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The document discusses two court cases related to torts and damages. The first case examines whether moral damages can be awarded for negligence that did not result in physical injury. The court found that moral damages require a culpable act that causes injury, and that negligence alone does not meet this standard.
The second case addresses whether the death of a child caused by a falling gift-wrapping counter was an accident or due to negligence. The court determined the store owners were negligent in maintaining an unstable counter and ruling out possible negligence by the child or mother. The tragedy was attributed to the store's negligence rather than an accident.
The document discusses two court cases related to torts and damages. The first case examines whether moral damages can be awarded for negligence that did not result in physical injury. The court found that moral damages require a culpable act that causes injury, and that negligence alone does not meet this standard.
The second case addresses whether the death of a child caused by a falling gift-wrapping counter was an accident or due to negligence. The court determined the store owners were negligent in maintaining an unstable counter and ruling out possible negligence by the child or mother. The tragedy was attributed to the store's negligence rather than an accident.
The document discusses two court cases related to torts and damages. The first case examines whether moral damages can be awarded for negligence that did not result in physical injury. The court found that moral damages require a culpable act that causes injury, and that negligence alone does not meet this standard.
The second case addresses whether the death of a child caused by a falling gift-wrapping counter was an accident or due to negligence. The court determined the store owners were negligent in maintaining an unstable counter and ruling out possible negligence by the child or mother. The tragedy was attributed to the store's negligence rather than an accident.
act or omission causes physical injuries, or (b) where the defendant is guilty of intentional tort.
Torts And Damages Case Digest
Expert Travel V. CA G.R. No. 130030 June 25, 1999 FACTS: October 7, 1987: Exper travel & Tours, Inc. issued to Ricardo Lo 4 round-trip plane tickets for Hongkong with hotel accommodations and transfersfor P39,67 7.20 Failing to pay the amount due, Expert filed a complaint for recovery plus damages
In culpa criminal, moral damages could be
lawfully due when the accused is found guilty of physical injuries, lascivious acts, adultery or concubinage, illegal or arbitrary detention, illegal arrest, illegal search, or defamation. Malicious prosecution can also give rise to a claim for moral damages.
CA affirmed RTC: Lo remitted the Monte de
Piedad Check for P42,175.20 to Expert's chairperson Ms. Ma. Rocio de Vega who in turn issued City Trust Check of P50,000
The term "analogous cases," referred to in
Article 2219, following the ejusdem generis rule, must be held similar to those expressly enumerated by the law. Excludes clearly unfounded civil suit
ISSUE: W/N moral damages for negligence or
quasi-delict that did not result to physicalinjury be awarded to Lo
Jarco Marketing Corp vs. CA and Aguilars
| Villa-Real GR. No.- 129792, December 21, 1999 | 321 SCRA 375
HELD: NO. petition is GRANTED and the award
of moral damages to respondent Ricardo Lo under the assailed decision is DELETED
FACTS Petitioner Jarco Marketing Corp is the
owner of Syvels Department Store. Petitioners Kong, Tiope and Panelo are the stores branch manager, operations manager and supervisor, respectively. Private respondents are spouses and the parents of Zhieneth Aguilar.
An award of moral damages would require
certain conditions to be met; to wit: (1) First, there must be an injury, whether physical, mental or psychological, clearly sustained by the claimant; (2) second, there must be a culpable act or omission factually established; (3) third, the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the claimant; and (4) fourth, the award of damages is predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219 in culpa contractual or breach of contract.
Criselda (mom) and Zhieneth were at the 2
floor of Syvels Department Store. Criselda was signing her credit card slip at the payment and verification counter andwhen she felt a sudden gust of wind and heard a loud thud. She looked behind her and saw her daughter on the floor, her young body pinned by the bulk of the stores gift-wrapping counter/structure. Zhieneth was crying and screaming for help.
Moral damages may be recovered when the
defendant acted in bad faith or was guilty of gross negligence (amounting to bad faith) or in wanton disregard of his contractual obligation and, exceptionally, when the act of breach of contract itself is constitutive of tort resulting in physical injuries.
With the assistance of people around,
Zhieneth was retrieved and rushed to the Makati Med where she was operated on. The next day, she lost her speech and 13 days thereafter, passed away.
By special rule in Article 1764, in relation to
Article 2206, of the Civil Code moral damages may also be awarded in case the death of a passenger results from a breach of carriage.
After the burial of Zhieneth, her parents
demanded reimbursment of the
hospitalization, medical bills and wake and
funeral expenses, which they had
Accident and negligence are intrinsically
contradictory; one cannot exist with the other. Accident occurs when the person concerned is exercising ordinary care, which is not caused by fault of any person and which could not have been prevented by any means suggested by common prudence.
incurred from petitioners. Upon petitioners
refusal, the parents filed a complaint for damages. Trial court absolved petitioners. It ruled that the proximate cause of the fall of the counter on Zhieneth was her act of clinging to it. Furthermore, Criseldas negligence contributed to her daughters accident. Basically, the court reasoned that the counter was situated at the end or corner of the 2 floor as a precautionary measure and hence it could not be considered as an attractive nuisance. The court added that the counter has been in existence for 15 years and its structure safe and well-balanced.
The test in determining the existence of
negligence is enunciated in Picart vs. Smith, thus: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. PETITIONER NEGLIGENT. According to the testimony of Gerardo Gonzales, a former gift-wrapper, who was at the scene of the incident: While in the emergency room the doctor asked the child what did you do to which the child replied nothing, I did not come near the counter and the counter just fell on me.
Court of Appeals reversed. It found that the
petitioners were negligent in maintaining a structurally dangerous counter. (The counter was shaped like an inverted L with a top wider than the base. It was top heavy and the weight of the upper portion was neither evenly distributed nor supported by its narrow base. Thus the counter was defective, unstable and dangerous.) Moreover, Zhieneth who was below 7 years old at the time of the incident was absolutely incapable of negligence since a child under 9 could not be held liable even for an intentional wrong.
Moreover, Ramon Guevarra, another former
employee, testified to the effect that the counter needed some nailing because it was shaky, but that it was not attended to. Undoubtedly, petitioner Panelo and another store supervisor knew the danger of the unstable counter yet did not remedy the situation.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
W/N death of Zhieneth was accidental or attributable to negligence.
Anent the negligence imputed to Zhieneth,
the conclusive presumption that favors children below 9 years old in that they are incapable of contributory negligence, applies (criminal cases- conclusively presumed to have acted without discernment).
In case of a finding of negligence, whether
attributable to private respondents for maintaining a defective counter or to Criselda and Zhieneth for failing to exercise due and reasonable care while inside the store premises.
Assuming Zhieneth committed contributory
negligence when she climbed the counter, no injury should have occurred if petitioners theory that the counter was stable and sturdy was true. Indeed, the physical analysis of the counter reveal otherwise, i.e. it was not durable after all.
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI
TRAGEDY, WHICH BEFELL ZHIENETH WAS NO ACCIDENT AND THAT HER HEATH COULD ONLY BE ATTRIBUTED TO NEGLIGENCE.
Criselda should likewise be absolved from
contributory negligence. To be able to sign her credit card, it was reasonable for Criselda to momentarily release her childs hand.
Second, the jogging trainees and the rear
guards were all wearing black T-shirts, black short pants, and black and green combat shoes, which made them hard to make out on that dark and cloudy night. The rear guards had neither reflectorized vests or gloves nor flashlights in giving hand signals. Third, GLENN was driving on the proper side of the road, the right lane. On the other hand, the jogging trainees were occupying the wrong lane, the same lane as Glenns vehicle was traversing. Worse, they were facing the same direction as Glenns truck such that their backs were turned towards the oncoming vehicles from behind. Fourth, no convincing evidence was presented to rebut Glenns testimony that he had been momentarily blinded by the very bright and glaring lights of the oncoming vehicle at the opposite direction as his truck rounded the curve. He must have been still reeling from the blinding effect of the lights coming from the other vehicle when he plowed into the group of police trainees. Indeed, as pointed out by appellant, instinct tells one to stop or swerve to a safe place the moment he sees a cow, dog, or cat on the road, in order to avoid bumping or killing the same"; and more so if the one on the road is a person. It would therefore be inconceivable for GLENN, then a young college graduate with a pregnant wife and three very young children who were dependent on him for support, to have deliberately hit the group with his truck.
Petition DENIED. Court of Appeals decision
AFFIRMED.
People v. Delos Santos
Facts: On the early morning of October 5, 1995, at the Maitum Highway in Cagayan de Oro City, a team of PNP members undergoing a Special Training Course were performing an Endurance Run. They were jogging at the right side of the lane. A speeding Isuzu Elf ran into them, resulting to deaths and injuries. The accused surrendered to the Governor, and was eventually convicted of Multiple Murder, Multiple Frustrated Murder, and Multiple Attempted Murder. He was sentenced to death by the Trial Court. Hence, this automatic review. Issue: Whether there was intentional killing or attempt to kill the policemen, or a mere reckless imprudence Held: From the convergence of circumstances, we are inclined to believe that the tragic event was more a product of reckless imprudence than of a malicious intent on Glenns part. First, as testified to by prosecution rebuttal witness Danilo Olarita, the place of the incident was "very dark," as there was no moon. And according to PAGASAs observed weather report within the vicinity of Cagayan de Oro City covering a radius of 50 kilometers, at the time the event took place, the sky was overcast, i.e., there was absolutely no break in the thick clouds covering the celestial dome globe; hence, there was no way for the moon and stars to be seen. Neither were there lampposts that illuminated the highway.
We are convinced that the incident, tragic
though it was in light of the number of persons killed and seriously injured, was an accident and not an intentional felony. It is significant to note that there is no shred of evidence that GLENN had an axe to grind against the police trainees that would drive him into deliberately hitting them with intent to kill. Glenns offense is in failing to apply the brakes, or to swerve his vehicle to the left or to a safe place the movement he heard and felt the first bumping thuds. Had he done so, many trainees would have been spared. The test for determining whether a person is negligent in doing an act whereby injury or damage results to the person or property of
another is this: Could a prudent man, in the
position of the person to whom negligence is attributed, foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course actually pursued? If so, the law imposes a duty on the actor to refrain from that course or to take precautions to guard against its mischievous results, and the failure to do so constitutes negligence. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the admonition born of this prevision, is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist.
Considering that the incident was not a
product of a malicious intent but rather the result of a single act of reckless driving, GLENN should be held guilty of the complex crime of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide with serious physical injuries and less serious physical injuries. Lopez v. Pan American World Airways Facts: Reservation for first class accommodation in Pan American Airlines from Tokyo to San Francisco was made by Delfin Faustino for then Senator Fernando Lopez and company. First class tickets were issued and paid for. The party left Manila for Tokyo as scheduled. Senator Lopez requested Minister Busuego to contact the airlines regarding their accommodation. However, they were informed that there was no accommodation for them. Because of some urgent matters to attend to in San Francisco, they were constrained to take the tourist flight under protest.
GLENN showed an inexcusable lack of
precaution. Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code states that reckless imprudence consists in voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration (1) his employment or occupation; (2) his degree of intelligence; (4) his physical condition; and (3) other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
Issues: (1) Whether the defendant acted in bad faith for deliberate refusal to comply with its contract to provide first-class accommodation to the plaintiff
GLENN, being then a young college graduate
and an experienced driver, should have known to apply the brakes or swerve to a safe place immediately upon hearing the first bumping thuds to avoid further hitting the other trainees. By his own testimony, it was established that the road was slippery and slightly going downward; and, worse, the place of the incident was foggy and dark. He should have observed due care in accordance with the conduct of a reasonably prudent man, such as by slackening his speed, applying his brakes, or turning to the left side even if it would mean entering the opposite lane (there being no evidence that a vehicle was coming from the opposite direction). It is highly probable that he was driving at high speed at the time. And even if he was driving within the speed limits, this did not mean that he was exercising due care under the existing circumstances and conditions at the time.
(2) Whether moral and exemplary damages
should be awarded Held: (1) From the evidence of defendant it is in effect admitted that defendant - through its agents - first cancelled plaintiffs, reservations by mistake and thereafterdeliberately and intentionally withheld from plaintiffs or their travel agent the fact of said cancellation, letting them go on believing that their first class reservations stood valid and confirmed. In so misleading plaintiffs into purchasing first class tickets in the conviction that they had confirmed reservations for the same, when in fact they had none, defendant wilfully and knowingly placed itself into the position of having to breach its a foresaid contracts with
plaintiffs should there be no last-minute
cancellation by other passengers before flight time, as it turned out in this case. Such actuation of defendant may indeed have been prompted by nothing more than the promotion of its self-interest in holding on to Senator Lopez and party as passengers in its flight and foreclosing on their chances to seek the services of other airlines that may have been able to afford them first class accommodations. All the time, in legal contemplation such conduct already amounts to action in bad faith. For bad faith means a breach of a known duty through some motive of interest or ill-will.
moral damages. In view of its nature, it should
be imposed in such an amount as to sufficiently and effectively deter similar breach of contracts in the future by defendant or other airlines. In this light, we find it just to award P75,000.00 as exemplary or corrective damages. Zulueta v Pan America (1972) Zulueta spouse and daughter were aboard PANAM from Honolulu to Manila. On its first lag, it landed on Wake Island, the stopover was 30 mins. Mr Z went to the CR at terminal but was full of soldiers, he was forced to look a CR down the beach. Upon boarding, Mr Z could not be found. The take-off was delayed and he blamed the EEs. Z claims that he was stopped at the gate and asked that Z open his luggage but he refused. He was disallowed to board and plane and was left in the island. He stayed there for 2 nights.
At the time plaintiffs bought their tickets,
defendant, therefore, in breach of its known duty, made plaintiffs believe that their reservation had not been cancelled. Such willful-non-disclosure of the cancellation or pretense that the reservations for plaintiffs stood - and not simply the erroneous cancellation itself - is the factor to which is attributable the breach of the resulting contracts. And, as above-stated, in this respect defendant clearly acted in bad faith.
In relation between carrier and passenger
involves special and peculiar obligations and duties, differing in kind and degree, from those of almost every other legal or contractual relation. On account of the peculiar situation of the parties the law implies a promise and imposes upon the carrier the corresponding duty of protection and courteous treatment. Therefore, the carrier is under the absolute duty of protecting his passengers from assault or injury by himself or his servants.
(2) First, then, as to moral damages. As a
proximate result of defendant's breach in bad faith of its contracts with plaintiffs, the latter suffered social humiliation, wounded feelings, serious anxiety and mental anguish. For plaintiffs were travelling with first class tickets issued by defendant and yet they were given only the tourist class. At stop-overs, they were expected to be among the first-class passengers by those awaiting to welcome them, only to be found among the tourist passengers. It may not be humiliating to travel as tourist passengers; it is humiliating to be compelled to travel as such, contrary to what is rightfully to be expected from the contractual undertaking.
Where a conductor uses language to a
passenger which is calculated to insult, humiliate, or wound the feelings of a person of ordinary feelings and sensibilities, the carrier is liable, because the contract of carriage impliedly stipulated for decent, courteous, and respectful treatment, at hands of the carriers EEs. Among the factors court take into account is assessing moral damages are the professional, social, political and financial standing of the offended parties on one hand, and the business and financial position of the offender on the other.
The rationale behind exemplary or corrective
damages is, as the name implies, to provide an example or correction for public good. Defendant having breached its contracts in bad faith, the court, as stated earlier, may award exemplary damages in addition to
Moral damages of 1M excessive, only
500K. Contributory negligence that aggravated the gravity of situation, mainly because of his arrogant and overbearing attitude and behavior.
assured the risk, and can not shed
responsibility merely because the precautions it adopted turned out to be insufficient. It is thus liable for damages.
Republic vs Luzon Stevedoring
Corporation (GR No. L-21749, September 29, 1967)
FACTS: The furniture manufacturing shop of F.F
. Cruz in Caloocan City was situated adjacent to the residence of the Mables. Sometime in August 1971, private respondent Gregorio Mable first approached Eric Cruz, petitioner's plant manager, to request that a firewall be constructed between the shop and Mables residence. The request was repeated several times but they fell on deaf ears.
F.F. Cruz vs. CA
G.R. No. L-52732 August 29, 1988 |SCRA
Facts: A barge being towed by tugboats
"Bangus" and "Barbero" all owned by Luzon Stevedoring Corp. rammed one of the wooden piles of the Nagtahan Bailey Bridge due to the swollen current of the Pasig after heavy rains days before. The Republic sued Luzon Stevedoring for actual and consequential damages. Luzon Stevedoring claimed it had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees; that the damages to the bridge were caused by force majeure; that plaintiff has no capacity to sue; and that the Nagtahan bailey bridge is an obstruction to navigation.
In the early morning of September 6, 1974,
fire broke out in Cruzs shop. Cruzs employees, who slept in the shop premises, tried to put out the fire, but their efforts proved futile. The fire spread to the Mables house. Both the shop and the house were razed to the ground. The Mables collected P35,000.00 on the insurance on their house and the contents thereof.
Issue: Whether or not the collision of
appellant's barge with the supports or piers of the Nagtahan bridge was in law caused by fortuitous event or force majeure.
The Mables filed an action for damages
against the Cruzs.
Held: There is a presumption of negligence on
part of the employees of Luzon Stevedoring, as the Nagtahan Bridge is stationary. For caso fortuito or force majeure (which in law are identical in so far as they exempt an obligor from liability) by definition, are extraordinary events not foreseeable or avoidable, "events that could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable" (Art. 1174, Civ. Code of the Philippines). It is, therefore, not enough that the event should not have been foreseen or anticipated, as is commonly believed, but it must be one impossible to foresee or to avoid. The mere difficulty to foresee the happening is not impossibility to foresee the same. Luzon Stevedoring knew the perils posed by the swollen stream and its swift current, and voluntarily entered into a situation involving obvious danger; it therefore
The TC ruled in favor of the Mables. CA
affirmed but reduced the award of damages. ISSUES & ARGUMENTS: W/N the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor is applicable to the case. HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI Yes. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitor is applicable to the case. The CA, therefore,had basis to find Cruz liable for the loss sustained by the Mables. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur , may be stated as follows: Where the thing which caused the injury complained of is shown to be under the management of the defendant or his servants
and the accident is such as in the ordinary
course of things does not happen if those who have its management or control use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care. [Africa v. Caltex (Phil.),Inc., G.R. No. L-12986, March 31, 1966, 16 SCRA 448.]
ordinance providing for safety regulations had
been ruled by the Court as an act of negligence [Teague v. Fernandez, G.R. No. L29745, June 4, 1973, 51 SCRA 181.] NIA vs Fontanilla Facts: Hugo Garcia is a regular employee of National Irrigation Administration (NIA) a govt agency created by its charter RA 3601 amended by PD 552 for the purpose of undertaking integrated irrigation project. Garcia driving the agency official pick-up bumped a bicycle ridden by Fontanilla resulting to his death. The victims parent filed a civil action against NIA and its driver Garcia who was found guilty of driving recklessly. NIA was ordered to pay, NIA appealed raising the issue that as govt agency performing govt function is not liable as being a part of the state, cannot be sued.
The facts of the case likewise call for the appli
cation of the doctrine,considering that in the normal course of operations of a furniture manufacturing shop, combustible material such as wood chips, sawdust, paint, varnish and fuel and lubricants for machinery may be found thereon. It must also be noted that negligence or want of care on the part of petitioner or its employees was not merely presumed. Cruz failed to construct a firewall between its shop and the residence of the Mables as required by a city ordinance that the fire could have been caused by a heated motor or a lit cigarette that gasoline and alcohol were used and stored in the shop; an that workers sometimes smoked inside the shop
Held: the state or govt agency performing
governmental function may be held liable for tort committed by its employees when it acts thru a special agent. While NIA is a govt agency performing governmental function, however it is suable because its charter provides that it may be sue or be sued, thus consent of the state for NIA to be sued has already given, so that the rule on immunity from suit normally extended to govt agencies performing governmental functions is no longer available to NIA. By waiving that immunity from suit in its charter, NIA open itself to suits.
Even without applying the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur , Cruz's failure to construct a firewall in accordance with city ordinances would suffice to support a finding of negligence. Even then the fire possibly would not have spread to the neighboring houses were it not for another negligent omission on the part of defendants, namely, their failure to provide a concrete wall high enough to prevent the flames from leaping over it.
Thus NIA was held responsible for the
negligent act of its employee Garcia who is not a special agent. (J. Padilla separate opinion in Fontanilla vs Maliaman Resolution in 1991, 194 SCRA 499)
Defendant's negligence, therefore, was not
only with respect to the cause of the fire but also with respect to the spread thereof to the neighboring houses. In the instant case, with more reason should petitioner be found guilty of negligence since it had failed to construct a firewall between its property and private respondents' residence which sufficiently complies with the pertinent city ordinances. The failure to comply with an
DUMLAO CASE --- digest mo
JIMENEZ v CITY OF MANILA FACTS: Jimenez bought bagoong at the Santa Ana public market at the time that it was
flooded withankle-deep water. As he turned
around to go home, he stepped on an uncovered opening w/c could notbe seen because of dirty rainwater.A dirty and rusty 4inch nail, stuck inside the uncovered opening, pierced his left leg to a depth of 1 inches. His left leg swelled and he developed fever. He was confined for 20 days, walked w/crutches for 15 days and could not operate his school buses. He sued City of Manila and Asiatic Integrated Corp under whose administration the Sta. Ana had been placed by virtue of Management and Operating Contract.TC found for respondent. CA reversed and held Asiatec liable and absolved City of Manila.
2.Mayor Bagatsing of Manila admitted such
control and supervision in his letter to Finance Sec.Virata (The City retains the power of supervision and control over its public markets) 3.City employed a market master for the Sta. Ana public Market whose primary duty is to take direct supervision and control of that particular public market 4.Sec. 30 of Tax Code The treasurer shall exercise direct and immediate supervision, administration and control over public markets It is thus the duty of the City to exercise reasonable care to keep the public market reasonably safe for people frequenting the place for their marketing needs. Ordinary precautions could have been taken during good weather to minimize danger to life and limb. The drainage hole could have been placed under the stalls rather than the passageways. The City should have seen to it that the openings were covered. It was evident that the certain opening was already uncovered, and 5 months after this incident it was still uncovered. There were also findings that during floods, vendors would remove the iron grills to hasten the flow of water. Such acts were not prohibited nor penalized by the City. No warning sign of impending danger was evident. Petitioner had the right to assume there were no openings in the middle of the passageways and if any, that they were adequately covered. Had it been covered, petitioner would not have fallen into it. Thus the negligence of the City is the proximate cause of the injury suffered. Asiatec and City are joint tortfeasors and are solidarily liable
ISSUE: WON City of Manila should be jointly
and solidarily liable with Asiatec HELD: YES RATIO: In the City of Manila v Teotico case, it was held that Art 1, Sec 4 of RA 409, which City of Manila is invoking in this case, establishes a general rule regulating the liability of City Of Manila while Art 2189CC governs the liability due to defective streets, public buildings and other public works in particular andis therefore decisive in this case. It was also held that for liability under 2189 to attach, control and supervision by the province, city or municipality over the defective public building in question is enough. It is not necessary that such belongs to such province, city or municipality. In the case at bar, there is no question that Sta. Ana public market remained under the control of the City as evidenced by: 1.the contract bet Asiatec and City which explicitly states that prior approval of the City is still needed in the operations.