Soft Determinism and Freedom in Early Stoicism

Author(s): R. W. Sharples
Source: Phronesis, Vol. 31, No. 3 (1986), pp. 266-279
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DISCUSSIONNOTE

Soft Determinismand Freedom

in Early Stoicism
R.W. SHARPLES

In her paper 'Freedom, Causality, Fatalism and early Stoic philosophy" Dr. Sophie
Botros challenges assumptionsthat have perhapstoo readily been taken for granted in
recent discussions, and makes importantsuggestions about the perspectivefrom which
we should approachStoic thoughton these topics. It is thereforeall the more necessaryto
examine her conclusions and consider whether they are all equally convincing.
B. is rightto emphasise(p. 275) that attemptsto assessthe Stoic positionin termsof the
modern debate between compatibilistsand incompatibilists,soft-deterministsand libertarians, runthe riskof obscuringthe distinctiveperspectivesof Stoic thought. She is right
to doubt whether the Stoic conception of causationcan be fully capturedin the terms of
modern post-Humeanformulationsof determinism,2and to emphasiseboth the fact that
the Stoics may have regardedcauses as constrainingtheireffects3andalso the teleological
and pantheistic aspects of Stoic determinism.
Perhaps, though, the conflict which B. sees (pp. 279-280)between the chain of causes
and causationby the divine is an unrealone. For Stoic pantheismidentifiedGod with the
active principle which is present in all things and makes them what they are - and is
particularlylinked, as nveiipa, with the principalcause of a thing'sbehaviourand hence
of its effects on other things.4Indeed, when B. suggests that we might "assume that a
teleological accountcan in principlealwaysbe reducedto a deterministicone" (p. 280), it
is arguablethat for the early Stoa the reductionwould, if anything,operate in the other
I

Phronesis 30 (1985) 274-304.

pp. 276-280. The suggestion on p. 277 that a distinction between logical and causal

necessity is anachronisticfor the Stoics relatesto widerissuesconcerningancientthought

generally; cf. R. Sorabji,"Aristotle and Oxford Philosophy", American Philosophical
Quarterly6 (1969) 127-135, at 129 and 133-5.
3 p. 277. Due weight should however be given here to the hostile, anti-determinist
characterof much of our evidence; and it is noteworthythat in Alexander's Defato the
verb &vayx6(Elv seems to be applied not to the action of causes, but only to speakers
being compelled to adopt particularpositions (165.19; 193.27;207.22).
4 Cf. M. Frede, "The original notion of cause", in M. Schofield, etc., eds., Doubt and
Dogmatism (Oxford, 1980), 217-249, especially 243f. The passage from Alexander
quoted by B. p. 279 itself refersto fate as identicalwith the divine naturewhichis "present
in all that is and comes to be" (my italics). Seneca, De beneficiis 4.7 (SVF 2.1024)
combines the notion of god as firstcause with the identificationof god and naturein a way
that is at least compatiblewith the close identificationof god and the causalchain;cf. also
SVF 2.528 (Arius Didymus), 2.1076 (Philodemus), 1077 (Cicero), and next n.
266

Phronesis 1986. Vol. XXXJ13(AcceptedJuly 1986)

direction. It is true that Plotinus treated causation by a single divine cause and the chain
of causes as distinct doctrines (3.1, chapters 4 and 7; cf. chapter 2, 37ff.), but this may
reflect a tendency in later antiquityto move away from the originalStoic conception to a
more hierarchical view of the relation between god and the world.5 The point is an
importantone because B. uses the alleged failure to clarify the relation between divine
agency and fate to support her claim that the relation between human agency and
universal determinism had not been clarified either (p. 299). At the very least it seems
that the problem where divine agency is concerned, if there is a problem at all, may just
be an aspect of a general metaphysicalproblemabout the relation between God and the
universe.

B. is also right to emphasise (pp. 280ff.) that the Stoic discussionsof possibility have
little obvious connection with individual freedom6and that we should not necessarily
accept the views of ancient criticswho, themselves preoccupiedwith the issue of freedom
and determinism, assumed that this must be the Stoics' primaryconcern too in their
discussionof possibility. However, the suggestionthat the Stoics accepted Philo's definition of possibility in terms of bare suitability whether impeded or not, as well as the
definition of the possible in termsof what is not impeded, seems wrong(p. 281).7Nor is it
clear that Alexander presents the claim that the Stoic position removes the point of
deliberating, in chapter 11 of his Defato, as a consequence of his rejection of the Stoic
defence of possibility, in ch. 10 (cf. B., p. 282); rather,both the denial of possibility and
the uselessness of deliberationare presented as paralleland unacceptableconsequences
of the doctrine that all things come about of necessity (7 171.26), and the alleged
exclusion of real possibility by determinismis objectionable to Alexander in itself, and
not just in connection with human action.8
Suggestive, too, is B.'s claim that the early Stoics may have combined a fundamental
assumptionthat human agency was distinctivein type with a causal determinismthe full
implications of which had not been realised - that they were, as she puts it, agentcausalists who simply did not fully realise the conflict between determinismand human
autonomy. For the combination of belief in fate and the assumptionthat men are, even
so, responsible for their actions is, as B. argues (p. 301), familiar from earlier Greek
thought;9and so in particularis the idea that human choices and fate function jointly
I

God is distinguishedfrom fate as the expression of his will or design in texts like SVF
2.932 (Augustine), 2.933 (Calcidius); but elsewhere the two are identified (SVF
1.102=2.580, 160, 2.580, 929-931, 937). Cf. W. Theiler, "Tacitus und die antike
Schicksalslehre",in PhylloboliaffurP. von der Muhil (Basel 1946)35-90, at 43-48;J. den
Boeft, Calcidiuson Fate (Leiden 1970), 14. It is true that even Chrysippus'doctrine of
nvEi34tccompromised divine immanence to some extent as contrasted with the original
position of Zeno (cf. R.B. Todd, "Monism and immanence", in J.M. Rist (ed.), The
Stoics (Berkeley 1978), 137-160);but Alexander for one could still object to the Stoic
emphasis on divine immanence (SVF 2.1047-8).
6 Cf. especially her remarkabout the jewel that can be broken; Cicero Defato 31, B. p.
281.
7Cf. my discussion in "Alexander of Aphrodisias:Problemsabout possibility, I", BICS
29 (1982), 91-108, at 92, and M. Frede, Die stoische Logik (Gottingen 1974) 107ff.
8 Cf. Alexander Defato 7 172.6-9, 24 194.23-5.
9 Cf. E.R. Dodds, The Greeksand the Irrational(Berkeley, 1951), 7; A.W.H. Adkins,
Meritand Responsibility(Oxford 1960) ch. 2.

267

without there being any conflict between them.'0These ideas mayeven throwlighton the
formulationof two problematicpassages, reflectingGreek philosophicaldiscussions, in
an author as late as Josephus:
judging that everything is done by fate they (the Pharisees) do not deprive the
humanwill (lit. the willing (part) of what is human)of the impulse that depends on
themselves, it havingseemed good to God that there should be a blendingbetween
(fate's) council-chamberand him among men who has consented (reading -u
iO8EXoavtL)to approach it with virtue or vice.
(JewishAntiquities 18.13)
The Pharisees. .. attributeeverythingto fate and God, and say that actingjustly or
not depends on men for the most part, but that fate also assists in each thing.
(Jewish War2.162)"
There are however two aspects of B.'s account about which some hesitationmay be felt.
They are, first, her argumentsagainstthe classificationof the Stoics as soft determinists,
and, secondly, her failure to distinguishwithin Stoic doctrine between the two conceptions of what, for want of a better word, I shallcall "responsibility"'2and freedom. It is to
these two issues and their ramificationsthat the rest of this paper will be devoted.
lI
In discussingwhether the Stoics were soft deterministsthere are both conceptual and
historicaldifficulties. The point of agent-causationtheory, as B. says (p. 298), has in
moderntimes usuallybeen to arguethat the discussionof humanagency in the context of
physical determinism is simply misplaced. An agent-causalistwill therefore reject the
attemptof the compatibilist,or soft determinist,to reconcile responsibilityand determinism by - as a libertarian will see it - unacceptably watering down our notion of
responsible action. But the agent-causalistwill also reject the claim that true responsibility can only be establishedby admittinga radicalindeterminism,for example like that
of the Epicureanatomic swerve, into the realm of physicalevents. In other words, the
agent-causalist, by drawing a contrast between human actions and physical events,
10 Cf. Aeschylus, Persae 742, Agamemnon 912f., 1507ff. Aristotle in Nicomachean
of their dispositions; cf.
Ethics 3.5 1114b23 suggests that men might be OVOELTLOL
W.F.R. Hardie, Aristotle'sEthical Theory(20xford 1980) 178-80and 384-5.
" Cf. G.F. Moore, "Fate and free will in the Jewish philosophers according to
Josephus", Harvard Theological Review 22 (1929) 371ff.; Theiler (above n. 5), 39ff.;
A.A. Long, "Stoicdeterminismand Alexander of AphrodisiasDefato (I-XIV)", AGPh
52 (1970), 266; R.W. Sharples,Alexanderof Aphrodisias On Fate (London 1983) 126.
12 Nicholas White has criticised this rendering of x6 tip' ilAiv in his review of my
Alexander:On Fatein PhilosophicalReview94 (1984) 31. I used the termsimplybecause
it seemed neutral in itself between libertarianand soft-determinist interpretations;it
should certainlynot be taken as indicatingmoralor legal concernsto the exclusionof the
underlyingphysical and psychologicaltheory of human action. I have endeavoured to
clarifythe point in "Could Alexander (follower of Aristotle) have done better? A reply
to Professor Frede and others", Oxford Studiesin Ancient Philosophy 5 (1987).

268

argues that the dilemma - soft determinismor radicalindeterminism- is misplaced.'3

B. however holds (p. 302) that a sharp distinction between human agency and other
causation is fundamentallyinconsistent with the tendency of early Stoicism to see the
whole world as a unified system. Since the Stoics certainly were determinists and
certainly did believe in human responsibility, the only possibilities are eitherthat they
assumed a soft-determinist notion of responsibility or that they took for granted a
separation between human agency and other causation which they did not clearly
formulatewith all its implications, and indeed could not have clearly formulatedwithout
compromisingtheir whole system. (B.'s claim that "philosopherswho were concerned
with both determinism and responsibility'4could treat these topics in virtual isolation
fromeach other" (p. 274) is only legitimateif it restson at least a tacit assumptionof either
agent-causation theory or compatibilism.) The question is thus, in general terms,
whether we should explain the Stoic position by attributing to them a doctrine of
responsibilitywhich has been widely held by modern philosophers, even if others have
found it unacceptable, or whether we should attribute to them a distinction between
human agency and other causationwhich may seem intuitivelyattractivebut is in fact on
B.'s own showing ultimately incompatiblewith their general position. Individualscholars'own views on the free-willquestion may influence their approachto the Stoics here;
and the philosophically more satisfying answer and the historicallymore accurate one
may not necessarily be the same. At one point B. herself, in attributing the Stoics'
position to their "defective concept of freedom"(p. 275) mightbe thoughtto implythat it
is tacit compatibilism, ratherthan tacit agent-causationtheory, that is at work in the Stoic
position.
B.'s case would be strengthenedif it could be shown that the problem of determinism
and freedom in its modern terms had simply not yet been realised. This, however, seems
at least uncertain. Realisation of a problem in reconcilingfreedom with universalcausal
determinism indeed presupposes clear formulationof such a theory; and it is true that
Aristotle does not generally seem to envisage such a theory explicitly, or draw a connection between his rejection of necessitating causal chains of indefinite extension in
MetaphysicsE3 and his discussionof responsibleaction in NicomacheanEthics 3.5. The
interpretation of the latter passage raises issues too complex to discuss here.'5 But
Epicurusat least does seem to have seen an incompatibilitybetween causal determinism
and human freedom.16Moreover, the question of the relation between individual
13 One may compare the attempt of thinkerslike Carneadesand Alexander to escape the
Stoic dilemma of determinismwithout a cause (cf. Sharples,above n. 11, 13 and 147-8).
White, above n. 12, indeed argues that Alexander should be regarded as an agent
causalist;I am not sure that this capturesall aspectsof Alexander'sposition (for example,
his apparent treatment of chance events as exceptions to determinism), but it seems an
acceptable descriptionas far as it goes. (I have discussedthis furtherin the articlecited in
n. 12 above.)
14 B. says "freedom"; but see below, section III.
'5 Cf. Hardie, above n. 10, 173-181and 381-6; Sharples, above n. 13, 6-7.
16 Cf.
Epicurus On Nature, 34.30 (7.XI.7ff.) in G. Arrighetti, ed., Epicuro: Opere
(2 Turin, 1973), with the discussion by D. Sedley, "Epicurus' Refutation of Determinism" in Syzetesis, studi offerti a M. Gigante (Naples 1983) 20 and 22-23; Letter to
Menoeceus 133-4. P.M. Huby, "The first discoveryof the freewill problem", Philosophy
42 (1967) 353-362.

269

propheciesor divine dispensationsand human responsibilityfor the actions prophesied

or decreed, while it is not the same as the issue of freedom and universal causal
determinism,does have some bearingon the realisationof the problem. It is true that a
conflict between destiny and responsibilityis not an issue in early and classical Greek
literatureas often as modem readers, looking back over centuries of argument about
individual responsibility in philosophical and theological contexts, tend to assume.
Nevertheless, besides the passages cited earlier which suggest a combinationof destiny
and human responsibilitywith no incompatibilitybeing felt, there are others, from well
before the period of the early Stoa, that do suggest awarenessof a problemin this area."
There are three main considerations that lead B. to reject the attributionof a softdeterminist position to the Stoics. First, she argues that the Stoics do not display the
desire of most soft-determinists to show that their position does not do away with
responsibilityfor action (p. 275, n. 6). This assumes - plausiblyenough perhaps- that
soft determinismmust be a consciouslyadopted position, that a soft-deterministconception of responsibilitycan only arise as the resultof a realisationof the primafacie conflict
between determinismand responsibilityas ordinarilyunderstood, while the assumption
that there is something distinctive about human action can be made without reflection,
and indeed in her view must be, if there is to be room for it in the Stoic theory at all.
But in fact the Stoics were it seems concerned to rebut the notion that their position
does away with responsibility. B. herself goes on to cite Chrysippusin SVF 2.1000
arguingthat "wicked ... men ought not to be endured . . . who, when they are caught
fast in guilt and sin, take refuge in the inevitablenatureof fate, as if in the asylumof some
shrine, declaring that their outrageous actions must be charged, not to their own
heedlessness, but to fate" (p. 301). (It might be thought that it is not absolutely certain
that it is his own position that Chrysippusis defendinghere; but in fact Gellius, who is the
source of this report, explicitly indicates that Chrysippus'discussion of the question of
responsibilityfollowed directlyon from the statement of the cylinder-argument.)Alexander gives Stoic argumentsclaimingto show that praise and blame are only in place if
fate exists (Defato 35 207.5ff., 37 210.15ff.); it is at least highlyplausibleto suppose that
these were intended to counter argumentsthat belief in fate renders praise and blame
inappropriate,though we do not know the date at which they originated.18B. herself (p.
302) interpretsthe analogy of the dog tied to the chariot, which may follow willinglyor
unwillinglybut must follow none the less, as "an attempt by the Stoics to come to grips
with the problem posed for freedom by their thesis of determinism",though her discussion of this passage raises furtherproblems to which we must return later.
Secondly, B. argues that modem soft-deterministscharacteristicallyemphasise the
difference between cases where the agent is, and those where he is not, unable to act
otherwisebecause constrainedby the circumstances;and she arguesthat the Stoics, who
do not emphasise this point, are therefore not typical soft-determinists.She recognises

17 Cf. Aristophanes Frogs 1182ff. - though it may be noted that this suggests that
Oedipus'destiny was incompatiblewith his happiness,not his responsibility- and, more
tellingly, Sophocles Oedipus at Colonus 969, which mentions the oracle as one among
Oedipus' reasons for denying his guilt (contrast B. p. 301, on the Oedipus Tyrannus).
18 The definition of law used in one of the arguments,at 207.8, is known to be Chrysippus' own - SVF 3.314, etc. - but that is not conclusive.

270

that the presence or absence of externalconstraintis mentioned in a passageof Nemesius

(SVF2.991),'9 but argues that the Stoics did not in general emphasise this point.20
It is true that some modern soft-deterministshave emphasisedthe difference between
cases where human agents are, and those where they are not, subject to external
constraints.2' But they have done so, in effect, in order to argue that other types of
necessitation- not externalto the agent, immediatelyanyway22-do not remove responsibility. It is this latterpoint that is at issue in the debate over whether"could"in "he could
have done otherwise", regarded as a necessary condition for responsibility, has a
categoricalsense or is alwaysin fact accompaniedby a suppressedconditionsuch as "if he
had chosen".23
Some caution is needed here. To say that "he could have done otherwise"can always
be interpreted as "he could have done otherwise if he had chosen" sounds, on its own,
like an innocent truism; for even the libertarian is not presumably going to make
responsibilitydepend on our actions being at variancewithour choices. When the issue
becomes a real one is when it is admitted- as it must be by the committeddeterminist, as
opposed to the agent-causalist- that our choices are themselves as predetermined as
everything else. For this reason it may be better to take the argument a stage further
back, and to state the issue as whether or not the determiningof choices and actions by
factors internal to the agent,24these being themselves predetermined by other factors
before them and so back ad infinitum, is to be regarded as removing responsibilityor

'9 Cf. R.W. Sharples, "Alexanderof AphrodisiasDefato: some parallels",Class. Quart.

28 (1978) 243-266, at 254-5. Origen in SVF 2.990 makes a similar point to Nemesius
(p. 290.6-8, where what is in our power includes not just our attitude to them but also
what use we make of them). The passage is influenced by the Stoics ratherthan a report
of their position, but it does occur in a context (following on directly from SVF 2.988)
which shows considerable influence of Stoic thought. B. is right to point out that
Epictetus' view that our will alone is free, on the grounds that it alone cannot be
constrained by external factors (whereas even our bodily movements can) makes a
different point from the modern soft-deterministdiscussion of cases where we are and
cases where we are not constrained (p. 286); but Epictetus' view can be seen as a
development of a more general point about actions that are or are not impeded. See
below, section III.
2' The importance of external constrainthad been indicated in Aristotle, Nicomachean
Ethics 1109b35-1110a4;but it is questionable how far the Stoics were either aware of or
interested in Aristotle's esoteric works. Cf. the generally negative conclusions of F.H.
Sandbach, Aristotle and the Stoics, Proc. CambridgePhilological Soc. supplementary
volume 10, 1985.
23 Cf. e.g. A.J. Ayer, Philosophical Essays (London 1954) ch. 12, cited by B. p. 275, n.
10.

See below, n. 25.

Cf. G.E. Moore, Ethics (Oxford 1912) 102ff., reprintedin G. Dworkin, ed., Determinism, Free Willand Moral Responsibility(Englewood Cliffs NJ 1970) 129ff. (especially
137ff. of the reprint), and J.L. Austin, "Ifs and Cans", p. 297 of the reprint in B.
Berofsky (ed.), Determinismand Free Will (New York 1966).

22

24

271

not.25The soft deterministwill hold that, even if externalconstraintat the time of action
removes responsibility,such internal necessitationdoes not.26
B. is right to argue that Chrysippus'cylinder-argument,concerned as it is with the
contrast between the principalcause of action and initiatingcauses that prompt it, has
nothingdirectlyto do with questionsof constraintor of factorspreventingaction, and that
it therefore has nothing directlyto do with the Stoic definition of possibility, in so far as
that is concerned with whether an outcome is prevented or not.27But it is very much
concerned, it would seem, with establishing that, even within the Stoic determinist
system, it is factorsinternalto us that play the majorpartin determininghow we behave.
This is especiallyapparentin the versionreportedby Cicero (Defato 42): a cylinderand a
25 One might rather say, by a combination of internal and external factors; for in a
determinist system it is true not only that people with different characterswill react in
different ways to the same situation, but also that how a given person reactsdepends on
the situation with which he is confronted. However, the emphasis in the cylinderargumentis all on the effect of the principalcause, located in the agent, in determining
the action (cf. below, n. 27, and B. pp. 287-8).
26 One needs to stress "andso back ad infinitum",because the claim that internalfactors
partlydetermine our actions sounds as innocuous in itself as the claim that our actions
follow our choices; it is the unbroken chain of causal necessitations into the past that
creates the problem. Similarly, to say that a man's characterdetermines his action is a
truismif his characteris defined in such a way that it includeshis deciding as he does on
the occasion in question (cf. A.A. Long, Problemsin Stoicism(London 1971) 188); but
this does not mean that there is not still a question whether or not our actions are
predetermined by antecedent factors some of which may be grouped together and
describedas our "character".(I am not convincedby Long'sattempt, loc. cit., to give the
truism force by relating it rather to the doctrine of the cyclical recurrenceof events.)
Puttingit another way, in an unbrokendeterministiccausalnexus all factors, even those
apparentlyinternal to the agent at the time of action, can ultimately be traced back to
ones external to him (cf. Sharples, above n. 13, 20 and n. 135). In a unified determinist
system human agents cannot be seen as ultimately distinct from the causal nexus as a
whole.
26The point about external constraint needs to be emphasised. It is questionable
whether, as B. p. 285-6suggests(in the context of an analysisshe does not herself accept),
Chrysippuswould see any moral difference between an alcoholic "compelled" to drink
by his own desire and someone who simplychooses to drink. For even in the case of the
alcoholic it is not a matterof external constraint.It is true, as it happens, that Chrysippus
would not regardthe alcoholic asfree, but neitherwould he so regardthe non-alcoholic,
unless he happens to be perfectly virtuous;see below, section III.
27 The distinctionsbetween causes found in the cylinderanalogycan indeed be related to
the Stoic definitionof possibility;what is possible is what admitsof being true and is not
prevented (SVF2.201; above n. 7), and "admitsof being true" is plausiblyinterpretedin
terms of the nature of the thing involved and hence of the principal cause (cf. M.E.
Reesor, "Fate and Necessity in EarlyStoic Philosophy",Phoenix 19 (1965) 285-297). But
the point of emphasisin the cylinderanalogyas actuallyused by Chrysippusseems not to
be that the cylindercan roll, but will not unlesspushed(and still less that it can in itself roll
but cannot if it is impeded by something). Rather, the point is that a cylinder can roll
downhill in a straightline while a cone (or a cube) cannot.

272

cone react in different ways to the same stimulus.28So the cylinder argument,while not
directly related to one half of the soft-deterministposition, the presence or absence of
external constraints, does seem very much related to the other part, the claim that
necessitation which is not (directly) external does not remove responsibility.
B. mightindeed object to bringingthe agent'scharacteror natureinto the discussionof
the principalcause at all; in her analysisof the cylinderargumentshe emphasises assent
and impulse as the principal causes. However, this reflects her general.view of the
significanceof the argument. If it is regarded as consciously stated within a determinist
context, then assent and impulse must be as predeterminedas everythingelse, and "the
agent's character" is at least a convenient shorthand for those factors, internal to the
agent, throughwhich they are predetermined.Moreover, the link between the principal
cause and the nvefi4a that determines the nature of a thing, suggested by Frede,29
suggests that it is not just the fact that the agent has the impulses and makes the assents
that he does that is at issue, but something about the agent's nature. It might still be
arguedthat what correspondsto the shape of the cylinderin the analogy is the natureof a
human agent as such ratherthan the characterof anyparticularhumanagent. But the fact
that the tension of one's soukrvei3iLa
determines,or ratheris, one's moralstate - of which
one's impulses and assents are the expression or the result - suggests that it is the
characterof the particularagent that is at issue.
B., however, interprets the cylinder argument differently, as emphasising that the
principal cause of our actions is human agency, regarded - even if only as a tacit
assumptionrather than explicitly- as different in kind from other types of causation (B.
p. 287-8: "humanaction . . . is distinguishedfrom mere happeningin termsof its special
causal structure"). This goes beyond the suggestion that principalcauses and external
initiating causes are in principle different in kind,-10
and involves a specific claim about
humanagency. But if this is the point of the argument,it seems that the choice of example
is hardly a good one, as it makes it all too easy for criticsto claim that the Stoic position,
far from distinguishing between human agency and other causation, reduces human
agents to the level of inanimateobjects. Alexander actuallymakes this point, with rather
less justice, against an argument, mentioned by B. on pp. 286-7, that does seek to
establish a difference in kind between the behaviour of animals qua animals, which
Cf. also Origen, SVF 2.988 fin., on the reactions of two different men to the same
situation.
29 Cf. Frede, above n. 4, 243f.
-0 B. suggests that, because the principalcause of action is in the agent, the distinction
between cases where we are and cases where we are not compelled ceases to be
intelligible in the Stoic system (p. 288). However, if a case is trulyone of forciblephysical
compulsion, so that my assent is not involved at all, it is not really my action (cf. B. p.
295), and there is no reason to expect the causal analysis to apply in the same way. A
person who is pushed and stumbles into someone, say (cf. Alexander, Ethical Problems
12 133.7-9), is not reactingas a person at all, but simply as a dead weight. If on the other
hand it is rathera question of my choosing, however reluctantly,to succumbto a threat, it
is not a matter of the external cause predominatingover assent and impulse, but of its
providingthe initiatingcause for them in the usual way; for different people will react in
different ways to the same threat, just as they would to other stimuliin general. (Cf. B. p.
300-1.)
28

273

resultsfrom impulse, and that of inanimateobjects; though it maybe noted that it is with
animal rather than human behaviourthat this argumentis concerned.3'
The singlingout of human agency from other types of causation, which B. sees in the
cylinder-argument,is the third factor which leads her to argue againsta soft-determinist
interpretationof the early Stoics and to see them ratheras implicitagent-causalists.She
sees evidence for a tendencyto drawa sharpdistinctionbetween humanagencyand other
types of causation, at least implicitly, not only in the cylinder argumentbut also in the
analogyof the dog tied to the waggon, which can either follow willinglyor be dragged.32
This analogyplays a centralpartin B.'s interpretation,and she devotes a largepartof her
article to a detailed discussion of it.
One problem for B.'s case, already touched upon, is that of chronology. Since she
rightly sees excessive emphasis on the human agent, as opposed to the whole causal
nexus, as threateningthe unity of the Stoic physicalsystem, she seems at times to present
it as a tendency whichwas present from the firstbut developed only gradually.However,
the more one stresses the fact that the tendency was not initiallystrong or explicit, the
harderit becomes to make it the central point of an interpretation.When she says that in
the dog and waggon analogy there "begins to emerge that metaphysicalconception of a
'willingsubject' which 'standsover and against'the whole determinedworld . . . such a
conception would have seemed alien, even revolutionary,to the early Stoics" (p. 302), it
is easy to forget that the analogy itself is early Stoic, explicitly attributedto Zeno and
Chrysippus(B. p. 290); and indeed it is essential for B.'s argumentthat it should be early
Stoic. B. is of course awareof the difficulty, and attemptsto resolve it by suggestingthat
"it mighteven have been resistanceto such a pictureof the relationbetween the self and
the world (sc. as "standingover against"each other) that prevented them (sc. the early
Stoics) from fully articulatingthe free will/determinismconflict, and thus from grappling
with it except by a confused, though suggestive, analogy". But in fact it can be argued,
first that the analogy does admit of a consistent soft-determinist interpretation, and
secondly that the shift in Stoic views may not have been as great as B. supposes.
The analogy certainly expresses a contrastbetween what is in our power and what is
not, between the human agent and external circumstances.But an adequate interpretation of this can be given without introducingthe tensions B. detects, providedthata softdeterministaccountof responsibilityis accepted. It may be predeterminedthat one man
will, by his actions, tryto resistwhat is decreed by fate andprovidence,while anotherwill
act in such a way as to assistit. Even if the actionsof each manare pre-determinedby fate,
they are none the less his actions, and he is - on a soft-deterministaccount such as that
impliedby the cylinderargumentas interpretedabove, thoughnot as interpretedby B. responsiblefor these actions preciselyup to the point where their effects are thwartedby
fate, as the analogyimpliesthey sooner or laterwill be if they are opposed to the direction
that it is alreadypredeterminedthat events will take.33The dog's attemptto resistthe pull
of the rope is doomed to achieve nothingas far as the dog's remainingwhere it is or going
in another direction is concerned;but it does have some effects - abrasionson the dog's
31 Alexander, Defato chapters 13 and 14; cf. Sharples, above n. 19, 253-258.

SVF 2.975; B. p. 290 and n. 33.

Predetermined,of course, in a way that is not independent of the agent's action, but
takes it into account - which need not be the same as admittingthat it will actually be
successful. See below, notes 38 and 39.
32
33

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paws, for instance- and the dog is responsiblefor those.34It may be objected that talk of
responsibility only makes sense because, in the analogy, the dog is distinct from the
waggon, which representsfate, so that its mode of following is not decided by fate; but it
is only those alreadyopposed to a soft-determinist,compatibilistconception of responsibility who will make such an objection. No analogy is perfect, and it is not clear that the
separationof the dog from the waggon in the example should lead us to regardthe dog's
choice as anything other than predetermined.35
There are of course difficultiesin such an interpretation.One objection mightbe that it
does not make sense to speak of fate itself causing some people to struggle against the
dictates of fate. However, it is not clear that there is anythingin this incompatiblewith
the notion of a deterministiccausal nexus as such; it may well be that, in a deterministic
system, certain effects of parts of the causal nexus conflict with those of others or even
cancel them out. It might indeed be asked why a fate identified with divine providence
should behave in this way; but whether or not a plausible answer can be found,36the
problem is one that is present for the Stoics on any account, since they hold both that
everything is governed by divine providence and also that the majorityof men are both
bad and mad.37It might also be arguedthat it makes no sense to speak of a man's actions
as assistingfate when they are a part of it; but there clearly is a contrastbetween actions
through which what eventually happens - and hence was fated to happen38- is brought
about and actions which, if they had succeeded, would have broughtabout an outcome
different from that which eventually occurred. One might be tempted to drawa contrast
between actions that play their part in the causal nexus and those that do not; but in fact
all actions do that - the difference is that for some the allotted part is an unproductive
one.39
u Clearly the dog is an analogy for a humanagent, so the question whether animals are
responsible for their actions does not arise. In fact, though, the Stoics may have held that
they were, in a sense; cf. C. Stough, "Stoic determinism and moral responsibility",in
Rist, above n. 5, 203-232, at 229 n. 21.
35 One is tempted to replace the image by one of a man sitting on a runaway bicycle
(controlled of course by divine providence)who can choose whetherto pedal or to trynot
to. But even the cyclist is distinct from the bicycle. B. herself elsewhere rejects Cicero's
claim (following Antiochus?) that the cylinder-argumentis intended to confine fate to
only a part of the chain of causes (B., p. 287 n. 30).
36 It might for example be argued that providence inflicts adversityon men in order to
teach them the hard way that external things are of no account compared to virtue (cf.
Seneca, De prov. 4.5ff.; F.H. Sandbach, The Stoics (London 1975) 107f.); but that will
just raise the question, why in a providentialworldshould men need to be taughtthis? Cf.
also SVF 3.177.
37 Cf. Alexander, De fato 28, and Sharples (above n.13) pp. 162-3. We know that the
Stoics attempted, not very plausibly, to account for this: Calcidius, In Timaeum165 =
SVF 3.229.
38 But not, of course, fated to happen regardlessof the action, as
the doctrineof co-fated
events shows (cf. B. p. 288, on Chrysippus'reply to the Lazy Argument).
39 Alexander in Defato 23 representsthe Stoics as claimingthat everythinghas
an effect;
but they must clearly have recognisedthat there were cases where one thingwas impeded
by another and so did not achieve itsfull effect, at any rate. The question is partlyone of
what counts as "having an effect". Cf. Sharples, above n. 13, p. 154.

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Admittedly, in discussingcases like that representedby the analogyof the dog and the
waggon it is almost inevitablethat one will in fact slide into treatingthe agent and the rest
of the causal nexus - that partwhich does not operate throughhim- as distinctnot just at
the moment of action but more fundamentally.But this is simplythe difficultythat noncompatibilists have always found in believing that anyone could simultaneously go
througha process of deciding how to act and be aware that the outcome of that process
was predetermined.I would not want to arguethat the tendency to treathumanagencyas
separate from the causal nexus which B. detects never influenced the thought of individualStoics in particularcontexts;40my point is ratherthat we should not too readily
give up the attemptto interpretformaldiscussionsof the issue, like the cylinderargument
and the example of the dog and the waggon, in termsof consistentsoft-deterministviews
which, however implausiblethey may seem, have been held by many, ratherthan basing
our whole interpretationon the imputationto the Stoics of viewpointswhichwere not yet
made explicit and in fact could not consistentlybe so. The suggestionis not that the point
of the analogy of the dog and the waggon is actuallyto emphasise our responsibilityfor
our behaviour, as the example of the cylinderis; the point of the analogyis, by contrasting two types of reaction, to make a point about the nature of freedom (below, section
III). But the actualpoint of the analogy, and the questionwhetherit can be interpretedas
makingthat point in a way that is compatiblewith Stoic determinismin generaland with a
soft-deterministaccount of human action in particular,are two different issues.
B. describesthe analogyof the dog and waggon, in consideringthe individualwho does
not want to do what he is compelled by fate to do, as "virtuallyunique in early Stoicism"
(p. 302). As she herself remarks- in a footnote - the implicationsof "the fates lead the
willing and drag the unwilling", attributed to Cleanthes by Seneca, are similar;41but
there is a complication here in that Cleanthes did claim that the actions of wicked men
were not caused by divine providence,42whether or not he nevertheless held that they
were caused by fate.43 However, it seems that Cleanthes, in denying the universalityof
40Alexander points out that it is above all the determinists'practiceof exhortationthat is
at odds with their position (Defato chapter 18); even if my appeal to you is one of the
factors that will determine whether you seek virtue or not, it is difficult to urge you to
seek virtue while in the same breath saying that, even if it is your decision, it is
predeterminedwhether you will say yes or no.
41 p. 290 n. 33. 1 do not know why B. refers to Augustine as quoting Seneca, when the
Seneca text itself is extant (SVF 1.527); nor is the citation taken from Cleanthes'Hymn to
Zeus (= SVF 1.537). In fact the line quoted from Seneca'sversion does not correspondto
anythingin that cited by Epictetus (also in SVF 1.527); but even if it is an addition by
Seneca himself, it only sums up in epigrammaticalform what is implicitin the preceding
lines.
42 In the Hymn, SVF 1.537 line 13. It is here if anywherethat the setting of the individual
(but only the wickedindividual?)over againstthe universeis found in early Stoicism;but
see next note.
43 Calcidius in SVF 1.551 suggests that Cleanthes held that everything was due to fate
even if not to providence, whereas Chrysippusheld the scope of the two to be identical;
but M. Dragona-Monachou,"Providenceand Fate in Stoicismand pre-Neoplatonism",
Philosophia 3 (Athens 1973) 262-304, has argued with some force that the formulation
may reflect Calcidius'desire to find a counterpartto the Middle Platonistview according
to which the scope of fate was narrowerthan that of providence.

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divine providence, was at variance with the general early Stoic opinion.44
The difference between early Stoic emphasis on co-operation with the divine, providential plan45and the later attitude of resignation (B. p. 291) is a matter of emphasis
rather than of substantial difference in doctrine. When B. notes an emphasis on
(unhappy) human fate in the later period, it is worth stressingthat for the early Stoics the
destiny of an individualwas part of universaldestiny, so that what we have is a shift in
emphasis, a stressing of one particular aspect, rather than a change in doctrine.46
Moreover, in saying that individualnaturecould be impeded, but universalnaturenever
(SVF2.935), Chrysippuswas recognisingthe possibilityof conflictsbetween the particular and the general;47and it seems to have been Chrysippushimself who said that "the
foot itself, if it had a mind, would eagerly seek to be covered with mud"."
It is true that Epictetus, later, lays emphasison the contrastbetween his own attitudes,
which he can control, and the external factorswhich he cannot, withoutadmitting- as he
should if he is to be consistent with early Stoic determinism- that his own attitudes are
themselves predetermined.But even if this marksa change and development in the Stoic
position, it may be seen as a naturalresultof the personalnatureof Epictetus'writingand
concerns. Soft-deterministaccountsof choice which may be plausiblein the thirdperson
are less so in the second or first.49
III
B. argues that the analogy of the dog and the waggon suggests that the Stoics regarded
humanagents as primarilyunfree (p. 290). But for the Stoics "free" has a special sense. It
Even if Calcidius' formulation goes beyond what the early Stoics explicitly said (see
last note), he would hardly have expressed himself so if Chrysippus had regarded
providence as less than universal; and for the universalityof fate and its identification
with providence by Chrysippuscf. SVF 2.937.
45 Cf. SVF 3.4 (Chrysippus); also Posidonius in Clement of Alexandria, Strom.
2.21
129.4 (fr. 186 Edelstein-Kidd).
46 A similarquestion arises in connection with Panaetius'emphasison individualnature
in ethics; cf. J.M. Rist, Stoic Philosophy (Cambridge1969) 186-7, and I.G. Kidd, "Stoic
Intermediates and the end for man", in Long, above n. 26, at 160-162.
"I Cf. also the justificationof what seems detrimentalto the individualas being in fact for
the benefit of the whole: SVF2. 1175-7.Alexander in quaestio 1.4 (p. 10.19 Bruns) refers
to the problem of those who are discontented with what is fated allegedly being so
through fate themselves, and at p. 10.23-4 he seems to suggest that the issue was one
discussed by deterministsthemselves, if indeed "fate creates some things which will not
obey their causes without force" is not a suggestion which he himself has put in their
mouths. But the suggested solution is not quite the same - or as plausible - as that
suggested above, which could rather be expressed by saying that some things do obey
theirown causes (how could they not?), but are caused by them to performfutile actions.
Nor is the date or precise identity of the deterministsin question altogether certain. Cf.
R.W. Sharples, "An Ancient Dialogue on Possibility: Alexander of Aphrodisias
quaestio 1.4", AGPh 64 (1982) 23-38, at 25 and 30-33.
48 SVF 3.191. See von Arnim's apparatusad loc.
49 Above, n. 40.

44

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is the wise man alone who is free;5?he is so because his wishes are not opposed to what
happensto him (and, since it happens, is ex hypothesidestined to do so). The point is not
so muchthat, knowingwhatwill happen, he confines his wishes to that alone; for that sort
of detailed knowledge is not humanly possible, it would seem, even for the sage.51
Rather, while he will attempt to achieve those external things that are "preferred",he
will recognise that virtue alone is what matters,and so will be resignedto failureand loss
where external things are concerned.52In Long's telling example,53a Stoic sage will
bravely try to rescue a child from a burninghouse, but if he fails will feel no regrets,S4
because he knows that the life of the child, like everything else other than virtue, is a
matter of indifference, and that the fact that he acted virtuouslyin making the attempt
matters more than the fact that he failed.
Epictetus, in claiming that our will is free because it alone can never be impeded,
whereas even our bodily movements can (B. p. 286), is making essentially the same
point. It may often, because of the circumstancesin which we are placed, be a matterof
our attitude to the actions of those more powerfulthan us, ratherthan of our taking the
initiativefor ourselves, but that does not alter the fact that the essential point is how we
behave, rather than either what we achieve or what happens to us, and that a man's
behaviourwill not be favourablyjudged if he simply has the right attitudes but does not
act virtuously(whether successfullyor not) when it is right for him to do so. Certainly
neither Epictetusnor the early Stoics can have held that what was in our power included
only our attitudes and not our (predetermined) actions, as that would lead to the
absurditythat a man compelled by fate to commit a crimewould not be responsiblefor it
providedonly that he did it with an attitude of revulsion from it. What is at issue in the
analogy of the dog and the waggon is not just what the dog feels but what - in a very
limited sense, it is true - he does. Some of the actions we choose to perform will be
preventedby other factorsfrom achievingthe intended result, others will not. Epictetus'
claim that our will alone is free because it alone can never be controlled by anything
outside us is a generalclaim; it does not mean that we should not try to act in a way that
will, if not impeded, affect both our limbsand the externalworld, nor does it mean that, if
our attempts are not impeded, we are not responsiblefor their effects.
It mightbe objected that the particularway in whichthe Stoics used "free", confiningit
to the wise man, need not affect discussion of whether they regardedhuman actions in
general as "free" in some other sense. But the restrictionof the applicationof "free"
necessarilyraisesthe questionof the terms'inwhichthe Stoics did discusshumanaction in
general; and here their concern seems to be not so much freedom as responsibilityor
50SVF3.355-364, 544; Long, above n. 25, 189ff. and nn.
5' It might be thought that the analogy of the dog and waggon does suggest that it is
conformityto the courseof fate as far as one can foresee it that is at issue. But presumably
we are to think of even the willingdog as not realisingwhere he mustgo until he feels the
pull of the rope. On the other hand it would be wrong to be led by the analogyto regard
the issue as purely one of our passive response; runningbehind the waggon is itself an
action, though not one with any obvious effects on anythingbut the dog.
52 Cf. the illuminatingdiscussionof this point in B. Inwood, Ethicsand HumanAction in
Early Stoicism (Oxford 1985) 119-126.
53 A.A. Long, HellenisticPhilosophy (London 1974) 197-9.
54 Cf. SVF 3.565.

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imputability,concepts which are, at least in the view of soft determinists, in place in a

soft-determinist as well as in a libertarian system. In the Stoic system all men are
responsible for their actions, unless physicallyconstrained;but not all men or all actions
arefree, as B. claims on p. 296. This does not however mean that we should interpretthe
dog and waggon analogy as suggesting that human actions are essentially unfree either
(cf. B. p. 290); rather, the dog that follows willingly is, in Stoic terms, free, the one that
resists and is dragged is not (or at least, the man for whom the dog is an analogy will be
free if his following willinglystems from perfect virtue). If this "freedom"seems unreal,
we may reflect, first, that the dog who follows willinglyis in a happierstate than the one
for whom it is predetermined that he will, on his own responsibility, resist and be
dragged;and, secondly, that it is divine providencethat is directingfor the best the course
of the waggon and of all the dogs tied to it.
UniversityCollege, London

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