connection between the economic life of
society, the psychological development of the individual, and the
transformations of the cultural spheres in a strict sense, to which belong not only the 'intellectual' matters of science, art, and religion, but
also law, morality, fashion, public opinion, sport, leisure, lifestyle, and
so on" ("Lage," 43). This formulation already makes clear the Frankfurt citcle's strong "fixation on the superstructure."
They were less
lferested in the internal transformations of the economic structure
tnanin xtra-economic processes, whose social detenination
(in ac-cordance with the Marxist
distinction
between
the
essence
and
ap.,.~
pearance of capitalist relations) was to be investigated as well as their
intrinsic logic of development. For Hor!heimer, making good on this
~was
less a theoretical problem than a problem of die organization of science. Psychological, cultural, and historical arguments must
e emp oyed alongside economic arguments, since the autonomy and
nonsynchronic character of the extra-economic processes could no
longer be understood
through further refinements in economic
explanation:
lA
115
114
WolfgangBonB
"l5igque~"('::Lage,"
4iiBps~
~tandards
o'
Materialism-and
Its Limits
1:
.,
l'
i.
il
;1
r.
.J
I
'\
116
117
WolfgangBonB
slruclure
between momenls
relaling lo society
maleril-list
bourgeois
theory-practice
separation
dilemma
between
knowledge
theorelical
fragmentalion
gaps
organization
Interdisciplinary
tween:
materialism
social phiJosophy
(=
within Ihe
01 science
as the connection
be-
general assumptions
01 society
asawhole)
social research
(=
disciplinary
scienlilic
Figure 5.1
re
social psy.
118
119
WolfgangBonB
I
I
I
i
work of various specialized disciplines to interact in a way that transforms the disciplines themselves.
With his "naive" understanding of interdisciplinary research,
Horkheimer also faBs short of the leve! on which his own critique of
science operates. If his argument is taken seriously, one must assume
that, along with the breakdown of the connection once posited between philosophy and science, the forms of scientific-rational appropriation developed within the context of the Enli~~tenme~t concept
of reason are also brought into question. The cnsls of SClencethus
also lll~ans a crisis of its methods, and overcoming the aporias Horkheimer described correspondingly presupposes the development of
an alternative methodology. However, this issue is never raised; from
a methodological point of Vlew, Horkheimer's conception rem~ins
largely conventional. He was, of course, well aware of the se1ect~vity
of the work within the individual disciplines, but he hardly took mto
account that this se!ectivity is conditioned by the way the disciplines
constitute their objects and is continually reproduced at the methodologicallevel. Instead, Horkheimer caBed for social research to go on
applying the "most refined scientific methods" ("Lage," 411BPSS) as
if they were value neutral and would be given a critical turn ex post
through their integration with social philosophrl
,From today's point of view, such a conceptlon seems more than
problematic. It also indicates decisive weaknesses in t~e program ~s a
whole. Quite apart from the fact that the reformulauon of maten~lism was achieved at the cost of separating materialist critique (= sOClal
philosophy) from material analysis (= social research), this conception amounts to a tacit upgrading of social philosophy that is both
undear and ambiguous. To be sure, Horkheimer be!ieves that after
Marx philosophy as material theory can no longer be justified, but in
his eyes it was not thereby overcome or, as in the case of Habermas,
reduced to the status of an inquiry concerned with justification. Instead, philosophy appears as a loose bundle of convictions drawn from
the philosophy of history-the normative remains of the critique of
political economy, which functions as a kind of "court of final appeal."
It is hardly surprising that this "court" remained remarkably vague,
apart from a few associative references to historical materialism, since
even then Horkheimer's conception amounted to a history of the de-
11
i
1
120
Wolfgang BonB
121
The Program of Interdisciplinary Research
r
J
cial research]
Fromofthis
perspective,
Adorno
was more
consisten
lo His "The Actuality
Philosophy"
(1931)
at times
suggests
an alternative
model
for the program of interdisciplinary materialism.26 Adorno interpreted the crisis of science and philosophy as a transformation of the
, conditions of the possibility of knowledge. He assumed that after the
breakdown of the Enlightenment's concept of reason, knowledge can
only be produced negatively. To the extent that the universalization
of the commodity form eliminates the potential of sociallife to oppose
the existing structures, "only history now vouches for the images of
our lives."27They appear only in traces, splinters, and fragments, and
deciphering them requires a concept of "preserving traces" that goes
beyond the "most refined scientific methods" in Horkheimer's sense
and points to a different form of scientific appropriation.28
....Of course, one may argue whether Adorno's version of the concept
of "preserving traces" can be reconciled at all with the program of an
interdisciplinary social science, but it can hardly be contested that his
argument took Horkheimer's critique of science more seriously and
even radicalized it. As Susan Buck-Morss has shown, on this point
Adorno stood much closer to the "dialectic of enlightenment" than to
the concept of "interdisciplinary materialism,"29 and precisely this
emphasis was probably what hindered his line of thought from
achieving more influence on the development of early critical theory.
For Horkheimer at the beginning of the 1930s, there could be no
question of anticipating the "dialecticof enlightenment." Like Adorno,
he saw an increaslng trend toward irrationalism but did not interpret
these symptoms of a crisis as an irreversible destruction of reason.
Rather, they appeared as a temporary, sociallyconditioned regression
that was to be illuminated by the positive, specialized sciences. And
the integration of these sciences, in turn, was understood to be fundamentally rational, inasmuch as the "detour" of analyzing the
regression would uncover the possibility of bringing about a realization of reason.
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
122
123
WalI'gangBanB
}!p~~
Notes
Ilol'kheimcr's texts are cited and English translations, where available, are cross-refer. d a ording to the following key (in some cases the translations have been modifI'<I):
(Cambridge, 1993).
"~b ". "AnP.ingedel' brgerlichen Geschichtsphilosophie"(Stuttgart, 1930);"Origins
t)f 110 BourgeOls Philosophy of Hlstory," in BPSS.
IIP$S Between Philosophy and Social Science: Selected Early Writings
"Lage" = "Die gegenwartige Lage der Sozialphilosophie und die Aufgaben eines
Instituts fr Sozialforschung," in Sozialphosophische Studien (Frankfurt, 1972), 33ff.;
"The Present Situation of Social Philosophy and the Tasks of an Institute for Social
Research," inBPSS.
"Vorwort" = "Vorwort," leitschriftfr Sozialforschung [=llSl 1 (1932):lff.
"Bemerkungen" = "Bemerkungen ber Wissenschaft und Krise," lIS 1 (1932): lff.;
"Notes on Science and the Crisis," in Critical Theory: Selected Essays [= Cn (New York,
1972).
"Geschichte" = "Geschichte und Psychologie," lIS 1(1932): 125ff./"History and Psychology," in BPSS.
"Metaphysik" = "Materialismus und Metaphysik," ZIS 2 (1933): lff.; "Materialism
and Metaphysics," in CT
"Moral" = "Materialismus und Moral," lIS 2 (1933): 161ff.; "Materialism and Morality," in BPSS.
"Rationalismusstreit" = "Zum Rationalismusstreit in del' gegenwartigen Philosophie," lIS 3 (1934): lff.; "The Rationalism Dispute in Current Philosophy," in BPSS.
"Voraussage" = "Zum Problem del' Voraussage in den Sozialwissenschaften," lIS 2
(1933): 407ff.
Diimmerung = Diimmerung. Notizen in Deutschland, in Notizen 1950 bis 1969 und Diimmerung. Notizen in Deutschland (Frankfurt, 1974); DD = Daum and Decline: Notes 19261931 and 1950-1969 (New York, 1978)."(Contains only selections from Diimmerung.)
"Wahrheit" = "Zum Begriff del' Wahrheit," lIS 4 (1935): 32lff.; "Truth" = "On
the Problem ofTruth," in Andrew Arato and Eike Gebhardt, eds., The Essential Frankfurt
School Reader (New York, 1982).
"Traditionelle" = "Traditionelle und kritische Theorie," ZIS 6 (1937): 245ff.; "Traditional and Critical Theory," in CT.
1. Martin jay, The Dialectical1magination: A History of the Frankfurt School and the 1nstitute
ofSocialResearch, 1923-1950 (Bostan, 1973).
2. j rgen Habermas, TheoTe des kommunikativen Handelns (Frankfurt, 1981), 2: 554/Theory of Communicative Action [= TCA] (Boston, 1987),2:378.
3. Ibid., 562/TCA, 2:383; 1:489ff./TCA,
1:366ff.
i
125
124
I
Wolfgang BonB
Research
11
111
bewuf1tsein (NeuwiedlBerlin, 1968), esp. 342ff.; see also Martinjay, "Positive und negative Totalitat. Adornos Alternativenwurf zur interdisziplinaren Forschung," in Wolfgang
BonG and Axel Honneth, eds., Sozialforsehung als Kritik (Frankfurt, 1982), 69f. English
translation: "Positive and Negative Totalities: lmplicit Tensions in Critical Theory's
Vision of lnterdisciplinary Research," in jay, Permanent Exiles: Essays on the lntelleetual
Migration from Germany to Ammca (New York, 1985). Helmut Dubiel, WissenschaftsMganisation und politisehe Erfahrung. Studien zur frhen Kritsehen Theorie (Frankfurt, 1978),
39ff. English translation: Theory and Politics: Studies in the Development of Critical Theory
(Cambridge, 1985).
the "methodological skeleton" of critical social theory. See C. Grossner, Verfall der Phi-
I
I
10. Thus, Horkheimer employed an exclusively "bourgeois" terminology in his inaugural address as director of the lnstitute (1931), whereas in the aphorisms of Diimmerung (1926-1931) he used primarily materialist language. In most of his essays,however,
these paradigms appear alongside one another, resulting in the well-known "Aesopian
language" whose ambiguity was as significant for early critical theory as it was for its
reception by the student movement.
11. From this perspective, it is perhaps not surprising that the revolutionary transformation in Russia did not succeed but was perverted and collapsed.
12. See chapter 9 in this book.
13. See Erich Fromm, "ber Methode und Aufgabe einer analytischen Sozialpsychologie," in ZS 1 (1932): 28ff. English translation: ''The Method and Function of an
Analytical Social Psychology," in Andrew Arato and Eike Gebhardt, eds., The Essential
Frankfurt School Reader (New York, 1982), 477ff.; Wolfgang BonG, "Psychoanalyse als
Wissenschaft und Kritik," in Wolfgang BonG and Axel Honneth, eds., Sozialforsehung
als KriJ.ik. Zum sozialwissensehaftliehen Potential der Kritisehen Theorie (Frankfurt, 1982):
367ff.
Marcuse," 1.
27. Adorno, "Die Aktualitat der Philosophie," in Adorno, Gesammelte Schriften (Frankfurt, 1973), 1:325. English lranslation: "The Actuality of Philosophy," Telos 31 (1977).
28. On the co~cept of )reser~ing traces" in general, see Carlo Ginzburg, "Spurensicheru~g: D~rja.ger enlzlffert dIe Fahrte, Sherlock Holmes nimmt die Lupe, Freud liest
Morelh-Dle Wlssenschaft auf der Suche nach sich selbst," Freibeuter, 3, no. 4 (1980):
,~Iff. ~?r an atte~pt. to interpret Ad~rno's project in this way, see Wolfgang BonG,
~mpme a~sDechlffnerung von Wlrkhchkelt. Zur Methodologie bei Adorno," in LudwIg von Fnedeburg and jrgen Habermas, eds., Adorno-Konl'erenz (Frankfurt 1983)
W~
"
"
29. Susan Buck-Morss, The Origin of Negative Dialeeties: Theodor W. Adorno, Walter Benjamin, and the Frankfurt lnstitute (New York/London, 1977).
15. See Axel Honneth, "Max Horkheimer's Original Program: The SociologicalDeficit
of Critical Theory," chapter 8 in this book.
~I. Fromm, "ber .Methode und Aufgabe einer analytischen Sozialpsychologie," 54/
Method and Functlon of an Analytical Social Psychology," 496.
16. See Alfons Sellner, Gesehuhte und Herrsehaft: Studien zur materia/istisehen Sozialwissensehaft 1929-1942 (Frankfurt, 1979), 165ff.
I
I
I
32. Wolfgang BonG, Die Einbung des Tatsachenblicks. Zur Struktur und Veranderung empirischer Sozialforsehung (Frankfurt, 1982), 167ff.
17. See Susanna Schad, Empirical Social Research in Weimar Germany (P~rislDen Haag,
1972), 76ff., and Rainer M. Lepsius, ed., Soziologie in Deutscland und Osterreich 19181945. Materialien ,zur Entwicklung, Emigration und WirkungsgesehUhte (KelnlOpladen, 1982).
o,.
18. Viewed in this way, moreover, Horkheimer's concept of social philosophy shows
parallels to that of Weber, who in rus essay "'Objectivity' in Social Science and Social
Policy" characterized social philosophy as a system of "speculative value judgements"
that are to be emphatically distinguished from social research. Max Weber, "'Objectivity' in Social Science and Social Policy," in The Methodology of the Social Sciences (New
York, 1949), 49ff.
19. See, for instance, Karl Mannheim,ldeology
20. The trend toward method is especially true of Habermas (e.g., Zur Logik der Sozialwissenschaften [Frankfurt, 1967]), who also made the remarkable comment, on the occasion of Adorno's death, that now Adorno's "theoretical veil" would no longer conceal
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
1