1. Lambino v.

COMELEC
The S.C. may exercise judicial review over any matter relative to the process of amending or
revising the Constitution. Revision of the Constitution cannot be carried out through Peoples
Initiative.
G.R. No. 174153

October 25, 2006

Facts

1.

On 15 February 2006, petitioners in G.R. No. 174153, namely Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado ("Lambino
Group"), with other groups1 and individuals, commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change the
1987 Constitution. On 25 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that
will ratify their initiative petition under Section 5(b) and (c)2 and Section 73 of Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative
and Referendum Act ("RA 6735").

2.

The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals constituting at least twelve per
centum (12%) of all registered voters, with each legislative district represented by at least three per centum (3%) of
its registered voters. The Lambino Group also claimed that COMELEC election registrars had verified the signatures
of the 6.3 million individuals.

3.

The Lambino Group's initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7 of Article VI
(Legislative Department)4and Sections 1-4 of Article VII (Executive Department)5 and by adding Article XVIII entitled
"Transitory Provisions."6 These proposed changes will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a
Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government. The Lambino Group prayed that after due publication of their petition,
the COMELEC should submit the following proposition in a plebiscite for the voters' ratification:
DO YOU APPROVE THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI AND VII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, CHANGING
THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESENT BICAMERAL-PRESIDENTIAL TO A UNICAMERALPARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM, AND PROVIDING ARTICLE XVIII AS TRANSITORY PROVISIONS FOR THE
ORDERLY SHIFT FROM ONE SYSTEM TO THE OTHER?
4. On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an Amended Petition with the COMELEC indicating modifications in
the proposed Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of their initiative.
Issues:
w/n the proposed changes constitute an amendment or revision
w/n the initiative petition is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement on direct proposal by the people
Held:
Initiative petition does not comply with Sec. 2, Art. XVII on direct proposal by people
Sec. 2, Art. XVIIis the governing provision that allows a peoples initiative to propose amendments to the
Constitution. While this provision does not expressly state that the petition must set forth the full text of the proposed
amendments, the deliberations of the framers of our Constitution clearly show that:
a. the framers intended to adopt relevant American jurisprudence on peoples initiative; and
b. in particular, the people must first see the full text of the proposed amendments before they sign, and that the
people must sign on a petition containing such full text

The essence of amendments directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition is that the entire
proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means two essential elements must be present:
a. the people must author sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative can sign on their behalf
b. as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition
These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is first shown to the people
who express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition. The full text of the proposed amendments
may be either written on the face of the petition, or attached to it. If so attached, the petition must state the fact of
such attachment. This is an assurance that every one of the several millions of signatories to the petition had seen
the full text of the proposed amendments before not after signing.
Moreover, an initiative signer must be informed at the time of signing of the nature and effect of that which is
proposed and failure to do so is deceptive and misleading which renders the initiative void.
In the case of the Lambino Groups petition, theres not a single word, phrase, or sentence of text of the proposed
changes in the signature sheet. Neither does the signature sheet state that the text of the proposed changes is
attached to it. The signature sheet merely asks a question whether the people approve a shift from the BicameralPresidential to the Unicameral- Parliamentary system of government. The signature sheet does not show to the
people the draft of the proposed changes before they are asked to sign the signature sheet. This omission is fatal.
The initiative violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution disallowing revision through initiatives
Article XVII of the Constitution speaks of three modes of amending the Constitution. The first mode is through
Congress upon three-fourths vote of all its Members. The second mode is through a constitutional convention. The
third mode is through a peoples initiative.
Section 1 of Article XVII, referring to the first and second modes, applies to any amendment to, or revision of, this
Constitution. In contrast, Section 2 of Article XVII, referring to the third mode, applies only to amendments to this
Constitution. This distinction was intentional as shown by the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. A
peoples initiative to change the Constitution applies only to an amendment of the Constitution and not to its revision.
In contrast, Congress or a constitutional convention can propose both amendments and revisions to the Constitution.
Does the Lambino Groups initiative constitute a revision of the Constitution?
Yes. By any legal test and under any jurisdiction, a shift from a Bicameral-Presidential to a Unicameral-Parliamentary
system, involving the abolition of the Office of the President and the abolition of one chamber of Congress, is beyond
doubt a revision, not a mere amendment.
Tests to determine whether amendment or revision
In California where the initiative clause allows amendments but not revisions to the constitution just like in our
Constitution, courts have developed a two-part test:
Quantitative testasks whether the proposed change is so extensive in its provisions as to change directly the
substantial entirety of the constitution by the deletion or alteration of numerous existing provisions. The court
examines only the number of provisions affected and does not consider the degree of the change.
Qualitative testinquires whether the change will accomplish such far reaching changes in the nature of our basic

governmental plan as to amount to a revision. Whether there is an alteration in the structure of government is a
proper subject of inquiry. Thus, a change in the nature of the basic governmental plan includes change in its
fundamental framework or the fundamental powers of its Branches. A change in the nature of the basic governmental
plan also includes changes that jeopardize the traditional form of government and the system of check and balances.
Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests, the Lambino Groups initiative is a revision and not merely an
amendment. Quantitatively, the Lambino Groups proposed changes overhaul two articles Article VI on the
Legislature and Article VII on the Executive affecting a total of 105 provisions in the entire Constitution.
Qualitatively, the proposed changes alter substantially the basic plan of government, from presidential to
parliamentary, and from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature.
A change in the structure of government is a revision
A change in the structure of government is a revision of the Constitution, as when the three great co-equal branches
of government in the present Constitution are reduced into two. This alters the separation of powers in the
Constitution. A shift from the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system is a
revision of the Constitution. Merging the legislative and executive branches is a radical change in the structure of
government. The abolition alone of the Office of the President as the locus of Executive Power alters the separation
of powers and thus constitutes a revision of the Constitution. Likewise, the abolition alone of one chamber of
Congress alters the system of checks-and-balances within the legislature and constitutes a revision of the
Constitution.
The Lambino Group theorizes that the difference between amendment and revision is only one of procedure, not of
substance. The Lambino Group posits that when a deliberative body drafts and proposes changes to the Constitution,
substantive changes are called revisions because members of the deliberative body work full-time on the changes.
The same substantive changes, when proposed through an initiative, are called amendments because the changes
are made by ordinary people who do not make an occupation, profession, or vocation out of such endeavor. The SC,
however, ruled that the express intent of the framers and the plain language of the Constitution contradict the
Lambino Groups theory. Where the intent of the framers and the language of the Constitution are clear and plainly
stated, courts do not deviate from such categorical intent and language.
Alternative digest:
Issue:

Whether or Not the Lambino Groups initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on
amendments to the Constitution through a peoples initiative.

Whether or Not this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 incomplete, inadequate or wanting
in essential terms and conditions to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution.
Whether or Not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to the Lambino Groups
petition.

Held: According to the SC the Lambino group failed to comply with the basic requirements for conducting a peoples
initiative. The Court held that the COMELEC did not grave abuse of discretion on dismissing the Lambino petition.

1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct Proposal by the
People

The petitioners failed to show the court that the initiative signer must be informed at the time of the signing of the
nature and effect, failure to do so is deceptive and misleading which renders the initiative void.

2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing Revision through Initiatives

The framers of the constitution intended a clear distinction between amendment and revision, it is intended that the
third mode of stated in sec 2 art 17 of the constitution may propose only amendments to the constitution. Merging of
the legislative and the executive is a radical change, therefore a constitutes a revision.

3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary

Even assuming that RA 6735 is valid, it will not change the result because the present petition violated Sec 2 Art 17
to be a valid initiative, must first comply with the constitution before complying with RA 6735

Petition is dismissed.

2. Ampatuan, Jr. v. De Lima et. al.,

- Consistent with the principle of separation of powers, the Supreme Court held that it is
sound judicial policy not to interfere in the conduct of the preliminary investigation
conducted by the DOJ.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 197291, April 03, 2013]
DATU ANDAL AMPATUAN JR., Petitioner, v. SEC. LEILA DE LIMA, AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, CSP CLARO ARELLANO, AS CHIEF STATE PROSECUTOR, NATIONAL PROSECUTION SERVICE,
AND PANEL OF PROSECUTORS OF THE MAGUINDANAO MASSACRE, HEADED BY RSP PETER
MEDALLE, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
In matters involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, mandamus cannot be used to direct the manner or the
particular way the judgment and discretion are to be exercised. Consequently, the Secretary of Justice may be

compelled by writ of mandamus to act on a letter-request or a motion to include a person in the information, but may
not be compelled by writ of mandamus to act in a certain way, i.e., to grant or deny such letter-request or motion.
The Case
This direct appeal by petition for review on certiorari has been taken from the final order issued on June 27, 2011 in
1
Civil Case No. 10-124777 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 26, in Manila, dismissing petitioners petition
2
for mandamus. cralawvllred
Antecedents
History will never forget the atrocities perpetrated on November 23, 2009, when 57 innocent civilians were massacred
in Sitio Masalay, Municipality of Ampatuan, Maguindanao Province. Among the principal suspects was petitioner,
then the Mayor of the Municipality of Datu Unsay, Maguindanao Province. Inquest proceedings were conducted
against petitioner on November 26, 2009 at the General Santos (Tambler) Airport Lounge, before he was flown to
Manila and detained at the main office of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). The NBI and the Philippine
National Police (PNP) charged other suspects, numbering more than a hundred, for what became aptly known as the
3
Maguindanao massacre. cralawvllred
Through Department Order No. 948, then Secretary of Justice Agnes Devanadera constituted a Special Panel of
Prosecutors to conduct the preliminary investigation.
On November 27, 2009, the Department of Justice (DOJ) resolved to file the corresponding informations for murder
4
against petitioner, and to issue subpoenae to several persons. On December 1, 2009, 25 informations for murder
5
were also filed against petitioner in the Regional Trial Court, 12th Judicial Region, in Cotabato City. cralawvllred
On December 3, 2009, Secretary of Justice Devanadera transmitted her letter to Chief Justice Puno requesting the
transfer of the venue of the trial of the Maguindanao massacre from Cotabato City to Metro Manila, either in Quezon
6
City or in Manila, to prevent a miscarriage of justice. On December 8, 2009, the Court granted the request for the
7
transfer of venue. However, on December 9, 2009, but prior to the transfer of the venue of the trial to Metro Manila,
the Prosecution filed a manifestation regarding the filing of 15 additional informations for murder against petitioner in
8
Branch 15 of the Cotabato City RTC. Later on, additional informations for murder were filed against petitioner in the
9
RTC in Quezon City, Branch 211, the new venue of the trial pursuant to the resolution of the Court. cralawvllred
The records show that petitioner pleaded not guilty to each of the 41 informations for murder when he was arraigned
10
11
12
on January 5, 2010, February 3, 2010, and July 28, 2010. cralawvllred
In the joint resolution issued on February 5, 2010, the Panel of Prosecutors charged 196 individuals with multiple
13
murder in relation to the Maguindanao massacre. It appears that in issuing the joint resolution of February 5, 2010
the Panel of Prosecutors partly relied on the twin affidavits of one Kenny Dalandag, both dated December 7,
14
2009. cralawvllred
15

On August 13, 2010, Dalandag was admitted into the Witness Protection Program of the DOJ. On September 7,
16
2010, the QC RTC issued its amended pre-trial order, wherein Dalandag was listed as one of the Prosecution
17
witnesses. cralawvllred
On October 14, 2010, petitioner, through counsel, wrote to respondent Secretary of Justice Leila De Lima and
Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Richard Fadullon to request the inclusion of Dalandag in the informations for murder
considering that Dalandag had already confessed his participation in the massacre through his two sworn
18
19
declarations. Petitioner reiterated the request twice more on October 22, 2010 and November 2,
20
2010. cralawvllred
By her letter dated November 2, 2010,

21

however, Secretary De Lima denied petitioners request.

Accordingly, on December 7, 2010, petitioner brought a petition for mandamus in the RTC in Manila (Civil Case No.
22
10-124777), seeking to compel respondents to charge Dalandag as another accused in the various murder cases
undergoing trial in the QC RTC.
23

On January 19, 2011, the RTC in Manila set a pre-trial conference on January 24, 2011 in Civil Case No. 10124777. At the close of the pre-trial, the RTC in Manila issued a pre-trial order.
In their manifestation and motion dated February 15, 2011

24

and February 18, 2011,

25

respondents questioned the

propriety of the conduct of a trial in a proceeding for mandamus. Petitioner opposed.

26

On February 15, 2011, petitioner filed a motion for the production of documents, which the RTC in Manila granted
on March 21, 2011 after respondents did not file either a comment or an opposition.
Respondents then sought the reconsideration of the order of March 21, 2011.
27

On March 21, 2011, the RTC in Manila issued a subpoena to Dalandag, care of the Witness Protection Program of
the DOJ, requiring him to appear and testify on April 4, 2011 in Civil Case No. 10-124777.
28

On April 4, 2011, respondents moved to quash the subpoena. Petitioner opposed the motion to quash the
29
subpoena on April 15, 2011. The parties filed other papers, specifically, respondents their reply dated April 26,
30
31
32
2011; petitioner an opposition on May 12, 2011; and respondents another reply dated May 20, 2011. cralawvllred
33

On June 27, 2011, the RTC of Manila issued the assailed order in Civil Case No. 10-124777 dismissing the petition
34
for mandamus. cralawvllred
Hence, this appeal by petition for review on certiorari.
Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues, to wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
1.

WHETHER THE PUBLIC RESPONDENTS MAY BE COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS TO INVESTIGATE

AND PROSECUTE KENNY DALANDAG AS AN ACCUSED IN THE INFORMATIONS FOR MULTIPLE
MURDER IN THE MAGUINADANAO MASSACRE CASES IN LIGHT OF HIS ADMITTED PARTICIPATION
THEREAT IN AFFIDAVITS AND OFFICIAL RECORDS FILED WITH THE PROSECUTOR AND THE QC
RTC; and,

2.

WHETHER THE SUBSEQUENT INCLUSION OF KENNY DALANDAG IN THE WITNESS PROTECTION

PROGRAM JUSTIFIES EXCLUSION AS AN ACCUSED AND HIS NON-INDICTMENT FOR HIS
COMPLICITY IN THE MAGUINDANAO MASSACRE NOTWITHSTANDING ADMISSIONS MADE THAT HE
35
TOOK PART IN ITS PLANNING AND EXECUTION.

The crucial issue is whether respondents may be compelled by writ of mandamus to charge Dalandag as an accused
for multiple murder in relation to the Maguindanao massacre despite his admission to the Witness Protection
Program of the DOJ.
Ruling
The appeal lacks merit.
The prosecution of crimes pertains to the Executive Department of the Government whose principal power and
responsibility are to see to it that our laws are faithfully executed. A necessary component of the power to execute
our laws is the right to prosecute their violators. The right to prosecute vests the public prosecutors with a wide range
of discretion the discretion of what and whom to charge, the exercise of which depends on a smorgasbord of
36
factors that are best appreciated by the public prosecutors. The public prosecutors are solely responsible for the
determination of the amount of evidence sufficient to establish probable cause to justify the filing of appropriate
criminal charges against a respondent. Theirs is also the quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether or not
37
criminal cases should be filed in court. cralawvllred
Consistent with the principle of separation of powers enshrined in the Constitution, the Court deems it a sound judicial
policy not to interfere in the conduct of preliminary investigations, and to allow the Executive Department, through the
Department of Justice, exclusively to determine what constitutes sufficient evidence to establish probable cause for
the prosecution of supposed offenders. By way of exception, however, judicial review may be allowed where it is
clearly established that the public prosecutor committed grave abuse of discretion, that is, when he has exercised his
discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, patent
and gross enough as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by
38
law. cralawvllred

The records herein are bereft of any showing that the Panel of Prosecutors committed grave abuse of discretion in
identifying the 196 individuals to be indicted for the Maguindanao massacre. It is notable in this regard that petitioner
does not assail the joint resolution recommending such number of individuals to be charged with multiple murder, but
only seeks to have Dalandag be also investigated and charged as one of the accused based because of his own
admissions in his sworn declarations. However, his exclusion as an accused from the informations did not at all
amount to grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Panel of Prosecutors whose procedure in excluding Dalandag
as an accused was far from arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic. Section 2, Rule 110 of the Rules of
Court, which requires that the complaint or information shall be xxx against all persons who appear to be responsible
for the offense involved, albeit a mandatory provision, may be subject of some exceptions, one of which is when a
participant in the commission of a crime becomes a state witness.
The two modes by which a participant in the commission of a crime may become a state witness are, namely: (a) by
discharge from the criminal case pursuant to Section 17 of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court; and (b) by the approval of
his application for admission into the Witness Protection Program of the DOJ in accordance with Republic Act No.
39
6981 (The Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Act). These modes are intended to encourage a person who
has witnessed a crime or who has knowledge of its commission to come forward and testify in court or quasi-judicial
body, or before an investigating authority, by protecting him from reprisals, and shielding him from economic
dislocation.
These modes, while seemingly alike, are distinct and separate from each other.
Under Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, the discharge by the trial court of one or more of several accused
with their consent so that they can be witnesses for the State is made upon motion by the Prosecution before resting
its case. The trial court shall require the Prosecution to present evidence and the sworn statements of the proposed
witnesses at a hearing in support of the discharge. The trial court must ascertain if the following conditions fixed by
Section 17 of Rule 119 are complied with, namely: (a) there is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused
whose discharge is requested; (b) there is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense
committed, except the testimony of said accused; (c) the testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated
in its material points; (d) said accused does not appear to be most guilty; and (e) said accused has not at any time
been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.
On the other hand, Section 10 of Republic Act No. 6981 provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Section 10. State Witness. Any person who has participated in the commission of a crime and desires to be a
witness for the State, can apply and, if qualified as determined in this Act and by the Department, shall be admitted
into the Program whenever the following circumstances are present:cralaw
a. the offense in which his testimony will be used is a grave felony as defined under the Revised Penal Code or its
equivalent under special laws;cralawlibrary
b. there is absolute necessity for his testimony;cralawlibrary
c. there is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed;cralawlibrary
d. his testimony can be substantially corroborated on its material points;cralawlibrary
e. he does not appear to be most guilty; and
f. he has not at any time been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude.
An accused discharged from an information or criminal complaint by the court in order that he may be a State
Witness pursuant to Section 9 and 10 of Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court may upon his petition be admitted to
the Program if he complies with the other requirements of this Act. Nothing in this Act shall prevent the discharge of
an accused, so that he can be used as a State Witness under Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Save for the circumstance covered by paragraph (a) of Section 10, supra, the requisites under both rules are
essentially the same. Also worth noting is that an accused discharged from an information by the trial court pursuant
to Section 17 of Rule 119 may also be admitted to the Witness Protection Program of the DOJ provided he complies
with the requirements of Republic Act No. 6981.
A participant in the commission of the crime, to be discharged to become a state witness pursuant to Rule 119, must
be one charged as an accused in the criminal case. The discharge operates as an acquittal of the discharged

accused and shall be a bar to his future prosecution for the same offense, unless he fails or refuses to testify against
40
his co-accused in accordance with his sworn statement constituting the basis for his discharge. The discharge is
expressly left to the sound discretion of the trial court, which has the exclusive responsibility to see to it that the
41
conditions prescribed by the rules for that purpose exist. cralawvllred
While it is true that, as a general rule, the discharge or exclusion of a co-accused from the information in order that he
42
may be utilized as a Prosecution witness rests upon the sound discretion of the trial court, such discretion is not
43
absolute and may not be exercised arbitrarily, but with due regard to the proper administration of justice. Anent the
requisite that there must be an absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is sought, the
trial court has to rely on the suggestions of and the information provided by the public prosecutor. The reason is
obvious the public prosecutor should know better than the trial court, and the Defense for that matter, which of the
several accused would best qualify to be discharged in order to become a state witness. The public prosecutor is
44
also supposed to know the evidence in his possession and whomever he needs to establish his case, as well as the
availability or non-availability of other direct or corroborative evidence, which of the accused is the most guilty one,
45
and the like. cralawvllred
On the other hand, there is no requirement under Republic Act No. 6981 for the Prosecution to first charge a person
in court as one of the accused in order for him to qualify for admission into the Witness Protection Program. The
admission as a state witness under Republic Act No. 6981 also operates as an acquittal, and said witness cannot
subsequently be included in the criminal information except when he fails or refuses to testify. The immunity for the
state witness is granted by the DOJ, not by the trial court. Should such witness be meanwhile charged in court as an
accused, the public prosecutor, upon presentation to him of the certification of admission into the Witness Protection
46
Program, shall petition the trial court for the discharge of the witness. The Court shall then order the discharge and
47
exclusion of said accused from the information. cralawvllred
The admission of Dalandag into the Witness Protection Program of the Government as a state witness since August
13, 2010 was warranted by the absolute necessity of his testimony to the successful prosecution of the criminal
charges. Apparently, all the conditions prescribed by Republic Act No. 6981 were met in his case. That he admitted
his participation in the commission of the Maguindanao massacre was no hindrance to his admission into the Witness
Protection Program as a state witness, for all that was necessary was for him to appear not the most guilty.
Accordingly, he could not anymore be charged for his participation in the Maguindanao massacre, as to which his
admission operated as an acquittal, unless he later on refuses or fails to testify in accordance with the sworn
statement that became the basis for his discharge against those now charged for the crimes.
Mandamus shall issue when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of
an act that the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station. It is proper when the act
against which it is directed is one addressed to the discretion of the tribunal or officer. In matters involving the
exercise of judgment and discretion, mandamus may only be resorted to in order to compel respondent tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person to take action, but it cannot be used to direct the manner or the particular way
48
discretion is to be exercised, or to compel the retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of
49
judgment or discretion. cralawvllred
As such, respondent Secretary of Justice may be compelled to act on the letter-request of petitioner, but may not be
compelled to act in a certain way, i.e., to grant or deny such letter-request. Considering that respondent Secretary of
Justice already denied the letter-request, mandamus was no longer available as petitioners recourse.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari; AFFIRMS the final order issued on June 27,
2011 in Civil Case No. 10-124777 by the Regional Trial Court in Manila; andORDERS petitioner to pay the costs of
suit.???r?bl? ??r??l l?? l?br?r
SO ORDERED.

3. Republic v. Bayaoet. al.,

The relocation of a government center is a prerogative of the executive branch unless the
implementation is contrary to law, morals, public policy and the Court cannot intervene in the
legitimate exercise of such power.

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. NO. 179492, June 05, 2013

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY ABUSAMA M. ALID, OFFICER-IN-CHARGE,

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE-REGIONAL-FIELD UNIT XII (DA-RFU XII), Petitioner, v.ABDULWAHAB A.
BAYAO, OSMEA I. MONTAER, RAKMA B. BUISAN, HELEN M. ALVARES, NEILA P. LIMBA, ELIZABETH B.
PUSTA, ANNA MAE A.. SIDENO, UDTOG B. TABONG, JOHN S. KAMENZA, DELIA R. SUBALDO, DAYANG W.
MACMOD, FLORENCE S. TAYUAN, IN THEIR OWN BEHALF AND IN BEHALF OF THE OTHER OFFICIALS AND
EMPLOYEES OF DA-RFU XII,Respondents.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed under Rule 45. This Petition prays for the reversal and setting
aside of the Court of Appeals' (1) Resolution dated March 21, 2007 that dismissed the Petition for Certiorari under
Rule 65 filed by petitioner for failure to resort to a Motion for Reconsideration of the assailed trial court Order dated
October 9, 2006 and (2) Resolution dated August 16, 2007 denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
Petitioner Department of AgricultureRegional Field Unit XII (DA-RFU XII) is a government office mandated to
implement the laws, policies, plans, programs, rules, and regulations of the Department of Agriculture in its regional
1
area, while respondents are officials and employees of DA-RFU XII. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On March 30, 2004, Executive Order (E.O.) No. 304 was passed designating Koronadal City as the regional center
2
and seat of SOCCSKSARGEN Region. It provides that all departments, bureaus, and offices of the national
government in the SOCCSKSARGEN Region shall transfer their regional seat of operations to Koronadal
3
City. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In an April 1, 2005 Memorandum, the Department of Agriculture (DA) Undersecretary for Operations Edmund J. Sana
directed Officer-in- Charge (OIC) and Regional Executive Director of DA-RFU XII Abusama M. Alid as
follows:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In compliance with Executive Order No. 304 of which Section 2 states "Transfer of Regional Offices. All departments,
bureaus and offices of the National Government on the SOCCSKSARGEN Region shall transfer their regional seat of
operations to Koronadal City," you are hereby directed to immediately effect the transfer of the administrative, finance
and operations base of RFU XII from Cotabato City to Koronadal City. On the interim, part of the staff can temporarily
hold office at either or both the ATI building in Tantangan and Tupi Seed Farm, but the main office shall be within
Koronadal City.
The action plan for transfer should be submitted to my office not later than 6 April 2005 so that appropriate funding
can be processed soonest. Further, execution of the plan should commence by 16 April 2005 or earlier so that
concerned personnel can benefit from the summer break to make personal arrangements for the transfer of their
work base.
For strict compliance.

In a Memorandum dated April 22, 2005 addressed to DA Secretary Arthur Yap, private respondents opposed the
5
implementation of the April 1, 2005 Memorandum. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
They alleged that in 2004, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo made a pronouncement during one of her visits
6
in Cotabato City that the regional seat of Region 12 shall remain in Cotabato City. Only three departments were not
covered by the suspension of E.O. No. 304, namely, the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), Department of
7
Tourism (DOT), and Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Respondents alleged further in their Memorandum to the DA Secretary that on March 7, 2005, they appealed to the
Secretary of Agriculture that the implementation of E.O. No. 304 be held in abeyance. A copy of the Petition was
attached to the Memorandum. It cited reasons such as the huge costs the physical transfer will entail and the plight of
8
employees who have already settled and established their homes in Cotabato City. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On March 8, 2005, their Petition was endorsed by Department of Agriculture Employees Association-12 (DAEAS-12)
President Osmea I. Motaer to then President Macapagal-Arroyo, and on April 12, 2005, this was referred to DA
9
Secretary Yap for his information and appropriate action. Respondents justified their appeal saying that a building
was constructed in Cotabato City that can accommodate the whole staff of DA- RFU XII. On the other hand, there is
10
no building yet in Koronadal City where rent is very expensive. Moreover, if the regional office remains in Cotabato

City, the government need not spend over P7,200,000.00 as dislocation pay as well as other expenses for equipment
11
hauling and construction. Finally, respondents alleged that the proposed third floor of the ATI Building in Tantangan
has a sub-standard foundation and will not be issued a certificate of occupancy by the City Engineering Office of
12
Koronadal City as per information from an auditor. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On May 17, 2005, OIC Abusama M. Alid held a meeting and ordered the transfer of the regional office to ATI Building
in Tantangan and Tupi Seed Farm in Tupi, both located in South Cotabato and Uptown, Koronadal City, to be carried
13
out on May 21, 2005. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
This prompted respondents to file on May 18, 2005 a Complaint for Injunction with Prayer for Issuance of Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 of Cotabato
14
City. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
By Order dated October 9, 2006, the trial court granted respondents' Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary
15
Injunction. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
16

In a petition dated December 17, 2006, petitioner went to the Court of Appeals via Rule 65 on the ground that the
assailed Order of the trial court is contrary to the pronouncement of this Court inDENR v. DENR Region 12
Employees.
Through the March 21, 2007 Resolution, the Court of Appeals dismissed the Petition for Certiorari for failure of
17
petitioner to resort to a Motion for Reconsideration of the assailed trial court Order. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Hence, the present Petition under Rule 45.
Petitioner argues that (1) this case falls under the exceptions for filing a Motion for Reconsideration prior to filing a
Petition under Rule 65; (2) the trial court Order enjoining the transfer is contrary toDENR v. DENR Region 12
18
Employees that upheld the separation of powers between the executive and judiciary on the wisdom of transfer of
regional offices; (3) the trial court interfered into this wisdom of the executive in the management of its affairs; and (4)
the trial court disregarded basic rules on amendment and revocation of administrative issuances and the propriety of
19
injunction as a remedy. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In their Comment, respondents counter that a Petition via Rule 45 is not the proper remedy to assail the disputed
20
Resolutions. They allege that the assailed Court of Appeals Resolution dismissing the Petition for Certiorari for
failure of the petitioners to file a Motion for Reconsideration is not a "final order or resolution" contemplated by Rule
21
22
45. It is not an adjudication on the merits. In fact, the Court of Appeals did not even attempt to resolve the
23
propriety of the issuance of the assailed trial court Order. In any case, respondents argue that petitioner's failure to
file a Motion for Reconsideration is fatal. They contend that this is a condition sine qua non for a Petition under Rule
24
65, and none of the exceptions are present in this case. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Based on both parties' contentions, the issues involved in this case may be summarized as
follows:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
I.

Whether a Petition via Rule 45 is the proper remedy to assail the disputed Resolutions

II.

Whether the present case falls within the exceptions on the requisite for filing a Motion for Reconsideration
prior to filing a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65

III.

Whether petitioner can raise other issues not addressed in the assailed Resolutions

IV.

Whether the issuance by the RTC of a preliminary injunction against the transfer of the DA Regional Office
to Koronadal City violates the separation of powers between the executive department and the judiciary as
to the wisdom behind the transfer

First, we discuss the procedural issues.

25

Respondents contend that a Petition via Rule 45 is not the proper remedy to assail the disputed Resolutions. They
allege that the assailed Court of Appeals Resolution dismissing the Petition forCertiorari for failure of the petitioners to
file a Motion for Reconsideration is not a "final order or resolution" contemplated by Rule
26
45. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On the other hand, petitioner argues that if the assailed Resolutions are not elevated via Rule 45, they would attain
finality and consequently, the trial court Order dated October 9, 2006 would become unassailable as
27
well. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
A dismissal by the Court of Appeals of a Petition via Rule 65 for failure to file a Motion for Reconsideration may be
assailed via Rule 45.
Unlike a Petition via Rule 45 that is a continuation of the appellate process over the original case, a special civil
28
action for certiorari under Rule 65 is an original or independent action. Consequently, the March 21, 2007
Resolution of the Court of Appeals dismissing the Petition via Rule 65 as well as its August 16, 2007 Resolution
denying reconsideration are the final Resolutions contemplated under Rule 45. As correctly pointed out by petitioner,
these Resolutions would attain finality if these are not elevated on appeal via Rule 45. As a result, the trial court
29
Order dated October 9, 2006 would also become unassailable. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Respondents also argue that petitioner's failure to file a Motion for Reconsideration of the assailed Regional Trial
30
Court Order dated October 9, 2006 is fatal. They contend that the reasons raised by petitioner do not justify
31
dispensing with the prerequisite of filing a Motion for Reconsideration. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
For its part, petitioner argues that its Petition for Certiorari filed before the Court of Appeals falls under the exceptions
32
to the necessity of filing a Motion for Reconsideration. In its Petition with the Court of Appeals, petitioners explained
its reasons for no longer filing a Motion for Reconsideration of the assailed order in that (a) the questions to be raised
33
in the motion have already been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court and (b) there is urgent necessity
34
for the resolution of the questions or issues raised. Petitioners allege that the trial court presiding judge was not
acting on the disposition of the case with dispatch and that any further delay would unduly prejudice the interests of
35
the government in pursuing its economic development strategies in the region. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The settled rule is that a Motion for Reconsideration is a condition sine qua non for the filing of a Petition
36
for Certiorari. Its purpose is to grant an opportunity for the court to correct any actual or perceived error attributed to
37
it by re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
This rule admits well-defined exceptions as follows:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Concededly, the settled rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non for the filing of a petition
for certiorari.
Its purpose is to grant an opportunity for the court to correct any actual or perceived error attributed to it by the reexamination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case. The rule is, however, circumscribed by well-defined
exceptions, such as (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b)where the
questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are
the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution
of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the
subject matter of the action is perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be
useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a
criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g)
where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceeding were ex
parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or
38
where public interest is involved. (Emphasis provided)
The second exception is present in this case.
39

In Siok Ping Tang v. Subic Bay Distribution, Inc., this Court found that the non-filing of a Motion for Reconsideration
in the case was not fatal since the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have already been duly raised and
passed upon by the lower court, viz:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Respondent explained their omission of filing a motion for reconsideration before resorting to a petition
for certiorari based on exceptions (b), (c) and (i). The CA brushed aside the filing of the motion for reconsideration
based on the ground that the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon
by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court. We agree.
Respondent had filed its position paper in the RTC stating the reasons why the injunction prayed for by petitioner
should not be granted. However, the RTC granted the injunction. Respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the CA

and presented the same arguments which were already passed upon by the RTC. The RTC already had the
opportunity to consider and rule on the question of the propriety or impropriety of the issuance of the injunction. We
found no reversible error committed by the CA for relaxing the rule since respondent's case falls within the
40
exceptions.
Similarly, the various issues raised in the Petition with the Court of Appeals have already been raised by petitioner on
several occasions through its pleadings with the trial court. The lower court, therefore, passed upon them prior to its
issuance of its Order dated October 9, 2006. Specifically, the table below summarizes the issues and arguments
raised by petitioner before the trial court vis a vis those raised in the Petition for Certiorari filed with the Court of
Appeals:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
TRIAL COURT
Motion to Dismiss

41

Memorandum

42

COURT OF APPEALS
43

Manifestation and Reply

Petition for Certiorari

44

dated June 27, 2005

dated September 1, 2006

dated September 5, 2006

dated December 17, 2006

The Honorable Supreme

Court had already ruled that
the propriety or wisdom of
the transfer of government
agencies or offices from
Cotabato City to Koronadal,
South Cotabato is beyond
45
judicial inquiry.

The instant complaint filed

by plaintiffs for injunction is
an indirect way of
preventing the transfer of
the regional seat of DARFU XII which has been
upheld by the Supreme
Court in DENR v. DENR
Region 12 Employees (409
SCRA 359 [2003]). If this
Honorable Court cannot
countermand the Supreme
Court's ruling directly, it
46
cannot do so indirectly.

To reiterate, the Supreme

Court has held in the
applicable case of DENR v.
DENR Region 12
Employees (409 SCRA 359
[2003])that respondent
DENR employees "cannot,
by means of an injunction,
force the DENR XII
Regional Offices to remain
in Cotabato City, as the
exercise of the authority to
transfer the same is
executive in nature." The
Supreme Court further
stated in said case that "the
judiciary cannot inquire into
the wisdom or expediency
of the acts of the executive
or the legislative
47
department."

Respondent judge
committed grave abuse of
discretion to lack or excess
of jurisdiction when he
enjoined petitioner from
transferring DA-RFU XII
from Cotabato City to South
Cotabato and Koronadal
City. The assailed order of
the lower court enjoining
petitioner from transferring
the seat of the DA-RFU XII
office to Koronadal City in
South Cotabato is contrary
to the pronouncement of
the Supreme Court inDENR
v. DENR Region 12
Employees (409 SCRA 359
48
[2003]).

Corollary to the above, the

Order dated May 31, 2005
of this Honorable Court
enjoining defendants from
transferring the seat of the
DA-RFU XII office to
Koronadal City in South
Cotabato is contrary to the
above pronouncement of
the Supreme Court.
Perforce, the Order must be
49
set aside accordingly.
The allegation under
Paragraph 4 of the
Complaint that her
Excellency, President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
only made a public
pronouncement that the
effect of E.O. No. 304 is
suspended is hearsay and
contrary to the procedure
on the repeal, amendment

Executive orders are

amended, modified or
revoked by subsequent
ones. The alleged public
pronouncement of the
President suspending the
implementation of
Executive Order No. 304 is
contrary to the ordinance
power of the President as
provided under the

Respondent judge acted

arbitrarily, whimsically and
in a very bias[ed] manner
when he concluded that the
President of the Republic
has suspended the
implementation of
52
Executive Order No. 304.

or modification of rules and Administrative Code of

50
51
regulations.
1987.
By the nature of their
appointment as Regional
Officials and Employees,
plaintiffs can be reassigned
anywhere within Region XII
in the exigency of the
53
service.

There is absolutely no

Respondent judge
committed grave abuse of
discretion when he
concluded that the transfer
of DA-RFU XII to Koronadal
City will affect seriously the
studies of respondents'
children and that there will
be no buildings to house
54
respondents.
The allegation of possible
injury to plaintiffs and their
families as a consequence
of the planned transfer of
the regional seat of DARFU XII to Koronadal City
had been ruled upon by the
Supreme Court inDENR v.
DENR Region 12
Employees (409 SCRA 359
[2003]) to be beyond
judicial inquiry because it
involves concerns that are
more on the propriety or
wisdom of the transfer
55
rather than on its legality.

If the plight and conditions

of the families of the DENR
employees are worth
considering, like the
dislocation of schooling of
their children, which without
doubt has more adverse
impact than the supposed
absence of allowances for
the transfer, the Supreme
Court should have granted
the injunction prayed for by
said DENR employees.

The families of the

employees can still stay in
Cotabato City in as much
as they have established
residences in the area. It
must be emphasized that
the employees derive
salaries and benefits from
their government work, from
which they support their
families. The movement of
employees thus would not
cause much financial
dislocation as long as the
employees received their
57
salaries and benefits.

The Honorable Court must

further realize that the
employees are being paid
their salaries. In the given
order of things, such
salaries are enough to
provide for their basic
necessities. The Regional
Office can simply provide
for transportation to
effectuate the minimum
required for the transfer to
Koronadal City and expect
the employees to live on
their salaries. Any
allowances due and owing
the employees connected
with the transfer can be
given to them later as back
payments. This is not to
forget that the Regional
Office has provided
temporary housing for said
employees to alleviate any
inconvenience that they
58
may suffer.

The issues on the alleged

Apparently, the Supreme

Court did not find it
compelling to grant the
injunction over and above
the wisdom of the
56
transfer.
Respondent judge
committed grave abuse of
discretion when he
concluded that the transfer
of DA-RFU XII would
stretch out the meager
salaries of respondents and
that it would cause them
59
economic strangulation.

Respondent judge

technical malversation in
the realignment of
budgetary allocation for the
intended transfer of DARFU XII to Koronadal
60
City.

illegal realignment of funds,

unauthorized issuance of
memorandum and the
alleged unjust transfer of
employees of DA-RFU XII
are acts that are executive
61
in nature x x x.

committed grave abuse of

discretion when he ordered
the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction based
on the absence of
appropriation for the
transfer to Koronadal City in
the amount of
62
P9,250,000.00.

x x x the funds needed for

the transfer can be sourced
and met by the DA from
sources such as the
discretionary administrative
fund of the Office of the
Secretary.
Respondent's computation
of the amount required for
the transfer in the amount
of P9,222,000.00 is bloated
63
or exaggerated.
Respondents who are
accountable officers cannot
be coerced to transfer funds
that are deemed illegal or
improper. Hence, no
personal liability or
irreparable injury would be
caused upon them. On the
other hand, the rest of
respondents who are
ordinary employees would
not suffer any irreparable
injury. This is due to the fact
that they have no privity to
the alleged illegal transfer
64
of funds.

Respondent judge
committed grave abuse of
discretion when he
concluded that respondents
would suffer irreparable
damage if the transfer of
DA-RFU XII from Cotabato
City to Koronadal City is not
65
enjoined.

Thus, the present case falls under the second exception in that a Motion for Reconsideration need not be filed where
questions raised in the certiorari proceedings are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court.
In any case, this Court disregards the presence of procedural flaws when there is necessity to address the issues
because of the demands of public interest, including the need for stability in the public service and the serious
implications the case may cause on the effective administration of the executive
66
department. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The instant Petition involves the effective administration of the executive department and would similarly warrant
relaxation of procedural rules if need be. Specifically, the fourth clause of E.O. No. 304 states as follows:
"WHEREAS, the political and socio-economic conditions in SOCCSKSARGEN Region point to the need for
designating the regional center and seat of the region to improve government operations and
67
services." chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Respondents' final contention is that the disputed Resolutions issued by the Court of Appeals dwell solely on the
indispensability of the filing of a Motion for Reconsideration with the trial court before filing a Petition via Rule 65;
68
thus, the other grounds in the present Petition need not be addressed. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Considering that the Petition has overcome the procedural issues as discussed above, we can now proceed to
discuss the substantive issues raised by petitioner.

Petitioner argues that the assailed Order of the trial court enjoining it from transferring the seat of the DA-RFU XII
Regional Office to Koronadal City is contrary to this Court's pronouncement in DENR v. DENR Region 12
Employees upholding the separation of powers of the executive department and the judiciary when it comes to the
69
wisdom of transfer of regional offices. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
This Court has held that while the power to merge administrative regions is not provided for expressly in the
Constitution, it is a power which has traditionally been lodged with the President to facilitate the exercise of the power
70
71
of general supervision over local governments. This power of supervision is found in the Constitution as well as in
the Local Government Code of 1991, as follows:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Section 25 National Supervision over Local Government Units
(a) Consistent with the basic policy on local autonomy, the President shall exercise general supervision over local
government units to ensure that their acts are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions.
The President shall exercise supervisory authority directly over provinces, highly urbanized cities, and independent
component cities; through the province with respect to component cities and municipalities; and through the city and
72
municipality with respect to barangays.
In Chiongbian v. Orbos, we held further that the power of the President to reorganize administrative regions carries
73
with it the power to determine the regional center. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The case of DENR v. DENR Region 12 Employees is in point. This Court held that the DENR Secretary can
reorganize validly the DENR by ordering the transfer of the DENR XII Regional Offices from Cotabato City to
74
Koronadal, South Cotabato. We also found as follows:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
It may be true that the transfer of the offices may not be timely considering that: (1) there are no buildings yet to
house the regional offices in Koronadal, (2) the transfer falls on the month of Ramadan, (3) the children of the
affected employees are already enrolled in schools in Cotabato City, (4) the Regional Development Council was not
consulted, and (5) the Sangguniang Panglungsod, through a resolution, requested the DENR Secretary to reconsider
the orders. However, these concern issues addressed to the wisdom of the transfer rather than to its legality.
It is basic in our form of government that the judiciary cannot inquire into the wisdom or expediency of the
acts of the executive or the legislative department, for each department is supreme and independent of the others,
and each is devoid of authority not only to encroach upon the powers or field of action assigned to any of the other
department, but also to inquire into or pass upon the advisability or wisdom of the acts performed, measures taken or
75
decisions made by the other departments. (Emphasis provided)
The transfer of the regional center of the SOCCSKSARGEN region to Koronadal City is an executive function.
Similar to DENR v. DENR Region 12 Employees, the issues in the present case are addressed to the wisdom of the
transfer rather than to its legality. Some of these concerns are the lack of a proper and suitable building in Koronadal
to house the DA regional office, the inconvenience of the transfer considering that the children of respondentemployees are already enrolled in Cotabato City schools, and other similar reasons.
76

The judiciary cannot inquire into the wisdom or expediency of the acts of the executive. When the trial court issued
its October 9, 2006 Order granting preliminary injunction on the transfer of the regional center to Koronadal City when
such transfer was mandated by E.O. No. 304, the lower court did precisely that.
The principle of separation of powers ordains that each of the three great government branches has exclusive
77
cognizance of and is supreme in concerns falling within its own constitutionally allocated sphere. The judiciary as
Justice Laurel emphatically asserted "will neither direct nor restrain executive [or legislative] action x x
78
x." chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Finally, a verbal pronouncement to the effect that E.O. No. 304 is suspended should not have been given weight. An
79
executive order is valid when it is not contrary to the law or Constitution. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions of the Cow1of Appeals dated March 21, 2007 and August
16, 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No. 01457-MIN, as well as the Decision dated October 9, 2006 of the Regional Trial Cout1,
Branch 14 of Cotabato City are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.

4. Angara v. Electoral Tribunal, 63 Phil. 139, 158 (1936).

The Court cannot interfere with an independent body like the Electoral Tribunal under the principle of
separation of powers. It is premature for the Court to exercise its power of judicial review until after
the tribunal has terminated its proceedings.
[G.R. No. 45081. July 15, 1936.]
JOSE A. ANGARA, Petitioner, v. THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION, PEDRO YNSUA, MIGUEL
CASTILLO, and DIONISIO C. MAYOR, Respondents.
Godofredo Reyes for Petitioner.
Solicitor-General Hilado for respondent Electoral Commission.
Pedro Ynsua in his own behalf.
No appearance for other respondents.

SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; SEPARATION OF POWERS. The separation of powers is a fundamental
principle in our system of government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our
Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction,
and is supreme within its own sphere.
2. ID.; ID.; SYSTEM OF CHECKS AND BALANCES. But it does not follow from the fact that the three
powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely
unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of
checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of various departments of government. For
example, the Chief Executive under our Constitution is 80 far made a check on the legislative power that his
assent is required in the enactment of laws. This, however, is subject to the further check that a bill may
become a law notwithstanding the refusal of the President to approve it, by a vote of two-thirds or threefourths, as the case may be, of the National Assembly. The President has also the right to convene the
Assembly in special session whenever he chooses. On the other hand, the National Assembly operates as a
check on the Executive in the sense that its consent through its Commission on Appointments is necessary
in the appointment of certain officers; and the concurrence of a majority of all its members is essential to the
conclusion of treaties. Furthermore, in its power to determine what courts other than the Supreme Court
shall be established, to define their jurisdiction and to appropriate funds for their support, the National
Assembly exercises to a certain extent control over the judicial department. The Assembly also exercises
the judicial power of trying impeachments. And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final
arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence
to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; JUDICIARY THE ONLY CONSTITUTIONAL ARBITER TO ALLOCATE CONSTITUTIONAL
BOUNDARIES. But in the main, the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines,
allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the government. The
overlapping and interlacing of functions and duties between the several departments, however, sometimes
makes it hard to say just where the one leaves off and the other begins. In times of social disquietude or
political excitement, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely
obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called
upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among the integral
or constituent units thereof.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; MODERATING POWER OF THE JUDICIARY IS GRANTED, IF NOT EXPRESSLY, BY
CLEAR IMPLICATION. As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking perfection and
perfectibility, but as much as it was within the power of our people, acting through their delegates to so
provide, that instrument which is the expression of their sovereignty however limited, has established a
republican government intended to operate and function as a harmonious whole, under a system of checks
and balances, and subject to specific limitations and restrictions provided in the said instrument. The
Constitution sets forth in no uncertain language the restrictions and limitations upon governmental powers
and agencies. If these restrictions and limitations are transcended, it would be inconceivable if the
Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by which to direct the course of government along
constitutional channels, for, then, the distribution of powers would be mere verbiage, the bill of rights mere

expressions of sentiment, and the principles of good government mere political apothegms. Certainly, the
limitations and restrictions embodied in the Constitution are real as they should be in any living constitution.
In the United States where no express constitutional grant is found in their constitution, the possession of
this moderating power of the courts, not to speak of its historical origin and development there, has been set
at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half centuries. In our case, this
moderating power is granted, if not expressly, by clear implication from section 2 of article VIII of our
Constitution.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; WHAT IS MEANT BY "JUDICIAL SUPREMACY." The Constitution is a definition of the
powers of government. Who is to determine the nature, scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution
itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary
mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments;
it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the Legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred
obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution
and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and
guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly
is the power of judicial review under the Constitution.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; JUDICIAL REVIEW LIMITED TO ACTUAL LITIGATION; WISDOM, JUSTICE OR
EXPEDIENCY OF LEGISLATION. Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and
controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the
constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to
dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its
function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of
legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments not
only because the Legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the
determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as
expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the government.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; SYSTEM ITSELF NOT THE CHIEF PALLADIUM OF CONSTITUTIONAL LIBERTY;
SUCCESS MUST BE TESTED IN THE CRUCIBLE OF FILIPINO MINDS AND HEARTS. But much as we
might postulate on the internal checks of power provided in our Constitution, it ought not the less to be
remembered that, in the language of James Madison, the system itself is not "the chief palladium of
constitutional liberty . . . the people who are authors of this blessing must also be its guardians . . . their eyes
must be ever ready to mark, their voice to pronounce . . . aggression on the authority of their constitution." In
the last and ultimate analysis, then, must the success of our government in the unfolding years to come be
tested in the crucible of Filipino minds and hearts than in the consultation rooms and court chambers.
8. ID.; OUR CONSTITUTION HAS ADOPTED THE AMERICAN TYPE OF CONSTITUTIONAL
GOVERNMENT. Discarding the English type and other European types of constitutional government, the
framers of our Constitution adopted the American type where the written constitution is interpreted and given
effect by the judicial department. In some countries which have declined to follow the American example,
provisions have been inserted in their constitutions prohibiting the courts from exercising the power to
interpret the fundamental law. This is taken as a recognition of what otherwise would be the rule that in the
absence of direct prohibition courts are bound to assume what is logically their function. For instance, the
Constitution of Poland of 1921, expressly provides that courts shall have no power to examine the validity of
statutes (article 81, chapter IV). The former Austrian Constitution contained a similar declaration. In
countries whose constitutions are silent in this respect, courts have assumed this power. This is true in
Norway, Greece, Australia and South Africa. Whereas, in Czechoslovakia (arts. 2 and 3, Preliminary Law to
Constitutional Charter of the Czechoslovak Republic, February 29, 1920) and Spain (arts 121-123, Title IX,
Constitution of the Republic of 1931) especial constitutional courts are established to pass upon the validity
of ordinary laws.
9. ID.; JURISDICTION OVER THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION. The nature of the present controversy
shows the necessity of a final constitutional arbiter to determine the conflict of authority between two
agencies created by the Constitution. If the conflict were left undecided and undetermined, a void would be
created in our constitutional system which may in the long run prove destructive of the entire framework.
Natura vacuum abhorret, so must we avoid exhaustion in our constitutional system. Upon principle, reason
and authority, the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of
the present controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of the constitutional
grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly."cralaw virtua1aw library

10. ID.; THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION; CONSTITUTIONAL GRANT OF POWER TO THE ELECTORAL
COMMISSION TO BE THE SOLE JUDGE OF ALL CONTESTS RELATING TO THE ELECTION,
RETURNS AND QUALIFICATIONS OF MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY. The original
provision regarding this subject in the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902 (sec. 7, par. 5) laying down the rule
that the assembly shall be the judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its members", was taken
from clause 1 of section 5, Article I of the Constitution of the United States providing that "Each House shall
be the Judge of the Elections, Returns, and Qualifications of its own Members, . . . ." The Act of Congress of
August 29, 1916 (sec. 18, par. 1) modified this provision by the insertion of the word "sole" as follows: "That
the Senate and House of Representatives, respectively, shall be the sole judges of the elections, returns,
and qualifications of their elective members, . . ." apparently in order to emphasize the exclusive character of
the jurisdiction conferred upon each House of the Legislature over the particular cases therein specified.
This court has had occasion to characterize this grant of power to the Philippine Senate and House of
Representatives, respectively, as "full, clear and complete." (Veloso v. Boards of Canvassers of Leyte and
Samar [1919], 39 Phil., 886, 888.)
11. ELECTORAL COMMISSION; HISTORICAL INSTANCES. The transfer of the power of determining
the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the Legislature long lodged in the legislative body,
to an independent, impartial and non-partisan tribunal, is by no means a mere experiment in the science of
government. As early as 1868, the House of Commons in England solved the problem of insuring the nonpartisan settlement of the controverted elections of its members by abdicating its prerogative to two judges
of the Kings Bench of the High Court of Justice selected from a rota in accordance with rules of court made
for the purpose. Having proved successful, the practice has become imbedded in English jurisprudence
(Parliamentary Elections Act, 1868 [31 & 32 Vict. c. 125] as amended by Parliamentary Elections and
Corrupt Practices Act, 1879 [42 & 43 Vict. c. 75], s. 2; Corrupt and Illegal Practices Prevention Act 1883 [46
& 47 Vict. c. 51], s. 70; Expiring Laws Continuance Act, 1911 [1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 22]; Laws of England, vol. XII,
p. 408, vol. XXI, p. 787). In the Dominion of Canada, election contests which were originally heard by the
Committee of the House of Commons, are since 1922 tried in the courts. Likewise, in the Commonwealth of
Australia, election contests which were originally determined by each house, are since 1922 tried in the High
Court. In Hungary, the organic law provides that all protests against the election of members of the Upper
House of Diet are to be resolved by the Supreme Administrative Court (Law 22 of 1916, chap. 2, art. 37, par.
6). The Constitution of Poland of March 17, 1921 (art. 19) and the Constitution of the Free City of Danzig of
May 13, 1922 (art. 10) vest the authority to decide contested elections to the Diet or National Assembly in
the Supreme Court. For the purpose of deciding legislative contests, the Constitution of the German Reich of
July 1, 1919 (art. 31), the Constitution of the Czechoslovak Republic of February 29, 1920 (art. 19) and the
Constitution of the Grecian Republic of June 2, 1927 (art. 43) all provide for an Electoral Commission.
12. ID.; ELECTORAL COMMISSION IN THE UNITED STATES. The creation of an Electoral Commission
whose membership is recruited both from the legislature and the judiciary is by no means unknown in the
United States. In the presidential elections of 1876 there was a dispute as to the number of electoral votes
received by each of the two opposing candidates. As the Constitution made no adequate provision for such
a contingency, Congress passed a law on January 29, 1877 (United States Statutes at Large, vol. 19, chap.
37, pp. 227-229), creating a special Electoral Commission composed of five members elected by the
Senate, five members elected by the House of Representatives, and five justices of the Supreme Court, the
fifth justice to be selected by the four designated in the Act. The decision of the commission was to be
binding unless rejected by the two houses voting separately. Although there is not much moral lesson to be
derived from the experience of America in this regard, the experiment has at least abiding historical interest.
13. ID.; ID.; FAMILIARITY OF THE MEMBERS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION WITH THE
HISTORY AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF OTHER COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD; ELECTORAL
COMMISSION IS THE EXPRESSION OF THE WISDOM AND ULTIMATE JUSTICE OF THE PEOPLE.
The members of the Constitutional Convention who framed our fundamental law were in their majority men
mature in years and experience. To be sure, many of them were familiar with the history and political
development of other countries of the world. When, therefore, they deemed it wise to create an Electoral
Commission as a constitutional organ and invested it with the exclusive function of passing upon and
determining the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly, they must
have done so not only in the light of their own experience but also having in view the experience of other
enlightened peoples of the world. The creation of the Electoral Commission was designed to remedy certain
evils of which the framers of our Constitution were cognizant. Notwithstanding the vigorous opposition of
some members of the Convention to its creation, the plan was approved by that body by a vote of 98 against
58. All that can be said now is that, upon the approval of the Constitution, the creation of the Electoral
Commission is the expression of the wisdom and "ultimate justice of the people." (Abraham Lincoln, First

Inaugural Address, March 4, 1861.)

14. ID.; ID.; ID.; PURPOSE WAS TO TRANSFER IN ITS TOTALITY POWER EXERCISED PREVIOUSLY
BY THE LEGISLATURE OVER THE CONTESTED ELECTIONS OF THE MEMBERS TO AN
INDEPENDENT AND IMPARTIAL TRIBUNAL. From the deliberations of our Constitutional Convention it
is evident that the purpose was to transfer in its totality all the powers previously exercised by the
Legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of its members, to an independent and impartial
tribunal. It was not so much the knowledge and appreciation of contemporary constitutional precedents,
however, as the long-felt need of determining legislative contests devoid of partisan considerations which
prompted the people acting through their delegates to the Convention to provide for this body known as the
Electoral Commission. With this end in view, a composite body in which both the majority and minority
parties are equally represented to off-set partisan influence in its deliberations was created, and further
endowed with judicial temper by including in its membership three justices of the Supreme Court.
15. ID.; ID.; ID.; THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION IS AN INDEPENDENT CONSTITUTIONAL CREATION
ALTHOUGH FOR PURPOSES OF CLASSIFICATION IT IS CLOSER TO THE LEGISLATIVE
DEPARTMENT THAN TO ANY OTHER. The Electoral Commission is a constitutional creation, invested
with the necessary authority in the performance and execution of the limited and specific function assigned
to it by the Constitution. Although it is not a power in our tripartite scheme of government, it is, to all intents
and purposes, when acting within the limits of its authority, an independent organ. It is, to be sure, closer to
the legislative department than to any other. The location of the provision (sec. 4) creating the Electoral
Commission under Article VI entitled "Legislative Department" of our Constitution is very indicative. Its
composition is also significant in that it is constituted by a majority of members of the Legislature. But it is a
body separate from and independent of the Legislature.
16. ID.; ID; ID.; GRANT OF POWER TO THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION INTENDED TO BE AS
COMPLETE AND UNIMPAIRED AS IF IT HAD REMAINED ORIGINALLY IN THE LEGISLATURE. The
grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it
had remained originally in the Legislature. The express lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is
an implied denial of the exercise of that power by the National Assembly. And this is as effective a restriction
upon the legislative power as an express prohibition in the constitution (Ex parte Lewis, 46 Tex. Crim. Rep.,
1; State v. Whisman, 33 S. D., 260; L. R. A., 1917B, 1). If the power claimed for the National Assembly to
regulate the proceedings of the Electoral Commission and cut off the power of the Electoral Commission to
lay down a period within which protest should be filed were conceded, the grant of power to the commission
would be ineffective. The Electoral Commission in such a case would be invested with the power to
determine contested cases involving the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly but subject at all times to the regulative power of the National Assembly. Not only would the
purpose of the framers of our Constitution of totally transferring this authority from the legislative body be
frustrated, but a dual authority would be created with the resultant inevitable clash of powers from time to
time. A sad spectacle would then be presented of the Electoral Commission retaining the bare authority of
taking cognizance of cases referred to, but in reality without the necessary means to render that authority
effective whenever and wherever the National Assembly has chosen to act, a situation worse than that
intended to be remedied by the framers of our Constitution. The power to regulate on the part of the National
Assembly in procedural matters will inevitably lead to the ultimate control by the Assembly of the entire
proceedings of the Electoral Commission, and, by indirection, to the entire abrogation of the constitutional
grant. It is obvious that this result should not be permitted.
17. ID.; ID.; ID; ID.; THE POWER TO PROMULGATE INCIDENTAL RULES AND REGULATIONS LODGED
ALSO IN THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION BY NECESSARY IMPLICATION. The creation of the
Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the power regulative in character to limit the time
within which protests intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. It is a settled rule of construction that where
a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one
or the performance of the other is also conferred (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, eighth ed., vol. I, pp.
138, 139). In the absence of any further constitutional provision relating to the procedure to be followed in
filing protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules
necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive powers to judge all contests relating to the election, returns
and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have
been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.
18. ID; ID.; ID.; POSSIBILITY OF ABUSE NO ARGUMENT AGAINST GRANT OF POWER. The
possibility of abuse is not an argument against the concession of the power as there is no power that is not

susceptible of abuse. If any mistake has been committed in the creation of an Electoral Commission and in
investing it with exclusive jurisdiction in all cases relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly, the remedy is political, not judicial, and must be sought through the
ordinary processes of democracy. All the possible abuses of the government are not intended to be
corrected by the judiciary. The people in creating the Electoral Commission reposed as much confidence in
this body in the exclusive determination of the specified cases assigned to it, as it has given to the Supreme
Court in the proper cases entrusted to it for decision. All the agencies of the government were designed by
the Constitution to achieve specific purposes, and each constitutional organ working within its own particular
sphere of discretionary action must be deemed to be animated with same zeal and honesty in accomplishing
the great ends for which they were created by the sovereign will. That the actuations of these constitutional
agencies might leave much to be desired in given instances, is inherent in the imperfections of human
institutions. From the fact that the Electoral Commission may not be interfered with in the exercise of its
legitimate power, it does not follow that its acts, however illegal or unconstitutional, may not be challenged in
appropriate cases over which the courts may exercise jurisdiction.
19. ID.; ID.; ID.; FACTS OF THE CASE; EQUITABLE CONSIDERATIONS. The Commonwealth
Government was inaugurated on November 15, 1935, on which date the Constitution, except as to the
provisions mentioned in section 6 of Article XV thereof, went into effect. The new National Assembly
convened on November 25, of that year, and the resolution confirming the election of the petitioner was
approved by that body on December 3, 1935. The protest by the herein respondent against the election of
the petitioner was filed on December 9 of the same year. The pleadings do not show when the Electoral
Commission was formally organized but it does appear that on December 9, 1935, the Electoral
Commission met for the first time and approved a resolution fixing said date as the last day for the filing of
election protests. When, therefore, the National Assembly passed its resolution of December 3, 1935,
confirming the election of the petitioner to the National Assembly, the Electoral Commission had not yet met;
neither does it appear that said body had actually been organized. As a matter of fact, according to certified
copies of official records on file in the archives division of the National Assembly attached to the record of
this case upon the petition of the petitioner, the three justices of the Supreme Court and the six members of
the National Assembly constituting the Electoral Commission were respectively designated only on
December 4 and 6, 1936. If Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly confirming non-protested elections of
members of the National Assembly had the effect of limiting or tolling the time for the presentation of
protests, the result would be that the National Assembly on the hypothesis that it still retained the
incidental power of regulation in such cases had already barred the presentation of protests before the
Electoral Commission had had time to organize itself and deliberate on the mode and method to be followed
in a matter entrusted to its exclusive jurisdiction by the Constitution. This result was not and could not have
been contemplated, and should be avoided.
20. ID.; ID.; ID.; CONFIRMATION BY THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY CAN NOT DEPRIVE THE ELECTORAL
COMMISSION OF ITS AUTHORITY TO FIX THE TIME WITHIN WHICH PROTESTS AGAINST THE
ELECTION, RETURNS AND QUALIFICATIONS OF MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHOULD
BE FILED. Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly confirming the election of members against whom
no protests has been filed at the time of its passage on December 3, 1936, can not be construed as a
limitation upon the time for the initiation of election contests. While there might have been good reason for
the legislative practice of confirmation of members of the Legislature at the time the power to decide election
contests was still lodged in the Legislature, confirmation alone by the Legislature cannot be construed as
depriving the Electoral Commission of the authority incidental to its constitutional power to be "the sole judge
of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly",
to fix the time for the filing of said election protests. Confirmation by the National Assembly of the returns of
its members against whose election no protests have been filed is, to all legal purposes, unnecessary.
Confirmation of the election of any member is not required by the Constitution before he can discharge his
duties as such member. As a matter of fact, certification by the proper provincial board of canvassers is
sufficient to entitle a member-elect to a seat in the National Assembly and to render him eligible to any office
in said body (No. 1, par. 1, Rules of the National Assembly, adopted December 6, 1935).
21. ID.; EFFECT OF CONFIRMATION UNDER THE JONES LAW. Under the practice prevailing when
the Jones Law was still in force, each House of the Philippine Legislature fixed the time when protests
against the election of any of its members should be filed. This was expressly authorized by section 18 of
the Jones Law making each House the sole judge of the election, returns and qualifications of its members,
as well as by a law (sec. 478, Act No. 3387) empowering each House respectively to prescribe by resolution
the time and manner of filing contest the election of members of said bodies. As a matter of formality, after
the time fixed by its rules for the filing of protests had already expired, each House passed a resolution
confirming or approving the returns of such members against whose election no protest had been filed within

the prescribed time. This was interpreted as cutting off the filing of further protests against the election of
those members not theretofore contested (Amistad v. Claravall [Isabela], Second Philippine Legislature,
Record First Period, p. 89; Urgello v. Rama [Third District, Cebu], Sixth Philippine Legislature; Fetalvero
v. Festin [Romblon], Sixth Philippine Legislature, Record First Period, pp. 637-640; Kintanar v. Aldanese
[Fourth District, Cebu], Sixth Philippine Legislature, Record First Period, pp. 1121, 1122; Aguilar v.
Corpus [Masbate], Eighth Philippine Legislature, Record First Period, vol. III, No. 56, pp. 892, 893). The
Constitution has expressly repealed section 18 of the Jones Law. Act No. 3387, section 478, must be
deemed to have been impliedly abrogated also, for the reason that with the power to determine all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is inseparably linked
the authority to prescribe regulations for the exercise of that power. There was thus no law nor constitutional
provision which authorized the National Assembly to fix, as it is alleged to have fixed on December 3, 1935,
the time for the filing of contests against the election of its members. And what the National Assembly could
not do directly, it could not do by indirection through the medium of confirmation.
-

DECISION

LAUREL, J.:

This is an original action instituted in this court by the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, for the issuance of a writ of
prohibition to restrain and prohibit the Electoral Commission, one of the respondents, from taking further
cognizance of the protest filed by Pedro Ynsua, another respondent, against the election of said petitioner
as member of the National Assembly for the first assembly district of the Province of Tayabas.
The facts of this case as they appear in the petition and as admitted by the respondents are as
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(1) That in the elections of September 17, 1935, the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and the respondents, Pedro
Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor, were candidates voted for the position of member of the National
Assembly for the first district of the Province of Tayabas;
(2) That on October 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers, proclaimed the petitioner as member-elect
of the National Assembly for the said district, for having received the most number of votes;
(3) That on November 15, 1935, the petitioner took his oath of office;
(4) That on December 3, 1935, the National Assembly in session assembled, passed the following
resolution:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
" [No. 8]
"RESOLUTION CONFIRMANDO LAS ACTAS DE AQUELLOS DIPUTADOS CONTRAQUIENES NO SE HA
PRESENTADO PROTESTA.
"Se resuelve: Que las actas de eleccion de los Diputados contra quienes no se hubiere presentado
debidamente una protesta antes de la adopcion de la presente resolucion sean, como por la presente, son
aprobadas y confirmadas.
"Adoptada, 3 de diciembre, 1935."cralaw virtua1aw library
(5) That on December 8, 1935, the herein respondent Pedro Ynsua, filed before the Electoral Commission a
"Motion of Protest" against the election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, being the only protest filed
after the passage of Resolution No. 8 aforequoted, and praying, among other-things, that said respondent
be declared elected member of the National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas, or that the election of
said position be nullified;
(6) That on December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted a resolution, paragraph 6 of which
provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"6. La Comision no considerara ninguna protesta que no se haya presentado en o antes de este dia."cralaw

virtua1aw library
(7) That on December 20, 1935, the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, one of the respondents in the
aforesaid protest, filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion to Dismiss the Protest", alleging (a) that
Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly was adopted in the legitimate exercise of its constitutional
prerogative to prescribe the period during which protests against the election of its members should be
presented; (b) that the aforesaid resolution has for its object, and is the accepted formula for, the limitation of
said period; and (c) that the protest in question was filed out of the prescribed period;
(8) That on December 27, 1935, the herein respondent, Pedro Ynsua, filed an "Answer to the Motion of
Dismissal" alleging that there is no legal or constitutional provision barring the presentation of a protest
against the election of a member of the National Assembly, after confirmation;
(9) That on December 31, 1935, the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, filed a "Reply" to the aforesaid
"Answer to the Motion of Dismissal" ;
(10) That the case being submitted for decision, the Electoral Commission promulgated a resolution on
January 23, 1936, denying herein petitioners "Motion to Dismiss the Protest."cralaw virtua1aw library
The application of the petitioner sets forth the following grounds for the issuance of the writ prayed
for:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(a) That the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the Electoral Commission solely as regards the
merits of contested elections to the National Assembly;
(b) That the Constitution excludes from said jurisdiction the power to regulate the proceedings of said
election contests, which power has been reserved to the Legislative Department of the Government or the
National Assembly;
(c) That like the Supreme Court and other courts created in pursuance of the Constitution, whose exclusive
jurisdiction relates solely to deciding the merits of controversies submitted to hem for decision and to matters
involving their internal organization, the Electoral Commission can regulate its proceedings only if the
National Assembly has not availed of its primary power to so regulate such proceedings;
(d) That Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly is, therefore, valid and should be respected and obeyed;
(e) That under paragraph 13 of section 1 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution and paragraph 6 of
article 7 of the Tydings-McDuffie Law (No. 127 of the 73rd Congress of the United States) as well as under
sections 1 and 3 (should be sections 1 and 2) of article VIII of the Constitution, the Supreme Court has
jurisdiction to pass upon the fundamental question herein raised because it involves an interpretation of the
Constitution of the Philippines.
On February 25, 1936, the Solicitor-General appeared and filed an answer in behalf of the respondent
Electoral Commission interposing the following special defenses:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(a) That the Electoral Commission has been created by the Constitution as an instrumentality of the
Legislative Department invested with the jurisdiction to decide "all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly" ; that in adopting its resolution of December 9,
1935, fixing this date as the last day for the presentation of protests against the election of any member of
the National Assembly, it acted within its jurisdiction and in the legitimate exercise of the implied powers
granted it by the Constitution to adopt the rules and regulations essential to carry out the powers and
functions conferred upon the same by the fundamental law; that in adopting its resolution of January 23,
1936, overruling the motion of the petitioner to dismiss the election protest in question, and declaring itself
with jurisdiction to take cognizance of said protest, it acted in the legitimate exercise of its quasi-judicial
functions as an instrumentality of the Legislative Department of the Commonwealth Government, and hence
said act is beyond the judicial cognizance or control of the Supreme Court;
(b) That the resolution of the National Assembly of December 3, 1935, confirming the election of the
members of the National Assembly against whom no protest had thus far been filed, could not and did not
deprive the Electoral Commission of its jurisdiction to take cognizance of election protests filed within the
time that might be set by its own rules;

(c) That the Electoral Commission is a body invested with quasi- judicial functions, created by the
Constitution as an instrumentality of the Legislative Department, and is not an "inferior tribunal, or
corporation, or board, or person" within the purview of sections 226 and 516 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
against which prohibition would lie.
The respondent Pedro Ynsua, in his turn, appeared and filed an answer in his own behalf on March 2, 1936,
setting forth following as his special defense:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(a) That at the time of the approval of the rules of the Electoral Commission on December 9, 1935, there
was no existing Law fixing the period within which protests against the election of members of the National
Assembly, the Electoral Commission was exercising a power impliedly conferred upon it by the Constitution,
by reason of its quasi-judicial attributes;
(b) That said respondent presented his motion of protest before the Electoral Commission on December 9,
1935, the last day fixed by paragraph 6 of the rules of the said Electoral Commission;
(c) That therefore the Electoral Commission acquired jurisdiction over the protest filed by said respondent
and over the parties thereto, and the resolution of the Electoral Commission of January 23, 1936, denying
petitioners motion to dismiss said protest was an act within the jurisdiction of the said commission, and is
not reviewable by means of a writ of prohibition;
(d) That neither the law nor the Constitution requires confirmation by the National Assembly of the election
of its members, and that such confirmation does not operate to limit the period within which protests should
be filed as to deprive the Electoral Commission of jurisdiction over protests filed subsequent thereto;
(e) That the Electoral Commission is an independent entity created by the Constitution, endowed with quasijudicial functions, whose decisions are final and unappeallable;
(f) That the Electoral Commission, as a constitutional creation, is not an inferior tribunal, corporation, board
or person, within the terms of sections 226 and 516 of the Code of Civil Procedure; and that neither under
the provisions of sections 1 and 2 of Article II (should be article VIII) of the Constitution and paragraph 13 of
section 1 of the Ordinance appended thereto could it be subject in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions
to a writ of prohibition from the Supreme Court;
(g) That paragraph 6 of article 7 of the Tydings-McDuffie Law (No. 127 of the 73rd Congress of the United
States) has no application to the case at bar.
The case was argued before us on March 13, 1936. Before it was submitted for decision, the petitioner
prayed for the issuance of a preliminary writ of injunction against the respondent Electoral Commission
which petition was denied "without passing upon the merits of the case" by resolution of this court of March
21, 1936.
There was no appearance for the other respondents. The issues to be decided in the case at bar may be
reduced to the following two principal propositions:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. Has the Supreme Court jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the
controversy upon the foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative,
2. Has the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in assuming to take
cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous
confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly?
We could perhaps dispose of this case by passing directly upon the merits of the controversy. However, the
question of jurisdiction having been presented, we do not feel justified in evading the issue. Being a case
prim impressionis, it would hardly be consistent with our sense of duty to overlook the broader aspect of
the question and leave it undecided. Neither would we be doing justice to the industry and vehemence of
counsel were we not to pass upon the question of jurisdiction squarely presented to our consideration.
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through
express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has
exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not
follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended

them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an
elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments
of the government. For example, the Chief Executive under our Constitution is so far made a check on the
legislative power that this assent is required in the enactment of laws. This, however, is subject to the further
check that a bill may become a law notwithstanding the refusal of the President to approve it, by a vote of
two-thirds or three-fourths, as the case may be, of the National Assembly. The President has also the right
to convene the Assembly in special session whenever he chooses. On the other hand, the National
Assembly operates as a check on the Executive in the sense that its consent through its Commission on
Appointments is necessary in the appointment of certain officers; and the concurrence of a majority of all its
members is essential to the conclusion of treaties. Furthermore, in its power to determine what courts other
than the Supreme Court shall be established, to define their jurisdiction and to appropriate funds for their
support, the National Assembly controls the judicial department to a certain extent. The Assembly also
exercises the judicial power of trying impeachments. And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the
final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and
hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.
But in the main, the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the
executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the government. The overlapping and interlacing of
functions and duties between the several departments, however, sometimes makes it hard to say just where
the one leaves off and the other begins. In times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great
landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict,
the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper
allocation of powers between the several departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof.
As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking perfection and perfectibility, but as much as it
was within the power of our people, acting through their delegates to so provide, that instrument which is the
expression of their sovereignty however limited, has established a republican government intended to
operate and function as a harmonious whole, under a system of checks and balances, and subject to
specific limitations and restrictions provided in the said instrument. The Constitution sets forth in no
uncertain language the restrictions and limitations upon governmental powers and agencies. If these
restrictions and limitations are transcended it would be inconceivable if the Constitution had not provided for
a mechanism by which to direct the course of government along constitutional channels, for then the
distribution of powers would be mere verbiage, the bill of rights mere expressions of sentiment, and the
principles of good government mere political apothegms. Certainly, the limitations and restrictions embodied
in our Constitution are real as they should be in any living constitution. In the United States where no
express constitutional grant is found in their constitution, the possession of this moderating power of the
courts, not to speak of its historical origin and development there, has been set at rest by popular
acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half centuries. In our case, this moderating power is
granted, if not expressly, by clear implication from section 2 of article VIII of our Constitution.
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature, scope and
extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the
rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any
superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but
only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting
claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights
which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed
"judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution. Even then, this
power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of
argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota
presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile
conclusions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of
constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the
Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must
reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and
legislative departments of the government.
But much as we might postulate on the internal checks of power provided in our Constitution, it ought not the
less to be remembered that, in the language of James Madison, the system itself is not "the chief palladium
of constitutional liberty . . . the people who are authors of this blessing must also be its guardians . . . their
eyes must be ever ready to mark, their voice to pronounce . . . aggression on the authority of their
constitution." In the last and ultimate analysis, then, must the success of our government in the unfolding

years to come be tested in the crucible of Filipino minds and hearts than in consultation rooms and court
chambers.
In the case at bar, the National Assembly has by resolution (No. 8) of December 3, 1935, confirmed the
election of the herein petitioner to the said body. On the other hand, the Electoral Commission has by
resolution adopted on December 9, 1935, fixed said date as the last day for the filing of protests against the
election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, notwithstanding the previous
confirmation made by the National Assembly as aforesaid. If, as contended by the petitioner, the resolution
of the National Assembly has the effect of cutting off the power of the Electoral Commission to entertain
protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, submitted
after December 3, 1935, then the resolution of the Electoral Commission of December 9, 1935, is mere
surplusage and had no effect. But, if as contended by the respondents, the Electoral Commission has the
sole power of regulating its proceedings to the exclusion of the National Assembly, then the resolution of
December 9, 1935, by which the Electoral Commission fixed said date as the last day for filing protests
against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, should be upheld.
Here is then presented an actual controversy involving as it does a conflict of a grave constitutional nature
between the National Assembly on the one hand, and the Electoral Commission on the other. From the very
nature of the republican government established in our country in the light of American experience and of
our own, upon the judicial department is thrown the solemn and inescapable obligation of interpreting the
Constitution and defining constitutional boundaries. The Electoral Commission, as we shall have occasion to
refer hereafter, is a constitutional organ, created for a specific purpose, namely to determine all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly. Although the
Electoral Commission may not be interfered with, when the while acting within the limits of its authority, it
does not follow that it is beyond the reach of the constitutional mechanism adopted by the people and that it
is not subject to constitutional restrictions. The Electoral Commission is not a separate department of the
government, and even if it were, conflicting claims of authority under the fundamental law between
departmental powers and agencies of the government are necessarily determined by the judiciary in
justiciable and appropriate cases. Discarding the English type and other European types of constitutional
government, the framers of our Constitution adopted the American type where the written constitution is
interpreted and given effect by the judicial department. In some countries which have declined to follow the
American example, provisions have been inserted in their constitutions prohibiting the courts from exercising
the power to interpret the fundamental law. This is taken as a recognition of what otherwise would be the
rule that in the absence of direct prohibition courts are bound to assume what is logically their function. For
instance, the Constitution of Poland of 1921, expressly provides that courts shall have no power to examine
the validity of statutes (art. 81, chap. IV). The former Austrian Constitution contained a similar declaration. In
countries whose constitutions are silent in this respect, courts have assumed this power. This is true in
Norway, Greece, Australia and South Africa. Whereas, in Czechoslovakia (arts. 2 and 3, Preliminary Law to
Constitutional Charter of the Czechoslovak Republic, February 29, 1920) and Spain (arts. 121-123, Title IX,
Constitution of the Republic of 1931) especial constitutional courts are established to pass upon the validity
of ordinary laws. In our case, the nature of the present controversy shows the necessity of a final
constitutional arbiter to determine the conflict of authority between two agencies created by the Constitution.
Were we to decline to take cognizance of the controversy, who will determine the conflict? And if the conflict
were left undecided and undetermined, would not a void be thus created in our constitutional system which
may in the long run prove destructive of the entire framework? To ask these questions is to answer them.
Natura vacuum abhorret, so must we avoid exhaustion in our constitutional system. Upon principle, reason
and authority, we are clearly of the opinion that upon the admitted facts of the present case, this court has
jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the present controversy for the purpose
of determining the character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as
"the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the
National Assembly."cralaw virtua1aw library
Having disposed of the question of jurisdiction, we shall now proceed to pass upon the second proposition
and determine whether the Electoral Commission has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in
adopting its resolution of December 9, 1935, and in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed against
the election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation thereof by the National
Assembly on December 3, 1935. As able counsel for the petitioner has pointed out, the issue hinges on the
interpretation of section 4 of Article VI of the Constitution which provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SEC. 4. There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three Justices of the Supreme Court
designated by the Chief Justice, and of six Members chosen by the National Assembly, three of whom shall
be nominated by the party having the largest number of votes, and three by the party having the second

largest number of votes herein. The senior Justice in the Commission shall be its Chairman. The Electoral
Commission shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly." It is imperative, therefore, that we delve into the origin and history of
this constitutional provision and inquire into the intention of its framers and the people who adopted it so that
we may properly appreciate its full meaning, import and significance.
The original provision regarding this subject in the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902 (sec. 7, par. 5) laying
down the rule that "the assembly shall be the judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its
members", was taken from clause 1 of section 5, Article I of the Constitution of the United States providing
that "Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns, and Qualifications of its own Members, . . . ."
The Act of Congress of August 29, 1916 (sec. 18, par. 1) modified this provision by the insertion of the word
"sole" as follows: "That the Senate and House of Representatives, respectively, shall be the sole judges of
the elections, returns, and qualifications of their elective members, . . ." apparently in order to emphasize the
exclusive character of the jurisdiction conferred upon each House of the Legislature over the particular
cases therein specified. This court has had occasion to characterize this grant of power to the Philippine
Senate and House of Representatives, respectively, as "full, clear and complete" (Veloso v. Boards of
Canvassers of Leyte and Samar [1919], 39 Phil., 886, 888.) .
The first step towards the creation of an independent tribunal for the purpose of deciding contested elections
to the legislature was taken by the sub-committee of five appointed by the Committee on Constitutional
Guarantees of the Constitutional Convention, which sub- committee submitted a report on August 30, 1934,
recommending the creation of a Tribunal of Constitutional Security empowered to hear protests not only
against the election of members of the legislature but also against the election of executive officers for
whose election the vote of the whole nation is required, as well as to initiate impeachment proceedings
against specified executive and judicial officers. For the purpose of hearing legislative protests, the tribunal
was to be composed of three justices designated by the Supreme Court and six members of the house of
the legislature to which the contest corresponds, three members to be designated by the majority party and
three by the minority, to be presided over by the Senior Justice unless the Chief Justice is also a member in
which case the latter shall preside. The foregoing proposal was submitted by the Committee on
Constitutional Guarantees to the Convention on September 15, 1934, with slight modifications consisting in
the reduction of the legislative representation to four members, that is, two senators to be designated one
each from the two major parties in the Senate and two representatives to be designated one each from the
two major parties in the House of Representatives, and in awarding representation to the executive
department in the persons of two representatives to be designated by the President.
Meanwhile, the Committee on Legislative Power was also preparing its report. As submitted to the
Convention on September 24, 1934, subsection 5, section 5, of the proposed Article on the Legislative
Department, reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The elections, returns and qualifications of the members of either House and all cases contesting the
election of any of their members shall be judged by an Electoral Commission, constituted, as to each House,
by three members elected by the members of the party having the largest number of votes therein, three
elected by the members of the party having the second largest number of votes, and as to its Chairman, one
Justice of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice."cralaw virtua1aw library
The idea of creating a Tribunal of Constitutional Security with comprehensive jurisdiction as proposed by the
Committee on Constitutional Guarantees which was probably inspired by the Spanish plan (art. 121,
Constitution of the Spanish Republic of 1931), was soon abandoned in favor of the proposition of the
Committee on Legislative Power to create a similar body with reduced powers and with specific and limited
jurisdiction, to be designated as an Electoral Commission. The Sponsorship Committee modified the
proposal of the Committee on Legislative Power with respect to the composition of the Electoral Commission
and made further changes in phraseology to suit the project of adopting a unicameral instead of a bicameral
legislature. The draft as finally submitted to the Convention on October 26, 1934, reads as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"(6) The elections, returns and qualifications of the Members of the National Assembly and all cases
contesting the election of any of its Members shall be judged by an Electoral Commission, composed of
three members elected by the party having the largest number of votes in the National Assembly, three
elected by the members of the party having the second largest number of votes, and three justices of the
Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice, the Commission to be presided over by one of said
justices."cralaw virtua1aw library

During the discussion of the amendment introduced by Delegates Labrador, Abordo, and others, proposing
to strike out the whole subsection of the foregoing draft and inserting in lieu thereof the following: "The
National Assembly shall be the sole and exclusive judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of the
Members", the following illuminating remarks were made on the floor of the Convention in its session of
December 4, 1934, as to the scope of the said draft:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x
x
x
"Mr. VENTURA. Mr. President, we have a doubt here as to the scope of the meaning of the first four lines,
paragraph 6, page 11 of the draft, reading: The elections, returns and qualifications of the Members of the
National Assembly and all cases contesting the election of any of its Members shall be judged by an
Electoral Commission, . . . . I should like to ask from the gentleman from Capiz whether the election and
qualification of the member whose election is not contested shall also be judged by the Electoral
Commission.
"Mr. ROXAS. If there is no question about the election of the members, there is nothing to be judged; that is
why the word judge is used to indicate a controversy. If there is no question about the election of a
member, there is nothing to be submitted to the Electoral Commission and there is nothing to be
determined.
"Mr. VENTURA. But does that carry the idea also that the Electoral Commission shall confirm also the
election of those who election is not contested?.
"Mr. ROXAS. There is no need of confirmation. As the gentleman knows, the action of the House of
Representatives confirming the election of its members is just a matter of the rules of the assembly. It is not
constitutional. It is not necessary. After a man files his credentials that be has been elected, that is sufficient,
unless his election is contested.
"Mr. VENTURA. But I do not believe that that is sufficient, as we have observed that for purposes of the
auditor, in the matter of election of a member to a legislative body, because he will not authorize his pay.
"Mr. ROXAS. Well, what is the case with regards to the municipal president who is elected? What happens
with regards to the councilors of a municipality? Does anybody confirm their election? The municipal council
does this: it makes a canvass and proclaims-in this case the municipal council proclaims who has been
elected, and it ends there, unless there is a contest. It is the same case; there is no need on the part of the
Electoral Commission unless there is a contest. The first clause refers to the case referred to by the
gentleman from Cavite where one person tries to be elected in place of another who was declared elected.
For example, in a case when the residence of the man who has been elected is in question, or in case the
citizenship of the man who has been elected is in question.
"However, if the assembly desires to annul the power of the commission, it may do so by certain maneuvers
upon its first meeting when the returns are submitted to the assembly. The purpose is to give to the Electoral
Commission all the powers exercised by the assembly referring to the elections, returns and qualifications of
the members. When there is no contest, there is nothing to be judged.
"Mr. VENTURA. Then it should be eliminated.
"Mr. ROXAS. But that is a different matter, I think Mr. Delegate.
"Mr. CINCO. Mr. President, I have a similar question as that propounded by the gentleman from Ilocos Norte
when I arose a while ago. However I want to ask more questions from the delegate from Capiz. This
paragraph 6 on page 11 of the draft cites cases contesting the election as separate from the first part of the
section which refers to elections, returns and qualifications.
"Mr. ROXAS. That is merely for the sake of clarity. In fact the cases of contested elections are already
included in the phrase the elections, returns and qualifications. This phrase and contested elections was
inserted merely for the sake of clarity.
"Mr. CINCO. Under this paragraph, may not the Electoral Commission, at its own instance, refuse to confirm
the election of the members?.
"Mr. ROXAS. I do not think so, unless there is a protest.

"Mr. LABRADOR. Mr. President, will the gentleman yield? .

"THE PRESIDENT. The gentleman may yield, if he so desires.
"Mr. ROXAS. Willingly.
"Mr. LABRADOR. Does not the gentleman from Capiz believe that unless this power is granted to the
assembly, the assembly on its own motion does not have the right to contest the election and qualification of
its members?
"Mr. ROXAS. I have no doubt but that the gentleman is right. If this draft is retained as it is, even if two-thirds
of the assembly believe that a member has not the qualifications provided by law, they cannot remove him
for that reason.
Mr. LABRADOR. So that the right to remove shall only be retained by the Electoral Commission.
"Mr. ROXAS. By the assembly for misconduct.
"Mr. LABRADOR. I mean with respect to the qualification of the members.
"Mr. ROXAS. Yes, by the Electoral Commission.
"Mr. LABRADOR. So that under this draft, no member of the assembly has the right to question the eligibility
of its members?.
"Mr. ROXAS. Before a member can question the eligibility, he must go to the Electoral Commission and
make the question before the Electoral Commission.
"Mr. LABRADOR. So that the Electoral Commission shall decide whether the election is contested or not
contested.
"Mr. ROXAS. Yes, sir: that is the purpose.
"Mr. PELAYO. Mr. President, I would like to be informed if the Electoral Commission has power and
authority to pass upon the qualifications of the members of the National Assembly even though that question
has not been raised.
"Mr. ROXAS. I have just said that they have no power, because they can only judge."cralaw virtua1aw
library
In the same session, the first clause of the aforesaid draft reading "The election, returns and qualifications of
the members of the National Assembly and" was eliminated by the Sponsorship Committee in response to
an amendment introduced by Delegates Francisco, Ventura, Vinzons, Rafols, Lim, Mumar and others. In
explaining the difference between the original draft and the draft as amended, Delegate Roxas speaking for
the Sponsorship Committee said:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x
x
x
"Sr. ROXAS. La diferencia, seor Presidente, consiste solamente en obviar la objecion apuntada por varios
Delegados al efecto to que la primera clausula del draft que dice: The election, returns and qualifications of
the members of the National Assembly parece que da a la Comision Electoral la facultad de determinar
tambin la eleccion de los miembros que no han sido protestados y para obviar esa dificultad, creemos que
la enmienda tiene razon en ese sentido, si enmendamos el draft, de tal modo que se lea como sigue: All
cases contesting the election, de modo que los jueces de la Comision Electoral se limitaran solamente a los
casos en que haya habido protesta contra las actas." Before the amendment of Delegate Labrador was
voted upon the following interpellation also took place:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"El Sr. CONEJERO. Antes de votarse la enmienda, quisiera pedir informacion del Subcomit de Siete.
"El Sr. PRESIDENTE. Qu dice el Comit?.

"El Sr. ROXAS. Con mucho gusto.

"El Sr. CONEJERO. Tal como esta el draft, dando tres miembros a la mayoria, y otros tres a la minoria y
tres a la Corte Suprema, no cre Su Seoria que esto equivale practicamente a dejar el asunto a los
miembros del Tribunal Supremo?.
"El Sr. ROXAS. Si y no. Cremos que si el tribunal o la Comision esta constituido en esa forma, tanto los
miembros de la mayoria como los de la minoria asi como los miembros de la Corte Suprema consideraran
la cuestion sobre la base de sus mritos, sabiendo que el partidismo no es suficiente para dar el triunfo.
"El Sr. CONEJERO. Cree Su Seoria que en un caso como ese, podriamos hacer que tanto los de la
mayoria como los de la minoria prescindieran del partidismo?.
"El Sr. ROXAS. Creo que si, porque el partidismo no les daria el triunfo."cralaw virtua1aw library
x
x
x
The amendment introduced by Delegates Labrador, Abordo and others seeking to restore the power to
decide contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly to
the National Assembly itself, was defeated by a vote of ninety-eight (98) against fifty-six (56).
In the same session of December 4, 1934, Delegate Cruz (C.) sought to amend the draft by reducing the
representation of the minority party and the Supreme Court in the Electoral Commission to two members
each, so as to accord more representation to the majority party. The Convention rejected this amendment by
a vote of seventy-six (76) against forty-six (46), thus maintaining the non-partisan character of the
commission.
As approved on January 31, 1935, the draft was made to read as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"(6) All cases contesting the elections, returns and qualifications of the Members of the National Assembly
shall be judged by an Electoral Commission, composed of three members elected by the party having the
largest number of votes in the National Assembly, three elected by the members of the party having the
second largest number of votes, and three justices of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice,
the Commission to be presided over by one of said justices."cralaw virtua1aw library
The Style Committee to which the draft was submitted revised it as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SEC. 4. There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three Justices of the Supreme Court
designated by the Chief Justice, and of six Members chosen by the National Assembly, three of whom shall
be nominated by the party having the largest number of votes, and three by the party having the second
largest number of votes therein. The senior Justice in the Commission shall be its chairman. The Electoral
Commission shall be the sole judge of the election, returns, and qualifications of the Members of the
National Assembly."cralaw virtua1aw library
When the foregoing draft was submitted for approval on February 8, 1935, the Style Committee, through
President Recto, to effectuate the original intention of the Convention, agreed to insert the phrase "All
contests relating to" between the phrase "judge of" and the words "the election", which was accordingly
accepted by the Convention.
The transfer of the power of determining the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the
legislature long lodged in the legislative body, to an independent, impartial and non-partisan tribunal, is by
no means a mere experiment in the science of government.
Cushing, in his Law and Practice of Legislative Assemblies (ninth edition, chapter VI, pages 57, 58), gives a
vivid account of the "scandalously notorious" canvassing of votes by political parties in the disposition of
contests by the House of Commons in the following passages which are partly quoted by the petitioner in his
printed memorandum of March 14, 1936:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"153. From the time when the commons established their right to be the exclusive judges of the elections,
returns, and qualifications of their members, until the year 1770, two modes of proceeding prevailed, in the
determination of controverted elections, and rights of membership. One of the standing committee appointed
at the commencement of each session, was denominated the committee of privileges and elections, whose

function was to hear and investigate all questions of this description which might be referred to them, and to
report their proceedings, with their opinion thereupon, to the house, from time to time. When an election
petition was referred to this committee, they heard the parties and their witnesses and other evidence, and
made a report of all the evidence, together with their opinion thereupon, in the form of resolutions, which
were considered and agreed or disagreed to by the house. The other mode of proceeding was by a hearing
at the bar of the house itself. When this court was adopted, the case was heard and decided by the house,
in substantially the same manner as by a committee. The committee of privileges and elections although a
select committee was usually what is called an open one; that is to say, in order to constitute the committee,
a quorum of the members named was required to be present, but all the members of the house were at
liberty to attend the committee and vote if they pleased.
"154. With the growth of political parties in parliament questions relating to the right of membership gradually
assumed a political character; so that for many years previous to the year 1770, controverted elections had
been tried and determined by the house of commons, as mere party questions, upon which the strength of
contending factions might be tested. Thus, for example, in 1741, Sir Robert Walpole, after repeated attacks
upon his government, resigned his office in consequence of an adverse vote upon the Chippenham election.
Mr. Hatsell remarks, of the trial of election, cases, as conducted under this system, that Every principle of
decency and justice were notoriously and openly prostituted, from whence the younger part of the house
were insensibly, but too successfully, induced to adopt the same licentious conduct in more serious matters,
and in questions of higher importance to the public welfare. Mr. George Grenville, a distinguished member
of the house of commons, undertook to propose a remedy for the evil, and, on the 7th of March 1770,
obtained the unanimous leave of the house to bring in a bill, to regulate the trial of controverted elections, or
returns of members to serve in parliament. In his speech to explain his plan, on the motion for leave, Mr.
Grenville alluded to the existing practice in the following terms: Instead of trusting to the merits of their
respective causes, the principal dependence of both parties is their private interest among us; and it is
scandalously notorious that we are an earnestly canvassed to attend in favor of the opposite sides, as if we
were wholly self-elective, and not bound to act by the principles of justice, but by the discretionary impulse of
our own inclinations; nay, it is well known, that in every contested election, many members of this house,
who are ultimately to judge in a kind of judicial capacity between the competitors, enlist themselves as
parties in the contention, and take upon themselves the partial management of the very business, upon
which they should determine with the strictest impartiality.
"155. It was to put an end to the practices thus described, that Mr. Grenville brought in a bill which met with
the approbation of both houses, and received the royal assent on the 12th of April, 1770. This was the
celebrated law since known by the name of the Grenville Act; of which Mr. Hatsell declares, that it was one
of the noblest works, for the honor of the house of commons, and the security of the constitution, that was
ever devised by any minister or statesman. It is probable, that the magnitude of the evil, or the apparent
success of the remedy, may have led many of the contemporaries of the measure to the information of a
judgment, which was not acquiesced in by some of the leading statesmen of the day, and has not been
entirely confirmed by subsequent experience. The bill was objected to by Lord North, Mr. De Grey,
afterwards chief justice of the common pleas, Mr. Ellis, Mr. Dyson, who had been clerk of the house, and Mr.
Charles James Fox, chiefly on the ground, that the introduction of the new system was an essential
alteration of the constitution of parliament, and a total abrogation of one of the most important rights and
jurisdictions of the house of commons."cralaw virtua1aw library
As early as 1868, the House of Commons in England solved the problem of insuring the non-partisan
settlement of the controverted elections of its members by abdicating its prerogative to two judges of the
Kings Bench of the High Court of Justice selected from a rota in accordance with rules of court made for the
purpose. Having proved successful, the practice has become imbedded in English jurisprudence
(Parliamentary Elections Act, 1868 [31 & 32 Vict. c. 125] as amended by Parliamentary Elections and
Corrupt Practices Act, 1879 [42 & 43 Vict. c. 75], s. 2; Corrupt and Illegal Practices Prevention Act, 1883 [46
& 47 Vict. c. 51], s. 70; Expiring Laws Continuance Act, 1911 [1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 22]; Laws of England, vol. XII,
p. 408, vol. XXI, p. 787). In the Dominion of Canada, election contests which were originally heard by the
Committee of the House of Commons, are since 1922 tried in the courts. Likewise, in the Commonwealth of
Australia, election contests which were originally determined by each house, are since 1922 tried in the High
Court. In Hungary, the organic law provides that all protests against the election of members of the Upper
House of the Diet are to be resolved by the Supreme Administrative Court (Law 22 of 1916, chap. 2, art. 37,
par. 6). The Constitution of Poland of March 17, 1921 (art. 19) and the Constitution of the Free City of
Danzig of May 13, 1922 (art. 10) vest the authority to decide contested elections to the Diet or National
Assembly in the Supreme Court. For the purpose of deciding legislative contests, the Constitution of the
German Reich of July 1, 1919 (art. 31), the Constitution of the Czechoslovak Republic of February 29, 1920
(art. 19) and the Constitution of the Grecian Republic of June 2, 1927 (art. 43), all provide for an Electoral

Commission.
The creation of an Electoral Commission whose membership is recruited both from the legislature and the
judiciary is by no means unknown in the United States. In the presidential elections of 1876 there was a
dispute as to the number of electoral votes received by each of the two opposing candidates. As the
Constitution made no adequate provision for such a contingency, Congress passed a law on January 29,
1877 (United States Statutes at Large, vol. 19, chap. 37, pp. 227-229), creating a special Electoral
Commission composed of five members elected by the Senate, five members elected by the House of
Representatives, and five justices of the Supreme Court, the fifth justice to be selected by the four
designated in the Act. The decision of the commission was to be binding unless rejected by the two houses
voting separately. Although there is not much of a moral lesson to be derived from the experience of
America in this regard, judging from the observations of Justice Field, who was a member of that body on
the part of the Supreme Court (Countryman, the Supreme Court of the United States and its Appellate
Power under the Constitution [Albany, 1913]-Relentless Partisanship of Electoral Commission, p. 25 et seq.)
, the experiment has at least abiding historical interest.
The members of the Constitutional Convention who framed our fundamental law were in their majority men
mature in years and experience. To be sure, many of them were familiar with the history and political
development of other countries of the world. When, therefore, they deemed it wise to create an Electoral
Commission as a constitutional organ and invested it with the exclusive function of passing upon and
determining the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly, they must
have done so not only in the light of their own experience but also having in view the experience of other
enlightened peoples of the world. The creation of the Electoral Commission was designed to remedy certain
evils of which the framers of our Constitution were cognizant. Notwithstanding the vigorous opposition of
some members of the Convention to its creation, the plan, as hereinabove stated, was approved by that
body by a vote of 98 against 58. All that can be said now is that, upon the approval of the Constitution, the
creation of the Electoral Commission is the expression of the wisdom and "ultimate justice of the people."
(Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address, March 4, 1861.) .
From the deliberations of our Constitutional Convention it is evident that the purpose was to transfer in its
totality all the powers previously exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of
its members, to an independent and impartial tribunal. It was not so much the knowledge and appreciation of
contemporary constitutional precedents, however, as the long-felt need of determining legislative contests
devoid of partisan considerations which prompted the people, acting through their delegates to the
Convention, to provide for this body known as the Electoral Commission. With this end in view, a composite
body in which both the majority and minority parties are equally represented to off-set partisan influence in
its deliberations was created, and further endowed with judicial temper by including in its membership three
justices of the Supreme Court.
The Electoral Commission is a constitutional creation, invested with the necessary authority in the
performance and execution of the limited and specific function assigned to it by the Constitution. Although it
is not a power in our tripartite scheme of government, it is, to all intents and purposes, when acting within
the limits of its authority, an independent organ. It is, to be sure, closer to the legislative department than to
any other. The location of the provision (section 4) creating the Electoral Commission under Article VI
entitled "Legislative Department" of our Constitution is very indicative. Its composition is also significant in
that it is constituted by a majority of members of the legislature. But it is a body separate from and
independent of the legislature.
The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it
had remained originally in the legislature. The express lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is
an implied denial of the exercise of that power by the National Assembly. And this is as effective a restriction
upon the legislative power as an express prohibition in the Constitution (Ex parte Lewis, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep.,
1; State v. Whisman, 36 S. D., 260; L. R. A., 1917B, 1). If we concede the power claimed in behalf of the
National Assembly that said body may regulate the proceedings of the Electoral Commission and cut off the
power of the commission to lay down the period within which protests should be filed, the grant of power to
the commission would be ineffective. The Electoral Commission in such case would be invested with the
power to determine contested cases involving the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the
National Assembly but subject at all times to the regulative power of the National Assembly. Not only would
the purpose of the framers of our Constitution of totally transferring this authority from the legislative body be
frustrated, but a dual authority would be created with the resultant inevitable clash of powers from time to
time. A sad spectacle would then be presented of the Electoral Commission retaining the bare authority of

taking cognizance of cases referred to, but in reality without the necessary means to render that authority
effective whenever and wherever the National Assembly has chosen to act, a situation worse than that
intended to be remedied by the framers of our Constitution. The power to regulate on the part of the National
Assembly in procedural matters will inevitably lead to the ultimate control by the Assembly of the entire
proceedings of the Electoral Commission, and, by indirection, to the entire abrogation of the constitutional
grant. It is obvious that this result should not be permitted.
We are not insensible to the impassioned argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner regarding the
importance and necessity of respecting the dignity and independence of the National Assembly as a
coordinate department of the government and of according validity to its acts, to avoid what he characterized
would be practically an unlimited power of the commission in the admission of protests against members of
the National Assembly. But as we have pointed out hereinabove, the creation of the Electoral Commission
carried with it ex necesitate rei the power regulative in character to limit the time within which protests
intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. It is a settled rule of construction that where a general power is
conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance
of the other is also conferred (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, eighth ed., vol. I, pp. 138, 139). In the
absence of any further constitutional provision relating to the procedure to be followed in filing protests
before the Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the
proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications
of members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also
in the Electoral Commission.
It is, indeed, possible that, as suggested by counsel for the petitioner, the Electoral Commission may abuse
its regulative authority by admitting protests beyond any reasonable time, to the disturbance of the
tranquillity and peace of mind of the members of the National Assembly. But the possibility of abuse is not
an argument against the concession of the power as there is no power that is not susceptible of abuse. In
the second place, if any mistake has been committed in the creation of an Electoral Commission and in
investing it with exclusive jurisdiction in all cases relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly, the remedy is political, not judicial, and must be sought through the
ordinary processes of democracy. All the possible abuses of the government are not intended to be
corrected by the judiciary. We believe, however, that the people in creating the Electoral Commission
reposed as much confidence in this body in the exclusive determination of the specified cases assigned to it,
as they have given to the Supreme Court in the proper cases entrusted to it for decision. All the agencies of
the government were designed by the Constitution to achieve specific purposes, and each constitutional
organ working within its own particular sphere of discretionary action must be deemed to be animated with
the same zealand honesty in accomplishing the great ends for which they were created by the sovereign
will. That the actuations of these constitutional agencies might leave much to be desired in given instances,
is inherent in the imperfections of human institutions. In the third place, from the fact that the Electoral
Commission may not be interfered with in the exercise of its legitimate power, it does not follow that its acts,
however illegal or unconstitutional, may not be challenged in appropriate cases over which the courts may
exercise jurisdiction.
But independently of the legal and constitutional aspects of the present case, there are considerations of
equitable character that should not be overlooked in the appreciation of the intrinsic merits of the
controversy. The Commonwealth Government was inaugurated on November 15, 1935, on which date the
Constitution, except as to the provisions mentioned in section 6 of Article XV thereof, went into effect. The
new National Assembly convened on November 25th of that year, and the resolution confirming the election
of the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, was approved by that body on December 3, 11935. The protest by the
herein respondent Pedro Ynsua against the election of the petitioner was filed on December 9 of the same
year. The pleadings do not show when the Electoral Commission was formally organized but it does appear
that on December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission met for the first time and approved a resolution fixing
said date as the last day for the filing of election protests. When, therefore, the National Assembly passed its
resolution of December 3, 1935, confirming the election of the petitioner to the National Assembly, the
Electoral Commission had not yet met; neither does it appear that said body has actually been organized.
As a matter of fact, according to certified copies of official records on file in the archives division of the
National Assembly attached to the record of this case upon the petition of the petitioner, the three justices of
the Supreme Court and the six members of the National Assembly constituting the Electoral Commission
were respectively designated only on December 4 and 6, 1935. If Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly
confirming non-protested elections of members of the National Assembly had the effect of limiting or tolling
the time for the presentation of protests, the result would be that the National Assembly on the hypothesis
that it still retained the incidental power of regulation in such cases had already barred the presentation of
protests before the Electoral Commission had had time to organize itself and deliberate on the mode and

method to be followed in a matter entrusted to is exclusive jurisdiction by the Constitution. This result was
not and could not have been contemplated,and should be avoided.
From another angle, Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly confirming the election of members against
whom no protests had been filed at the time of its passage on December 3, 1935, can not be construed as a
limitation upon the time for the initiation of election contests. While there might have been good reason for
the legislative practice of confirmation of the election of members of the legislature at the time when the
power to decide election contests was still lodged in the legislature, confirmation alone by the legislature
cannot be construed as depriving the Electoral Commission of the authority incidental to its constitutional
power to be "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members
of the National Assembly", to fix the time for the filing of said election protests. Confirmation by the National
Assembly of the returns of its members against whose election no protests have been filed is, to all legal
purposes, unnecessary. As contended by the Electoral Commission in its resolution of January 23, 1936,
overruling the motion of the herein petitioner to dismiss the protest filed by the respondent Pedro Ynsua,
confirmation of the election of any member is not required by the Constitution before he can discharge his
duties as such member. As a matter of fact, certification by the proper provincial board of canvassers is
sufficient to entitle a member-elect to a seat in the National Assembly and to render him eligible to any office
in said body (No. 1, par. 1, Rules of the National Assembly, adopted December 6, 1935).
Under the practice prevailing both in the English House of Commons and in the Congress of the United
States, confirmation is neither necessary in order to entitle a member-elect to take his seat. The return of the
proper election officers in sufficient, and the member-elect presenting such return begins to enjoy the
privileges of a member from the time that he takes his oath of office (Laws of England, vol. 12, pp. 331, 332;
vol. 21, pp. 694, 695; U. S. C. A., Title 2, secs. 21, 25, 26). Confirmation is in order only in cases of
contested elections where the decision is adverse to the claims of the protestant. In England, the judges
decision or report in controverted elections is certified to the Speaker of the House of Commons, and the
House, upon being informed of such certificate or report by the Speaker, is required to enter the same upon
the Journals, and to give such directions for confirming or altering the return, or for the issue of a writ for a
new election, or for carrying into execution the determination as circumstances may require (31 & 32 Vict., c.
125, sec. 13). In the United States, it is believed, the order or decision of the particular house itself is
generally regarded as sufficient, without any actual alteration or amendment of the return (Cushing, Law and
Practice of Legislative Assemblies, 9th ed., sec. 166).
Under the practice prevailing when the Jones Law was still force, each house of the Philippine Legislature
fixed the time when protests against the election of any of its members should be filed. This was expressly
authorized by section 18 of the Jones Law making each house the sole judge of the election, returns and
qualifications of its members, as well as by a law (sec. 478, Act No. 3387) empowering each house to
respectively prescribe by resolution the time and manner of filing contest in the election of members of said
bodies. As a matter of formality, after the time fixed by its rules for the filing of protests had already expired,
each house passed a resolution confirming or approving the returns of such members against whose
election no protests had been filed within the prescribed time. This was interpreted as cutting off the filing of
further protests against the election of those members not theretofore contested (Amistad v. Claravall
[Isabela], Second Philippine Legislature, Record-First Period, p. 89; Urgello v. Rama [Third District, Cebu],
Sixth Philippine Legislature; Fetalvero v. Festin [Romblon], Sixth Philippine Legislature, Record First
Period, pp. 637-640; Kintanar v. Aldanese [Fourth District, Cebu], Sixth Philippine Legislature, Record-First
Period, pp. 1121, 1122; Aguilar v. Corpus [Masbate], Eighth Philippine Legislature, Record-First Period, vol.
III, No. 56, pp. 892, 893). The Constitution has repealed section 18 of the Jones Law. Act No. 3387, section
478, must be deemed to have been impliedly abrogated also, for the reason that with the power to
determine all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly, is inseparably linked the authority to prescribe regulations for the exercise of that power. There
was thus no law nor constitutional provision which authorized the National Assembly to fix, as it is alleged to
have fixed on December 3, 1935, the time for the filing of contests against the election of its members. And
what the National Assembly could not do directly, it could not do by indirection through the medium of
confirmation.
Summarizing, we conclude:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(a) That the government established by the Constitution follows fundamentally the theory of separation of
powers into the legislative, the executive and the judicial.
(b) That the system of checks and balances and the overlapping of functions and duties often makes difficult
the delimitation of the powers granted.

(c) That in cases of conflict between the several departments and among the agencies thereof, the judiciary,
with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, is the only constitutional mechanism devised finally to resolve
the conflict and allocate constitutional boundaries.
(d) That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and appropriate cases and
controversies, and is the power and duty to see that no one branch or agency of the government transcends
the Constitution, which is the source of all authority.
(e) That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation with specific powers and
functions to execute and perform, closer for purposes of classification to the legislative than to any of the
other two departments of the government.
(f) That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly.
(g) That under the organic law prevailing before the present Constitution went into effect, each house of the
legislature was respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of their elective
members.
(h) That the present Constitution has transferred all the powers previously exercised by the legislature with
respect to contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of its members, to the Electoral
Commission.
(i) That such transfer of power from the legislature to the Electoral Commission was full, clear and complete,
and carried with it ex necesitate rei the implied power inter alia to prescribe the rules and regulations as to
the time and manner of filing protests.
(j) That the avowed purpose in creating the Electoral Commission was to have an independent constitutional
organ pass upon all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly, devoid of partisan influence or consideration, which object would be frustrated if the National
Assembly were to retain the power to prescribe rules and regulations regarding the manner of conducting
said contests.
(k) That section 4 of article VI of the Constitution repealed not only section 18 of the Jones Law making each
house of the Philippine Legislature respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns and qualifications of
its elective members, but also section 478 of Act No. 3387 empowering each house to prescribe by
resolution the time and manner of filing contests against the election of its members, the time and manner of
notifying the adverse party,and bond or bonds, to be required, if any, and to fix the costs and expenses of
contest.
(l) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any member, irrespective of whether his
election is contested or not, is not essential before such member-elect may discharge the duties and enjoy
the privileges of a member of the National Assembly.
(m) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any member against whom no protest had
been filed prior to said confirmation, does not and cannot deprive the Electoral Commission of its incidental
power to prescribe the time within which protest against the election of any member of the National
Assembly should be filed.
We hold, therefore, that the Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its
constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Pedro Ynsua
against the election of the herein petitioner Jose A. Angara, and that the resolution of the National Assembly
of December 3, 1935 can not in any manner toll the time for filing protests against the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a protest within such time as the
rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe.
In view of the conclusion reached by us relative to the character of the Electoral Commission as a
constitutional creation and as to the scope and extent of its authority under the facts of the present
controversy, we deem it unnecessary to determine whether the Electoral Commission is an inferior tribunal,
corporation, board or person within the purview of sections 226 and 516 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

The petition for a writ of prohibition against the Electoral Commission is hereby denied, with costs against
the petitioner. So ordered.
Avancea, C.J., Diaz, Concepcion and Horrilleno, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
I concur in the result and in most of the views so ably expressed in the preceding opinion. I am, however,
constrained to withhold my assent to certain conclusions therein advanced.
The power vested in the Electoral Commission by the Constitution of judging of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly, is judicial in nature. (Thomas
v. Loney, 134 U.S., 372; 33 Law. ed., 949, 951.) On the other hand, the power to regulate the time in which
notice of a contested election may be given, is legislative in character. (MElmoyle v. Cohen, 13 Pet., 312;
10 Law. ed., 177; Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U. S., 496; 50 Law. ed., 572.) .
It has been correctly stated that the government established by the Constitution follows fundamentally the
theory of the separation of powers into legislative, executive, and judicial. Legislative power is vested in the
National Assembly. (Article VI, sec. 1.) In the absence of any clear constitutional provision to the contrary,
the power to regulate the time in which notice of a contested election may be given, must be deemed to be
included in the grant of legislative power to the National Assembly.
The Constitution of the United States contains a provision similar to that found in Article VI, section 4, of the
Constitution of the Philippines. Article I, section 5, of the Constitution of the United States provides that each
house of the Congress shall be the judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its own members.
Notwithstanding this provision, the Congress has assumed the power to regulate the time in which notice of
a contested election may be given. Thus section 201, Title 2, of the United States Code Annotated
prescribes:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Whenever any person intends to contest an election of any Member of the House of Representatives of the
united States, he shall, within thirty days after the result of such election shall have been determined by the
office or board of canvassers authorized by law to determine the same, give notice, in writing, to the Member
whose seat he designs to contest, of his intention to contest the same, and, in such notice, shall specify
particularly the grounds upon which he relies in the contest." (R.S., par. 105.)
The Philippine Autonomy Act, otherwise known as the Jones Law, also contained a provision to the effect
that the Senate and House of Representatives, respectively, shall be the sole judges of the elections,
returns, and qualifications of their elective members. Notwithstanding this provision, the Philippine
Legislature passed the Election Law, section 478 of which reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The Senate and the House of Representatives shall by resolution respectively prescribe the time and
manner of filing contest in the election of members of said bodies, the time and manner of notifying the
adverse party, and bond or bonds, to be required, if any, and shall fix the costs and expenses of contest
which may be paid from their respective funds."cralaw virtua1aw library
The purpose sought to be attained by the creation of the Electoral Commission was not to erect a body that
would be above the law, but to raise legislative election contests from the category of political to that of
justiciable questions. The purpose was not to place the commission beyond the reach of the law, but to
insure the determination of such contests with due process of law.
Section 478 of the Election Law was in force at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, Article XV,
section 2, of which provides that
"All laws of the Philippine Islands shall continue in force until the inauguration of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines; thereafter, such laws shall remain operative, unless inconsistent with this Constitution, until
amended, altered, modified, or repealed by the National Assembly, and all references in such laws to the
Government or officials of the Philippine Islands shall be construed, in so far as applicable, to refer to the
Government and corresponding officials under this Constitution."cralaw virtua1aw library
The manifest purpose of this constitutional provision was to insure the orderly processes of government, and

to prevent any hiatus in its operation after the inauguration of the Commonwealth of the Philippines. It was
thus provided that all laws of the Philippine Islands shall remain operative even after the inauguration of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines, unless inconsistent with the Constitution, and that all references in such
laws to the government or officials of the Philippine Islands shall be construed, in so far as applicable, to
refer to the government and corresponding officials under the Constitution. It would seem to be consistent
not only with the spirit but with the letter of the Constitution to hold that section 478 of the Election Law
remains operative and should now be construed to refer to the Electoral Commission, which, in so far as the
power to judge election contests is concerned, corresponds to either the Senate or the House of
Representatives under the former regime. It is important to observe in this connection that said section 478
of the Election Law vested the power to regulate the time and manner in which notice of a contested election
may be given, not in the Philippine Legislature but in the Senate and House of Representatives singly. In
other words, the authority to prescribe the time and manner of filing contests in the election of members of
the Philippine Legislature was by statute lodged separately in the bodies clothed with power to decide such
contests. Construing section 478 of the Election Law to refer to the National Assembly, as required by Article
XV, section 2, of the Constitution, it seems reasonable to conclude that the authority to prescribe the time
and manner of filing contests in the election of members of the National Assembly is vested in the Electoral
Commission, which is now the body clothed with power to decide such contests.
In the light of what has been said, the resolution of the National Assembly of December 3, 1935, could not
have the effect of barring the right of the respondent Pedro Ynsua to contest the election of the petitioner. By
the same token, the Electoral Commission was authorized by law to adopt its resolution of December 9,
1935, which fixed the time within which written written contests must be filed with the commission.
Having been filed within the time fixed by its resolution, the Electoral Commission has jurisdiction to hear
and determine the contest filed by the respondent Pedro Ynsua against the petitioner Jose A. Angara. Writ
denied.

5. Pimentel v. Joint Committee of Congress, G.R. No. 163783, June 22, 2004.
The Congress is a continuing body and must fulfill its constitutional mandate to conduct the
presidential canvass of votes even it if is in recess. The Senate shall convene in joint
session during any voluntary or compulsory recess to canvass the votes for President and
Vice-President not later than thirty days after the day of the elections in accordance with Section 4,
Article VII of the Constitution.

G.R. No. 163783. June 22, 2004]

PIMENTEL vs. CONGRESS
EN BANC
Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated JUN 22 2004.
G. R. No. 163783 (Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. vs. Joint Committee of Congress to Canvass the Votes Cast for President
and Vice-President in the May 10, 2004 Elections.)
RESOLUTION
By the present Petition for Prohibition, petitioner Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. seeks a judgment declaring null
and void the continued existence of the Joint Committee of Congress (Joint Committee) to determine the authenticity
and due execution of the certificates of canvass and preliminarily canvass the votes cast for Presidential and VicePresidential candidates in the May 10, 2004 elections following the adjournment of Congress sine die on June 11,
2004. The petition corollarily prays for the issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Joint Committee to cease and
desist from conducting any further proceedings pursuant to the Rules of the Joint Public Session of Congress on
Canvassing.

Petitioner posits that with "the adjournment sine die on June 11, 2004 by the Twelfth Congress of its last regular
session, [its] term ... terminated and expired on the said day and the said Twelfth Congress serving the term 2001 to
2004 passed out of legal existence." Henceforth, petitioner goes on, "all pending matters and proceedings terminate
upon the expiration of ... Congress." To advance this view, he relies on "legislative procedure, precedent or practice
[as] borne [out] by the rules of both Houses of Congress."
Given the importance of the constitutional issue raised and to put to rest all questions regarding the regularity, validity
or constitutionality of the canvassing of votes fro President and Vice-President in the recently concluded national
elections, this Court assumes jurisdiction over the instant petition pursuant to its power and duty "to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government" under Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution and its original
jurisdiction over petitions for prohibition under Section 5 of the same Article.
After a considered and judicious examination of the arguments raised by petitioner as well as those presented in the
Comments filed by the Solicitor General and respondent Joint Committee, this Court finds that the petition has
absolutely no basis under the Constitution and must, therefore, be dismissed.
Petitioner's claim that his arguments are buttressed by "legislative procedure, precedent or practice [as] borne [out]
by the rules of both Houses of Congress" is directly contradicted by Section 42 of Rule XIV of the Rules adopted by
the Senate, of which he is an incumbent member. This section clearly provides that the Senate shall convene in
joint session during any voluntary orcompulsory recess to canvass the votes for President and VicePresident not later than thirty days after the day of the elections in accordance with Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution.
Moreover, as pointed out in the Comment filed by the Senate Panel for respondent Joint Committee and that of the
Office of the Solicitor General, the precedents set by the 1992 and 1998 Presidential Elections do not support the
move to stop the ongoing canvassing by the Joint Committee, they citing the observations of former Senate President
Jovito Salonga.
Thus, during the 1992 Presidential elections, both Houses of Congress adjourned sine die on May 25, 1992. On June
[1]
16, 1992, the Joint Committee finished tallying the votes for President and Vice-President. cralaw Thereafter, on
June 22, 1992, the Eighth Congress convened in joint public session as the National Board of Canvassers, and on
even date proclaimed Fidel V. Ramos and Joseph Ejercito Estrada as President and Vice-President,
[2]
respectively. cralaw
Upon the other hand, during the 1998 Presidential elections, both Houses of Congress adjourned sine die on May 25,
1998. The Joint Committee completed the counting of the votes for President and Vice-President on May 27,
[3]
1998. cralaw The Tenth Congress then convened in joint public session on May 29, 1998 as the National Board of
Canvassers and proclaimed Joseph Ejercito Estrada as President and Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President and
[4]
Vice-President, respectively. cralaw
As for petitioner's argument that "the [e]xistence and [p]roceedings [o]f the Joint Committee of Congress [a]re
[i]nvalid, [i]llegal and [u]nconstitutional [f]ollowing the [a]djournment [s]ine [d]ie [o]f [b]oth Houses of Congress [o]f
[t]heir [r]egular [s]essions on June 11, 2004," he cites in support thereof Section 15, Article VI of the Constitution
which reads:
Sec. 15. The Congress shall convene once every year on the fourth Monday of July for its regular session, unless a
different date is fixed by law, and shall continue to be in session for such number of days as it may determine until
thirty days before the opening of its next regular session, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays. The
President may call a special session at any time.
Contrary to petitioner's argument, however, the term of the present Twelfth Congress did not terminate and expire
upon the adjournment sine die of the regular session of both Houses on June 11, 2004.
Section 15, Article VI of the Constitution cited by petitioner does not pertain to the term of Congress, but to its regular
annual legislative sessions and the mandatory 30-day recess before the opening of its next regular session (subject
to the power of the President to call a special session at any time).

Section 4 of Article VIII also of the Constitution clearly provides that "[t]he term of office of the Senators shall be six
years and shall commence, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their
election." Similarly, Section 7 of the same Article provides that "[t]he Members of the House of Representatives shall
be elected for a term of three years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day
of June next following their election." Consequently, there being no law to the contrary, until June 30, 2004, the
present Twelfth Congress to which the present legislators belong cannot be said to have "passed out of legal
existence."
The legislative functions of the Twelfth Congress may have come to a close upon the final adjournment of its regular
sessions on June 11, 2004, but this does not affect its non-legislativefunctions, such as that of being the National
Board of Canvassers. In fact, the joint public session of both Houses of Congress convened by express directive of
Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution to canvass the votes for and to proclaim the newly elected President and
Vice-President has not, and cannot, adjourn sine die until it has accomplished its constitutionally mandated tasks. For
only when a board of canvassers has completed its functions is it rendered functus officio. Its membership may
change, but it retains its authority as a board until it has accomplished its purposes. (Pelayo v. Commission on
Elections, 23 SCRA 1374, 1385 [1968], citing Bautista v. Fugoso, 60 Phil. 383, 389 [1934] and Aquino v. Commission
on Elections, L-28392, January 29 1968)
Since the Twelfth Congress has not yet completed its non-legislative duty to canvass the votes and proclaim the duly
elected President and Vice-President, its existence as the National Board of Canvassers, as well as that of the Joint
Committee to which it referred the preliminary tasks of authenticating and canvassing the certificates of canvass, has
not become functus officio.
In sum, despite the adjournment sine die of Congress, there is no legal impediment to the Joint Committee
completing the tasks assigned to it and transmitting its report for the approval of the joint public session of both
Houses of Congress, which may reconvene without need of call by the President to a special session.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby DISMISSED.

6. Re: COA Opinion on computation of the Appraised Value of the Properties purchased by
retired Chief/Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, A.M. No. 11-7-10 SC, July 31, 2012.
Any form of interference by the Legislative or Executive Branch on the Judiciarys fiscal autonomy
amounts to improper check on a co-equal branch of government.

EN BANC
[A.M. NO. 11-7-10-SC - July 31, 2012]
Re: COA Opinion on the Computation of the Appraised Value of the Properties Purchased by the Retired
Chief/Associate Justices of the Supreme Court.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
The present administrative matter stems from the two Memoranda, dated July 14, 2011 and August 10, 2010,
submitted by Atty. Eden T. Candelaria, Deputy Clerk of Court and Chief Administrative Officer, Office of
Administrative Services, to the Office of the Chief Justice. These
Memoranda essentially ask the Court to determine the proper formula to be used in computing the appraisal value
that a retired Chief Justice and several Associate Justices of the Supreme Court have to pay to acquire the
government properties they used during their tenure.
THE FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS

This issue has its roots in the June 8, 2010 Opinion issued by the Legal Services Sector, Office of the General
Counsel of the Commission on Audit (COA), which found that an underpayment amounting to P221,021.50 resulted
when five (5) retired Supreme Court justices purchased from the Supreme Court the personal properties assigned to
them during their incumbency in the Court, to wit:rbl r l l lbrr

Name of Justice

Artemio Panganiban
(Chief Justice)

Valuation under
Items Purchased
CFAG
(in pesos)

Valuation under
COA
Difference
Memorandum
(in pesos)
No. 98-569A
(in pesos)

Toyota Camry,
2003 model

341,241.10

365,000.00

23,758.90

Toyota Grandia,
2002 model

136,500.00

151,000.00

14,500.00

Toyota Camry,
2001 model

115,800.00

156,000.00

40,200.00

Toyota Camry,
2005 model

579,532.50

580,600.00

1,067.50

Toyota Grandia,
2003 model

117,300.00

181,200.00

63,900.00

Angelina S. Gutierrez
(Associate Justice)

Toyota Grandia,
2002 model

115,800.00

150,600.00

34,800.00

Adolfo S. Azcuna
(Associate Justice)

Toyota Camry,
2005 model

536,105.00

543,300.00

9,195.00

Toyota Grandia,
2002 model

117,300.00

145,000.00

27,700.00

Sony TV Set

2,399.90

2,500.00

100.10

Ruben T. Reyes
(Associate Justice)

Ma. Alicia

5,800.00

The COA attributed this underpayment to the use by the Property Division of the Supreme Court of the wrong formula
in computing the appraisal value of the purchased vehicles. According to the COA, the Property Division erroneously
appraised the subject motor vehicles by applying Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy Group (CFAG) Joint Resolution No.
35 dated April 23, 1997 and its guidelines, in compliance with the Resolution of the Court En Banc dated March 23,
3
2004 in A.M. No. 03-12-01, when it should have applied the formula found in COA Memorandum No. 98-5694
A dated August 5, 1998.
Recommendations of the Office of Administrative Services In her Memorandum dated August 10, 2010, Atty.
Candelaria recommended that the Court advise the COA to respect the in-house computation based on the CFAG
formula, noting that this was the first time that the COA questioned the authority of the Court in using CFAG Joint
Resolution No. 35 and its guidelines in the appraisal and disposal of government property since these were issued in
5
1997. As a matter of fact, in two previous instances involving two (2) retired Court of Appeals Associate Justices, the
COA upheld the in-house appraisal of government property using the formula found in the CFAG guidelines. More
importantly, the Constitution itself grants the Judiciary fiscal autonomy in the handling of its budget and resources.
6
Full autonomy, among others, contemplates the guarantee of full flexibility in the allocation and utilization of the
Judiciary s resources, based on its own determination of what it needs. The Court thus has the recognized authority
to allocate and disburse such sums as may be provided or required by law in the course of the discharge of its
7
functions. To allow the COA to substitute the Court s policy in the disposal of its property would be tantamount to an
encroachment into this judicial prerogative.
OUR RULING

We find Atty. Candelaria s recommendation to be well-taken.

The COA s authority to conduct post-audit examinations on constitutional bodies granted fiscal autonomy is provided
under Section 2(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, which states:rl
Section 2. (1) The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority, and duty to examine, audit, and settle all
accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in
trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, and on a post-audit basis: (a) constitutional
bodies, commissions and offices that have been granted fiscal autonomy under this Constitution. emphasis ours
This authority, however, must be read not only in light of the Court s fiscal autonomy, but also in relation with the
constitutional provisions on judicial independence and the existing jurisprudence and Court rulings on these matters.
Separation of Powers and Judicial Independence
8

In Angara v. Electoral Commission, we explained the principle of separation of powers, as follows:rl

The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through express
provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of
matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three
powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and
independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure
coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. x x x And the judiciary in turn, with the
Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine
9
the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution. rll
The concept of the independence of the three branches of government, on the other hand, extends from the notion
that the powers of government must be divided to avoid concentration of these powers in any one branch; the
division, it is hoped, would avoid any single branch from lording its power over the other branches or the
10
citizenry. To achieve this purpose, the divided power must be wielded by co-equal branches of government that are
equally capable of independent action in exercising their respective mandates; lack of independence would result in
11
the inability of one branch of government to check the arbitrary or self-interest assertions of another or others. rll
Under the Judiciary s unique circumstances, independence encompasses the idea that individual judges can freely
exercise their mandate to resolve justiciable disputes, while the judicial branch, as a whole, should work in the
discharge of its constitutional functions free of restraints and influence from the other branches, save only for those
12
imposed by the Constitution itself. Thus, judicial independence can be "broken down into two distinct concepts:
13
decisional independence and institutional independence." Decisional independence "refers to a judge s ability to
14
render decisions free from political or popular influence based solely on the individual facts and applicable law." On
the other hand, institutional independence "describes the separation of the judicial branch from the executive and
15
legislative branches of government." Simply put, institutional independence refers to the "collective independence of
16
the judiciary as a body." rll
In the case In the Matter of the Allegations Contained in the Columns of Mr. Amado P. Macasaet Published in Malaya
17
Dated September 18, 19, 20 and 21, 2007, the Court delineated the distinctions between the two concepts of
judicial independence in the following manner:rl
One concept is individual judicial independence, which focuses on each particular judge and seeks to insure his or
her ability to decide cases with autonomy within the constraints of the law. A judge has this kind of independence
when he can do his job without having to hear or at least without having to take it seriously if he does hear criticisms
of his personal morality and fitness for judicial office. The second concept is institutional judicial independence. It
focuses on the independence of the judiciary as a branch of government and protects judges as a class.
A truly independent judiciary is possible only when both concepts of independence are preserved - wherein public
confidence in the competence and integrity of the judiciary is maintained, and the public accepts the legitimacy of
judicial authority. An erosion of this confidence threatens the maintenance of an independent Third Estate. italics and
emphases ours Recognizing the vital role that the Judiciary plays in our system of government as the sole repository

of judicial power, with the power to determine whether any act of any branch or instrumentality of the government is
18
attended with grave abuse of discretion, no less than the Constitution provides a number of safeguards to ensure
that judicial independence is protected and maintained.
The Constitution expressly prohibits Congress from depriving the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction, as enumerated in
Section 5, Article VII of the Constitution, or from passing a law that undermines the security of tenure of the members
19
20
of the judiciary. The Constitution also mandates that the judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy, and grants the
21
Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts and judicial personnel. Jurisprudence has characterized
administrative supervision as exclusive, noting that only the Supreme Court can oversee the judges and court
personnel's compliance with all laws, rules and regulations. No other branch of government may intrude into this
22
power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers. rll
The Constitution protects as well the salaries of the Justices and judges by prohibiting any decrease in their salary
23
during their continuance in office, and ensures their security of tenure by providing that "Members of the Supreme
Court and judges of lower courts shall hold office during good behavior until they reach the age of seventy years or
24
become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office." With these guarantees, justices and judges can
administer justice undeterred by any fear of reprisals brought on by their judicial action. They can act inspired solely
by their knowledge of the law and by the dictates of their conscience, free from the corrupting influence of base or
25
unworthy motives. rll
All of these constitutional provisions were put in place to strengthen judicial independence, not only by clearly stating
the Court s powers, but also by providing express limits on the power of the two other branches of government to
interfere with the Court s affairs.
Fiscal Autonomy
One of the most important aspects of judicial independence is the constitutional grant of fiscal autonomy. Just as the
Executive may not prevent a judge from discharging his or her judicial duty (for example, by physically preventing a
court from holding its hearings) and just as the Legislature may not enact laws removing all jurisdiction from
26
courts, the courts may not be obstructed from their freedom to use or dispose of their funds for purposes germane
to judicial functions. While, as a general proposition, the authority of legislatures to control the purse in the first
instance is unquestioned, any form of interference by the Legislative or the Executive on the Judiciary s fiscal
autonomy amounts to an improper check on a co-equal branch of government. If the judicial branch is to perform its
primary function of adjudication, it must be able to command adequate resources for that purpose. This authority to
exercise (or to compel the exercise of) legislative power over the national purse (which at first blush appears to be a
violation of concepts of separateness and an invasion of legislative autonomy) is necessary to maintain judicial
27
independence and is expressly provided for by the Constitution through the grant of fiscal autonomy under Section
3, Article VIII. This provision states:rl
Section 3. The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for the Judiciary may not be reduced by the
legislature below the amount appropriated for the previous year and, after approval, shall be automatically and
regularly released.
In Bengzon v. Drilon,
manner:rl

28

we had the opportunity to define the scope and extent of fiscal autonomy in the following

As envisioned in the Constitution, the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the Judiciary, the Civil Service Commission, the
Commission on Audit, the Commission on Elections, and the Office of the Ombudsman contemplates a guarantee of
full flexibility to allocate and utilize their resources with the wisdom and dispatch that their needs require. It recognizes
the power and authority to levy, assess and collect fees, fix rates of compensation not exceeding the highest rates
authorized by law for compensation and pay plans of the government and allocate and disburse such sums as may
be provided by law or prescribed by them in the course of the discharge of their functions.
Fiscal autonomy means freedom from outside control. If the Supreme Court says it needs 100 typewriters but DBM
rules we need only 10 typewriters and sends its recommendations to Congress without even informing us, the
autonomy given by the Constitution becomes an empty and illusory platitude.
The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have the independence and flexibility
needed in the discharge of their constitutional duties. The imposition of restrictions and constraints on the manner the

independent constitutional offices allocate and utilize the funds appropriated for their operations is anathema to fiscal
autonomy and violative not only of the express mandate of the Constitution but especially as regards the Supreme
Court, of the independence and separation of powers upon which the entire fabric of our constitutional system is
based. In the interest of comity and cooperation, the Supreme Court, Constitutional Commissions, and the
Ombudsman have so far limited their objections to constant reminders. We now agree with the petitioners that this
29
grant of autonomy should cease to be a meaningless provision. (emphases ours)
In this cited case, the Court set aside President Corazon Aquino s veto of particular provisions of the General
Appropriations Act for the Fiscal Year 1992 relating to the payment of the adjusted pensions of retired justices of the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, on the basis of the Judiciary s constitutionally guaranteed independence
and fiscal autonomy. The Court ruled:rl
In the case at bar, the veto of these specific provisions in the General Appropriations Act is tantamount to dictating to
the Judiciary how its funds should be utilized, which is clearly repugnant to fiscal autonomy. The freedom of the Chief
Justice to make adjustments in the utilization of the funds appropriated from the expenditures of the judiciary,
including the use of any savings from any particular item to cover deficits or shortages in other items of the Judiciary
is withheld. Pursuant to the Constitutional mandate, the Judiciary must enjoy freedom in the disposition of the funds
allocated to it in the appropriations law. It knows its priorities just as it is aware of the fiscal restraints. The Chief
30
Justice must be given a free hand on how to augment appropriations where augmentation is needed. rll
The Court s declarations in Bengzon make it clear that the grant of fiscal autonomy to the Judiciary is more extensive
31
than the mere automatic and regular release of its approved annual appropriations; real fiscal autonomy covers the
grant to the Judiciary of the authority to use and dispose of its funds and properties at will, free from any outside
control or interference.
Application to the Present Case
The Judiciary s fiscal autonomy is realized through the actions of the Chief Justice, as its head, and of the Supreme
Court En Banc, in the exercise of administrative control and supervision of the courts and its personnel. As the Court
En Banc s Resolution (dated March 23, 2004) in A.M. No. 03-12-01 reflects, the fiscal autonomy of the Judiciary
serves as the basis in allowing the sale of the Judiciary s properties to retiring Justices of the Supreme Court and the
appellate courts:rl
WHEREAS, by the constitutional mandate of fiscal autonomy as defined in Bengzon v. Drilon (G.R. No. 103524, 15
April 1992, 208 SCRA 133, 150) the Judiciary has "full flexibility to allocate and utilize (its) resources with the wisdom
and dispatch that (its) needs require";
WHEREAS, the long-established tradition and practice of Justices or Members of appellate courts of purchasing for
sentimental reasons at retirement government properties they used during their tenure has been recognized as a
privilege enjoyed only by such government officials; andcralawlibrary
WHEREAS, the exercise of such privilege needs regulation to the end that respect for sentiments that a retiring
Justice attaches to properties he or she officially used during his or her tenure should be in consonance with the need
for restraint in the utilization and disposition of government resources.
By way of a long standing tradition, partly based on the intention to reward long and faithful service, the sale to the
retired Justices of specifically designated properties that they used during their incumbency has been recognized
both as a privilege and a benefit. This has become an established practice within the Judiciary that even the COA has
32
previously recognized. The En Banc Resolution also deems the grant of the privilege as a form of additional
retirement benefit that the Court can grant its officials and employees in the exercise of its power of administrative
supervision. Under this administrative authority, the Court has the power to administer the Judiciary s internal affairs,
and this includes the authority to handle and manage the retirement applications and entitlements of its personnel as
33
provided by law and by its own grants. rll
Thus, under the guarantees of the Judiciary s fiscal autonomy and its independence, the Chief Justice and the Court
En Banc determine and decide the who, what, where, when and how of the privileges and benefits they extend to
justices, judges, court officials and court personnel within the parameters of the Court s granted power; they
determine the terms, conditions and restrictions of the grant as grantor.

In the context of the grant now in issue, the use of the formula provided in CFAG Joint Resolution No. 35 is a part of
the Court s exercise of its discretionary authority to determine the manner the granted retirement privileges and
benefits can be availed of. Any kind of interference on how these retirement privileges and benefits are exercised and
availed of, not only violates the fiscal autonomy and independence of the Judiciary, but also encroaches upon the
constitutional duty and privilege of the Chief Justice and the Supreme Court En Banc to manage the Judiciary s own
affairs.
As a final point, we add that this view finds full support in the Government Accounting and Auditing Manual (GAAM),
Volume 1, particularly, Section 501 of Title 7, Chapter 3, which states:rl
Section 501. Authority or responsibility for property disposal/divestment. The full and sole authority and responsibility
for the divestment and disposal of property and other assets owned by the national government agencies or
instrumentalities, local government units and government-owned and/or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries
shall be lodged in the heads of the departments, bureaus, and offices of the national government, the local
government units and the governing bodies or managing heads of government-owned or controlled corporations and
their subsidiaries conformably to their respective corporate charters or articles of incorporation, who shall constitute
the appropriate committee or body to undertake the same. italics supplied; emphases ours
This provision clearly recognizes that the Chief Justice, as the head of the Judiciary, possesses the full and sole
authority and responsibility to divest and dispose of the properties and assets of the Judiciary; as Head of Office, he
determines the manner and the conditions of disposition, which in this case relate to a benefit. As the usual practice
of the Court, this authority is exercised by the Chief Justice in consultation with the Court En Banc. However, whether
exercised by the Chief Justice or by the Supreme Court En Banc, the grant of such authority and discretion is
unequivocal and leaves no room for interpretations and insertions.
ACCORDINGLY, premises considered, the in-house computation of the appraisal value made by the Property
Division, Office of `Administrative Services, of the properties purchased by the retired Chief Justice and Associate
Justices of the Supreme Court, based on CFAG Joint Resolution No. 35 dated April 23, 1997, as directed under the
Court Resolution dated March 23, 2004 in A.M. No. 03-12-01, is CONFIRMED to be legal and valid. Let the
Commission on Audit be accordingly advised of this Resolution for its guidance.
SO ORDERED.

7. Consolidated Petitions: Belgicaet. al. v. Executive Secretary et. al. G.R.No. 208566, Alcantara
et. al. v. Drilon et. al. G.R. No. 208493, and Nepomucenoet. al. v. Pres. Aquino et. al., G.R.
No.209251, Nov. 19, 2013:
The Court resolved issues related to procedural matters and substantive matters.
8. BOCEA v. Hon. Teves, G.R. No. 181704, December 6, 2011.
R.A. No. 9335 otherwise known as the Attrition act of 2005 is constitutional and the adoption of its
Implementing Rules and Regulations is a valid delegation of powers.
9. Pichay v. Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary et al., G.R. No. 196425, July 24, 2012.
The power of the President to reorganize is a prerogative under his continuing delegated legislative
authority to reorganize his own office pursuant to E.O. No.292.
10. Banda et al. v. Ermita, G.R. No. 166620, April 20, 2010.
The power to reorganize executive offices has been consistently supported by specific provisions in
general appropriations laws.
11. Judge Angeles v. Hon. Gaite et al., G.R. no. 176596, March 23, 2011.
The Presidents act of delegating authority to the Secretary of Justice is well within the doctrine of
qualified political agency.
12. Hacienda Luisita v. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council, G.R. No. 171101, November 22, 2011.

The operative fact doctrine is not confined to statutes and rules and regulations issued by the
executive branch that are accorded the same status as that of a statute or those which are quasilegislative in nature.