Emir Bayer 2782580

Network Analysis, Culture, and the Problem of Agency
Author(s): Mustafa Emirbayer and Jeff Goodwin

Source: American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 99, No. 6 (May, 1994), pp. 1411-1454
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
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NetworkAnalysis,Culture, and the

Problem of Agencyl
Mustafa Emirbayer
New Schoolfor Social Research
JeffGoodwin
New York University
Networkanalysisis one ofthemostpromisingcurrentsin sociological research,and yetit has neverbeen subjectedto a theoretically
informedassessmentand critique.This articleoutlinesthetheoretical presuppositionsof networkanalysis. It also distinguishesbetweenthreedifferent
(implicit)modelsin the networkliteratureof
the interrelations
of social structure,culture,and human agency.
It concludesthatonlya strategy
forhistoricalexplanationthatsynthesizessocial structuraland culturalanalysiscan adequatelyexplain theformation,
reproduction,
and transformation
ofnetworks
themselves.The articlesketchesthebroad contoursof such a theoreticalsynthesisin the conclusion.
Recentyearshave witnessedthe emergenceof a powerfulnew approach
to the studyof social structure.This mode of inquiry,commonlyknown
as "networkanalysis,"has achieveda highdegreeof technicalsophistiwide range of
cation and has proven extremelyusefulin a strikingly
substantiveapplications.Since the seminalwork of Barnes (1954) and
Bott(1971), sociologicalstudiesutilizingnetworkanalysishave appeared
withincreasingfrequency;a veritableexplosionof such workhas taken
place overthelast 15 years,particularly
withthefoundingoftwospecial' We wouldliketo thankparticipants
in theCROPSO Workshop
at HarvardUniverin
as wellas participants
sity(esp. Theda Skocpol)fortheirmanyhelpfulcomments,
theSociologyStaffSeminarat theNew SchoolforSocial Research(esp. JanetAbuLughod,Diane Davis, Karl-DieterOpp, and ArthurVidich)and the Methodology
at theNew YorkUniversity
Workshop
Sociology
Department
(esp.WolfHeydebrand,
Guillermina
Jasso,and JamesJasper).We wouldalso liketo thankPeterBearman,
GerardoDel Cerro,KarenGelb,Jeffrey
Goldfarb,
RogerGould,AnnMische,Calvin
Morrill,JohnPadgett,AlessandroPizzorno,MargaretSomers,CharlesTilly,and the
fortheirmanyhelpfulsuggestions
AJS referees
alongtheway. Correspondence
may
be addressedto MustafaEmirbayer,
ofSociology,
New SchoolforSocial
Department
Research,65 FifthAvenue,New York,New York 10003.
? 1994byThe University
ofChicago.All rightsreserved.
0002-9602/94/9906-0001$01.50
AJS Volume 99 Number6 (May 1994): 1411-54

1411
AmericanJournalof Sociology
ized journals,Social Networksand Connections,in thelate 1970s.Today
networkanalysis is one of the most promisingcurrentsin sociological
research.Its practitioners
includesome of the mosthighlyrespectedfigures in the profession:Ron Breiger,Ronald Burt, Mark Granovetter,
David Knoke, Peter Marsden, Barry Wellman, and Harrison White.
Many other prominentsociologists,such as Claude Fischer, Edward
Laumann, Doug McAdam, David Snow, and CharlesTilly,draw extensivelyupon networkconcepts.The late GeorgeHomans, in his reflections
upon the last 50 yearsof sociology,justlydescribednetworkanalysisas
in thediscipline(Homans
one ofthemostencouragingnew developments
1986, p. xxvi).
Despite its growingprominence,however,networkanalysishas yetto
be subjected to a theoretically
informedassessmentand critique.The
secondaryliteratureon this perspectivehas tended to restrictitselfto
outliningbasic concepts,discussingtechnicalprocedures,and summarizing empiricalresearchfindings.There has been an unfortunate
lack of
interestin situatingnetworkanalysiswithinthe broadertraditionsof
sociologicaltheory,much less in undertakinga systematicinquiryinto
its underlyingstrengthsand weaknesses. Theoretical"precursors"of
networkanalysishave oftenbeen invokedin passing-especially Durkheimand Simmel-but networkanalysis,itselfa constellation
of diverse
methodological
strategies,has rarelybeen systematically
groundedin the
conceptualframeworkstheyelaborated.In addition,therehas been a
notable absence in this literatureof any sustainedconsiderationof the
potential usefulnessof networkanalysis for historicalinvestigation.
and historicalsociologists,fortheirown part,
Meanwhile,social theorists
have largelyignoreddevelopmentsin this field;we have yet to see a
sustaineddiscussionof this approach in recentworks of social theory,
even in the writingsof such wide-ranging
thinkersas AnthonyGiddens
(1984, 1987) and Jeffrey
Alexander(1982, 1987, 1988a) or, alternatively,
in studiesof recentdevelopmentsin comparativeand historicalresearch
(e.g., Skocpol 1984; D. Smith 1991).2 In short,the task of rethinking
networkanalysis,sociologicaltheory,and historicalsociologyin lightof
one anotherhas been sadly neglected.
In thisessay we aspireto accomplishpreciselysuch a task. We begin
withan expositionoftheunderlying
theoretical
and conpresuppositions
ceptual strategiesof networkanalysis,outliningthe characteristic
featuresof this approach in relationto broadercurrentsin social theory.
Along the way, we examineseveral exemplarystudiesthat investigate
historicalprocessesof social change usingthe tools and insightsof net2 Giddensdoes,however,
criticize
the"structuralism"
ofPeterBlau, whichhas strong
affinities
withnetworkanalysis(Giddens1984,pp. 207-13).
1412

NetworkAnalysis
work analysis. Upon this basis we thenelaboratea critique-a fundamentallysympathetic
critique-of the networkperspective,stressingits
inadequateconceptualizations
of humanagencyon theone hand, and of
cultureon theother.We carefullydistinguish
herebetweenthreedistinct
models in the networkliteratureof the relationshipsamong culture,
agency,and social structure;
each ofthesemodels,in ourview, conceptualizes theserelationships
in varyingdegreesof theoreticalsophistication.
Throughouttheessay,we attemptto groundour criticalargumentscarefullyin detailed and substantiveconsiderationsof actual worksof network analysis-studies that, in our estimation,rank among the most
powerfuland impressiveapplicationsto date ofthenetworkperspective.
Throughoutthis article,our primaryfocus is on analyticalcategories,
not on authors.Our concernwith agencyand culturehas implications
fornetworkanalysisin general,but our focushere remainson studies
thatattemptto explainsocial changeover time-includingthe transformationof social networksthemselves-and henceon specifically
historical studies.3
Our argumentis thatwhilethisnew mode ofstructuralist
inquiry-in
all threeof its versions-offersa morepowerfulway of describingsocial
interactionthan do otherstructuralperspectivesthatfocussolelyon the
categoricalattributesof individualand collectiveactors,it has yet to
provide a fullyadequate explanatorymodel for the actual formation,
of social networksthemselves.Netreproduction,and transformation
workanalysisall too oftendeniesin practicethecrucialnotionthatsocial
structure,culture,and human agencypresupposeone another;it either
neglectsor inadequatelyconceptualizesthe crucialdimensionof subjecof
tive meaningand motivation-includingthe normativecommitments
actors-and therebyfailsto show exactlyhow it is thatintentional,creativehumanactionservesin partto constitute
thoseverysocial networks
thatso powerfully
constrainactorsin turn.In its less nuanced versions,
in fact,thenetworkapproachemergesas themirrorimageofitsinterpretive and hermeneuticcounterpart(Schutz 1967; Rabinow and Sullivan
1979). Whetherfromthe standpointof objectivesocial structuresor of
subjectiveexperience,both of theseperspectivesin themselvesprovide
no morethana descriptionof social reality;ultimately,
bothfailto grasp
in conceptsthe dynamicprocessesthatshape thisrealityover time.We
3 We arenotinterested
here,itshouldbe pointedout,inthemorepurelymethodological and technicalcontributions
thatnetworkanalystshave produced(e.g., Boorman
and White1976;Davis 1967;Freeman1977,1979;Harary,Norman,and Cartwright
1965; Lorrainand White 1971; White,Boorman,and Breiger1976). Nor are we
concernedwithcoveringall ofthemanyimportant
empiricalstudiesthathave been
producedin recentyearsusingnetworktechniquesand concepts.See, e.g., Fischer
1982;Laumannand Knoke1987;and Wellman1979.
1413

believe,by contrast,thatan adequate approachto historicalexplanation
and culturalperspectiveson social
mustencompassbothsocial structural
action. We demonstratehow more sophisticatedversionsof network
analysisdo approximatesuch a strategy,and we sketchout the broad
explanatoryperspectivein the concluding
contoursof our own synthetic
pages.
ANALYZING SOCIAL NETWORKS
The Priorityof Relationsover Categories

Networkanalysisis not a formalor unitary"theory"that specifiesdistinctivelaws, propositions,or correlations,but rathera broad strategy
forinvestigating
social structure.It is not,thatis, a "deductivesystem"
in which "lower-orderpropositions"follow "as a logical conclusion
from. . . generalpropositionsunder . . . specifiedgiven conditions"
or dependencytheory
(Homans 1964,p. 812). Rather,like modernization
in the field of economic development,it is more a "paradigm" or a
"perspective"-"a loose federationof approaches"(Burt 1980a)-than
a predictive"social theory."As a resultof the internaldiversityof network approaches,networkanalyststhemselvesdebate the usefulnessof
alternativemodels of social relationsand methodologicalstrategies.Inhave arisenovertheverydefinition
of its
deed, importantdisagreements
fundamentalconcepts.Networkanalystsdisputethe mannerin which
ideas such as social structure,networkcentrality,distance,cohesion,
and social networkitself-terms used by othersociologistssimplyas
metaphors-can be operationalizedforpurposesof empiricalresearch.
(We have provideda shortglossaryof termscommonlyused by network
analystsin the appendixbelow.)
Nevertheless,networkanalysisproceedsfromcertainbasic theoretical
presuppositionsand premisesthat are acceptableto most,if not all, of
It holdsto a setofimplicitassumptionsaboutfundamenitspractitioners.
tal issues in sociologicalanalysissuch as the relationshipbetweenthe
individualand society,the relationshipbetween"micro"and "macro,"
and the structuringof social action by objective, "supra-individual"
The pointofdeparturefornetworkanalypatternsofsocialrelationships.
sis is what we shall call the anticategoricalimperative.This imperative
rejectsall attemptsto explainhumanbehavioror social processessolely
in termsof the categoricalattributesof actors,whetherindividualor
collective.Networkanalysis,as BarryWellmanputsit, rejectsexplanationsof "social behavioras the resultof individuals'commonpossession
of attributesand normsratherthanas the resultof theirinvolvementin
structured
social relations"(Wellman1983, p. 165). In otherwords,one
1414

NetworkAnalysis
can neversimplyappeal to such attributesas class membershipor class
consciousness,politicalpartyaffiliation,
age, gender,social status,religiousbeliefs,ethnicity,
sexual orientation,
psychologicalpredispositions,
and so on, in order to explain why people behave the way they do.
"Network theorybuilds its explanationsfrompatternsof relations,"
notes Ronald Burt. "It capturescausal factorsin the social structural
bedrockof society,bypassingthespuriouslysignificant
attributesof people temporarily
occupyingparticularpositionsin social structure"(Burt
1986, p. 106).4In thisrespect,networkanalysispursuesthe Simmelian
goal of a formalisticsociology(Simmel 1971, chap. 3), one that directs
attentionexclusivelyto the overall structureof networkties while suppressingconsiderationof theirsubstantivecontent(see also Bearman
1993, p. 48).5
Given this anticategoricalimperative,networkanalysisemphatically
rejectsall varietiesofculturalism,
essentialism,and methodological
individualism.It stands fundamentally
opposed, forexample,to certainof
theassumptionsofstructural-functionalism,
whichstressesthenormative
integrationof societies.Despite a commonemphasison the priorityof
structuresover "essences"-an emphasis(derivingultimatelyfromthe
earlyDurkheim)thatlinksbothperspectivesto tendenciesin structural
anthropology,
linguistics,and ordinarylanguage philosophy-network
analysts"take seriouslywhat Durkheimsaw but most of his followers
did not: that the organicsolidarityof a social systemrestsnot on the
cognitionof men, but ratheron the interlockand interactionof objectively definablesocial relationships"(Boorman and White 1976, p.
1442).6 It shouldbe pointedout,on theotherhand,thatnetworkanalysis
does notrejectall ofthetenetsofstructural-functionalism.
Manynetwork
analysts(e.g., White, Boorman, and Breiger1976; Burt 1982) employ
functionalist
notionssuch as "role," "role set," and "status," although
they reconceptualizethese notionsinto relationalor network-analytic
4 Thus one networkanalyst(Brym1988)is able to showin his workon intellectual
in Russiathatsharpdiscrepanradicalism
amongthefin-de-siecle
Jewishintelligentsia
circumscribed
ciesin politicalideologiescan developevenwithinnarrowly
categories,
of"structural
depending
upontheactors'different
patterns
rootedness"
withinparticularsocialnetworks.
5 This last formulation
appliessomewhatless well,it shouldbe pointedout,to the
thirdoftheseveralnetwork
modelsthatwe shallgo on toanalyze,thatofstructuralist
analysisof netconstructionism.
This modelsupplements
a "static"and formalistic
transformaworkstructure
witha more"dynamic"accountof processesof identity
to thecontentofnetwork
ties.
tion,one thatnecessarily
devotesmoreattention
6 Network
view of societyis
analysts'disagreement
withthestructural-functionalist
whoviewthe
thusreminiscent
ofSeligPerlman'sobjectionto thoseMarxisttheorists
workingclass as "an abstractmass in thegripof an abstractforce"(1979,p. 6).
1415

terms.In thisregard,theycan indeed be said to be workingwithinthe
traditionof Mertonand Rossi (1950), Parsons(1951), and Nadel (1957).
As a "structuralist"approach to social analysis, the networkperspectivenecessarilyalso questionsthe explanatorypotentialof all those
conceptualstrategiesthatemphasizethe nonrelationalattributesand/or
purposive actions of individuals or collectivities-strategiessuch as
interpretive
sociology,phenomenology,
symbolicinteractionism,
ethnomethodology,certainvariantsof Marxian analysis,and rationalchoice
theory.Fromthenetworkpointofview,analyticalapproachesthatdirect
attentionto the "intrinsiccharacteristics,""essences," attributes,or
interregoals ofindividuals,as opposedto theirpatternedand structured
lationships,are all inherently
suspect(Wellmanand Berkowitz1988, p.
5). Althoughcertainrationalchoiceanalystsdo employthemethodological tools and techniquesof networkanalysis(e.g., Coleman 1990), and
of networkanalysistodaytacitly
while,conversely,certainpractitioners
rely on instrumentalist
conceptionsof action (as we shall see below),
networkanalysis itselfas a broad perspectiveon social structurecan
fromtheradicalindividualismof rationalchoice
clearlybe distinguished
theory.
Finally,networkanalysisdepartsin importantways fromthe "mainstream"sociologicalapproach to empirical"quantitative"research.As
bothJamesColeman and AndrewAbbotthave observed,Americansociology beforethe "watershed"momentof the 1940s was marked by a
of qualitativecommunitystudies,influencedin large part
proliferation
by the Chicago school and, ultimately,by the writingsof RobertPark
(Park, Burgess,and McKenzie 1967),W. I. Thomas (1966), and Georg
Simmel(1955). These theoristsregardedsocial factsas ecologicallyembeddedwithinspecificcontextsoftimeand space - thatis to say, within
particularinteractional
fieldscomposedof concrete,historically
specific
"natural areas" and "natural histories.""All social facts," notes Abbott,wereseen as "locatedin particularphysicalplaces and in particular
social processes.They werealso locatedwithinthetemporallogicof one
or moreprocessesofsuccession,assimilation,conflict,
and so on.... The
in
embeddedin time,a structure
Chicago visionwas ofa social structure
process"(Abbott1992b,p. 14).
Afterthe 1940s,however,Americansociologyshifteditsfocusofattention away fromcontextualdetermination
and onto statisticalsurveyresearchand othertypesof workthattookas theirunitof analysisnotthe
communityor the social group,but ratherthe individual."In much of
the work followingthis change," remarksColeman, "the focus shifted
fromsocial processeswithinthecommunity
shapingthe system'sbehavior to psychologicalor demographicprocessesshapingindividualbehavior" (Coleman 1986, p. 1315).
1416

NetworkAnalysis
oftoolsforanalysis
Therewasnocomparable
development
ofthebehavior
ofinteracting
orforcapturing
systems
ofindividuals
theinterdependencies
ofindividual
actionsas theycombineto producea system-level
outcome.
oftoolsforthesepurposes
The fargreater
complexity
required
constituted
a serious impedimentto theirdevelopment..
. The end result[was]
foranalysisofthebehaviorofa setof
extraordinarily
elaborated
methods
independent
entities
(mostoftenindividuals),
withlittledevelopment
of
methods
forcharacterizing
systemic
actionresulting
fromtheinterdependentactionsofmembers
ofthesystem.
[Coleman1986,p. 1316]
Fromthishistoricalvantagepoint,contemporary
networkanalysiscan
be viewed as part of a second crucial watershedperiod in American
sociology,one in whichempiricalresearchis now directingits attention
back again to the systemiclevel, thistimeassistedby the development
of quantitativetechniquesand methodsof a highlysophisticatednature.
In thissecondpivotalmoment,analyticconcernsare shifting
back once
moreto thosequestionsof interactional
fieldsand contextualdeterminationthathad been so centralto sociologistsbeforethe"variablesrevolution" of the 1940s.
How, then,does networkanalysisproposeto accountforsocial behavior and processes?The answeris implicitin theprecedingremarks.Such
behaviorand processes,it suggests,mustbe explainedwithreference
to
networksof social relationsthat link actors or "nodes." These social
relations,significantly,
mustbe understoodas independentof the actors'
wills, beliefs,and values; theymustalso be assumed to allocate scarce
resourcesdifferentially
(Wellman1983, p. 176). Social structure,in this
in thepatternsof relationsamongconcreteentities;
view, is "regularities
it is not a harmonyamongabstractnormsand values or a classification
of concreteentitiesby theirattributes"(Whiteet al. 1976, pp. 733-34;
emphasisin original).A social networkis one of manypossible sets of
social relations of a specificcontent-for example, communicative,
power,affectual,or exchangerelations-thatlinkactorswithina larger
social structure(or networkof networks).The relevantunitof analysis
need not be an individualperson,but can also be a group,an organizaboundednetwork
tion,or, indeed,an entire"society"(i.e., a territorially
of social relations);7any entitythat is connectedto a networkof other
such entitieswill do.
Networkanalystsoftenfinditdesirableto carryouttheirinvestigations
at boththeindividualand grouplevels;suchcombinations
what
highlight
some ofthem,in a Simmelian(1955) fashion,referto as the"dualism"of
groupsand actors-the factthatthe natureof groupsis determinedby
the intersection
of the actorswithinthem(i.e., by theties of theirmem7One
recent writer,Margaret Somers (1993), prefersthe term "relational setting."
1417

bersto one anotheras well as to othergroupsand individuals),whilethe
nature of actors is determinedby the intersectionof groups "within"
them (i.e., by theirown various group affiliations;
see Breiger 1974).
Individualand groupbehavior,in thisview, cannotbe fullyunderstood
independently
of one another.By thus facilitating
analysesat both the
individualand grouplevel, networkanalysismakesit possibleto bridge
the "micro-macrogap"-the theoreticalgulfbetweenmicrosociology,
which examines the interactionof individuals, and macrosociology,
whichstudiesthe interaction
of groupsor institutions.
Thus theway in whichnetworkanalysisconceptualizessocialstructure
is at once moregeneraland moreconcretethan alternativestructuralist
approaches.It is moregeneralbecause manydifferent
kindsof groups,
relations,and institutions
thatputativelyorganizeor structure
social processes can be understoodin, or be "translated"into, networkterms.
And it is moreconcretebecause thesestructures
need not be treatedas
"black boxes," but rathercan be disaggregatedinto theirconstituent
elementsof actorsand relations.The significance
of thesetwo features
ofnetworkanalysisforempiricalresearchis considerable.Networkanalystsare now able to providefarmorepreciseand accuraterepresentationsofsocial structures
and social relationsthanare proponentsofcompetingresearchstrategies.
Most networkanalysts,of course, also purportto do far more than
simplydescribethe ways in which actorsare connectedin society.As
Knoke and Kuklinskipointout, "If networkanalysiswere limitedto a
how a set of actorsis linked toconceptualframeworkforidentifying
gether,it would not have excitedmuchinterestand effortamongsocial
researchers.But networkanalysiscontainsa further
explicitpremiseof
greatconsequence:The structure
ofrelationsamongactorsand thelocationof individualactorsin thenetworkhave importantbehavioral,perceptual, and attitudinalconsequencesboth forthe individualunitsand
for the systemas a whole" (Knoke and Kuklinski1982, p. 13). "The
hallmarkof networkanalysis," in Edward Laumann's (1979, p. 349)
words,"is to explain,at least in part,the behaviorof networkelements
(i.e., thenodes)and ofthesystemas a wholebyappeal to specificfeatures
of the interconnections
the netamongthe elements."More specifically,
workapproachinvestigatesthe constraining
and enablingdimensionsof
patternedrelationshipsamong social actors withina system.It is 'this
emphasis,in fact,thatprovidesthe link betweenits theoreticalinsights
and its key contributions
to empiricalresearch.What networkanalysis
provides,in particular,is a way of avoidingthe pitfallsof what Arthur
Stinchcombeterms"epochal interpretations"
(or, morememorably,"epochal garbage"); that is, of causal explanationsthat proceedby "using
theapparentcausal structure
createdbynarrativeofa sequenceofevents
1418

NetworkAnalysis
to create the illusion that epochal theoriesare being substantiated"
(Stinchcombe1978, p. 10; see also Tilly 1992). Networkanalysisallows
historicalsociologists,by contrast,to pinpointthose wide-rangingand
recurrentcausal mechanisms"whose combinationsproduce," as Tilly
expressesit, "the actual unique historieswe observe"(Tilly 1992,p. 11).
does networkanalysisattemptsuchan important
task?
How, specifically,
RelationalAnalysisas a Way of Representing
Social Structure
Networkanalystsgenerallymake use of one oftwo conceptualstrategies
in order to explain how networksconstrainand enable-and thus to
accountforvarioustypesof social behavior(Burt 1980a, 1987). On the
one hand, many analystsadopt a "relational"or "social cohesion"approachthatfocuseson thedirectand indirectconnectionsamongactors.
This approach explainscertainbehaviorsor processesthroughthe fact
of social connectivity
itself-as well as throughthe density,strength,
symmetry,
range,and so on, ofthetiesthatbind. Fromthisperspective,
verystrong,dense, and relativelyisolatedsocial networksfacilitatethe
developmentof uniform"subcultures"and of strongcollectiveidentities;
thisnotion,ofcourse,dates back bothto Durkheim(1984) and to Simmel
(1955; 1971, chap. 18). Relationalanalyses,however,also demonstrate
that"weak" tiesindirectly
connectingindividualsor bridgingthe"structural holes" between isolated social groups may be crucial for many
importantsocial processes,such as locatingemploymentopportunities
(e.g., Granovetter1973; Burt 1992). The mathematicaltools of "graph
theory"have been helpfulin developingthese approaches(see Harary
et al. 1965).
One importantapplicationof networkanalysisthatemploysthe relationalor social cohesionapproachis a studyby Naomi Rosenthalet al.
(1985) of women'sreformorganizationsin New York State duringthe
latterhalfof thenineteenth
century.Rosenthaland herassociatesexamine the organizationalaffiliations
in
of 202 prominentwomenreformers
state reformactivityduringthe yearsbetween1840 and 1914. By mappingout theseaffiliations,
theydevelopa detailedportraitof the "multiorganizationalfield"of social movementactivitythat obtained during
thatperiod.Measuresof centrality
enable themto identify
theparticular
to thatnetworkofreform
groupsthatweremostimportant
organizations.
Otherrelatedmethodsprovidethemwith carefulmeasurementsof the
boundaries,shape, and textureof variousclustersof such organizations.
Finally, "directionalanalysis" of flowsof individualsacross organizationsprovidesthemwitha pictureof "threeuniquelyshaped map conof social movementclustersin threedistincthistoricalpefigurations"
riods between 1840 and 1914, each of these manifestinga "different
1419

contentto the relationsamongorganizationsand activity"(Rosenthalet
al. 1985, p. 1043).
Anotherimportantline ofnetworkresearchemployingrelationalanalysis concernsitselfwith processesof recruitment
to social movements.
Its pointof departureis a studyby Snow, Zurcher,and Ekland-Olson
(1980) thatexaminesmaterialson a wide varietyofmovements.Snow et
al.'s work suggeststhat individualswith preexistingties to movement
membersare morelikelyto be contactedand recruitedto those movementsthan are individualswithoutsuch ties; individualswith few or
weak ties to alternativenetworksare morelikelyto respondfavorably
to theserecruitment
efforts
thanare individualswithstrongcommitments
to countervailing
networks.Snow et al.'s studydoes notemploysophisticated networkanalysistechniques,nor does it examinesystematically
the independenteffectsof networkstructures
themselves;it focusesinstead upon individualtiesalone. And yetit does providea usefulcorrective to social psychologicaland culturalistapproachesthatplace undue
explanatoryweightupon such variables as "individualmotivation"to
the exclusionof actors'patternsofembeddednesswithinactual networks
of social ties.
A seriesof studiesby Doug McAdam (1986, 1988; see also Fernandez
and McAdam 1988, 1989) further
corroborates
and advances thisline of
investigation.McAdam's studiesare concernedwiththe participationof
collegestudentsin the 1964 FreedomSummerprojectin Mississippiand
focus on the patternsof social relationshipsof studentparticipants,as
comparedto thoseofstudentswho appliedfortheproject,wereaccepted,
but failed to participate.McAdam's principalconclusionis that "all of
the applicants-participantsand withdrawalsalike-emerge as highly
committed,articulatesupportersof the goals and values of the summer
campaign" (McAdam 1986, p. 73). What clearlydifferentiates
particinor
pants fromwithdrawalsare not theirsocioeconomiccharacteristics
attitudinaldifferences
that "push" individualsinto participating,but
threestructural"pull" factorsthatfacilitatedand encouragedparticipation: (1) participantsbelongedto a greaternumberof organizationsand
to moreexplicitly
thandid withdrawals;(2) participoliticalorganizations
pants had higherlevels of involvementin prior civil rightsactivities
than did withdrawals;and, mostimportant,(3) participantshad more
ties-to otherFreedomSummerapties-especially "strong"friendship
plicantsthan did withdrawals.
An articlebyMcAdam and RobertoFernandez(1988; see also Fernandez and McAdam 1989) extendsthe scope of thisanalysisto includethe
effects
ofeven morespecifically
structural
variablessuch as the"network
in Freedom
prominence"of applicantsupon theireventualparticipation
Summer. McAdam and Fernandez argue that individuals' positions
1420

NetworkAnalysis
withinmultiorganizational
fields-in thiscase, the variousnetworksof
interlockingactivistorganizationsat theirrespectiveuniversities-did
undercertainconditionssignificantly
affectthe likelihoodof theirbeing
recruitedto the summerproject.It was not the quantityof individuals'
ties to social movementorganizationsor to otherapplicantsto Freedom
Summerthatdetermined
theireventualparticipation,
but ratherthepatternof theirinterpersonal
connectionsand commonmemberships
within
these organizations.To capture the effectsof these patterns,Fernandez and McAdam employa standardcohesionmeasureof centrality"prominence"-in theiranalysis;theyuse it to focus attentionon the
densityof applicants'tiesto othermoreor less centrally
locatedindividuals withinfieldsof overlappingorganizations.
Despite his increasinginterestin the significanceof "networksas
such" in movementrecruitment,
however-as opposed to social ties
"treat[ed]. . . in piecemealfashion"(Gould 1991, p. 717)-McAdam's
researchleaves out of considerationone furtherstructuralvariable:
namely,themultiplexity
ofnetworksthemselvesand thecomplexinteractionsamongthem.WhileMcAdam's studiesneglectthepreexisting
webs
of relationships
withinwhichFreedomSummerapplicantshad been embedded beforejoiningactivistorganizations,RogerGould's (1991, 1992)
studiesof the Paris Communeexploretheinteractiveeffectsof precisely
such networkswith more formalorganizationalstructures.Together,
Gould argues-not separately-theseindigenousstructures
(specifically,
the neighborhoodswithinwhich the Parisian insurgentslived) and the
National Guard unitsto whichthe insurgentswere assigneddecisively
affectedtheiroveralllevels of solidarityand resistance.The key to this
interaction
processwas theresidentialrecruitment
systemoftheNational
Guard. "Membersof each battalionwere tied to each othernot only
throughtheirsharedorganizationalaffiliation,
but also by the factthat
theywere neighbors."Gould findsthat
in different
insurgents
neighborhoods
influenced
each other'sdegreeof
commitment
to theinsurrection
through
thenetwork
oflinkscreatedby
inone
overlapping
enlistments
[inguardunits].Highlevelsofcommitment
areaenhancedcommitment
elsewhere
whenenlistment
patterns
provided
a conduitforcommunicationand interaction..
. [Thus] neighborhoods
responded
toeventsinotherareaswheretheirresidents
servedinNational
inthefifth
Guardunits.Forinstance,
resistance
was posiarrondissement
affected
tively
bythefactthatmanyofitsresidents
servedinthethirteenth
legion,whosemembers
a strong
totheinsurgent
demonstrated
commitment
effort.
[Gould1991,p. 726]
Gould concludesfromthis that "cross-neighborhood
solidarity"was a
featureof the Parisianinsurrection.
"The interdependence
of
significant
resistancelevels acrossresidentialareas was . . . intimately
tiednotonly
1421

to the quantity,but also to the structureof overlappingenlistments"
(Gould 1991, p. 727). Gould thusshowsthatstructuralanalysisneeds to
take into accountnot onlyindividual-levelvariablessuch as thosethat
are employedin theMcAdam studies,but also thecomplexinfluencesof
multiplexor overlappingnetworksof social ties.
Social Structure
PositionalAnalysisas a Way of Representing
approachto conceptualizing
Many networkanalystsemploya different
social structure;their"positional"strategyfocusesupon the natureof
actors'ties not to one another,but to thirdparties.This strategymakes
sense of certainbehaviorsand processesin termsof the patternof relations that definesan actor's positionrelativeto all otheractorsin the
social system.Positionalanalyses emphasizethe importanceof "structuralequivalence"-that is, thesharingbytwo or moreactorsofequivabothindividual
lentrelationsvis-'a-visa thirdactor-for understanding
and collectivebehavior(see Lorrainand White1971). The relevantissue
fromthis pointof view is the specific"position"or "role" that a set of
actorsoccupies withinthe systemas a whole. Any such set is termeda
"block." An algebraic procedure called "blockmodeling"partitions
equivalentactors(Whiteet
overall populationsinto sets of structurally
al. 1976; Boormanand White 1976).
Structuralequivalencemodelsdifferfromrelationalmodelsin at least
two crucialrespects.First,whilethelatterfailto distinguishamongthe
membersof social "cliques" on the basis of those members'different
typesof ties to externalactors,the formerdo concernthemselveswith
the structureof the social systemas a whole. They generatemodels"in
actorssuch
whichan actoris one of manyin a systemofinterconnected
that all definedrelationsin which he is involvedmust be considered"
(Burt 1980a, p. 80). Second, structuralequivalencemodelspay no heed
to whetheractorsin a givenpositionhave any directtiesto one another.
A block, or set of structurally
equivalentactors,fromtheirperspective,
may not be a denselyknitsocial clique at all (Whiteet al. 1976).
One interesting
exampleof networkanalysisthatmakes use of blockmodelingand positionalanalysisis theworkof PeterBearman(1993) on
local elitesocial structurein England duringthe centurybeforethe English Civil War. Bearman examinesthe actual patternsof kinshipand
patron-clientties that bound elite actors together(and that simultaneouslydrovethemapart)duringthisperiod,and thereby"inducespartitions" or "equivalencyclasses" of these actors that describetheirpatternedinteractionsmore accuratelythan do the standard categorical
Ratherthan specifythe relevanteliteactorsfromafarin
classifications.
such categoricaltermsas "middling,""rising,""falling,""court," or
1422

NetworkAnalysis
"country"gentry,he generatesspecificblockmodelsof theirinterrelationshipsin fourdiscretetimeperiodsbetween1540and 1640. "Individuals with distinctivepersonal biographiesact coherently,"he argues,
"with respectto the interestswhich arise fromthe structuralpositions
theyshare in local and nationalnetworks"(Bearman 1993, pp. 11-12).
Changes over timein the structureand distribution
of these networks
thus provide the key to understandinglong-termstructuralchanges.
Bearman's largerargumentis that the social transformations
that did
occur at the elite level created the "structuralprerequisites"for the
widespreadadoptionof certainabstracttheologicaltenets,whichin turn
would play a crucialrolein inspiringthetumultuouspoliticaleventsthat
were to come. They led, in otherwords, "to the formationof an elite
subworldorganizedon the basis of social relationsthattranscendedthe
[localistand kinship-based]
traditionalsocial orderand createda context
in whichabstractreligious[and constitutionalist]
rhetoricscould emerge
as thecriticaldeterminants
of elitesocial actionin thecenturypreceding
the EnglishCivil War" (Bearman 1993, p. 1).
Anotherhighlysophisticatedand innovativehistoricalcase studyemployingthepositionalapproachto structural
analysisis JohnPadgettand
ChristopherAnsell's brilliantwork on the rise of the Medici in early
15th-century
Florence. Padgettand Ansell, much like Bearman before
"thefamthem,employthe conceptof structural
equivalenceto identify
ily, economic,and patronagenetworksthat constitutedthe Medicean
politicalparty"(Padgettand Ansell 1993,p. 1260),as well as theirmain
rivals in Florentinepolitics,the "oligarchs."They use archivaldata on
marital,economic,political,and personalties to produce an "overall
relationalpictureof Florence'ssocial structure,
within[a] 92-familyruling elite" (Padgettand Ansell 1993, p. 1274). Throughblockmodeling
theyfindthat they are able to predictactual partymembershipsfar
more accuratelythan throughstandardcategoricalanalyses based, for
example, on class and status. Indeed, theiranalyses of marriageand
economicties in particularprove highlyusefulin revealingthe connectionsamong networks,groups,and partymembership.In a pointedreminderof the potentialempiricalusefulnessof what we have termed
here the "anticategoricalimperative,"Padgettand Ansell concludethat
"ratherthan partiesbeing generatedby social groups,. . . both parties
and social groupswere inducedconjointlyby underlying
networks....
We do not argue . . . thatsocial attributesand groupsare irrelevantto
partyformation;merelythattheirrole needs to be understoodwithina
deeperrelationalcontext.Thereis no simplemappingofgroupsor spatial
dimensionsontoparties;social attributes
and groupinterestsare 'merely'
cognitivecategories,which party mobilization,networks,and action
crosscut"(Padgettand Ansell 1993,pp. 1277-78, 1274;emphasisadded).
1423

Blockmodelingalso provesusefulin explainingthe superiorcapacity
forcollectiveactionof theMedici partyvis-'a-visits rivalfaction,despite
the bitterdivisionbetweenthosepatricianelitesand "new men" aligned
with the Medici. The Medici party,Padgett and Ansell observe, was
"deeplycleaved on two attributional
dimensionssimultaneously-social
class (i.e., prestige)and neighborhood.Not onlydid thevariouscomponentsdespise each other;theydid not run intoeach othermuch either.
Only the Medici familyitselflinkedthe segments"(Padgettand Ansell
1993,p. 1281).In fact,theMedici familyexertedan exceptionaldegreeof
centralizedcontroloveritsfollowerspreciselyby bridgingthe"structural
hole" betweenpatriciansand new men. (On theimportanceof structural
holesmoregenerally,see Burt[1992].)The morecliquisholigarchparty,
by contrast,was constantlybesetwith"cross-pressure[s]
on each family
insteadof collectiveconvergence,"due preciselyto itsfarhigherlevelsof
networkmultiplexity
and attributional
homogeneity
(Padgettand Ansell
1993, p. 1279).
Padgettand Ansellrevealthroughan analysisof "networkdynamics"
just how these patternsof social relationshipscame about in the first
place. "Elite marriageand economicnetworks,"theyargue, "were reconfiguredby working-classrevoltand by wartimefiscalcrisis,respectively"(Padgettand Ansell 1993, p. 1287). As part of theirstrategyof
reconsolidationin the aftermathof the Ciompi wool workers'revoltof
1378, the temporarily
victoriousoligarchsdeliberatelyexcludedthe losers' elite collaborators,includingthe Medici, fromtheirmarital networks. "The oligarchicclique and the Medicean . . . networks,"claim
Padgettand Ansell, thus "both emergedin tandem,a singlenetwork,
and asymmetrically
the other"(Padgettand
each reflexively
structuring
Ansell 1993, p. 1298). In the meantime,foreignwars withMilan (142328) and Lucca (1430-33) had theeffectofseverelyweakeningtheFlorentineeconomyand of sendingmanyelitefamilies(withthenotableexception of the Medici themselves,who enjoyed special papal ties) into
bankruptcy.The elitefamiliesattemptedto helpthemselvesbydepriving
in turnthe sociallyand politicallymorevulnerablenew mercantileelements-the new men-of officesand tax revenues.After1427, the Medici began to pursueeconomicrelationswiththesenew elementsin their
local residentialneighborhoods.
It was preciselyat thatmomentthatthe
Medici partyemergedas a powerfuland self-consciouspoliticalactor
engagedin struggleagainstthe dominantoligarchfaction.
THREE NETWORK MODELS OF HISTORICAL EXPLANATION
Each of thesetwo alternativemodelsof social structure
has its strengths
and weaknesses. Proponentsof the relationalapproach emphasize its
1424

NetworkAnalysis
suitabilityformappingthe typicalrelationsthat individualshave with
one another.It is more amenable to traditionalsurveyresearchtechniques,theyclaim,in contrastto positionalapproachesthatrequiredata
forall the elementsin the system.Proponentsof structuralequivalence,
conversely,stressits moreconsistently
structuralist
nature,its capacity,
that is, simultaneouslyto take into account all of the relationaldata
pertainingto a given actor, includinghis patternsof externalrelationships-"the relationsin whichhe is involvedas well as the relationsin
which he is not involved" (Burt 1980a, p. 131). "A global [positional]
approach," notesMichael J. Mandel (1983, pp. 376-77), "examinesall
interlocks
betweenrolesat thesame time .... [This]simultaneousconsiderationofall actorsin an entirepopulation. .. spotlights
theinterdependence of the different
rolesfoundin the population.Each role therefore
has builtintoit theelementswhichdifferentiate
itfromotherroleswithin
the same overallstructure."Positionalanalystscontendthatthisfeature
lendstheirmodelsa significantly
greaterdegreeof predictivepower. For
of a classic "cohesion"studyby Coleman,
example,in a reconsideration
Katz, and Menzel (1966), Burt showshow the structuralequivalenceof
physiciansbetteraccountsforthe informalsocial pressuresthat led to
the diffusionof the use of the drug tetracycline
than does theirsocial
cohesion(Burt 1987).
Networkpractitioners
employbothof theseapproachesto make sense
of an impressivearrayof substantiveissues. Despite the considerable
methodologicalusefulnessof both strategies,however,we contendthat
each can be subjected to a numberof importantcriticisms.The very
assumptionsand premisesthat have made networkanalysisin both of
its methodologicalvariantssuch a powerfultool raise seriousquestions
about itsadequacy as an overallresearchstrategy.We contendthatthere
have been threemodelsimplicitin the literatureon networkanalysismodelsoftherelationships
amongculture,agency,and social structurethathave led to varyingdegreesof difficulty
in elaboratingsatisfactory
explanationsof historicalprocesses.The firstof these implicitmodels,
thatof structuralist
determinism,
neglectsaltogetherthepotentialcausal
role of actors' beliefs,values, and normativecommitments-or,more
of culturaland politicaldiscoursesin hisgenerally,of the significance
ofactionthatshape
tory.It neglectsas wellthosehistoricalconfigurations
and transform
in thefirstplace. A secondand
pregivensocial structures
more satisfactory-butstill deeply problematic-approach is that of
structuralist
instrumentalism.
Studieswithinthisperspectiveaccept the
prominentrole of social actorsin history,but ultimatelyconceptualize
theiractivityin narrowlyutility-maximizing
and instrumentalforms.
And finally,themostsophisticated
networkperspectiveon social change,
which we termstructuralist
thematizesprovocatively
constructionism,
1425

certainhistoricalprocessesof identityconversionand "robustaction."
It is themostsuccessfulofall oftheseapproachesin adequatelyconceptualizinghuman agencyand the potentiallytransformative
impactof cultural idioms and normativecommitments
on social action. However,
even thisperspectivefallsshortin understanding
thefullcomplexities
of
the theoreticalinterconnections
amongculture,agency,and social structure. It too pays insufficient
attentionto the structuring
influencesof
culturaland politicaldiscoursesupon historicalactors.8
Structuralist
Determinism
All threeof these basic approachesare representedby practitioners
of
bothrelationaland positionalnetworkanalysis.The aforementioned
relationalstudyby Rosenthalet al. (1985), forexample,standsas an illuminatingcase studyin structuralist
determinism.
Rosenthaland herassociates delineatethreedistincthistoricalperiodsofwomen'sreformactivity
in New York State betweentheyears 1840 and 1914. The firstof these,
theyclaim, lasted from1840 to the late 1860s; it was dominatedby a
women'srightsmovementand also featuredhighlevels of involvement
in antislaveryand temperanceorganizations.The second periodwas a
transitionalone; betweenthe end of the Civil War and the late 1880s
therewas comparatively
littleactivity,manyof theearliergroupsdisappeared, and "the possibilityof creatingnew nationalorganizationswas
limited"(Rosenthalet al. 1985, p. 1044). And finally,betweenthe late
1880sand 1914,therewas a resurgence
ofintensereformactivity,centering around an increasingnumberof new organizationslinkedprimarily
by thesuffrage
issue. Rosenthalet al.'s delineationofthesethreeperiods
of women'sreformactivityby means of relationalanalysissurelyranks
as a significantand worthycontribution.But its limitationsare also
considerable:the studyprovideslittlesystematicexplanationas to preciselywhythesechangesoccurredfromone historicalperiodto thenext,
or relasettlinginsteadfora successionof static"map configurations"
tional "snapshots"'of networkpatterns.The individualand social actionsthatled fromone structuralconfiguration
of reformactivityto the
nextare leftunanalyzed,as are thedevelopmentsin social structure
and
8
Our termstructuralistconstructionismis coincidentallyreminiscentof Pierre Bourdieu's phrase, "constructiviststructuralism"(Bourdieu 1990). But we do not imply
by this any direct connectionbetween the networkanalysts whom we are discussing
and Bourdieu, although it is true that these various thinkersall share an underlying
concern to overcome at both the theoreticaland empirical levels the dichotomybetween "subjectivist" and "objectivist" standpoints. Bourdieu's understanding of
"fields," e.g., does bear strikinganalytical affinitieswith that of "social networks"
(Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, p. 114).
1426

NetworkAnalysis
culturaland politicaldiscoursethat underlayand motivatedthem. At
best, Rosenthalet al. treatthesevariousdevelopmentsin theiranalysis
as exogenousvariables.
On theside ofpositionalratherthanrelationalanalysis,theearlywork
ofHarrisonWhiteand hisassociateson blockmodeling
techniques(White
et al. 1976; see also Boormanand White 1976) providesanotherilluminatingexampleof structuralist
determinism.9
White'sresearchincludes
studiesof networkdata describingstructuralchangesover time(White
et al. 1976, pp. 763-68); each of these studies,however(like that of
Rosenthalet al.), ultimately
culminatesin a successionofstaticrepresentationsof social structure.Each manages,thatis to say, to generate"no
modelsof processesover time." Whiteet al. recognizethattransformationsin social structurestillneed to be explained:"Models of structure
are not sufficient
untothemselves.Eventuallyone mustbe able to show
how concretesocial processesand individualmanipulationsshape and
are shaped bystructure.... One fundamental
problemhereis thatmany
settingsmay admitnot just a singleequilibriumoutcome,but multiple
alternativeequilibria. . . . In turnthe interesting
questionsmay bear
on what externalforcesmay cause a social structureto pass fromone
to another"(Whiteet al. 1976,p. 773; emphaequilibriumconfiguration
sis added). Toward the end of anotherimportantarticleon blockmodeling techniquesand role structures,
Whiteand his collaboratorsfurther
acknowledgethat "the next analytictask is to provideways to probe
how role structures. . . actuallycome intobeing"(Boormanand White
1976, p. 1442). But again, theyprovideno systematic
way of buildinga
concernforhumanagencyand processuality
intotheirexplanations.
Anothershortcoming
thatbothoftheseexamplesofstructuralist
determinismhave in commonis theassumptionthatsocial networkscan best
be conceptualizedas linkingtogether"concrete"entitiessuch as persons
and organizations,ratherthan as also embodyingideals, discursive
and "cognitivemaps." The latter,fromtheirperspective,
frameworks,
remain mere "abstractions."'0Structuralistdeterminismrests analyticallyon a reificationofsocial relations;it transforms
theimportanttheoretical distinctionbetween a structureof social relations,on the one
hand, and culturalformations,
on theother,intoan ontologicaldualism.
It thereby"ruthlesslyabstracts"the formalor "objective" dimensions
of social relationsfromtheirculturaland intersubjective
contextsso as
to be able to representand analyze such relationswith sophisticated
9 We discussbelowtheratherdifferent
thatWhitehas subseanalyticalperspective
quentlyadopted-e.g., in Identityand Control(1992).
10 For a tellingexample,see Granovetter's
synopsisof CambridgeUniversity
Press's
serieson "Structural
Analysisin theSocial Sciences"(Knoke1990,frontmatter).
1427

technicaltools; in the process,however,it drainssuch relationsof their
active, subjectivedimensionand theirculturalcontentsand meanings.
To compoundtheproblem,thisvariantofnetworkanalysisthentheoretically privilegesone side of this dualism-namely, that of "social relations"itself(albeitsocial relationsnow blanchedof boththeiractiveand
symbolicaspects)-over that of culturaland discursiveformations.It
uses social networks("social being,"in Marx's famousformulation)
to
explain "social consciousness"and culture,but not (also) the otherway
around. Indeed, in Wellmanand Berkowitz'swords(1988, p. 5), "symbols, meanings,and values . . . are a derivativeand oftenresidual
concern.)"
Instrumentalism
Structuralist
Perhaps because of its theoreticallimitations,structuralist
determinism
has givenriseto relatively
littleempiricalresearchon historicalprocesses.
Far more commonhas been the perspectiveof structuralist
instrumenof both relational
talism,which has also been adopted by practitioners
and positionalnetworkanalysis.This perspectivecertainlytakesthehistoricalrole of social actorsverycarefullyintoaccount.However,it also
draws implicitly
upon "residualcategories"fromoutsideits own conceptual framework-in particular,a model of homo economicus-for explainingtheformation
and transformation
ofsocialnetworksthemselves.
Thereis a striking
tendencyamongstructuralist
instrumentalists,
in fact,
to "smuggle"conceptionsof agency into theirinvestigations,whether
overtlyor covertly,fromthe domainof rationalchoicetheory.Many, if
thatactorsnotmost,such networkanalystsassumeunproblematically
individualsand even groups or organizations-are utilitymaximizers
who pursuetheirmaterialinterestsin money,status,and powerin preciselythe ways predictedby theoristsof rationalchoice. In effect,these
on the actorstheystudy,
analystsprojecttheirown anticategoricalism
neglectinghow the latter'sown culturaland moral categorieshelp to
structuretheirbeliefsand behaviors.
A usefulexampleof structuralist
on the side of relainstrumentalism
tional analysis are Roger Gould's aforementioned
studies of the 1871
Paris Commune(1991, 1992). Gould beginsby "posit[ing]an influence
processin whicha [Parisian]district'sresistancelevel is a functionof a
set of exogenousvariables and of the resistancelevels of all the other
of its linkswiththem"(Gould 1991,
districts,weightedby the strength
p. 721; emphasis in original).He investigatesthree such "exogenous
variables"thathelp to explainthesevaryinglevels of resistance:(1) the
levels of povertyin an arrondisement;
(2) the percentageof skilledsalamidriedworkersresidingtherein;and (3) thepercentageofwhite-collar,
1428

NetworkAnalysis
dle-classemployeeslocatedin any specificneighborhood
(Gould 1991,p.
723). "Resistancewas stronger,"concludesGould, "in areas that were
poor and workingclass," althoughhis "expectationthat white-collar
and unskilledworkerswould playless prominent
rolesin theinsurrection
is not supported"(Gould 1991, p. 725). Gould departs here fromhis
own anticategoricalapproach by relyingupon "exogenous"gradational
measuresofpovertyand occupationalcomposition-in additionto social
networks-in orderto make senseof themobilizationin each arrondisement(see also Gould 1992, p. 727).
Not onlymustGould movefromrelationalto gradationaldata in order
to identifyaccuratelythe social base of the Paris Commune,but, more
troublingly,
he neverprovidesa plausiblecausal accountas to whyParisians would have riskedtheirlives forthe Communein the firstplace.
At timeshe seemssimplyto assume,dubiouslyin our view, thatworking
people (or, at least, working-class
males of 19th-century
France)" would
automaticallyfightand die fora staterepresenting
theirclass interests.
He predicts,forexample,thatwhite-collar
employees,"who oftencame
frommiddle-classfamilies,"would have been less likelythanartisansor
workersto participatein theinsurrection
(Gould 1991,p. 724). As noted
above, this expectationis unsupportedby the data, an outcomethat
Gould himselfnever explains. At othertimes, Gould emphasizesthe
importanceof neighborhood
(and cross-neighborhood)
loyaltyor solidarity. In this account,he argues that Parisiansjoined the insurgencynot
because of class interestsper se, but ratherbecause of "social pressure"
fromneighbors:"Failure to participatein the insurgenteffortwas construedas a betrayalof loyaltyto the neighborhoodand was sanctioned
accordingly"(Gould 1992, p. 748). This argument,however,fails to
explainwhyor how certaintiesand interactions
amongneighbors,which
Gould does not specifyconcretely,
generatedsuch a powerfulneighborhood loyaltyin the firstplace; it begs the questionas to how certain
(unspecified)workerscame to believe,and apparentlymanaged to convince others,that "neighborhoodloyalty"requirednothingless than
riskingtheirlives for the Commune. Gould's assumptionsabout the
purelyinstrumental
foundationsofpoliticalmobilization-whetherclass
or statusbased-in the presentstage of his researchpreventhim from
analyzingsuch culturaland normativeinfluencesin a fullysatisfactory
manner.Gould impliesthatsimplybelongingto a neighborhoodwitha
certainoccupationalcomposition(and ties to othersuch neighborhoods)
producedpro-Communesolidarities.But whydid such "belongingness"
indifgeneratepowerfulsolidarityinsteadof,forexample,interpersonal
" Goulddoesnotsaymuchaboutthecomplexly
gendered
character
oftheinsurgency,
simplynotingthatwomenwerenotadmittedintotheNationalGuard.
1429

ferenceor even cutthroatcompetition,
as amongthe oligarchicclique in
Padgettand Ansell'sstudy?
We recognizethatGould's workhas thusfarappearedonlyin journal
articlesand thatlater,moreexpansiveversionsmightwell exemplifya
different
sortof explanatorystrategy.In its presentform,however,we
claim that it does relativelylittleto explorethe specificallynormative
of the social actorsengagedin politicalresistanceduring
commitments
the Commune.(The difficulty
hereis not that Gould neglects"culture"
per se, but ratherthattheunderlying
logicofhis argument-itstheoretical logic-fails to accord normativecommitments
any independentexplanatorysignificance.)
In a morecompletehistoricalexplanation,Gould
would have to directfarmoreattentionthan he does to the specifically
culturalbases of (cross-)neighborhood
solidarityand theirinfluenceupon
individuals'projectsof action. Exactlywhat sortsof practicesand rituals, he would need to ask, producedthepowerfulsolidaritiesof Parisian
neighborhoodsand the National Guard? What role did politicalideologiesand culturaldiscoursesplayin sustainingor evenexpandingrelations
of solidarity?(Gould mentionsthe discoursesof "socialism"and of "republican patriotism"in thiscontext,but he neverexaminestheirmeanin any systematic
ingsto workersand thustheircausal significance
fashion.) And finally,what do sourcesofinformation
such as diaries,letters,
unionrecords,and journalisticaccountsreveal to us about popularcultural practicesin 19th-century
Paris and duringthe Commune itself?
(See, e.g., Sewell [1980]and thesourcescitedin Edwards [1973,p. 175].)
Such data sourceswould demonstrate
how popularpracticesand popular
culture,farfrombeing"additional"factorsor forcesneedingto be either
"controlledfor"or examinedalongsideof networkstructures,were in
factimportantdimensionsof thosestructures
themselves-groundedin,
and sustaining,specific,identifiable
social ties.
On the side of positionalanalysis,PeterBearman (1993), too, adopts
the perspectiveof structuralist
instrumentalism.
Bearman tellsthe story
of changingelite social relationsin England duringthe "long sixteenth
of elite
century"by means of a sequence of blockmodelrepresentations
social structure.By examiningtheseblockmodels,he specifies"the slow
and arduousprocessby whichreligiousheterodoxy
was embeddedin the
fabricof local elite social and politicallife,"the tangiblemechanisms
"by whichlocal elitescame to perceivethemselvesand othersas actors
whose activitywas of religioussignificance"
(Bearman 1993, pp. 171,
132). Bearman's approach is not dissimilarto what Max Weber (1949)
long ago termedthe analysis of "electiveaffinity"-thestudyof how
particulardiscoursesand culturalformationscome to finda "match"
and to "resonate"withspecifichistorically
embeddedactors.Wherehis
approach differsfromthatof Weber,however,is in its tacitinstrumen1430

NetworkAnalysis
talism-that is, itstendencyto devotealmostall ofitsanalyticalattention
to uncoveringthe "structuralpreconditions"for this elective affinity,
of these
ratherthanto also exploringtheindependentcausal significance
discursiveframeworks
themselves.Indeed, Bearman seems to attribute
littlemorethan purelymaterialinterests(in money,status,and power)
to the historicalactors at the centerof his account. "The eclipse of
localism,the decline of kinship,and the emergenceof a national elite
subworld,"he argues,"were aggregateoutcomesof the gentry'spursuit
of local statusand power"(Bearman 1993, p. 3). The searchfor"political advantage"was the drivingmechanism,in otherwords,behindthe
crucial historicaltransformations
of the period-and not (also) the beliefs, values, and normativecommitments
of these elite actors themselves. Bearmanmightwell have noted,in theopeningpage ofhis study,
that he is primarilyinvestigating
only one side of "the interactionbetween structuraland ideationalprocesses. . . the complexrelationship
betweenaction and structure"(Bearman 1993, p. 1).
Structuralist
Constructionism
Severalnetworkanalystshave, in recentyears,developedmoresophisticated approachesthantheseto studyinghistoricalprocesses,approaches
that take into account cultureand agencyas well as social structure.
Again, practitioners
of bothrelationaland positionalanalysishave pursued suchinvestigations.
construcOne revealingexampleofstructuralist
tionismon theside of relationalanalysisis Doug McAdam's recentwork
on Freedom Summer(1986, 1988). McAdam explicitlyrejectsmany of
the instrumentalist
claims of othernetworkanalysts.He qualifiesthe
notion,specifically,that "structuralavailability"for social movement
to a movementcompletely
participationrenders"attitudinalaffinity"
activism,"
irrelevant.Such a notionmighthold true of "low-risk/cost
in instancesofhigh-risk
but"participation
activism[suchas theFreedom
Summerprojectand, we mightadd, theParis Communeand theEnglish
Civil War]would appear to dependon an intenseattitudinaland personal
identification
withthe movement"(McAdam 1986, p. 73). Surely,high
levels of such identification
were requiredforthe FreedomSummervoldanunteersto aspireto participatein such a demandingand potentially
gerousundertaking;
moreover,thevolunteers'accountsoftheirown motives in open-endedapplicationquestionnairesclearlydemonstratethat
to theproject's
theyfelta deep-seatedidealismand a strongcommitment
goals. "The real questionis: Were the volunteers'priorattitudessufficientin themselvesto accountfortheirparticipation?
My answerhereis
a qualifiedno.... Attitudinalaffinity
[as well as] biographicalavailabil1431

itymustbe considerednecessarybutnotsufficient
causes ofparticipation
in high-risk/cost
activism"(McAdam 1986, pp. 73, 87).
Exactly where, then, did this "attitudinalaffinity"
forthe Freedom
Summerproject(or, moregenerally,forany social action)actuallycome
from?One of McAdam's major innovationsin FreedomSummer(1988)
is to elaboratean implicittheoryof identityconversionthattakes seriously the formationof motivationsand identitieswithoutsacrificing
at
all the momentof "structurallocation." McAdam argues that the key
to his accountlies in thoseorganizationsthatdrew "the applicantsinto
civil rightsactivitybefore
FreedomSummer.... Extremelyrisky,timeconsuminginvolvementssuch as FreedomSummer,"he contends,"are
almostalways precededby a seriesof safer,less demandinginstancesof
activism.In effect,people committhemselvesto movementsin stages,
each activitypreparingtheway forthenext"(McAdam 1988,pp. 50-51;
emphasisin original).Individualsfirstcomeintocontactwithmovement
participantsand engage in discussionsand joint activitieswith them,
firsthand
theissuesthatthemovementhas setout to address
confronting
and gainingin theprocessa deeperunderstanding
of and moralcommitmentto its goals. Then, eventually,"at thelevel of identity,"
theybegin
to " 'play at' and [to] grow morecomfortablewith the role of activists
themselves"(McAdam 1988, p. 51). Unlike many othernetworkanalysts,McAdam recognizesthatactorscan undergofar-reaching
processes
in thecourseoftheirinvolvements
in extraordinary
ofidentityformation
affairs.Such an insightis especiallyimportantto bear in mind when
activitiessuch as Freeanalyzingtheirparticipationin "high-risk/cost"
dom Summer-or, for that matter,in any major social or political
movement.
In a recentpublication,McAdam concludesthat"networktheoryfails
a convincing
to offera plausiblemodelofindividualactionand therefore
mechanismby whichinterpersonal
contactsand organizationalmemberships draw individualsinto activism"in the firstplace (Friedmanand
McAdam 1992, p. 160). Friedmanand McAdam claim insteadthatnetworktheorycan yieldrobustexplanationsof collectiveactiononlywhen
synthesizedwith a modifiedrationalchoice model of individualaction,
one that views collectiveidentities(and not just materialresources)as
potentiallypowerfulincentivesfor action: "One of the most powerful
motivatorsof individualaction," theywrite,"is the desire to confirm
throughbehavior a cherishedidentity.. . . Integrationinto [activist]
networksmakes it morelikelythattheindividualwill value theidentity
of 'activist' and choose to act in accordance with it" (Friedman and
McAdam 1992, pp. 169-70). It is our contentionthat the distinctive
contributionof McAdam's work is, indeed, to expand the conceptof
itselfto the pointof burstingthroughthe seams of
purposiverationality
1432

NetworkAnalysis
standardrationalchoicetheory.It is historicalactors'specifically
normativecommitments,
ratherthan(or in additionto) theirpursuitofmaterial
goals, thateffectively
drivestheirsocial movementparticipation.
If thereis a weaknessto McAdam's analysisof FreedomSummer,it
lies in his insufficient
attentionto preciselythis elementof normative
commitment
to cherishedideals. In one of theirarticlesFernandezand
McAdam (1988) notethatrecruitment
contexts,"theresidueof a protest
culture,"affected"thenumberand formof interactions
amongpotential
recruits,"and thereby"exert[ed]an importantinfluenceon all the processes involvedin . . . recruitment"
(Fernandezand McAdam 1988, p.
379). McAdam devotesseveralpassages in his book (althoughnot in his
articles)to explainingtheoriginsoftheserecruitment
contextson theeve
of FreedomSummer.He discusses,forexample,theroleofdemographic
and economicdevelopmentsin producinga youthcohortdrivenby an
exaggeratedsense of its own culturalimportanceand potencyand the
role of the liberalizationof domesticpoliticsunderthe leadershipof figures such as JohnF. Kennedyand MartinLutherKing, Jr. (McAdam
1988, pp. 13-24). And yetMcAdam stopsshortof providinga satisfacofAmericancultural(and polititoryaccountofhow establishedcurrents
cal) discoursewere selectivelydrawn upon by civil rightsleaders and
othersand refashionedinto a new and powerfuldefinition
of the situation.It was thecompellingnatureof thisculturaland politicaldefinition
thatdrewfreshrecruitsto thecivilrightscause in thefirstplace, and that
helpedto createthoseverynetworksthemselvesthatMcAdam regardsas
the startingpointof his analysis.McAdam mighthave provideda more
convincingaccountthanhe does oftheculturaland politicalidiomsofthe
day-not all of which,afterall, weresupportiveof racial equality-and
examinedhow and why certainof themcame to have such a powerful
resonanceforso manypeople,especiallyyoung,relativelyaffluent
college
students,preciselyat thatspecifichistoricaljuncture.
On theside ofpositionalanalysisusingblockmodeling
techniques,Padgettand Ansell's(1993) workon the FlorentineRenaissanceservesas a
usefulexampleofinnovativeresearchon networks,culture,and agency.
Padgettand Ansell employtwo importanttheoreticalideas to help explain theriseof theMedici familyin early15th-century
Florence:"structural channelingof learning"and "robust action." All of the major
figuresin theiraccount, theyargue, were highlyactive and dynamic
players.Cosimo de' Medici, forexample,steeredhis familyfroma positionofabject defeatin Florentinepoliticsto one ofnear-totalascendancy
duringa periodof no morethan 40 years. And yet,claim Padgettand
Ansell, Cosimo did not pursue fromstart to finishsome omniscient
"grandstrategy";rather,he shrewdlyand opportunistically
took advantage of the local "openings"that a successionof exogenouseventshad
1433

fortuitously
broughthis way. Specifically,the reconsolidation
strategies
of the oligarchsafterthe Ciompi uprisingof 1378 had leftopen several
important"structuralholes" in theirmarriagenetwork,one around the
Medici themselvesand anotherarounda different
segmentoftheoligarchic elitewhichwas based in the Santo Spiritoquarterof Florence.The
Medici learnedthatthe latter"breachin the oligarchs'defenses"could
be successfullyexploitedthrougha focusedmarriagestrategy.In addition, a "second structuralchain reaction"was made possible by the
fromthe nonpatriciannew men. This pattern,
oligarchs'self-enclosure
togetherwithneighborhood-based
policies oftax extractionduringa period of financialcrisiscaused by foreignwars, led to defensivealliances
of the new men firstwithone anotherin theirown neighborhoodsand
theneventuallywithlocal neighborhood
patronsamongtheelite-again,
the Medici themselves.Thus, "theMedici partygrewup . . . fromraw
channeledto them.... Only verylate
networkmaterialunintentionally
in thegame . . . did [theMedici]adaptivelylearnofthepoliticalpotential
In almostHegeofthesocial networkmachinethatlay at theirfingertips.
lian fashion,[the]oligarchscreatedthe networksof theirown destruction" (Padgettand Ansell 1993, p. 1287).
The Medici were able to exploitthe possibilitiesbroughttheirway
throughsuch processesof "networkcascading" by virtueof theirown
anomalous positionwithinthe overall Florentinenetwork.
structurally
Involved in several different
"games" at once-pursuing higherstatus
throughmarriagestrategiesand simultaneously
pursuingmonetarygain
and patronageinfluencethroughneighborhoodeconomiccontacts-the
Medici soughtaftera multiplicity
ofnotalwayscompatiblegoals. Having
such genuinelymultivocalinterests,they appeared inscrutablebefore
theirvariousfollowers(thenew menand patricians)and outmaneuvered
their"opponentsinto the forcedclarification
of their(but not [the Medici's])tacticallines of action"(Padgettand Ansell 1993, p. 1264). The
key to Cosimo de' Medici's styleof robust action, note Padgett and
Ansell,was "maintainingdiscretionary
optionsacross unforeseeablefuturesin the face of hostileattemptsby othersto narrowthoseoptions.
. . .Victory meanslockingin others,but notyourself[Cosimo],to goalorientedsequences of strategicplay that become predictablethereby"
(Padgett and Ansell 1993, pp. 1263-64). In this respect,Padgett and
Ansellecho Eric Leifer'sconceptionof"local action"as thosemovesthat
allow actorsin "face-to-face
competitionwith otherswho have similar
credentials. . . to avoid claiminga (global) role untilthereis evidence
[thatsuch a role] will be conferred"(Leifer1988, pp. 865, 866). They
echo as well Charles Tilly's conceptualizationof "contentiousaction,"
the resourcefulness
of individualsand groupswho "performin dramas
in whichtheyalreadyknowtheirapproximate
of contention]
[repertoires
1434

NetworkAnalysis
parts,[but]duringwhichtheynevertheless
improviseconstantly"(Tilly
1992, p. 15; 1986).
It is importanthere not to confusePadgett and Ansell's notion of
robustactionwithrationalchoiceconceptualizations
of instrumental
action. It is true, of course, that Padgett and Ansell themselvesspeak
repeatedlyoftheMedici's pursuitofmoney,status,and power. But they
also take special pains to point out that none of these ends of action
makesanysenseat all outsidethetermsoftheculturalcategories,values,
and beliefsprevailingin Florentineelitesocietyat thatparticularjunctureof history.Moreover,theyquite explicitlydistancethemselvesfrom
the Machiavellian presuppositions
of game theoryby emphasizingthe
"mutually adaptive learning processes" and "bounded rationality"
characteristicof elite conflicts,especially during "tumultuoustimes"
such as those of the Milan and Lucca wars (Padgettand Ansell 1993,
pp. 1301-2; see also Padgett 1986). During such momentsof "complicated chaos," theysuggest,"the games themselvesare all up forgrabs.
Rational choice requiresa commonmetricof utilityforfooting,but revealed preferences
(the basis forinferring
trade-offs
across goals/roles)
. . . are not really
only exist post hoc. . . . Clear goals of self-interest
featuresofpeople;theyare Florentine(and our)interpretations
ofvarying
of games" (Padgettand Ansell 1993, pp. 1307-8).
structures
If thereis a major deficiencyto the Padgettand Ansell account, it
lies elsewhere:in theirclosingdiscussionof the Medici party'sultimate
accessionto statepower.Padgettand Ansellfailto explainthereprecisely
why Cosimo de' Medici came in the end to be considerednothingless
than the "pater patriae," the fatherof his country,by so many of his
or why he was installedin power with the supportof
contemporaries
"those Florentineswho have remainedon the marginsof our account
thusfar-the politicalneutrals"(Padgettand Ansell 1993,p. 1308). The
key to the problem,suggestthe authors,is containedin "the cognitive
in control,they
category'oligarch.'. . . When the oligarchswere firmly
were not labeled 'oligarchs';theywere republican'public citizensof the
state.' Loss of legitimacyand Medici victoryare what got themtheir
and selflessin attribution,
pejorativetag. No longerpublic-spirited
they
in Florentineeyes" (Padgett and
came to epitomizeclass self-interest
Ansell 1993, p. 1308). It was when the rulingfamilies,squeezed by the
fiscalcrisisbroughton byforeignwars,in turnsoughtto repressthenew
men that theyearned the epithet"oligarchs."Clearly,this was a most
momentin thehistoryrecountedby Padgettand Ansell;withsignificant
out it, theMedici, despiteall of theirtacticalmaneuverings,
quite possibly would neverhave takenpowerat all. And yet,thiscrucialaspect of
thestory-the evidentsuccessoftheMedici in manipulating
towardtheir
own ends the very contentof such key termsas "public-spiritedness"
1435

and "self-interest"-isleftcompletelyout of the pictureuntilthe final
pages of the study.Moreover,the authorsneverprovidetheirreaders
with any analysis as to why such issues as public-spiritedness,
selfinterest,and corruption
mighthave had so muchmeaningforFlorentines
to begin with. Could the discursiveframeworkof civic republicanism
(Baron 1966; Pocock 1975), virtuallyunmentionedin this study,have
profitably
been broughtintothe storyat preciselythisjuncture?(Might
still other culturaland politicaldiscoursesalso prevalentduringthat
historicalperiodhave emphasizedsuchthemes?)It was civic republicanism,afterall-by itselfor, morelikely,in complexinteraction
withother
discursiveformations-thatmade possiblethat special combinationof
deep concernover social statusand hatredof class interest(as opposed
to civic virtue)that togetherallowed the Medici successfully
to engage
in robustactionin the firstplace and ultimately
to seize statepower.
RETHINKING THE PROBLEM OF AGENCY

Social Networksand CulturalNarratives
networkapproachesthat we
Clearly,then,none of the threedifferent
have been examiningoffersa completely
satisfactory
approachto historical explanation.Whileeach of thesethreemodelsdoes representa more
nuanced understandingof the complex interrelationships
among networks, culture,and agency than the one preceding,none completely
succeeds by itselfin addressingall of the difficult
issues at hand. The
modelof structuralist
forone, featuresa successionof netdeterminism,
work "snapshots"of social structure,while neglectingaltogetherthe
of symbolicand discursiveformationsand
potentialcausal significance
fewinsightsintotheconcretehistoricalmechanismsleadingfrom
offering
one such networkconfiguration
to another. Structuralistinstrumentalism,by contrast,clearlyacknowledgestheexplanatorysignificance
of
social action,but, on theotherhand, conceptualizesthedeterminants
of
such action in excessivelynarrowterms,oftenrelyingon unwarranted
assumptionsabout the overridingimportanceto historicalactors of
constructionism
afmoney,status,and power.And finally,structuralist
firmsthepossibilitythatactors'goals and aspirationsmightwell be complex, multivalent,and historically
determined;it inquires,forexample,
intosuch intricateprocessesas identity
conversion,structural
channeling
of learning,and flexibleopportunism.And yet not even this model, at
least as it has been elaboratedby networkanalyststo date, fullyrecognizesthe(potentially)
autonomouscausal significance
ofculturalor political discoursesin shapingthe complexeventsequencesthatit examines.
In recentyears, by far the mostsignificant
theoreticalsteps takenin
1436

NetworkAnalysis
the alternativedirectionthatwe are proposinghave been the important
writingsby HarrisonWhiteon identity,
temporality,
and narrative.Formerlya leading exponentof structuralist
determinism,
White has now
begun to argue that the interrelationships
among networkstructures,
culture,and agencythemselvesneed to be reconceptualized.In Identity
and Control(1992), he suggeststhat "agency is the dynamicface of
networks,"agency understoodnot only as a "by-productof control,"
but also as "ways of . . . upend[ing]institution[s]
and . . . initiat[ing]
freshaction" (White 1992, pp. 315, 245). Significantly-andperhaps
surprisingly,
givenhis earlieranticulturalist
bias-White includesa theoryof culturalsymbolsand discoursesin this new versionof his social
theory;he now takes discursive"narratives"and "stories"to be among
the key featuresof social life. "Social networks,"he asserts,"are phenomenologicalrealities,as well as measurementconstructs.Storiesdescribethe tiesin networks.. . A social networkis a networkof meanings" (White 1992, pp. 65, 67).
White'sdiverseconceptualizations
of "identity"play a prominentrole
in this new social networktheory."Identity,"claims White, signifies
"any source of action not explicablefrombiophysicalregularities,and
to which observerscan attributemeaning"(White 1992, p. 6). Four
distinctsenses or levels of identity"come wound togetherin the same
constructedreality."The firstof these is identityas a "primordialand
continuingurge" for "secure footing"in "an otherwisechaotic social
world." The second is identityas a "social face," the basis "for our
everydayconstructforthe person. . . as an actorin a role [supplying]
that may guide him or her toward goals, and into rational
preferences
The
and errorsacross different
action."
thirdis "identityfromfrictions
.
.
.
social settingsand disciplines
aris[ing]exactlyfromcontradictions
from
across disciplines,
mismatchesand social noise." And the fourthis
"identityas more-or-less
coherentaccounts,as biography. . . afterthe
in
fact as presented accountswhichmaybecomewovenintosomeunique
narrativestory"(White 1992, pp. 315, 312-14; emphasisadded).
Despite its obviousimportanceforsocial networktheory,what is perhaps moststrikingabout White'snew approachare two closelyrelated
omissions.First,Whiteneverexplainspreciselywhyactorsor identities
engage in these "contendingcontrolattempts"in the firstplace (as in
his remarkson the firstlevel of identity).It is clearlyinadequate to
explain away thesecontrolprojectssimplyas some ahistorical"primordial and continuingurge" for"securefooting."And second, White neglectsto analyze closelythe role of culturalidiomsand normativecommitmentsin helping to shape the very identitiesand aspirationsof
historicalactors.Indeed, he devotesverylittlespace at all to exploring
and patterning
ofthesesymbolicformations.
theinternalstructure
White
1437

begins his book by declaringthat he will be "focus[ing]. . . upon the
purelysocial" (1992, p. 14) as distinguished
fromtheculturallevel. This
is a "perilousundertaking,"
as he himselfclearlyrecognizes(White1992,
p. 14n.20). White accordinglyrelegates"narratives"and "stories"to a
secondarypositionin his theory,in favorof moresocial structuralpatternssuch as networksof social interaction(his second and thirdlevels
of identity,e.g., are both constitutedby actors' locations withinrole
structuresand disciplines).Ultimately,thesenarrativesand storiesfail
to receive,even in the fourthand finallevel of identity(constitutedby
"accounts . . . afterthe fact"),the sort of carefulanalyticalattention
thatWhiteaccordsto social networksthroughout.
It is our contentionhere, by contrast,that networks,culture,and
agency relate to one anotherin ways that not even White, nor even
the structuralist
constructionists
whom he mostcloselyresembles,have
on this crucial
adequatelyconceptualized.Let us not be misunderstood
point. White is certainlycorrectin assertingthat cultural(as well as
political) discourses do inform-and are deeply embedded withinnetworkpatternsof social relationships.Social networksare, indeed,
"phenomenologicalrealities,"as Whiteputs it-or "networksof meanwith and
ing." Culture and social relationsempiricallyinterpenetrate
mutuallyconditionone anotherso thoroughly
thatit is well-nighimpossible to conceiveof theone withouttheother.This is the respectin which
culturecan, indeed, be said to constitute,in Charles Tilly's felicitous
formulation,
nothingless than the very"sinews"of social reality.12
And yet thereis another-and itselfno less critical-sense in which
culturaldiscourses,narratives,and idiomsare also analyticallyautonoThese symmouswithrespectto networkpatternsofsocial relationships.
have emergentproperties-an internallogicand organibolicformations
zationoftheirown-that requirethattheybe conceptualizedas "cultural
structures"(Rambo and Chan 1990; Barber 1992) analyticallyseparate
fromsocial structure."3
noteJeffrey
Alex"When theyare interrelated,"
anderand PhilipSmith,"symbolsprovidea nonmaterialstructure.They
12 An important
illustration
ofthiscan be foundina recentarticlebyMargaretSomers
(1993)on thedevelopment
of citizenship
practicesin 18th-century
England.Somers
demonstrates
therehow different
typesofpoliticalculturewereembodiedin distinctive"relational
settings,"
or "patterned
matri[ces]
ofinstitutional
relationships
among
cultural,economic,social, and politicalpractices"(p. 595). Politicalculture-and
citizenshippracticesthemselves-hardly
stood apart frompatternsof familylife,
oflaw, governance,
and administrasocialgeography,
and "theinstitutional
dynamics
tive structure"
(p. 603). Citizenship,as Somerspointsout (following
Karl Polanyi
[1957]),is bestconceivedof as an "instituted
process."
13 One couldalternatively
use theterm"culturalframes"hereas well(see,e.g., Snow
et al. 1986; Snow and Benford1988;and the variousarticleson "collectiveaction
frames"in Morrisand Mueller[1992]).
1438

NetworkAnalysis
representa level of organizationthatpatternsactionas surelyas structuresof a more visible, materialkind" (Alexanderand Smith 1993, p.
156; emphasisadded). This is an insightthatgoes back at least as faras
the classical Parsoniandistinctionbetweenculturaland social systems
(Parsons and Shils 1951; see also Sorokin1947); indeed,it originatesin
thelaterDurkheim,who in his religioussociologywas thefirstto underscore the internallogic of systemsof symbolicclassification
(Durkheim
1965;Durkheimand Mauss 1963;Douglas 1966;Alexander1988b,1988c;
Kane 1991; P. Smith 1991; Alexander and Smith 1993; Emirbayer
1993).14 Those who, like Whitein his morerecentwork,stressthe utter
inseparability
of cultureand social structurecome close to denyingthis
all-important
theoreticalinsight.They veer offin the direction,in fact,
of what MargaretArcherhas termedthe fallacyof "centralconflation":
the assumptionthat because cultureand social structureare mutually
constitutive,
"thereis no way of 'untying'the constitutive
elements.The
intimacyof theirinterconnection
denies even relativeautonomyto the
componentsinvolved. . . . In the absence of any degreeof autonomyit
becomes impossibleto examine theirinterplay"(Archer1988, p. 80;
that
emphasisin original).15Examplesofculturalor discursivestructures
need to be analyzedinternally
(as well as in theirinterplaywithnetwork
structures)
includethe civic republicanismof Padgettand Ansell'sFlorence, the civil rightsdiscourseof FreedomSummer,and the socialism
and republicanpatriotismof the Paris Commune.
Recognitionof theanalyticalautonomyof culturalstructures
certainly
does not necessitatea returnto "values-based"sociology.We are not
speakinghereof mere"norms"and "values," as Parsonsand his followersdid, but ratherofmuchlargersymbolicformations
such as discursive
frameworks
and culturalidioms.(For a discussionofhow thisperspective
"value analysis,"see
pointswell beyondthe limitationsof functionalist
14 Another
approach,thatof "narrativeanalysis,"also inquiresintotheinnerlogic
ofculturalstructures.
See Steinmetz
(1992)and Somers(1992).As Steinmetz
summarizes it, thisapproachholds that"one . . . shouldpay special attentionto [such
elements
as] thecentralsubjectand actors,theformoftheplotand itsrelationto the
story,therulesforexcluding
eventsfromthenarration,
theturning
points,repetitions,
and 'filling
in.' One shouldask whether
a givenhistory
assumestheformofa complete
historical
narrative,
ofannals,orofchronicles.
Finally,oneshouldidentify
thenarrator,the actorsin the story,and theexplicitor implicitaudience"(Steinmetz1992,
with
p. 501). Such a programfornarrativeanalysisis notnecessarily
incompatible
late-Durkheimian
approachesto culturalinquiry.
15
White'sown workcan be said to vacillatebetweencentralconflation
and what
Archer(1988) terms"upwardconflation,"
which,like its counterpart,
"downward
she definesas a varietyof epiphenomenalism.
denotesfor
conflation,"
The former
Archeran analyticalprivileging
ofthesocialstructural
realm,whilethelatterentails
a reduction
to theculturaldomain.
1439

Alexanderand Smith[1993].) Nor do theseinsightsnecessarilylead in
the directionof a "reification"
of culture,a renderingof culturalframeworks as "concretesocial entities"with theirown appropriatesets of
institutions,rules, and resources.There is a significant
differencebetweenconceivingof culturalnarratives,idioms,and discoursesas symbolic patternspossessingtheirown autonomousinnerlogic, on the one
hand, and thinkingof themas substantively
distinct"domains"of social
life,on theother-surelya "fallacyofmisplacedconcreteness,"
in Alfred
NorthWhitehead'smemorablephrase(see Goodwin 1994). And finally,
in speakingofculturalstructures
we are notsimplyaddinganother"variable" to our complexexplanatoryequation,as ifculturewereitselfnothing morethana residualcategoryto be broughtin afterthefactin order
to completea task that social structuralanalysis alone had failed to
accomplish.(For two compellingcritiquesof the "variables" approach
in general,see Blumer1969, chap. 6; Abbott1992c.) The pointwe wish
to make is perhapsarticulatedbest by Theda Skocpol,who affirms
that
"it [does] makea difference
whichidiomor mixtureofidiomsis available
to be drawnupon bygivengroups.Indeed,theverydefinitions
ofgroups,
theirinterests,and theirrelationsto one anotherwill be influencedby
culturalidioms"(Skocpol 1985, p. 91; emphasisadded).
as ifthey
Whyis it so important,
then,to thinkofsymbolicformations
wereanalyticallyautonomousculturalstructures?
We proposethatthese
are significant
culturalformations
becausetheybothconstrainand enable
historicalactors,in muchthe same way as do networkstructures
themselves. Culturalstructuresconstrainactors,to begin with,by blocking
out certainpossibilitiesforaction,as, forexample,by rendering
it inconceivablefortheoligarchsof 15th-century
Florenceto have pursuedmarriage ties with nonpatriciannew men, even when it mighthave been
materiallyadvantageousforthemto do so. Eviatar Zerubavel(1991) has
referredto these cognitivecategorizationsphenomenologically
as "islands of meaning"-an interesting
analogue,certainly,to Ronald Burt's
(1992; and Padgettand Ansell'sown) conceptof "structural
holes." Cultural structuresalso constrainactors by preventingcertainarguments
frombeingarticulatedin publicdiscourseor,oncearticulated,frombeing
favorablyinterpreted
by othersor even understood(Swidler1987). It is
oftenunder theiraegis, moreover,that contendingsocial groupswage
their cultural and political battles. Each of these contendinggroups
"sketch[es]out a different
blueprintfroma commonset of [ideological]
principles,. . . out of the same terminology
and the same essentialset
of concepts"(Sewell 1985, pp. 74, 76; see also Sewell 1980; Skocpol
"In
1985, p. 89). Alexandertermsthis a contextof culturalrefraction:
this situationdifferent
interestshave been refractedthroughthe same
culturallens" (Alexander1988a, p. 155).
1440

NetworkAnalysis
But culturalformations
also enablehistoricalactorsin diversewaysforexample,by orderingtheirunderstandings
of thesocial worldand of
theiridentities,goals, and aspirations,and
themselves,by constructing
by renderingcertainissuessignificant
or salientand othersnot. (Indeed,
by constrainingactors' possibilities,these culturalformationsalready
"enable" them as well, since, as Niklas Luhmann [1982, 1990] has
pointedout, the "reductionof complexity"servespreciselyto enhance
the range of alternativesopen to individualand/orcollectiveactors.)'6
Symbolicpolaritiescrystallizewithinculturalstructures,
dividingsocial
and metaphysicalrealityinto such antitheticalcategoriesas "pure" and
''polluted,'""just" and "unjust,'" and "sacred" and "profane.'"Such
categoriesprovidethe groundworkfornormativeevaluationsas well as
forguidelinesforaction,as in the case of RenaissanceFlorence,where,
as we have seen, the decisive momentoccurredonlywhen the Medici
had succeededin becomingidentified
in the mindsof politicalneutrals
as "pure," "just," and "public-spirited,"
while the oligarchshad come
to be seen as exemplarsof political"impurity,"
"corruption,"
and "selfinterest."Under such circumstances,certainidentities,interests,and
coursesof actioncome to be morevalued thanothers,to thepointwhere
individualsand groupsoftenpreferto sacrificetheirown materialinterests out of a deep-seatedcommitment
towardthem,as in the cases not
only of the Medici's ascensionto power, but also of the English Civil
War, the Paris Commune,and the civil rightsstrugglein the United
States (see also Calhoun 1991). Strugglesto redefinethe culturaland
of such situations,and in so doingto identify
certain
symbolicdefinition
actors (and typesof action) with purityand sacralityand otherswith
impurityand pollution,constitute
one of themostimportantdimensions
of social conflict(see Emirbayer1992a; 1992b). PierreBourdieu'strenchant insightsinto the dynamicsof classificationstrugglesare helpful
here in bringingthese conflictsinto sharperfocus(Bourdieu 1984, pp.
466-84; Bourdieuand Wacquant 1992; see also Emirbayer1993).
Culturalstructures
and enablingof social
are, then,bothconstraining
action. They are also, in conclusion,multipleand interpenetrating.
As
cultural
idioms
and
deSkocpol puts it, "Multiple
coexist,
theyarise,
in temposthatneed to be exploredby intellectual
cline,and intermingle
and socioculturalhistorians"(Skocpol 1985, p. 91; emphasis added).
There has probablyneverbeen but one overarchingculturalidiom,narrative,or discourseoperativein anygivenhistoricalcontext.A fullexplorationof a case such as that of the rise of the Medici would thus have
to featurenot onlya carefulconsiderationof the internallogic of civic
16 We are grateful
to AnnMischeforthisobservation.
1441

republicanism,
but also an inquiryintootherpopularidiomsofthedayand of how these possiblyinteractedwith (or stood in tensiontoward)
civic republicanismitself.Social actors nearlyalways findthemselves
withina cultural"environment"
(more on this specificconceptbelow)
markedby a richpluralityof culturalformations;
while theremightin
certaincases be historicaljustification
forarguingthatone or anotherof
theseis primary,the questionitselfcan onlybe resolvedthroughcareful
empiricalinvestigation.
Human Agencyand Social Action
This last setofconsiderations
allowsus now to shiftourfocusofattention
away fromthe analyticalautonomyof culturalformations-themain
topicoftheprecedingsection-onto thequestionoftheirconcreteinterrelationshipwithother(network)structures
and withthesocial actorsthat
reproduceand transform
them. This lattertopic is surelyeverybit as
significant
as the former.For as Ann Swidlerhas pointedout, "It is ...
the concretesituationsin which . . . culturalmodels are enacted that
determinewhich take root and thrive,and which wither and die"
(Swidler1986,p. 280). Unfortunately,
many-if notmost-cultural sociologiststodayfailto addresssuchissues,or even engagethemin thefirst
place, at least in a systematicfashion.All too often,theytake cultural
as unproblematically
formations
reflecting
thebeliefsand assumptionsof
certaincategoriesof individuals,includingentiresocial classes, nations,
and even genders,withoutrecognizingthattheseformations
themselves
have a relationalcharacterand are groundedin specificconcretesettings.
There moreoverremainsthe questionas to how structures
of all types
-cultural as well as societal-interrelatewith social action itselfand
withthe verypotentialforhumanagency.These questionsrequirethat
we consider,in turn,the influencethatculturaland societalformations
have upon social actorsand thetransformative
impactthatsocial actors,
fortheirown part,have upon culturaland societalstructures.
thatWhiteand thestructuralist
constructionists
We beginbyaffirming
we have examinedare surelyon therighttrackin theircommonemphasis
upon the role of human agencyin history.Networkanalystssuch as
stressthevolitionalaspects
McAdam, Padgett,and Ansellquitecorrectly
of social life, the capacity of social actors to transformas well as to
reproducelong-standing
structures,
frameworks,
and networksof interaction.In thisessay,we ourselvesholdto sucha view. In ourunderstandas
ing, human agencysignifiesthatmomentof freedom-or of "effort,"
Talcott Parsonstermedit (1937)-that existsas an analyticaldimension
of all actual empiricalinstancesof social action. Human agency,as we
conceptualizeit, entailsthe capacityof sociallyembeddedactorsto ap1442

NetworkAnalysis
propriate,reproduce,and, potentially,
to innovateuponreceivedcultural
categoriesand conditionsof action in accordance with theirpersonal
and collectiveideals,interests,
and commitments
(Emirbayerand Mische
1994). We hope to have shownabove whya recognition
of thiscapacity
forhumanagencyis criticalto any adequate attemptat historicalexplanation.
in thisarticle
On the otherhand, it is also our implicitunderstanding
thatsuch a capacityforhumanagencydoes not-and shouldnot-mean
preciselythe same thingas "social action"per se. While the momentof
"effort"
or agencyis presentin all empiricalunitsof action,thisdimension mustbe understoodas an analyticalmomentonly.The "identificationof actorand agency,"writesJeffrey
Alexander,rendersone "guilty
of [thefallacyof]misplacedconcreteness.Ratherthanreplacingor reinterpreting
the familiardichotomybetweenactors and structures,[this]
identification
. . . actuallyreproducesit in anotherform.. . . Actorsper
se are much more than, and [simultaneously]
much less than, 'agents'
[alone]"(Alexander1992, pp. 1-2; see also Alexander1988a). Empirical
action,then,is multiplydetermined.It is not drivenexclusivelyby human agency, but ratheris deeply structuredas well by several other
"environments"
of action (to use Alexander'sterminology),
such as the
societal (network)and culturalenvironments.17
Each of these environmentsinterpenetrates
withand givesshape and directionto themoment
of human agencyitself.Any empiricalinstanceof action is structured
simultaneously
by thedynamicsof societalas well as culturalstructures,
even though-in principle,at least-it is nevercompletelydetermined
and structuredby them. Long beforeAlexander,Parsons had come to
thisverysame conclusionas well,bymeansofhis structural-functionalist
model and his celebrated"AGIL" schema (Parsons and Smelser 1956;
Parsons 1961). More recently,
JurgenHabermas, too, has reliedheavily
in his majorwork,The TheoryofCommuuponthisanalyticaldistinction
nicativeAction(1984-87).
Our aspirationhere is not to endorse any one of these particular
theoriesof social action unambiguously-certainlynot the structuralfunctionalism
of Parsons, for example, with its powerfulidealist and
consensualisttendencies.The fundamentalpointthatwe wish to make,
rather,is thatnetworkanalysiserrsseriouslyin ignoringthe conceptual
insightssharedby all of thesevarioustheories,in particularthe notion
withone anotherin all individthatagencyand structure
interpenetrate
environmentLike Parsonsand Sorokin,Alexanderalso speaksofa "personality"
an analyticalmove thatwe certainlyendorse,even thoughwe have not had the
opportunity
to discusspersonality
structures
in thisparticularcontext(see Smelser
1968;Chodorow1989;and Goodwin1992).
17
1443

ual units(as well as complexes)ofempiricalaction,and thatall historical
processesare structuredat least in part by culturaland politicaldiscourses, as well as by networksof social interaction.Earlier we had
quoted fromMargaretArcher,who called foran analysisof thecomplex
interaction(or "interplay")betweenculturaland social structuralformations. Here we suggestthat it is preciselythroughempiricalsocial acsituatedhistorand undertakenbyconcretely
tion-multiplydetermined,
ical actors-that these various analyticalenvironmentsrelate to one
of actionoughtneverto be reifiedas
another.The severalenvironments
as ifone ofthem(social
separate,concreteentities,muchlesshierarchized
than the others.
networks)were always morecausallysignificant
Two crucial implicationsfollowimmediatelyand directlyfromthese
remarks.One is the notionthathistoricalactors'veryidentities,goals,
and aspirationsare themselvesfundamentally
constructedphenomena.
articulatedin the classical socioThis is a pointperhapsmostforcefully
logical literatureby GeorgeHerbertMead (1962), who argued that the
mind and the social self-no less than societyitself-arise and are susand thatthehumansubjectmustbe regarded
tainedthroughinteraction,
as an ongoingdevelopmentalprocess. More recently,Craig Calhoun,
too, has suggestedthat identity"is not a static, preexistingcondition
that can be seen as exertinga causal influenceon collectiveaction; at
bothpersonaland collectivelevels,itis a changeableproductofcollective
action." In particular,identitycannotbe "adequatelycapturedby the
notionofinterest.Identityis a no morethanrelativelystableconstruction
in an ongoingprocess of social activity"(Calhoun 1991, pp. 59, 52).
Structuralist
constructionists
such as McAdam, Padgett,and AnselldeThe insightthat"riskyand unusual
velop thesepointsquite forcefully.
collectiveactionplaces one's identity
on thelinein an especiallypowerful
forexample,
way" (Calhoun 1991, p. 61) receivesstrongcorroboration,
in McAdam's argumentsabout processesof identityconversionin social
movements.And Padgettand Ansell'sperceptiveremarkconcerningthe
"varying structuresof games"-and thereforeof "goals of selfinterest"-duringtimesof "complicatedchaos" illustratesthis point as
well. Thereis simplyno suchthingas a prestructured
individualidentity;
both individualsand societiesare the productsand the contents-but
notthestartingpoints-of interaction."What is primaryis theintersubjective process"(Calhoun 1991, p. 59).
It is importantto notehere,incidentally,
thatindividualautonomyis
itselfa constructedphenomenon;that is, individualautonomyis only
of structures-societalas well as
made possibleby the sheermultiplicity
cultural-withinwhichsocial actorsare situatedat any givenmoment.
Not only is autonomylinkedto locationwithinoverlappingand intersectingnetworksof social ties, as Simmelpointedout long ago (1955,
1444

NetworkAnalysis
1971, chap.18; see also Coser 1975; Burt 1980b), but it is also made
possible by actors'locationamong a multiplicity
of culturalstructures,
such as idioms,discourses,and narratives.18
Of course,if culturaland societal(network)structuresshape actors,
in turn.Cultural
thenit is equallytruethatactorsshape thesestructures
and social structures
do not,in otherwords,bythemselvesbringaboutor
somehow"cause" historicalchange.Rather,it is theactionsof historical
conducivecircumsubjectsthatactually"reconfigure"
(givenhistorically
structures
ofaction,bothculturaland societal
stances)existing,long-term
(Sewell 1992b, p. 46). Hence the second implicationof our earlierremarks: namely,that for a more comprehensiveunderstandingof processes of change,it is necessaryto devotemoreattentionnotonlyto the
structural
levelsofcausation,butalso to thosemoreephemeraldynamics
of historical"events,"that"relativelyrare subclass of happenings"that
such structuresin "significant"
transform
ways (Sewell 1992b,p. 31).19
While structuralist
determinists
such as the earlyWhite(and Rosenthal
et al. 1985) neglectaltogetherthisdimensionof historicalevents,contingencies,and processesof social change in favorof static,side-by-side
structuralist
instrumentalists
are
comparisonsof networkconfigurations,
of human agency.
considerablymoresensitiveto the causal significance
It is the structuralist
constructionists,
however,such as McAdam and
his associatesand, especially,Padgettand Ansell,who mostsuccessfully
of explaincorporatethislevel of analysisintotheirexplicitframeworks
nation. Indeed, theirnotionsof "robustaction," "identityconversion,"
and "channelednetworkcascading" capturefar betterthan any other
networkconceptsthe inherentprocessualityand temporality-the"sequentialconnectednessand unfolding"(Griffin
1993,p. 1097)-of social
action (Ricoeur 1985; Abbott 1992b, 1992c; Sewell 1992c; Griffin1992;
Aminzade 1992). Togethertheyrevealmoreclearlythanever beforethe
extentto which, as Sewell has put it, "structures[findthemselves]at
risk,at least to some extent,in all of the social encounterstheyshape"
(Sewell 1992a, p. 20).
The mostfruitful
directionin whichnetworkanalysiscan now proceed
is thustowarda deeperexplorationofjust such analyticalthemes.Network analystswould do well, in our view, to thematizemoreexplicitly
thantheyhave theinherently
natureofindividualand collecconstructed
tive identities.They would do well also to thematizethe complexways
18 Here, too, thevariousstructures
of the"personality"
environment-andthe tensionsand contradictions
amongthem-mustbe noted,althoughonceagainit would
takeus too farafieldto discussthesestructures
at greaterlength.
19 For a provocative
and historically
grounded
discussion
of"theinteraction
ofsystem
and event,"see Sahlins(1981, 1991).
1445

in which actors' identitiesare culturallyand normatively,as well as
in otherwords,
societally,determined-theempiricalinterpenetration,
thatwe have been arguingmust
of those culturaland social structures
be carefullydistinguished
fromone anotheron an analyticalplane. And
the
finally,networkanalystswould do well to distinguishtheoretically
ordersoftemporality
and causationthatappear alreadyin their
different
deterstructural
historicalexplanations-theorders,thatis, oflong-term
mination,on the one hand, and of the dynamiceffortsand projectsof
historicalactors,on theother.It is onlyby takingthesevarioustheoretical notionsintoaccountthatnetworkanalystswill realizemostfullythe
considerableresearchpotentialthatalreadyinheresin theirtechniques,
view ofthesocial world.
and theirhighlydistinctive
theirmethodologies,
CONCLUSION
Despite thequantityand qualityofthescholarshipthatnetworkanalysis
has produced over the past 20 years, historicalsociologistsand social
to criticizeits fundatheoristshave failedto examineand systematically
The abstruseterminology
and statementaltheoreticalpresuppositions.
of-the-artmathematicalsophisticationof this unique approach to the
studyof social structureseem to have preventedmanyof these"outsiders" fromventuringanywherenear it. The resulthas been an unfortunate lack of dialogue amongnetworkanalysts,social theorists,and hisof theirrespective
toricalsociologists,and a consequentimpoverishment
domains of social inquiry.In networkterms,all threecamps have remained isolatedcliques separatedfromone anotherby structuralholes,
diswithunbridgeablesubculturalstylesand mutuallyincomprehensible
courses. By examiningand criticizingthe theoreticalpresuppositions
of networkanalysis,we have triedto provide some sort of a link-a
"weak" tie, so to speak-between thesevariouscamps, and therebyto
renderthis approach more accessibleto sociologistsin a wide range of
fields.
We have shown how networkanalysis, despite its forbiddingselfpresentation,
actuallyproceedsfroma fewspecific,simple,and elegant
Its principalachievement,we have argued,
theoreticalpresuppositions.
of the ema merelymetaphoricalunderstanding
has been to transform
intoa moreprebeddednessof actorsin networksof social relationships
cise and usable toolforsocial analysis.We have also suggested,however,
that despiteits powerfulconceptualizationof social structure,network
analysisas it has been developedto date has inadequatelytheorizedthe
causal role of ideals, beliefs,and values, and of the actorsthatstriveto
realize them;as a result,it has neglectedthe culturaland symbolicmomentin the verydetermination
of social action. Networkanalysisgains
1446

NetworkAnalysis
its purchaseupon social structure
onlyat the considerablecost of losing
its conceptualgrasp upon culture,agency,and process. It providesa
useful set of tools forinvestigating
the patternedrelationshipsamong
historicalactors.These tools,however,by themselvesfail ultimatelyto
make sense of the mechanismsthroughwhich these relationshipsare
reproducedor reconfigured
over time. Our own positionis that a truly
synthetic
accountof social processesand transformations
thattakes into
considerationnot onlystructuralbut also culturaland discursivefactors
will necessarilyentaila fullerconceptionof social actionthan has been
providedthusfarby networkanalysts.
APPENDIX
A ShortGlossaryof NetworkAnalysisTerms
The followingdefinitions
are meantto orientthe generalreaderto the
basic termsof networkanalysisas well as to conveythe way in which
certainmore generalsociologicalconceptshave been "translated"into
theseterms.
Actor.-A person,group,organization,
thing,event,and so on, linked
to othersin a network.This is sometimesreferred
to as a "node."
tie.-A relationwhose form,content,or bothis different
Asymmetric
forthe linkedactors.See also symmetric
tie.
Block.-A setofstructurally
equivalentactorsin a multiplexnetwork.
See also multiplexnetworkand structuralequivalence.
Blockmodeling.-A technique for findingor "partitioning"(and
graphicallyrepresenting)
structurally
equivalentactors(or blocks) in a
network.
thepopulationof actors
Boundaryproblem.-The problemofdefining
in
to be studiedthroughnetworkanalysis a way whichdoes not depend
on a prioricategories;in otherwords,theproblemofdelimiting
thestudy
of social networkswhichin realitymay have no limits.
-A sociallycohesiveset of strucCatnet(fromcategoryand network).
turallyequivalentactorshypothesizedas moreable and likelyto share
ideas or a commoncultureand to engagein collectiveactionthan other
sortsof real or latentgroups.See also social cohesion.
Centrality.-The numberof an actor'stiesto others,weightedby the
numberof the latter'sties to others.
Clique.-A group of actors in which each is directlyand strongly
linkedto all of the others.Comparesocial circle.
Content.-The specificnatureor typeof relationlinkingactorsin a
network(e.g., exchange,kinship,communicative,
affective,instrumental, or powerrelations).
1447

Density.-The ratio of actual relationsor ties among a set of actors
in a networkand the maximumpossiblenumberof ties.
Distance.-A functionof the numberand strength
of social tiesseparatingtwo actors.
Dualism.-The idea that the natureof groupsis determinedby the
intersection
of the actorswithinthem(i.e., by the actionsof theirmemof
bers),and thatthe natureof actorsis determinedby the intersection
groups"within"them(i.e., by theirgroupaffiliations).
Egocentricnetwork.-An actor (sometimescalled the "anchorage"),
the actors with which it has relation,and the relationsamong those
actors. This is sometimesreferred
to as a "personalnetwork."
Form.-The formalpropertiesof the relationsamongactorsin a network(e.g., strength
or weakness,density,symmetry
or asymmetry).
-A networkwith two or moretypesof relations
Multiplexnetwork.
in a marketor commulinkingactors(e.g., exchangeand communication
nicativeand affectivetiesin a clique).
Network.
-The set of social relationsor social ties among a set of
actors(and the actorsthemselvesthuslinked).
Networkstructure.-The patterningof relationsand "holes" among
actorsin a network.See also structuralholes.
Position.-A set of structurally
equivalent actors or nodes (e.g., a
block).
Positional approach.-An analysisthat focuseson the patterningof
structurally
equivalent relationsamong actors. See also relationalapproach.
Range.-The numberof an actor'sties to others.See also centrality.
Relational approach.-An analysisthat focuseson patterningof sociallycohesiverelationsamongactors.See also positionalapproach.
Role.-The patternof relationsof a set of structurally
equivalent
actors(i.e., a block) to otherblocks.
Simultaneity,the principleof. The idea that all positionsand roles
(see above) are determinedrelativeto one anotherand thus cannot be
assumed or alteredindependently
of one another.
Social circle.-A groupin which each actor is directlyand strongly
linkedto most(e.g., 80%), but not necessarilyall, others.This is sometimescalled a "social cluster."Compare clique.
Social cohesion.-The presenceof a dense networkof strongties
among a set of actors.See also clique and social circle.
Social structure.-The persistingpatternof ties among actors;more
a network(microstructure)
or thenetworkofnetworks(macspecifically,
rostructure).
Strengthof ties.-The relativefrequency,duration,emotionalinten1448

NetworkAnalysis
sity,reciprocalexchange,and so on whichcharacterizea giventie or set
of ties.
Structuralequivalence.-The sharing,by a set of two or moreactors
who are not necessarilylinkedthemselves,of equivalentrelationsto a
thirdactor.
Structuralhole.-The absenceofa relationamongactorsin a network
(a crucialelementof networkstructure).
Symmetric
tie.-A relationwhoseformand/orcontentis thesame for
the linkedactors.See also asymmetric
tie.
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Network Analysis, Culture, and the Problem of Agency

Author(s): Mustafa Emirbayer and Jeff Goodwin

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NetworkAnalysis,Culture, and the

AJS Volume 99 Number6 (May 1994): 1411-54

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ANALYZING SOCIAL NETWORKS

The Priorityof Relationsover Categories

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. The end result[was]

recent writer,Margaret Somers (1993), prefersthe term "relational setting."

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RETHINKING THE PROBLEM OF AGENCY

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