VINUYA VS. SEC.

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ISABELITA C. VINUYA, VICTORIA C. DELA PEA, HERMINIHILDA, MANIMBO,
LEONOR H. SUMAWANG, CANDELARIA L. SOLIMAN, MARIA L. QUILANTANG,
MARIA L. MAGISA, NATALIA M. ALONZO, LOURDES M. NAVARO, FRANCISCA
M. ATENCIO, ERLINDA MANALASTAS, TARCILA M. SAMPANG, ESTER M.
PALACIO MAXIMA R. DELA CRUZ, BELEN A. SAGUM, FELICIDAD TURLA,
FLORENCIA M. DELA PEA, FRANCIA A. BUCO, PASTORA C. GUEVARRA,
VICTORIA M. DELA CRUZ, PETRONILA O. DELA CRUZ, ZENAIDA P. DELA
CRUZ, CORAZON M. SUBA, EMERINCIANA A. VINUYA, LYDIA A. SANCHEZ,
ROSALINA M.BUCO, PATRICIA A. ERNARDO, LUCILA H. PAYAWAL,
MAGDALENA LIWAG, ESTER C. BALINGIT, JOVITA A. DAVID, EMILIA C.
MANGILIT, VERGINIA M. BANGIT, GUILLERMA S. BALINGIT, TERECITA
PANGILINAN, MAMERTA C. PUNO, CRISENCIANA C. GULAPA, SEFERINA S.
TURLA, MAXIMA B. TURLA, LEONICIA G. GUEVARRA, ROSALINA M. CULALA,
CATALINA Y. MANIO, MAMERTA T. SAGUM, CARIDAD L. TURLA, et al.
In their capacity and as members of the Malaya Lolas Organization,
versus THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ALBERTO G. ROMULO, THE
HONORABLE SECRETARY OF FOREIGNAFFAIRS DELIA DOMINGO-ALBERT,
THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ, and
THE HONORABLE SOLICITOR GENERAL ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO
G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010
FACTS:
This is an original Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with an application
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against the Office of the Executive
Secretary, the Secretary of the DFA, the Secretary of the DOJ, and the OSG.
Petitioners are all members of the MALAYA LOLAS, a non-stock, non-profit organization
registered with the SEC, established for the purpose of providing aid to the victims of rape by
Japanese military forces in the Philippines during the Second World War.
Petitioners claim that since 1998, they have approached the Executive Department through the
DOJ, DFA, and OSG, requesting assistance in filing a claim against the Japanese officials and
military officers who ordered the establishment of the comfort women stations in the
Philippines. But officials of the Executive Department declined to assist the petitioners, and took
the position that the individual claims of the comfort women for compensation had already been
fully satisfied by Japans compliance with the Peace Treaty between the Philippines and Japan.

Hence, this petition where petitioners pray for this court to (a) declare that respondents
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of discretion in refusing to
espouse their claims for the crimes against humanity and war crimes committed against them;
and (b) compel the respondents to espouse their claims for official apology and other forms of
reparations against Japan before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and other international
tribunals.
Respondents maintain that all claims of the Philippines and its nationals relative to the war were
dealt with in the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 and the bilateral Reparations Agreement of
1956.
On January 15, 1997, the Asian Womens Fund and the Philippine government signed a
Memorandum of Understanding for medical and welfare support programs for former comfort
women. Over the next five years, these were implemented by the Department of Social Welfare
and Development.
ISSUE:
WON the Executive Department committed grave abuse of discretion in not espousing
petitioners claims for official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan.
RULING:
Petition lacks merit. From a Domestic Law Perspective, the Executive Department has the
exclusive prerogative to determine whether to espouse petitioners claims against Japan.
Political questions refer to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by
the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure.
One type of case of political questions involves questions of foreign relations. It is wellestablished that the conduct of the foreign relations of our government is committed by the
Constitution to the executive and legislativethe politicaldepartments of the government, and
the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial
inquiry or decision. are delicate, complex, and involve large elements of prophecy. They are
and should be undertaken only by those directly responsible to the people whose welfare they
advance or imperil.
But not all cases implicating foreign relations present political questions, and courts certainly
possess the authority to construe or invalidate treaties and executive agreements. However, the
question whether the Philippine government should espouse claims of its nationals against a
foreign government is a foreign relations matter, the authority for which is demonstrably
committed by our Constitution not to the courts but to the political branches. In this case, the
Executive Department has already decided that it is to the best interest of the country to waive all

claims of its nationals for reparations against Japan in the Treaty of Peace of 1951. The wisdom
of such decision is not for the courts to question.
The President, not Congress, has the better opportunity of knowing the conditions which prevail
in foreign countries, and especially is this true in time of war. He has his confidential sources of
information. He has his agents in the form of diplomatic, consular and other officials.
The Executive Department has determined that taking up petitioners cause would be inimical to
our countrys foreign policy interests, and could disrupt our relations with Japan, thereby
creating serious implications for stability in this region. For the to overturn the Executive
Departments determination would mean an assessment of the foreign policy judgments by a
coordinate political branch to which authority to make that judgment has been constitutionally
committed.
From a municipal law perspective, certiorari will not lie. As a general principle, where such an
extraordinary length of time has lapsed between the treatys conclusion and our consideration
the Executive must be given ample discretion to assess the foreign policy considerations of
espousing a claim against Japan, from the standpoint of both the interests of the petitioners and
those of the Republic, and decide on that basis if apologies are sufficient, and whether further
steps are appropriate or necessary.
In the international sphere, traditionally, the only means available for individuals to bring a claim
within the international legal system has been when the individual is able to persuade a
government to bring a claim on the individuals behalf. By taking up the case of one of its
subjects and by resorting to diplomatic action or international judicial proceedings on his behalf,
a State is in reality asserting its own right to ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect for the
rules of international law.
Within the limits prescribed by international law, a State may exercise diplomatic protection by
whatever means and to whatever extent it thinks fit, for it is its own right that the State is
asserting. Should the natural or legal person on whose behalf it is acting consider that their rights
are not adequately protected, they have no remedy in international law. All they can do is resort
to national law, if means are available, with a view to furthering their cause or obtaining redress.
All these questions remain within the province of municipal law and do not affect the position
internationally.
Even the invocation of jus cogens norms and erga omnes obligations will not alter this analysis.
Petitioners have not shown that the crimes committed by the Japanese army violated jus cogens
prohibitions at the time the Treaty of Peace was signed, or that the duty to prosecute perpetrators
of international crimes is an erga omnes obligation or has attained the status of jus cogens.
The term erga omnes (Latin: in relation to everyone) in international law has been used as a legal
term describing obligations owed by States towards the community of states as a whole.
Essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a State towards the international
community as a whole, and those arising vis--vis another State in the field of diplomatic
protection. By their very nature, the former are the concern of all States. In view of the

importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in their
protection; they are obligations erga omnes.
The term jus cogens (literally, compelling law) refers to norms that command peremptory
authority, superseding conflicting treaties and custom. Jus cogens norms are considered
peremptory in the sense that they are mandatory, do not admit derogation, and can be modified
only by general international norms of equivalent authority
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED.

Tanada vs. Angara

G.R. No. 118295 | May 2, 1997
J. Panganiban
Facts:
On April 15, 1994, the Philippine Government represented by its Secretary of the
Department of Trade and Industry (Rizalino Navarro) signed the Final Act Embodying the
Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Negotiations (Final Act) binding the Philippine
Government to submit to its respective competent authorities the WTO (World Trade
Organization) Agreements to seek approval of such. On December 14, 1994, Resolution No. 97
was
adopted
by the
Philippine
Senate
ratifying
the
WTO
Agreement.
Petitioners Senators Taada, et al. questioned the constitutionality of the concurrence by
the Philippine Senate of the Presidents ratification of the international Agreement establishing
the World Trade Organization (WTO). They argued that the WTO Agreement violates the
mandate of the 1987 Constitution to develop a self-reliant and independent national economy
effectively controlled by Filipinos . . . (to) give preference to qualified Filipinos (and to) promote
the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods. Further,
they contended that the national treatment and parity provisions of the WTO Agreement
place nationals and products of member countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local
products, in contravention of the Filipino First policy of our Constitution, and render
meaningless the phrase effectively controlled by Filipinos.
Issue:
Whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the Senate in giving its concurrence of the said WTO agreement.
Ruling:
No, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit. While the constitution mandates a bias in
favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need
for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and
limits protection of Filipino interests only against foreign competition and trade practices that are
unfair. In other words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationalist policy.
Furthermore, the constitutional policy of a self-reliant and independent national economy does
not necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and services. It contemplates

neither economic seclusion nor mendicancy in the international community.

The Senate, after deliberation and voting, gave its consent to the WTO Agreement thereby
making it a part of the law of the land. The Supreme Court gave due respect to an equal
department in government. It presumes its actions as regular and done in good faith unless there
is convincing proof and persuasive agreements to the contrary. As a result, the ratification of the
WTO Agreement limits or restricts the absoluteness of sovereignty. A treaty engagement is not a
mere obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the parties. A state which has
contracted valid international obligations is bound to make its legislations such modifications as
may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken.
It is true that in the recent case of Manila Prince Hotel vs. Government Service Insurance
System, et al., this Court held that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a
mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines
or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not
require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable. However, as the
constitutional provision itself states, it is enforceable only in regard to the grants of rights,
privileges and concessions covering national economy and patrimony and not to every aspect of
trade and commerce.
While sovereignty has traditionally been deemed absolute and all-encompassing on the domestic
level, it is however subject to limitations and restrictions voluntarily agreed to by the Philippines
as a member of the family of nations. One of the oldest and most fundamental rules in
international law is pacta sunt servanda international agreements must be performed in good
faith. A treaty engagement is not a mere moral obligation but creates a legally binding
obligation on the parties xxx. A state which has contracted valid international obligations is
bound to make in its legislation such modifications as may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment
of the obligations undertaken.
By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness of sovereignty. By their
voluntary act, nations may surrender some aspects of their state power in exchange for greater
benefits granted by or derived from a convention or pact. After all, states, like individuals live
with coequals, and in pursuit of mutuality covenanted objectives and benefits, they also
commonly agree to limit the exercise of their otherwise absolute rights.
The sovereignty of a state therefore cannot in fact and in reality be considered absolute. Certain
restrictions enter into the picture: (1) limitations imposed by the very nature of membership in
the family of nations and (2) limitations imposed by treaty stipulations.

Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS

267 SCRA 402February 1997
FACTS: Pursuant to the privatization program of the government, GSIS chose to award during
bidding inSeptember 1995 the 51% outstanding shares of the respondent Manila Hotel Corp.
(MHC) to theRenong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, for the amount of Php 44.00 per share against
herein petitioner which is a Filipino corporation who offered Php 41.58 per share. Pending
thedeclaration of Renong Berhad as the winning bidder/strategic partner of MHC,
petitioner matched the formers bid prize also with Php 44.00 per share followed by a managers

check worth Php 33 million as Bid Security, but the GSIS refused to accept both the bid match
and themanagers check.One day after the filing of the petition in October 1995, the Court issued
a TRO enjoining therespondents from perfecting and consummating the sale to the Renong
Berhad. In September 1996, the Supreme Court En Banc accepted the instant case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the GSIS violated Section 10, second paragraph, Article 11 of the
1987Constitution
COURT
RULING: The Supreme Court directed the GSIS and other respondents to cease and desist from
selling the51% shares of the MHC to the Malaysian firm Renong Berhad, and instead to accept
thematching bid of the petitioner Manila Prince Hotel.According to Justice Bellosillo, ponente of
the case at bar, Section 10, second paragraph, Article11 of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory
provision, a positive command which is complete initself and needs no further guidelines or
implementing laws to enforce it. The Court En Bancemphasized that qualified Filipinos shall be
preferred over foreigners, as mandated by the provision in question.The Manila Hotel had long
been a landmark, therefore, making the 51% of the equity of saidhotel to fall within the purview
of the constitutional shelter for it emprises the majority andcontrolling stock. The Court also
reiterated how much of national pride will vanish if the nationscultural heritage will fall on the
hands of foreigners.

DFA vs. NLRC

G.R. No. 113191 | 18 September 1996
Facts:
On 27 January 1993, private respondent Magnayi filed an illegal dismissal
case against ADB. Two summonses were served, one sent directly to the
ADB and the other through the Department of Foreign Affairs ("DFA"). ADB
and the DFA notified respondent Labor Arbiter that the ADB, as well as its
President and Officers, were covered by an immunity from legal process
except for borrowings, guaranties or the sale of securities pursuant to Article
50(1) and Article 55 of the Agreement Establishing the Asian Development
Bank (the "Charter") in relation to Section 5 and Section 44 of the
Agreement Between The Bank And The Government Of The Philippines
Regarding The Bank's Headquarters (the "Headquarters Agreement").
The Labor Arbiter took cognizance of the complaint on the impression that
the ADB had waived its diplomatic immunity from suit and, in time, rendered
a decision in favour Magnayi.
The ADB did not appeal the decision. Instead, on 03 November 1993, the
DFA referred the matter to the NLRC; in its referral, the DFA sought a

"formal vacation of the void judgment." When DFA failed to obtain a

favorable decision from the NLRC, it filed a petition for certiorari.
Issues:
1. Whether or not ADB is immune from suit
2. Whether or not by entering into service contracts with different private
companies, ADB has descended to the level of an ordinary party to a
commercial transaction giving rise to a waiver of its immunity from suit
3. Whether or not the DFA has the legal standing to file the present petition
4. Whether or not the extraordinary remedy of certiorari is proper in this
case
Held:
1. Under the Charter and Headquarters Agreement, the ADB enjoys
immunity from legal process of every form, except in the specified cases of
borrowing and guarantee operations, as well as the purchase, sale and
underwriting of securities. The Banks officers, on their part, enjoy immunity
in respect of all acts performed by them in their official capacity. The
Charter and the Headquarters Agreement granting these immunities and
privileges are treaty covenants and commitments voluntarily assumed by
the Philippine government which must be respected.
Being an international organization that has been extended a diplomatic
status, the ADB is independent of the municipal law.
"One of the basic immunities of an international organization is immunity
from local jurisdiction, i.e., that it is immune from the legal writs and
processes issued by the tribunals of the country where it is found. The
obvious reason for this is that the subjection of such an organization to the
authority of the local courts would afford a convenient medium thru which
the host government may interfere in their operations or even influence or
control its policies and decisions of the organization; besides, such
subjection to local jurisdiction would impair the capacity of such body to
discharge its responsibilities impartially on behalf of its member-states."
2. No. The ADB didn't descend to the level of an ordinary party to a
commercial transaction, which should have constituted a waiver of its

immunity from suit, by entering into service contracts with different private
companies. There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each
widely held and firmly established. According to the classical or absolute
theory, a sovereign cannot, without its consent, be made a respondent in
the Courts of another sovereign. According to the newer or restrictive
theory, the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to
public acts or acts jure imperii of a state, but not with regard to private act
or acts jure gestionis.
Certainly, the mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a
private party cannot be the ultimate test. Such an act can only be the start
of the inquiry. The logical question is whether the foreign state is engaged
in the activity in the regular course of business. If the foreign state is not
engaged regularly in a business or trade, the particular act or transaction
must then be tested by its nature. If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign
activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii, especially when
it is not undertaken for gain or profit.
The service contracts referred to by private respondent have not been
intended by the ADB for profit or gain but are official acts over which a
waiver of immunity would not attach.
3. Yes. The DFA's function includes, among its other mandates, the
determination of persons and institutions covered by diplomatic immunities,
a determination which, when challenged, entitles it to seek relief from the
court so as not to seriously impair the conduct of the country's foreign
relations. The DFA must be allowed to plead its case whenever necessary or
advisable to enable it to help keep the credibility of the Philippine
government before the international community. When international
agreements are concluded, the parties thereto are deemed to have likewise
accepted the responsibility of seeing to it that their agreements are duly
regarded. In our country, this task falls principally on the DFA as being the
highest executive department with the competence and authority to so act in
this aspect of the international arena. In Holy See vs. Hon. Rosario, Jr., this
Court has explained the matter in good detail; viz:
"In Public International Law, when a state or international agency wishes to
plead sovereign or diplomatic immunity in a foreign court, it requests the
Foreign Office of the state where it is sued to convey to the court that said
defendant is entitled to immunity.
"In the United States, the procedure followed is the process of 'suggestion,'
where the foreign state or the international organization sued in an American

court requests the Secretary of State to make a determination as to whether

it is entitled to immunity. If the Secretary of State finds that the defendant
is immune from suit, he, in turn, asks the Attorney General to submit to the
court a 'suggestion' that the defendant is entitled to immunity.
"In the Philippines, the practice is for the foreign government or the
international organization to first secure an executive endorsement of its
claim of sovereign or diplomatic immunity. But how the Philippine Foreign
Office conveys its endorsement to the courts varies. In International
Catholic Migration Commission vs. Calleja, 190 SCRA 130 (1990), the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs just sent a letter directly to the Secretary of
Labor and Employment, informing the latter that the respondent-employer
could not be sued because it enjoyed diplomatic immunity. In World Health
Organization vs. Aquino, 48 SCRA 242 (1972), the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs sent the trial court a telegram to that effect. In Baer vs. Tizon, 57
SCRA 1 (1974), the U.S. Embassy asked the Secretary of Foreign Affairs to
request the Solicitor General to make, in behalf of the Commander of the
United States Naval Base at Olongapo City, Zambales, a 'suggestion' to
respondent Judge. The Solicitor General embodied the 'suggestion' in a
manifestation and memorandum as amicus curiae.
"In the case at bench, the Department of Foreign Affairs, through the Office
of Legal Affairs moved with this Court to be allowed to intervene on the side
of petitioner. The Court allowed the said Department to file its memorandum
in support of petitioner's claim of sovereign immunity.
"In some cases, the defense of sovereign immunity was submitted directly to
the local courts by the respondents through their private counsels. In cases
where the foreign states bypass the Foreign Office, the courts can inquire
into the facts and make their own determination as to the nature of the acts
and transactions involved."
4. Yes. Relative to the propriety of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari,
the Court has, under special circumstances, so allowed and entertained such
a petition when (a) the questioned order or decision is issued in excess of or
without jurisdiction, or (b) where the order or decision is a patent
nullity, which, verily, are the circumstances that can be said to obtain in the
present case. When an adjudicator is devoid of jurisdiction on a matter
before him, his action that assumes otherwise would be a clear nullity.
Petition for certiorari is GRANTED, and the decision of the Labor Arbiter,
dated 31 August 1993 is VACATED for being NULL AND VOID.

World Health Organization v. Aquino 48 SCRA 243

Facts:
Herein petitioner, in behalf of Dr. Verstuyft, was allegedly suspected by the Constabulary
Offshore Action Center (COSAC) officers of carrying dutiable goods under the Customs and
Tariff Code of the Philippines. Respondent Judge then issued a search warrant at the instance of
the COSAC officers for the search and seizure of the personla effects of Dr. Verstuyft
notwithstanding his being entitled to diplomatic immunity, as duly recognized by the Executive
branch of the government.
The Secretary of Foreign Affairs Carlos P. Romulo advised the respondent judge that Dr.
Verstuyft is entitled to immunity from search in respect for his personal baggage as accorded to
members of diplomatic missions pursuant to the Host Agreement and further requested for the
suspension of the search warrant. The Solicitor General accordingly joined the petitioner for the
quashal of the search warrant but respondent judge nevertheless summarily denied the quashal.

Issue:
Whether or not personal effect of WHO Officer Dr. Verstuyft can be exempted from search and
seizure under the diplomatic immunity.

Ruling:
The executive branch of the Phils has expressly recognized that Verstuyft is entitled to
diplomatic immunity, pursuant to the provisions of the Host Agreement. The DFA formally
advised respondent judge of the Philippine Government's official position. The Solicitor General,
as principal law officer of the gorvernment, likewise expressly affirmed said petitioner's right to
diplomatic immunity and asked for the quashal of the search warrant.
It recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of powers that
diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts should refuse to look beyond a
determination by the executive branch of government, and where the plea of diplomatic
immunity is recognized by the executive branch of the government as in the case at bar, it is then
the duty of the courts to accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the
principal law officer of the government, the Solicitor General in this case, or other officer acting
under his discretion. Courts may not so exercise their jurisdiction by seizure and detention of
property, as to embarass the executive arm of the government in conducting foreign relations.
The Court, therefore, holds the respondent judge acted without jurisdiction and with grave abuse

of discretion in not ordering the quashal of the search warrant issued by him in disregard of the
diplomatic immunity of petitioner Verstuyft.