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The Politics of Electoral Reform:

The State of Research
Gideon Rahat

Hebrew University of Jerusalem , Israel

Published online: 06 Dec 2011.

To cite this article: Gideon Rahat (2011) The Politics of Electoral Reform: The State
of Research, Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties, 21:4, 523-543, DOI:
10.1080/17457289.2011.609618
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Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties

Vol. 21, No. 4, 523 543, November 2011

REVIEW ARTICLE

The Politics of Electoral Reform:

The State of Research
GIDEON RAHAT
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Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel

ABSTRACT This article examines three approaches rational choice, historical-comparative

and institutional used to study the politics of electoral reform. The first part is dedicated to a
review of explanations for stability of electoral systems while the second part looks at the analysis of the causes for electoral reform. This examination of the literature reveals that rational
choice is especially beneficial when explaining the stability of electoral systems, whereas the
rare occurrence of significant electoral reform in established democracies is better understood
using the more detailed historical-comparative approach. The institutional approach can be
seen as an important supplement to both other approaches. The general lesson and one
that might apply beyond the study of the politics of reform is that it is beneficial to employ
a combination of approaches rather than to stick to a single one.

The electoral system is a prime element of the regime structure in democracies. Its
reform is very likely to influence other central elements in the regime structure: the
nature of the party system, the composition of the cabinet (single party government
vs. coalition government) and the balance of power between the executive and legislative branches (Lijphart, 1994, 1999). The politics of electoral reform is a concept
that pertains to the struggles between the forces that try to preserve the existing electoral system and those that try to change it, as well as the struggles and cooperation
within these camps.
In his reflections on comparative electoral studies research, Shugart (2005: 51) states
that it is harder to study the origins and choice of electoral systems than to study their
consequences because there are (naturally) fewer cases to analyze, and because it is
harder to conduct systematic quantitative research. Yet, he advocates the research of
the origins of electoral systems, hailing the topic as the research frontier for the
twenty-first century. This front was actually opened several years before the end of
the last century (Norris, 1995a), with Shugart himself among its early explorers
(Shugart & Wattenberg, 2001). Following the adoption of electoral reforms in
several established democracies in the early 1990s, interest grew in the politics of
Correspondence Address: Prof. Gideon Rahat, Department of Political Science, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Mount Scopus, Jerusalem, 91905 Israel. Email: msgrah@huji.ac.il
ISSN 1745-7289 Print/1745-7297 Online/11/04052321 # 2011 Elections, Public Opinion & Parties
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17457289.2011.609618

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G. Rahat

electoral reform. Generalizations and theoretical propositions were made on the basis
of cross-national comparisons (Blais & Shugart, 2008; Katz, 2005; Norris, 1995b;
Rahat, 2008; Renwick, 2010; Sakamoto, 1999; Shugart, 2001), theoretical modeling
(Benoit, 2004) and single case studies (Bueno de Mesquita, 2000; Dunleavy & Margetts, 1995; Jackson & McRobie, 1998; Rahat 2004, 2006). In addition, numerous
single case studies appeared after 1995 (see, for example, the chapters in the collections: Blais, 2008a; Norris, 1995a; Shugart & Wattenberg, 2001).
This article deals with two connected issues: first, the stability of electoral systems
in established democracies the goal being to examine the explanations for stability,
that is, why electoral reforms are so rare in these democracies, and why we witnessed
so few of them in the preceding six decades; second, it looks at the ways scholars
explained those rare incidents of electoral reform. It will identify and analyze
studies that employed three distinct approaches: rational choice, historical-comparative and institutional. The rational choice approach can explain reform and stability as
reflecting the self-driven interests of the main political actors. The historical-comparative approach relates to those accounts that supply detailed yet systematic explanations for the successes and failures of attempts at reform promotion. Finally, the
institutional approach expects electoral reforms to be adopted if and when electoral
systems produce results that lead to the malfunctioning of the system, and for stability
and efficiency when it contributes to its proper functioning. These three approaches
are not mutually exclusive. The institutional and rational choice approaches partly
parallel each other when institutions are seen as creating incentives for specific behaviors. The historical-comparative approach, by its nature, is not committed to a
specific theory and clearly makes wide use of the other approaches.
The challenge that was set for these approaches was not a simple one yet the
reality of substantial electoral reforms in four established democracies in the 1990s
could not pass unnoticed. Scholars now had to explain not only reform but also to
account for long-term stability. Stability was virtually a given for institutionalists,
who focused on the political consequences of electoral systems; for rational choice
scholars, who formulated their claims in a particular institutional environment; and
for the less theoretically committed scholars, who focused on societal developments
within a given institutional framework in established democracies.
Most of the existing analyses of the politics of reform concentrate on major reforms,
on the study of those cases that seemingly posed the most difficult challenge to scholars: the electoral reforms of the 1990s in four established democracies Italy, New
Zealand, Japan and Israel (Norris, 1995a; Shugart & Wattenberg, 2001). These
reforms did not take place in the context of founding moments, nor at times of
massive external shocks or their aftermath, but rather as part of the politics of stable
democracies. Other studies some of which will be mentioned here refer to the
shift of many European countries from majoritarian to PR (proportional representation)
electoral systems at the beginning of the twentieth century. They are not at the center of
the review, however, because they occurred in a substantially different context, characterized by a massive growth of franchise; major changes in parties organizational patterns; and a wide-scale realignment of voters (Ahmed, 2010; Andrews & Jackman,

The Politics of Electoral Reform

525

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2005; Boix, 1999; Carstairs, 1980). Thanks to Renwick (2010), we can also address an
additional set of cases of electoral reforms, resembling the 1990s reforms in that they
did not occur during founding moments, but different because the reform adoption was
imposed by the elites rather than being imposed on them.
The article will critically examine the explanations of these approaches to stability
and change. The first part addresses those that the three approaches propose for stability in the electoral systems of established democracies. The second part analyzes the
explanations for electoral reform in established democracies in the 1990s. It will then
conclude with a summary of the achievements and limitations of these studies and
possible paths for future research.
Why Did the Electoral Systems of Established Democracies Remain
Unchanged?
Interest groups and political parties in many established democracies attempted to
promote electoral reform in the 1950 1990 period. Yet, with the exception of
France, no major electoral reform was adopted in that period. This put electoral
reform in the category of a non-event which the discipline does not tend to
address. Thus, prior to 1995, no studies attempted to construct a basis for a theory
on the politics of electoral reform. A few addressed the phenomenon of preservation,
such as Nohlens (1984) analysis of the stability of electoral systems in Western
democracies, and the more historical studies of the failed attempts at electoral
reform in the UK (Bogdanor, 1981; Butler, 1963, 1984). Only in the 1990s, after
such reforms were adopted, did it become apparent that the stability of electoral
systems in established democracies also deserves a developed theoretical treatment
(see, for example, Shugart, 2008). Several explanations for stability that represent
different research approaches and different levels of analysis can be proposed.
The Rational Choice Approach
In studying the politics of reform, rational choice explanations assume that electoral system
stability and reform result from the behavior of politicians who calculate and compare the
consequences of existing systems with those of alternative ones, and prefer those that maximize their power in terms of seats, office or policies. Building on this assumption, the main
aim is to supply elegant, parsimonious, simple and general explanations to the phenomenon. This breeds, as we shell see, quite acceptable explanations for stability but a lot of
criticism regarding the validity of rational choice analysis of reform.
Rational Choice: Vested Interests
The dominant political forces, that hold the key to change, have vested interests in preserving the conventions that enabled them, in the first place, to be the guardians of this
key. These forces might have been the designers of the electoral system or they might
have begun as opponents but adapted themselves to a given set of circumstances

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(Nohlen, 1984; Taagepera & Shugart, 1989). If politicians are sufficiently risk averse,
they will prefer defending what they have already achieved rather than endangering it
and facing the uncertain political consequences of reform. Dunleavy and Margetts
(1995) argue that it is not only parties that have vested interests in maintaining the institutional status quo, but also individual incumbents and strong interest groups.
Boix (1999) expects that the electoral system will remain unchanged as long the
electoral arena stays stable. Only when this stability is threatened can we expect
the ruling parties to change the system in an effort to control results. All four phenomena that he mentions as possible triggers for reform the extension of universal suffrage, introduction of competitive elections, massive political realignment among
voters, and a high turnover of party organization fail to account for the reforms
of the 1990s. These occurred in the framework of normal politics. True, we can identify a crisis in each case, yet it does not explain much as the same systems at other
times and other systems witnessed crises but did not react to them by reforming their
electoral systems (Rahat, 2008). Even in Italy, where voter realignment and the transformation of party organization did indeed occur, reform seems to be part of the earthquake rather than a response to it.1
According to Benoit (2004: 379), Electoral systems should cease to change once
no party or group of parties with the fiat power to change the electoral law perceives a
potential seat gain by doing so. This claim is especially relevant for predicting the
stability of majoritarian systems. The successful (few) parties have a strong interest
in preserving a system that provides them with valuable rewards in terms of representation and influence. Blais et al. (2004: 185) show that this is particularly so when
dealing with plurality systems. Other majority systems are more prone to change
because less strategic voting in majority systems leads to greater party fragmentation, which leads to coalition government, and the presence of coalition governments
increases pressure for the adoption of PR. Indeed, reform penetrated the political
agenda of countries with plurality systems at times when one of the two large
parties felt continuously impaired by the majoritarian system. But since the Second
World War there has been no instance of major parties in plurality systems acting
to continuously promote reform not even in the New Zealand case. Blais and
Shugart (2008) suggest that interests enable the preservation of FPTP, because in
the normative battlefield it is clear following the early twentieth-century reforms
and recent recommendations of several citizens assemblies that dealt with the
issue that proportional representation has the upper hand.
In many cases, a majority (a party or a coalition) may have a short-term interest in
changing the electoral system in order to manipulate its expected seat share. Such
motives largely explain what Renwick (2010) calls the elite-majority imposed electoral reforms in Italy (1953 and, to an extent, 2005) and France (1951, 1985, 1986).
These were applied either to control damages resulting from a loss of support or to
enhance the party or the party-coalition victory. These incidents, however, are still
an exception to the rule; that is, they are just a few out of many cases in which
parties could have been tempted, on the basis of electoral forecasts, to change the
rules of the game on their behalf. What seems to counter such temptations are not

The Politics of Electoral Reform

527

only long-run calculations that have to do with parties vested interests in the system
but also other calculations, such as fear of the expected electoral price a party might
pay for changing the rules of the game (Katz, 2005). What these reforms tell us, nevertheless, is that interests per se do not work only on behalf of system stability. Rather,
they may be a prime motive for reform, especially in those systems where reform is not
expected to create an electoral backlash for reformers.

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Rational Choice Coalition Politics and the Veto of the Few

Benoits (2004) claim above does not capture the different balance of interests that
exists at most times in PR systems. In such systems large parties have good reason
to believe most of the time that they will gain representation and influence from
the adoption of majoritarian features.2 Coalition politics often blocks these large
parties from reforming the system. Indeed, coalition politics makes reform difficult,
as any crucial member (an intraparty faction or a partner) of the coalition (governing
coalition, or even a policy coalition on another important issue) holds the power to
veto reform: even a small minority can block a reform initiative that has the support
of the majority in the legislature. Such a minority may cause the rejection of reform
by offering support for other policies of the coalition government in exchange for
throwing reform off the governmental agenda; or, it can also threaten to oust the government if the reform initiative is promoted. Furthermore, as Diskin and Diskin (1995)
demonstrate, this veto power is not limited to parties in minimal winning coalitions. So
rational choice formulation can actually be useful in explaining the electoral system
stability of PR systems as long as it does not ignore a main aspect of consensus politics
coalition politics (Rahat, 2008; van der Kolk, 2007).3

Rational Choice (Game Theory): The Obstacles to Designing a Majority for

Change
Mobilizing majorities to support reform, and coordinating their activities, requires the
creation of an agreement regarding the substance of such measures. In a situation in
which there is a majority that supports change, but there is no agreement on substance,
the status quo supported by a minority will prevail. This can happen for various
reasons. Lack of agreement on substance could make the institutional status quo a Condorcet Winner that is, an option that is preferred by a majority in all pair-wise matches.
This occurs when the alternatives are rejected, one by one, by the temporary coalitions of
status quo loyalists (by themselves, only a minority) and those supporting a different
version of reform. Lack of agreement can also lead to the postponement and burial of
reform bills. In addition, there is the possibility of the paradox of voting (Browne &
Hamm, 1996). This happens when a majority tends to prefer various reform initiatives
to the status quo, but each camp refrains from supporting the other camps versions
(even when preferable to the status quo) because it hopes that the others will yield and
support its specific version of reform. Thus, a situation illustrated by the chicken

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G. Rahat

game could lead to the failure of a reform attempt; put simply, postponements can lead to
the closing of the window of opportunity for reform.

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The Historical-Comparative Approach

The label historical-comparative approach is given here to those analyses that presented failed and successful attempts at reform in a systematic manner. They did so
by scrutinizing these attempts as complex processes with multiple participants (rather
than a simplified focused decision-making event), using flexible frameworks for
analysis. These frameworks were complex enough to combine assumptions and
models of various theories, including rational choice and institutionalism. They
were used in single case studies and in diachronic and synchronic focused comparisons. Some of the scholars holding this approach believe that comparisons are useful
to shed light on the different cases but are not likely to lead to generalizations (Bogdanor, 1983). Others try to bring history to the analysis in order to enhance it and help
to arrive at valid generalizations (Ahmed, 2010; Kreuzer, 2010).
There are several detailed historical accounts of failed attempts at electoral reform
in the research literature (see, for example, Farrell, 2001; van der Kolk, 2007;
Weaver, 2001). These studies are important in demonstrating that even if there is a
strong claim for systemic faults of the system, and even if there are opportunities
for reform, the status quo is still likely to prevail. Rahats (2008) comparison of
the failed attempt at electoral reforms in Israel and the successful attempt to reform
the government system demonstrated that (relative) concentration of power may
explain stability. When power was concentrated in the hands of fewer actors, it
was harder to promote reform because it seemed to be a calculated manipulation
meant to serve the self-interest of dominant forces. When power was more widely
dispersed, uncertainty increased and it became harder to identify reform with a particular interest, which in turn facilitated the growth of the pro-reform coalition. In
addition, when power was concentrated, reform could be vetoed much more
readily than when it was dispersed, as in the latter situation no single actor could
veto reform on his/her own, and because reformers had more room to maneuver.
Adding to this finding Renwicks (2010) account of elite imposed reforms leads
to the proposition that electoral stability is maintained when power is dispersed
between several political actors not a single actor (that can promote reform
alone) nor too many (that cannot block reform on their own).
Institutional Approaches
Even if we can sometimes find common ground between the rational choice and historical-comparative analyses of the politics of electoral reform, they can be viewed as largely
competing and even conflicting approaches. The institutional approaches, however, do
not necessarily compete with them. As can be seen from the discussion below, old and
new institutionalism can be useful to design a rational choice explanation, especially of
the kind that goes beyond the theoretical and formal. Unsurprisingly, all approaches can
be integrated in a broad historical-comparative explanation.

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529

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(Old) Institutionalism
Institutional procedures for electoral reform legislation give primacy to the institutional status quo. In any reform attempt, the institutional status quo is a default,
while the reform alternative faces several procedural barriers; if it fails to pass
even one of them, it returns to the starting point. Even when a reform can be legislated
as a regular law, reformers need to recruit majority support for its legislation at different times (i.e. several parliamentary readings) and in different forums (plenum, committees). In many countries, however, reform requires a constitutional amendment or
an amendment to special laws. These may involve recruiting special majorities or
securing the consent of additional majorities: second chambers; sub-national legislatures (in federal systems); or the electorate (through a referendum). This appears to be
an important determinant of the path of reform promotion, but it usually gets little
attention when it comes to explaining stability. The case of Ireland proves that this
neglect is not profound. There, a party with a majority in parliament twice succeeded
in passing a law that replaced the PR system with a plurality system, but because it
was a constitutional issue it had to face a referendum and there the majority of
voters rejected the reform (Gallagher, 1996). Two recent studies put procedures
back on the agenda in a modern mantle Lijpharts consensus model demonstrating that procedures are indeed crucial in explaining failures to reform within the
context of consensual regime architecture (Hooghe & Deschouwer, 2011; Nikolenyi,
2011). Blaus (2008) attempt to facilitate a veto player analysis to account for possible paths for reform (and its likely failure) can also be seen as an attempt to bring
procedures (in a more modern costume) back into the analysis.
Cultural Institutionalism
The institutional setting especially that of stable, established democracies is
linked to a countrys culture and its political tradition. As Lijphart (1994, 1998)
demonstrates, the cultural approach is well suited to explain the tendency of the
Anglo-American democracies toward majoritarianism (which imply majoritarian
electoral systems) and the tendency of the Continental democracies toward consensualism (which imply PR electoral systems). In a situation of relative stability,
which characterizes established democracies, it would be difficult to mobilize
support for abandoning an institutional principle linked to local traditions, particularly if it is perceived as one that has proven itself.
Sociological Institutionalism
This approach steers attention to the relationship between the institutional setting and
societal structure. In a divided and heterogeneous society, the expectation is that
power will be shared by adopting a consensus regime, and a central feature of
such a regime is a PR electoral system. This arrangement allows various social
groups to live within a common democratic framework. By contrast, a homogenous

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G. Rahat

society can adopt a majoritarian structure in which majoritarian electoral systems

are a main feature because it is not obliged to slice the pie into many pieces (Lijphart, 1984). According to this perspective, we expect a country to preserve its electoral system as long as it fits the structure of its society. The frequency of reform
should thus reflect the slow pace at which certain substantive societal changes
occur transforming society from a highly homogenous one to a heterogeneous
one, or vice versa.

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New Institutionalism System-Level Rationality

Following the logic of Shugart (2001), stability may result from having an electorally efficient system that balances representation and identifiability, as well as personal accountability with the party program, and thus better translates the will of the
majority of the voters into policies. From a systemic perspective it is rational to preserve a functioning existing order. But in his more recent attempt to tackle the question of reform of FPTP systems, Shugart (2008) suggests that pressures for change are
created when the plurality system does not stand by its own promises to grant
victory to the party with the plurality of votes and have a significant opposition
party. Vowles (2008: 182) points out that to understand why such a systemic
failure that helps reform promotion occurs, we have to take into account
other institutional features.
Following Colomers (2005) argument (see also Remmer, 2008) that electoral
systems reflect the party system, we should expect to see stability of majoritarian
systems when the number of effective parties is low and stability of PR when the
number of effective parties is high. In other words, the existing electoral order can
often be seen as reflecting an optimal system-level balance between various
societal-political actors. This means that the different levels of reductionist pressures
created by these types of electoral systems contribute to their survival. Such explanations are meeting points between institutionalism and rational choice.
So What Best Explains Stability?
In the case of majoritarian systems (arguably, plurality systems in particular), the few
large and successful parties have a strong interest in preserving a system that provides
them with valuable rewards in terms of representation and influence. Even when the
system does not stand by its promises for example, in the Canadian cases (Massicotte, 2008) politicians do not easily turn to support its reform, possibly because
they still harbor enough hope to win the grand prize. In PR systems, large parties
have good reason to believe most of the time that they will gain representation
and influence from the adoption of majoritarian features. What blocks these large
parties from reforming the system is an immediate interest in maintaining their
coalitions. To this we should add politicians fear that attempts to maximize their
power through electoral reforms would be counter-productive because the public
would negatively react to a change that can be perceived as an attempt to manipulate

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The Politics of Electoral Reform

531

the rules of the game (Katz, 2007). Nevertheless, as Katz (2007: 63) demonstrates,
there can be several reasons why parties might change, or allow to be changed,
the rules of a game they are winning. In those cases when a reform move starts,
the importance of other barriers such as the need to crystallize a majority around a
particular reform proposal and the nature of reform procedures become apparent.
In these situations, whether reform promotion materializes or not, there is a need
for a detailed analysis of the dynamic of the process.
Looking at the dynamics of the process of reform promotion, Rahat (2008) and
Rahat and Hazan (2011) found that the procedural barrier and disagreements over
a reforms content are effective in delaying its progress. That is, reformers must
even after they seemingly succeed in overcoming vested interests and coalition politics, and recruit the support of the needed majority invest much effort in keeping
reform on the agenda and in promoting it, and be prepared to make the compromises
needed to sustain and rebuild their coalitions. Accumulated delays may result in a
reforms burial.
Tradition and systemic societal and institutional logic might be the only obstacles
to reform in those cases where there is a clear stable majority for reform. These,
mixed with (and linked to) the fear of public protest might be sufficient to block
reform (Renwick, 2010). Yet, in the cases of the significant reforms of the 1990s,
the public was clearly on the side of change, suspecting that politicians as a rule
reject reform because of their vested interests. In that situation, the rationale of the
existing order, as well as the traditions affiliated with it, were apparently the least difficult barriers to overcome. In combining the old with the new, the mixed versions of
reform that were promoted in the 1990s enabled reformers to demonstrate sufficient
sensitivity to tradition and to the proven virtues of the existing order. Thus, the
easier barriers to overcome are those that scholars usually see as the most important
to the well-being of the polity: the suitability of the system to the countrys political
tradition and culture and to the structure of society.
To sum up, the rational choice explanations seem to supply elegant, simple and
seemingly valid explanations for the stability of electoral systems, as long as they
distinguish between the type of interests that lead to the preservation of majoritarian systems and those that lead to the stability of PR systems. They are even better
if they include voters likely reaction to change. These explanations seem to be
sufficient in explaining stability at most times. Yet, when serious reform proposals
are raised and promoted by prominent actors, the significance of the other
obstacles to reform, as proposed by all three approaches, becomes apparent
(Rahat & Hazan, 2011). In such circumstances, the scholar need not just stand
by and watch, expecting that the status quo will prevail (though it usually
does). Rather, this is the time for a detailed historical-comparative analysis that
makes good use of rational choice and institutional presumptions to formulate
hypotheses and behavioralist tools to examine them. Whether a reform is
adopted or rejected, the opportunity is there to empirically test what is often
accepted as a non-tested presumption that there are shields that guard the existing order and their relative strength.

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G. Rahat

Explaining Electoral Reform

Major electoral reform is not part of normal everyday politics. A reform initiative has
to pass all of the above-mentioned obstacles in order to be adopted. Nevertheless, the
few major reforms that have occurred in established democracies prove that there is a
viable possibility of substantial reform in the rules for the institutional division of
power. This section presents the explanations supplied by the three approaches for
the adoption of reform.
The Rational Choice Approach

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Benoit (2004: 363) proposes a theory, based on the notion that political parties are
motivated by their will to maximize their seat shares in parliament:
Electoral Laws will change when a coalition of parties exists such that each
party in the coalition expects to gain more seats under an alternative electoral
institution, and that also has sufficient power to effect this alternative through
fiat given the rules for changing electoral laws.
This is indeed an elegant, simple and parsimonious formulation, based on the very
logical notion that politicians (or parties, which are groups of politicians) are interested in maximizing their power by increasing their number of seats in the parliament.
It is also sensitive to the procedures of reform. In addition, Benoit is limited in his
aspirations and proposes a hypothesis that should, he himself notes, be checked
against reality in a relatively rich level of contextual detail (Benoit, 2004: 366).
In other words, he suggests a starting point rather than a deductively formulated
explanation.
Bueno de Mesquitas (2000) analysis of the politics of reform in Israel is the most
daring attempt of a rational choice scholar to exclusively use this approach to explain
an electoral reform that occurred in the 1990s. He analyzed the scene as a game in
which five actors (parties and party camps) calculated their support or rejection of
reform on the basis of two long-term office-seeking and vote-seeking considerations.
Surveys have indeed found that while interests in their strict and narrow sense are
not the sole factor that explains the perceptions of politicians and citizens toward
reform, they are central factors in explaining them (Banducci & Karp, 1999;
Bowler et al., 2006; Lamare & Vowles, 1996). The notion of vested interests
(though not in terms of prospective seat maximization) gets much support from a
recent study that checked 84 parties attitudes toward electoral reform in 13 different
electoral reform debates in established democracies (Pilet & Bol, 2011). The study
found that parties are more influenced by their past performance under the system
in use, and in particular their access to power is the key element to understand
their position. The more parties are in government, the less likely they would be
ready to take on the risk of changing the method of seat allocation; the more
parties are in the opposition, the less they have to lose, and the more they would
be willing to change the rules (Pilet & Bol, 2011).4

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The Politics of Electoral Reform

533

At the same time, the same surveys demonstrate that rational choice motives are
not enough to explain stands about reform or even the occurrence of reform.
Lamare and Vowles (1996) showed that even if rational variables can account for
most of the variance in citizens voting behavior in New Zealands 1993 referendum
on electoral reform, the difference between rejection and adoption was determined by
other factors. Finding that there is a minority that supports reform is not surprising, so
the weight of these variables that made the difference is more than their relatively
small statistically explanatory power. Banducci and Karp (1999) studied voters
stances in New Zealand in regard to electoral reform and found that both partisan
self-interest and evaluations of the fairness of the system influence their views on
the issue. It may not be surprising that voters with relatively few vested interests in
the status quo are influenced by values when they judge reform. Yet, Lamare and
Vowles (1996) and Bowler et al. (2006) found that the same applies to politicians
as well. Renwicks (2007) study of the National Partys behavior over the referendum
New Zealand conducted on electoral reform, as well as Carty et al.s (2008) study of
the case of reform attempt in British Columbia through a citizens assembly and a
referendum illustrate that even senior politicians with vested interests in the system
might see and act out of motives beyond the short-term rational electoral ones. These
studies substantiate the claim that a major factor in the politics of electoral reform is
indeed self-interest, but at the same time demonstrate that it is not a sufficient element
to explain the occurrence of reform. The missing part may be no less significant, as it
might spell the difference between victory and defeat in reform promotion. Recently,
Norris (2011: 531) analyzed cross-national data of public opinion from the World
Value Survey in around 50 countries and found that democratic aspirations are a
strong, significant and robust predictor of the occurrence of subsequent electoral
reforms.
The literature is loaded with criticism on rational choice explanation for electoral
reform. This includes attempts to reformulate explanations so they will be more sensitive to specific realities limited rationality, uncertainty and limited information
(Rahat, 2006), the multiplicity of interests (Lehoucq, 1995) and rationales (Pilet,
2007) and the role of nonparty actors with no immediate vested interests (Katz,
2011; LeDuc, 2011; Norris, 2011; Vowles, 2008). Van der Kolk (2007) points to
similar and to additional limits in his attempt to apply the rational choice models proposed by Benoit (2004), as well as those proposed by Bawn (1993) and Colomer
(2005), on cases of successful smaller-scale changes in the Dutch electoral system
and failed reform attempts. These have to do with the assumptions that parties are
unitary actors, that they always act as seat maximizers, and that decisions about electoral reform are isolated from other decisions. There are also cases of wholesale critique that claim that rational choice cannot be valid in the case of the 1990s reform
due to the inherent complexity of the environment in which reform was promoted
and adopted (Rahat, 2004; Sakamoto, 1999) or because interests simply cannot
explain large parts of the puzzle (Renwick, 2010). In an introductory comment to a
special issue on electoral reform, Katz (2007: 308) claimed that the analysis of the
cases included in the collection seem[s] to disconfirm, or at least limit the relevance

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of, the core assumptions of a rational choice paradigm as it is commonly used by political scientists to make predictions about the likely consequences of reforms when
they are proposed. Furthermore, he clearly recognizes the role of idealistic and
irrational motives.
The problem is that there is no real dialogue between scholars who employ rational
choice and their critics. Rather, what we see is a one-way stream of criticism that
remains unanswered. Nevertheless, even critics would be forced to agree that we
can learn much from the rational choice approach after all they do employ it as
their starting point! That is, we now know that it does not work in explaining the
1990s reforms. We can be even more certain that the very rare occurrence of the adoption of a major electoral reform takes place in an abnormal context, one in which the
almost trivial notion of self-interested politicians does not work well enough.
The general picture that rises from the research literature is that the rational choice
approach with its emphasis on parsimony and its aim of proposing ahistorical generalizations is much better at supplying convincing explanations for the regular patterns of preservation than in explaining the rare adoption of electoral reform. Yet,
even for its harsh critics, it is still a useful tool for formulating hypotheses for a
focused analysis of the stands and behaviors of the main actors (especially legislators)
at key decision-making points along the continuous struggle over reform.
From the attempts to improve the rational choice approach to the phenomenon and
make it useful (Blau, 2008; Pilet, 2007, 2008; Pilet & Boll, 2011), from the repeated
stabs at examining whether in certain conditions it does work (Rahat, 2006), and from
the fact that surveys found this factor to be central (if not exclusive) in explaining
politicians and citizens stands and behaviors (Bowler et al., 2006; Lamare &
Vowles, 1996) we learn that political scientists have not given up on this approach.
They may not be able to live with it, but nor can they live without it. In the future we
might witness a successful attempt to balance between the needs to address a complex
reality and keeping the great promise of elegance, simplicity and parsimony that
comes with the rational choice approach. Indeed, a recent empirical study suggests
that if rational choice were to go beyond the prospective seat maximization approach,
and add retrospective elements of past performance, it might yet make an important
contribution to our understanding of parties attitudes toward electoral reform (Pilet
& Bol, 2011).
The Historical-Comparative Approach
Most single-case studies use an approach that can be called historical comparative.
They do not merely present chronological descriptions, but propose a systematic
account that combines elements such as long-term developments and events with
elements that characterize the rational choice approach the interests and actions
of political actors, for example and available behavioralist evidence concerning
stands and behaviors.5 This blend also includes standard concepts and taxonomies of
comparative politics. The historical-comparative approach is characterized by seeing
the politics of reform as a process that, on the one hand, moves along a path that

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develops its own logic as a result of human action and inaction and the interactions
between political actors, and, on the other hand, is bound by procedural requirements
and constitutional conventions. Seeing regime structure reform as a process implies a
distinction between phases, in which actors calculations and behaviors are substantially different.
The studies of the politics of electoral reform in the last decade demonstrate that a
lot can be achieved from single-case studies and focused comparisons. Two attempts
by scholars to collate cases and construct generalizations proved particularly fruitful.
The first (Norris, 1995a) helped mainly in formulating the questions and in demonstrating the complexity of the puzzle. The second (Shugart & Wattenberg, 2001) proposed a generalization concerning the nature of those electoral systems that are prone
to reform the extreme systems.
Both Renwick (2010) and Rahat (2008) propose using a systematic protocol for a
historical-comparative study of the politics of reform. Renwick (2010) studied the
politics of electoral reform (successful and failed attempts) in four established democracies (France, Italy, Japan, New Zealand) after the Second World War. Rahat (2008)
conducted a systematic analysis of several failures to promote electoral reform in
Israel, the successful attempt to promote government system reform, and the successful attempts at electoral reform in New Zealand, Japan and Italy. These flexible historical-comparative research frameworks enable us to test the value of various
theoretical approaches for the analysis of the politics of reform in established democracies and propose improvements to them.6 The comparisons identified several commonalities between the cases of electoral reform in the 1990s. Rahat (2004, 2008)
found that the more power was dispersed among the actors in the politics of
reform in the 1990s, the further the reform initiative progressed and the more
reform was expected to change the future functioning of the system, especially the
patterns of power distribution among the various actors.7 Another common feature
was the multifaceted nature of the reform proposals mixed systems which were
a convenient platform for campaigning and lobbying. To different audiences and at
different times reform could be marketed as preserving or changing, serving the interests of one party or the other, fulfilling one value or another or any of these simultaneously. Renwick (2010), by including the cases of France and of Italy in 2005,
identified two categories of electoral reform, one that is imposed by a majority from
the elite (elite majority imposition) and the other (that relates to the 1990s cases)
that is promoted through the cooperation of a minority in the elite with extra-parliamentary forces (elite mass interaction).
Most of those that exclusively and uncritically employ rational choice to study the
politics of reform refrain from criticizing other approaches, and we thus have no clear
source to present criticism on the historical-comparative approach. Indeed, this approach
can wave validity as its winning card in analyzing successful attempts at reform. Yet,
here today, (partly) gone tomorrow: political scientists will repeatedly try to look for
more parsimonious, simple and easily generalized explanations. While they might not
be able to give up on the historical-comparative approach, it is likely to be thinner and
more inspired by the competing rational choice approach than current analyses.

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Institutional Approaches
The institutional approach faces a major challenge when dealing with the issue of
reform in the regime structure, because it usually treats institutions as stable
factors, as independent variables, and as anchors in a complex reality that supplies
steady incentives for behavior. Here, the institutional approach is asked to explain
changes in institutions, to relate to institutions as dependent variables.
In his seminal work on types of regimes in democracies, Lijphart (1984) argues
that we should expect institutions to fit the societies in which they are located.
Using his models, he justified electoral reform pressures in both New Zealand (Lijphart, 1987) and Israel (Lijphart, 1993). In New Zealand, located on the majoritarian
pole, the move was toward a more consensus-based regime; in Israel, which was
located along the consensus pole, the move was toward a slightly more majoritarian
regime. Following Lijpharts theory, Jackson and McRobie (1998) claim that the
evolutionary transformation of New Zealand from a homogenous to a multicultural
society explained the pressure to reform the majoritarian model. In Israel, a change
in power distribution among political and social forces preceded the reform in the
regime structure (Rahat, 2008). Thus, reform can be seen as an attempt either to
adapt to these changes (New Zealand) or to counter their influence (Israel).
Lijpharts (1984, 1999) analysis of regimes in democracies and Shugarts (2001,
2008) analysis of electoral systems both offer tools for identifying biases, or pathologies, that characterize a specific regime structure or an electoral system. These can
help predict potential sources for pressure for reform and even which kinds of reforms
are likely to be adopted. However, these approaches do not aspire to fully predict
where and when reform will be adopted, or its specific characteristics. According
to the logic of these approaches, pressure for reform is likely to intensify when inherently problematic elements in the structure of the regime are increasingly and repeatedly pronounced. Indeed, in the 1990s cases, pressure for reform increased when old
justifications for preserving a malfunctioning system were removed (anti-communism in Italy, political stability and economic development in Japan) or when an
expected pathology was repeatedly pronounced (wrong winner or elected dictatorship in New Zealand; the demise of the dominant party system in Israel and the
increase of the power of the small pivotal parties).
The institutional approaches suggest either that interactions between the social and
cultural environments and political institutions are central to reform initiation, promotion and adoption, or that an inherent fault in the institutions themselves can
lead to their reform. Reform of the regime structure can be seen as a possible (but
not a necessary) response to various problems in the functioning of democracies.
From this perspective, the nature of the problems that reform aims to solve is
likely to influence its characteristics. But these approaches are not so nave as to
suggest that the system simply corrects itself. Those who determine the specific
formula of reform are only human, and reform may thus reflect their incorrect calculations and flawed understanding of the working of the polity.

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So What Best Explains Reform?

The value of each approach to the study of the politics of electoral reform (stability
and change) can be assessed according to three properties: generality, simplicity and
validity. We should not accept one approach to be the best in all three, but rather look
for the approach that proposes an optimal balance.
Rational choice is very useful in analyzing the balance of interests that results in the
preservation of the system the vested interests of large and regional parties in
majoritarian systems and the strong existential vested interests of coalition veto
players in PR systems. But rational choice is not suitable as a research paradigm in
the case of electoral reform especially for the 1990s cases because it cannot
keep its promises of simplicity and ahistorical generality and at the same time be sensitive enough to the inherent complexity of the politics of electoral reform. As
Renwick (2010: 320) concludes in his comparative study: What the evidence presented here suggests is that the complexity of electoral reform must be regarded as
part of the main action, not as inconvenient noise on the sidelines. Blais (2008b:
6) ends his introduction to an edited collection on reforming FPTP systems by claiming that no simple and parsimonious model can explain why electoral reform does or
does not emerge on the political agenda, and, when it does, why it sometimes succeeds and, more often, fails. Research must relate to a variety of relevant actors;
to interests at different levels and with different time frames; and, in light of
changes over time in the perceptions, interests and behaviors of actors, to distinguish
between stages in the reform process. The price of elegance is much too high in this
case. It would be wrong, in the name of parsimony, to simplify the politics of reform
by encumbering the analysis with assumptions regarding the stands, interests, motivations and behaviors of the actors. That is, presenting the politics of reform as a single
game between two cohesive camps of supporters and opponents, that act out of the
same motives and have a single common perception of the anticipated consequences
of reform, would necessarily lead to an invalid analysis.
Like the rational choice approach, the organic conceptions of the fitness of political institutions to society and culture that institutionalists suggest are very useful in
explaining stability in regime structure. The institutional approach would also seem to
supply an elegant, simple explanation for reform. Yet, as Shugart (2001, 2008)
himself admits, it is limited in its explanatory power. Having an extreme system
(or a system that does not stand up to its promises) means that we may expect stronger
pressures for reform, not that reform will necessarily occur. Yet, even when the
relationship between the pathologies of the system and reform are not presented as
deterministic, the centrality of the former as an explanatory factor may still be exaggerated. While the defective products of extreme systems may be constructive for the
promotion of reform, we cannot ignore the fact that the existence of similar conditions
in the past and in other countries did not lead to change. In short, the institutional
approach supplies us with an elegant, simple explanation for the potential for electoral reform, yet it does touch only the potential. At best, it is a necessary, though
insufficient, condition for reform.

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The historical-comparative approach seems to be the one that best fits to serve the
goal of a comprehensive analysis of reform promotion. It is the only approach flexible
enough to encompass the inherent complexities of the successful attempts at reform
promotion, such as power dispersion, uncertainty and the lack of cohesion and coherence in the behavior of the political actors. It is an approach that enables reform
attempts to be treated as processes rather than single games. It sees information, perceptions and motives as part of research, rather than presuppositions. In this framework, rational choice and the institutional approach can only serve as research
tools (rather than as paradigms): actors are expected to act rationally in a certain institutional context (under a plethora of pressures and with biased information), and as a
result to make seemingly rational decisions at a distinct point in time.
Adopting the historical comparative approach, however, is not cost free. Due to the
lack of a restricted paradigm that is based on a few universal presuppositions,
research may not lead to the creation of elegant and plain theoretical generalizations.
Yet, it seems that a flexible framework would better suit the purpose of studying the
politics of reform because it allows the use of a complete series of available research
tools, and enables us to learn which of them are most valuable for analyzing the
different parts of the phenomenon and under what conditions.
Conclusions
Each research framework in the social sciences necessarily faces the dilemma of the
tradeoff between generalizability, simplicity and precision (Blalock, 1982). However,
the nature of the phenomenon itself, whether routine or extraordinary, reflecting normality or a relatively rare change, tends to dictate the relationship between these
values. Parsimonious approaches, which suggest rules with universal or high statistical validity, fit the study of regularities. More complex approaches should be
employed for studying extraordinary or relatively rare phenomena. The irregular
activity of individuals and groups (promoting major electoral reform) that interact
in a different setting (power dispersion) will likely develop substantially different patterns and produce substantially different results. Reform is a breach of normality that
is based on a balance of interests and conventions. Thus, the flexible but broad historical-comparative approach (which can encompass other approaches) is suited to a
general analysis of electoral reform, while the more sparing rational choice and institutional approaches supply convincing explanations for the preservation of the status
quo. In other words, in the case of reform, it is worth including more factors and variables in a broader explanation because it substantially enhances the explanatory
power of the analysis.
It might seem illogical that stability and reform have separate explanations. After
all, the presence of one implies the absence of the other. We would have the same
explanation for stability and change if we would be satisfied with a trivial and
banal explanation for reform that would argue that reform occurred because the interests of (at least some of) those who continuously took care of stability has changed so
they adopted a system that would serve them better. But, as already demonstrated,

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even if this is the core of the reform promotion story, its development and its results
are dependent upon a complex interplay between actors with a variety of interests and
even with different estimations of the utility of stability and change and for the utility
of their support or rejection to reform. Moreover, these actors play in a specific institutional environment, react to specific reform proposals and sometimes lack the
necessary information to make a rational decision.
Scholars of major electoral reforms face the small n problem. There are not enough
cases of reform adoption to enable valid statistical generalizations. And even if we
overcome this problem, Katz (2005: 74) warns that: While it may be possible statistically to estimate the probability of reform in any particular year, it would appear
that even the peaks in predicted probability will be so low as to leave accounting for
specific instances in the realm of historical reconstruction rather than statistical prediction. Yet, one does not have to wait until enough cases of reform adoption in
established democracies are collected. Reform should not be seen as a dichotomous
either/or variable. Reform is promoted in a process and, as such, its adoption is just
one value out of several possible values. That is, following Sakamotos (1999) recommendation, we can collect those cases in which reform was promoted but nevertheless failed to be adopted and those in which what seemed to be system failures did
not even lead to reform promotion. Indeed, efforts were made to analyze the cases in
which reform was promoted but failed (Farrell, 2001; LeDuc, 2011; van der Kolk,
2007) or where reform hardly penetrated the political agenda (Weaver, 2001), just
as efforts were made to compare failed and successful reform attempts (Rahat,
2008; Renwick, 2010) or to compare specific aspects of failed and of successful
attempts, such as the role of external reviewers in the politics of reform in New
Zealand, the UK and Canada (Lundberg, 2007).
Cross-national comparisons that include a large number of cases of electoral
reform are only now starting to appear (Celis et al., 2011; Pilet & Bol, 2011;
Renwick, 2011), mainly as a result of a change in research strategy and one that
seems to be gaining momentum. Adopting a more comprehensive approach will
expand the scope of case studies (Leyenaar & Hazan, 2011). Scholars suggest that
the phenomenon of electoral reform should be seen as encompassing a much
broader set of cases than the few cases of major electoral reforms in established
democracies. They argue, for example, that some changes, such as districting,
might have consequences for seat distribution that are as significant as those cases
which are included in the more narrow definitions of electoral reform (Bowler &
Donovan, 2008; Katz, 2005). Scholars who studied the spread of gender quotas
around the world argued that this field should also be included in the study of the politics of electoral reform (Celis et al., 2011). Jacobs and Leyenaar (2011) propose referring to a wider universe of changes in electoral laws that include the electoral formula,
ballot structure, franchise extension, the organization of elections and various levels
of elections. They then propose cut-off points to categorize these reforms as major,
minor and technical. Yet others argue that not only that should research refer to a
wider menu of reforms, but that the research population should be extended far
beyond established democracies (Norris, 2011).

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In his attempt to explain institutional variations between democracies, Lijphart

(1998: 107) suggested that different approaches should be judged according to
their explanatory power, and that it is unwise and self-defeating to focus on one
[approach] to the complete exclusion of the others. This recommendation seems
valid for the study of the politics of reform as well. Political science will continue
to benefit from scholars who use various approaches and who interact with each
other under the broad banner of the comparative approach: empiricists and behavioralists will continue to examine rational choice models; rational choice scholars will
react to empirical findings; generalizations identified by scholars who reconstruct
the political-historical story will be modeled by rational choice scholars, and so
forth. Employing pluralism and interaction across approaches, what Leyenaar and
Hazan (2011) call a multi-approach study of electoral change, seems to offer the
way to get closer to the better explanations concerning the phenomenon of stability
and reform of electoral systems.8
Notes
1. Indeed, the final formulation of the reform reflected an attempt of the old parties to control the expected
electoral damage (Katz, 2001).
2. It is true that large parties (or significant forces within them) can perceive the status quo as preferable
over reforms that can empower their main rivals and harm their close allies. This was the case in Italy
until the 1990s, when majoritarianism could encourage the creation of a governing alternative most
likely of the communist party which would have threatened the continued domination of the Christian
Democratic party and its close allies.
3. This barrier to reform seems to be valid, in general, for consensus democracies one of the main features of which is PR electoral systems (see Hooghe and Deschouwer, 2011; Nikolenyi, 2011).
4. Similar findings, that seem to have motivated the larger n comparative study, are presented in Pilets
(2008) in-depth study of the failure to promote a majoritarian system in Belgium.
5. See the collections edited by Norris (1995a) and Shugart and Wattenberg (2001). For a book-length
example, see Jackson and McRobie (1998).
6. One example of a recommendation made following the cross-national comparison was the idea to distinguish between the rationales for preserving majoritarian systems and those for preserving PR systems
(Rahat, 2008).
7. For further explanations, see Rahat (2004, 2008).
8. For a proposal for an integrative research strategy, see the barrier approach of Rahat and Hazan (2011).

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